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Strategic Futures Planning:

A Guide for Public


Sector Organisations
By Ben Ramalingam and Harry Jones
Contents
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................vii

About the authors ....................................................................................................................vii

Executive summary ...................................................................................................................ix

Part I: Futures and Scenario Planning

Chapter 1: Introduction.............................................................................................................1
What is futures planning? ....................................................................................................1
The rise of futures and scenario planning in society ...............................................................1
The rise of futures planning in corporations: Shell International...............................................2
The rise of futures in public sector organisations and government ...........................................3
Why is futures planning important?.......................................................................................5

Chapter 2: Scope and stages of organisational future projects .....................................................9


Breadth and complexity .......................................................................................................9
Different modes of thinking ................................................................................................10
Stages and framework .......................................................................................................11

Chapter 3: Choosing futures methodologies .............................................................................15


The importance of methods ...............................................................................................15
Matching approaches........................................................................................................15
Choosing methodologies based on outcomes .....................................................................15
Choosing methodologies based on objectives .....................................................................16
Choosing methodologies based on information needs .........................................................16
Combining approaches .....................................................................................................17

Chapter 4: Specific methods....................................................................................................19


Scenarios..........................................................................................................................19
Environmental scanning/horizon scanning...........................................................................20
Trend and driver analysis ...................................................................................................21
Visioning ..........................................................................................................................22
Backcasting ......................................................................................................................23
Simulation/gaming ............................................................................................................24
Delphi technique ...............................................................................................................25
Cross-impact analysis ........................................................................................................26
Roadmaps ........................................................................................................................27
Wild cards ........................................................................................................................27
Causal Layered Analysis (CLA)............................................................................................28
Morphological analysis ......................................................................................................28

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Contents Strategic Futures Planning

Chapter 5: Good practices and common problems...................................................................31


Clarifying objectives, limitations and timeframes of futures work............................................31
Positioning and involvement in an organisational context .....................................................33

Part II: Case Studies

Case study one: Limits to growth..............................................................................................37


The 30-Year Update ..........................................................................................................37
WORLD3..........................................................................................................................38
The driving force: Exponential growth .................................................................................39
The limits..........................................................................................................................40
Nonrenewable resources ...................................................................................................41
Physical capital .................................................................................................................41
The scenarios....................................................................................................................42
Transitions to a sustainable world .......................................................................................43
Suggested guidelines .........................................................................................................46

Case study two: The Mont Fleur scenarios ................................................................................47


Context and participants ....................................................................................................47
Summary of the scenarios ..................................................................................................47
What the project was and was not......................................................................................48
Results from the project......................................................................................................49
Why the project produced these results ...............................................................................50
What scenarios mean ........................................................................................................51
Conditions necessary for a successful scenario effort............................................................51
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................52

Case study three: Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2 2006............................................................53


Key UK trends: 2001-2006................................................................................................53

Case study four: The Scottish Futures Forum .............................................................................57


Introduction ......................................................................................................................57
The future lecture series .....................................................................................................57
The ‘positive ageing’ project ..............................................................................................59
Public policy debate ..........................................................................................................61
Planned projects................................................................................................................62

Case study five: EC Scenarios Europe 2010 .............................................................................63


Triumphant markets ...........................................................................................................63
Shared responsibilities .......................................................................................................63
Creative societies ..............................................................................................................64
Turbulent neighbourhoods .................................................................................................64
Methodology ....................................................................................................................64
Two stages: partial (theme specific) scenarios and global scenarios .......................................65
Production of partial scenarios ...........................................................................................65
Production of global scenarios ...........................................................................................68

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Strategic Futures Planning Contents

Case study six: The LGA Futures Toolkit ...................................................................................71


The origins of Futureswork .................................................................................................71

Case study seven: The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios..............................................77


Introduction ......................................................................................................................77
Why socio-economic scenarios are required for climate change impact assessment ...............78
Approach adopted for the UKCIP socio-economic scenarios.................................................78
Development of the UKCIP SES ..........................................................................................79
Four futures scenarios........................................................................................................80
Initial operationalisation within UKCIP.................................................................................82

Case study eight: Foresight Futures 2020 .................................................................................83


Overview of the scenarios..................................................................................................83
Why use futures scenarios? ................................................................................................85
How can the Foresight Futures 2020 scenarios be used? .....................................................87
Five keys to successful use of scenarios ...............................................................................89

Index .....................................................................................................................................93

v
Acknowledgements

Special thanks to all those whose work has been used as a case study in this report: the Club of
Rome think tank; Adam Kahane, Mont Fleur facilitator; the UK Cabinet Office; Scottish Futures
Forum; the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission; the UK’s Local Government
Association, the UK Climate Impacts Programme in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs, and the Foresight programme managed by the Office of Science and Technology.

About the authors

Ben Ramalingam is a member of the Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) Programme at
the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London. He provides strategic advice and support to a
wide range of international development and humanitarian agencies, from United Nations
international agencies to local civil society organisations. Email: b.ramalingam@odi.org.uk

Harry Jones is a research associate working with the Research and Policy in Development
Programme. As well as the present study, he has done work for ODI on the complexity theory and
international development, with Plan International on disaster risk reduction and for IDRC on the
Outcome Mapping methodology. Email: h.jones@odi.org.uk

vii
Executive summary

S trategic futures planning is an


anticipatory discipline that supports and
complements organisational planning and
in the Australian state of New South Wales,
and the Scottish Parliament’s Scottish
Futures Forum. The groundbreaking work of
policy-making processes. The success of recognised futures planning and scenario
organisations such as Shell and of broad experts and institutions have informed and
ranging initiatives such as the Limits to strengthened the report. These include
Growth study has contributed to futures individuals such as Pierre Wack, formerly of
approaches being adopted in many different Shell Plc, Andy Hines, formerly of Dow
settings and in many different kinds of Chemical Company, and organisations such
organisations, including those in the public as the Henley Management Centre and the
and not-for-profit sector. There is now an Global Business Network.
increasing amount of work being Part I of the report covers the origins
undertaken by public organisations on where strategic futures work came from, why
futures issues. In a 2004 speech to civil it is important, how to do it, and the useful
servants, the then UK prime minister Tony methods that could be considered.
Blair made explicit links between policy Chapter One looks at the origins of
making and futures approaches: strategic futures planning, drawing on
examples from outside the public sector such
“Strategic policy making is a professional as Shell’s groundbreaking use of scenarios in
discipline in itself involving serious analysis the 1970s. The chapter also explains how
of the current state of affairs, scanning futures work is taking on growing importance
future trends and seeking out developments for public sector organisations, and
elsewhere to generate options; and then concludes with a four part rationale of the
thinking through rigorously the steps it value of futures thinking.
would take to get from here to there.” Chapter Two explains how
organisational futures projects need to be
The report aims to provide managers, carefully positioned in terms of their scope
planners and strategists in public sector and their ambitions, and the need to clarify
organisations with more information about from the outset the kind of futures project
futures planning efforts, why they are useful, that should be used, depending on context
and what needs to be considered in putting and the available resources. The chapter
together a futures initiative. It brings moves on to cover the key stages that
together practical examples from a range of futures projects should cover, and provides
efforts, including the Club of Rome’s Limits an initial insight into the different tools and
to Growth work in the 1960s which methodologies that can be utilised.
identified the global challenges facing Chapter Three goes into more detail
human development, the Mont Fleur process about the different strategic futures tools and
which steered South Africa out of apartheid methodologies, using powerful examples
and into democracy, health planning futures from the UK government’s Foresight Unit to

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Executive summary Strategic Futures Planning

clarify what tools are most appropriate for Impacts Programme in DEFRA, and the
different kinds of projects. The chapter Foresight programme managed by the
provides a range of ways in which futures Office of Science and Technology.
tools might be selected, ranging from the
hoped-for outcomes, the kind of analysis
that would be most credible and useful, and
the kind of thinking processes that would be
most appropriate. The chapter ends with a
summary of ways in which different tools can
be used in combination to strengthen the
overall futures process.
Chapter Four provides practical insights
on specific methodologies, ranging from
scenarios and visions – the most famous
and widely used futures tools – to less well
known methods but equally powerful tools
such as Delphi and Backcasting.
Chapter Five provides information about
the common problems faced by
organisations trying to implement futures
projects, and provides useful tips and tricks
on issues as where to position futures
groups within organisations, the appropriate
timeframe to look into the future, and how
to broaden ownership of futures projects.
Part II is made up of a number of case
studies of the use of futures planning in
leading public sector bodies and
organisations. These were drawn from
publicly available information about high
profile exercises, and cover methods such as
scenario planning and trend analysis on
different issues. They include futures
initiatives that are wide-ranging, including
an update to the Limits to Growth study, to
more specific initiatives such as the UK
Climate Change Impacts programme.
Specific case studies are drawn from the
following organisations: the Club of Rome
think tank; the South African Mont Fleur
process; the UK Cabinet Office; Scottish
Futures Forum; the European Commission’s
Forward Studies Unit; the UK’s Local
Government Association, the UK Climate

x
Part I:
Futures and Scenario Planning
Chapter 1: Introduction
What is futures planning? What should we want the future to be?1
Thinking about and planning for the future
has been an inherent part of human activity The philosophy behind futures approaches is
since the beginning of civilisation. summed up in the following quote from the
Traditionally, the most common way of Institute of Alternate Futures:
looking into the future was through the
many different forms of divination, the “…trends, scenarios, visions and strategies
practice of attempting to discover the future are an integral part of most decision-
though eliciting a divine response. Today, making… Their power to make decision-
they seem somewhat far-fetched and making ‘wise’ comes when they are made
included examining the configurations of explicit and consciously shared to provoke
animal organs and observing the patterns thought, stimulate imagination, clarify
that fire makes as it burns. options, and move people to take action…”
Since World War II there has been a
growing use of a rather more pragmatic and In order to understand the potential and
rational set of tools called ‘futures methods’ value of futures planning for the public
which attempt to demystify the future in a sector, it is worth exploring a little more of
systematic and creative manner. The the history behind it.
movement has led to a number of methods
– the most famous of which are scenarios. The rise of futures and
Futures experts have also worked to test and scenario planning in society
probe the plausibility of results through It is difficult, if not impossible, to exactly
discussion and debate. By contrast with their pinpoint the emergence of a new way of
historical roots, modern futures approaches thinking. As already noted, futures has roots
are based on being systematic, rational and which stretch back to antiquity. However, there
explicit about how organisations and is general agreement that the attempt to
individuals think about the future. This anticipate future trends and events through
involves asking questions such as: systematic methods was developed in the
United States during and after World War II.
What procedures do we use when we Techniques such as scenario-based planning
think about the future? which were used by the US military in war
How do we prepare to carry out our games crossed into the corporate world and
plans and projects? public sector bodies through the work of the
What makes us successful in shaping or world famous think-tank, RAND Corporation.
adapting to the coming future? Having developed out of a military project,
At any given time, what alternative RAND’s futures work focused initially on the
courses of action are open to us? future of military technology, strategy and
What will be the future consequences operations, a growing concern given the onset
of choosing to do one thing rather of the Cold War. However, the scope soon
than others? broadened to include non-military projects.

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Chapter 1 Strategic Futures Planning

The 1950s also saw a growing movement with the Limits to Growth report, the
in Europe focused on the scientific and seeds were being sown for one of the first,
political aspects of futures planning. This and almost certainly the most famous,
period saw the set up of the Centre D’études applications of futures planning in the
Prospectives (Centre for Prospective Studies) context of a specific organisation with Shell
and the International Futuribles Association in International2. The Shell system of scenario
Paris, which still acts as a clearing house for planning emerged because of the need for
research on the future. Meanwhile, the ‘managerial assumption-smashing’. As one
Science Policy Research Unit in the UK of the originators, Pierre Wack, put it:
pioneered futures research by presenting
critiques of global models of the future as well “...it [was] extremely difficult for managers to
as attempting to create a theory of futures break out of their worldview while operating
research. In the former Eastern Bloc states, within it. When they are committed to a
‘prognostics’ was considered a crucial process certain way of framing an issue, it is difficult
preceding the formulation of a plan, for them to see solutions that lie outside this
consisting of the analysis of scientific and framework. By presenting other ways of
technological process and the consequences seeing the world, decision scenarios allow
this may have for social progress. The late managers to break out of a one-eyed view.
1960s saw the founding of the World Future Scenarios give managers something very
Society (WFS) in the US, whose mandate was precious: the ability to re-perceive reality...”
to which investigate how ‘social, economic
and technological developments were shaping In the early days of their work with
the future’ and ‘to help individuals, scenarios, Shell planners developed
organisations, and communities observe, scenarios which simply quantified alternative
understand, and respond to social change outcomes of key uncertainties. For example,
appropriately and effectively applying the price of oil could be $20 a barrel in
anticipatory thinking practices’. At the same a given year, or it could be $40. Such
time, the World Futures Studies Federation scenarios were not particularly useful for
was set up in Europe to promote futures long-term planning and decision-making,
education and research. as they provided only a set of plausible
In 1968 the Club of Rome was initiated, a alternatives, with no reasons, justifications or
think tank which sprang to global prominence assumptions, thereby offering no basis on
with its project The Predicament of Mankind which managers could exercise judgment.
published in 1972 under the title Limits To Such scenarios resembled the straight-line
Growth. Limits to Growth, which modelled the forecasting that Shell and other companies
consequences of a rapidly growing world had engaged in for years and were
population and finite natural resources, increasingly rejected as inadequate for the
stimulated debate worldwide about the future complexities of the modern world.
of the planet and the human population. The Shell planning team, inspired in part
by wider societal initiatives such as the Club
The rise of futures planning in of Rome, started to work with the idea that
corporations: Shell International there were a range of driving forces which
Around the same time that the Club of impacted upon their work, which included
Rome was capturing global imaginations but went beyond industry dynamics to

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Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 1

include social, technological, economic, the dramatic rise in oil prices than many of
environmental and political factors (see its competitors. It catapulted from being the
Figure 1). seventh to the second biggest oil company
The Shell planners started to focus the in the world3.
development of scenarios around better
understanding these broad drivers, and The rise of futures in public sector
creatively weaving future ‘stories’ built on this organisations and government
new understanding. The early 1970s saw a The success of Shell and the impact of the
period of recession in the oil industry because 1960s initiatives have led to futures
of low prices resulting from an oil surplus planning and scenarios being adopted in
after the development of huge fields in the many different kinds of organisations and
Middle East. This led Shell planners, already settings, including the public and not-for-
obsessing about the key factors which might profit sector. But it is important to note that
shape their future, to look at the world from the use of futures approaches by public
the perspectives of Middle Eastern oil organisations is somewhat different to its
producing nations, and think through use in corporations. As a recent House of
different scenarios of how the decisions of this Commons review has put it:
group of nations might shape the world.
These scenarios were presented to senior “In the private sector, strategy is defined (by
management in 1972, and led the leaders the consultants McKinsey & Company) as ‘a
of Shell to realise that business-as-usual coherent and evolving portfolio of initiatives
mentalities were blinding them to the to drive shareholder value and long-term
inevitability of the coming changes. As a performance’. In the public sector, however,
result, during the 1970s, Shell was better strategy is concerned with long-term public
positioned to handle the oil embargo and value, a complex and contested concept.
Accountability is to Parliament and the
public rather than to shareholders.”
Contextual
environment Despite this, there is undoubted potential for
Working application of futures approaches in the
environment realm of society and politics. This was
powerfully demonstrated to the world in
Your early 1990s South Africa. As the Global
organisation Business Network has described it:
or issue

“In South Africa in 1991, a diverse group of


Constituencies
Driving forces Customers South African leaders – community activists,
Social
Technological
Communities politicians, unionists, academics,
Partners
Economic Driving forces Regulation economists, and business leaders – used
Environmental
Political scenario thinking as a way to envision paths
to democracy as the country transitioned out
of apartheid. Each resulting scenario
described a very different outcome of the
Figure 1: Drivers of the future political negotiations that were then

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Chapter 1 Strategic Futures Planning

underway. One scenario, which the group throughout South Africa, and became an
called Ostrich, told of what would happen if instrumental common language that helped
the negotiations were to break down facilitate public debate in the transition to
between the apartheid government and democracy. FW de Klerk was famously quoted
Nelson Mandela’s African National in the press as saying “I am not an Ostrich!”
Congress [burying head in the sand]. There is now a huge amount of work
Another scenario, Lame Duck, foresaw a being undertaken by public organisations on
world in which a prolonged transition futures issues. Many public sector futures
left the government weak and unable to initiatives are regional and sector specific
satisfy all interests. A third scenario, Icarus, such as the state-specific health futures
described a South Africa in which the ANC project in Australia illustrated in Figure 2.
came to power and its massive public Other public sector futures initiatives
spending resulted in an economic crash. have taken a global perspective on a
The fourth scenario, Flight of the Flamingos, particular issue. Perhaps the most
described how the apartheid government, famous recent example is the Stern
the ANC, and their respective constituencies Review of Climate Change, which has
might slowly and steadily rise together4.” re-shaped the way in which policy
makers and the public think about
These scenarios, known as the Mont Fleur the economics of climate change and
scenarios, were subsequently shared widely its impact on the world.

FUTURES PLANNING PROJECT


28 April 2005  Identify key issues and trends which will have greatest
Roundtable impact on health and health care over the next 20 years
 Identify uncertainties in relation to trends
 Suggest draft operating principals to guide future action

18 July 2005
Futures Forum  Clarify values relating to health and health care
 For key issues and trends, identify those matters requiring priority
attention and action over the next 20 years
 Test and refine operating principals which will guide necessary
action on key issues over the long-term

Undertake state-wide consultation process to finalise the Future


May-July 2006 Consultation Document Directions for the NSW public health system. The Future Directions
and Consultation process will identify priority areas for action and guide decision-making
over the long-term.

Use the Future Directions as a framework to develop a high


level corporate strategic plan for the NSW public health system
outlining strategic directions and service development priorities
October 2006 STATE HEALTH PLAN for the next 5 years (2006-210).

In Australia, the New South Wales Health Futures Planning Project in is the government's response to recommen-
dations for a longer term planning framework for health and health care in NSW. Clarity about the future direc-
tions for the New South Wales health care system will help ensure that the system continues to meet patient and
community needs over the next 15 to 20 years. While planning for this timeframe in a rapidly changing world
presents a challenge, it also provides a unique opportunity for the community and health care personnel to work
with government to shape the future of the health system.

Figure 2. State-specific health futures project in Australia

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Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 1

Finally, there are a number of wide- organisational environments are increasingly


ranging, multi-sectoral futures initiatives, characterised by levels of unpredictability,
which involve actively engaging the whole of surprise and discontinuities. Against this
government in futures thinking. In Finland, for background, one leading thinker has
example, the government produces a report developed a four-part rationale for the
on a futures topic once every electoral cycle, adoption of futures thinking:
which is considered a dedicated Parliament’s
Committee of the Future. The government’s Rationale 1: Decisions have
most recent report for the 2003–2007 long-tterm consequences
electoral period was on the theme A Good What we do now will have many future
Society for People of All Ages and looked at consequences, direct and indirect,
demographic trends, population policy and foreseen and unforeseen. In one way or
preparation for changes in the age structure. another policy and strategy decisions
A similar initiative was undertaken by the made today will shape the landscape of
Scottish Parliament, and the recent House of tomorrow. A policy put in place to address
Commons review of the role of futures in the some problem could be ineffectual,
UK government has recommended that the leading to a worsening of the problem,
UK parliament set up a Parliamentary Forum could solve the immediate problem but
for the Future5. have longer-term side effects bringing up
a new set of issues, or could successfully
Why is futures planning important? negotiate the difficulties and ensure a
The very notion of planning and strategising better future for the organisation.
in organisations is based upon the idea that We see examples of this in the case
the future is unpredictable, with only some studies in the latter half of this report. In
aspects that can be foreseen. If the future Limits to Growth – the 30-year update it is
was entirely predictable, then the course of argued that humanity is currently in the
events would be completely determined in process of ‘overshooting’ the capacity of
advance, and planning would make no earth, and policy decisions made by
difference. On the other hand, if no aspects national governments in the present day
of the future were foreseeable then setting could on the one hand lead to industrial
out plans and strategies would be futile or decline, food shortages, high death rates
even counterproductive, as there is no way and low quality of life, if current policy
of knowing in advance what course of trends continue, or on the other hand a
action will be most appropriate. As one sustained effort to decrease mankind’s
commentator, JC Glenn, puts it: ecological footprint through lowering
pollution and controlling birth rates could
“You cannot know the future, but a range of result in a sustainable society.
possible futures can be known…Gradations of In the Mont Fleur scenarios it was argued
foreknowledge and probabilities can be made; that South Africa’s policy decisions made in
we can be more certain about the sunrise than the 1990s had the potential to continue
about the rise of the stock market6.” crises and negotiations, lead to an
incapacitated government, produce collapse
The insight from JC Glenn above is echoed through over-ambitious policies, or lead to a
by those who observe that modern sustainable, inclusive democracy and growth.

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Chapter 1 Strategic Futures Planning

Rationale 2: Future alternatives imply decide how to act in the present in order to
present choices bring these goals about.
These possible long-term impacts need to The UK Climate Impacts Scenarios case
be considered in weighing up present-day study in Part II provides an interesting
policy decisions. Although decisions are illustration of how present day policy makers
always constrained in some ways, must consider possible future implications of
individuals and groups do have the capacity climate change. For example, it identifies the
to explore and choose between the need for present-day housing policy to
possible options for their decisions. Being incorporate an understanding of potential
more aware of the alternative courses that flood plains to ensure sustainable
future events may take as a result of a developments are undertaken. In addition,
policy decision gives a greater the UK Cabinet Office Trends initiative in the
understanding of the nature of those options case studies section highlights issues such as
that must be weighed up, as well as demographics, which should be taken into
potentially illuminating new options or account when present-day decisions are
possibilities that could have preferable long- made on a range of subjects, including
term consequences. pensions, benefits, taxation and so on.
Many things take time to create or set in
motion, so it is wise to be mindful in Rationale 3: Forward thinking is preferable
advance. The rationale for the health futures to crisis management
project mentioned earlier is as follows: Crises are frequently expensive and wasteful,
as it is likely to be more costly to reverse a
“We cannot expect the nature of health downward trend after it has begun rather
services in 2023 to be an image of those in than to prevent it in the first place. In many
2003 simply adjusted for population growth. cases the effects of a lack of forward thinking
There is little doubt that the health services in may be disastrous. As the Stern Review on
2023 will be as different from those in 2003 climate change puts it: “The scientific
as today's services are different from those of evidence is now overwhelming: climate
1983… Just as there will be increasing change is a serious global threat, and it
demands on the health system driven by demands an urgent global response7.”
demographic and societal factors, the way in The report stated that, if no action is
which the system delivers health care is more taken today, the overall costs and risks of
than likely to further change… The system climate change will be equivalent to losing
must be capable now to meet future pressures at least 5% of global GDP each year, now
while being sufficiently flexible to meet and forever, which could rise to 20% of
changing health structures and protocols.” GDP or more. In contrast, it suggests that
the costs of action if taken now could be
Looking at this from another angle it is clear limited to around one per cent of global
that you need to know where you would GDP each year. Similarly, the Limits to
prefer to end up in the future, or how you Growth case study shows that a massive loss
would prefer the future to pan out, in order of life and dip in wellbeing may result from
to know how to act in the present. If it is not policies focusing on short term issues and
clear where an organisation aims to be in only reacting to matters once they are crises.
the future, then it is difficult for members to In some environments an organisation

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Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 1

may never be given a chance to recover suggests, the possible changes over the next
from being slow to react to changing century are probably as great as those
circumstances. It is therefore preferable to which have occurred over the previous
take a strategic view, exploring options and millennium. Such turbulence and dynamic
alternatives, and anticipating eventualities change dramatically increases the value of
and preparing for contingencies. Forward futures thinking. As Glenn puts it:
thinking allows an organisation to
understand what can be done today to “The increasing complexity and acceleration
prepare for an uncertain future, and allow of change decreases the lead-time for
them to rehearse potential strategies. decisions and makes previous expectations
The Singapore government’s Scenario less reliable. Forecasting increases lead-time
Planning office explains these benefits: between potential events and current
planning. Hence, the faster pace and
“It approximates to a strategic fire-drill. We complexity of change today increases the
learn to be forward thinking by ‘living in the value of futures thinking, because it
future’, whilst positioning ourselves to react increases time and space for analysis to
to change quickly and nimbly8.” create more intelligent decisions.”

In the case studies, the Mont Fleur process There are a number of benefits of strategic
identified a range of scenarios which futures work that serve to improve an
highlights the importance of forward organisation’s likelihood of better dealing
thinking. This was embodied in the ‘Icarus’ with the future. Without strategic futures
scenario in which short-term thinking and work, forward planning thinking within an
policy making could have led to economic organisation may go on in an ad-hoc
and social collapse for the new regime in manner, at a superficial level, or be
South Africa. discouraged or subsumed by organisational
practices. ‘Group-think’ and similar
Rationale 4: Further transformations are processes can lead to organisations that
certain to occur never question their underlying assumptions
Change is incessant, and inevitable. Various about the future. In addition, conventional
technological advances have resulted in short-term planning processes can often
people and societies being increasingly reinforce existing thinking, as organisations
interdependent; as Nobel Peace Prize-winner seek out justifications based on existing
Joseph Rotblat puts it: knowledge, behaviours and trends rather
than using wider frames of reference. These
“The fantastic progress in communication can cause an organisation to be inflexible
and transportation has transformed the and unreceptive to changing circumstances,
world into an intimately interconnected which will lead to it being highly vulnerable
community, in which all members depend in times of turbulence.
on one another for their wellbeing9.” Futures approaches can help address
these problems. Through ensuring that an
This combination of factors leaves organisation thinks more explicitly, deeply
organisations and individuals facing and systematically about the future it is
accelerating change. As one thinker possible to question the received wisdom,

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Chapter 1 Strategic Futures Planning

unpicking the assumptions that lie beneath


current dominant views and encouraging
receptivity to new thinking. It allows
organisations to better understand what they
know and don’t know but need to know,
better identify upcoming opportunities and
threats, and focus on the difficult questions
that must be addressed in order to make
more intelligent decisions and design better
policy and strategy.
The more that organisations gain insight
into the possible future ramifications of
present-day decisions, the greater part they
can play in determining the course of their
future. The following chapters explain more
about how to determine the scope of futures
projects, provide an overview of futures
methods, and demonstrates good and bad
practices to watch out for.

References
1. Bell, Foundations for Futures Studies.
2. The Art of the Long View, By Peter Schwartz,
1991, and Strategic Planning in Shell Pierre
Wack, Shell International Petroleum Company
Limited, Group Planning, 1986.
3. A fuller account is at:
http://www.davisfloyd.com/userfiles/Storying%20
Corporate%20Futures.pdf
4. Sourced from: http://www.gbn.com
5. Governing the Future, House of Commons
Public Administration Select Committee, 2007
accessible via: http://www.publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubadm/12
3/123i.pdf
6. JC Glenn, Futures Research Methodology v2.0.
7. HM Treasury, The Stern Review of the Economics
of Climate Change, October 2006, pvi.
8. Henley Centre – Understanding Best Practice in
Strategic Futures Work.
9. J.Rotblat, in Urry (2003).

8
Chapter 2: Scope and stages of
organisational future projects
Breadth and complexity end, futures projects take into account a
In order to carry out futures work effectively number of drivers simultaneously, exploring
within public sector organisations, or indeed how they might affect each other and
any organisations, it is vital to consider and patterns of interaction that shape the future.
clarify the intended scope of the project. The levels of resources available play an
Futures analysis can be very broad, drawing important role in determining the scope of
on work from a wide range of drivers, and the project. The linear approach would
applying a number of different frameworks allow experts in various fields to be
and perspectives. On the other hand, it can consulted on an individual basis. By
also be more specific, focusing on how a contrast, a more complex approach could
narrow set of issues might play out, or on require considerable in-depth analysis after
specific factors that are particularly relevant the collection of a range of views, bringing
for a particular organisation or decision. together experts from different fields in order
What is feasible and what is needed is to take a more integrated and multi-
dependent on the context and the resources disciplinary approach to a problem.
available. Importantly, the broader the There is good reason to believe that in
analyses, the more important it is to bring in many areas a more complex view would be
a number of different organisations or more likely to bring valuable and useful
experts to contribute, and consequently the insights2. A benchmarking of futures
greater resources required. organisations undertaken by the UK’s
One of the best examples of wide Henley Centre found that ‘almost all’
ranging futures work is that undertaken by the appear to take a multidimensional, complex
Club of Rome think tank, which aims to approach, even where the topic of concern
address ‘the complex set of the most crucial is quite a specific one3. For example, the
problems – political, social, economic, International Institute for Strategic Studies, a
technological, environmental, psychological military think-tank, brought together business
and cultural – facing humanity1.’ Many people, journalists, academics and
government initiatives also undertake wide- government officials in examining the issue
ranging analysis, such as the Norwegian of ‘Scarcity and Conflict’. The project
government’s Norway 2030 project, which is attempted to identify relationships between a
intended to inform the work of all range of key social, economic and political
government departments, and which involves drivers, rather than extrapolating from
participation of 15 separate departments. military trends.
It is also important to consider the The Henley Centre4 best practice report
degree of complexity of the futures analysis proposes that futures work should involve an
which will be undertaken. At one end of the iterative ‘journey’ through the steps shown in
spectrum, futures work can take a fairly Figure 1. This shows that the most effective
linear approach, examining drivers and futures efforts incorporate both specific and
trends (for example, healthcare, transport, more general and wide-ranging
crime, environment) in isolation. At the other approaches, and should also move

9
Chapter 2 Strategic Futures Planning

the organisation deploys a


Complex
number of techniques to
IV. Futures III. Futures group ensure that the strategic
work feeds builds bigger
into specific picture futures thinking is applied to
thinking,
tested with the organisation’s practice.
audiences
Effective futures processes
Specific Wide should continue through this
V. Apply ranging loop on an ongoing basis5.
thinking to
specific organisation II. Making the
practice and organisation
policymaking ‘future-ready’ This journey can be seen in
the European Commission’s
Simple Europe 2010 Scenarios
Figure 1. The iterative futures journey
case study. After the question
was agreed, the drivers were
between simple and more complex views identified (Stage II), their inter-relations were
of the future. analysed (Stage III) and five specific scenarios
for the European Commission were formed
I. Agree question In the bottom left-hand (Stage IV), which were used to shape decision-
corner, the organisation decides that it making (Stage V).
needs a wider view of the world – either
to improve its overall perspective or to Different modes of thinking
achieve a better resolution for a Strategic futures methods can be also
particular problem or issue – and agrees characterised as spanning a spectrum from
a key question. the highly analytical to the highly creative.
II. Making the organisation ‘future- For example, trend analysis and simulation
ready’ The organisation makes itself are in many ways more ‘hard’ analytical
ready for a futures approach, winning tools while visioning and horizon-scanning
acceptance from senior managers and can involve more creative approaches.
people at multiple levels within the Another way of understanding the ends of
organisation that a more strategic this spectrum is seeing it as characterised by
approach is required to the future. the differences between qualitative and
III. Futures group builds bigger picture A quantitative approaches, with some projects
futures group applies itself to the work, using statistical and econometric models as
engaging the organisation as it goes. the best way to forecast the future, while other
IV. Futures work feeds into specific projects build on the awareness and insights
thinking, tested with audiences Futures of unexpected drivers and possible events.
thinking is then applied to the specific Two different types of reasoning of
issues faced by the organisation to build reasoning may be involved. Convergent
a new strategic view. This process can be thinking is about problem solving, bringing
slow, and it can depend on the success a variety of material to bear in order to
of the methods to make the organisation find a ‘correct’ answer, using description,
future-ready in Stage II. observation, and deduction. Divergent
V. Apply thinking to specific organisation thinking is related to the creative
practice and policymaking In this stage, elaboration of ideas prompted by an

10
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 2

initial stimulus. Futures planning


methods can be designed to foster
‘blue sky’ thinking, or they can be
designed to foster rigorous and more
analytical thinking.
Sense that the future is predictable
It has been remarked that futures
practitioners can often be split Analytical Creative
between those who favour one
Sense of ‘multiple futures’
approach or the other. The analytical
side tends towards a belief that
knowledge of the future can be tied
down given appropriate levels of
analysis, while the creative tend to 6.

feel comfortable with the sense of


multiple possible futures. The diagram In this framework, the first phase involves
below looks at balancing analytical and convergent thinking while phases two, three
creative approaches. and four involve both convergent and
JS Iversen suggests that good futures
7
divergent approaches.
work should involve a mix of these J Voros also emphasises the importance
approaches. As he puts it: of a coherent foresight framework to
ensure futures work brings together the
“Good future study design must balance the various types of reasoning that are
divergent and convergent processes in order necessary, and feeds effectively into
to facilitate a process where the use of two organisational strategy. This involves seeing
different ways of thinking produces a result four key elements of the process: inputs,
which is explanatory and creative and foresight work, outputs, and strategy.
rooted in facts, numbers, and explicitly
stated rational assumptions.” Inputs: this is the gathering of information
and scanning for strategic intelligence.
Stages and framework It could involve many tools and techniques,
Due to this need to balance different modes such as environmental scanning and the
of thinking, and assessing matters with Delphi technique, and could include various
different levels of scope and complexity, it is workshop formats such as brainstorming in
important to use a range of methods in order to open out the thinking about the
futures work. Iverson argues that it is useful near future. These tools are covered in more
to think of futures work as consisting of the detail in Chapter Three.
following four phases:
Foresight work: can be conceived as
1. Mapping and delineation comprising three broad steps:
of subject matter.
2. Identification of critical issues Analysis: the sort of question asked here
and trends. is what seems to be happening? The
3. Assessments of trends. aim is to make a first attempt at finding
4. Use. patterns in the variety of data which the

11
Chapter 2 Strategic Futures Planning

Key questions Useful methodologies

Inputs Delphi

“What seems to
Analysis be happening?”
Trends analysis, cross-impact analysis

Foresight
Interpretation “What’s really
happening?”
Causal layered analysis

Prospection “What might happen?” Scenarios, visioning, backcasting

“What might we Reports, presentations,


Outputs need to do?” publications, roadmaps

Strategy development
“What will we do?”
and strategic planning;
“How will we do it?” Individual, workgroup, organisation,
society, etc.

Strategy

The four elements of futures projects8

Inputs step usually generates. Common as inputs into more formal strategy work.
tools used here are trend analysis and The essence of this step is captured by
cross-impact analysis. the question what might we need to do?
Interpretation: this stage looks to The aim is to expand the perception of
probe beneath the surface, to ask strategic options. There are two types
the question what’s really happening? of output – tangible, which would include
This can be performed using tools the actual range of options produced
such as causal layered analysis and by the work, and intangible, which
systems thinking. would include changes in thinking
Prospection: this is an activity of brought about by the process of
creating forward views, where various foresight. Methods employed here
views of alternative futures are explicitly could include workshops, reports,
examined or created. The question multimedia, etc.
being asked is what might happen?
Useful tools at this stage are scenarios, Strategy: this is where the results of
visioning, and backcasting. foresight are passed to those making
strategic decisions, in order to help
Outputs: the focus here is communicating direct implementation. The kind of
the generated insights, and the stimulation question answered here is what will we do?
of thinking about options, prior to and and how will we do it?

12
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 2

References
1. Club of Rome, in the Henley Centre
Benchmarking UK Strategic Futures Work (2001).
2. The Implications of Complexity Theory for
International Development, H. Jones B.
Ramalingam and T. Reba, ODI (2007).
3. The Henley Centre Benchmarking UK Strategic
Futures Work (2001).
4. The Henley Centre Understanding Best Practice
in Strategic Futures Work (2001).
5. ibid
6. The Henley Centre Benchmarking UK Strategic
Futures Work (2001).
7. Futures thinking methodologies – options relevant
for ‘schooling for tomorrow’, JS Iverson, Danish
Technolgical Institute.
8. Foresight Framework all from J Voros (2005) A
Generic Foresight Process Framework.

13
Chapter 3: Choosing futures methodologies
The importance of methods “Let us assume you are standing on the
As outlined earlier, it is important that bridge of a ship. You scan the horizon
futures work produces useful outcomes that (horizon scanning) and see an iceberg and
can properly inform the strategy and policy your supply ship. You work out the likely
of an organisation. But how you get there – speeds and directions of the iceberg and
the methods chosen – are crucial to the supply ship (trend analysis) and put the
success of the exercise. information into the ship’s computer
It is important to understand the (modelling) and then plot a course
role that different tools can play and (roadmapping) so that you meet with the
the way that available tools might fit in supply ship and not the iceberg. While you
with various objectives. This will help are doing this you daydream of eating
ensure that the futures work being some nice chocolate that you hope is on
carried out is relevant. By being clear the supply ship (visioning).
and explicit about which methods are You realise that the speeds and
used and why, there is greater likelihood directions of the iceberg and supply ship
that the futures project will gain trust, might change, so you work out a range of
demonstrate openness, and win enthusiasm possible options to make sure you have the
of participants. greatest chance of meeting the supply ship
The following analogy from the UK (scenarios). Even with all of this planning,
government’s Office of Science and you know there is a chance of the
Innovation gives a simple yet powerful unexpected and hitting the iceberg so you
introduction to some of the key get the crew to do an evacuation drill
futures methodologies. (gaming). While they are doing it, you work
back from the most likely
Objectives future position of the supply
Suitable methods ship to work out the steps you
need to get there
(backcasting)1.”
Horizon scanning
Looking for challenges and
Delphi
opportunities Matching approaches
Trend/driver analysis
In order to effectively develop
a process to explore the
Scenarios Assessing social, political and future, it is important to match
Visioning economic contexts the tools used to the project’s
objectives, outcomes and
Roadmaps information needs. We look at
Defining ideal actions
Backcasting each of these in turn below.

Models Choosing methodologies


To explore future options based on outcomes
Simulations/gaming
It is important to consider the
Table 1. Choosing methods based on objectives project outcomes that are

15
Chapter 3 Strategic Futures Planning

Choosing methodolo-
Method Quantitative Qualitative gies based
on objectives
Casual layered The project objectives are
X
analysis
usually described in terms of
Cross-impact analysis X the key questions the project
Modelling X is seeking to inform. It is
Delphi techniques X vital to make sure that every
Econometrics and stream of work in the project
X
statistical modelling reflects these questions,
Horizon scanning X because this will make it
Futures wheel X much easier to ensure that
Visioning X all relevant aspects are
Road mapping X covered, and make it easier
to draw together the various
Scenarios X
elements into one coherent
Simulation, gaming X
output. Typical objectives
Trend analysis X
might be to:
Table 2. The information base of different methods
look for challenges
desired from the futures project. These are and opportunities;
the broader goals to which the futures assess social, political and
project should contribute. Clarity on the economic contexts;
hoped-for outcomes will also help highlight define ideal actions;
the stakeholders who are most relevant to explore future options.
the project.
Typical outcomes might be normative Table 1 shows a useful framework
or exploratory: which matches specific methods to
different kinds of objectives, and how to
Normative: improved institutions’ combine approaches.
strategic preparedness for key external
trends and shocks, by informing present- Choosing methodologies based on
day decision-making. information needs
Exploratory: broaden the organisational It is important to consider what sort of
horizons through improved ‘blue information is likely to be of most use for the
sky’ thinking. project’s stakeholders, and/or what type of
analysis and evidence they are likely to find
For example, the Limits to Growth case most credible. For example, the American
study reflects a more normative outcome organisation Resources for the Future bases
in that it looks to recommend actions to its futures work on economic models and
bring about preferred futures, while the highly quantitative approaches, driven by
Cabinet Office Trends case study the principle that these kinds of information
demonstrates a more exploratory and will carry more weight within the US
open-ended outcome. executive bodies2.

16
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 3

Typical information
considerations
might include:

Quantitative and qualitative


information – what balance
to strike?
Different kinds of analysis –
how to use and combine to
best effect?
What kind of timeline is
being explored, for
example, five to ten years,
30 years+, etc?
Figure 1. Connections and dependencies between methods
Based around the quantitative
and qualitative distinction, the categorisation
in Table 2 (opposite) can be used.
For example, the Mont Fleur Scenarios
case study highlights a number of
qualitative, narrative-based scenarios, the
aim of which was to inform and mobilise
many different stakeholders across South
African society. By contrast, the Foresight
Futures 2020 Scenarios case study
demonstrates a more detailed and in-depth
analysis intended to be used by specialists
and senior executives making decisions
about strategic issues.

Combining approaches
The OST provide a useful approach for
combining the different futures methodolo-
gies, based on a number of dependencies
between approaches and a number of
optional connections. These are
demonstrated in Figure 1 above.

References
1. Office of Science and Innovation, Strategic
Futures Planning: Suggestions for success: A
toolkit, www.foresight.gov.uk
2. Understanding Best Practice.

17
Chapter 4: Specific methods
Scenarios 6. Develop the scenarios: often done in the
A scenario is a detailed picture of a form of narratives that represent a
plausible future world, which describes the plausible sequence of events.
future conditions in a way which allows the 7. Impact analyses: analyse the impact of
planner to comprehend the possible the scenarios on the key concerns with
problems, challenges and opportunities which the process began.
that it would present. The term was 8. Policy implications: analyse the
introduced by Herman Kahn in connection implications for policy and identify
with strategic studies carried out by the indicators that will help monitor changes
RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 60s, as they occur.
and transferred into corporate use in the
70s as companies such as Shell used Scenarios are used to encompass a broad
scenario planning to anticipate possible span of possible futures, to ensure that plans
future events and react quickly to could cope with many eventualities, and will
changing circumstances. be robust under the many different ways in
There are a number of different which the future could pan out. In this way, a
methods for constructing scenarios. scenario is not intended as a specific forecast,
Schwarts offers several steps required in but rather varieties of scenarios outline various
their development1: possibilities for alternative futures, constructing
a ‘possibility space’ in which the future is likely
1. The setting: what are the central to unfold2. Thus, a good scenario should not
concerns, the key issues, of the users of only be plausible, internally consistent, and
the scenarios? anchored in clear purposes and assumptions,
2. Identify the drivers: identify the driving but also concise and creative, providing real
forces that are likely to have the most alternatives for the future which can be useful
important influences on these central to decision-makers.
concerns of the future. Scenarios can be developed through
3. Analyse the drivers: where can the long and intricate processes, or in
drivers be reasonably predicted, what is abbreviated workshops, and anything in
known and unknown, the trends and the between. This depends on their intended use
trend breaks? and the various resource constraints, for
4. Assessment of the importance and the example, scenarios developed from scratch
uncertainty of the drivers: identify two or in a four-hour workshop can be used
three critical factors of the central primarily to give a group experience of the
themes of the scenarios. process rather than providing concrete
5. Select the scenario logics: inputs into policy.
construct the main themes or The types of question being answered
assumptions around which the through the scenario process can be
scenarios are to be built. It is important categorised in the following way3:
to end up with a few scenarios
whose differences are relevant for Predictive scenarios: aim to answer the
decision-makers. question what will happen? in two

19
Chapter 4 Strategic Futures Planning

possible ways – forecasts respond to the action of ‘watching and collecting


question what will happen, on the information on a company’s rivals and the
condition that the likely development overall market4’. Brown and Weiner explain
unfolds? while what-if scenarios respond that it should be seen as a ‘kind of radar to
to the question what will happen, on the scan the world systematically and signal the
condition of some specified events? new, the unexpected, the major and the
Explorative scenarios: respond to the minor5’. It is a process that aims to provide
question what can happen? in two ways early warning to managers, a system to
– external scenarios examines the organise the information flow about various
development of external factors, and trends and events that may be significant for
strategic scenarios look at what can an organisation.
happen if the organisation acts in a It can be carried out using a number of
certain way. techniques. One approach is the use of
Normative scenarios: look at how expert panels, which provide observations
a specific target can be reached, with and judgements about important
two angles – preserving scenarios developments that are underway or
examine how the target can be reached expected. As with Delphi, the value of this
through adjustments to the current ‘look out’ panel will depend on the
situation, and transforming scenarios knowledge and cooperation of the
look at how an answer can be reached panellists, so it is essential to give much
when the prevailing structure blocks the consideration to choosing participants who
necessary changes. have the required level of expertise and are
likely to contribute valuable ideas. A second
The benefit of scenario planning is to give a approach, suggested by Glenn, is to use a
balanced evaluation of the range of computerised online literature review. This
strategies that may be required by an involves searching through online databases
organisation, offering signposts and using carefully selected search terms in
indicating possible paths to alternative order to uncover information that may
futures. However, difficulties may arise in provide clues to important future trends.
convincing decision-makers to incorporate Thirdly, a hard-copy literature review can be
the results into their ways of thinking. Also, carried out, and a fourth approach is to
because they are based on qualitative commission a number of essays on
analysis they are not necessarily particularly emerging issues by experts.
precise instruments, and are dependent on P. Terry6 argues that there are three areas
the level of creativity, imagination and of focus for environmental scanning:
rigorous thinking that go into them.
For examples of the use of scenarios, 1. the first is the immediate environment of
see the case studies in Part II. current concern to the organisation;
2. the second is the probable environment
Environmental scanning/ not of immediate concern to the
horizon scanning organisation but likely to be in the future;
Environmental scanning was a term coined 3. the third is the possible environment,
in the 1960s by Harvard Business School ‘weaker signals’ that may become very
professor Francis Aguilar to describe the serious issues or disappear.

20
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 4

This can have two aspects: the societal or Quantitative trend analysis involves
‘general’ environment, and the task or analysing historical data using statistical
‘specific’ environment. Clearly the boundary models or other such analytical tools in
between these two is not clear-cut or static. order to fit a curve to the data which can be
There are a number of ways that extrapolated into the future. Tools suitable
organisations can integrate environmental for this task include time series forecasts,
scanning. Passive scanning is ongoing, trend extrapolations, S-curve analyses, cycle
which will usually involve ad hoc activity, analyses and long-waves analyses.
and employees simply ‘bearing in mind’ Since these approaches are based on
the need to keep an eye on the data, they are best suited to fields where there
environment, almost at a subconscious are large and reliable data collections. Their
level. Active scanning involves a much benefits lie in the high degree of objectivity in
higher level of attention, and involves the method, the ease of communicating their
explicit and systematic activities. use and their being relatively inexpensive to
In addition to this, Terry argues that perform. On the downside (except in highly
organisations can perform such scanning stable systems) it is often quite unlikely that the
in irregular, regular and continuous modes. future will turn out to run as such a simple
Irregular involves a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ to extrapolation of the past, so they serve best as
an unanticipated occurrence; regular a useful starting point for futures discussions.
involves periodic reflection often on This aspect can be missed, and the data is
specified issues, whereas continuous often taken as an unquestionable prediction
scanning is the ongoing monitoring of of the future.
various environmental systems rather than Trend Impact Analysis (TIA) is a method
specific events. that improves on quantitative trend analyses.
The downside is that environmental TIA uses extrapolations of historical trends
scanning is ‘an imperfect activity7’, and can combined with and modified by expectations
not achieve total objectivity. Scanners are about possible future events. An analyst
faced with various decisions about what to interested in tracking a particular trend can
focus on, what material to include, and are systematically examine the effects of possible
typically influenced by their overall world view future events, including technological,
that will favour some factors over others. political, social and economic changes.
The ten challenges to local TIA involves two main steps8:
government, in the Local Government
Futures case study in Part II, are a useful 1. a curve is fitted to historical data to
example of an environmental/horizon calculate the future trend, given no
scanning approach. unprecedented future events; and
2. expert judgements are used to identify a
Trend and driver analysis set of future events that, if they were to
The terms trend analysis, quantitative trend occur, could cause deviations from the
analysis, driver analysis, qualitative trend extrapolation of historical data. For each
analysis, and trend impact analysis mark out such event, experts judge the probability
a set of techniques which are used for of occurrence, possible time that the
spotting emerging patterns in historical data trend will take to be affected, and
and examining where they may lead. expected impact.

21
Chapter 4 Strategic Futures Planning

Step one provides a forecast for a ‘surprise- the whole system involved. However, they
free’ future, just as with quantitative trend are unavoidably limited by the personal
analyses, but then judgement and views and assumptions of those people
imagination are needed to identify potential carrying them out, and it can often be
significant events and their impact. These difficult to identify how many different trends
events can be identified using a number of may pan out – whether something is a short-
methods, such as literature reviews or a term fad or a major long-term shift.
Delphi study. For a concrete example of trend
TIA offers clear advantages over analysis, see the Cabinet Office Key Trends
straightforward trend analysis, adding more case study in Part II.
depth and realism to forecasts. Criticisms
levelled at the technique focus on the fact Visioning
that the list of possible events and their The creation of a vision of the future that an
potential impact is inevitably incomplete, organisation would like to see is an essential
and can be affected by certain assumptions element of normative forecasting. It involves
about the future. asking the question how would we like the
Qualitative trend analysis can be seen future to evolve? in a systematic,
as more of a matter of interpretation and an comprehensive manner in order to help
‘art form’ compared to the relatively answer the wider question of what should
technical exercises of quantitative trend we do now? Contemporary normative
analyses9. They involve spotting traces and forecasting had its origins in World War II
clues about the future, and looking at how with the military need for goal and mission-
these trends and their consequences may oriented planning, and has since been used
affect the system being investigated. in many large public and private
Qualitative trend analysis can be used in organisations. The conclusions and
all areas, but are often most useful to use in suggested guidelines in the Limits to Growth
situations of considerable change, where case study in Part II are a powerful example
quantitative analysis may be inappropriate. of visioning.
Coates10 identifies fours steps for performing The creation of a vision is important
qualitative trend analysis: because it provides a focus, purpose and
direction for the planning process. This
1. develop a conceptual framework of the provides a normative base against which
forces at play; other goals, objectives, strategies and projects
2. look for theoretical constructs that shed can be judged – it is impossible to know
light on these forces, and identify what is how to act today if we do not know where
known and unknown about them; we want to be tomorrow. The vision expresses
3. seek out any relevant information; and, the goals that the organisation is striving
4. derive an alternative future implied by towards, which can help with the planning of
the examination of that system. various activities by providing a ‘big picture’
that they should fit into. This also has the
Qualitative trend analyses can give insights effect of bringing the members of the
into possible future scenarios that may not organisation together through underlining the
be possible to get from other techniques, part they are each playing in bringing about
and may bring a greater understanding of these overall aims.

22
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 4

Visioning is best undertaken when what futures are likely to happen, but with
informed with a variety of exploratory how desirable futures can be attained. It is
forecasts, and analysis of the ways the future thus explicitly normative, involving working
might pan out. As such, it is best used as part backwards from a particular desirable future
of a wider foresight process. There are many end-point to the present in order to
possible techniques for producing a vision, but determine the physical feasibility of that
the most common are various survey future and what policy measures would be
techniques: visions can be formulated through required to reach that point.”
conducting in-depth interviews with people
both inside and outside the organisation, The activity follows the formulation of an
through holding meetings and workshops with image or several images of a desirable
them, or through the Delphi technique. future (such as a vision or normative
The vision statement produced can feed scenarios). The task of backcasting is then to
into the strategic planning process. It is assess how this future can be achieved,
worth noting that visions can often be easily asking questions such as what are the
confused with mission statements and resources to help one get there? what is the
strategic plans. They are interrelated, but the state of society that would allow one to
following questions may serve to help move in that direction?, and then what
distinguish them: mission statement – why plans and policies can we put in place to
do we exist now?; vision statement – where work towards this? Futurologists tend to
should we be headed?; strategic plan – define backcasting as an approach rather
how do we plan to get there?11. than a method, it can be carried out
It is acknowledged that normative through a variety of techniques such as
forecasting is ‘indispensable’ to planning in expert panels, Delphi techniques, and
large organisations12. However, there is participatory processes.
significant danger in performing the Dreborg16 argues that the following
visioning activity badly. Whereas a well characteristics favour backcasting:
formed vision statement can have the power
to motivate and align efforts, visions formed when the problem to be studied is
through processes not carrying out the complex, affecting many sectors and
necessary analysis, or taking too narrow a levels of society;
view, can produce nothing but ‘a piece of when there is a need for major
paper that everyone subsequently ignores’13. change, such as when marginal
changes within the prevailing order
Backcasting will not be sufficient;
Backcasting is the process of planning from when the dominant trends are part of
a desirable future outcome. It has its origin the problem – these trends are often the
in the 1970s, when Amory Lovins proposed cornerstone of forecast;
it as an alternative technique for electricity when the problem to a great extent is a
supply and demand14. The actual term was matter of externalities, which the market
coined by Robinson, who defined it as15: cannot treat satisfactorily; and
when the time horizon is long enough
“The major distinguishing characteristic of to allow considerable scope for
backcasting analysis is a concern, not with deliberate choice.

23
Chapter 4 Strategic Futures Planning

Clearly the usefulness of backcasting although notoriously difficult to define, tends


depends greatly on the quality of the future to place a player (a person, an organisation,
visions or scenarios which are worked back a team, or even a device) in a structure of
from, as well as the judgements about the objectives or competition with other players,
steps required to reach that future state. standards, and so on. So, for instance, a
Therefore, it is important to incorporate would-be pilot might be asked to perform
diverse perspectives, and knowledgeable aerobatic tasks in a flight simulator, a disaster
participants. Backcasting is used in the management team might have to coordinate
Limits to Growth case study as an overall a response to a fictional event, or children
way of structuring the analysis and thinking. might be taught about disaster risk reduction
through the use of a simple computer game
Simulation/gaming where the objective is to fortify a village
The use of simulations and games allows you against impending natural hazards17.
to investigate the dynamics of a system by Rausch18 suggests some common
looking at how different scenarios might play tasks required in the design of games
out, and how people or organisations might and simulations:
react to new situations. This approach has
been used throughout the ages, for example setting objectives, defining scope, and
with the use of war games to train soldiers, setting resource demands;
models simulations used by designers and selecting design features of the model to
architects to test their ideas, and fire drills to express and communicate the fixed and
improve an organisation’s response to such variable conditions and their
an emergency. More recently, computer relationships, including the assumptions
models have hugely expanded the potential on which they are based;
for simulation and gaming. adapting the design to the
Simulations and games use a model of a characteristics and arrangement of
situation to investigate them. A model is a participants and coordinators;
simplified representation of some selecting a communications system to
phenomenon: examples include a scale prepare participants and coordinator for
model of a building using small physical the simulation/game and to provide
objects to investigate architectural instructions/guidelines;
characteristics, a mathematical model used to considering ease of access during
represent the forces affecting an atom with simulation and game activities
various equations, or a computer model using to designers for clarification of
mathematical relationships to generate a questions not answered in the
picture of the forces at work in an economy. A instructions or guidelines;
simulation is the use of this model to explore selecting facilities and equipment for
and predict the possible behaviour of the real- delivery of the model and for working
life phenomenon that is being modelled. It the simulation and/or the game; and
allows one to pose various what if…? constructing, reviewing, and
questions so, for example, a computer model piloting simulations.
of the economy could simulate the effect of a
proposed new taxation in order to understand The great strength of simulation and
the possible effects of such a policy. A game, games is the opportunity they offer to

24
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 4

allow experimentation with various possible First, the topic of discussion is circulated
future options without the worry of the so that the participants can share
costs that might be incurred by carrying out general thoughts and comments on the
such experimentation in real life. They can issues under scrutiny before a set
also offer multidimensional views of a structure is decided.
situation that is extremely hard to capture in These responses are synthesised by
complex systems19, allowing a broader the monitoring team, and a
picture and more detailed examination than questionnaire is then developed and
otherwise available. distributed to participants. This
However, clearly any simulation or game questionnaire is drawn up in order to
can only be useful to the extent that the ascertain the opinions of the
model it is based on represents the situation participants, and to start to find points
or phenomenon being investigated. This can of convergence and disagreement.
be a difficult task, and at every stage a Thirdly, the questionnaires are
potential forecast or beneficial strategy must re-distributed a number of times,
be analysed for its realism, and whether it is each time presenting the information
more a feature of the model than the reality from previous questionnaires.
being modelled.
The Scotland Futures Forum case study The feedback provides each participant with
provides an interesting example of gaming textual and statistical material on the
in the Young Time Lords Face the Future, group’s response, as well as their own
where 100 young people participated in response. Where a participant’s view differs
dynamic processes exploring their radically from the group’s, they are asked to
perceptions of the future. reconsider and/or justify it. This process is
repeated until a certain level of stability or
Delphi technique consensus is reached.
This technique is named after the Oracle at Common variations include missing out
Delphi, famous in classical times for the first stage, with the monitoring team
foreseeing the future. It is a set of framing questions based on their own
procedures for eliciting and refining the research. Also, there are often one-to-one
opinions of a group, usually a panel of interviews or group meetings held in
experts, in a way designed to minimise the between rounds of questionnaires.
adverse qualities that are usually Its champions see Delphi methods as
encountered when groups interact. offering a way of objectively exploring issues
The basic features are: that require judgement and decisions. They
see the collective judgements and the results
structured questioning; of a consensus between experts as more
iteration; reliable and objective than other methods.
controlled feedback; The process also highlights the reasons for
anonymity of responses. disagreement in a constructive manner.
Delphi techniques are best used to
While there are a range of Delphi techniques, answer four broad kinds of questions20:
which differ from application to application,
there is set of common elements. 1. normative issues such as ‘goal setting’;

25
Chapter 4 Strategic Futures Planning

2. narrative issues such as 1966 as a way of forecasting future events


‘problem statements’; based on how they might interact. It was
3. predictive issues such as forecasting the initially developed as a fairly basic game
occurrence of new events, and values where events occurred according to certain
and trends of key parameters; and probabilities, and each new occurrence
4. suggestive issues such as developing affected the probability of a number of other
causal models and formulating events occurring.
new policies. It became clear that the interactions
between events constituted a powerful way
The key to a successful Delphi study lies in to examine perceptions about the future
the selection of participants, and the group (Gordon 1994)21, and this possibility was
could include both mainstream experts as taken forward in a number of simulations
well as ‘unknown’ people who may be (for example by John Stover in simulating
outside the normal lines of communication the economy of Uruguay)22. In recent years it
but may be able to contribute has been used as a standalone method as
innovative ideas. well as integrated with other tools, for
Criticisms levelled at Delphi techniques example it can be integrated with more
question the basis for taking its results as deterministic methods to include
any more objective than other methods, that perceptions about possible interactions, and
the pressure to conform with the statistical mailed questionnaires and Delphi studies
feedback from the panel is an instance of have been used to collect judgements
exactly the sort of ‘adverse quality of about probabilities.
interacting groups’ that Delphi claims to The first step in conducting a cross-
eliminate, and that the process can take impact analysis is to define the events to be
too long. included in the study, in order to ensure that
There are a number of other all pertinent possibilities are considered
techniques for ascertaining the opinions of while not over-complicating analysis (the
experts, which may be less formalised than number of interactions to consider increases
Delphi. One example of this is the rapidly with the number of events).
exploratory process initiated in the UK The next step is to assign the initial
Climate Impact Scenarios, where the future probability that each event will occur by
was approached in an exploratory way by some future year, judged in isolation. After
taking into account the knowledge and this, the conditional probabilities are
perceptions of the social and economic calculated, which is the way in which the
players involved. occurrence of each event will affect the
probability of occurrence of the others.
Cross-impact analysis These are put into a cross-impact matrix,
An event that occurs often has causal and a computer programme is used to
predecessors that made it more likely, and it perform a calibration of the matrix, which
in turn will have an effect on future events. produces new estimates of the events
This interrelationship between events and probabilities that take into account the
developments is known as cross-impact. The interrelationships between the events. The
cross-impact method was first developed by differences between the initial and final
Theodore Gordon and Olaf Helmer in probabilities are a result of reducing

26
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 4

inconsistencies in judgements, not taking analysis is at the heart of the Limits to


into account certain possible combinations Growth case study, and this approach also
of events. After this, sensitivity analysis can features to a certain degree in the Europe
be performed to analyse which judgements 2010 Scenarios case study.
and events have a particularly large part to
play in the overall determination of Roadmaps
probabilities, and policy testing can be Roadmaps are visualisations of the future
performed through introducing an integrating all relevant organisational
additional event (and its cross-impact) to the aspects. Key to a good roadmap is the skill
matrix, and comparing the resulting of showing the important, relevant issues.
calibrated matrix with that of the original Roadmaps are often documented and
calibrated one. presented at several layers of detail. The
The selection of events is performed higher levels are important to create and
through a literature search, consulting key maintain the overview, while the more
experts, or other such methods, and can be detailed levels explain the supporting data,
refined through combining closely-related providing an immediate insight in to the
events, eliminating others, and refining most relevant developments.
wording for others. Similarly, the initial Roadmaps and the roadmapping
estimation of probabilities needs to be process serve as excellent communication
carried out through consultation with tools – an effective means to link strategic
experts. They can either estimate the operations, collaborative ventures, and
probability of events ‘judged in isolation’, business plans. However, to achieve success,
or include possible interactions; either way, roadmaps need to involve the appropriate
the matrix calibration improves these group intelligence, and provide a specific
estimations in light of the interactions level of detail.
between the events.
Criticisms of the cross-impact method Wild cards
allude to the fact that the collection of data Wild cards refer to incidents with perceived
can be fatiguing and tedious – an eight by low probability of occurrence but with
eight matrix requires 56 conditional potentially high impacts and strategic conse-
probability judgements to be made, and a quences for an organisation or a society if it
20 by 20 matrix requires 380 judgements. were to take place. Such sudden and unique
Also, it has not been proven that the incidents might constitute turning points in
conditional probabilities are necessarily the evolution of a certain trend or system
more accurate than the estimates of a and are usually serious, destructive, cata-
priori probabilities. strophic or anomalous and essentially
However, the act of examining the not predictable.
relationships and interactions of future Important questions surrounding these
events is a worthwhile one, and looking at are which are the most important wild cards
how coherent judgements of probability are for an organisation?, can we anticipate their
in relation to these interactions can add arrival?, is there anything we can do about
power to futures approaches. The them?23. This concept may be introduced
interdependence of drivers and trends which into anticipatory decision-making activity in
is the primary concern of cross-impact order to increase the ability of organisations

27
Chapter 4 Strategic Futures Planning

to adapt to surprises arising in turbulent 1. formulation and definition of a problem;


business environments. 2. identification and characterisation of all
parameters toward a solution;
Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) 3. construction of a multidimensional
CLA has been developed by Sohail matrix (morphological box) whose
Inayatullah as a method of deepening combinations will contain all
thinking about the future, through looking at possible solutions;
different layers of analysis. CLA involves 4. evaluation of the outcome based on
participants exploring four different layers of feasibility and achievement of desired
understanding the issues of concern: goals; and
5. in-depth analysis of best possibilities
1. ‘litany’ involves visible events, issues considering available resources25.
and quantitative trends that do
not necessarily appear connected References
or continuous; 1. Schwarts, quoted from PIU Strategic futures team
A Futurist’s Toolbox 2001.
2. the ‘systemic’ level is concerned with
2. PIU Stategic futures team A Futurist’s
social causes, where interpretation gives
Toolbox 2001.
economic, cultural, political and 3. L. Borjeson, M. Hojer, K. Dreborg, T. Ekvall, G.
historical perspectives on various data; Finnvedon, Scenario types and techniques:
3. the ‘discourse’ or ‘worldview’ level goes towards a user’s guide, Futures 38 (2006)
deeper, looking at structures and pp723-739.
4. Fuld & Company, Inc CI Strategies & Tools:
assumptions that constitute or ‘frame’ a
Intelligence Dictionary.
problem; and 5. Brown, A., & Weiner, E. (1985). Superm
4. the ‘metaphor’ or ‘myth’ level, which anaging: How to harness change for
involves deep stories, unconscious personal and organisational success.
dimensions of the problem, providing New York: Mentor.
6. Terry P (1977) ‘mechanisms for environmental
the emotional experience behind
scanning’ in Long Range Planning Vol 10
the worldview.
No 3 pp2-9.
7. Marien M (1991) ‘scanning: an imperfect activity
Morphological analysis in an era of fragmentation and uncertainty’ in
This is a method for rigorously structuring Futures Research Quarterly, fall.
and investigating the total set of 8. Glenn, Futures Research Methodology.
9. Cabinet Office Toolkit.
relationships in complex socio-technical
10. (in cabinet office toolkit), originally: Coates, An
problems. The method is carried out by overview of futures method, in The Knowledge
developing a parameter space of the Base of Futures Studies, Vol 2, DDM media
problem to be investigated, and defining group, Australia.
relationships between the parameters on the 11. Visioning at-a-glance, MAPP.
12. Normative Forecasting by J Coates, in Futures
basis of looking to eliminate inconsistent or
Research Methodolgy, Glenn.
impractical combinations of various
13. The Future Belongs To Those Who..., Institute for
parameters. Fritz Zwicky applied it to such Alternative Futures.
diverse fields as the classification of 14. A Lovins, in J Quist and P Vergragt, Past
astrophysical objects and developing new and future of backcasting: The shift to
forms of propulsive power systems24, with stakeholder participation and a propasal
for a methodological framework, Futures 38
five basic steps:
(2006), 1027-1045.

28
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 4

15. Robinson (1990), Futures under glass: a recipe


for people who hate to predict, Futures, Vol. 22
(9): 820-843.
16. KH Dreborg, Essence of Backcasting, Futures 28
(1996) 813-828.
17. http://dev.threeserve.com.un_isdr/
18. E Rausch, Simulations and games in futuring and
other issues, Futures Research Methodolgy (1994).
19. See Implications of Complexity Theory for
International Development, H Jones, B
Ramalingham and T Reba, forthcoming.
20. Overview of Four Futures Methodologies,
Trudi Lang.
21. Theodore Jay Gordon, Cross-impact method,
Futures Research Methodology.
22. The use of Probabilistic System Dynamics in the
Analysis of National Development Policies: A
Study of Economic Growth and Income
Distribution in Uruguay, presented at the 1975
Summer Computer Simulation Conference, San
Francisco, California, July 1975.
23. J.L Petersen, Out of the Blue: How to anticipate
Big Future Surprises, Madison, Lanham, 1999.
24. F Zwicky, Morphological Astronomy, The
Observatory. Vol. 68, No, 845, Aug. 1948, S.
121-143.
25. Relevance Tree And Morphological Analysis by
The Futures Group (1994), in Futures
Thinking Methodologies.

29
Chapter 5: Good practices and
common problems
Clarifying objectives, limitations and A forecast is more probabilistic
timeframes of futures work statement, often based on conditional
One review of best practice for strategic hypotheses, and grounded in careful
futures work argues that it is crucial to analyses of past experience with the
ensure that people understand and trust the system in question.
process being used: Foresight is a natural human faculty
used for day-to-day decision-making,
“Transparent processes where methodologies involving one’s perception of the nature
and objectives are explained fully to the and significance of events before they
participants are more likely to be successful have occurred. Slaughter argues that:
than ‘black box’ methodologies where the ‘foresight is the ability to create and
assumptions are concealed.1” maintain a high-quality, coherent and
functional forward view and to use the
This general statement applies particularly to insights in organisationally useful ways’.
strategic futures, as those who are not Horton offers an alternative: ‘foresight is
familiar with it may view attempts to forecast a process of developing a range of
the future as involving some kind of views of possible ways in which the
‘soothsaying’ or ‘hocus pocus’. Therefore, it future could develop, and understanding
is particularly important to clarify the nature these sufficiently well to be able to
of futures work both with those who will be decide what decisions can be taken
involved in it and those who will be using today to create the best possible
the outputs. Here are some common tomorrow’. The process of foresight may
problems and misunderstandings. involve carrying out various exploratory
forecasts and predictions, and
Common problem one: prediction versus synthesising the results.
forecast versus foresight
One of the most common misunderstand- Strategic futures planning is often
ings about futures is that it a form of characterised as incorporating a foresight
modern-day soothsaying, which enables function into organisations.
its users to predict future events.
Another common confusion is that Common problem two: forecasting
futures is about extending the past into accuracy versus forecasting precision
the future. versus forecasting usefulness
It should be noted that these three concepts
A prediction is a confident statement do not necessarily go hand-in-hand:
about a future state of affairs. They are
ubiquitous in everyday life, but tend A forecast could be precise without
mainly to be useful when dealing with being accurate, for example the
systems that can be fully measured weather forecast could state tomorrow’s
and understood. weather to within 0.01 degrees C

31
Chapter 5 Strategic Futures Planning

but come tomorrow turn out to futures work should be judged on its ability
be inaccurate. to help decision-makers make policy now by
Similarly, a forecast could be accurate using methods to look at the range of
but not precise, such as forecasting that possible futures, identifying and evaluating
tomorrow’s temperature will be between possible policy decisions through
-20 and +50 degrees C. illuminating and anticipating the various
Forecasts can be accurate and useful in opportunities and threats, and the
a variety of different ways, but can also consequences of one’s actions.
be useful despite being wholly
inaccurate. For example, they can be The limitations of futures work
self-defeating such as with what is Strategic futures work is not a ‘silver bullet’,
known as the Lijphart effect2, where the and has its limitations. There are a large
prediction of a future undesirable state number of features of today’s society that,
of affairs causes actors to move to with hindsight, would be nearly impossible
prevent this ‘natural’ result from to predict 30 years ago. Often the most
epidemic break out may make the significant events are those which nobody
epidemic less likely through motivating foresaw, and frequently various new
political action among key stakeholders. possibilities stemming from some kind of
fundamental breakthrough are very difficult
Forecasts involved in strategic futures to conceive before that breakthrough.
planning can serve a variety of purposes, Being systematic and rigorous about
including a mix of these three. forward thinking ensures that an
These considerations serve to help organisation does everything it can to take
answer a common misunderstanding about responsibility for the future, by ensuring that
the nature of futures work: its value is not in the organisation is being as prudent as
forecasting accuracy, and it should not be possible about where it is heading. However,
judged on whether its various forecasts were clearly this doesn’t guarantee that the future
accurate or not. It has been noted that will be free from surprises.
many: “embark on strategic futures work It may make decisions better-informed,
because they want to know what the future but this does not necessarily make decisions
will hold. However, sometimes they confuse easy. Decision-making in the context of
prediction with understanding. Managers uncertainty and a variety of possible futures
want to reduce the anxiety caused by the is complex and tough.
uncertainty of not knowing. This immediately
creates a source of disappointment, for it is The timeframe of futures work
never possible to know the future.” (Henley It is important to understand that strateg
Centre 2001.) ic futures work will take time to deliver
Forecasts can be intended to be proven benefits to an organisation. It takes time to
wrong, for example in the original Limits to learn what approach best suits the
Growth study the authors fully hoped that organisation, which methodologies best fit
their predictions of mankind exceeding the the context and environment, and by its
carrying capacity of the earth would be nature the results of futures thinking work
seized upon as a warning and prevented may not be felt for a number of years after
from occurring. The value of strategic its completion. This can cause anxiety, as

32
Strategic Futures Planning Chapter 5

No of organisations
14
12
12

10 9
8
8

6
4
4 3
2 2
2
1
0
0
0 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 70 to 79 80 to 89
Length of experience in strategic futures work (years)

protagonists look to see concrete results by senior management, but throughout the
from their efforts. organisation. A study of best practice
A survey of organisations involved in suggests that:
strategic futures work has found that the
considerable length of time for which many “Much of the effectiveness of strategic
of them have been involved in futures work futures thinking depends on the willingness
is ‘striking’3, as shown below. of the futures group or organisation to
Such long-term commitment to futures engage with the organisation as a whole
work involves institutionalising futures within and, critically, vice versa. In the world of the
the organisation, and fostering ongoing learning organisation, this requires inclusive
projects and mobilising resources. This is and participatory processes which are
not easy, however, as the more effective an designed to engage members of the
organisation is with establishing futures as organisation throughout. This is as true of
an ongoing process, the more difficult it modelling-based processes as it is of
may be to recognise the impact of averted scenario methods, since the assumptions
crises. As Ged Davis of Shell puts it: underpinning the model are critical to the
acceptance within the organisation of the
“One of the difficulties of assessing the output, and therefore needed to be tested
value of scenario work is that it’s the dogs with stakeholders5.”
that don’t bark that matter. It’s the events
that happen that are a crisis for other There are a number of ways that this could be
people that aren’t a crisis for you. It’s quiet carried out. The Henley centre emphasises in-
preparation ahead of events that matters4.” depth stakeholder engagement, in which the
proponents of the new ideas stemming from
Positioning and involvement in an the futures work ‘have to engage with
organisational context opinion-formers, stakeholders, and networks
Ensuring ownership both inside and outside the organisation to
Strategic futures work cannot achieve its win acceptance for new ideas6’. This involves
objectives without it being accepted not just ensuring that senior managers are exposed to

33
Chapter 5 Strategic Futures Planning

the foresight process, including representatives


of all key departments in the process, and Think tanks
Dissidents Opinion formers
distributing information generated throughout
the organisation as quickly as possible.
Another approach suggested by Andy Hines is
Strategic Stakeholders
what he calls ‘permission futuring’: futures
group
The organisation Critics
“The premise is to think of our work with
internal clients in terms of dating or
Advocacy groups
courtship. We hope to attract our internal
customers enough such that they say ‘yes’
when we ask them for a first ‘futures’ date. If
we perform well on this first date, analogous Positioning futures groups
to going for a cup of coffee, we can then
ask permission for a second date, perhaps not normally heard, whether inside or
the equivalent of dinner. If we perform well outside the organisation.
on that, we get to do progressively deeper This is demonstrated opposite. This
and more interesting work, provided we independence will serve to enhance the
‘deliver the goods’ of the early simpler dates credibility of the futures work. Through being
or tasks. Experience suggests this approach somewhat unaffected by the day-to-day
is a viable one – my own tasks have pressures of organisational life, participants
generally become more involved, are able to more fully and objectively
interesting, and futures-oriented over time. A assess various features of the organisation
key dynamic that makes this especially and environment.
suitable for the organisational world is the
need that internal clients have for saving References
face or maintaining credibility. It will almost 1. Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in
Strategic Futures Work, (2001).
always be politically wiser not to take the
2. See Systems Effects, Robert Jervis, 1997.
risk of doing a futures-related project. So
3. Henley Centre: Benchmarking UK Stategic
our sponsors will look for a track record to Futures Work, (2001).
back them up as they insert their necks in 4. Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in
the political noose. The risk of this approach Strategic Futures Work, (2001).
is that we get caught up in ‘delivering the 5. Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in
Strategic Futures Work, (2001).
goods’ and lose focus on the futures
6. Henley Centre: Understanding Best Practice in
agenda. Constant checking in with Strategic Futures Work, (2001).
ourselves and our work is the best way to 7. Andy Hines, An audit for organisational futurists:
avoid this trap7.” ten questions every organisational futurist should
be able to answer, Foresight 5.1 (2003).
Finding the right position
The Henley Centre argues that a strategic
futures group should be ‘separate but
connected’ to the organisational culture.
Strategic futures work needs to draw from
diverse sources, to listen to voices which are

34
Part II:
Case Studies
Case study one: Limits to growth

The Limits to Growth, published by the Club capacity. The team found that there was still
of Rome in 1972 is one of the first high- room to grow safely while we could examine
profile applications of futures thinking to longer-term options.
world issues. It suggested that mankind was In 1992, this was no longer true. On the
in danger of ‘overshooting’ the capacity of 20th anniversary of the publication of The
the earth, and it lead to great controversy. Limits to Growth, the team updated Limits in
Since the first report, many trends appear to a book called Beyond the Limits. Already in
support its findings, and The Club of Rome the 1990s there was compelling evidence
has subsequently released two updates of that humanity was moving deeper into
the report, re-examining the possible unsustainable territory. Beyond the Limits
consequences and available options. argued that in many areas we had
The central aim of the Limits to Growth ‘overshot’ our limits, or expanded our
series is modeling the interaction between demands on the planet’s resources and
the world population, economy and sinks beyond what could be sustained over
environment. It is a powerful example of the time. The main challenge identified in
power of computer simulation to produce Beyond the Limits was how to move the
valuable insights, and used the tool of world back into sustainable territory.
scenarios to express the possible fate of
mankind given different policy trends. The 30-Year Update
Now in a new study, Limits to Growth: The
More than 30 years ago, a book called The 30-Year Update, the authors have produced
Limits to Growth created an international a comprehensive update to the original
sensation. Commissioned by the Club of Limits, in which they conclude that humanity
Rome, an international group of is dangerously in a state of overshoot.
businessmen, statesmen, and scientists, The While the past 30 years has shown some
Limits to Growth was compiled by a team of progress, including new technologies, new
experts from the US and several foreign institutions, and a new awareness of
countries. Using system dynamics theory and environmental problems, the authors are far
a computer model called ‘World3’, the more pessimistic than they were in 1972.
book presented and analysed 12 scenarios Humanity has squandered the opportunity to
that showed different possible patterns – and correct our current course over the last 30
environmental outcomes – of world years, they conclude, and much must
development over two centuries from change if the world is to avoid the
1900 to 2100. serious consequences of overshoot in the
The World3 scenarios showed how 21st century.
population growth and natural resource use When The Limits to Growth was first
interacted to impose limits to industrial published in 1972, most economists, along
growth, a novel and even controversial idea with many industrialists, politicians, and Third
at the time. In 1972, however, the world’s World advocates raised their voices in outrage
population and economy were still at the suggestion that population growth and
comfortably within the planet’s carrying material consumption need to be reduced by

37
Limits to Growth Strategic Futures Planning

1.4

ecological footprint of humanity


1.2

1.0
carrying capacity of the Earth
number of Earths

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Ecological footprint versus carrying capacity


This graph shows the number of Earths required to provide the resources used by humanity and to absorb their emissions for each
year since 1960. This human demand is compared with the available supply: our one planet Earth. Human demand exceeds nature’s
supply from the 1980s onward, over-shooting it by some 20 per cent in 1999. (Source: M. Wackernagel et al.)

deliberate means. Over the years, Limits was stratospheric ozone layer have proved
attacked by many who didn’t understand or them wrong.
misrepresented its assertions, dismissing it as
Malthusian hyperbole. But nothing that has All the environmental and economic problems
happened in the last 30 years has invalidated discussed in The Limits to Growth have been
the book’s warnings. treated at length before. There are hundreds
On the contrary, as noted energy of books on deforestation, global climate
economist Matthew Simmons recently wrote, change, dwindling oil supplies, and species
extinction. Since The Limits to Growth was first
“The most amazing aspect of the book is how published 30 years ago, these problems have
accurate many of the basic trend been the focus of conferences, scientific
extrapolations… still are some 30 years later.” research, and media scrutiny.
What makes Limits to Growth: The 30-
For example, the gap between rich and Year Update unique, however, is that it
poor has only grown wider in the past presents the underlying economic structure
three decades. Thirty years ago, it seemed that leads to these problems.
unimaginable that humanity could expand
its numbers and economy enough to alter WORLD3
the earth’s natural systems. But experience The World3 computer model is complex,
with the global climate system and the but its basic structure is not difficult to

38
Strategic Futures Planning Limits to growth

understand. It is based in system dynamics – capital and resources from the productive
a method for studying the world that deals economy. It has no wars to kill people,
with understanding how complex systems destroy capital, waste lands, or generate
change over time. Internal feedback loops pollution. It has no ethnic strife, no
within the structure of the system influence corruption, no floods, earthquakes, nuclear
the entire system behaviour. accidents, or AIDS epidemics. The model
World3 keeps track of stocks such as represents the uppermost possibilities for the
population, industrial capital, persistent ‘real’ world.
pollution, and cultivated land. In the model, The authors developed World3 to
those stocks change through flows such as understand the broad sweep of the future –
births and deaths; investment and the possible behaviour patterns – through
depreciation; pollution generation and which the human economy will interact with
pollution assimilation; land erosion, land the carrying capacity of the planet over the
development, and land removed for urban coming century.
and industrial uses. World3’s core question is: how may the
The model accounts for positive and expanding global population and materials
negative feedback loops that can radically economy interact with and adapt to the
affect the outcome of various scenarios. It earth’s limited carrying capacity over the
also develops nonlinear relationships. For coming decade? The model does not make
example, as more land is made arable, predictions, but rather is a tool to
what’s left is drier, or steeper, or has thinner understand the broad sweeps and the
soil. The cost of coping with these problems behavioral tendencies of the system.
dramatically raises the cost of developing
the land – a nonlinear relationship. The driving force:
Feedback loops and nonlinear Exponential growth
relationships make World3 dynamically For more than a century, the world has been
complex, but the model is still a experiencing exponential growth in a
simplification of reality. World3 does not number of areas, including population and
distinguish among different geographic parts industrial production. Positive feedback
of the world, nor does it represent separately loops can reinforce and sustain exponential
the rich and the poor. It keeps track of only growth. In 1650, the world’s population had
two aggregate pollutants, which move a doubling time of 240 years. By 1900,
through and affect the environment in ways the doubling time was 100 years. When
that are typical of the hundreds of pollutants The Limits to Growth was published in
the economy actually emits. It omits the 1972, there were fewer than four billion
causes and consequences of violence. And people in the world. Today, there are more
there is no military capital or corruption than six billion.
explicitly represented in World3. Another area of exponential growth has
Incorporating those many distinctions, been the world economy. From 1930 to
however, would not necessarily make the 2000, the money value of world industrial
model better. And it would make it very output grew by a factor of 14 – an average
much harder to comprehend. doubling time of 19 years. If population had
This probably makes World3 highly been constant over that period, the material
optimistic. It has no military sector to drain standard of living would have grown by a

39
Limits to growth Strategic Futures Planning

factor of 14 as well. Because of population for this loss, but yields cannot be expected
growth, however, the average per capita to increase indefinitely. Per capita grain
output increased by only a factor of five. production peaked in 1985 and has been
Moreover, in the current system, trending down slowly ever since. Exponential
economic growth generally occurs in the growth has moved the world from land
already rich countries and flows abundance to land scarcity. Within the last
disproportionately to the richest people 35 years, the limits, especially of areas with
within those countries. Thus, according to the best soils, have been approached.
the United Nations Development Program, Another limit to food production is water.
the 20% of the world’s people who lived in In many countries, both developing and
the wealthiest nations had 30 times the per developed, current water use is often not
capita income of the 20% who lived in the sustainable. In an increasing number of the
poorest nations. By 1995 the average world’s watersheds, limits have already been
income ratio between the richest and reached. In the US the Midwestern
poorest 20% had increased from 30:1 Ogalallah aquifer in Kansas is overdrawn by
to 82:1. 12 cubic kilometers each year. Its depletion
Only 8% of the world’s people own a has so far caused 2.46 million acres of
car. Hundreds of millions of people live in farmland to be taken out of cultivation. In
inadequate houses or have no shelter at all, an increasing number of the world’s
much less refrigerators or television sets. watersheds, limits have already, indisputably,
Social arrangements common in many been exceeded. In some of the poorest and
cultures systematically reward the privileged, richest economies, per capita water
and it is easier for rich populations to save, withdrawals are going down because of
invest, and multiply their capital. environmental problems, rising costs,
or scarcity.
The limits Another renewable resource is forests,
Limits to growth include both the material which moderate climate, control floods, are
and energy that are extracted from the home to a number of useful species, from
earth, and the capacity of the planet to rattan vines to dyes and sources of
absorb the pollutants that are generated as medicine. But today, only one-fifth of the
those materials and energy are used. There planet’s original forest cover remains in
are limits to the rates at which sources can large tracts of undisturbed natural forests.
produce these materials and energy without Although forest cover in temperate areas is
harm to people, the economy, or the earth’s stable, tropical forest area is plummeting.
processes of regeneration and regulation. From 1990 to 2000, the FAO reports
Resources can be renewable, like that more than 370 million acres of forest
agricultural soils, or nonrenewable, like the cover – an area the size of Mexico – was
world’s oil resources. Both have their limits. converted to other uses. At the same time
The most obvious limit on food production that forests decline, demand for forest
is land. Millions of acres of cultivated land products is growing. If the loss of 49 million
are being degraded by processes such as acres per year, typical in the 1990s,
soil erosion and salinisation, while the continues to increase at 2% per year, the
cultivated area remains roughly constant. unprotected forest will be gone before the
Higher yields have compensated somewhat end of the century.

40
Strategic Futures Planning Limits to growth

Counted in GDP

Manufactured
consumer goods

Resource-obtaining capital Resource


mines output

Industrial capital
steel mills
tool factories Agricultural capital
robots Industrial irrigation systems Agricultural
output tractors

Service capital Service


schools output
hospitals

Industrial
investment
(+)

Flows of physical capital in the economy of World3


It is important to distinguish between money and the real things money stands for. This figure shows how the economy is
represented in World3. The emphasis is on the physical economy, the real things to which the earth’s limits apply, not the monetary
economy, which is a social invention not constrained by the physical laws of the planet.

industrial capital refers here to actual hardware - the machines and factores that produce manufactured products.

The production and allocation of industrial output are central to the behaviour of the simulated economy in World3. The amount of
industrial capital determines how much individual output can be produced each year. This output is allocated among five sectors in
a way that depends on the goals and needs of the population. Some industrial capital is consumed; some goes to the resource
sector to secure raw materials. Some goes to agriculture to develop land and raise land yield. Some is invested in social services, and
the rest is invested in indutry to offset depreciation and raise the industrial capital stock further.

Nonrenewable resources Physical capital


A prime example of a nonrenewable Nonetheless the stock of reserves is finite
resource is fossil fuels, whose limits should and nonrenewable. Moreover, fossil fuels
be obvious, although many people, use is limited by the planet’s capacity to
including distinguished economists, are in absorb their byproducts after burning, such
denial over this elementary fact. More than as the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide.
80% of year 2000 commercial energy use Fossil fuels may be limited by both supply
comes from nonrenewable fossil fuels: oil, and sinks. Peak gas production will certainly
natural gas, and coal. The underground occur in the next 50 years; the peak for oil
stocks of fossil fuels are going continuously production will occur much sooner, probably
and inexorably down. within the next decade. Energy efficiency
Between 1970 and 2000, however, even and renewables offer the best prospect for a
though billions of barrels of oil and trillions sustainable future.
of cubic feet of natural gas were burned, the Materials are another finite resource. If
ratio of known reserves to production population rises, and if those people are to
actually rose, due to the discovery of new have housing, health services, education,
reserves and reappraisal of old ones. cars, refrigerators, and televisions, they will

41
Limits to growth Strategic Futures Planning

need steel, concrete, copper, aluminum, different scenarios for the future, through the
plastic, and many other materials. year 2100. In each scenario a few numbers
But if an eventual nine billion people on are changed to test different estimates of
earth all consumed materials at the rate of the ‘real world’ parameters, or to incorporate
average American, world steel production optimistic predictions about the development
would need to rise by a factor of five, copper of technology, or to see what happens if the
by a factor of eight, and aluminum by a factor world chooses different policies, ethics, or
of nine. From source to sink, the processing, goals. Most of the scenarios presented in
fabricating, handling, and use of materials Limits result in overshoot and collapse
leaves a trail of pollution. through depletion of resources, food
Such materials flows are neither possible shortages, industrial decline, or some
nor necessary. Fortunately, growth in combination of these or other factors.
materials consumption has slowed, and the Under the ‘business as usual scenario’
prospects for further slowing are good. The world society proceeds in a traditional
possibilities for recycling, greater efficiency, manner without major deviation from the
increased product lifetime, and source policies pursued during most of the 20th
reduction in the world of materials are century. Population rises to more than seven
exciting. On a global scale, however, they billion by 2030. But a few decades into the
have not yet reduced the vast materials flow 21st century, growth of the economy stops
through the economy. At best, they have and reverses abruptly.
slowed its rate of growth. As natural resources become harder to
Another fundamental limit to growth is obtain, capital is diverted to extracting more
sinks – the capacity of the planet to absorb of them. This leaves less capital for
the pollution and waste resulting from investment in industrial output. The result is
human economic activity. The most industrial decline, which forces declines in
intractable wastes are nuclear wastes, the service and agricultural sectors. About
hazardous wastes (like human synthesised the year 2030, population peaks and begins
chemicals), and greenhouse gases. They are to decrease as the death rate is driven
chemically the hardest to sequester or upward by lack of food and health services.
detoxify, and economically and politically A similar scenario assumes that the
the most difficult to regulate. world’s endowment of natural resources
Current atmospheric concentrations of doubles, and further postulates that
carbon dioxide and methane are far higher advances in resource extraction technologies
than they have been in 160,000 years. It are capable of postponing the onset of
may take decades for the consequences of increasing extraction costs. Under this
climate change to be revealed in melting scenario industry can grow 20 years longer.
ice, rising seas, changing currents, greater But pollution levels soar, depressing land
storms, shifting rainfall, and migrating yields and requiring huge investments in
insects, birds or mammals. It is also agricultural recovery. The population finally
plausible that climate may change rapidly. declines because of food shortages and
negative health effects from pollution.
The scenarios Other scenarios address the problems of
Using the World3 computer model, Limits to pollution and food shortages by assuming
Growth: The 30-Year Update presents ten more effective pollution control

42
Strategic Futures Planning Limits to growth

needed per unit of industrial output


State of the world
(resource efficiency technology), in
Resources
combination all these features permit
a fairly large and prosperous world,
Industrial until the bliss starts declining in
output
response to the accumulated cost of
the technologies.
Population This technology program
comes online too late to avoid a
gradual decline in human welfare
Food throughout the century. By the end
Pollution
of the 21st century, a stable
1900 2000 2100
population of less than eight billion
people is living in a high-tech, low
Human welfare and footprint
pollution world with a human
welfare index roughly equal to that
Human welfare index
of the world of 2000.
But industrial output begins to
decline around 2040 because the
rising expense of protecting the
population from starvation, pollution,
Human ecological footprint erosion, and resource shortage cuts
into the capital available for growth.
Ultimately this simulated world fails to
sustain its living standards as
1900 2000 2100
technology, social services, and new
Scenario 2: More abundant non-renewable resources investment simultaneously become
This table postulates that advances in resource extraction technologies are capable of postponing the
onset of increasing extraction costs. Industry can grow 20 years longer. population peaks at 8 billion in too expensive.
2040, at much higher consumption levels. But pollution levels soar (outside the graph!), depressing land
yields and requiring huge investments in agricultural recovery. The population finally declines because of
food shortages and negative health effects from pollution.
Transitions to a
sustainable world
technologies, land enhancement (an The world can respond in three ways to
increase in the food yield per unit of land), signals that resource use and pollution
and protections against soil erosion. emissions have gone beyond their
Even a scenario with these features sustainable limits. One way is to disguise,
however, results in overshoot and collapse. deny, or confuse the signals. Generally this
After 2070 the costs of the various takes the form of efforts to shift costs to
technologies, plus the rising costs of those who are far away in space and time.
obtaining nonrenewable resources from An example would be to buy air
increasingly depleted mines, demand more conditioners for relief from a warming
capital than the economy can provide. The climate, or to ship toxic wastes for disposal
result is rather abrupt decline. in a distant region.
If to this scenario one adds reductions in A second way is to alleviate the pressures
the amount of nonrenewable resources from limits by employing technical or

43
Limits to growth Strategic Futures Planning

and sustainable than perpetual


State of the world
material growth.
Resources
Scenario 7 supposes that after
Industrial output 2002, all couples decide to limit
their family size to two children and
have access to effective birth control
technologies. Because of age
Population
structure momentum, the population
Food Pollution
continues to grow for another
generation. But the slower
population growth permits industrial
output to rise faster, until it is
1900 2000 2100
stopped by rising pollution.
Under this scenario, world
Human welfare and footprint
population peaks at 7.5 billion in
2040. A globally effective, two
Human welfare index
children policy introduced in 2002
reduces the peak population less
than 10%. Because of slower
population growth, consumer goods
per capita, food per capita, and life
expectancy are all higher than in the
scenario where the world’s
Human ecological footprint
endowment of natural resources
was doubled.
1900 2000 2100
But industrial output peaks in
Scenario 9: World seeks stable population and stable industrial output per person, and adds
pollution, resource, and agricultural technologies from 2002
2040 and declines. The larger
In this scenario population and industrial output are limited, and in addition technologies are added to capital plant emits more pollution,
abate pollution, conserve resources, increase land yield, and protect agricultural land. the resulting
society is sustainable: nearly 8 billion people live with high human welfare and a continuously declining which has negative effects on
ecological footprint.
agricultural production. To sustain
food production, capital must be
economic fixes. For example, reducing the diverted to the agricultural sector. Later
amount of pollution generated per mile of on, after 2050, pollution levels are
driving or per kilowatt of electricity generated. sufficiently high to have negative impacts
These approaches, however, will not eliminate on life expectancies.
the causes of these pressures. The third way But what if the world’s people decide to
is to work on the underlying causes, to moderate not only their demand for children,
recognise that the socioeconomic system has but also their material lifestyles? What if they
overshot its limits, is headed toward collapse, set a goal for themselves of an adequate but
and therefore seek to change the structure of not excessive standard of living?
the system. World3 can be used to test some If the model society both adopts a
of the simplest changes that might result from desired family size of two children and sets a
a society that decides to back down from fixed goal for industrial output per capita, it
overshoot and pursue goals more satisfying can extend somewhat the ‘golden age’ of

44
Strategic Futures Planning Limits to growth

fairly high human welfare between 2020 and sets modest limits for material
and 2040 in the previous scenario. But production, as in the previous scenario.
pollution increasingly stresses agricultural Further, starting in 2002 it begins to
resources. Per capita food production develop, invest in, and employ the
declines, eventually bringing down life technologies that increase the efficiency of
expectancy and population. resource use, decrease pollution emissions
These changes cause a considerable rise per unit of industrial output, control land
in consumer goods and services per capita erosion, and increase land yields until food
in the first decade after the year 2002. In per capita reaches its desired level.
fact, they rise higher and faster than they did The society of this scenario manages to
in the previous run, where industrial growth begin reducing its total burden on the
was not curtailed. But this economy is not environment before the year 2020; from
quite stabilised. It has an ecological that point the total ecological footprint of
footprint above the sustainable level, and it humanity is actually declining. The system
is forced into a long decline after 2040. brings itself down below its limits, avoids
The world of Scenario 8 manages to an uncontrolled collapse, maintains its
support more than seven billion people at standard of living, and holds itself very close
an adequate standard of living for almost to equilibrium.
30 years, from 2010 to 2040, but during In a final scenario, the sustainability
that time the environment and soils steadily policies of the previous scenario are
deteriorate. To remain sustainable, the world introduced 20 years earlier, in 1982.
in this scenario needs to lower its ecological Moving toward sustainability 20 years
footprint to a level below the carrying sooner would have meant a lower final
capacity of the global environment. population, less pollution, more
Scenario 9: world seeks stable nonrenewable resources, and a slightly
population and stable industrial output per higher average welfare for all. Under this
person, and adds pollution, resource and scenario, population levels off just above six
agricultural technologies from 2002. billion instead of eight billion. Pollution
Moving in this direction, in another scenario peaks at a much lower level and 20 years
the world seeks stable population and stable sooner, and interferes less with agriculture
industrial output per person, and adds than it did in the previous scenario. Life
pollution, resource and agricultural expectancy surpasses 80 years and remains
technologies starting in 2002. high. Life expectancy, food per capita,
In this scenario, population and services per capita, and consumer goods
industrial output are limited as in the per capita all end up at higher levels than
previous run, and in addition technologies they did in the previous scenario.
are added to abate pollution, conserve Two general insights from this effort are
resources, increase land yield, and protect valid and relevant. The first insight is the
agricultural land. The resulting society is realisation that waiting to introduce
sustainable: nearly eight billion people live fundamental change reduces the options for
with high human welfare and a continuously humanity’s long-term future. The second
declining ecological footprint. insight is that the model world’s goal for
Under this scenario, the world decides industrial goods per capita, even with all the
on an average family size of two children ameliorative technologies, cannot be

45
Limits to growth Strategic Futures Planning

sustained for the resulting population of Speed up response time. Look actively
more than seven billion. for signals that indicate when the
The final four scenarios also suggest environment or society is stressed.
some general conclusions: Decide in advance what to do
if problems appear.
A global transition to a sustainable Minimise the use of non
society is probably possible without renewable resources.
reductions in either population or Prevent the erosion of
industrial output. renewable resources.
A transition to sustainability will require Use all resources with
an active decision to reduce the human maximum efficiency.
ecological footprint. Slow and eventually stop exponential
There are many choices that can be growth of population and
made about numbers of people, living physical capital.
standards, technological investment, and
allocations among industrial goods,
services, food, and other material needs.
There are many trade-offs between the
number of people the earth can sustain
and the material level at which each
person can be supported.
The longer the world takes to reduce its
ecological footprint and move toward
sustainability, the lower the population
and material standard that will be
ultimately supportable.
The higher the targets for population
and material standard of living are set,
the greater the risk of exceeding and
eroding its limits.

Suggested guidelines
The authors do suggest a few general
guidelines for what sustainability would
look like, and what steps we should take
to get there:

Extend the planning horizon. Base the


choice among current options much more
on their long-term costs and benefits.
Improve the signals. Learn more about
the real welfare of human population
and the real impact on the world
ecosystem of human activity.

46
Case study two: The Mont Fleur scenarios

The Mont Fleur Scenario Process was constitutional matters, and many other
undertaken in South Africa from 1991-92, in areas. They ranged from informal, off-the-
the context of deep political and social record workshops to formal, public
divisions caused by apartheid. It brought negotiations. The Mont Fleur project was
people together from a range of one type of forum that, uniquely, used the
organisations and backgrounds to think scenario methodology.
creatively about the future of their country, The purpose of Mont Fleur was ‘not to
and provided an innovative approach and present definitive truths, but to stimulate
an important contribution in the midst of a debate on how to shape the next ten years’.
deep conflict. The project brought together a diverse
Provided here are excerpts from the group of 22 prominent South Africans –
scenario process as originally published in politicians, activists, academics, and
the South African newspaper The Weekly businessmen, from across the ideological
Mail and The Guardian Weekly, in July spectrum – to develop and disseminate a
1992. It offers an invaluable example to set of stories about what might happen in
the importance of providing foresight in their country from 1992 to 2002.
times of change, the power of building
scenarios, and offers advice for constructing Summary of the scenarios
a scenario process. The scenario team met three times in a
series of three-day workshops at the Mont
Context and participants Fleur conference centre outside Cape Town.
The historical context of the project is After considering many possible stories, the
important to understanding its impact. It participants agreed on four scenarios that
took place during the period between they believed to be plausible and relevant:
February 1990, when Nelson Mandela was
released from prison, and the African Ostrich, in which a negotiated
National Congress (ANC), Pan African settlement to the crisis in South Africa is
Congress (PAC), South African Communist not achieved, and the country’s
Party (SACP), and other organisations were government continues to be non-
legalised, and April 1994, when the first representative.
all-race elections were held. During these Lame Duck, in which a settlement is
years, dozens of forums were set up in achieved but the transition to a new
South Africa, creating temporary structures dispensation is slow and indecisive.
that gathered together the broadest Icarus, in which transition is rapid
possible range of stakeholders (political but the new government unwisely
parties, civic organisations, professional pursues unsustainable, populist
bodies, government departments, trade economic policies.
unions, business groups, etc.) to develop a Flight of the Flamingos, in which the
new way forward in a particular area of government’s policies are sustainable
concern. There were forums to discuss and the country takes a path of
education, housing, economic policy, inclusive growth and democracy.

47
The Mont Fleur scenarios Strategic Futures Planning

other, non-scenario forum processes,


Flight of the flamingoes
Inclusive democracy and growth
contributed to the establishment of a
YES
common vocabulary and mutual
understanding. The shared language of
Are the
government’s policies Mont Fleur extended beyond the
sustainable?
negotiating elite, and was thus able to
YES NO
include such dialogues as an exhortation
Icarus
Macro-economic
populism
to Flamingos in a Sunday church
Is the transition rapid sermon and a concern raised about
and decisive?
Lame Duck on a rural radio phone-in.
Current YES NO
negotiations Lame duck This kind of common understanding,
Incapacitated
government
together with many other factors,
Is a settlement
negotiated? promoted agreement upon a settlement
NO Ostrich to the crisis.
Non-representative
government The participants did not agree upon a
concrete solution to the country’s
Logic of the scenarios problems. They reached a consensus on
some aspects of how South Africa
The group developed each of these stories ‘worked’ on the complex nature of the
into a brief logical narrative. A 14-page crisis, and on some of the possible
report was distributed as an insert in a outcomes of the current conditions.
national newspaper, and a 30-minute video More specifically, they agreed that, given
was produced which combined cartoons the prevailing circumstances, certain
with presentations by team members. The strongly advocated solutions could not
team then presented and discussed the work, including armed revolution,
scenarios with more than 50 groups, continued minority rule (Ostrich), tightly
including political parties, companies, circumscribed majority rule (Lame Duck),
academics, trade unions, and civic and socialism (Icarus). As a result of this
organisations. At the end of 1992, its goals process of elimination, the broad outline
achieved, the project was wrapped up and of a feasible and desirable outcome
the team dissolved. emerged (Flamingos).
The process was not a formal,
What the project was and was not mandated negotiation. Rather, it was an
The ideas in the Mont Fleur team’s four informal, open conversation. At the first
scenarios were not in themselves novel. workshop, some of the participants
What was remarkable about the project was expected to encounter difficulties in
the heterogeneous group of important agreeing on anything. Over the course
figures delivering the messages, and how of the meetings, they talked until they
this group worked together to arrive at these found areas of shared understanding
messages. The approach was indirect and and agreement, several of which were
the results subtle. relevant to the formal negotiations which
were occurring simultaneously.
Mont Fleur did not resolve the crisis in It did not deal with the differences
South Africa. The project, along with among the participants. Negotiation

48
Strategic Futures Planning The Mont Fleur scenarios

tends to focus on identifying the


Non-representative Government
positions and interests of the parties and
then finding a way to narrow or International community International community
“too radical” tolerant
reconcile these differences. The Mont STAND
Fleur process, in contrast, only discussed Liberations movement OFF Government inflexible
maintains the bottom line
the domain that all of the participants Negotiations break down
had in common: the future of South
“Moderate alliance” government
Africa. The team then summarised this
Resistance
shared understanding in the scenarios.
The aim of such non-negotiating Repression Negative business Economic No social
and violence climate stagnation delivery
processes is, as Marvin Weisbord, an
The crisis worsens
organisational consultant, has stated, to
‘find and enlarge the common ground’. Back to negotiations

Ostrich scenario
Results from the project
The Mont Fleur project produced several restrictions, and the ANC wanted
different types of results: substantive unfettered ‘winner takes all’ rules. Lame
messages, informal networks and Duck explored the boundary in a GNU
understandings, and changed ways of between compromise and incapacitation.
thinking. The primary public output of the Icarus warned of the dangers of a new
project was the group of scenarios, each of government implementing populist
which had a message that was important to economic policy. This message, coming
South Africans in 1992. from a team which included several of
the left’s most influential economists,
The message of Ostrich was that a non- was very challenging to the left, which
negotiated resolution of the crisis would had assumed that government money
not be sustainable. This was important could be used to eradicate poverty
because elements of the National Party quickly. The business community, which
(NP) government and the business was worried about Icarus policies, found
community wished to believe that a deal the team’s articulation reassuring. The
with their allies, instead of a negotiation fiscal conservatism of the GNU was one
with their opponents, could be sufficient. of the important surprises of the post-
After hearing about the team’s work, NP election period.
leader FW de Klerk was quoted as The simple message of Flight of the
saying, “I am not an Ostrich.” Flamingos was that the team believed in
Lame Duck’s message was that a weak the potential for a positive outcome. In a
coalition government would not be able country in the midst of turbulence and
to deliver and therefore could not last. uncertainty, a credible and optimistic
This was important because the nature, story makes a strong impact. One
composition, and rules governing the participant said recently that the main
Government of National Unity (GNU) result of the project was that: “We
were a central issue in the pre-election mapped out in very broad terms the
negotiations. The NP wanted the GNU to outline of a successful outcome, which is
operate subject to vetoes and other now being filled in. We captured the

49
The Mont Fleur scenarios Strategic Futures Planning

Long transition
- Political settlement
- All party coalition
- Sunset clauses Macro-economic populism (fly now, crash later)

Lowest common denominator decision-making Capacity constraints and imbalances


- Indecisive policies
- Purports to respond to all, satisfies none

Uncertainty because of long transition


Investors hold back Insufficient growth Massive social Economic and
spending spree social collapse

Insufficient Social crisis


growth inadequately
addressed
Popular Some form of
government authoritarian rule?

The vicious circle of political, economic and social crises worsens

Lame Duck scenario Icarus scenario

way forward of those committed to The scenario process is logical. There is


finding a way forward.” no place in the core of a scenario
conversation for positions or values.
The second result of Mont Fleur was the Instead the discussion is about facts and
creation of informal networks and logic: can you convince your fellow
understandings among the participants – an team members that the story you are
influential group from across the political putting forward is plausible?
spectrum – through the time they spent The process is open and informal.
together. These connections cumulatively Building scenarios can be creative
provided the basis for the subsequent because the process is ‘only’ about
critical, formal agreements. telling stories, not about making
The third result, the least tangible yet commitments. This allows people to
most fundamental, was the change in the discuss almost anything, even taboo
language and thought of the team members subjects. Early in the Mont Fleur process,
and those with whom they discussed their one of the ANC members proposed a
work. The Mont Fleur team gave vivid, story called ‘The Chilean Option:
concise names to important phenomena Growth through Repression’ (a play on
that were not widely known, and previously the ANC slogan, ‘Growth through
could be neither discussed nor addressed. Redistribution’). This precipitated an
At least one political party reconsidered its important discussion which would not
approach to the constitutional negotiations have had a place in a normal left-wing
in light of the scenarios. party political debate.
The process is inclusive and holistic. A
Why the project produced story about the future has to be able to
these results encompass all aspects of the world:
How can such a simple story-telling process social, political, economic, cultural,
produce these kinds of results? A scenario ecological, etcetera. Moreover, the
conversation has several characteristics that process of telling several stories
make it powerful. encourages people to surface and listen

50
Strategic Futures Planning The Mont Fleur scenarios

Pierre Wack, who pioneered scenario


Inclusive democracy and growth planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, said that
Political settlement
Facilitating international scenario work involves ‘the gentle art of
environment
- Regional stability reperceiving’. A scenario process can
- Access to world markets

Good government
facilitate shifts in language, thinking, and
- Clear and consistent policies
- Efficient: not corrupt
action. Each of these reframings provides for
- Observes macro-economic constraints a more constructive basis for working on
Broad participation
difficult issues.
- People have a say

Social reconstruction Sustained economic growth What scenarios mean


- Business is confident
Plausible scenarios must be internally
- More social investment
- Decrease in violence - Investment is high
- Employment increases
consistent and based on credible
Flight of the Flamingos interpretations of present trends. Scenarios
are a strategic planning tool. They identify
to multiple perspectives. In discussing a what has to be done to secure a desired
fundamentally unpredictable future, outcome. Scenarios imply the future is not
there is no one truth; this accords fixed but can be shaped by decisions and
respect for the points of view of all of actions of individuals, organisations, and
the participants (in a conflict, one or institutions. Scenarios are used to avoid
more parties is usually not being heard) being caught off guard; to challenge
and it allows everyone to see more of conventional mental maps about the future;
the world. to recognise signs of change; and to test
The process elicits choices. One of the strategies in different circumstances.
premises of scenario thinking is that the There is no standard method of
future is not predetermined and cannot be developing scenarios. It is a creative process
predicted, which means, therefore, that that harnesses the expertise of the people
the choices we make can influence what involved. For a successful scenario planning
happens. In a situation where people feel exercise it is important to set up a skilled team
swept along by overwhelming, inevitable who can understand the present; identify the
currents, this is an empowering world predictable elements about the future; identify
view. During its transition, South Africa plausible possible pathways into the future;
was haunted by apocalyptic visions; the and recognise divergent views.
scenario stories helped people rationally Overleaf is a chart of the Mont Fleur
think through their options. scenario process.
The process is constructive. A scenario
conversation turns the attention of a Conditions necessary for a
group away from the past and present – successful scenario effort
where the debate is often mired – The most important element required for
toward the future. It shifts from looking the success of this type of scenario project
for ‘The Solution’ to exploring different is proper timing: are public leaders ready
possibilities, and from the separate to talk together about the future? If there
interests of the parties (as in negotiation) is readiness, then two other things become
to their common ground (the future in critical: how the process is led and how
which they all will live). the team is composed. The process must be:

51
The Mont Fleur scenarios Strategic Futures Planning

Credible. The people who convene and Party wasn’t included, which has
lead the project must be broadly been an important dissenter in
respected. They must be seen as South African politics.
advocates of the process and not of any
particular position or outcome. The team needs to be:
Informal and reflective. A scenario
exercise is a ‘Track Two’ process, which Respected – composed of leaders who
must be separate from (parallel or prior are influential in their own communities
to) ‘Track One’ formal negotiations. The or constituencies. They need not hold
power of scenario work comes from its official positions.
status as an exercise in reflection and Open-minded (in particular, not
imagination, which is not directly linked fundamentalist) and able to listen to and
to action. Therefore, although it is work with others.
possible to follow on from constructing Representative of all the important
scenarios (what might happen) to perspectives on the issues at hand. Any
creating a vision (what we want to stakeholder must be able to see their
happen), and then to planning action point of view represented by someone
(what we will do), these processes must on the team, though they need not be
be carefully insulated from one another. formal representatives of these groups
Inclusive. The value of these projects or positions.
is that they build the common ground
among different perspectives and Conclusion
parties. It is therefore important to be The Mont Fleur exercise demonstrated the
as inclusive as possible. The Mont Fleur informal, indirect scenario approach to be an
project was unfortunately diminished innovative and productive method for a
by the fact that the Inkatha Freedom society in conflict to approach the future. This
approach is different from and
complementary to negotiation. As this project
Team members’ ideas demonstrates, it is a promising tool for future
attempts to reach public consensus.
First team workshop Brainstorming 30
September 1991 initial ideas

Research Research

9 preliminary schools

Second team workshop November 1991 Assessment

Consultation 4 draft Consultation


scenarios

Third team workshop March 1992 Refinement

4 final
scenarios

Dissemination, debate, and use

The scenario process


52
Case study three: Cabinet Office UK trends
2001-2006
This 1997 report provides an overview of the some other countries which face more rapid
research on some key economic, social, ageing and a more serious fall-off in the
technological and other trends likely to affect birth rate.
the UK in the period 2001 – 2006. The work
looks at likely trends in: income, wealth and By 2005, around 36.5% of the UK
other inequalities; science, technology and population will be paying tax on their
innovation; public ethics, values and working income to support the 22% of
attitudes; demography; the labour market; the population then in retirement.
the environment and the UK’s position in the The average life expectancy for UK men
world. Contrasts between trends affecting the is likely to have risen to 78 years by
UK, Europe and the rest of the world have 2006, while the average life expectancy
also been included where relevant data for women will have risen to around 81
could be found. by the same time.
A range of representative sources was If past trends continue there is likely to
consulted in compiling this synopsis, which be an increase in the number of births to
includes futures work undertaken by UK and girls under 16. Births in this age group
foreign organisations from business, have been rising since 1993 to the
academia and non-governmental highest recorded level ever in 1996.
organisations (NGOs), as well as However births are strongly correlated
government sources. The intention was to with a range of factors including
focus on those trends that are reliably employment opportunities, educational
predictable, linear or otherwise grounded in performance between 11 and 16, as
evidence, avoiding projections based on well as sex education. These factors may
pure speculation or trends subject to reverse the trend in the UK.
volatility. Key trends in this excerpt are from
the five year timeframe (2001 – 2006), Information and
although the report continues to provide communications technologies
trends for 2006–2011. Multimedia and communications
This is particularly interesting because of technologies, including the internet, mobile
the pertinence of many of the observations! phones and digital television, are likely to
have become entrenched as an integral part
Key UK trends: 2001–2006 of daily life in the UK over the next five
Demography years. For example, it is predicted that by
In common with the rest of Western Europe, 2003 60% of all households in the UK will
the UK’s population will continue to age have internet access (either through a PC or
over the next decade, although the fullest digital TV connection) and the total number
economic/social impacts of a ‘top-heavy’ of internet access terminals (PC, TV and
population distribution are unlikely to be felt mobile phones) in the UK may exceed the
until after 2015. The changing age balance national population. This may be compared
of the UK population is less marked than against the current figure of 450 million

53
Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006 Strategic Futures Planning

regular internet users globally, a figure emerge or re-emerge, often through food-
expected to grow to two billion by 2005. borne routes.

By 2005, several billion domestic Childhood ill health resulting from


appliances and other machinery are socio-economic factors has been rapidly
likely to be connected to the internet rising but the policy challenges are
through the use of automated being recognised. Nearly one third of
wireless technologies. UK children currently live in poverty (as
Digital television is expected to be in defined by relative measures), compared
use by 15 million subscriber homes with one in ten in 1979. This is known
by 2005. to correlate with ill health. The
Because of the spread of digital TV, up government has committed itself to using
to 50% of Internet access may be financial and other means to take
through non-PC devices within significant numbers of children out of
three years. poverty and hence reduce poverty linked
On-line retailing (e-commerce) is likely ill-health. There are some tentative signs
to become more popular, with internet- that the longer-term trend may now be
based sales rising to around £2.5bn to in reverse
£3bn by 2003. Increasing rates of drug use and abuse
By 2006, up to 10% of medical among young people are likely to
prescriptions could be administered over continue. The number of 15 to 24 year-
the internet. olds using drug treatment agencies in
The value of the European wireless data 1997 was 50% higher than in 1993.
market alone is projected to exceed the All the genes in the human genome
European voice data market by 2006. are likely to have been mapped by
Computer memory with average memory 2005, leading to new understandings
access time of one nanosecond will be of and perhaps treatments for human
in use by 2005. Molecular computing genetic diseases.
will also be in use by 2005. It is thought that electronic implants able
By 2005 Artificial Intelligence (AI), virtual to stimulate the muscles in disabled
reality and advanced ‘data mining’ people will be in use by around 2004.
technologies will allow organisations to The number of people taking out private
assimilate data and solve problems well health insurance in 1997 had risen by
beyond the range of today’s machines. 4% compared with 1990 figures. In the
same period, the total value of private
Health medical insurance claims rose by over
Individual health looks set to remain an 50 per cent. These trends look set
important issue within the UK. Although the to continue.
incidence of communicable diseases is likely
to decline, chronic diseases and mental Housing
illnesses are likely to increase in prevalence. A combination of economic, social and
The growing prevalence of trade and travel, political drivers will continue to affect where
global warming and social trends will ensure people live, buy houses and what they can
that new infectious diseases continually afford to buy. The average UK household

54
Strategic Futures Planning Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006

size is currently 2.34 people. This is already adapting to the opportunities


projected to drop to 2.29 by 2006. One offered by the internet and the vulnerabilities
reason for this is that young people who of increasingly networked societies. The
have tended to stay longer with their parents notion of organised crime may also change,
over the last 20 years will become as the internet offers greater individual
independent sooner. As a consequence of opportunities for empowered small actors to
this, and other factors, the number of private perpetrate serious crimes with
household dwellers is expected to have risen disproportionately large effects.
from 49,131,000 to approximately
49,783,000 by this time. The increasing use of technology in the
home (arising from factors such as the
Married couples will continue to make growing numbers of tele-workers) may
up the greatest percentage of household make domestic premises more attractive
dwellers in England (44%) whilst around targets for burglary.
31.4% of dwellers will be lone persons. However, the move towards a 24-hour
Some 6% of dwellers will be lone society will mean less predictable
parents and approximately 10.4% will patterns of domestic movement, which
be cohabiting couples. The remainder may discourage some criminals.
of households will be other ‘multi- Electronic services (such as online
person’ houses. banking), knowledge and information,
The number of first time house-buyers and identity will increasingly become
under 25 dropped from 28.1% of all targets for criminals, especially if
first time buyers in 1988 to 16% in physical property is made a more
1999. In 2006, it is expected that the difficult target.
majority of first-time mortgage borrowers
will remain in the 25–34 age bracket. Transport and infrastructure
The number of mortgage borrowers It is estimated that between 221 and
earning between £10k and £15k per 237 million people will be using UK air
annum has dropped from 28.2% to travel services per year by 2005.
13.2% of all borrowers between 1988 Between 2001 and 2006, an
and 1999. The number of borrowers annual 1.69% increase in road traffic
earning over £25k has risen, in the is anticipated.
same time, from 14.% to 50% of By 2006, car ownership in the UK is
all borrowers. likely to be at 0.47 cars per person.
Initial repayments as a percentage of By 2006, demand for UK rail services
income for first time buyers have is projected to have risen by 23%
remained at around 14% since 1971. since 2000.

Crime The environment


The British Crime Survey indicates an UK air quality is getting cleaner, though the
average overall increase in crime over the impact of greater extremes of weather will
last 20 years (1981 to 1997) but a decline continue to cause sporadic social disruption.
over the last few years in both burglary and The change in the earth’s atmosphere and
vehicle crime. Criminal organisations are gradual increase in average temperature will

55
Cabinet Office UK trends 2001-2006 Strategic Futures Planning

mean that the UK is likely to endure bouts of working in clerical and secretarial roles
extreme weather on a more frequent basis. and something like 12% in personal and
Heavy rains resulting in floods and dry protective services.
summers resulting in drought will A projected 9.5% of the UK workforce is
undoubtedly be more common. likely to be working as factory operatives
or in unskilled manual roles, with an
Road traffic NOx emissions are anticipated 7.5% in sales roles and
predicted to drop by 46% by 2005, around 5.75% in other roles.
due to implementation of a variety of By 2005, it is likely that basic IT literacy
EU Directives. will be regarded as an essential
Although CO2 emissions will rise slightly prerequisite for skilled employment.
in the latter half of the coming decade, Union membership looks set to continue
they will then fall again. The UK total its decline as workers become more
CO2 emissions currently stand at generally skilled, educated and inclined
around 154 million tonnes carbon (MtC) towards individual negotiation of
per annum. This is expected to fall to employment terms.
151.7 MtC by 2005. Countries like Russia, India and China
By 2005, lead emissions will decrease are likely to suffer an IT ‘brain drain’, as
by 90% compared to 1995 levels. many of their most skilled workforce
come to work in the Western world.
Employment and the national economy
The UK economy is expected to continue
growing at its recent average rate of 2 –
2.5% per annum until 2006. This growth,
and a parallel expected growth in
productivity, will come through the
acquisition of new labour skills, greater
specialisation and the application of new
technologies. By 2006, almost one-third of
the UK workforce are likely to be employed
in the distribution and transport sector, and
around one quarter employed in business
and miscellaneous services, emphasising the
continued decline in traditional
manufacturing industries.

By 2006, only 14.5% of the UK


workforce is expected to be employed in
manufacturing, around 6% in
construction and about 2% in the
primary/utilities sector.
By 2006, 18% of the UK workforce
could be working as managers and
administrators, with around 14%

56
Case study four: The Scottish Futures Forum
In its first year, the Scottish Futures Forum thinking in Scotland – that it will continue to
has adopted a wide range of approaches to act as a focal point for MSPs, policy makers,
help the Parliament become more porous to academics, businesses and the wider public
new ways of thinking. A range of futures to come around the table, to learn together
techniques has been used to stimulate public in a creative environment, and to test and
policy debate: scenarios, Delphi, visioning, promote new forms of social innovation for
gaming, surveys, futures cafes and systems the future.
mapping, as well as the more traditional The report illustrates how the forum
collaboration tools of workshops, drama, has blended in-depth futures work with
networking and lectures. open participation events, producing
instructive debates and creative learning
Introduction all round.
The Scottish Futures Forum is helping to Key highlights of the forum’s work over
develop the knowledge transfer agenda in its first year include the Future Lecture
Scotland. It has created new information Series, the Positive Ageing Project, and
pathways into the decision-making process, Public Policy Debates. Future work includes
a process which will be further developed a project on future policies around illegal
in 2007. Our ‘Supporting Local Futures’ drugs and alcohol.
programme will encourage local
communities to think, learn and plan for The future lecture series
their own specific futures – with, in turn, the The forum was asked by MSPs and others to
forum promoting the social innovations develop a high quality lecture series. The
which emerge to MSPs (Members of the forum wanted to bring international experts,
Scottish Parliament) and parliamentary known for their ‘big ideas’ and in some
committees. Over 1,000 members are now cases controversy, to Holyrood, to share and
registered on the forum’s website. In our first debate their views with MSPs.
year over ten Scottish universities, and many In March 2006, Geoff Mulgan, director
businesses have worked with the forum. of the Young Foundation and former head
As the Parliament approaches its third of policy and strategy at Ten Downing Street,
session the challenge to be open and spoke about the need for more social
responsive to those it serves, and to be innovation in Scotland. His inspiring lecture,
creative in planning for the future is as co-hosted with the International Futures
important as ever. As this report makes Forum, described how Scotland was ideally
clear, the forum has a role in this process placed to be creative and innovative when
and has made an encouraging start. In the testing new public policies:
next four years it will take a more focused
approach, working closely with MSPs and “Scotland should now be in the forefront of
parliamentary committees to take a futures (social) innovation. It is the right size, has
look at ‘drugs and alcohol’, ‘environmental the right traditions, and sits in the right part
futures’, and ‘funding the future’. of the world... and it has a very strong
Our aspiration for the forum is that it network of organisations involved in social
will become a central point for futures enterprise, like the school for social

57
The Scottish Futures Forum Strategic Futures Planning

entrepreneurs based in Fife. The potential most marginalised in society have the
payback is very substantial.” sharpest focus on what needs to be done
when producing innovative public policy”,
In September 2006, academic Professor she said. This has, in part, led the forum to
Howard Gardner, spoke at the forum about consider the establishment of a ‘Supporting
his ‘GoodWork’ Theory and his most recent Local Futures’ programme, being launched
book Changing Minds. Howard Gardner is in 2007; an attempt to bring local
one of the world’s leading thinkers. communities to think, learn and plan for
Originally a psychologist, much of his most their own local futures.
famous work has been done in the field of In September 2006, controversial
education. His interests are, however, Danish academic Professor Bjorn Lomborg
extremely wide and embrace many of the addressed a packed Garden Lobby at the
key issues facing contemporary society. In Scottish Parliament. Listed by Time Magazine
the mid-1990s, along with other renowned as one of the top 100 global influences,
academics, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi from Lomborg’s lecture, ‘Are We Destroying the
Harvard and William Damon from Stanford, Future?’ generated much debate from the
Gardner founded what has become known Scottish environmental lobby. Lomborg’s
as the ‘GoodWork’ project. It began from description of the ‘Copenhagen Consensus’
a consideration of the relationship between sparked some lively debate; global warming
high-level performance in whatever field he told the audience is important, especially
and social responsibility; in other words, to the developing world but, there are other
between excellence and ethics. In a world areas, such as the prevention of Aids /HIV,
where conditions are changing rapidly and education and poverty that should be seen
where market forces are often the only as a priority.
decisive factor, the project promotes the US Senator George Mitchell, the United
concept of GoodWork to establish what Nations prize-winning peacemaker, spoke to
assists its development. the forum in October 2006, examining ‘A
An education specialist, Gardner Future for International Peace?’. Senator
explored with the forum the relationship Mitchell spoke to MSPs and a high level
between ethics and excellence describing business audience about his humanitarian
how ‘work’ can be both socially responsible approach to resolving conflicts and
and personally fulfilling. In his lecture, discussed lessons for Scotland in dealing
educationalists from across Scotland also with problems of sectarianism.
heard Gardner launch his new theory, ‘Five The forum is very pleased by the success
Minds for the Future; the kinds of minds that of the futures lecture series. The presiding
people will need if they – if we – are to officer, George Reid MSP, has said that
thrive in the world during the coming era’. sharing big ideas and new thinking at
In June, Right Reverend Alison Elliot, Holyrood is important to the Parliament’s
former moderator of the Church of Scotland commitment to being open and accessible
spoke at the forum on the ‘Spirit of to the wider community. The Forum will
Innovation’. Drawing on her time and travels announce its forthcoming lecture speakers
as moderator, Alison stressed the need for early next year when we can look forward to
us to look for innovation in the most hearing more high level speakers and more
marginalised areas of society. “Often the ‘big ideas’.

58
Strategic Futures Planning The Scottish Futures Forum

The ‘positive ageing’ project better participate in public life and describe
Conscious that Scotland will have an how older people are a real asset to society
increasingly ageing population in the future, and not the burden they are often portrayed
‘positive ageing’ has been a core theme to be. Her point was that many older
running throughout the forum’s project work people increasingly feel alienated by the fast
throughout 2006. The Parliament’s Equal pace of change and usage of technology.
Opportunities Committee spokesperson on The forum believes many older people
ageing, Sandra White MSP, explained the would appreciate help, particularly around
importance of the ageing study: the internet, texting and digital television; for
example, ‘peer training’ schemes and inter-
“The fact that by the middle of this century generational schemes, where young people
over one third of Scotland’s population will teach older people about technology in
be over 50 years old, presents massive return for advice on life issues.
challenges for policy making today. It is vital This conference heard from SAGA, The
that Scotland develops initiatives and POWER Inquiry, DWP, Anti-Apathy, Microsoft
policies to ensure older people have the and Ofcom. Some very interesting points
opportunity to positively contribute to society came from this lesson around the barriers
in the way they want. That is why Scotland’s that older people experience in engaging in
Futures Forum futures study into positive decision-making processes.
ageing has been so important; to get policy
makers thinking now about the positive The drama of getting older
impact having an older population could During stage three of the forum’s project
make and to challenge government and into Positive Ageing, the Foxtrot Theatre
businesses to prepare the way. The forum’s Company was commissioned to produce an
ageing project is a good piece of work interactive play that would help stimulate
which has used creative methods to discussion with community groups. The
stimulate a positive debate in Scotland.” audience was very open and some
interesting findings came from the sessions.
The Forum Project Board, led by Lord In general, people were quite optimistic
Sutherland, developed a hybrid futures about getting older. An overwhelming
approach, using various techniques. The majority felt their generation had a better
‘learning to emerge’ was considered time of it than their parents’ generation.
through a scenario exercise, published in However, an overwhelming majority felt their
January 2007. Here are some of the children’s generation was not likely to have
sessions that contributed to the development as good an old age as they themselves
of the forum’s positive scenarios. would. This perhaps reflects a sense of what
some commentators have described as ‘a
Power to the people golden age of seniors’, arguing that as the
“If you love your Granny, don’t buy her a largest and wealthiest consumer group there
computer for Christmas!” was the feeling of is a lot to look forward to for them.
one older person attending the forum’s However, younger generations did not have
‘Power to the People Conference’. The event so much to look forward to, for example,
saw 150 elderly people in the parliamentary inability to afford proper housing, loss of
chamber discussing how older people can professional pension, the changing nature of

59
The Scottish Futures Forum Strategic Futures Planning

‘family’, etc. The play told the story of a social or financial reasons wanted to
couple, Bill and Shirley and her friend continue working or try something new, like
Christine. The play profiled each of the start their own businesses. According to
characters, all with different attitudes to Barclays Bank, the number of middle-aged
ageing. As a couple Bill and Shirley had people starting businesses has grown by
very different views on retirement and their 50% over the past decade and now
relationship started to suffer. Christine, while accounts for almost a quarter of new
worried about health in older age, was businesses. This variance in opinion reflects
determined to live an active life, and spend the forum’s belief that government and
her savings travelling to see her family in business should look together at how to
New Zealand. By the second scene, the provide a range of options for people
play moved on to profile the characters in making the transition in work from their 50s
2026. Shirley had had a stroke and Bill to 60s and 70s, to ensure they can make
was her carer. Christine was living in the right choices for themselves.
sheltered accommodation. The scene
describes a very positive conversation A business perspective (possibility spaces)
between the three via digital television. The The forum has been conscious of a dearth
play ‘paused’ between each scene and, of information on how Scottish businesses
through a facilitator, drew the audience into are preparing for an older population, and
a discussion. The actors, in character, also workforce. Using a ‘possibility space’
entered into the discussion. As a technique, the forum brought together a
participation tool, the theatre proved very number of businesses to consider their
powerful. attitudes to pensions, employment
practices, finance and the environment. The
Attitudes to retirement possibility spaces produced a very rich
There was a real sense that preparing for dialogue with business and their conclusions
retirement took time. The shift from work to helped inform the finding of the overall
retirement was massive, often sudden and ageing project.
abrupt. Most people felt things need not be
that way. More care and attention should be An academic perspective (Delphi exercise)
taken to help people move from work to The forum commissioned a Delphi
retirement over a phased period. People felt exercise, where three respected academics
employers should take more time to prepare from Scottish Universities were asked to
their staff for retirement, as much as ten to give their futures view of ageing. The
15 years ahead of actually retiring. People essays concentrate on three key areas
wanted to see reduced hours options, and heavily influenced the forum’s
flexible working, time off for volunteering, ageing project.
and the chance to find new interests and
skills outside working life. There was a An overall philosophical view of ageing
genuine mixture of opinion about working in the future.
beyond retirement. Some very much looked An economic view of ageing in
forward to it, as the character Bill said, “If I the future.
never see another column of numbers A learning and training perspective of
again, I would be happy”. Others for either ageing in the future.

60
Strategic Futures Planning The Scottish Futures Forum

Young Time Lords face the future (gaming) The Tomorrow Project, Careers Scotland and
In October 2006, through a series of gaming Scottish Enterprise, brought together 100
and drama exercises, the forum worked with people from various sectors to consider
100 young people aged between 14 and 18. work in the 21st century. The Scottish
With Young Scot, a very dynamic and Council Foundation’s work on how to take
successful organisation, the forum spent the an asset-based approach to education,
day discussing young people’s attitudes to work and retirement was hugely useful in
personal finance and getting older. It became this session.
clear that young people understood the need From this event four specific questions
for more financial literacy skills. It was came to the fore, which provided the focus
interesting to note that at the beginning of the of the ageing project.
session, around 85% of the young people felt
they received sufficient financial literacy 1. A pension crisis has been high on the
education at school and over 90% of them public agenda recently but what are the
said they expected to have some kind of attitudes of Scottish business and young
pension provision by the time they were 40- people to work, pensions and savings in
years-old. However, by the end of the day, it the future?
became clear that very few of the young 2. It has been clearly established that an
people actually knew what a pension was, increase in skills leads to increased
and many thought that the government would productivity in the workplace. What new
provide them with a pension post retirement. skills and re-training will be required by
At the end of the session, over 80% of the an ageing population, to meet the needs
young people said they would welcome more of work in the future?
financial planning skills and education. Most 3. Many have argued that ‘crisis’ is only a
of the young people did not think they would term to be used if society does not
have personal debt, excluding a mortgage adjust its practices now to meet the
and car, by the time they were 30 and yet, economic and social realities of the
over 90% of young people said, financial future. How do we enable and empower
planning was of little interest because it was people to meet this new environment?
too far in the future. Over 50% said, if given 4. How can the skills of an ageing
£1,000 today, they would spend the whole population, through, for example,
sum on luxury goods. Around 45 per cent volunteering, mentoring and other forms
said they would save a portion of the money. of ‘work’, best contribute to society in
the future?
Public policy debate
Another key role for the forum during 2006 Scottish Expo Fair 2006
has been to stimulate public policy debate Scottish Policy Innovation Forum (SPIF) aims
by bringing the futures work of partner to foster new ideas and ways of thinking
organisations to Holyrood. Below are three about public policy. Some have argued that
of the highlight events from 2006. there has been less policy innovation than
many people expected since devolution.
The Tomorrow Network Scottish distinctiveness has often meant not
The Tomorrow Network in Scotland, a following the line of England, rather than
network made up of the Scottish Executive, striking out on its own. The SPIF was created

61
The Scottish Futures Forum Strategic Futures Planning

to meet this need for bottom-up thinking


about Scottish solutions to Scottish Planned projects
problems. Its role is to bring together Alcohol and drugs are very topical and
existing knowledge and ideas and stimulate there is a good deal of new and provoking
new ones, across the public service, work emerging, in particular, the RSA
academia and civil society. The Futures Commission’s forthcoming report on Illegal
Forum was pleased to partner SPIF in Drugs and the Impact on Communities and
running The Scottish Policy Expo which Public Policy’. During 2007, the forum’s
showcased to MSPs some of the most focus will be on stimulating new debates
innovative policy ideas coming out of around alcohol and drugs. Of course,
Scotland’s universities. These related to the across Scotland, a wide range of views exist
shape of society, the balance of the on the best way to tackle issues around
economy, the structure of the public sector alcohol and drugs. The forum does not
and public services delivery. The expo develop policy, but uses fresh approaches to
helped stimulate public policy debate on look over the horizon and stimulate public
issues such as tackling social inequalities, policy debate on the near and long-term
and pursuing a distinctive Scottish economic actions that should be taken.
development programme and reform of the
public sector.

Goodison Group in Scotland


The Goodison Group, which was founded
in England about five years ago, takes its
name from its founder, Sir Nicholas
Goodison. Sir Nicholas was the chairman of
the London Stock Exchange, chairman of the
TSB Group and deputy chairman of Lloyds
TSB. The forum was delighted to partner the
Goodison Group in Scotland (GGiS) to run
an event to consider policy innovation. The
GGiS is an independent group of people
coming together to stimulate and support
wide-ranging discussion on the hugely
important issue of lifelong learning, with a
particular focus on post compulsory learning
and skills in Scotland. While the primary
focus of the group is quite explicitly
economic, the social and cultural
dimensions are very important. The purpose
of the GGiS is to take a longer-term view of
the issues involved in education and
training, outside the normal pressures and
timescales of government strategies
and initiatives.

62
Case study five: EC Scenarios Europe 2010
The approach of the year 2000 was used The hundred flowers
as an opportunity by the European This scenario will be marked by things such
Commission to reflect upon future as: trend growth slowdown; exploitation of
developments that could affect their some technologies (for example, bio-
activities. The Scenarios for Europe 2010 technologies); devolution of large
were drawn up to ‘stimulate debate inside organisations; and, explosion of one-person
and outside the commission on the future operations and informal networks. Belief in
of European integration; and to develop neighbourhood solidarity and local self-help
a tool to put the union’s policies and will be strong and women will be particularly
strategies into perspective and contribute active. Paid work will be less important.
to their improvement.’ Common will be anti-consumerism and ‘do-
Provided below is a brief summary of it-yourself’, but enthusiasm for information
each of the five scenarios, followed by a and communication technologies will grow.
detailed description of the method used. It ‘Green’ values will be prevalent. There
serves as an interesting example of foresight could be a crisis of large bureaucracies and
in the context of a large regional nation-states. Creation of new states may
organisation, and offers an interesting happen. Noticeable will be participation at
method for producing scenarios. local level, apathy at national and European
level (especially large states). Mistrust of
Triumphant markets government and big business (including
‘Third Industrial Revolution’ will be marked, media) will be common. Other trends
accompanied by an explosion of include: disobedience, tax evasion and
entrepreneurship (‘virtual enterprise’). boycotts. National administrations are
Unchallenged leadership of the US model i deemed to be largely incapable of reform
n technological innovation will also be and bureaucracies are seen to be largely
present and enterprise organisation irrelevant. Public functions performed by
(shareholder value). Also, strong emphasis associations and private organisations.
on self-reliance but widespread feeling of
insecurity. Residual family solidarity. Shared responsibilities
Materialism and consumerism common. ‘Third Industrial Revolution’ will be facilitated
There will be greater acceptance of social by policies for re-orientation of technologies
exclusion. Regions versus central toward the users (public/private
governments (national and EU) will show partnerships). Stakeholder model of
tension and there will be ‘inequality of enterprise will be apparent: ‘win-win’
governance’ across localities and social flexibility. There will be a renaissance of
groups. People will be increasingly social/ecological awareness, belief in
withdrawing from public life and there will responsibility and civic solidarity, and
be mistrust of collective action. There will be widespread tolerance of diversity. New
a downsized public sector and outsourcing politicians will be at odds with old
of public services will be common. The bureaucrats. There could be a European
private sector may take over traditional initiative for reform of public sector and a
public functions. broad consensus both for the reform of the

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EC Scenarios Europe 2010 Strategic Futures Planning

public sector and social institutions. Any the future but also a ‘back to roots’
reform will be according to the principles intolerance (including gender backlash).
of: decentralisation, transparency and Also likely: creeping racism, and concern
responsibility. There will be an important with economic and even physical security
minority – ‘active citizens’ who will be (urban crime, mafias, war in the near
conditioning political and community life. abroad). There could be a political centre of
There will also be an increased role for gravity towards right-wing populism
evaluation and control mechanisms (‘Fortress Europe’) and a re-legitimisation of
relative to regulation and implementation the state as well as diffuse support of
(and shrinking of traditional ministries authoritarianism. Media may be
could be widespread). encouraging a fear of diversity. Security may
prevail over transparency. Obsolescence of
Creative societies public services could also be prevalent1.
This scenario would be marked by: trend
growth slowdown; strong political impulsion Methodology
to develop green technologies and training The building of the Scenarios Europe 2010
technologies. There would be reorganisation followed a methodology called Shaping
of enterprises around democratic/egalitarian Actors-Shaping Factors. Its development has
lines and there would be revolutionary benefited from regular contacts between the
social/ecological awareness. Reaction Forward Studies Unit and numerous
against structures dominated by ‘economic international institutes active in future
rationality’ would be common. Violent studies. In particular, we would like to
uprisings (in a number of countries) could mention the French Conservatoire National
be sparkled by an EU coordinated plan to des Arts et Métiers, the Dutch institute
cut social protection. Europe-wide forums Clingendael, the Anglo-American Global
would be formed to discuss the future of Business Network, the German think-tank
European societies. We would see a crisis EUCIS, the association Futuribles
and reform of nation states around socio- International and strategic think-tanks of
ecological priorities. There would be large companies such as Shell. The Unit
increasing participation in community and also maintains close contacts with planning
political life following a period of social and future studies departments in EU
upheaval. NGOs would be active in the Member States and large international
provision of some public services organisations, such as the OECD.
(education, training, assistance to low- The basic sequencing of the construction
income people). of the Scenarios Europe 2010 is similar to
the methods developed and used by
Turbulent neighbourhoods Futuribles and CNAM and sometimes
A trend would see growth slowdown with referred to as the école française (analysis of
Europe increasingly at a disadvantage in variables, partial scenarios, global
world competition, especially in hi-tech scenarios). The brainstorming methods that
sectors. Political interference in re- were used are closer to the Anglo-Saxon
organisation of large enterprises would be tradition. Furthermore, the objective of the
seen and there would be increasing risk- exercise and the fact that it was organised
aversion. There would be a pervasive fear of within an institution like the European

64
Strategic Futures Planning EC Scenarios Europe 2010

Commission sometimes led the unit to break to ensure control of the process and
new ground in regard to the existing consistency of output, the methodology
methods. This included the writing up in full followed by each working group was
of the partial scenarios as well as the broadly the same. Specifically, the
technique used for the final selection of the production of the partial scenarios can be
global scenarios. described as a six-step process:

Two stages: partial (theme specific) 1. Kick-off paper: to start the discussion,
scenarios and global scenarios the coordinators present a paper
Given the broad scope of the project, it illustrating the main facts about the
was decided from the beginning that theme under consideration and putting
the construction of the scenarios would relevant questions about the future.
involve two separate stages resulting in two 2. Selection of variables: the group holds a
distinct products, the first of which would brainstorming exercise to put together a
provide the material for the second. rather comprehensive list of the variables
Specifically, the first stage of the project that can have an impact on the theme
aimed at producing partial scenarios under consideration. Each variable is
(theme-specific), to be subsequently subsequently classified as factor or actor.
integrated into the global scenarios Factors are defined as the structural
presented in this publication. trends that are considered important in
shaping future outcomes (in considering
Production of partial scenarios each trend, one should bear in mind
The production of the partial scenarios also the possibility of shocks and
worked as follows. Five themes were chosen inflection points). Actors are defined as
for their capacity to capture and illustrate those players that can influence factors
developments relevant for the future of in an interactive fashion. Through
Europe and its process of integration. They reflection and discussion, the initial list
were: institutions and governance; social of variables (typically numbering around
cohesion; economic adaptability; 50) is reduced to a more manageable
enlargement of the EU; and Europe’s set (ten to 15).
external environment. For each theme a 3. Construction of ‘mini-scenarios’2. A
working group was created, comprising 12 questionnaire is submitted to each
to 15 commission officials chosen for their member of the working group, in which
competence on the subject and their interest he is asked to sketch alternative paths of
in a scenario exercise. Each working group evolution for each shaping actor or
was coordinated by a member of the factor. The answers are elaborated to
Forward Studies Unit and the coordinator of yield comparable sets of alternatives. In
the project was involved in the five groups to practice, this means producing
ensure consistency. A total of over 60 alternative ‘stories’ (each summarized in
officials took part in the exercise. The a two-line sentence) for each
process was designed so as to encourage actor/factor. These receive the name of
participants to ‘think aloud’ and for group ‘mini-scenarios’. Figure 1 shows the
dynamics to generate contrasting mental actors/factors selected for the theme of
pictures about the future. At the same time, economic adaptability and the titles of

65
EC Scenarios Europe 2010 Strategic Futures Planning

1. Demography 2. Technology/Organisation 3. Culture/Values 4. Globalisation


Low population growth, No major breakthrough. Increasing individualism. Globalisation continuing,
medium participation growth Downsizing. Continuing Fear of the future sectoral resistances, local
despecialisation of Europe in difficulties
high-tech
Low population growth, high No major breakthrough. Strongly increasing Globalisation
participation growth, Increasing dualism. Increasing individualism. Social and accelerating. “Borderless
openness to emigration despecialisation of Europe in geographical world”
high-tech segregation. Power of
lobbies
Low population growth, low Major breakthrough. Europe Renaissance of Globalisatin slowing
participation growth, closure innovating and/or catching up social/ecological down, trade conflicts,
to emigration awareness. regional blocks
Regions/localities
experiments
Major breakthrough. Increasing Revolt of the bottom half Global crisis
technologically-induced against globalisation
inequality. Europe catching up

Major breakthrough. Increasing


technologically-induced
inequality. Europe falling
behind

5. Macroeconomic policies (EMU) 6. Industrial policies 7. Social and employment policies 8. International regulations
Broad EMU with limited “Horizontal” policies Continuing “decremental” Mixed strength of institutions
coordination and no major tensions (competitiveness approach) adjustment of social protection

Broad EMU with limited Acceleration of deregulation Strong labour market deregulation. Mixed strength of institutions.
coordination and major tensions and privatisation Residual welfare state Increasing regionalism

Broad EMU with strong “New” industrial policies Strong resistance against welfare Weak institutions. Reversal of
coordination (focus on users) state reform liberalisation

Failure of EMU “Mercantilistic” industrial Radical reform of welfare state: Strong global institutions
policies universalism and individual (economic security council)
incentives

9. European integration 10. Public actors 11. Trade unions 12. NGOs 13. Transnational corporations
Braod enlargement, Governments Continuing decline. Not significant TNCs increasingly important
deep integration constrained by Persistence in economic role
interdependence and protected sectors
lack of consensus

Broad enlaregment, Downsizing of Terminal decline Significant Delining corporative advantage of


shallow integration government economic role TNCs (multinational SMEs)

Narrow enlargement, Institutional review Decline reversal (new Very significant Polital reaction against TNCs
deep integration corporatism) economic role
(taking over
welfare state)

Failure of enlargement Paralysis

Figure 1

66
Strategic Futures Planning EC Scenarios Europe 2010

Figure 2
the ‘mini-scenarios’ corresponding to
each actor/factor. asked to concentrate on a smaller
4. Selection of the ‘pivot variables’. The number of variables, which are most
actors/factors considered with their liable to make the difference between
alternatives are still too numerous to the possible versions of the future. To
allow the formation of contrasted facilitate the choice each factor/actor
pictures of the future. Each group is can be ranked along two dimensions:

67
EC Scenarios Europe 2010 Strategic Futures Planning

uncertainty and impact. Those variables governance, five scenarios on social


that score the highest on both cohesion, etc.), the Forward Studies Unit
dimensions are selected as ‘pivot moved to the second stage of the scenarios
variables’. This allows concentrating on project, namely the production of global
five to six variables instead of ten to 15. scenarios. This stage was coordinated and
5. Selection of the scenarios. Taking into implemented by the three authors of the
account only the pivot variables, the present publication. They were assisted by a
group selects a number (typically steering group including ten other colleagues
ranging from six to eight) of plausible from the Forward Studies Unit and other
and consistent combinations of the departments in the European Commission,
‘mini-scenarios’. This means that each all of which had been already involved in the
combination contains one mini-scenario first stage. The production of the global
(in some cases a mix of two mini- scenarios involved a number of steps.
scenarios) for each ‘pivot variable’ and
that the mini-scenarios are considered to Consistency ranking of the combinations
fit well with each other across the of partial scenarios: in principle, each
variable spectrum. An appropriate title is global scenario can be seen as a
chosen for each combination. Figure 2 combination of five partial scenarios,
presents two examples drawn from the one for each theme. The theoretical
working group on economic number of such combinations, however,
adaptability: the white boxes indicate the is extremely high. An apposite technique
miniscenarios which are retained for is used to rank the possible
each of the pivot variables (note that combinations for overall consistency, so
only five variables are considered that only those combinations exhibiting a
instead of the 13 in the previous Figure). sufficiently high degree of consistency
Once the working group is satisfied with are retained for further consideration3.
the selection of combinations, the other Selection of the global scenarios.
(non-pivot) variables are attached to Concentrating on the combinations
each combination, as it subjectively retained from the consistency exercise,
seems fit. Finally, through a process of the steering group retains the eight to
merging and elimination, the ten more salient and consistent
combinations selected are reduced to combinations. This means not only that
five. Each of these five combinations of the partial scenarios contained in each
mini-scenarios provides the ‘skeleton’ for combination should not appear to
a different scenario. contradict each other, but also that there
6. Writing of the partial scenarios. Based should be some salient feature that
on the ‘skeleton’ of mini-scenarios, a clearly distinguishes each combination
script (about 3,000 words long) is from the others. The combinations are
produced to give narrative form to each reduced to five through a process of
partial scenario. merging and elimination. These five
combinations provide the ‘skeletons’ for
Production of global scenarios the global scenarios.
Each working group having produced a set Analysis of the key drivers of the global
of five partial scenarios (five scenarios on scenarios: based on a rereading of the

68
Strategic Futures Planning EC Scenarios Europe 2010

partial scenarios, a number of key References


drivers, recurring in the different working 1. Cabinet Office – Generic Scenarios: A Strategic
Futures paper (December 2002), Ruth Cousens,
groups, are selected. The role of the key
Tom Steinberg, Ben White & Suzy Walton.
drivers is succinctly described for each
2. Certain experts on prospective methodology call
global scenario. Contradictions and the phase mentioned in paragraphs (3) to (5)
lacunas are identified and eliminated. ‘morphological analysis’. The American F. Zwicky
Test presentation of ‘skeleton’ scenarios. used it for the first time in 1947. For more infor-
Based on the ‘skeleton’ for the global mation consult the book From Anticipation to
Action. A Handbook of Strategic Perspective by
scenarios, a visual presentation is
Michel Godet.
prepared for the purpose of discussion 3. The technique works as follows. Let gov, coh,
with test groups, both inside and outside eco, enl, wld stand for the groups of scenarios
the institution (ten presentations were on governance, social cohesion, the economy,
organised within the commission and 20 enlargement and the world environment, respec-
tively. The ten possible couples of groups are:
were given to outside audiences from
gov/coh, gov/eco, gov/enl, gov/wld, coh/eco,
Europe, the US and Asia.) Criticisms and
coh/enl, coh/wld, eco/enl, eco/wld, enl/wld. As
comments were collected, examined each group contains five scenarios, each couple
and, if deemed appropriate, of groups consists of 25 (five x five) combina-
incorporated in the scenarios. tions of two individual scenarios, for a total of
Writing of the global scenarios. Based 250 combinations. Each of these combinations
is assigned a score for consistency, ranging from
on the ‘skeleton’ combinations of partial
zero to five. At this point one can calculate a
scenarios and the analysis of key drivers, measure of the overall consistency of each theo-
a script (about 4,000 words long) is retically possible combination of five partial
prepared to give a narrative form to scenarios, by summing up the individual scores
each global scenario. of the ten couples of scenarios contained in
each combination. An electronic spreadsheet
Finalisation of the global scenarios. The
programme allows easily to perform the calcula-
draft global scenarios are subjected to
tions and to rank the combinations starting from
two rounds of screening and discussion: those with the highest overall score (50).
first by the authors, then within the 4. For instance, the Unit’s Shaping Actors-Shaping
steering group. Following that, a final Factors methodology was used by the
version of the global scenarios is Norwegian government for the scenario exercise
code-named Norway 2030 (started in 1998).
produced for publication.

The two-stage process described above was


implemented for the first time in the
construction of the Scenarios Europe 2010,
with innovations being introduced practically
at each step. While conceived with the specific
subject(s) in mind, the process has proved to
be flexible enough to accommodate a wide
range of possible topics4. The Forward Studies
Unit continues to work on applications of the
Shaping Actors-Shaping Factors method with
a view to further improving its scenario-
building capabilities.

69
Case study six: The LGA Futures Toolkit
The Local Government Association (LGA) resources to provide them effectively. In the
promotes better local government and face of this onslaught local authorities have
represents the interests of local authorities in quite reasonably concentrated on the short-
England and Wales. It works with and for its term, responding to new demands as they
members, various different types of local have been placed on them.
authorities, to ‘realise a shared vision of
local government that enables local people The origins of Futureswork
to shape a distinctive and better future for Perhaps because even more threats have
their locality and its communities’. Its futures emerged, such as the removal of
toolkit for local governments was produced responsibility for education and the
in the context of the emphasis on forward possibility of regional assemblies, which
thinking in the Modernising Government appear to question the very existence of
white paper and the Cabinet Office report local government, the Local Government
Professional Policy Making For The Twenty Association, the English local authorities
First Century (1999). The LGA recognised collective body, identified a need to look to
that local authorities will be required to start the longer term.
looking ahead, to become more preventative
and to shift the balance of effort away from “Most of the LGA’s work is concerned with
curing problems to anticipating and ‘here and now’ issues: influencing
preventing them. government in the short-term, lobbying for
This introduction to the LGA Futures amendments on Bills and providing
Toolkit serves as a useful example of looking guidance notes and circulars from
to work futures thinking into policy at a local government departments. But much is likely
level, including a discussion of the to change over the next five, ten,15 years
challenges that this might present. and so it is very important to think about the
longer term.1”
Before the reorganisation of 1974, local
government in England was almost a no-go Some success in thinking ahead had already
area, but since then each new government been achieved:
seems to have regarded it as ripe for
intervention. Change in local government “Good policy planning and lobbying by
has almost become endemic as new local government in the run-up to the 1997
structures, new ways of working, changes in general election led to the prospective local
responsibilities, etc. have been introduced in government legislation, to the replacement
a continual stream of reform. At the same of Compulsory Competitive Tendering with
time local authorities have faced Best Value and the innovative ‘New
considerable criticism for failing to attract Commitment’ pathfinder projects2.”
the interest of their electorates and to deliver
effective services, they have also faced tight To build on this success and to think about
budgetary controls, the loss of some of their what local government might be doing in a
traditional functions and the imposition of decade’s time the LGA embarked in early
new responsibilities often without extra 1999 on a new policy priority Futureswork. It

71
The LGA Futures Toolkit Strategic Futures Planning

was seen as important for local government Rising expectations on the part of the
“to be setting the agenda rather than just public which may be expected to spill
reacting to it,” and to be seen as innovative over from the market sector and bring
and influential3. new demands on to local authorities.
The aim of the programme is to explore Sustainable solutions to problems
the roles that local authorities and instead of the tendency to look for a
councillors might play within their quick fix which was too often seen in
communities in the future. Five initial themes the past.
were selected for examination in the Spring Centralisation or community leadership,
of 1999: which derives from the tension in the
government’s modernisation programme
patterns of local governance; between improving national standards
new ways of service delivery; and the development of local community.
effective public services; Appropriate structures for joined up
finance; and government and the effective provision
the information society. of services which may lead to different
patterns of delivery.
A series of workshops involving people from New roles for councillors; new measures
the business, voluntary and academic of success in part resulting from new
communities as well as local government ways of testing local opinion.
examined these themes concluding that Local government’s core business and
local authorities would face many questions particularly whether direct service
about their role and the way they should provision will be as important in
operate over the next ten years. Ten the future.
Challenges to Local Government were Local financial autonomy and
posed as a result of these discussions4. The accountability, including other ways of
challenges were intended to prompt local raising local revenue such as income or
authorities to discuss the issues they raised transport taxation.
and encourage them to consider ways in And the $64,000 question, can local
which local government should respond. government rise to the challenge?
The challenges were:
To further the discussion the LGA General
The challenge of global change, Assembly in December 1999 focused around
particularly in relation to local four propositions designed to encourage
economies, the environment and the debate about the future of local government
implications of the enlargement of the by the elected members present:
European Union.
New needs and new forms of exclusion, local government needs a new breed
related to changing demographic and of councillor;
social patterns and the growth of local government should stop
information technology, which it was delivering services;
argued could produce a new division there will always be excluded groups;
between the information rich and the there is no place left for
information poor. local government.

72
Strategic Futures Planning The LGA Futures Toolkit

The report of these discussions5 suggests a to highlight some of the drivers


recognition of the need for change but, not of change;
surprisingly, sees a continuing role for local to save councils reinventing the
government. Although it is anticipated that same wheels;
services will increasingly be provided by a to provide guidance on how questions
range of providers often outside local (how we can stimulate local discussion
government, the role of local authorities as and debate);
community representatives and leaders is to help to prompt what if questions
seen as offering them an effective future. about the future6.”
The ten challenges were also noted in a
parallel report produced by the Society of A working group composed of the director
Local Authority Chief Officers, (SOLACE of strategy at the LGA, two local
2000), Rebirth or Stillbirth? Reviewing key government officers and members of
trends and the role of local politics the CUDEM met in early 2000 to draw up a
SOLACE report suggested two alternative structure for the toolkit and to divide up
scenarios for local government in 2010. The responsibility for the production of the
‘Renaissance’ scenario sees local authorities material. Most of the development work
who are responsible for the strategic was done independently with two more
commissioning of services, risk taking, meetings during the process to coordinate
brokerage, planning, advocating, efforts. The toolkit, which was published in
governance, scrutiny, enabling and July 2000, provides:
representing the interests of their areas
whereas ‘The Pits’ sees them as bankrupt, an introduction which outlines the
bureaucratic, boring, non-performing, argument for a longer term view;
directed, demotivated, not valued, derided, information on the likely ‘drivers of
disaffected, Public sector shelf-stackers. In change’ over the next ten to 20 years;
order to achieve a renaissance it is argued three scenarios of the world in which
local authorities will need to address local government may be operating;
fundamental changes; failure to do so is ways to help authorities think about
most likely to lead to ‘The Pits’ and the future;
inevitable oblivion. some case studies illustrating how
councils are already considering the
The Futures Toolkit future and its potential implications;
In order to help authorities in facing these materials for use in local workshops;
challenges the LGA decided to develop a guidance to other sources of help
Futures Toolkit containing resources to assist and assistance.
them and it was at this stage that CUDEM
was invited to become involved. CUDEM Also included in the toolkit are a video Fast
was identified as an appropriate partner forward to 2010: Issues for tomorrow’s
because members of the research group council and a CD ROM local-
were involved in the MA in Foresight and government.net which gives authorities
Futures Studies offered by the University, the access to a range of resources.
only such course in the UK. “The purposes The introduction to the toolkit outlines
of the toolkit were: why local authorities should consider the

73
The LGA Futures Toolkit Strategic Futures Planning

future, both in general terms, pointing out points were used to illustrate important
the changing circumstances in which issues. Summaries of potential changes and
authorities are likely to be operating, and by questions for consideration plus a brief list
more specific reference to requirements of resources to provide further information
being placed on them. Among these the were included. Sample slides for use on a
Local Government Act 2000 that requires projector were included for each ‘driver’,
authorities to consider the long-term listing the most likely potential changes and
‘wellbeing’ of their areas as part of a questions which may arise. Some loss of
mandate for local political and community depth would be inevitable in this form of
leadership is particularly significant. Section presentation but it was considered more
four of the act requires local authorities to important to provide a relatively brief starter
prepare a community strategy, the first for discussion than a lengthy paper which
component of which is a long term vision for would probably not have been used.
the area. The need for policy-making to be A similar approach was adopted for the
forward-looking and take a long-term view futures methods. Using a classification
of the likely impact of policy is regarded as based on the assumptions on which different
a core competency of the Modernising futures methods are based, eight different
Government agenda and the Cabinet Office methods for Foreseeing, Managing or
report Professional Policy Making For The Creating the future were outlined:
Twenty-First Century7.
In preparing the sections for which Foreseeing
CUDEM was responsible we were – extrapolation
concerned to make the material accessible, – causal models
which meant limiting the length of the Managing
content of each driver and method – scenarios
described and as far as possible expressing – Delphi exercises
the ideas in easily understood terms. The – issues management
Drivers of Change were arranged under the Creating
following headings: – brainstorming
– creative imagery
demographic change; – community visioning
technology;
globalisation; Each method, again intended to be
environment and natural resources; described on no more that two sides of A4,
work and employment; though presented as part of a pamphlet,
inequality and social cohesion; was presented using the following headings:
patterns of settlement;
attitudes and values; and introduction, where the basis and the
governance, the state and politics. assumptions behind the method are
briefly explained;
Each was presented on two sides of a requirements, which sets out what is
separate A4 sheet to enable it to be easily needed to carry out the method;
copied and used either together or procedure, where the steps to be taken
individually to initiate discussion. Bullet in running the method are outlined;

74
Strategic Futures Planning The LGA Futures Toolkit

advantages; and doubt about their use by individual


disadvantages. authorities. Rather like the scenarios in
the SOLACE report there is one that is
The intention was to provide users with likely to be favoured and a risk that
guidance in using each of the methods to the others will be rejected. If this were
enable them to run their own exercises to happen the value of these less
rather than rely on outside experts. The desirable visions of the future, in
toolkit also included: encouraging authorities to think of
ways they might be avoided and the
A brief video with two sections: the first more favourable future achieved,
consisting of a ‘news bulletin’ from 2010 would be lost. This serves to
envisaging developments such as emphasise the care with which the
Regional Assemblies, privatised schools scenario method needs to be used if it
and pensions, congestion charging, joint is to be effective.
public-private ventures for library A directory of sources of local data
services and compulsory voting in available to authorities.
mayoral elections; and the second of Nineteen case studies of futures or
interviews with a range of councillors visioning activities that have been carried
about the future of local government. out by a range of councils and groups of
Three scenarios of local government councils, either in-house or involving local
in 2010. partner organisations and community
– Modernised Markets in which representatives. The brief details given
economic growth is high but indicate that 13 focused on a date for
fluctuating; society is prosperous but their exercise, eight choosing 2020 with
divided; crime, congestion and the others looking ten years ahead and the
environment remain unresolved furthest 30; nine included local
concerns and local authorities have organisations and four the local
fewer functions and are focused on community; two used the Ten Challenges
efficient service delivery in a to Local Government as the starter for
competitive environment. their debate and one focused on Agenda
– A New Dimension in which growth is 21. Relatively few mention any specific
fairly high but stable enabling a methods but three used scenarios, two
more cohesive society and councils visioning and two mind-maps, others used
are in the forefront of initiatives to timelines, guided visualisation and
rebuild civil society and involvement structured open space methods.
in governance.
– On The Edge in which growth is low; For more resources and information see
society is divided with those who can http://www.lga.gov.uk/Publication.asp?lsecti
afford to do so purchasing private on=0&ccat=28&id=-A7805B01
services particularly in education and
health and local authorities struggling References
to improve. Although the scenarios 1. Jones D (2001) the LGA Futures Toolkit,
presentation by Doug Jones (head of
were well written and in themselves
strategy group, LGA) to LARIA Annual
quite convincing there may be some
Conference 2001.

75
The LGA Futures Toolkit Strategic Futures Planning

2. Local Government Association (1999) An


Introduction to Future Work
http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/futures/introduction.ht
m (29/09/99).
3. Jones D (2001) the LGA Futures Toolkit, presen-
tation by Doug Jones (head of strategy group,
LGA) to LARIA Annual Conference 2001.
4. Local Government Association (1999) Ten
Challenges to Local Government, LGA circular
502/99, August.
5. LGA (2000) Debating Futures? Issues from the
LGA General Assembly, December 1999.
6. Jones D (2001) the LGA Futures Toolkit, presen-
tation by Doug Jones (Head of Strategy group,
LGA) to LARIA Annual Conference 2001.
7. Strategic Policy Making Team Cabinet Office
(1999) Professional Policy Making for the Twenty
First Century

76
Case study seven: The UK Climate Impacts
Programme Scenarios
The UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) reflect upon possible alternative futures
helps organisations assess how they might and to make sense of what this means
be affected by climate change, so they can for them in the context of climate change
prepare for its impact. UKCIP is part of a impacts. This report presents a toolkit,
wider programme of research into climate so that studies can select and develop
change being undertaken by Defra socio-economic scenarios and apply them
(Department for Environment, Food and within climate impact assessments. The
Rural Affairs). It works with its stakeholders report contains:
and coordinate research on how climate
change will have an impact at regional and 1. An explanation of why socio-economic
national levels, providing support and scenarios are required for climate
guidance throughout the process for both change impact assessment.
stakeholders and researchers, acting as a 2. A presentation of the national level
bridge between researchers and decision- scenarios commissioned by the
makers in government organisations Department of the Environment,
and business. Transport and the Regions (DETR) and
Its socio-economic scenarios for climate developed for the programme by a team
change impact assessment offer an insight led by SPRU (Science and Technology
into why foresight work is needed in the Policy Research) at the University of
present day for a wide range of Sussex, and comprising the Centre for
organisations. They also provide some Social and Economic Research on the
considerations on how best to go about Global Environment (CSERGE), the
constructing scenarios for such Climatic Research Unit (CRU) and the
broad relevance. Policy Studies Institute (PSI). They are
linked to scenarios developed for the
Introduction Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
The first signs of climate change are already Change (IPCC) Special Report on
emerging, and will continue into a future Emissions Scenarios (SRES) and the
which will be very different from today. scenarios used in the Department of
Enormous challenges are faced in devising Trade and Industry’s (DTI’s) Natural
socio-economic scenarios for the Resources and Environment Panel of the
assessment of future impacts and there UK Foresight Programme.
is very little experience to draw upon. 3. Guidance on the use of socio-economic
Socio-economic scenarios have not been scenarios at a regional level, drawing on
widely used within impacts studies, but the consultation process during the
this report will serve to encourage their development of the national level
use more widely within the UK Climate scenarios, along with commissioned
Impacts Programme (UKCIP). The aim papers which review initial experience of
has been to develop a scenarios framework their use in some first stage regional
through which stakeholders are able to studies within UKCIP.

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The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios Strategic Futures Planning

Why socio-economic scenarios Land use change and development of


are required for climate change the built environment is giving rise to
impact assessment loss of biodiversity irrespective of climate
Whilst the use of climate scenarios as change. In some cases climate change
inputs into vulnerability, impact or will exacerbate these pressures, in
adaptation assessments is well established, other cases it will cause additional
there is far less experience of using direct threats.
socio-economic scenarios. However, Flooding events may be worse if there is
studies to assess climate change impacts a larger population living on the flood
suffer from serious weakness if by default plain as a result of planning decisions.
they merely assume that the projected The effect of climate change on crop
future climates will take place in a yields will depend on how many farmers
world with a society and economy similar have planted the crops, whether their
to today. farm income is dependent on that crop,
Difficult though the task is of in turn depending on agricultural
constructing climate scenarios, it is generally subsidies, access to technology and
acknowledged that the job of generating so on.
socio-economic scenarios is even more Some technological developments, such
complex. This is because while most aspects as improvement of weather forecasting,
of climate projection are based on well- may enable better precautions to be
understood physical processes, there is less taken to diminish vulnerability to extreme
understanding of the interactions of factors weather events.
operating in socio-economic systems, which
change very rapidly. For this reason it is not Approach adopted for the UKCIP
possible to construct socio-economic socio-economic scenarios
scenarios on the same long-term time-scales Development of the UKCIP socio-economic
as climate scenarios. scenarios (UKCIP SES) has had the benefit
Scenarios are coherent, internally of some new work, but use of scenarios has
consistent and plausible descriptions only recently been undertaken significantly
of possible future states of the world, within public policy in the UK. Official
used to inform future trends, potential projections are generally extrapolated trends
decisions, or consequences. They can that, with the exception of demographic
be considered as a convenient way of data, rarely exceed 15-20 years ahead. The
visioning a range of possible futures, land use planning guidance currently
constructing worlds outside the normal stretches up to 2021. In the private sector,
timespans and processes covering the only multi-national enterprises have large
public policy environment. strategic and corporate teams with medium-
Different social and economic structures and long-term planning horizons. Many
will affect sensitivity to climate change, as small and medium size enterprises invariably
they affect the potential for response and focus on the next year or two ahead.
adaptation. The impacts of future climates However, with the accelerating pace of
will also be fundamentally determined by change surrounding globalisation and
future technology and governance technological development, there has been
structures. Here are some illustrations: increased recognition that more strategic,

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Strategic Futures Planning The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios

innovative perspectives can provide useful is sufficient: to make people think about the
insights. Thus, the UKCIP SES have been future; to present options; to examine the
able to draw on the work for the DTI’s robustness of long-term strategies; and to
Foresight Programme, which itself was indicate the boundaries of risks
related to new work developed for the IPCC. and chances.
In this work, led by SPRU, a predictive TRANSPARENT (clear exposition of
approach to the future was avoided in assumptions). The scenarios need to be
developing the scenarios. Instead the future transparent in order to be acceptable to
was approached in an exploratory way, stakeholders and impact researchers. A
taking into account the perceptions and clear methodology is needed to enable
knowledge of social and economic players different impact studies to be comparable.
involved. The approach adopted was to General principles of scenario
emphasise that futures scenarios are a tool construction were applied with the
for visioning the future; they are not a set of following aims.
prescriptions of how the future will evolve.
The basic scenario dimensions
Development of the UKCIP SES It was decided to make the more qualitative
A review was undertaken of existing scenario dimensions of socio-economic change the
work and this suggested four criteria for the basis of scenario construction. The two
development of the socio-economic dimensions relate to: (1) governance and
scenarios in this study: the capacity of institutions at different levels
RELEVANT (applicable to public and private to manage change; and (2) the orientation
sector decision-mmaking). The scenarios of social and political values. This choice
should be of relevance to impact was made on analytical grounds, on the
researchers and constructed in a way that basis of the scenarios literature, and follows
allows them to be broken down on a a similar set of dimensions chosen in the
regional and/or sectoral scale. The scenario IPCC SRES socio-economic scenarios. The
framework must be flexible enough to choice has been justified by stakeholder
integrate sector-specific options or sub- engagement throughout the project but
scenarios. Relevance to stakeholders could of course be different.
involves identifying the main variables
influencing vulnerability to climate change. Other scenario dimensions
CONSISTENT (based on coherent Other dimensions of future developments
assumptions). Scenarios for impact are associated to a greater or lesser extent
assessment have to be integrative and with governance and values. Some
comprehensive. They need to embody a dimensions such as population develop in a
consistent storyline and set of illustrative predictable, semi-autonomous way, while
quantified indicators. others such as technology are more
CREDIBLE (not overestimating the rate of dependent on social values and regulation.
change). The scenarios should describe a The task of elaborating storylines in the
set of credible outcomes that, nevertheless, context of these qualitative dimensions has a
challenge present-day assumptions. Being strong subjective and judgmental flavour
prospective in nature, the scenarios should where stakeholder contributions have
cover a range of alternative outcomes which been valuable.

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The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios Strategic Futures Planning

Relevance at national and regional levels however, that in terms of, for example
The scenarios refer to the UK, but are economic growth, the scenarios are more
applicable at a regional/country level. extreme than typical Treasury forecasts.
National indicators have had to be
supplemented by expert guidance about Drivers and impact domains
differences between regions within the UK. In order to facilitate use by the climate
At the same time, the UK operates in a impacts research community, the exposition
wider European and global context. of each of the scenarios is based around
Therefore, scenarios for developments in drivers and impact domains. The drivers are:
the UK implicitly assume characteristics values and policy; economic development;
about the development of Europe and the and settlement and planning. The impact
world at large. domains are: agriculture; water;
ecosystems; coastal zones; tourism; and the
Consistency of indicators built environment.
The need of the climate impacts research
community for a variety of quantified Four futures scenarios
indicators meant that a considerable The four socio-economic scenarios which
amount of attention has been paid to have been developed for the UK by the
consistency within scenarios. No formal SPRU team are set in a global context for
modelling has been undertaken within this two time-frames: the 2020s and the 2050s.
project, but a set of consistency checks has They are based on a review of the large
been applied to ensure that different global futures literature which identified five
indicators (for example, household main dimensions of change highlighted in
formation and economic growth), although previous scenario planning exercises:
determined through expert judgement, are
telling the same story. Where possible, the composition and rate of
sector specialists were consulted in economic growth;
choosing relevant indicators and defining the rate and direction of
indicator values. technological change;
the nature of governance; and
Symmetry in treatment of scenarios social and political values.
A balance has had to be struck between
scenarios which appear plausible because Social and political values, and the nature
they extrapolate current trends, and those of governance have been taken to be
which represent a break with the past and fundamental and independent determinants
are deliberately more challenging to the of future change. In particular, it was
conventional wisdom. A deliberate decision assumed that economic growth,
was made to develop a set of four scenarios demographic changes and technological
which were clearly separate and distinctive, changes are primarily an outcome of the
but which did not break all bounds of relationship between socio-political values
plausibility. Equivalent effort has been and the interests of organisations, although
devoted in this study to elaborating each they clearly have an influence on the
scenario – a practice recommended to users development of values and the nature of
of the scenario framework. This does mean governance. In addition, economic,

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Strategic Futures Planning The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios

social goals. There is greater concern about


the future, equity and participation. Civil
society is strong and highly valued, and
resources are allocated through more
deeply managed markets.
The vertical governance dimension aims
to show alternative structures of political and
economic power and decision-making. The
future of governance at the UK and regional
levels will be influenced to a great extent by
developments in the European Union, and
at the global level. At one end of the
spectrum (INTERDEPENDENCE), the power
to govern is distributed upwards, downwards
and outwards away from the national state
Four socio-economic scenarios for the UK level. International economic, political and
cultural relationships strengthen, and
demographic and technological changes regional and national boundaries become
are more easily quantified and amenable to more permeable. There may be a role for
modelling, whereas values and governance regional decision-making and for regional
cannot be quantified in any useful way. particularities, but this will be in the context
The scenario framework segments the of globalised economic and political
future ‘possibility space’ into four quadrants systems. At the other end of the spectrum
following other work on scenario (AUTONOMY), economic and political
development. Here they are defined by a power is retained at national (National
‘values’ and a ‘governance’ axis. Enterprise) and regional (Local Stewardship)
The horizontal values dimension captures levels. Sovereignty is retained over key areas
alternative developments in core social and of policy, and the process of economic
economic values as they might be globalisation is weakened. Governments
represented in choices by consumers and have greater autonomy in decision-making,
policymakers. At one end of the spectrum and economic, political and cultural
(CONSUMERISM), values are dominated by boundaries are maintained or strengthened.
the drive to private consumption and National and regional development is based
personal freedom. The rights of the on local capabilities and resources.
individual and the present are privileged These two dimensions generate a set of
over those of the collective and the future. associations which can be applied to
Resources are distributed through free and understanding of changes at a national,
competitive markets, with the function of sectoral and regional level. The implications
governance limited to guaranteeing trade of the dimensions for each of the four
and capitalist accumulation. At the other scenarios are elaborated in this report.
end (COMMUNITY), values are shaped by Storylines are presented for each scenario,
concern for the common good. The covering: values and policy; economic
individual is seen as part of a collective, development; and settlement and planning.
with rights and responsibilities determined by To facilitate their use in climate impacts

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The UK Climate Impacts Programme Scenarios Strategic Futures Planning

assessments, the storylines have also been opportunity to take a systematic approach to
developed for key impacts domains, exploring linkages between local, regional
including: agriculture; water; ecosystems; and global scales.
coastal zones; tourism; and the built Knowledge has accumulated on what
environment. Quantitative indicators are are realistic expectations for the application
provided for demography, economic growth of the UKCIP SES, along with both their
and development, land use change and strengths and constraints. New reference
settlement patterns. frameworks have also become established
below the UK level. More specifically, in
Initial operationalisation addition to the establishment of the
within UKCIP devolved administrations in Scotland and
The UKCIP SES has already provided a Wales, developments at a regional level in
useful toolkit for several studies. The England have proceeded apace in the past
scenarios have been shown to be capable two years, particularly with the emergence of
of flexible application for varying purposes, Regional Planning Guidance which virtually
for example: covers the first time period of the scenarios
(2020s). These changes suggest the need
awareness raising on socio-economic for a link between the scenarios and
dimensions of climate change impact developments in strategic planning at a
studies (South East scoping study, Wales regional level.
scoping study); To complement the scenarios, guidance
providing inputs to the development of is given on their use, drawing on experience
broad regional strategies and policies as during phase one of UKCIP for the benefit
undertaken by organisations such as the of next stage studies. The scenarios are not
Regional Development Agencies and intended to act as a ‘blueprint’. The
Regional Planning Bodies (North West research team carrying out a sectoral or
UKCIP SES operationalisation regional study, by virtue of its expertise, will
study); and be best placed to develop detailed
as the basis for development of scenarios. Teams will need to consider
quantified regional socio-economic carefully how to use the scenarios for
scenarios for use in integrated work maximum effectiveness in their studies.
(Regional Climate Change Impact and Guidance is given on the following issues:
Response Studies in East Anglia and selection and modification of the scenarios
North west England – RegIS). to the regional scale; their use with
stakeholders; quantification of the scenarios
The framework scenarios provide a set of at a regional scale; and their integration
standard, unifying assumptions about the with climate scenarios.
basic social and economic dimensions of
change. Qualitative assumptions about
social values and approaches to
governance, as well as quantitative
assumptions about economic growth and
population change, can be applied across a
range of studies. They also provide an

82
Case study eight: Foresight Futures 2020
The UK Foresight programme is managed by Getting started can be difficult and too
the Office of Science and Technology and often we are trapped in our own
‘brings together key people, knowledge and preconceptions of what the future might be
ideas to look beyond normal commercial like. This publication aims to help start the
time horizons to identify potential process of planning for the longer term. It
opportunities from new science and provides you with four alternative scenarios
technologies and actions to help realise of change in the UK over the next 20 to 30
those opportunities.’ years against which you can test your
These scenarios were developed by a business strategies. Set out at the back of
team of researchers at SPRU-Science and this report is guidance for those new to
Technology Policy Research, University of using scenarios. The guidance covers:
Sussex, in consultation with stakeholders
from business, government and academia. Why use scenarios?
The framework builds on an extensive review How to use scenarios to
of national and global futures scenarios and develop strategies.
draws on work of related scenarios exercises Five keys to ensure success when
from the Foresight programme and using scenarios.
more broadly.
The Foresight Futures 2020 scenarios Overview of the scenarios
give a valuable insight in to how to conduct Scenarios are not intended to predict the
a foresight process which can produce useful future. Rather, they are tools for thinking
results for a variety of different stakeholders, about the future based on four assumptions:
and valuable advice for how those
stakeholders can use and apply their work The future is unlike the past, and is
(taken from the UK Foresight Report). shaped by human choice and action.
The future cannot be foreseen, but
All decisions, whether in business or in exploring the future can inform
government, are taken against an uncertain present decisions.
future. Against this background of There are many possible futures,
uncertainty, business needs to choose more scenarios map a ‘possibility space’.
robust strategies that will bring benefits even Scenario development involves rational
in very different futures. Planning more analysis and subjective judgement.
robust strategies can be made easier by
assessing different options against three or The four scenarios in this report describe
four possible future scenarios. For example what the UK could be like during the period
if a business is involved in providing office 2010–2030. They have been developed by
accommodation it might want to consider its identifying social and economic trends. For
strategies against a scenario where demand example, potential changes in the balance
increases in and around London, one where of control between regional and national
demand increases evenly throughout the government. This and a range of other
UK, and also a future where overall demand factors have been used to build up four
falls in the UK. scenarios of the future.

83
Foresight Futures 2020 Strategic Futures Planning

storyline for each scenario. In


Interdependence addition, Snapshot 2010, which
can be found at the end of this
World Global report, provides key performance
markets sustainability indicators for each of the scenarios.
The indicators were chosen to
Conventional
development cover a wide range of economic,
Individual Community
National Local social and environmental issues
enterprise stewardship and relate to commonly-used
statistics, such as the UK Quality
of Life indicators1. However, all of
the storylines and indicators
Autonomy presented here are only examples
of what may happen in the future.
Figure 1: Four UK futures scenarios They are intended as tools to
help users on their way. The
Figure one shows the four scenarios four scenarios are:
and conventional development in relation to
two drivers of change: social values (x axis) world markets;
and systems of governance (y axis). Social global sustainability;
values range from individualistic values to national enterprise;
more community orientated values. It takes local stewardship.
account of social and political priorities and
the pattern of economic activity that results World markets
from them. Systems of governance deals People aspire to personal independence,
with the structure of government and the material wealth and mobility to the exclusion
decision-making process. It ranges from of wider social goals. Integrated global
autonomy where power remains at a markets are presumed to be the best way to
national level to interdependence where deliver this. Internationally coordinated
power increasingly moves to other policy sets framework conditions for the
institutions, for example, up to the EU and efficient functioning of markets. The
down to regional government. provision of goods and services is privatized
The scenarios are presented as storylines wherever possible under a principle of
which set out some general trends and ‘minimal government’. Rights of individuals
provide more detail in a number of areas: to personal freedoms are enshrined in law.

economic and sectoral trends; National enterprise


employment and social trends; People aspire to personal independence and
regional development; material wealth within a nationally-rooted
health, welfare and education; cultural identity. Liberalised markets together
the environment. with a commitment to build capabilities and
resources to secure a high degree of
A synopsis of key drivers and underlying national self-reliance and security are
assumptions is given alongside the believed to best deliver these goals. Political

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Strategic Futures Planning Foresight Futures 2020

and cultural institutions are


strengthened to buttress Drivers
national autonomy in a more
Social values Internationalist
fragmented world.
Libertarian

Global responsibility Governance structures Weak


Dispersed
People aspire to high levels of
Consultative
welfare within communities with
shared values, more equally Role of policy Minimal
distributed opportunities and a Enabling markets
sound environment. There is a belief Economic trends
that these objectives are best
achieved through active public Economic development High growth
High innovation
policy and international cooperation
Capital productivity
within the European Union and at a
global level. Social objectives are Strutural change Rapid
met through public provision, Towards services
increasingly at an international Fast-growing sectors Health and leisure
level. Markets are regulated to Media and information
encourage competition amongst Financial services
national players. Personal and Biotechnology
Nanotechnology
social behaviour is shaped by
commonly held beliefs and customs. Declining sectors Manufacturing
Agriculture
Local stewardship
Social trends
People aspire to sustainable levels of
welfare in federal and networked Unemployment Medium-low
communities. Markets are subject to
social regulation to ensure more Income High
equally distributed opportunities and
Equity Strong decline
a high quality local environment.
Active public policy aims to promote Areas of conflict Social exclusion
economic activities that are small Immigration/emigration
Political accountability
scale and regional in scope, and acts
to constrain large-scale markets and Table 1: World markets
technologies. Local communities are
strengthened to ensure participative and either side of this, and encourage us to
transparent governance in a complex world. explore a number of different, logically-
consistent pathways as a way of framing
Guide to using the scenarios questions about the future.
Good scenarios help us to understand how
key drivers might interact and affect the Why use futures scenarios?
future. Scenarios go beyond a single best In this guide we illustrate why organisations
estimate, or a ‘high’ and ‘low’ projection should use scenarios in their planning

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Foresight Futures 2020 Strategic Futures Planning

process; how to use scenarios to


test and refine strategies; and five Drivers
keys to the successful use
Social values Nationalist
of scenarios. Individualist
Governance structures Weak
Adding value to
National
strategy-ssetting Closed
Although scenario exercises vary
in their specific aims, they Role of policy State-centred
Market regulation to protect key sectors
possess a number of common
traits, which distinguish them Economic trends
from more traditional forecasting
approaches. Not only are they Economic development Medium-low growth
Low innovation
looking into the far future, usually
Maintenance economy
one or more decades ahead, but
they also assess developments Strutural change More stable economic structure
across a broad area.
The use of exploratory Fast-growing sectors Private health and education
scenarios approaches should be Domestic and personal services
considered when: Tourism
Retailing
Defence
the future is uncertain;
the ability to adapt to future Declining sectors Public services
change is restrained or if Civil engineering
adjustments carry the risk of
Social trends
negative effects over the
longer term (for example, Unemployment Medium-high
technological ‘lock-in’);
there are opportunities for Income Medium-low
positive gains from pursuing Equity Decline
‘robust strategies’.
Areas of conflict Unemployment
Broadly, the benefits of scenario Poor public services
Inequality
planning are:
Table 2: National enterprise
It expands the range of future
outcomes considered in strategic prospects or consumer preferences.
decision-making, so strategies are The process of engaging with scenario
developed to be more robust under a elaboration itself can be a valuable
variety of circumstances. This avoids the contribution to preparing the ground
risk of ‘putting all eggs in one basket’. It for change. If carried out in an
places under scrutiny the assumptions inclusive and positive process, scenario
underlying strategic decisions, for planning can encourage self-reflection
example about long-term growth within the organisation, strengthen

86
Strategic Futures Planning Foresight Futures 2020

How can the Foresight Futures


Drivers 2020 scenarios be used?
The Foresight Futures can be used in a
Social values Internationalist range of different ways, depending on
Communitarian
the needs of the individuals or
Governance structures Strong organisations and the resources
Coordinated available. Users are encouraged to
Consultative develop their own conclusions about the
futures, employing the scenarios as a
Role of policy Corporatist starting point and then elaborating and
Political
evaluating them in ways that are in tune
Social and environmental goals
with their needs.
Economic trends Over the past three years, a number
of organisations have used the scenarios
Economic development Medium-high growth to explore the future. For example, a
High innovation number of trade associations have used
Resource productivity the scenarios to challenge views of future
prospects in their sectors; government
Strutural change Fast
Towards services departments have explored strategic
policy issues and research; and research
projects, including a number of Foresight
Fast-growing sectors Education and training
Large systems engineering projects, have used the scenarios to
New and renewable energy assess long-term socio-economic trends.
Information services Based on a review of these exercises and
insights from the futures literature, this
Declining sectors Fossil fuel energy section provides guidance on the use of
Traditional manufacturing the Foresight Futures scenarios. It offers
some ideas and recommendations,
Social trends without attempting to be prescriptive.
There are two basic approaches to
Unemployment Low the use of the scenarios.

Income Medium-high Approach 1


To use the scenarios to stimulate
Equity Improvement
thought on what the future holds and to
Areas of conflict Structural change consider the implications for medium
Change of skills and long-term strategies.
Political accountability
Such exercises are usually carried
Institutional rigidity
out on a small scale with one-off
Table 3: Global responsibility
brainstorming events. Typically they start
with a presentation and discussion of the
strategic thinking at all levels, and scenarios, followed by a brainstorming
help overcome organisational rigidities session to consider the implications.
and routines. Involving representatives from all interested

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Foresight Futures 2020 Strategic Futures Planning

parties is crucial for the success


of these exercises. So, in a Drivers
business, people from
marketing, finance and Social values Localist
Cooperative
production should be included,
rather than just staff from the Governance structures Strong
strategy or research unit.These Local
exercises are usually: Participative

participative; Role of policy Interventionist


based on the experience Social and environmental
of practitioners;
a mechanism to engage key Economic trends
people in the development
of strategy. Economic development Low growth
Low innovation
Modular and sustainable
Frequently their use depends on a
‘champion’ of scenario planning Strutural change Moderate
at a senior level of management. Towards regional systems
Their function is to attract interest
and to stimulate creative thinking.
Fast-growing sectors Small-scale manufacturing
Food and organic farming
Approach 2 Local services
To use the scenarios as the basis
for a research-based study on a
Declining sectors Retailing
specific sector or issue. The Tourism
scenarios provide the conceptual Financial systems
framework for the study.
When the scenarios are
Social trends
used in this way the
Unemployment Medium-low (larger voluntary sector)
approach typically:
Income Low
is based on data in addition
to expert knowledge; Equity Strong improvement
includes scientific methods
as well as consultation; Areas of conflict Land use
Under-investment
uses the scenarios to
Environmental restrictions
assess outcomes.
Table 4: Local stewardship
The main challenge for this
approach is to combine the ‘soft’ scenario only be seen as a starting point. If it seems
tool with ‘hard’, quantitative methods. This appropriate, they can be revised, specified
report offers a number of indicators as an or complemented by other indicators.
illustration of trends, but again these should Simple modelling and cross-impact analysis

88
Strategic Futures Planning Foresight Futures 2020

can be employed to ensure consistency and


An exercise carried out by the Foresight
analytical depth. Crime Prevention Panel provides an
example for a typical one-off scenario
Five keys to successful use planning event. The aim of the panel was
of scenarios to explore the crime potentials of new
technologies and to ensure that these
There are five key challenges to meet in
potentials were minimized through pre-
order to use scenarios successfully.These ventive action. The 1998 Foresight
are as follows. Futures scenarios were used in a one-day
workshop to structure thinking about the
Engaging stakeholders future of crime. Groups organised around
Scenario exercises can only be successful in each of the four scenarios developed
sectoral scenarios for the crime of the
promoting creative and unconventional
future. They identified new technologies
thinking if those with an interest trust the likely to be used by criminals, as well as
process and are engaged throughout. To potential prevention strategies and
convince stakeholders of the value of these necessary responses. Results of the
exercises, it is vital to: workshop were fed into the panel’s
consultation paper and report.
Be clear about the aims and limitations
of the approach. Scenarios are not
The RegIS study investigated the
aiming to predict the future, nor even to combined effects of the UKCIP socio-
identify the most likely future. Instead, economic scenarios (based on the same
they map out a ‘possibility space’ to framework as the Foresight Futures
inform the decisions of the present. The scenarios) and the UKCIP98 climate
scenarios, for two regions of the UK. This
scenarios method is based on subjective
was the first UK regional integrated
choices (as is any other approach to assessment of the impacts of climate
explore uncertain futures) but unlike change on agriculture, water, biodiversity
other tools, it allows stakeholders to and the coastal zone. In RegIS, two of the
consider the underlying assumptions and UKCIP socioeconomic scenarios were
to discuss and challenge how this might further developed with local decision
makers from East Anglia and North West
affect the future.
England. This provided quantified indica-
Provide sufficient detail. Experience tors (for example, for agricultural crop
has shown that the first presentation prices) for the 2050s, for input into the
of the scenarios is crucial. It needs to RegIS sectoral models.
give enough detail to convey the basic
logic of the scenarios without
overwhelming the audience. It can be need to be given as to how the results
helpful if participants have the chance will feed into decision-making.
to become familiar with the scenarios
in advance. Getting the process right
Explain how the results will be used. If Maximising the learning benefits of scenario
participants are to be convinced of the planning exercises requires close attention to
importance of their contribution, the aim process. Careful planning and structuring of
of the scenario planning process needs the scenario elaboration, synthesis and
to be well-defined and clear indications evaluation stages of scenario planning is

89
Foresight Futures 2020 Strategic Futures Planning

needed. The details of the process should be as possible – covering the same areas and
tailored to the needs and resources available seeking to avoid bias towards or against any
in each case.The process needs to: particular scenario.

allow for the integration of the different Triangulation (comparison)


viewpoints and technical expertise; A process of ensuring that the distinctiveness
be iterative, combining creative, and coherence of scenarios is
participative workshops with work carried retained (mainly by viewing the narratives
out by individuals or small groups to side-by-side).
synthesise and elaborate scenarios;
be realistic about the time and resources Adapting the scenarios
needed to complete an exercise as this The scenarios provide a generic framework
tends to be under-estimated; allow time but they are in themselves not relevant to
for analysis of the results; many sectors or policy areas. The aim of the
involve stakeholders. framework and these guidance notes is to
provide a means for scenarios to be
The scenario elaboration workshop is elaborated for any given area of interest.
perhaps the most critical stage. Key points to This requires:
consider are:
the identification of key drivers in
it takes time to familiarise participants the sector (for example, international
with future thinking; the initial workshop markets, social preferences,
should be at least a full day. regional planning);
a typical structure for the workshop an assessment of the links between
might be: aim of the process, drivers and relevant sectoral trends;
introduction scenario approach, specialist knowledge of the sector.
presentation of scenarios, elaboration of
sectoral scenarios (for example, The scenario framework is a flexible tool
transport in 2020) in break-out groups, which should be adapted and altered to suit
feedback, planning next steps. the needs of a given study; it can be
moderation by a professional with modified and ‘played with’. They should not
scenario experience is recommended. be taken as an authoritative set of
We recommend that three principles are projections. The benefit of using a common
applied in scenario elaboration and set of basic dimensions (values and
evaluation: symmetry, balance and governance) is that these have proven
triangulation (comparison). robust in a number of different settings.
However, these dimensions may not always
Symmetry be relevant, or there may be an interest in
Equivalent effort is devoted to the testing alternatives. New dimensions and
elaboration of all the scenarios chosen. new scenario labels would then be the right
course to take.
Balance Producing four scenario elaborations
The scenario storylines and indicators are can be time-consuming, with diminishing
developed as neutrally and dispassionately returns. One alternative approach is to

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choose a smaller number of scenarios brainstorming session), and a


for in-depth analysis (say two or three). subsequent analysis of impacts under
Some studies have chosen to look at each scenario.
diametrically-opposed scenarios (world Another approach would be to introduce
markets and local stewardship, for instance). a third dimension (driver of change)
However, we recommend that the symmetric relevant to the sector: high or low
two-by-two matrix approach to scenario technology scenarios have been tried in
elaboration is retained during a first phase a number of exercises including the
to avoid the risk of narrowing down the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
thinking too soon. (SRES) for the Intergovernmental Panel
Effort devoted to the development of on Climate Change (IPCC), (which are
indicators will vary between studies. based on the same principal axes as the
Indicators may illustrate the storylines, or Foresight scenarios)2. In this case the
they may be outputs of the scenario effects of different assumptions about the
planning exercise that are used in further adoption of energy technologies in the
analysis (planning, options appraisal or future was analysed in detail for one of
scientific modelling). four socio-economic scenarios.
We recommend that scenarios are kept If the original set of scenarios is thought
simple to make them accessible and to test to over-simplify trends it is possible to
them with non-specialist audiences. In add a second round of scenario
longer or more intensive scenario planning elaboration encouraging participants to
exercises, users may want to introduce think about feedback mechanisms. This
extreme events and feedback mechanisms. allows learning processes to be taken
There are several ways to adapt the into account. One option would be to
scenarios: organise this round of the evaluation as
a ‘game-playing’ simulation.
Two scenarios can be combined, for
example one for the UK level, and one Taking account of major shocks
for the international level. It is, of The exploratory and synthetic approach
course, essential to choose the used in these scenarios suggests that
combination carefully. The choices made change occurs gradually along a single
will depend on what is realistic and trajectory. Future states are seen as the
relevant for the study in question. For outcome of an accumulation of changes
example, a scenario exercise on the UK over time, all pointing in the same direction.
manufacturing industry could examine But not all change is like this. The direction
the effects of an international World of change may itself vary over time, with
Market scenario combined with a one set of conditions being replaced by a
National Enterprise scenario. new set. This change in direction may take
Major shocks or extreme events are not place slowly (as part of the process of
part of the scenario storylines presented economic and social development), or it
here. They can, however, be introduced may happen suddenly as a result of major,
during the planning process. This surprise external events (such as terrorist
involves the identification of relevant attacks, or rapid changes in the natural
‘side swipes’ (for example through a environment). If the change is slow it may be

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Foresight Futures 2020 Strategic Futures Planning

possible for one scenario to be superseded 2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change


(2000). IPCC Special Report – emissions
by another (a shift from World Markets to
scenarios. A Special Report of IPCC Working
Global Responsibility, for instance). If the Group III.
change is sudden, the question to be asked
is how resilient is a given scenario to its
impact? Answering this question will be very
difficult, mainly because large-scale,
unanticipated events are hard to foresee.
We suggest that governments and other
organisations build up inventories of ‘shock’
events, by scanning conventional and
unconventional sources, and through
brainstorming. The question of resilience
could then be investigated by applying the
shock to each of the scenarios and trying to
assess how easily each of them could
recover or adapt to their impacts.

Taking scenario planning further


We believe that scenario planning is one
example of a broader set of tools that
today’s business and public sector
organisations need to apply more
consistently. Economic and political
conditions change rapidly, and foresight
enables organisations to think about early
warning signs for identified trends, plan for
possible responses by the organisation, and
develop ways of increasing their capacity to
adapt. Periodic scenario planning exercises
can be helpful, but beyond this the
organisation may also seek to embed
futures ‘routines’ within many business
processes. Generating greater awareness
about future trends throughout the
organisation is a condition of organisational
change, and is likely to lead to a more agile
and responsive business.

References
1. Department of the environment transport and
the regions, 1999. Quality of Life counts –
indicators for a strategy for sustainable
development for the United Kingdom: a
baseline assessment. London.

92
Index
A
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 72, 85, 87
Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 5-6, 20, 32, 51-52, 63, 69, 83, 89
Adapting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 24, 55, 90
African National Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47
Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 57, 61, 72, 74-75
Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45, 80, 82, 85, 89
AIDS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39, 58
Alternative futures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 19-20, 28, 77
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 2, 7, 9-12, 15-17, 20-24, 26-29, 64, 68-69, 83, 88, 90-91
Analysis of National Development Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
ANC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47, 49-50
Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 22, 51
Artificial Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 19, 77-79, 89-90, 92

B
Backcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, x, 12, 15, 23-24, 28-29
Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 17, 53, 62, 71, 80, 83, 90
Biotechnology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
British Crime Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

C
Cabinet Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, vii, x, 6, 16, 22, 28, 53-56, 69, 71, 74, 76
Cabinet Office Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Cabinet Office Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 16
Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 39-44, 46, 85
Causal Layered Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 12, 28
Centralisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Change . . . . . . . . v, x, 2, 4, 6-8, 15, 22-23, 28, 37-39, 42, 44-45, 47, 50-51, 55, 59, 71-74,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77-80, 82-89, 91-92
CLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 28
Climate change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, x, 4, 6, 8, 38, 42, 77-79, 82, 89, 91-92
Climatic Research Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 52, 57-58, 62, 71-72, 85
Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 47, 51-52, 85-88
Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 68-69, 80, 89
Creative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 1, 10-11, 19, 50-51, 57, 59, 64, 74, 88-90
Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 55, 64, 75, 89
Criticisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 26-27, 69

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Index Strategic Futures Planning

Decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2, 10, 16, 27, 31-32, 57, 59, 79, 81, 84, 86, 89
Decline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 40, 42-43, 45, 54-56, 66, 85-86
Defining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 24, 28, 80
DEFRA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x, 77
Demography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 66, 82
Development. . . . . v, vii, ix, 3, 13, 20, 29, 37, 39-40, 42, 58-59, 62, 64, 72-73, 77-88, 91-92
Digital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53-54, 59-60
Downsizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 9-10, 19, 27, 54, 68-69, 73-74, 80, 84-88, 90
DTI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 79

E
EC Scenarios Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 63-69
Econometrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Economic . . . . . . . . 2-4, 7, 9, 15-16, 21, 26, 28-29, 38, 40, 42-43, 47, 49-50, 53-54, 60-62,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64-66, 68, 75, 77-88, 91-92
Economics of climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 8
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 41, 47, 53, 58, 61-62, 64, 71, 75, 84, 86-87
Emissions scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 91-92
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 56, 60, 66, 74, 84
EMU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Engaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 10, 59, 86, 89
Environment . . . . . vii, 9, 20-21, 32, 34, 37, 39, 45-46, 53, 55, 57, 60-61, 65, 69, 72, 74-75,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77-78, 80, 82, 84-85, 91-92
Equal Opportunities Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
European . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 10, 54, 63-64, 66, 68, 72, 80-81, 85
European Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 10, 63-64, 68
European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72, 81, 85
Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 16, 61
Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 28, 31, 34, 38, 59, 77-78, 82, 88-90
Exploratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 23, 26, 31, 79, 86, 91
Exponential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 39-40, 46

F
Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6-7, 9, 19-21, 42, 48, 53-55, 64-65, 67, 69, 78, 83
Failure of EMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-26, 39, 90-91
Financial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 60-61, 72, 85, 88
Five Minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Flamingos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47-49, 51
Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 24, 47, 49, 51
Flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 5, 40, 42-46, 77, 88
Forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 7, 22-23, 26, 28, 31-32, 78, 86

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Strategic Futures Planning Index

Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-23, 31-32, 80


Foresight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, vii, ix-x, 11-13, 17, 23, 31, 34, 47, 63, 73, 77, 79, 83-92
Forward Studies Unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 64-65, 68-69
Futures Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, vii, ix-x, 25, 57-62
Futures Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 28-29
Futures Toolkit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 71-76
Futureswork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 71
FW de Klerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 49

G
Generic scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Global. . . . . . . . iv, ix, 2-4, 6, 38-39, 42, 45-46, 54, 58, 64-66, 68-69, 72, 77, 80-85, 87, 91
Global Business Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 3, 64
Global environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45, 77
Global responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 87, 91
Globalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66, 74, 78, 81
Governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 65, 68-69, 72-75, 78-82, 84-88, 90
Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 63, 66, 71, 81, 92
Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x, 6, 25-26, 34, 47-48, 52, 59, 63, 65, 69, 72, 75, 89-90
Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71, 73, 75, 77-78, 80, 82-83, 87, 90

H
Harvard Business School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 4, 6, 41-42, 54, 60, 75, 84-86
HIV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
HM Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
House of Commons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 8
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 41, 47, 54, 59
Humanity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 37-38, 45

I
Icarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7, 47-50
Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 28, 90-91
Identify. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9, 19, 21-22, 51, 83, 89
Immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Impact . . . . . . . . v, 3-4, 19, 21-22, 26, 33, 46-47, 49, 55, 59, 62, 65, 67, 74, 77-80, 82, 92
Inclusive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 33, 47, 50, 52, 86
Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 79-80, 82, 84, 88-92
Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 54-56, 66, 69, 75, 81
Industrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 37, 39, 42-46, 63, 66
Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 42, 77, 91
Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 66, 74, 86
Information . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 11, 15-17, 20, 22, 25, 34, 53, 55, 57, 60, 63, 69, 72-75, 85, 87

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Innovation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 17, 53, 57-58, 61-63, 85-88


Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12, 19, 78, 82
Integrated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 26, 65, 82, 84, 89
Intergovernmental Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 91-92
International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, vii, 2, 8-9, 13, 29, 37, 57-58, 64, 66, 81, 85, 90-91
International Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 13, 29
International Futures Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53-55, 59
Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 22, 28
IPCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77, 79, 91-92
Issues . . . . . . . ix-x, 4-6, 9-11, 17, 19-21, 25-29, 37, 51-52, 58-59, 62, 71-74, 76, 82, 84, 87
IT . . . . ix, 1-12, 15-16, 19-28, 31-34, 37-40, 42, 44-45, 47-48, 50-61, 63-65, 68-69, 71-75,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77-80, 83-84, 86-91

K
Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 11, 20, 26, 28, 55, 57, 62, 79, 82-83, 88, 90

L
Lame duck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47-50
Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-40, 42-43, 45, 78, 82, 88
Learn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 32, 46, 57-58
LGA Futures Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 71-76
Lloyds TSB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Local government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 21, 71-76
Local Government Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Local Government Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 71, 76
Local Stewardship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81, 84-85, 88, 91
Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48, 50, 89
London Stock Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

M
Macroeconomic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 2, 10, 20, 32-33, 56
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56, 85, 87-88, 91
Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 11, 16, 57
Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 63, 75, 81, 84-85, 90-91
Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 38, 63-64, 85
Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7, 22, 33, 48, 50, 57, 71-73
Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, vii, 8, 28-29, 47, 64-65, 69, 79
Methods . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 1, 8, 10-12, 15-17, 19, 22, 25-27, 32-33, 59, 64-65, 74-75, 88
Microsoft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Modelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-16, 80-81, 88, 91
Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 10, 15-16, 21, 24, 26, 74, 89

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Mont Fleur Scenario Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47, 51


Multimedia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 53

N
Nanotechnology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
National . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5, 29, 47-49, 53, 56, 63-64, 72, 77, 80-81, 83-86, 91
National enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81, 84, 86, 91
Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 42, 44, 74, 77
Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48-49, 51-52, 56
Nelson Mandela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47
NGOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 64, 66
Nonrenewable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 40-41, 43, 45
Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 20, 22-23, 26, 28
Normative forecasting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-23, 28

O
Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii-iv, 15-16, 22, 24, 31, 33, 85
Open-minded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5-7, 9-10, 15-16, 20, 22-24, 27, 32-34, 61, 63, 66, 86, 92
Ostrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 47-49
Outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12, 31, 91
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 8, 27-29, 53, 83

P
Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 3, 5, 8, 57-59
Participative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 88, 90
Passive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Past. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 28, 31, 37-38, 51, 53, 60, 72, 80, 82-83, 87
People . . 1, 5, 7, 9-10, 22-26, 29, 31, 33, 39-47, 50-51, 54-55, 58-64, 71-72, 79, 83-85, 88
Personal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 28, 56, 61, 81, 84-86
Physical. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 23-24, 41, 46, 55, 64, 78
Planning . . . . . . . . i, iii-v, ix-xi, 1-8, 10-13, 15-17, 19-29, 31-34, 38-46, 48-52, 54-62, 64-69,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71-76, 78-92
Policy . . . . . . . . iv, vii, ix, 2, 4-8, 15, 19, 23-24, 27, 32, 37, 44, 47, 49, 54, 57-59, 61-62, 71,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74, 76-78, 80-81, 83-88, 90
Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 39, 42-45
Poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38-39, 72, 86
Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5-6, 37, 39-46, 53, 59-61, 66, 78-79, 82
Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 7, 33-34
Positive ageing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 57, 59
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4, 23, 27-28, 37, 47, 52, 59, 66, 81, 84
Private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 22, 54-55, 63, 75, 78-79, 81, 86
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 39-42, 44-45, 65, 68, 73, 88

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Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, vii, x, 26, 57-58, 62, 69, 72, 77-83


Public . . . . . . . . . i, iii-iv, ix-x, 1, 3-4, 8-9, 22, 47, 49, 51-53, 57-59, 61-64, 66, 72-73, 78-79,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85-86, 92
Public policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 57-58, 61-62, 78, 85
Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 65, 68-69, 75, 83

Q
Qualitative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 16-17, 20-22, 79, 82
Quantitative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 16-17, 21-22, 28, 82, 88

R
RAPID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 47, 53, 85, 91
Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 5-7
Regional Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71, 75
Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 66, 77, 80, 89, 92
Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 77, 79-80
Renaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63, 66, 73
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 2, 8, 25, 28-29, 38, 53, 73, 77, 80, 82-83, 87-88
Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 24, 37, 40-43, 45, 87
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, ix, 2, 9, 16, 23, 33, 37, 39-46, 71, 73-75, 77, 81, 84, 87, 89-90
Retailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54, 86, 88
Reviewing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 73
Roadmaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 15, 27
RSA Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

S
Scarcity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 40
Scenario. . . . . . iii-iv, ix-xi, 1-4, 7, 19-20, 28, 33, 42-45, 47, 49-52, 59, 63-65, 68-69, 73, 75,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79-81, 83-84, 86, 88-92
Scenario planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, x-xi, 1-2, 7, 19-20, 51, 80, 86, 88-89, 91-92
Scenarios, Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 63-69
Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 2, 15, 17, 53, 77, 83
Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, ix, 1, 8-9, 11, 23-24, 65, 85
Scottish Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix, 5, 57-58
Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26-27, 65, 67-68, 82
Shell International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 2, 8
Significant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 22-23, 32, 54, 66, 74
Simple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 15, 21, 24, 49-50, 88, 91
Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 10, 16, 24-25, 29, 37, 91
Slow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10, 46-47, 91
SMEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Socio-economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v, 54, 77-82, 87, 89, 91
Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Stakeholder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 33, 52, 63, 79

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Storylines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79, 81-82, 84, 90-91


Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 5, 8, 11-12, 15, 25, 57, 73-76, 88, 92
Sustainable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 5-6, 37, 40-41, 43-47, 49, 72, 85, 88, 92
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 21, 31, 34, 38-39, 57, 78, 81, 84, 87-88

T
Teams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78, 82
Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, x, 1, 42-43, 53, 55, 59, 66, 72, 74, 77-79, 83, 91
Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 24, 42, 44, 51, 57, 69, 83, 86, 91
Thinking . . . . . . iii, ix-x, 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, 16, 20, 24, 28-29, 32-33, 37, 49, 51, 57-59, 61-62,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71, 83, 87-91
Third World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix-x, 1, 10-12, 15, 21, 26-28, 57, 83-84, 89, 92
Tourism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80, 82, 86, 88
Traditional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42, 56-57, 63-64, 71, 86-87
Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 55-56, 72, 77, 90, 92
Treasury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 80
Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, x, 6, 10-11, 15-16, 19, 21-22, 27, 38, 53-54, 63-65

U
UK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-v, vii, ix-x, 2, 5-6, 8-9, 13, 15, 17, 26, 34, 53-56, 73, 75-84, 89, 91
Under-investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85-88
Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56, 63, 72, 81, 85
United Nations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii, 40, 58
Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 31, 54, 63, 66, 75, 80, 84, 87, 91

V
Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 50, 53, 63, 66, 74, 79-82, 84-88, 90
Visioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 10, 12, 15-16, 22-23, 28, 57, 74-75, 78-79

W
Weak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 49, 66, 85-86
World markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84-85, 91
World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 22
WORLD3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv, 3, 37-39, 42, 44
Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65, 68-69

Y
Young Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

99

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