The attacks on Westgate mall in Nairobi provide a number of insights into the decision making cycle of a terrorist organisation,

some of which we tend to pay insufficient attention to. The targeting of a shopping mall was as much a decision about base line tactical and operational aspects of the attack as it was about symbolism and the media attention that the targeting would achieve. While a shopping mall or similar facility offers a number of tactical benefits such as a delimited and defendable operating environment and a contained target population, in this particular instance it also offered communicative value. As a representation of the burgeoning middle class in Kenya, and Africa more broadly, frequented as much by foreigners and specifically, Westerners, as it was by locals, the shopping mall also served as a representation of the claimed Western influence on African society. t also provided a relatable target for engaging a Western audience. The broader target audience is thus deemed able to imagine themselves at a shopping mall, and thus by relating to the locale, the intended fear and terror is more easily transmittable. Adding to this dynamic was the demographic makeup of the customers at the shopping mall. !y targeting a location that was guaranteed to have Westerners present, Al "habaab was able to ensure Western media coverage of the attack. The last decade of terrorist activity has made Western media audiences somewhat desensitised to conventional terrorist violence and as last month#s attack, and the $%%& 'umbai attacks demonstrate, there is a need for more spectacular or specifically targeted attacks to garner the kind of media attention that terrorist groups require. !y utilising these tactics the terrorists were able to prolong the incident, and in turn, prolong the media interest and media coverage. !y targeting affluent locations they are also able to capitalise on the likelihood of citi(en generated content, as witnessed by the proliferation of )ouTube user generated content. *iven the centrality of the communicative dynamic to terrorist actions, these considerations are likely to have been central to the planning of the incident. Additionally, A" was able to tweet the incident live, providing blow by blow updates on their long standing twitter account. This siege tactic utilised in Nairobi was pioneered by +ashkar,e,Toiba in -akistan and was at the core of the 'umbai attacks. .utside of its historical development in Kashmir, this tactic has thankfully not been deployed more frequently in the West, although it continues to be utilised in Kashmir and across Afghanistan and -akistan. Known as fidayeen attacks, these tactics were refined by +eT and deployed initially against military and law enforcement installations in Kashmir. The advantages of this style of attack are multiple. The subsequent damage that was inflicted on the installations was one aspect of their success. 'ost importantly however, unlike a conventional suicide attack, fidayeen attacks provided an opportunity for defensive actions by the terrorists involved, removing the /suicide# aspect of implicit in a suicide bombing. This has been deemed to be more religiously permissible and thus more broadly tolerable to the wider community. This tactic, and its deployment in 'umbai, and at Westgate, demonstrates the clear consideration of the communications aspects of a terrorist attack, and the importance to terrorist groups of perception amongst a number of different audiences. The final, yet crucially important dynamic of this operation was the pre,operational planning and intelligence that facilitated the duration and success of the operation. n eerie similarities

to the crucial pre,operational intelligence gathered in 'umbai by 0avid 1eadley, reports have suggested that A" went as far as to rent property inside the mall, facilitating the planting of weaponry and the provisioning of detailed intelligence on the facility. An operational understanding of key choke points, entry and e2it points and other crucial planning information will have greatly assisted the attackers in achieving the siege duration they desired. This serves as a reminder of an often forgotten aspect of terrorist actions and terrorist campaigns, namely that terrorist violence is, in and of itself, an instrumental act. That is to say that it is a means rather than an end. Whether we are discussing terrorist or insurgent behaviour, it remains crucial to retain the understanding that overwhelmingly, these acts are communicative and are desired to deliver a message rather than to solely inflict kinetic damage for its own sake. 3inally, and as 0avid Kilcullen recently4argued, and e2pands on in his new book, urbanised environments, such as 'umbai or Nairobi, represent potential sites for future terrorist incidents. 5rban environments have long offered attractive propositions for terrorist groups and insurgents. While A" was not able to overwhelm Nairobi to the same e2tent as +eT was able to cripple 'umbai, the implications for Africa#s ma6or urban centres are substantial. Africa is facing a growing challenge in confronting a diversity of non,state terrorist entities who, if the attack in Nairobi, and the oil facility siege in Algeria are any indication, have an increasing capability to deploy smart, effective tactics against vulnerable targets. 7ompounding these problems is the broader operating environment that Africa presents for these groups. As was recently written in The Atlantic, 8Africa#s slamists are able to take advantage of the fact that many of the continents countries have pourous borders9 weak and corrupt central governments9 undertrained and underequipped militaries9 flourishing drug trades that provide a steady source of income9 and vast, lawless spaces...:$ When these broader facilitating factors are combined with the structural advantages that an urban environment presents to a terrorist cell, Africa, and specifically Africa#s growing urbanised centres will need to think deeply on the approach they want to take in relation to countering these types of threats, and compromises they are prepared to make in seeking to ensure the security of both the local population, but the growing foreign presence in this part of the world.

http;<<www.theaustralian.com.au<news<world<6ihadists,turn,to,urban,warfare<story,fnb=>oi=,4$$=?$@A$4&>$ http;<<www.theatlantic.com<maga(ine<archive<$%4A<4%<the,new,terrorist,training,ground<A%@>>=<