TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA, Respondent. G.R. No.

180764 January 19, 2010 Facts: Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001 but five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. On July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Valera to respondent Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva , then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary from implementing Valeras appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction. Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. But the RTC dismissed respondents complain. The CA reversed the RTCs decision, holding instead that petitioners refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damagesfrom him. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case, thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer. Held/Ruling: No, the decision of the CA did not err. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty. The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the defendants transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish in the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan. Esguerra, J.: Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous eventstorm; (2) WON boys parents negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down. (2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. L-28554 February 28, 1983 UNNO COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, in his capacity as Director of Patents,respondents. On December 11, 1962, respondent General Milling Corporation filed an application for the registration of the trademark "All Montana" to be used in the sale of wheat flour. In view of the fact that the same trademark was previously, registered in favor of petitioner Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc., the Chief Trademark Examiner of the Philippines Patent Office declared an interference proceeding 1 between respondent corporation's application (Serial No. 9732), as Junior - Party-Applicant and petitioner company's registration (Registration No. 9589), as Senior Party-Applicant, docketed in the Philippines Patent Office as Inter Partes Case No. 313, to determine which party has previously adopted and used the trademark "All Montana". Respondent General Milling Corporation, in its application for registration, alleged that it started using the trademark "All Montana" on August 31, 1955 and subsequently was licensed to use the same by Centennial Mills, Inc. by virtue of a deed of assignment executed on September 20, 1962. On the other hand petitioner Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. argued that the same trademark had been registered in its favor on March 8, 1962 asserting that it started using the trademark on June 30, 1956, as indentor or broker for S.H. Huang Bros. & Co., a local firm. The Director of Patents, after hearing, ruled in favor of respondent General Milling Corporation. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner brought the instant petition seeking the reversal of the decision and praying that it be declared the owner and prior user of the trademark "All Montana" on wheat flour. Petitioner based its claim of ownership over the trademark in question by the fact that it acted as an indentor or broker for S. H. Huang Bros. & Co., a local importer of wheat flour, offering as evidence the various shipments, documents, invoices and other correspondence of Centennial Mills, Inc., shipping thousand of bags of wheat flour bearing the trademark "All Montana" to the Philippines. Petitioner argued that these documents, invoices and correspondence proved the fact that it has been using the trademark "All Montana" as early as 1955 in the concept of an owner and maintained that anyone, whether he is only an importer, broker or indentor can appropriate, use and own a particular mark of its own choice although he is not the manufacturer of the goods he deals with. Relying on the provisions of Section 2-A of the Trademarks Law 2 (Republic Act 166), petitioner insists that "the appropriation and ownership of a particular trademark is not merely confined to producers or manufacturers but likewise

to anyone who lawfully deals in merchandise who renders any lawful service in commerce, like petitioner in the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON petitioner, although not the owner, may validly register for a trademark. RULING:

No. When the applicant is not the owner of the trademark being applied for, he has no right to apply for the registration of the same. Under the Trademark Law only the owner of the trademark, trade name or service mark used to distinguish his goods, business or service from the goods, business or service of others is entitled to register the same. A local importer, however, may make application for the registration of a foreign trademark, trade name or other mark of ownership. The term owner does not include the importer of the goods bearing the trademark, trade name, service mark, or other mark of ownership, unless such importer is actually the owner thereof in the country from which the goods are imported. Thus this Court, has on several occasions ruled that where the applicant's alleged ownership is not shown in any notarial document and the applicant appears to be merely an importer or distributor of the merchandise covered by said trademark, its application cannot be granted.

Vergara v. CA Facts: A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-residence of private respondent Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage assessed at P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The insurance company was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict Held: It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

Vestil v. IAC G.R. No. 74431 G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989 PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents. CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.

RULING: Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility

shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually.