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Lijphart & Grofman - Electoral Laws and their political consequences(2003)

CHAPTER

10

Degrees of Proportionality of Proportional Representation Formulas


Avend

t is a well-established proposition in the literature on electoral systems that proportional representation (PR) is generally quite cessful in achieving its principal goal - a reasonably proportional translation of votes into seats - especially in comparison with plurality and majority formulas. One of Raes (1971, 96) differential propositions is that proportional representation formulae tend to allocate seats more proportionally than do majority and plurality formulae. It is also known that different PR formulas are not equally proportional, but students of PR disagree about which of the formulas are more and which are less proportional. The purpose of this analysis is to establish a rank order of the principal PR formulas according to their degree of proportionality. I shall use Blondels (1969, pp. 186-191) ranking of the able vote, Sainte-Lague, and largest remainder systems - the most important attempt to rank order PR formulas undertaken so far-as my preliminary hypothesis. In addition to the four formulas analyzed by I shall also try to include the two Imperiali formulas in my ranking. The degree of proportionality may be defined in terms of two elements. One is the degree to which the seat percentages of the different parties correspond to their vote percentages. The second is the
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Proportionality of PR Formulas

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degree to which large and small parties are treated equally. It is the second element that provides a clear criterion for judging the proportionality of PR formulas, because deviations from proportionality are not random: They tend to systematically favor the larger and to discriminate against the smaller parties.

Blondel's Ranking
Blonde1 (1969, p. 191) ranks four PR formulas in the following decreasing order of proportionality:
1. Single transferable vote (STV) 2. Sainte-Lague 3. 4. Largest remainders

STV is therefore the most, and the largest remainder method the least, proportional formula, according to Blondel. Other, more limited, attempts to determine the proportionality of PR systems tend to (1)ignore the STV method, (2) agree with Blondel's judgment that the formula is less proportional than the Sainte-Lague formula, and ( 3 ) disagree with Blondel's placement of the largest remainder formula at the bottom of the list. Loosemore and Hanby (1971)consider three of Blondel's four formulas, and they arrive at the following rank order:

1. Largest remainders 2. Sainte-Lague 3.


Their relative placement of Sainte-Lagueand is in agreement with Blondel's, but they conclude that the largest remainder formula is the most proportional of the three. Rae (1971, p. 105) also finds that the largest remainder method is more proportional than the other two lumped together. Balinski and Young (1980) confirm the LoosemoreHanby finding that the Sainte-Lague formula, equivalent to the ster method of apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives, yields more proportional results than the formula, which is the equivalent of the Jefferson method of apportionment. Most of the literature confines itself to a comparison of the and largest remainder formulas. The consensus is that disproportionally favors the larger parties and that the

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est remainder formula is more proportional and more favorable to the smaller parties (Van den Bergh, 1955, pp. 24-26; Mackenzie, 1958, 78-80; 1974, 93-97; Berrington, 1975, 366-368; Nohlen, 1978, pp. 77-80; Bon, 1978, This consensus deviates from Blondels ranking. In the next section, I shall show that the consensus is right and that Blonde1 is wrong.

Comparing dHondt and Largest Remainders


A comparison of the dHondt and largest remainder formulas is a good starting point for our exercise because it also supplies us with the key we need for the ranking of the other PR methods. How can we explain the different results of these two basic PR formulas? The initial difficulty is that the dHondt and largest remainder formulas appear to use completely different methods for allocating seats on the basis of the parties votes. Table 10.1gives a concrete illustration. The largest remainder formula first calculates the electoral quota or quotient (often called the Hare quota): the total number of valid votes cast divided by the total number of seats in the district (s). The parties votes are divided by this quota, and each party receives a seat for every whole number in the result. The remaining seats are then awarded to the largest of the unused remainders or remaining votes. The dHondt formula does not require the calculation of an electoral quota. As Table 10.1shows, each partys votes are divided by the series of divisors 1, 2, 3, and so forth, and the seats are given successively to the highest of the resulting values, usually referred to as averages. It is possible, however, to interpret the highest average formula in such a way that it becomes comparable to the largest remainder formula. The purpose of the dHondt formula may be said to be the improvement of the largest remainder formula by finding an electoral quota, lower than the Hare quota, which allows us to allocate all of the seats exactly according to the largest remainder rule but without having to take any remaining votes into account (Van den Bergh, 1955, 68-72). This lower dHondt quota is equal to the last of the averages to which a seat is awarded. In the example of Table 10.1, the dHondt quota is 14 votes. When the parties votes are divided by this quota, party A is entitled to 2 seats, to 2, C to 1, and and E to none; all of the seats have been allocated and the remaining votes can be ignored.

Proportionality of PR Formulas

TABLE 10.1. Hypothetical Example of the Operation of the Largest Remainder, and Pure Sainte-Lague Formulas a District with 100 Votes, 5 Seats, and 5 Parties

Largest Initial Parties


A B
C

Votes
36 30 14 12 8

Allocation of Seats
1 1 0 0 0 u12

Remaining Votes
16 10 14 12 8 u13 12 10

Allocation of

Remaining Seats
1

Final Seat Allocation


2 1 1 1 0

0
1 1 0

D E

Parties
A B
C D E
36 (1) 30 (2) 14 (5) 12 8

Total
2 2 1 0

18 (3) 15 (4) 7

Pure Parties
A B C D E
36 (1) 30 (2) 14 (3) 12 (5) u13 12 (4) 10 4.67 4 u15 7.2

Total
2 1 1 1

electoral quota is 10015 = 20. numbers in parentheses indicate the sequential order of the allocation of seats.

The reason for the disproportionality of now becomes clear. The remaining votes that it disregards are a relatively small portion of the votes of the larger parties but a very large portion of the small parties votes - and, of course, the entire vote total of a party that does not receive any seats. As a result, the seat shares of the larger parties will tend to be systematically higher than their vote shares, and the smaller parties will tend to receive seat shares that are systematically below their vote shares. In contrast, the largest remainder method treats large and small parties equally: The initial allocation of seats is exactly proportional, and small and large parties compete for the remaining seats on an equal basis.

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Sainte-Lague Like dHondt, the Sainte-Lague formula is a highest average method but, in Sainte-Lagues original proposal, the divisors are the odd integers 1, 3, 5, and so forth, instead of the dHondt divisors 1, 2, 3, and so forth (for an English translation of his article, written in 1910, see Lijphart and Gibberd, 1977, pp. 241-242). Table 10.1 illustrates this method of translating votes into seats. The Sainte-Lague formula can also be interpreted as a variant of the largest remainder method in that it tries to find a quota that it considers more suitable than the Hare quota. Unlike dHondt, however, it aims to be completely proportional and even-handed as between large and small parties. The Sainte-Lague quota equals twice the last of the averages to which a seat is given. In Table 10.1, for example, it is 24. For each quota of votes the parties receive 1seat, and all remaining votes of half a quota or more are also honored. Party A with 36 votes receives 1seat for its first 24 votes and a second seat for its remainder of 12 votes, which is exactly half of the Sainte-Lague quota. Party Cs remaining votes are 14, more than half of the quota and hence good for a remaining seat. The crucial difference between dHondt and Sainte-Lague is that the latter does honor some of the remainders. If all remainders were honored with a seat, a strong bias in favor of the small parties would result-just as the dHondt rule of ignoring all remainders entails a bias against the small parties. By setting a boundary of half a quota above which remainders do, and below which they do not, qualify for a seat, Sainte-Lague treats all parties in an even-handed manner. In this respect, it resembles the largest remainder formula, and both have to be regarded as equally proportional. In most cases, they also yield exactly the same results (as in Table but this is not necessarily always the case. In practice, the Sainte-Lague formula is not used in its original and pure form. The Scandinavian countries use a modified formula in which the first divisor is raised to 1.4 in order to make it more difficult for small parties to win a first seat. The divisor series 1.4, 3, 5, and so forth, can be made comparable to the dHondt and pure Sainte-Lague divisors by dividing each of these divisors by 1.4. The modified Sainte-Lague divisor series can therefore also be stated as 1, 2.14, 3.57, 5.00, 6.43, and so forth. It is clear that the distance between these divisors is greater than in the dHondt series but smaller than in the pure Sainte-Lague series. The modified Sainte-Lague formula is therefore less proportional than the pure form-and hence also less

Proportionality o f PR Formulas

tional than largest remainders -but more proportional than . It should be noted that, as Rosensweig (1981; see also Grofman, 1975, p. 316) has pointed out, this conclusion also applies to the chance that a small party has to win its first seat. The 1.4 divisor makes modified Sainte-Lague less proportional than pure Lague, but it would have to be raised to 1.5 to be equivalent to as far as the winning of the first seat is concerned. Hence Rae (1971, 34) is mistaken when he argues that modified Sainte-Lague entails a higher cost of the initial seat than and Taylor and Johnston (1979, 67) erroneously state that modified Sainte-Lague is relatively more severe on small parties than Elder (1975, 187) commits the same error. The relative proportionality of the three PR formulas considered so far can be summarized as follows, with the proviso that here and henceforth Sainte-Lague signifies the modified formula as used in Scandinavia: 1. Largest remainders 2. Sainte-Lague 3.

The Single-Transferable Vote


The difficulty of comparing STV with these three formulas is that in STV systems the voters cast their votes for individual candidates instead of for party lists. There are two ways to solve this problem. One is to assume that all voters will vote for the candidates of only one party, so that intraparty, but no interparty, transfers will take place. Under such conditions, the STV rules become virtually equivalent to those of the largest remainder formula. The second solution is to look at the votes in the final round of counting, which is the basis on which the seats are allocated. Applying the largest remainder rule to this final count will yield the same results in all but very exceptional circumstances. There is one important difference between the largest remainder formula and STV The former uses the Hare quota while the latter normally uses the Droop quota, defined as the total number of votes divided by the total number of seats plus + 1)-and then usually rounded up to the next higher integer. The consequence of using the Droop instead of the Hare quota as well as its relationship with the formula is stated succinctly in one of the oldest

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treatises on PR by Humphreys. After discussing the largest remainder method, Humphreys writes:
The rule subsequently devised aimed at reducing the importance of remainders in the allotment of seats. The total of each list was divided by the number of seats plus one. This method yielded a smaller quota than the original rule and enabled more seats to be allotted at the first distribution. The final improvement, however, took the form of devising a rule which should so allot the seats to different parties that after the first distribution there should be no seats remaining unallotted. This is the great merit of the Belgian or rule (Humphreys, 1911, 188).

Humphreyss comment makes clear that the Droop quota is lower quota. The Droop than the Hare quota but higher than the quota and STV based on it are therefore less proportional than the largest remainder method with the Hare quota, since it honors fewer remainders, but more proportional than since it usually does honor some remainders. In order to rank it among the three previously ranked formulas, we also have to compare it with SainteLague. Unfortunately, no unambiguous relative placement is possible here; it depends on the numbers of parties, the number of seats, and the sizes of the small parties. If there are small parties that would be barred from representation by the the Droop quota is more favorable; it should be remembered that the 1.4-divisor makes SainteLague almost like as far as the first seats are concerned. Once the small parties have gained their first seats, however, Sainte-Lague becomes more favorable to them, because it is, from this point on, completely proportional. With this reservation, we can now rank the four methods as follows:
1. Largest remainders 2. Single-transferable vote 3. Sainte-Lague 4.

overlapping

The Imperiali Formulas

Two other formulas - variously referred to as the Imperiali and Imperial have been discussed in the literature on electoral systems. One is the Imperiali largest remainder formula (Rae, 1971, 34-36; Grofman, 1975, 309; Wertman, 1977, pp. 45-47; Brew, 1981, and the other is the Imperiali highest average

Proportionality of PR Formulas

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formula (Van den Bergh, 1955, p. 25; Nohlen, 1978, 78; Laakso, 1979, 162). The distinctive feature of the Imperiali largest remainder method is that it uses a quota that is lower than the Hare and Droop quotas. It equals the total number of votes divided by the total number of seats plus 2: t 2). As it is used in Italy, its other special characteristic is that the remaining votes and seats are not handled at the district level but gathered into a national pool. For our purposes, it is important to recognize that the Imperiali quota is lower, and hence less proportional, than the Droop quota but usually higher and more proportional than the quota. It is incorrect to state, as Rae (1971, p. 34) does, that Imperiali is a variant of the largest remainder formula intended to lower the price of the initial seats, helping weak parties. Similarly, Wertman (1977, p. 45) is mistaken when he argues that the (s t 2) denominator lowers the quota and thus increases the small parties chances to gain seats in the Chamber of Deputies. As Carstairs (1980, p. 159) points out, the quota used in the 1948 and 1953 Italian elections was even lower than the Imperiali quota: + 3) instead of t 2). The change to the higher quota was made in response to the demands of the smaller parties: The denominator used for calculating the quota of votes necessary for election was reduced from seats plus to seats plus two.This meant that there would be more remaining seats to be allocated. A more difficult question is what the relative ranking of Imperiali and Sainte-Lague is. The answer is analogous to the relationship that we found between the Droop quota and Sainte-Lague. With regard to the first seats, Sainte-Lague behaves very much like dHondt and is therefore less proportional than Imperiali, although the Imperiali quota is usually close to the dHondt quota. After the first seats have been obtained, Imperiali obviously becomes much less proportional than Sainte-Lague. In the overall ranking, the former should therefore be placed below the latter, but with the proviso that there is some overlap. The second Imperiali formula is completely different from the first, in spite of the similarity of the name. It is a form of highest averages that looks deceptively similar to dHondt since it uses the divisors 2, 3, 4, 5, and so forth; the crucial exception is that the first divisor of 1is omitted. In order to make these divisors comparable to the dHondt divisors, they have to be divided by 2. The Imperiali divisors then become 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and so forth. It is immediately clear that, because the distance between the divisors is much smaller than in the Imperiali highest average formula is considerably less

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proportional than In the example of Table 10.1, Imperiali would give party A 3 seats, instead of the 2 awarded under the rule, and it would take away party Cs 1 Our final ranking, including the two Imperiali formulas, is as follows: 1. Largest remainders 2. Single-transferable vote 3. Sainte-Lague 4. Imperiali largest remainders 5. 6 . Imperiali highest averages Notes
1. A formula that is also sometimes compared with the other PR formulas is the so-

overlapping overlapping

called Danish method (Laakso, 1979, p. 162). It is a highest average formula that and so forth. The distance between the divisors is greater uses the divisors than in the pure Sainte-Lague method, and the Danish method would therefore be even more favorable to small parties. I have not included it in my ranking for two reasons. (1)It would have to be ranked above the largest remainder formula because it favors the small parties more. However, this characteristic derives not from the basic proportionality of the formula, as in the case of the largest remainder and pure Sainte-Lague formulas, but from the fact that the Danish method is disproportionally favorable for small parties. (2) In Denmark, this method is not used for the translation of votes into seats: It has nothing to do with the allocation of supplementary seats among parties. It is solely related to the geographic distribution within parties over regions and constituencies (Johansen, 1979, 47). 2. There are two crucial qualifications that must be added to the above ranking of PR formulas according to proportionality. First, the proportionality of PR systems is not only a function of the kind of formula that is used. A more important factor is the magnitude of the electoral district. As James Hogan has forcefully pointed out, the decisive point in PR is the size of the constituencies: the larger the constituency, that is, the greater the number of members which it elects, the more closely will the result approximate to proportionality. On the other hand, the smaller the constituency, that is, the fewer the number of members which it returns, the more radical will be the departure from proportionality (Hogan, 1945, p. 13). Second, although I find that the largest remainder formula is the most proportional of the six, my conclusion should not be read as meaning that it is therefore also the best method. One may be in favor of PR without wanting to maximize proportionality. A special disadvantage of largest remainders is that it may give rise to the Alabama paradox: the phenomenon that a party would lose a seat if the total number of seats available in the district would be increased (Brams, 1976, 137-166).This problem does not occur in any of the highest average systems, since these allocate seats sequentially. If one should want to maximize proportionality while avoiding the Alabama paradox, the pure Sainte-Lague formula is preferable to

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largest remainders. However, both methods suffer from a more serious weakness: They may encourage party splits. In the example of largest remainders in Table 10.1, party B could win an additional seat, at the expense of party D, if it would present two separate lists, each of which would get 15 votes. Pure Sainte-Lague would have the same effect. This tendency declines as PR formulas become less proportional, rule-certainly a very powerful arguand it disappears entirely under the ment in favor of this not maximally proportional formula (cf. Balinski and Young, 1983).

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