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G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994 ISHMAEL HIMAGAN,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.

JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City ,respondents. Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner. KAPUNAN,J.: Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine Nati onal Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Mac hitar. After the informations for murder1and attempted murder2were filed with the Re gional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial cour t issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and L ocal Government Act of 1990, which provides: Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a compl aint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1 ) day or more,the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until t he case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours). On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspens ion,3relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspe nsion should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling inDeloso v. Sandiganbayan,4andLayno v. Sandiganbayan.5In his order dated December 14, 19936respond nt judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied.7Hence, the petit ion forcertiorariandmandamusto set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to comm and him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension. We find the petition devoid of merit. There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is w hether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering tha t while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged w ith grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day sh all be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuou s trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused. Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads: Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department. he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Ci vil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus: Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive su spension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service;Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to th e fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrar y to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in

Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case sha ll be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) day s from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken toge ther to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of pr eventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment. We disagree. First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plai n and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension fr om office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. T he suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second se ntence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ni nety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. Th e two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of s uspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished. Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law u ses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (9 0) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspen sion of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that pe riod. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period with out justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in approp riate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal8or civil liability.9If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived o f his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the di smissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused ca n compel its dismissal bycertiorari, prohibition ormandamus, or secure his liberty byhabeas corpus.10 Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the sec tion clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pen ding administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its impl ementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulati ons are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the p rovisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the pr eventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP becau se Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is te rminated. Third. Petitioner's reliance onLayno and Delosois misplaced. These cases all stemm ed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Gr aft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R. A. 3019 reads as follows: Any public officer against whom any criminal pr Suspension and loss of benefits. osecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of th e Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from off ice. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or g ratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed a gainst him. In the case ofLayno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preve ntively suspended after an information was filed against him for offenses under

R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended fo r four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspensio n. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protect ion clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus: 2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corr upt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of hi s functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of Oc tober 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the s ervices of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, a ny of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in thi s instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Mor eover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presu mption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For e ven if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office h ad been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and r esulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension sh ould be lifted. 3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duratio n thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty da ys after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle ag ainst indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leading case ofGarcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an o fficer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be prevent ively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the prev entive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of gui lt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and th e Civil Service law." Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his ter m of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a find ing of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitut ion. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act do es not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguar d of the equal protection guarantee.11 The case ofDeloso, likewise, involved another elective official who was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-G raft Law. This Court, faced with similar factual circumstances as inLayno, applie d the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process an d equal protection." It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive su spension of the accused inLaynoandDelosowas based is silent with respect to the dur ation of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused ther ein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process questio n. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revis ed Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that hissuspension shall last until the case is t

erminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be s ubjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days f rom arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law doe s it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive sus pension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applie s to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read in to the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language employed and the statute must be tak en to mean exactly what it says.12 Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 o f R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the mor e clear. We quote: So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Cri minal Cases?" What is this all about? REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular courts. SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . . THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction. REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accuse d from the office until the case is terminated." REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more. SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .? THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e. SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene? Preventive Suspension. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang nata takot iyong mga witnesses. SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e. REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . . xxx xxx xxx SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito b ut I think we should also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihi n, okay, hindi ba "the suspension of the accused from office until the case is t erminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e. REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na. SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene pointed out, can run to six years bago ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. . . REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing. SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period. REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial. SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha? REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days, SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nat ing gawin iyon. REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case?Hindi ba that has all been held as dire ctory even if you put it in the law? SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a pa

rticular situation. SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than nine ty days. REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the same thing. SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really keen on having it quick, swift. SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice. REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes. REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganba yan, the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyon d ninety days which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive sus pension. SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least. SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a policeman may be anti-graft in nature. . . SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it? REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure. SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for crimina l cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say , of murder, rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that context thatthere i s a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be a serious casesince it is six years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony. xxx xxx xxx REP. ALBANO. . . . What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the Veloso case. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The f eeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a crim inal case. What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing to expe dite it.So let us study what kind of language could be done along that line. So j ust on the National Police Commission . . . SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . . THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please. SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated n ot later than . . ." whatever we agree. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that. So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commi ssion. . . . . .13 The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive s uspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty impo sed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues unti l the case against him is terminated. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses aga inst them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by th e mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventi ve suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equ al protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is in tended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizi ng the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be trea ted alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges con ferred and liabilities enforced.14Thus, the equal protection clause does not absol utely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences;15is germane to the purpose of the law;16applies to all members of the same class;17and applies to current as well as future conditions,18the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A d istinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legis lative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capriciou s nor unfounded. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. ELENA P. DYCAICO, G.R. No. 161357 Petitioner, Present: DAVIDE, JR.,C.J., PUNO, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, -versus - CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM CHICO-NAZARIO HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph 005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" *and and SOCIAL SECURITY GARCIA,JJ. COMMISSION, Respondents. Promulgated: November 30, 2005 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR.,J.: Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court fil Elena P. Dycaico which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision HYPERLINK "ht tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" [1]datedApril 15, 2003of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution datedFebruary 6, 2002of th e Social Security Commission (SSC), denying the petitioner s claim for survivor s pe nsion accruing from the death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Secu rity System (SSS) member-pensioner. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate court s Resolution datedDecember 15, 2003, denying the petitioner s motion for reconsideration.

The case arose from the following undisputed facts: Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS onJanuary 24, 1980. In his self-e ata record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived tog ether as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pens rom the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away onJu ne 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the peti tioner onJanuary 6, 1997. Shortly after Bonifacio s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor s pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that und er Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security La w HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" [2]she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads: Sec. 12-B.Retirement Benefits.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the dat e of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon our receipt of a report on h is death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage co ntract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement date; hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary. In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you. However, if yo u do not conform with us, you may file a formal petition with our Social Securit y Commission to determine your benefit eligibility. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciar y.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" [3] OnJuly 9, 2001, the petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the den her survivor s pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that it wa s not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be made benefi ciaries. Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that th e primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled to the survivor s pension. The SSS is legally bound to respect Bonifacio s designation o f them as his

beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote social justice. OnFebruary 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of th e petitioner s claim. The SSC refuted the petitioner s contention that primary benefi ciaries need not be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primar y beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph (k ) of the said provision, primary beneficiaries are [t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the other hand, defi nes dependents as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, a nd illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reach ed twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incap able of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent who is receiv ing regular support from the member. Based on the foregoing, according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivor s pension in one s capaci ty as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime. Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are en titled to survivor s pension are those who qualify as

such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retire ment, could not be considered his primary beneficiary. The SSC further opined th at Bonifacio s designation of the petitioner as one of his primary beneficiaries i n his SSS Form RS-1 is void, not only on moral considerations but also for misre presentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivor s pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSC sFebruar y 6, 2002Resolution. In the assailed Decision, datedApril 15, 2003, the appellate c ourt dismissed the petition. Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as t hose cited by the SSC, the CA declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, his designat ion of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 i s void. The CA further observed that Bonifacio s children with the petitioner could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have all reached twenty -one (21) years of age. The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, thePetitionis DISMISSED and the assailed 06 Februa ry 2002Resolutionof respondent Commission is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto. No costs. SO ORDERED. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/1613 "_ftn5" \o "" [4]

The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Reso n datedDecember 15, 2003, the appellate court denied her motion. Hence, the petiti oner s recourse to this Court. The petitioner points out that the term primary beneficiaries as used in Section 1 2-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not have any qualification. She thus theorizes that regardless of whether the primary beneficiary designated by the member as s uch is legitimate or not, he or she is entitled to the survivor s pension. Reliance by the appellate court and the SSC on the definitions of primary beneficiaries an d dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282 is allegedly unwarranted because th ese definitions cannot modify Section 12-B(d) thereof. The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997 , a few months before he passed away, they merely intended to legalize their rel ationship and had no intention to commit any fraud. Further, since Rep. Act No. 8 282 is a social legislation, it should be construed liberally in favor of claima nts like the petitioner. She cites the Court s pronouncement that the sympathy of th e law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own te rms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. HYPERLINK "http: //sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" [5] The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 s hould be read in conjunction with the definition of the terms dependents and primar y beneficiaries in Section 8 thereof. Since the petitioner was not as yet the lega l spouse of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, she is not entitled to claim the survivor s pension accruing at the time of his death. The SSS insists that the designation by Bonifacio of the petitioner and their illegitimate child ren in his SSS Form RS-1 is void. According to the SSS, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 8282 which provides that s hould there be no primary or secondary beneficiaries, the benefit accruing from the death of a member should go to his designated common-law spouse and that to ru le otherwise would be to condone the designation of common-law spouses as benefi ciaries, a clear case of circumventing the SS Law and a violation of public poli cy and morals. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/16 1357.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" [6] Finally, the SSS is of the opinion that Section 12-B (d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is clear and explicit; hence, there is no room for its interpretation, only for application. In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as well a s the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective comments on the issue of whether or not the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12 -B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court believes that this issue is intertwined with and indispensable to the resolution of the merits of the petition. In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso as of th e date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the r eckoning date of qualification and entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivors hip pension. It asserts that this classification of beneficiaries is based on val id and substantial distinctions that are germane to the legislative purpose of R ep. Act No. 8282. The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after his retir ement stating that it was contracted as an afterthought to enable her to qualify for the survivorship pension upon the latter s death. It further alleges that ther e is no violation of the due process clause as the petitioner was given her day in court and was able to present her side.

The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was n ot the legitimate spouse of the deceased member at the time when the contingency occurred (his retirement) and, therefore, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary within the contemplation of Rep. Act No. 8282. The SSS posits that t he statute s intent is to give survivorship pension only to primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of the deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself or dains the persons entitled thereto and cannot be subject of change by the SSS. The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the proviso as of the date of his retirement merely marks the period when the primary beneficia ry must be so to be entitled to the benefits. It does not violate the equal prot ection clause because the classification resulting therefrom rests on substantia l distinctions. Moreover, the condition as to the period for entitlement,i.e., as of the date of the member s retirement, is relevant as it set the parameters for t hose availing of the benefits and it applies to all those similarly situated. The Solicitor General is also of the view that the said proviso does not offend the due process clause because claimants are given the opportunity to file their cl aims and to prove their case before the Commission. For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below: Sec. 12-B.Retirement Benefits.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the dat e of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the primary beneficiaries are: 1.The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and 2.The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children. Further, the dependent spouse and dependent children are qualified under paragraph ( e) of the same section as follows: 1.The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she remarries; and 2.The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physical ly or mentally. The SSS denied the petitioner s application for survivor s pension on the sole groun d that she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement ; hence, she could not be considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B p. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitution al for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitut ion. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" [7] In an analogous case,Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, HYPERLIN //sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" [8]th e Court invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn10" \

o "" [9]which stated that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. In the said case, the Court characterized ret irement benefits as property interest of the pensioner as well as his or her sur viving spouse. The proviso, which denied a dependent spouse s claim for survivorshi p pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within th e three-year prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due process clause . There was outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without gi ving him or her an opportunity to be heard. The proviso was also held to infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated against dependent spouses who c ontracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three years before the y qualified for their pension. For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of his re t in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The proviso infringes the equal protection clause As illustrated by the petitioner s case, the proviso as of the date of his retireme nt in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term primary benefi ciaries results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiari es into two groups: (1)Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracte dpriorto the latter s retirement; and (2)Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracte dafterthe latter s retirement. Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respecti ve marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spous es. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contrac ted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses,i.e., her mar riage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those si milarly situated do not qualify as primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to survivor s pension under the same provision by reason of the subject proviso. It is noted that the eligibility of dependent children who are biological offsprin gs of a retired SSS member to be considered as his primary beneficiaries under S ection 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is not substantially affected by the proviso as of the date of his retirement. A biological child, whether legitimate, legitima ted or illegitimate, is entitled to survivor s pension upon the death of a retired SSS member so long as the said child is unmarried, not gainfully employed and h as not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently inca pacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally. On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered p rimary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is affected by th e proviso as of the date of his retirement in the same manner as the dependent spo uses. A legally adopted child who satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2) HY PERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ ftn11" \o "" [10]thereof is considered a primary beneficiary of a retired SSS membe r upon the latter s death only if the said child had been legally adopted prior to the member s retirement. One who was legally adopted by the SSS member after his o r her retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary for the purpose of en titlement to survivor s pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a dependent spouse

who claims to have been unjustly deprived of her survivor s pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Hence, the subsequent discussion will focus on the resultant classification of the dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said provision. As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spous es,i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and th ose similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso as of the date of his retirement disqualifies them from being considered primary benefi ciaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivor s pension. Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the con stitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law. HYPERLINK "http:/ /sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" [11 ] With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security law, it i s recognized that it is permeated with provisions that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are ent itled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of gover nment with the primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of comp eting policies and interests. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/ 2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" [12] However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with resp ect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the fol lowing requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must b e germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing cond itions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. HYPE RLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ft n14" \o "" [13] The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Co ngress in inserting the proviso as of the date of his retirement to qualify the te rm primary beneficiaries in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Court s mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with the possibility of relationships entered af ter retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse. This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and dete rmining their entitlement to survivor s pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the poli cy objective of the law,i.e., provide meaningful protection to members and their b eneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, dea th and other contingencies

resulting in loss of income or financial burden." HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary. gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" [14] The nexus of t he classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective. For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those ente red in contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a definit e duration-of-relationship or durational period of relationship as one of the requ irements for entitlement to survivor s pension. For example, in theUnited States, a provision in their social security law which excludes from social security benef its the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage earner who had their res pective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior to his death, was declared valid. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/20 05/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" [15]Thus, nine months is recognized in theU nited Statesas the minimum duration of a marriage to consider it as having been c ontracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension. In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) in Re p. Act No. 8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to survivor s pension al l those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to retired SSS members were contracted after the latter s retirement. The duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in certain instances, the retirement age under Rep. Act No. 8282 is sixty (60)

years old. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/16135 7.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" [16] A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after t he said age may still last for more than ten years, assuming the member lives up to over seventy (70) years old. In such a case, it cannot be said that the marri age was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose of enabling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of the other spouse. Nonethe less, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivor s pension because he o r she is not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the SSS membe r following Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their r espective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latt er s retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivor s pension does not rest o n real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which effectively d isqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latter s retirement as primary beneficiaries, unf airly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spous e. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, l ike the petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law to provide meaningfu l protectionto members and their beneficiariesagainst the hazards of disability, s ickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2 005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" [17] The proviso infringes the due process clause As earlier opined, inGovernment Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, HYPERLIN //sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" [1 8]the Court characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that [i]n a pension plan where employee participation is mandator y, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. HYPERLINK "http://s c.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" [19] Th us, it was ruled that, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requi rements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due pro cess clause and [r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acqui re a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judic iary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" [20] Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, a widow s right to receive pension following the demise of h er husband is also part of the husband s contractual compensation. HYPERLINK "http:/ /sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" [21 ] Although the subject matter in the above-cited case involved the retirement benefit er P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 HYPERLIN K "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" [22]covering government employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees e njoy a protected property interest in their retirement benefits applies squarely to those in the private sector under Rep. Act No. 8282. This is so because the m andatory contributions of both the employers HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.p h/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" [23]and the employees HYP ERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_f tn25" \o "" [24]to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep . Act No. 8282 mere gratuity but form part of the latter s compensation. Even the r etirement benefits of self-employed individuals, like Bonifacio, who have been i ncluded in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judi ciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" [25]are not m

ere gratuity because they are required to pay both the employer and employee con tributions. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/1613 57.htm" \l "_ftn27" \o "" [26] Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spou se is entitled to survivor s pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, t he surviving spouse s right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wi fe or husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latter s contractual compen sation. The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8 afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latter s retirement of their survivor s benefits. There is outright confiscation of b enefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be hear d. By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriag SSS members were contracted after the latter s retirement, the proviso as of the d ate of his retirement qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivor s pension has created the presumption that marriages contr acted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In theUnited States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttable presumption and statutes creating permanent a nd irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clau se. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \ l "_ftn28" \o "" [27] In the petitioner s case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio go t married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commi t fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest child was already twentyfour (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to pro ve her claim that she was Bonifacio sbona fidelegal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the pet itioner was deprived of the survivor s benefits, a property interest, accruing fro m the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due pr ocess require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that h er marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as hisbona fidespouse sh e is entitled to the survivor s pension accruing upon his death. HYPERLINK "http:// sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" [28] H ence, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) which depriv es the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down. Conclusion Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) is nullifi ed, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to s urvivor s pension is not substantially affected since the following persons are co nsidered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282: (1)The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and (2)The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child ren.

In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and depe ren as follows: (1)The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2)The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unm arried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a mi nor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally. Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the v alidity of the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a constitu tional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. HYPERLINK "h ttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/nov2005/161357.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" [29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to p ass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to ren der substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivor s pension accruing upon the death of her husband. WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and Resoluti on dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632 areREVE RSEDandSET ASIDE. The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declaredVOIDfor being contrary to the due process and equal p rotection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivor s pension on the basis of this invalid proviso. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 129118. July 19, 2000] AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., NARCISO M. ARABE, LETICIA T. ENDOMA, ARISTIDES A. RA MOS, PANCHO M. RIVERA, TERESITA A. DE CASTRO, CANDIDA C. HABANA, AZUCENA C. FALC ON, MARIA LUZ P. CAEDO, YOLANDA V. RIO, RUBEN S. ANIEVAS, LELISA L. SANCHEZ, VIL LARDO A. TRINIDAD, ENRIQUE CH. ZUNIGA, ROMEO A. GONZALES, CASIANO G. ATUEL, JR., GEMMA L. BANARES, PERFECTO T. CAMPOS, ARNULFO A. AGUILAR, RUDOLPH R. MELON, MAG DALENA M. LAO, MARINA GERONA, FLORIANA O. DE GUIA, EMETERIO B. BRUCAL, NILDA C. CONCHA, YOLANDA P. FERMA, TEOTISTA C. ANGKIKO, FRANCISCO V. TRIAS, JENELYN E. ES TERNON, MILAGROS M. ABELLAR, ALICIA T. MOJICA, ELVIRA E. BAYBAY, PRICILLA P. GOL FO, ELISEA M. HIERCO, TERESITA L. DIMACUHA, MYRNA GUILLERMO, GRACIANO R. SAMELA, JR., NIMFA M. LAGASCA, JOSEFINA P. JARENO, NORMA V. ORDENES, FRANCISCO T. SERVA NDO, VIOLETA M. ANONUEVO, ALFREDO O. BAYANI, MARIO J. RAMOS, EME FEROLINO, LEONI DES P. COMIA, MILAGROS E. GENEBLAZO, LORNA L. MENORCA, REYNALDO DE LA CRUZ, ROMU LO A. FAZ, LIMUEL G. GADO, REY G. FABELLA, DOMINGUITO G. TACASA, IMELDA R.B. ROT ONI, TITA FOJA, NOEMI F. CASTRO, LILIA B. CAWALING, ROBERT A. REYES, CONCEPCION H. PARRENO, SERAFIN L. OLMEDO, ADOLFO L. ALLAN, PROSPERO D. CASTRO, ROSELLER C. GAPULAO, GLICERIO B. LAURENTE, BERNICE E. BERNABE, ADINA L. FERNANDEZ, ANITA M. PAALAN, ROSA P. PINOON, INOCENCIA P. DANGUE, JULITA E. MENDOZA, ELENA O. RAMOS, GENE BE BARTE, FLORENCIA Z. MAGANITO, PABLO A. ARGA, PEDRO S. LUNA, CARMELITA P. LAUREL, VICTORINO I. MARASIGAN, ROMEO M. MENDOZA, JUAN C. MALABANAN, MANUEL B. ABRELI, JOSEPH T. MACAHIYA, LEONOR P. ARADA, JULIA G. PEREZ, MODESTO M. VILLADEL REY, ARNULFO Y. FAJILAN, MARLON P. HERRERA, JAIME A. BISCOCHO, MICHAEL D. CASTIL LO, MILAGROS H. BAYLOSIS, ARSENIO T. GUSTE, ALFREDO V. ORAYANI, DANTE A. PENAMAN TE, ROMEO A. DE CHAVEZ, MANUEL M. ILAGAN, ALFREDO O. MANZA, JR., DOMINGO B. GUNI O, FIDEL V. PALERACIO, VICENTE V. DEL MORO, JUSTINO R. DEQUILLA, ERNESTO A. RUZO L, ROMEO D. DELGADO, ERLINDA P. MAGSINO, VERONICA R. CAMBRONERO, NORMA A. DEQUIN A, WELLIE R. RAVINA, CORAZON T. LOPEZ, REMEDIOS R. QUIZON, LORETA E. VERGARA, ME LECIA M. ASTRERA, VICENTA R. SAMANTE, HELEN M. CUENTO-BUENDICHO, ANICIA V. MORAL

ES, RISALINA C. GONZALES, ROSARIO CHARITO R. PABELLON, LOLITA L. MALADAGA, MAXIM O A. GLINDO, WILFREDO A. RODELAS, CELSO O. ROGO, RAMON C. VALENCIA, FELIPE R. FR ANDO, ADEN B. DUNGO, OFELIA N. QUIBEN, LIGAYA S. VALENZUELA, EUNICE S. FAMILARIN , MARCELA DE LEON, ADELA M. JAMILLA, RENY ABLES, ADELA E. FABERES, ALICIA P. BAL DOMAR, EDNA C. GARCIA, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, ELOISA P. TORRENO, CHARITO M. LACAME NTO, CLARENCIA M. AQUINO, HILDA DIMALANTA, ELSIE SIBAL, PURIFICACION TANGONAN, A MELITA FERNANDEZ, TEDDY C. MARIANO, LORETO SANGGALANG, GERARDO GONZALES, FEDERIC O ONATE, JR., ARTURO BALIGNASAY, FELIX M. CABARIOS, JR., NORBERTO PUNZALAN, JAIM E G. ALCANTARA, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA, ESTANISLAO SANCHEZ, ADORACION L. PINEDA, LUC ILA S. DUNGCA, ADELAIDA B. LAOIJINDANUM, ROLANDO A. BALUYUT, FRANCISCO M. DAVID, LEONELLE S. MENDOZA, MA. LUZ A. BASILIO, NESTOR J. TIMBANG, HILDA P. DIZON, EMM ANUEL E. IGNACIO, RAMON S. ABELLA, JOSELITO MATIAS, HEZEQUIAS B. GALANG, ERLINDA C. ZAPATA, IMELDA R. MANALASTAS, PEDRO L. PALO, AURECIO C. TRASPE, JOSEPHINE GA LANG, FLORINDA R. MADULID, MAGDALENA W. SADI, NYDIA V.A. BOLISAY, PRESENTACION A . PALOM, ANTONIO B. ANCHETA, MACARIO L. SADI, PACIFICO E. GISAPON, FELICIANO C. CRUZ, IMELDA A. QUIMEL, LINDA D. SANDOVAL, MARILOU R. ORTIZ, NORMA F. SANTOS, MA GPAYO V. ABESAMIS, BONIFACIO B. VILLAFLOR, DANIEL O. TABIOS, CONSTANTE T. CATRIZ , JESUS E. ALICANTE, FEDERICO SACLAYAN, JR., NOLY G. UMINGA, FE FRAELI L. DE GUZ MAN, RODRIGO S. WYCOCO, JOVEN HERMOGENES, RODOLFO D. BANAWA, ABELARDO O. CAPANZA NA, ERNESTO Q. TIONGSON, ROSANNA CRUZ, OSCAR C. ONGOCO, CONSUELO A. KABIGTING, J ULITA V. PASTELERO, ARSENIA V. BONDOC, ISIDRO A. TOMAS, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, CON SOLACION N. LABOG, ELENITA A. RIVERA, SOCORRO NOCES, RODOLFO GALLARDO, CARMENCIT A M. ONGEO, CAMILO L. SEDURIFA, ARLEEN VIC B. OCHANDRA, EDGARDO E. APOSTOL, CLOT ILDE C. CANETE, ALEJANDRO B. DEL AGUA, PILAR R. BUENO, TEODOICO C. MAGALLANES, P ETRONIO N. PIANGCO, JR., JOSE M. FLORENDO, BIBIANO A. CAGNAN, ALICIA A. TUBI, RO DOLFO C. NATAN, JAIME B. MENDONEZ, EDILBERTO EDANG, ROSENDA T. JENOVEVA, VEDASTO B. ELIZAN, JR., MILAGROS P. DE LUNA, ATILANO L. ISAAC, CORAZON L. J. PEPITO, LU CILA S. PINEDA, ROCHE B. CERRO, JOCELYN KL. LIBUT, REMBERTO L. GUTIERREZ, NAZARI O A. TRASMONTE, REYNALDO O. MACARAT, FLORENCIA M. MALIBAGO, IMELDA G. TUYAY, JUA N A. GIBA, JR., JOSE M. CAPACITE, ARCITA M. GARCIA, ANGEL G. DACUNO, RITA M. BED IANG, RENATO L. CANDIDO, NESTORIO B. BOCO, JONATHAN C. AMBIDA, MONICA MACABARE, BENITO A. MONTALLANA, CLOTILDE C. APURA-VALDEMORO, CIRIACO J. ARCENO, PABLO L. F ORMARAN, JR., PROSPERO S. OLMEDO, IGNACIO V. CASCANO, SERAFIN L. CLUTARIO, ARTUR O L. DIN, JUCHITA C. SY, RODOLFO L. ASUERO, PIO T. PORTES, MARILOU F. TAMAYO, MI LAGROS P. LAMBINO, ESTANISLAO A. ESPINA, RENERIO D. ENGO, FERNANDO A. MOSCARE, C ONCHITA A. PICARDAL, ELIAS T. TURLA, BONIFACIO T. LIM, JOSEFINA A. AGUILAR, ANTO NIO O. TEPACE, GAVINO S. ASOTES, RENE P. MAGBUTAY, NICOLAS C. UY, JR., JESUS B. LAVA, SENORA C. CALAGOS, RAFAEL A. PAYOD, MACARIO L. CIEGO, SALVADOR T. CRUZ, VI RGINIA V. BESAS, RAUL S. FIGUERDA, EDGAR R. DELOS REYES, TERESO R. ROSEL, JOSE J . MABANGUE, PRIMO D. PALOMO, JOHN C. YANGZON, ROMULO D. JABON, FIDENCIO Z. LA TO RRE, JR., LETICIA R. MACARIOLA, CARLOS P. VARELA, JR., ANTONIO L. PEDRAZA, SALVA CION A. LAMBAN, LINO L. JAPSON, EUNIA H. VACAL, ANTONIO F. VALDEZ, NATIVIDAD E. PRADO, LORENZO C. MERKA, GAUDIOSO A. RUEGO, ETERIO Z. ABOCEJO, DEMETRIA O. COROL LO, MARIA S. OBEN, ARTHUR V. LEYSON, PEDRO L. AVILA, DOMINADOR S. RODILLA, MARCI AL MAGPATOC, FEDERICO D. BARCELON, EVANGELINE DELA ROSA, ELENO GIL, ARSENIA GARC IA, HUMILDA ALICUM, DIOSDADO CAS, ABRAHAM MASAOY, SAMUEL ORALLO, AMELIA OLORES, CANDIDO URBANO, LOURDES FRIAS, ROEL SORIANO, EMELDA AGUSTIN, PAQUITO SORIANO, GE RMAN BALOLONG, BENJAMIN C. ROSARIO, EFREN BUYA, LEONIDA LEGASPI, TOMAS ABELLA, J R., JOVENCIA CANTO, JUAN DACONO, MIGUEL BAUTISTA, LORNA PASCUAL, FERDINAND BRAGA NZA, PRISCILLA PEREZ, ALMA LUZ SORIANO, JUAN VALENCIA, JR., JULIAN APOSTOL, ROSA RIO GUICO, BONITA VIDAL, GUIA GARCIA, LEOCADIO GINEZ, CATALINA BANEZ, VERONICA T ABILIN, ELVIRA CALSADO, ALIPIO LOPEZ, JOSEPHINE MALANA, PIO ANONUEVO, ELMA DEL R OSARIO, RUFINO FLORES, ANTONIO ORDONEZ, CARMEN CLAVERIA, ESTRELLA RAMOS,petitione rs, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent. D E C I S I O N PURISIMA, J.: At bar is a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with urgent prayer for the issua nce of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assaili ng the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voter s Registration Act of 1996".

RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold of fice in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any elec tion officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent t hereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipal ity shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district." By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COME LEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-0002 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ju risprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn1" \o "" [1]and 97-0610 HYPERLINK "ht tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn2" \o "" [2]for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several direct ives HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.htm l" \l "_ftn3" \o "" [3]reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipa l Election Officers, to different stations. Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitione rs found their way to this Court via the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending that: I SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION; II SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SEC URITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS; III SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOU T DUE PROCESS OF LAW; IV SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE O F COMELEC AND COMELEC S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME, DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AN D THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES; V SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGR ESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF; and VI SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONST ITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE. Petitioners contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 81 89 is valid and constitutional. The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it. Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal prote ction clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Munic ipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the s ame city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and ther efore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provisio n of law under attack. The Court is not persuaded by petitioners arguments. The "equal protection clause " of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following co nditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. HYPERL

INK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ft n4" \o "" [4] After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification und er Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of el ection officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of th e Constitution. InLutz vs. Araneta, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2 000/129118.html" \l "_ftn5" \o "" [5]it was held that "the legislature is not requi red by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none ". This is so for unde rinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed t o the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, i t can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law wou ld be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corrupti on than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) o f RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representat ives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without th e complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of vot ers can hardly be carried out. Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the r egistration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or mu nicipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELE C. Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioner s nor unduly deprive them of due process of law. As held inSta. Maria vs. Lopez. H YPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn6" \o "" [6] "xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenu re applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a part icular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign th e employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. xxx" (it alics supplied) The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or tr ansferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and afte r due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious e xercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itsel f which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such c apriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceiv ed evil is germane to the purposes of the law. Untenable is petitioners contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the aut hority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon b y the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to f ollow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or tran sfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to app oint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter o f fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforc ement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress. The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, S ection 44 even strengthens the COMELEC s power of appointment, as the power to rea ssign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain. Petitioners contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is

equally untenable. The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]v ery bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be ex pressed in the title thereof", are: 1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; 2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in b ills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overl ooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and 3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceed ings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considere d, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurispr udence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn7" \o "" [7] Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied wi th where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the gene ral objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are relat ed and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the sam e are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. HYPERLIN K "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn8 " \o "" [8]Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8 189 is "The Voter s Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provide s for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter o f registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process b y providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of electio n officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears st ressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title o f an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogu e, all the contents and the minute details therein. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciar y.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn9" \o "" [9] In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its validity. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.p h/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn10" \o "" [10] As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was e nacted in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, p etitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-equal departments of the government in matters entru sted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave ab use of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judicia ry.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/july2000/129118.html" \l "_ftn11" \o "" [11] WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, -versus G.R. No. 189698

Present: PUNO,C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DELCASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA,JJ. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. Promulgated: February 22, 2010 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x R E S O L U T I O N PUNO,C.J.: Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the responde ission on Elections (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movants-interve nors motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court s December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision). HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/feb ruary2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn1" \o "" [1] The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitution al the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9 369, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698 .htm" \l "_ftn2" \o "" [2]Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code HYPERLINK "http:// sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn3" \o "" [3]and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary. gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn4" \o "" [4]mainly on th e ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and s uffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appo intive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena. In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC a nd movants-intervenors submit the following arguments: (1)The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and member s of the military in partisan political activity; (2)The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they a ccord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is ger mane to the purposes of the law; (3)The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and (4)There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such reversal.

We find the foregoing arguments meritorious. I. Procedural Issues First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC s m otion for reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the p ropriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed aft er the Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision. i.Timeliness of COMELEC s Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court, HYPERLINK "http://sc.j .gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn5" \o "" [5]in relation toSection 1, Rule 52 of the same rules, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/juri sprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn6" \o "" [6]COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to mo ve for its reconsideration.COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on Dec ember 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconside ration. The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on Dece mber 14, 2009.The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one o riginally submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 still within the reglementary period. ii.Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the cus tody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the interven tion will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the origin al parties, and whether or not the intervenor s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for interventi on shall be entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the wou ld-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in ano ther proceeding. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/februar y2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn7" \o "" [7] Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for intervention may be filed,viz.: SECTION 2.Time to intervene. The motion for interventionmay be filed at any time befor e rendition of judgmentby the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (italics supp lied) This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyo nd the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of ju stice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been re ndered by the trial court, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/20

10/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn8" \o "" [8]when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, HYPER LINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn9" \o "" [9]and even where the assailed order has already become final and exe cutory. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189 698.htm" \l "_ftn10" \o "" [10]InLim v. Pacquing, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.p h/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn11" \o "" [11]the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of thePhilippineswas allowed by this Court to a void grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive i ssues raised by the parties. In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudenc e/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn12" \o "" [12]after consideration of the ap propriate circumstances. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010 /february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn13" \o "" [13]We stress again that Rule 19 of theR ules of Courtis a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the cou rt fully and completely available for justice. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn14" \o "" [14]Its purpose i s not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of ju stice. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/1896 98.htm" \l "_ftn15" \o "" [15] We rule that, with the exception of the IBP Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-i ntervenors may properly intervene in the case at bar. First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the case. As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge t he December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter , he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; a nd as a public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its system of government. On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are can didates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in v iew of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed Decision, unless it is reversed. Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequate ly pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be fo reclosed if this Court s Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of t he land. With regard to the IBP Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the asserti on that this case involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this comin g 2010 National Elections, and that there is a need for it to be allowed to interv ene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal profession would also be h eard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental import ance. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698 .htm" \l "_ftn16" \o "" [16] Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Ch apter has failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to cl othe it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too indistinguishable to justify its intervention. We now turn to the substantive issues.

II. Substantive Issues The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second pr oviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, andSection 6 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds: (1)They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the di fferential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding ele ctive positions; (2)They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servant s holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they oc cupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civi l servants activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in char acter, or whether they be in the national, municipal orbarangaylevel; and (3)Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these public appointive officials. We grant the motions for reconsideration.Wenow rulethat Section 4(a) of Resolution 8 678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the thir d paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordinglyrev erseour December 1, 2009 Decision. III. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter,viz.: Incumbent Appointive Official.- Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Sec tion 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive off ice or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines , and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, sh all be consideredipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certifi cate of candidacy. Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/20 10/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn17" \o "" [17]which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/fe bruary2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn18" \o "" [18]and rendered ineffective Section 11 o f R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon t he start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they ar e running, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/ 189698.htm" \l "_ftn19" \o "" [19]an elected official is not deemed to have resigne d from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same o r any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat. These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Cons titution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service o and employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange bet ween Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of the C onstitutional Commission is instructive: MS. QUESADA.

x x x x Secondly, I would like to address the issue here asprovided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, dir ectly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity." This is almost the sam e provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the government service h ave actually experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or i ndirect partisan political activities of many government officials. So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this pro vision more strict, and which would deter its violation? MR. FOZ.Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rule s on the matter are more than exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and e mployees in the public service from engaging in any form of partisan political a ctivity. But the problem really lies in implementationbecause, if the head of a m inistry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of government wi ll themselves violate the constitutional injunction against partisan political a ctivity, then no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this dra ft will really implement the constitutional intent against partisan political ac tivity. x x x HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february20 10/189698.htm" \l "_ftn20" \o "" [20](italics supplied) To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers a nd employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Sec tion 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 respectively provide in relevant part : Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions: x x x x (b)The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: x x x x (26)Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office. x x x x Section 55. Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil Service includ ing members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any part isan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent an y officer or employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom h e supports: Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offic es may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code. Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further ma kes intervention by civil service officers and employees in partisan political a ctivities an election offense,viz.: SECTION 261.Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

x x x x (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in th e civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special f orces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-milit ary units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or in directly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan politic al activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace office r. The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the par ticipation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activit ies is too plain to be mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing sta tutesapply only to civil servantsholdingapoliticaloffices. Stated differently,the cons itutional bandoes not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, andagencies oftheGovernment, including government-owned or controlled corporations with origina l charters. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/ 189698.htm" \l "_ftn21" \o "" [21]This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.g ov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn22" \o "" [22]Political p artisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/1 89698.htm" \l "_ftn23" \o "" [23] The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowe d to vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the na mes of certain candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal c lear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,viz.: MS. AQUINO:Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1, s ubparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between the words "any" and "partisa n," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the word "ac tivity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN. May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas):Commissioner Aquino may proceed. MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except t o vote" which was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "e xcept to vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a qua lification of the general prohibition against taking part in elections. Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words, the Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold from any class the right to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only like to reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those who may want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in parti san political campaigns or electioneering may vote. MR. FOZ:There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand thatthere w no intention on the part of the Committee to disenfranchise any government offic ial or employee. The elimination of the last clause of this provision was precis

ely intended to protect the members of the civil service in the sense that they are not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political contest.The la st phrase or clause might have given the impression that a government employee o r worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote, which i s not the case. They are still free to express their views although the intentio n is not really to allow them to take part actively in a political campaign. HYPE RLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn24" \o "" [24] IV. Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Elec tion Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 936 9 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. i.Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.is Controlling In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution inFarias,et al.v. Executive Secretary, et al. HYPERLINK "http://sc .judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn25" \o "" [ 25] InFarias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Sec tion 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e.,the deemed-resigned provision in respect of ele cted officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer co nsideredipso factoresigned from their respective offices upon their filing of cert ificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limit ation on appointive officials continues to be operative they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy. The petitioners inFariasthus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions apply equally to both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichoto my created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are mater ial and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequen tly, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sec tions 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster.We ruled: The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Electi on Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials a s against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the co nstitution, is tenuous. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by s ubstantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequali ty. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the ob ject to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It d

oes not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all pe rsons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is n ot infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reas onable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the elect orate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed ther efrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials ho ld their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authorit y. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are e ntitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointi ng authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V o f the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive official s, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take(sic)part in any election excep t to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employee s holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in pol itical and electoral activities. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, t he legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differen tly with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of th e certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wis dom of this classification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significa nt distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010 /189698.htm" \l "_ftn26" \o "" [26] The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is tha t our assailed Decision gave it new life.We ought to be guided by the doctrine ofst are decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really adherence to pre cedents, mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case in volving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. HYP ERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \ l "_ftn27" \o "" [27]This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for s ecuring certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Be njamin Cardozo stated in his treatiseThe Nature of the Judicial Process: It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. If a group of cases involves the same point , the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterd ay when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plai ntiff.To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my b reast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are t o have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts. HYPERLIN K "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_f

tn28" \o "" [28] OurFariasruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisi ons cannot be minimalized as mereobiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adju dication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be consider ed asobiter dictum. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/febru ary2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn29" \o "" [29]This rule applies to all pertinent questi ons that are presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration o f the case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the m atter on which the decision is predicated. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn30" \o "" [30]For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the dis position of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have bee n the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did . HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.ht m" \l "_ftn31" \o "" [31]As we held inVillanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,et al.: HYPE RLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn32" \o "" [32] A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to con sider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forw ard after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is suffici ent to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such poi nts,the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point sho uld not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and m ore fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make sta tements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. HYPERLINK "http://sc.jud iciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn33" \o "" [33](it alics supplied) ii.Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law TheFariasruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if re examined. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal applic ation of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. HYPERLINK "http:/ /sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn34" \o "" [34]What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/ february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn35" \o "" [35]The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn36" \o "" [36]which has four re quisites: (1)The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2)It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3)It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It applies equally to all members of the same class. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judic iary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn37" \o "" [37] Our assailed Decisionreadily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions s atisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, pr offers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive offi cials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, becaus e whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain, viz.:

For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matt er, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were a ppointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interio r and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently whe n both file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the prese nt state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period an d can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. HYPERLINK "h ttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn38 " \o "" [38] Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that t o remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of t he evil at once; it may proceed one step at a time. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary. gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn39" \o "" [39]In address ing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or excluded. HYPERLINK "http://sc.jud iciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn40" \o "" [40]Ne vertheless, as long as the bounds of reasonable choice are not exceeded, the court s must defer to the legislative judgment. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/j urisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn41" \o "" [41]We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully achieve d by expanding the class. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/201 0/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn42" \o "" [42]Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it un constitutionally arbitrary or invidious. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ju risprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn43" \o "" [43]There is no constit utional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be applied; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/februa ry2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn44" \o "" [44]that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none. Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a classification that is palpably arbitrary or capricious. HYP ERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \ l "_ftn45" \o "" [45]He must refuteallpossible rational bases for the differing trea tment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enact ment, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/18969 8.htm" \l "_ftn46" \o "" [46]such that the constitutionality of the law must be sus tained even if the reasonableness of the classification is fairly debatable. HYPERL INK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l " _ftn47" \o "" [47]In the case at bar, the petitioners failed and in fact did not ev en attempt to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was likewise si lent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following thesis: ... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the st atute s distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution fr om a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.p h/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn48" \o "" [48] In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected off icials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/juri

sprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn49" \o "" [49]It involves the choic e or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. HYPERLINK "http:// sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn50" \o " " [50]Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituentsfor a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the am bit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the s overeign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as ap pointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore ger mane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, w hose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring t o the sovereign will. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/fe bruary2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn51" \o "" [51](emphasis in the original) In fine, the assailed Decision would have us equalize the playing field by invalid ating provisions of law that seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest of both appointive and electe d officials, over another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. T he absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least. The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his disse nt, that elected officials (vis--vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring butnotby this Court . Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legisla ture that is given the authority, under our constitutional system, to balance co mpeting interests and thereafter make policy choices responsive to the exigencie s of the times. It is certainly within the Legislature s power to make the deemedresigned provisions applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not a rrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best sta te of affairs from a public policy standpoint. iii.Mancuso v. TaftHas Been Overruled Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision adverted to, and extensively cited,Mancuso v. Taft. HYPERLINK "h ttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn52 " \o "" [52]This was a decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as unconstitutional a simil ar statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying onMancuso, c laimed: (1)The right to run for public office is inextricably linked with two fundamental f reedoms freedom of expression and association; (2)Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental rig ht must be subjected to strict equal protection review; and (3)While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impar tiality of its public work force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their ob jective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render them unconstitutional. It then concluded with the exhortation that since the Americans, from whom we cop ied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for b eing unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit.

Our assailed Decision s reliance onMancusois completely misplaced.We cannot b at the United States Supreme Courteffectively overruledMancusothree months after it s promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals. InUnited States Civil Servi ce Commission,et al.v. National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO,et al. HYPERL INK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l " _ftn53" \o "" [53]andBroadrick,et al. v.State of Oklahoma, et al., HYPERLINK "http://sc .judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn54" \o "" [ 54]the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory p rovisionsprohibiting federal HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2 010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn55" \o "" [55]and state HYPERLINK "http://sc.ju diciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn56" \o "" [56]em ployees fromtakingan active part in political management or in political campaignsw ereunconstitutionalas to warrant facial invalidation.Violation ofthese provisionsresu lts in dismissal from employmentandpossible criminal sanctions. The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that(i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating th e speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression against the interests of the em ployer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees express ion interferes with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning servi ces, the limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.p h/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn57" \o "" [57]Therefore, inso far as government employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an interest-balancing approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question. HYPERLI NK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ ftn58" \o "" [58] Letter Carrierselucidated on these principles, asfollows: Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to h ave been that partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play t heir proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to b e sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties, groups, or points of vie w, but apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They disc riminate against no racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone 's vote at the polls. But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education, HYPERLINK "http://sc.j udiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn59" \o "" [59 ]the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and the speech of its emp loyees that differ(s) significantly from those it possesses in connection with r egulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the (government), as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Although Congress is free to strike a different balance th an it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustai nable by the obviously important interests sought to be served by the limitation s on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act. It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch o

f the Government, or those working for any of its agencies, shouldadminister the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with thei r own or the will of a political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or agains t any political party or group or the members thereof. A major thesis of the Hat ch Act is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal po sitions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisa n political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. For bidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective gove rnment. There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that t he Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice,but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidenc e in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent. Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was perhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1 939.That was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work force shou ld not be employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt politica l machine.The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that t hese dangers were sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised a gainst the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the t housands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expen se, to man its political structure and political campaigns. A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further se rve the goal thatemployment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government empl oyees would befree from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their sup eriors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitio ns against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint judg ment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federa l employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it i s not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce ano ther. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberaliz ing the prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Servic e Commission stated that the prohibitions against active participation in partisa n political management and partisan political campaigns constitute the most sign ificant safeguards against coercion . . .. Perhaps Congress at some time will com e to a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is its current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does the Constitution forbid it. Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activit ies is absolute in any event. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence /2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn60" \o "" [60]x x x x x x x As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional li mitations.(italics supplied) Broadricklikewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is con ally permissible,viz.:

Appellants do not questionOklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on political conduct of state employees.Appellants freely concede that such restrict ions serve valid and important state interests, particularly with respect to att racting greater numbers of qualified people by insuring their job security, free from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting them from polit ical extortion. Rather, appellants maintain that however permissible, even commenda ble, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct t hat may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For these and other re asons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced against them or anyone else. We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague. HYPERLINK "http ary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn61" \o "" [61]We hav e little doubt that s 818 is similarly not so vague that men of common intelligen ce must necessarily guess at its meaning. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ju risprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn62" \o "" [62]Whatever other pro blems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out explicit standards' for those who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state classified employee from being an officer or member of a parti san political club or a candidate for any paid public office. It forbids solicitati on of contributions for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose and taking part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign. Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as wit h the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of such terms in s 818 a s partisan, or take part in, or affairs of political parties. But what was said inLett r Carriers, is applicable here: there are limitations in the English language wit h respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that a lthough the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any co st, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary commo n sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the pu blic interest.' x x x x x x x [Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to cted, as well as unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its f ace and held to be incapable of any constitutional application. We do not believ e that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this manner here . x x x x The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is tot ally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and on ly as a last resort. x x x x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-b dication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and thatits functio n, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conductand tha t conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive contro ls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a

point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify i nvalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.To put t he matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is invol ved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but sub stantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.It is our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever overbre adth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situati ons to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied. Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 8 18 is directed, by its terms, at political expression which if engaged in by pri vate persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular g roups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity i n an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remain s that s 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly s ubject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass.This much was established inUnited Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly rea ffirmed today inLetter Carriers.Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is n o question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbidsclassified employees from: soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or o ther partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan po litical clubs, orcandidates for any paid public office; taking part in the manage ment or affairs of any political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties; addres sing or taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; solicit ing votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to ge t voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign li terature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate. x x xIt may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be sus ceptible of some other improper applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be discarded in toto because some persons arguably p rotected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not, therefore, unconstitutional on its f ace. (italics supplied) It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachuradoes not de ciples enunciated inLetter CarriersandBroadrick.He would hold, nonetheless, that the se cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal ofMancuso,since they pertain to d ifferent types of laws and were decided based on a different set of facts, viz.: InLetter Carriers,the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enf orcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act s prohibition against active parti cipation in political management or political campaigns. The plaintiffs desired t o campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get federal employ ees to run for state and local offices, to participate as delegates in party con ventions, and to hold office in a political club. InBroadrick,the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the(sic)Oklahoma s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restri cting the political activities of the State s classified civil servants, in much t he same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of fede ral employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their superior, and were adminis tratively charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campai

gn work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for soli citing money for the campaign, and for receiving and distributing campaign poste rs in bulk. Mancuso,on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provi sion. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time police officer and classified civil service e mployee of the City of Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination as represen tative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began th e process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter . Clearly, as the above-citedUScases pertain to different types of laws and were dec ided based on a different set of facts,Letter CarriersandBroadrickcannot be interpre ted to mean a reversal ofMancuso.x x x (italics in the original) We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim,Letter Carriers, BroadrickandMancusoallconcerned the constitut ionality of resign-to-run laws,viz.: (1)Mancusoinvolved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nominatio n as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the consti tutionality of 14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which prohibits continuing in the classified service of the city after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any public office. (2)Letter Carriersinvolved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commissio n was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Act s prohibition against act ive participation in political management or political campaigns HYPERLINK "http:/ /sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn63" \o "" [63]with respect to certain defined activities in which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this discussion are: (a)The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members wer e desirous of, among others, running in local elections for offices such as scho ol board member, city council member or mayor; (b)Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidat e for the office of Borough Councilman in his local community for fear that his participation in a partisan election would endanger his job; and (c)Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate i n the 1971 partisan election for the mayor ofWest Lafayette,Indiana, and that he w ould do so except for fear of losing his job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act. The Hatch Act defines active participation in political management or political c ampaigns by cross-referring to the rules made by the Civil Service Commission. Th e rule pertinent to our inquiry states: 30.Candidacy for local office:Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any Na tional, State, county, or municipal office is not permissible. The prohibition a gainst political activity extends not merely to formal announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading to such announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or permitting to be done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an emplo yee acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such a cquiescence constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political acti vity. (italics supplied) Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds thereafter to pay compensation to these persons. HYPERLINK "ht tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn64"

\o "" [64] (3)Broadrickwas a class action brought by certainOklahomastate employees seeking a d eclaration of unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of Oklaho ma s Merit System of Personnel Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that [n]o employee in the classified service shall be a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office Violatio n of Section 818 results in dismissal from employment, possible criminal sanctio ns and limited state employment ineligibility. Consequently, it cannot be denied thatLetter CarriersandBroadrickeffectively overrul edMancuso.By no stretch of the imagination couldMancusostill be held operative, asLe tter CarriersandBroadrick(i)concerned virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (i i) were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court.It was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals the same court that decide dMancuso to holdcategorically and emphaticallyinMagill v. Lynch HYPERLINK "http://sc.ju diciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn65" \o "" [65]th atMancuso is no longer good law.As we priorly explained: MagillinvolvedPawtucket,Rhode Islandfiremen who ran for city office in 1975.Pawtucket s Little Hatch Act prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad range of polit ical activities. Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically proscr ibed, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/18969 8.htm" \l "_ftn66" \o "" [66]the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials o n the ground that that the provision of the city charter was unconstitutional.How ever, the court, fully cognizant ofLetter CarriersandBroadrick,took the position tha tMancusohad since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that polit ical candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no lo nger viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the government s interest in re gulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly fro m its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government emp loyees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of C ongress, and applying a balancing test to determine whether limits on political ac tivity by public employees substantially served government interests which were i mportant enough to outweigh the employees First Amendment rights. HYPERLINK "http:/ /sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn67" \o "" [67] It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election inMagillwas characterized asnonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of that case, that politically active bureaucr ats might use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. Ruled the court: The question before us is whetherPawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's candidacy in even a nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. Th e issue compels us to extrapolate two recent Supreme Court decisions,Civil Servic e Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter CarriersandBroadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt wit h laws barring civil servants from partisan political activity.Letter Carriersrea ffirmedUnited Public Workers v. Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustainedOklahoma's Little Hatch Act a gainst constitutional attack, limiting its holding toOklahoma's construction that the Act barred only activity in partisan politics.In Mancuso v. Taft, we assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan elections would not be constitut ional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis. x x x x

What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is t oapply the Court s interest balancing approach to the kind of nonpartisan electionre vealed in this record.We believe that the district court found more residual vigo r in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than remains after Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to our view that political candidacy was a fundamental inte rest which could be trenched upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available. While this approach may still be viable for citizens who are not gov ernment employees, the Court in Letter Carriers recognized that the government's interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differs sig nificantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general. No t only was United Public Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but th e Court gave little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercio n of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring t o the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than the Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process". HY PERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn68" \o "" [68]It appears that the government may place limits on campaignin g by public employees if the limits substantially serve government interests tha t are "important" enough to outweigh the employees' First Amendment rights. x x x (italics supplied) Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, theMagillcourt detail ed the major governmental interests discussed inLetter Carriersand applied them to thePawtucketprovision as follows: InLetter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an ef ficient government, faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The district court discounted this interest, reasoningthat candidates in a local election woul d not likely be committed to a state or national platform. This observation undo ubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy positions is concern ed. But a different kind of possible political intrusion into efficient administ ration could be thought to threaten municipal government: not into broad policy decisions, but into the particulars of administration favoritism in minute decis ions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts and purchasing, hir ing, zoning, licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court inLetter Carriersidenti fied a second governmental interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "polit ical justice" as to policy, so there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the a ppearance of political preferment in privileges, concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors evidently feare d is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal election process. Where, as here, party support is a key to successful campaigning, and party riva lry is the norm, the city might reasonably fear that politically active bureaucr ats would use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. This is not to say that the city's interest in visibly fair and effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition of all employee campa igning; if parties are not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of favorit ism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as easily identified. A second major governmental interest identified inLetter Carrierswas avoiding the danger of a powerful political machine. The Court had in mind the large and grow ing federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The district court felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no control over nominations. But in f act candidates sought party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to be hi ghly effective both in determining who would emerge from the primary election an d who would be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs, know n party affiliation and support were highly significant factors inPawtucketelectio ns. The charter's authors might reasonably have feared that a politically active public work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In municipal elections especially, the

small size of the electorate and the limited powers of local government may inh ibit the growth of interest groups powerful enough to outbalance the weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to influence voters or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party structure will mass t he scattered powers of government workers behind a single party platform or slat e. Occasional misuse of the public trust to pursue private political ends is tol erable, especially because the political views of individual employees may balan ce each other out. But party discipline eliminates this diversity and tends to m ake abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of employees pressured into advancing their immediate superior's political ambitions, the entire government work forc e may be expected to turn out for many candidates in every election. InPawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in political campaigns, a carefully orc hestrated use of city employees in support of the incumbent party's candidates i s possible. The danger is scarcely lessened by the openness ofPawtucket's nominat ing procedure or the lack of party labels on its ballots. The third area of proper governmental interest inLetter Carrierswas ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both co ercion and the prospect of favor from political activity. The district court did not address this factor, but looked only to the possibility of a civil servant using his position to influence voters, and held this to be no more of a threat than in the most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the possibility of coercion of employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in municipal elect ions as it was inLetter Carriers. Once again, it is the systematic and coordinate d exploitation of public servants for political ends that a legislature is most likely to see as the primary threat of employees' rights. Political oppression o f public employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan system. Some superior s may be inclined to ride herd on the politics of their employees even in a nonp artisan context, but without party officials looking over their shoulders most s upervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways. In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participat ion in nominally nonpartisan elections if political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the absence of substantial party involvement, on the other ha nd, the interests identified by theLetter CarriersCourtlose much of their force. Wh ile the employees' First Amendment rights would normally outbalance these dimini shed interests, we do not suggest that they would always do so. Even when partie s are absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to endanger at least one strong public interest, an interest that looms larger in the context of municipa l elections than it does in the national elections considered inLetter Carriers. The city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly ag ainst his superior or running for a position that confers great power over his s uperior. An employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses le ss of a direct challenge to the command and discipline of his agency than a fire man or policeman who runs for mayor or city council. The possibilities of intern al discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should an employee gather subs tantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted) The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedi ngs in respect of the petitioners overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark, the court held: The governing case isBroadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" ov erbreadth in a closely analogous case. UnderBroadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overb readth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in re lation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major uncertainties atten

d the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define "subst antial" overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry byBroadrickitself. The plaint iffs in that case had solicited support for a candidate, and they were subject t o discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities, including solic iting contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate. The Court found that this combination required a substantial overbreadth approach. The fa cts of this case are so similar that we may reach the same result without worryi ng unduly about the sometimes opaque distinction between speech and conduct. The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of.Broadrickfound no substantial o verbreadth in a statute restricting partisan campaigning.Pawtuckethas gone further , banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns as well.Measuring the substantia lity of a statute's overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balanci ng of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially inv alid applications. Some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. Th e question is a matter of degree; it will never be possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a law substantially overbroad. S till, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some idea o f the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits. Often, sim ply reading the statute in the light of common experience or litigated cases wil l suggest a number of probable invalid applications. But this case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part on the number of electio ns that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed toPawtucketemployees. For all the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections inPawtucketis actively contested by political parties. Certainly the record suggests that par ties play a major role even in campaigns that often are entirely nonpartisan in other cities. School committee candidates, for example, are endorsed by the loca l Democratic committee. The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a st ep is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark. On the other h and, the entire focus below, in the short period before the election was held, w as on the constitutionality of the statute as applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not justified,but they should be afforded the oppor tunity to demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the candidacy for which by municipal employees would not pose the p ossible threats to government efficiency and integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand for considera tion of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted) Clearly,Letter Carriers, Broadrick,andMagilldemonstrate beyond doubt thatMancuso v. T aft,heavily relied upon by theponencia,has effectively been overruled. HYPERLINK "ht tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn69" \o "" [69]As it is no longer good law, theponencia sexhortation that [since] the Americ ans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, shou ld follow suit is misplaced and unwarranted. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph /jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn70" \o "" [70] Accordingly, our assailed Decision s submission thatthe right to run for public of tricably linked with two fundamental freedoms those of expression and association lies on barren ground. American case law has in factnever recognized a fundament al right to express one s political views through candidacy, HYPERLINK "http://sc.j udiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn71" \o "" [71 ]as to invoke a rigorous standard of review. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn72" \o "" [72]Bart v. Telford HY PERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn73" \o "" [73]pointedly stated that [t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does no

t do so by implication either. Thus, one s interest in seeking office,by itself, isno tentitled to constitutional protection. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/juri sprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn74" \o "" [74]Moreover, one cannot bring one s action under the rubric of freedom of association, absent any allegati on that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the political ide as of a particular set of voters. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprud ence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn75" \o "" [75] Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resig ned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient c ivil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii ) avoidance of the appearance of political justice as to policy; (iii) avoidance o f the danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees a chieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity).These are interests that are impor tant enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and em ployees to seek elective office. En passant,we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura citesClements v. Fash K "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_f tn76" \o "" [76]andMorial,et al.v. Judiciary Commission of the State ofLouisiana,et al. YPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn77" \o "" [77]to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run prov isions are valid only when made applicable to specified officials, he explains: U.S.courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions when applied tospecified or particular officials, as distinguished fro m all others, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february20 10/189698.htm" \l "_ftn78" \o "" [78]under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law.These resign-to-run legislationswere not expressed in a genera l and sweeping provision, and thusdid not violate the test of being germane to th e purpose of the law, the second requisite for a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis in the original) This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation ofClementsandMorial. The resign-torun provisions in these cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or particular officials (vis--vis a general class); the questioned provisions we re found validprecisely because the Courtdeferredto legislative judgment and found that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happen s to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge inClementsrevolved aro und the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain whysomepublic officials ar e subject to the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the Unite d States Supreme Court: Article XVI, 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically resign their positions if they become candidates for any o ther elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the current term is one yea r or less. The burdens that 65 imposes on candidacy are even less substantial th an those imposed by 19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially the sam e state interests. The District Court found 65 deficient, however, not because o f the nature or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the manner in which the offices are classified.According to the District Court , the classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny, because Te xas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are sub ject to 65 and why others are not. As with the case of 19, we conclude that 65 s urvives a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no rational predicate to the classification scheme. The history behind 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step

at a time" approach that this Court has undertaken with regard to state regulati on not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended the terms of those offices enume rated in the provision from two to four years. The provision also staggered the terms of other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be c ontested at each election. The automatic resignation proviso to 65 was not added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic resignation provision was added i n Art. XI, 11, which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve term s longer than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extend ing the terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years. Thus, the automatic resignation provision inTexasis a creature of the State's elec toral reforms of 1958.That the State did not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose terms were not extended by 1 1 or 65, absent an invidious purpose, is not the sort of malfunctioning of the S tate's lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbidTexasto restrict one elected officehold er's candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places similar res trictions on other officeholders. The provision's language and its history belie any notion that 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying access to the politi cal process to identifiable classes of potential candidates.(citations omitted an d italics supplied) Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took theMorialline that there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office out of context. A correct reading of that line readi ly shows that the Court only meant to confine its ruling to the facts of that ca se, as each equal protection challenge would necessarily have to involve weighin g governmental interests vis--vis the specific prohibition assailed. The Court he ld: The interests of public employees in free expression and political association a re unquestionably entitled to the protection of the first and fourteenth amendme nts. Nothing in today's decision should be taken to imply that public employees may be prohibited from expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner that does not interfere with the proper performance of their public du ties. In today's decision, there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the r ight of public employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we appro ve any general restrictions on the political and civil rights of judges in parti cular.Our holding is necessarily narrowed by the methodology employed to reach it . A requirement that a state judge resign his office prior to becoming a candida te for non-judicial office bears a reasonably necessary relation to the achievem ent of the state's interest in preventing the actuality or appearance of judicia l impropriety. Such a requirement offends neither the first amendment's guarante es of free expression and association nor the fourteenth amendment's guarantee o f equal protection of the laws. (italics supplied) Indeed, theMorialcourteven quotedBroadrickand stated that: In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment positions require restrictions on partisan political activities and w hich may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted for attempting t o limit the positions upon which such restrictions are placed. (citations omitte d) V. Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369,

and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, an d Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assail ed Decisionstruck them down for being overbroad in two respects,viz.: (1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding ap pointive posts without due regard for the type of position being held by the emp loyee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto; HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/1 89698.htm" \l "_ftn79" \o "" [79]and (2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants ho lding appointive positions without due regard for the type of office being sough t, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, munic ipal orbarangaylevel. Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision. i.Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Official s Position, Valid According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointi ve posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of influence that may be attendant t hereto. Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented ar e extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post. Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausibl e, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growi ng bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful politica l machine that has amassed the scattered powers of government workers so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. HYPER LINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn80" \o "" [80]As elucidated in our prior exposition: HYPERLINK "http://sc.judici ary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn81" \o "" [81] Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use o f their respective positions (apparently) to promote their own candidacy may see m tolerable even innocuous particularly when viewed in isolation from other simi lar attempts by other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that s uch seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effo rt on the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda through a carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials com ing from various levels of the bureaucracy. [T]he avoidance of such a politically active public work force which could give an emerging political machine an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power is reason en ough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officia ls without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such em ployees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omi tted) ii.Limitation on Candidacy

Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants hol ding appointive offices, without due regard for the type of elective office bein g sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national , municipal orbarangaylevel. This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from t hose involved in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warran t distinctive treatment, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/ february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn82" \o "" [82]so that restrictions on candidacy ak in to those imposed by the challenged provisions can validly apply only to situa tions in which the elective office sought is partisan in character. To the exten t, therefore, that such restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for n onpartisan elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be considered as overbroad. Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matt er will show that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real.Our expositio n on this issue has not been repudiated,viz.: A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidel ines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomi nation of official candidates of registeredpolitical parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov .ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn83" \o "" [83]Obviously, the se rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Lo cal Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedlypartisanin character. Thus, i t is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the c andidacies of appointive officials vying forpartisanelective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leve led against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable. Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Om nibus Election Code, in conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections fo r nonpartisan public offices. The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections fo offices, since these are the only elections in this country which involvenonparti sanpublic offices. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/februa ry2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn84" \o "" [84] In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these nonpartisanbaran gayelections be governed by special rules, including a separate rule on deemed re signations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said provi sion states: Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. No person shall be electedpunong barangay o r kagawad ng sangguniang barangayunless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the commencement of the election period but not l ater than the day before the beginning of the campaign period in a form to be pr escribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the barangay office for wh ich he is a candidate. x x x x

Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or e mployee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in governmen t-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned u pon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. Sincebarangayelections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under t he present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than apartisanone. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omn ibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698 .htm" \l "_ftn85" \o "" [85] In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public o ffices, the overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained: In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partis an behavior has not received judicial imprimatur, because the general propositio n of the relevant US cases on the matter is simply that the government has an in terest in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees that differs signif icantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of t he citizenry in general. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010 /february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn86" \o "" [86] Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad, particularly where, as in this case, conduct and not pure speech is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial a s well, judged in relation to the statute s plainly legitimate sweep. HYPERLINK "ht tp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn87" \o "" [87] In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute s overbreadth woul d entail, among other things, a rough balancing of the number of valid applicati ons compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. HYPERLINK "http:/ /sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn88" \o "" [88]In this regard, some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid applicatio n that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. HY PERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn89" \o "" [89]The question is a matter of degree. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judic iary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn90" \o "" [90]Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge presently mounte d must demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the number of potenti ally invalid elections (i.e. the number of elections that were insulated from pa rty rivalry but were nevertheless closed to appointive employees) that may in al l probability result from the enforcement of the statute. HYPERLINK "http://sc.ju diciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn91" \o "" [91] The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrow ing from the words ofMagill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken ligh tly, much less to be taken in the dark, HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jur isprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn92" \o "" [92]especially since an overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit the State from enfor cing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is admittedly within its po wer to proscribe. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/februar

y2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn93" \o "" [93] This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it co mes to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes t hat purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freed om of speech, for such approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/juris prudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn94" \o "" [94] In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only wh ere, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of othe rs may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inh ibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. HYPERLINK "http ://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn95" \ o "" [95]Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting construc tion could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily appa rent constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the allege d overbreadth of the statute. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence /2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn96" \o "" [96] In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appoint ive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies bloc ked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged stat utes which are, at best, bold predictions cannot justify invalidating these stat utes intotoand prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and intere st to proscribe. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/februar y2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn97" \o "" [97]Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself. HYPE RLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn98" \o "" [98] Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranki ng Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without rel inquishing their posts. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/ february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn99" \o "" [99]Several COMELEC election officers ha d likewise filed their Certificates of Candidacy in their respective provinces. H YPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn100" \o "" [100]Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution for representative of the first district of Quezon province last D ecember 14, 2009 HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/februar y2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn101" \o "" [101] even as her position as Justice Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors, HYPERLINK "http:/ /sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm" \l "_ftn102" \o "" [102]who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/189698.htm " \l "_ftn103" \o "" [103]The Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena.We cannot all ow the tilting of our electoral playing field in their favor. For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent s and the intervenors M otions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court s December 1, 2009 De cision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONST ITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second provis o in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. L-23794. February 17, 1968.] ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC.,Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, TH E MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS, as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY,Defendants-Appellees. Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Taada, fo rPlaintiff-Appellant. Ramon O. de Veyra forDefendants-Appellees. SYLLABUS 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; POWER TO IMPOSE EXPORT OR IMPORT TAX; REP. ACT 2264, SEC. 2; EFFECT ON SEC. 2287 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. Section 2 of Rep. Ac t 2264 which became effective on June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipal ities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uni form taxes, licenses or fees. This provision of law has repealed Sec. 2287 of th e Revised Administrative Code (Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, L-20 125, July 20, 1965), which withheld from municipalities the power to impose an i mport or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for w harfage. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW; REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION; REQUI SITES. The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legisla tion. A classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distin ctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to f uture conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TAX ORDINANCE SHOULD NOT BE SINGULAR AND EXCLUSIVE. When the t axing ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Co,, Inc. was the only sugar central in the City. A reasonable classification should be in terms applicable to future c onditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central. 4. TAXATION; TAX, REFUND OF; NO INTEREST CAN BE CLAIMED; REASONS. Appellant is n ot entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily col lected. There is sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness. The constitutionali ty of the statute is presumed until declared otherwise. D E C I S I O N BENGZON, J.P.,J.:

On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar mille d at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other fo reign countries." 2 Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000.00, or a total of P12,087.50. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Insta nce of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 a gainst the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, al leging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative o f the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule o f uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being a n export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Or moc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and th at the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar. Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant c ity s power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violat e the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the t axing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to i nclude all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the afore said taxing ordinance mentioned earlier. Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) pe r export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Thou gh referred to as a "production tax", the imposition actually amounts to a tax o n the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For prod uction of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 i n part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipa lity, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."cralaw virtua1aw library Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsis tency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of R epublic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, 4

held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And s of the transcendental effects that municipal export or s will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of tated that there was no other alternative until Congress l measures to forestall any unfavorable results.

expressing Our awarenes import taxes or license Republic Act 2264, We s acts to provide remedia

The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on th e power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of unifor mity of taxation, were infringed. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1[1], Art. 111) In Felwa v. Sala s 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on sub stantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present condition s but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of th e present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same c lass. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does n ot meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the O rmoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance s ena ctment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be sing ular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan).6 A t the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherw ise. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinan ce is declared unconstitutional and the defendants- appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff- appellant paid under protest. No. costs. So ordered. Concepcion,C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Ang eles and Fernando,JJ., concur.

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