The As'arite Ontology - I-Frank

Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 9 (1999) pp.
163-231 Copyright 1999 Cambridge University Press
THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES RICHARD M. FRANK The aim of the present study is to examine the most basic concepts and terms of those fundamentals of AS'arite ontology and theology about which there was generally common agreement within the school.1 The major features of their teaching concerning atoms and accidents and God and His attributes are well known and are often, if not generally, regarded as relatively simple. One reason for their being so regarded is that in most studies, including my own, far too much has too often been taken for granted or treated only superficially. Many of the most fundamental concepts and the associated terminology have not been thoroughly examined; and concommitantly a number of expressions employed in translating and explaining the texts have not been properly scrutinized with regard to how accurately they represent the intention of the Arabic. Though omitting all formal discussion of the As'arites' antecedents and their opponents, we shall give some serious attention to the Arabic lexicography concerning a number of words in hopes of gaining a clearer view of how they were heard and so of their uses and nuances. This will also help bring to the fore certain important^ features of the AS'arite theology in its being, like that of al-Gubba'i and his Mu'tazilite followers, a Muslim science originally thought out and elaborated in Arabic with no commitment to and little or no direct influence of prior, non-Muslim traditions. Because the terminology is of central importance to our purpose here, we have given the Arabic more frequently than might normally seem required.
Accordingly, the notions of ontologically distinct "states" (ahwal) as held by alBaqillani and al-6uwayni will not be treated. Nor will we offer more than a very elementary discussion of the concepts and terminology that have to do with relationships of primary entities, e.g., those that involve matters such as an atom's being black or a cognition's relationship to its object, and the like, for these are topics that embrace a number of complex issues about which there were disagreements on various levels.
1
164
RICHARD M. FRANK
Al-Baqillani says that some As'arites, among others, hold that "the most universal nouns are 'say", 'dat', 'nafs', and "ayn' and that by 'universal nouns' (al-asma'u al-amma) they mean those descriptions which include2 all beings' (al-tasmiyatu al-mustamilatu 'aid sa'iri al-dawdt). To say that these are the most universal of nouns might appear to take 'dot', 'nafs', and ''ayn' as synonymous with 'say" viewed simply from the standpoint of ordinary lexicography, as al-Mubarrad says that 'say" is "the most universal expression you can use" ia'ammu ma takallamta bihi).3 Within the context of kalam, however, one formally distinguishes "those nouns which convey the assertion that the entities [referred to] have actuality in being {tufidu al-itbata lial-dawat), 'say", for instance, which is the most universal of 4 positive nouns" (a'ammu asma'i al-itbat).
Al-Baqillani, K. al-Tamhld [hereafter Tarn], ed. R. McCarthy (Beyrouth, 1957), p. 234, 7f. ('description' is here singular since these terms are taken as synonymous). The reason that some, including al-Baqillani, do not hold these to be the most universal is that 'known' and several others may be used of both the existent and the non-existent, while these, according to common AS'arite doctrine, are used only of the actually existent; cf. Abu Bakr ibn Furak, Mugarrad maqalat al-As'ari [hereafter Mug], ed. D. Gimaret (Beyrouth, 1987), pp. 252, 4ff. and 255, 4ff. To predicate 'say" of a non-existent (i.e., a possible or imagined) being is to use the word in an extended sense (tawassu'; ibid., p. 253, 12f. and al-Qusayri, Lata'if al-isarat, ed. I. Busyuni, 6 vols. (Cairo, 19681971), 4, p. 200, 13ff. (ad al-Qur'dn, 22.1). Note that, following the usage of the grammarians, 'ism' is employed as a term for all nominal forms, including verbal adjectives, both active and passive, which are used as attributives and/or predicates. Our rendering of the word, therefore, varies according to what seems most appropriate in each context. 'Say" and the other words under discussion here are taken up in a somewhat different perspective in D. Gimaret, Les Noms divins en Islam (Paris, 1988), pp. 133ff. 3 Al-Mubarrad, K. al-Muqtadab, ed. M. A. 'Udayma, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1964-68), vol. 4, p. 280. [The indefinite noun] "is not particular to one individual of a class apart from all the others, e.g., 'man', 'horse'..." (Mubarrad 4, p. 276); "the most indefinite of nouns is 'say" for it is non-specific with respect to all things (ankaru al-asmd'i qawlu al-qa'ili say'un li-annahu mubhamun fi al-asya'i kulliha: ibid. 3, p. 186), Similarly Abu alQasim al-Zaggagi says (al-Gumal fi al-nahw, ed. A.T. al-Hamad [Beyrouth, 1984], p. 178) '"say" is the most indefinite of indefinites, then 'gawharun', then 'body', then 'animal', then 'human being' (insdn), then 'man' (ragul);" cp. also Istiqaq asmd Allah, ed. A. H. Mubarak (Cairo, 1974), p. 466, ult. The occurrence of 'gawhar' has in this sentence - for us at least - a somewhat peripatetic ring, but that it be meant as an equivalent to Greek ouaio is quite implausible. The word is used in its normal Arabic sense where, for example al-Mubarrad says (3, p. 272) that [the names for] iron and silver and the like, which are material substances (gawahir) cannot be employed as descriptives {la yun'atu bihd). Similarly Ibn Ginni says (al-Hasd'is, ed. M. A. al-Naggar, 3 vols. [Beyrouth, 1983], I, p. 119) that verbs are taken only from events not from substances (innama yastaqqu min al-hadati Id min al-gawhar), i.e., they are derived from verbal nouns, not from nouns that name material substances. 4 Mug, p. 252, lOf. (concerning the meanings of 'itbdf and the sense of 'positive' here, see below). So also 'mawgud', is termed a universal and a synonym of 'say"; cf. also ibid., p. 255, 6ff.
2
THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES
165
Discussing the semantics of 'mawgud' (existent/exists) alAs'arl

said that it commonly means 'known', something a knower knows (md wagadahu wdgidun), and that it is known by virtue of the knower's knowing it {mawgudun bi-wugudi al-wdgidi lahu) and by his knowing it so long as it is known to him. [...J But what is mawgud in an absolute sense {al-mawgudu al-mutlaq), which is not correlated to a knower's knowing it, is whatever has actuality and is, which is neither non-actual nor non-existent {al-tdbitu alka'inu alladl laysa bi-muntafin wa-la ma'dum).5
What he means by "absolute" is that 'mawgud' is not said with reference to or as implying any relationship, but only as asserting the actuality of the object/referent. The etymological explanation of the use of 'mawgud' in the sense of existent proposed here may perhaps originate with al-As'ari's master, Abu 'All alGubba'i, whose study of the semantics of the Divine Names is justly admired and was commonly followed even by his opponents. The fact is, however, that the use most likely originates not from wagada, yagidu in the sense of to know, but in the sense of to find, as it would seem to be a caique on Syriac 'seklh' as a rendering of Greek 6v or undpxov. Al-Ansari says:
The existent (al-mawgud) is what has actuality and is {al-tdbitu al-kd'in), viz., a ddt and a nafs and an 'ayn. These are all expressions for a being {say'). Every being is existent and every existent is a being; nothing is described by. 'is a being' that is not described as being existent and nothing is described by 'exists' that is not described by 'is a being' {ma Id yusafu bi-al-wugudi Id yusafu bi-kawnihi say'an).6
Mug, p. 27, 12ff. {Wagada, yagidu in the sense of to know commonly connotes to know of one's own knowledge and is sometimes so distinguished from 'alima, ya'lamu and 'arafa,ya'rifu. It is clear from al-A5'ari's discussion here, however, that this distinction is not in play.) So also in Sirazi {La Profession de foi d'Abu Ishaq alShirazi, ed. M. Bernand, Supplement aux Annales islamologiques, no. 11 [Cairo, 1987], p. 67, lOf.) we read, "al-mawgiidu kuwa al-say'u a/-ka 'in ... fa-ma 'na qaw/ind mawgudun wa-say'un wa-tabitun ma'nan wahid" and in Abu al-Ma'ali al^Guwayni, As-Samil ft Usul ad-Din, Some Additional Portions of the Text [hereafter Sam (81)], ed. R. M. Frank (Tehran, 1981), p. 48, 9f, "... anna al-tabita wa-al-say'a wa-almawguda 'ibardtun 'an mu'abbarin wahid." For a different use of the expression 'almawgudu al-mutlaq', see Abu al-Qasim al-Ansari, Sarh al-Irsad [hereafter S.Ir], MS Princeton University Library, ELS no. 634, foi. 42r, llff, cited below. 6 Abu al-Qasim al-Ansari, al-Gunya ft usul al-din [hereafter Gn], MS III Ahmet no. 1916, foi. 12r, 14ff. It is thusv that al-Guwayni cites al-Baqillani as denning to be a say' {al-say'iyya) by existence (Sam (81), p. 56, 20f). On the phrase 'al-tdbitu al-kd'in' here see n. 25 below.
166
RICHARD M. FRANK
In non-kalam usage 'daf commonly means (refers to or designates) an individual being as such. Al-Sirafi thus in explaining why Slbawayh in the first line of his Book employs 'al-kalim' as the name for words rather than (al-kalam' distinguishes several kinds of nouns and says that 'al-kalim' is the name of the intended object itself (ismu dati al-say'), sc, words as such, while 'al-kalam' is a verbal noun (ismu al-ft'l) based on 'kalim' and that of the two classes, names of things/objects are primary (aqdamuhumd fi al-rutbati ismu al-ddt). In a later passage he says:
When you say 7 thought Zayd was leaving' you have no doubt concerning Zayd, but have doubt only with regard to his leaving, whether it took place or not; [...] and when you say 'Zayd is leaving' before introducing these verbs [e.g., 'I think', 'I know', and the like] you inform the hearer of his leaving, about which he didn't know, not about his person as such (datuhu), which he knew already.7
'Nafs' has many meanings in Arabic, most of which are of no concern to us here.8 In its basic meaning it is taken by the lexicographers to name something associated with the ruh (life breath or pneuma) and so is employed also to mean the human person as a living being and also, thus, the (human) body (algasad).9 Thus al-Zaggag is cited in Lisan al-'arab as saying that in the speech of the Arabs the word has two basic uses, the one to mean the life breath and "the other in which it has the meaning of the whole entity/object and its basic reality as such (ma'na gumlati al-say'i wa-haqiqatihi), as in 'so-and-so killed himself, destroyed himself, i.e., he brought destruction on his whole being and his very reality [i.e., as a living person]" (taqulu qatala nafsahu wa-ahlaka nafsahu ay awqa'a al-ihlaka bi-datihi kullihi wa-haqiqatihi). Thus al-Ansari says (Gn, fol. 36v, 21f.) "'nafs' refers to the actual reality of the being as such;
Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi, Sarh Kitab Sibawayh [hereafter SK], ed. R. 'Abd al-Tawwab et al, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1986-1990), vol. 1, p. 316, ad Slbawayh, al-Kitdb, 2 vols. (Bulaq, 1316), vol. 1, p. 18, 1-5. In the sequel, where the citation is found, as here, in the margins of the Bulaq edition of the Kitab reference is given simply asadloc. 8 For a list, cf. Gimaret, Noms, pp. 151ff. 9 Lisan al-'arab, s.v. and al-Gawhari, Tag al-luga wa-sihah al-'arabiyya, 6 vols., ed. T. A. 'Attar (Beyrouth, 1979), s.v., citing Ta'lab. So in the line of Ibn Abi Rabi'a {Diwan, # 204, 5): in kana saqamun fa-kana land I wa-lahd l-saldmu wa-sihhatu lnafsi (If there is illness, let it be ours, while to her, well being and good health. The plural, 'anfus' is treated as masculine because it is taken to refer to men: Magdlis Ta'lab, ed. A. M. Hartin (Cairo, 1969), p. 252.
7
THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES
167
one says 'the cognition itself and the [instance of the accident] black itself (inna al-nafsa yunbi'u 'an haqiqati al-say'i yuqalu nafsu al-'ilmi wa-nafsu al-sawdd). So it is that 'dat', and 'nafs' and "ayn' are employed almost interchangeably as emphatics: the very Self of the particular referent: "The nafs of a thing is its 'ayn (nafsu al-say'i 'aynuhu) and is employed as an emphatic: 'ra'aytu fulanan nafsahu' and 'ga'anl bi-nafsihV ('I saw so-and-so himself and 'he came to me in person')": (al-Gawhari, s.v.). Abu al-Hasan al-Tabari says, "if some one says 'so-and-so is king in Syria and Iraq' he means [he has] dominion over Syria and Iraq, not that he is himself (datuhu) in them."10 Again, al-Sirafi says, you use
"alimtu' when you mean the recognition of a particular object as such (datu al-say') and you did not previously recognize it/him, as in 'I recognized Zayd'; that is, you recognized him but did not recognize him earlier (SK, fol. 126r, 6ff, ad Sibawayh 1, p. 18).11
In accord with this common usage, Ibn Furak says:

To designate a body and assert the fact of a movement is not an assertion of the existence of the particular body as such {'aynu al-gism). The desire of some one who asks "did Zayd move?" and "did he leave Egypt?" is not to know the individual, Zayd and that this individual actually exists in the world {'aynu Zaydin wa-annahu mawgudu al-dati fi al-'alam); the desire of the one who asks the question concerns Zayd's departure and his movement (Mug, p. 218, 14ff.).
That is, he knows the particular being/person (dat, 'ayn) named Zayd and that he exists. The analysis here follows that of the grammarians regarding predicational sentences, in which it is the predicate (habar, hadit) only that confers information, since
10 Ta'wll al-ayat al-muskila, MS Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, Tal'at, mag. no. 490, fol. 133v, 4ff. 11 Note that the '-hi' of datu al-say'i wa-lam takun 'arifan bihi refers to 'say" and not to 'dat', which is simply an emphatic as in 'he himself. The phrase means the individual as an individual. (With this contrast its use in the phrase 'mawgudu alddt' in the following citation (Mug, p. 218, 16)). It may be worth pointing out that in kalam works 'dat' is often treated as a masculine, e.g., Abu al-Ma'ali al-Guwaynl, alSatnil fi usul al-din [hereafter Sam (69)], ed. A. S. al-Nasar (Cairo, 1969), p. 127, 9 and 132, 11, but al-Sirafi in the passage translated above treats it more properly as feminine (... Id datahu allati 'arafaha at the end of the passage cited). Regarding variant readings, K = the portion of the text edited by H. Klopfer (Cairo, 1963), T = Tehran University Library, MS 350, and E = a paraphrase found in Escorial MS 1610. NaSSar's edition is based on Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya MS kalam no. 1290, which is in fact a photocopy of MS Kopriilu no. 826 from part of which Klopfer prepared his edition.
168
RICHARD M. FRANK
the referent of the subject term (mubtada', ism) is assumed to be known to the hearer. With nouns that designate classes, 'dot' is often employed to mean the individual instance as such. Thus al-Mubarrad says (2, p. 296, 5) that, in contrast to the personal 'man', 'ma' is employed "of non-human entities and of the attributes of human beings" (li-dawati gayri al-adamiyyina wa-nu'uti aladamiyyin). Ibn Furak speaking of "created atoms and bodies" says that their individual instances are numerically finite and limited (dawatuha mutanahiyatun mahduda).12 So too, alBaqillani speaks of "the power whereby God created classes and individual beings (al-agnasu wa-al-dawat)"13 and al-Guwayni (Sam (69), p. 632, lOf.) says that "the act of naming [or refering to something] is a particular verbal utterance and is a particular entity (qawlun min al-aqwali wa-datun min al-dawat)" and so too (ibid., p. 170, 14) "every action is a being and an entity (say'un wa-dai)." In the formal usage of the As'arites accordingly, 'daf, along with "ayn' and 'nafs\ employed as a simple noun or predicate synonymous with 'say" means an actually existent entity or being as such, its "Self."14 In this formal sense, however, 'say" is synonymous with 'mawgud'. "The definition of 'say" is what exists; the definition of non-existent is what is not a say'" (haddu al-say'i huwa al-mawgud; haddu alma'dumi huwa alladi laysa bi-say')15. Accordingly, "every being (say') exists and every existent is a being" (Gn, fol. 12r, 15; for the same assertion concerning 'nafs', see n. 29 below). "'The existence of atoms and of accidents' has no meaning other than their individual Selves (dawatuhuma); and their being created
12 R. Robert, Baydn muskil al-hadit des ibn Furak: Auswahl nach den Handschriften Leipzig, Leiden, London, und dem Vatikan, Analecta Orientalia 22 (Rome, 1941), p. 19, 13f. [hereafter Baydn (K)]. 13 Abu al-Qasim al-Baqillani, al-Insdf fimd yagib i'tiqdduh, ed. M. al-Kawtari, 2nd edn (Cairo, 1963), p. 23, 15. Cp. al-As'ari, Risdla ild ahl al-tagr bi-Bdb al-Abwdb [hereafter Tagr], in Dar al-Funiln: llahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuasi 8 (1928), pp. 80-108, at p. 93, llf. (= p. 65, 8f. in the edition of M. A. al-Gulaynid [Cairo, 1987]), where he says the world has a single creator "ihtara'a a'yanahu... wa-hdlafa bayna agndsihi" using "ayn' where al-Baqillani employs 'ddt'. God's creating the classes of contingent beings we shall take up later. 14 In denning "ayn' al-Gawhari says (s.v.), "wa-'aynu al-say'i nafsuhu, yuqdlu huwa huwa 'aynan wa-huwa huwa bi-'aynihi." 15 A. S. Abdel Haleem, "Early theological and juristic terminology: Kitdb al-Hudud fi l-Usul by Ibn Furak," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 54, 1 (1991): 5-41, p. 20, # 13f. [hereafter Hudud].
169
has no meaning other than the causing of their Selves to exist after they were not entities and beings and Selves (la ma'nd liigadihima ilia itbatu dawatihima ba'da an lam takun datan wa-say'an wa-nafsan: Gn, fol. 13r, 9)."16 'Daf does not mean essence as essence is commonly associated with what a thing is. The dot of a being is not shared or common with that of other beings. As meaning a single entity or individual being ldaf may be ambivalent. That is, it is sometimes employed of composite beings, as where it is used in Mug (p. 218, cited above) to refer to a body or where al-Guwayni says that 'agsam' (greater in body) means that there is a differential11 of size between the two beings in question (bayna al-datayn) or where al-Qusayri18 says that "izamu al-daf (magnitude of being) refers to the multiplicity of partsc (Tahbir, fol. 78v, 8f.).19 In the most formal sense, however, dat' properly describes or refers to a primary entity as such, i.e., to a single, incomposite and indivisible being20 that has actuality of existence either as an independent being (one that does not exist in a subject of any kind) or as one that as such exists in another.
The use of the singular noun here seems a bit curious, since the plural plainly refers to the multiple instances of each of the two classes. I have for this reason emended the datuhuma of the first sentence in accord with the plural that follows and for the sake of the sense have translated the three singulars in the final clause as plurals even though I have let them stand in the transcription. What I have transcribed as lam takun lacks the diacriticals; I have chosen the feminine because of the plural dawatihima that precedes. 17 Sam (69), p. 401f., where with T read al-datayn for al-dat at p. 401, 2. 18 Abu al-Qasim al-Qusayri, al-Tahbirfi al-tadkir, MS Yeni Cami no. 705, fols. 22v131v, under the title Sarh asmd' Allah al-husna. An abridged and mutilated version of the work was published by I. Busyuni (Cairo, 1968) which is here referred to when it contains the integral text of the passage cited. 19 So too, for example, al-Baqillani speaks of a set of names that signify features of things which are "structure and shape, as with 'horse' and 'man' and 'human being' and those analogous nouns that convey the meaning of structure and composition" (al-mufidatu li-al-binyati wa-al-ta'lif: Tarn, p. 235, 9ff.). With this cp. al-Mubarrad 4, p. 276, 3ff. 20 Cf., e.g., Bayan (K), p. 18, Iff., where he contrasts the strict meaning of 'one' to its use with reference to things that are in fact composites or conglomerates, e.g., when it is said of a man or a house, where what is referred to is in reality an assemblage of beings (fi al-haqiqati asya'u mugtami'a). Thus 'Abd al-Qahir al-Bagdadi (Usul al-din [Istanbul, 1928], p. 35, 8f.) speaks of bodies as things that are single units considered as a class (i.e., members of the class named by 'gism') but not as actually existent beings (mufradun fi al-ginsi duna al-dat). That is, they are members of a particular, well defined class, but in themselves are not unitary beings and so are not primary entities.
16
170
RICHARD M. FRANK
'Mawgicd' is denned, as we have seen, by 'ka'in' and 'tabit'. When used as a simple verb (i.e., neither with a predicate nor as a simple time marker) kana, yakunu is commonly taken by the grammarians to mean to come to be or occur;21 and so also alGawhari (s.v.): "when you use it for the coming to be of something and its occurrence ('an huduti al-say'i wa-wuqu'ihi) it doesn't need a predicate since it signifies a referent and a time." Ibn Faris in Maqayis (s.v.),22 where he is concerned with setting out the most basic sense of roots and stems, defines it as to occur or be present: waqa'a or hadara) and 'to be present' is plainly to be understood as to be/exist. There is in classical Arabic no proper equivalent for kana, yakunu as a "complete verb" (i.e., where it neither serves as a time marker nor is required simply because of a syntactical feature of the particular clause or sentence). The use of the passive wugida, yugadu in the sense of exist originated in the usage of translations made from another language and therefore, since it did not belong to the lexicon of proper literary Arabic, could not itself be employed as an equivalent whereby to define kana, yakun. But 'to be created', 'to come to be', 'to take place', &c, mean (imply, anyhow), each in its own way, to be, to have (or to have had) actuality in being, and the As'arites commonly use kana, yakunu in this sense. It was thus that Abu 'All al-Gubba'I, alAs'ari's master, takes 'ka'in' in a formal sense as meaning to be, to exist, when he says that to predicate 'baq' (continues to exist, endures/perdures) of God is to say 'He exists not by a having come to be' (annahu ka'inun la bi-hudut).23 In discussing the meanings of 'ka'in', al-As'arl says that when one predicates 'is' of God what is meant by 'He is' is that He has actuality in being (amma wasfuhu bi-annahu ka'inun . . . yuradu bi-kawnihi
21 Commonly 'huliqa' and 'waqa'a\as in Sibawayh 1, p. 21, 13 but the 'huliqa' is paraphrased as hadata' by al-Sirafi, SK 2, p. 354. 22 Abu al-Husayn ibn Faris, Maqayis al-luga, ed. A. M. Harun, 6 vols. (Cairo, 19691972). 23 Al-As'ari, Maqalat al-islamiyyln [hereafter Maq], ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 192930), p. 529, 6f. Accordingly 'baq' may not be said of a human being (ibid., p. 531, 6f. The same position is asserted in Tarn, p. 263, 8 and Istiqaq, p. 347); and al-Baqillani employs the phrase 'ka'inun bi-gayri hudut', Tarn, p. 263, 8.; cp. 'Abd al-Gabbar alHamadani, al-Mugnl fi abwab al-tawhld [hereafter M], 16 vols. (Cairo, 1959-65), 5, p. 237, lOf. Thus the use of 'ka'in' seems to have been common, as 'Abd al-G-abbar says wa-yusafu ta'ala bi-annahu ka'inun wa-yuradu bihi annahu mawgudun li-anna kulla mawgudin yastahiqqu an yusafa bi-dalika (M 5, 232, 10f.). For a discussion of the semantics of 'mawgud', 'ka'in', and 'tabit' as equivalents cf. M 5, p. 202.

24
171
tubutuhu). So also al-Ansarl speaks of a class of existent beings iginsun min al-ka'inat), using 'ka'in' instead of the more usual 'mawgud' (Gn, fol. lv, 19). Predicated of what are entities iasya' I dawat) in the proper sense, 'tabit' is synonymous with 'mawgud', but unlike 'mawgud' it is also predicated of things (e.g., states of affairs and relationships) which are not considered as beings or entities in the formal sense and of which therefore 'mawgud' is not properly predicated. 'Tabit' is equivocal: used of what are entities (asya' I dawat) in the strict sense of the term it means actually existent, while used of relationships and states of affairs it means having actuality.25 According to the formal usage of the As'arites, a say' or dot is a concrete, actually existent entity. A number of scholars regularly employ 'thing' to render 'say" as used in these texts, but
Mug, p. 43, 12. The use of'tubut' instead of'wugud' here and in ibid., p. 27, 12ff., translated above, as well as in Tarn, p. 263 (cited in the previous note), is no doubt in order to avoid the presence of items that do not belong to the lexicon of proper Arabic as recognized by the lexicographers. Thus al-Guwayni says (Sam (69), p. 271, 5) "alwugudu tubutun 'aid al-tahqiq." 25 Since tabata, yatbutu is often used as a synonym of wugida, yugadu', the IVth form, atbata, yutbitu (most often the masdar, itbat) is sometimes employed with the meaning to cause to exist, as in Gn, fol. 13r, 9f., cited below, n. 36. Concerning the original and more general sense, of tabata, yatbutu', cf. al-Sahibi fi fiqh al-luga, ed. M. el-Chouemi (Beyrouth, 1964), p. 130, where, in discussing the usage of 'inna', Ibn Faris says "al-ma'na fi inna Zaydan qa'imun tabata 'indi hada al-hadit," i.e., it introduces an assertion that seems to be certain/the fact, to present what is truly the case. The verb is thus used in a number of senses. The phrase "al-tdbitu al-ka'in" in Gn, fol. 12r, 14 (cited in n. 6 above) and in Mug, p. 43,12 (cited in the previous note), for example, could be understood either as "that has actuality and exists," i.e., what actually is and exists, or as "that in fact exists." In the former he is using the verbs as equivalents in order to define 'mawgud', while in the latter it is used in the sense of 'actual', what in fact is [presently] the case. In this latter sense 'tabit' may be used in the sense of true or validly assertable, as al-Guwayni speaks (Sam (81), p. 87, 5f.) of contradictory theses all of which cannot be taken as valid (maddhibu mutanaqidatun yastahilu taqdlru tubuti gami'iha), or in speaking of "the actually non-existent," in the phrase "ida arada an yugida gawharan min al-gawahiri alma'dumati al-tdbita" (Gn, fol. 13v, 6) where he may mean either presently non-existent or (more likely?) those atoms whose [eventual] existence is given in God's eternal knowing as present^ though in the present now of the world's time are nonexistent (cf. Gn, fol. 67r = S.Ir, fol. 73r). Al-Guwayni uses 'tubut' of the ahwal, e.g., Sam (69), p. 694, 18f. This is closely related to the common use of atbata, yutbitu in the sense of asserting, making a positive statement as opposed to negating something. The univocity of 'mawgud' in the sense of entity/existent in the usage of the As'arites is most probably due to the fact that, in contrast to 'ka'in' and 'tabit', this meaning does not belong to it in the lexicon of ordinary Arabic but only as a caique on Syriac 's"kih'.
24
172
RICHAED M. FRANK
'thing' is far too vague and general a word properly to convey what is meant by 'say" as a formal expresssion in the AS'arite metaphysics. We say, for example, that it was an unexpected thing for both the Cowboys and the 49'ers to be eliminated in the playoffs, or that Godel's theorem is an interesting thing or that security is a good thing, but none of these things would the As'arites term a say' (or a dat, a nafs, or an 'ayn) in the strict sense of the word.26 So it is that al-Guwayni says that the nonexistent is called a say' in ordinary usage and lexically, but is, strictly speaking, neither an 'ayn nor a dat."21 In sum, 'thing' cannot rightly be considered a literal equivalent of 'say" when the latter occurs as a technical term in the lexicon of As'arite metaphysics where it is not equivalent to 'res' or 'aliquid' - ein blofies Ding - but is a formal lexeme, distinct from the common use of the word in ordinary language. As descriptive terms, formal predicates, 'dat', 'mawgud', etc., are universal. "What strictly is meant by existence does not vary in formal predications, since to exist is to have actuality in being and an instance of the accident black does not differ from
26 'Say" is, of course, occasionally employed in these texts with the general sense it has in ordinary language, as Abu al-Ma'ali al-Guwayni says "laysa li-al-'abdi min iqd'i al-maqduri say'," which might best be rendered, "the human agent has no part in..." (K. al-Irsdd [hereafter Ir], ed. M. Y. Musa and A. A. Abd el-Hamid [Cairo 1950], p. 203, 6; regarding variant readings the edition of J.-D. Luciani [Paris, 1938] is also cited). In the most general sense of "thing," one more commonly finds 'al-amr', as where Abu Bakr al-Baqillani says (Hiddyat al-mustarsidin (Part Six), MS al-Azhar, al-tawhid no. (21) 242, fol. llr, 7f.) that he objects to a given thesis "because it is something that implies..." (li-annahu amrun yugibu...) and similarly (ibid., fol. 129v, 2) that a given thesis "entails one of two things both of which are false" {innahu qawlun yugibu ahada amrayni batilayn). In both these cases the "thing" is an abstract, (the content of) a proposition. Speaking elsewhere of something more concrete he says (ibid., fol. lOr, 12ff.) that if a given thesis were tenable, "then it would point to something [sc, a state of affairs]..." (la-dalla 'aid amrin min al-umur...). So also with the Mu'tazila, as where Abu RaSid al-Nisaburi, says (al-Masd'il fi al-Hildf bayn al-Basriyyln wa-al-Bagdddiyyin, ed. M. Ziyada and R. al-Sayyid [Beyrouth, 1979], p. 65, 3f.) "one of two things must be the case (Idyahlu 'an amrayn), either it is a relationship of need or a relationship of necessity"; and he speaks of non-existence as an 'amr' where we read "non-existence is not something that comes to be... (laysa bi-amrin hdditin...)" (Ziydddt al-Sarh [hereafter ZS], ed. M. A. Abu Zida under the title Fi al-tawhid (Cairo, 1969), pp. 300, 18f.). 27 Sam (69), p. 125, If.: yusammd say'an itldqan wa-lugatan wa-lam yakun fi alhaqiqati 'aynan wa-ld ddtan. The same use of 'itldq' is found where al-Ansari says (Gn, fol. 27r, 16f.), in reply to an objection, "kaldmund fi al-haqd'iqi Id fi al-itldqdt" (we are talking here about strict and proper meanings, not about mere words).
173
an instance of the accident white under the description of existence."28 Similarly, al-Ansari says, citing al-Baqillani, that
existent beings do not differ insofar as they are existent, wherefore it is not necessary that if some existents are independent beings every existent be an independent being since it is not because it is an independent being that it is existent {al-mawgudu Id yahtalifu min haytu annahu mawgudun fa-idd qdma ba'du al-mawguddti bi-nafsihi lam yagib qiyamu kulli mawgudin binafsihi li-annahu lam yakun mawgudan li-qiydmihi bi-nafsihi: Gn, fol. 56r, 3f.; cp. Tarn, pp. 259f.).
It is for this reason that the As'arites hold the terms 'say", l 'mawgud', 'dat\ nafs\ and "ayn' to be universals that are said of all entities,29 wherefore "'being' (say') is not applied to any one class and not to another... and it is possible that there exist a being which belongs to no class 30 of contingent entities (say'un laysa bi-ginsin min al-hawadit)." The implications of this are spelled out in the report that al-As'ari
held that existent beings fall into two distinct categories, those whose existing does not require a substrate or something to which they are related and those that require a substrate or something to which they are related. This is the case whether the existence of the being in question be eternal or contingent, because even if their existence be eternal it is possible theoretically and in fact that they be divided under these two descriptions just as in the case of contingent existence. And in one of his works he said concerning the terminology employed regarding this matter that whatever does not require something to which it is related is said to be an independent being and whatever requires something to which it is related is said not to be an independent being (Mug, pp. 28f.: inna al-mawgudati 'aid qismayni minhd md Id yaqtadi bi-wugudihi md yata'allaqu bihi min mahallin aw-gayrihi waminhd md yaqtadi mahallan aw-muta'allaqan bihi wa-sawd'an kdna dalika azaliyya al-wugudi aw-hddita al-wugudi Id yaftariqu al-hukmu fi ddlika fa28 Sam (69), p. 637, 5ff.: inna haqiqata al-wugudi la yahtalifu fi qadaya al-'uquli id al-wugudu huwa al-tubutu wa-al-sawadu la yuhalifu al-bayada fi wasft al-wugud. Cf. al-Kiya' al-Harasi, Usul al-din, MS Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, kalam no. 295, fol. 38v, cited in n. 39 below. 29 E.g., Tarn, p. 234, cited above ad loc. n. 2. Though less commonly than 'dat ' or "ayn', 'nafs' too is employed in the sense of entity, e.g., Abu Bakr al-Bayhaqi (alAsma' wa-al-sifat [Cairo, 1357], p. 286, 2ff.), where he says that to say that God is a nafs is to say "annahu mawgudun tabitun gayru muntafin wa-la ma'dumin wa-kullu mawgudin nafs"; cp. Mug, pp. 27, 12f., cited above and 254, 13, cited below. 30 Tarn, pp. 193f, where he is speaking only of contingent entities; cp. Gn, fol. 56r, 3f., cited above. The phrase 'bi-ginsin' here seems curious, but the sense, i.e., that is not [an instantiation of] any class, is clear enough. Note also that even though 'hadit' and 'muhdat' may be, and in certain contexts are, formally distinguished they are commonly employed as synonyms (v. n. 94 below) and are so here translated where appropriate.
174
RICHARD M. FRANK
in kana azaliyya al-wugudi amkana wa-gaza inqisamuhu ila hadayni alwasfayni kama ida kana hadita al-wugud. wa-kana yaqiilu fi ba'di kutubihi fi al-'ibarati 'an dalika inna ma la yaqtadl muta'allaqan bihi fa-al-'ibaratu 'anhu annahu qa'imun bi-nafsihi wa-ma yaqtadi ma yata'allaqu bihi fa-al'ibaratu 'anhu annahu la yaqumu bi-nafsihi).
Al-As'ari here divides all existent beings into two basic categories, viz., independent beings (al-qd'imu bi-al-nafs) and those which are not independent beings, those, that is, which must exist in independent beings as their subjects, and then states that each category embraces both eternal (necessary) beings and temporally contingent beings, viz., God and the atoms on the one hand and God's eternal attributes and the accidents on the other. In the realm of logic 'mawgud' is said univocally of all four. Of the two components of the phrase "a substrate or something to which they are related" the first is reduced to the second at the end of the passage, as the latter may be understood to include or to imply what is meant by the former. The expression "something to which they are related" seems at first odd, not to say all too vague. Quite to the contrary, however, the formulation is not only altogether clear within the immediate context, but is logically and conceptually required for consistency. At this point it will suffice to note that al-As'ari wishes to avoid describing God and His eternal attributes by terms which he considers to be, in their strictest sense, proper only to created beings. He will not say that God is the subject (mahall) or locus of His attributes and tends, moreover, to avoid saying that God's attributes are qa'imatun bihi and therefore simply negates 'qa'imun bi-nafsihi\ The nature of the "relation" is 31 clear enough in the context. But the existence of an entity is the entity (wugudu al-say'i
We shall have later to examine the AS'arite discussion of the senses of 'qa'imun bi-al-nafs' more closely. Regarding its use in the present passage it would seem obvious that as a general predicate or description its basic sense is "independently existing," i.e., not in another as its bearer, subject or substrate. This use of the expression is found outside kalam and falsafa, as for example in the statement of Abu al-Qasim al-Zaggagi (al-ldah fi 'Hal al-nahw, ed. M. al-Mubarak [Beyrouth, 1973], p. 93), that al-harakatu la taqumu bi-nafsiha wa-la tugadu Hid fi harf. So also Abu al-Barakat alAnbari asserts (al-Insdffi masa'il al-hildf ed. M. M. 'Abd al-Hamid, 4th edn [Cairo, 1961], 28, p. 237) that, unlike the verb, the noun is an independent word: al-ismu yaqumu bi-nafsihi wa-yastagni 'an al-fi'li wa-amma al-fi'lu fa-innahu Id yaqumu binafsihi wa-yaftaqiru ild al-ism. The use of the expression in kalam is analogous to (and may well have its origin in) the use of omBunapxToc a/o auGunoCTTaroc by Hellenistic authors (e.g., John of Damascus) to describe the ouaia.
31
175
huwa huwa: Mug, p. 239,19f.). "There is no distinction between being (ens) and existence and entity" (Id farqa bayna al-say'i wa-al-wugudi wa-al-ddt: Gn, fol. 12r, 18). "The essential reality of an entity is existence; existence is not a referent distinct from the entity" (haqiqatu al-ddti al-wugudu wa-laysa al-wugudu ma'nan zd'idan 'aid al-ddt: Sam (69), p. 129, 18f.; cp. Mug, pp. 212f.). "Existence is the Self of an entity" (inna al-wuguda nafsu al-ddt: Ir, p. 31, 8f.); it is "the Self of any existent entity" (nafsu al-mawgud: Gn, fol. 27v, 23; cp. ibid., fol. 112r, 20, where the phrase is "aynu al-ddt'), i.e., is the particular entity as such and in itself. Here, thus, we find that the formal sense of 'nafs' and ''ayn' (along with 'ddt') is intimately related to their common use as emphatics. "It is impossible to distinguish between a being and its Self, since the entity is not different from itself (yastahilu al-farqu bayna al-say'i wa-nafsihi id al-say'u la yuhdlifu nafsahu: Sam (69), p. 173, 3f.).32 From its use as a kind of emphatic 53 asserting the actual reality of a being (bi-ma'nd itbdti al-ddt) 'nafs' becomes a noun for existent/existence in its own right. "Lexically, the Self of a being is its existence" (Qusayri, Risdla 2, p. 103, ult.). In the case of a created entity, thus, "we do not assert its having a Self prior to its coming to 34 be" (lam nutbit li-al-halqi qabla hudutihi nafsan). To describe God as having a Self "refers to the fact of His being existent, since any entity is its Self and its existence."35 Reflecting the
32 Note that the position of al-Guwayni here does not differ in the present matter from that of those AS'arites, the great majority in fact, who refuse the concept of ontologically distinct features or states. Since 'nafs', 'ddt', and "ayn' are held to be synonymous and are often employed interchangeably, it is for the most part not practicable to distinguish them in translating. I have here employed 'Self for all three where it seems appropriate. That they should not be translated by 'essence' would seem obvious. The topic of essence as what essentially a being is we shall take up shortly. 33 Abu Bakr ibn Furak, Muskil al-hadit wa-bayanuh (Hyderabad, 1943), p. 151, 17 [hereafter Baydn (H), where variants are mentioned V = MS Vatican, Ar. no. 1406], which is based on Ta'wil, fol. 144v, 2f. and is repeated in al-Bayhaqi, Asma', p. 286, 4ff. Following kamd taqulu, Baydn has al-'arab, which was inserted in the margin of Ta 'wil and subsequently deleted. For kamd taqulu V reads mimmd taqulu al- 'arabu kamd taqulu, which would seem likely to be the original reading, subsequently confused because of the quasi homoioarch, mimmdlkamd taqul. 34 Sam (69), p. 208, 19f., reading nafsan with T and K against the nafsahd of NaSSar's edition. Note too that the in which is added in line 17 is found neither in T nor K and is not needed. 35 Inna wasfa Alldhi ta'dld bi-anna lahu nafsan ... ma'nd hddd al-itldqi yargi'u ild annahu mawgudun li-anna data al-say'i huwa nafsuhu wa-wuguduhu: Baydn (H), pp. 181f.
176
RICHARD M. FRANK
common construct use of 'nafs', 'dat', etc., al-Ansari says that "to say 'the existence of the atom' and 'the Self of the accident' is to join a being to itself by means of 'of" (qawlu al-qd'ili wugudu ql-gawhari wa-ddtu al-'aradi huwa idafatu al-say'i ila nafsihi: Gn, fol. 43r, 22f.; v. generally ibid., lines 6ff.). The Self is the individual existence, the single entity (dat, nafs, 'ayn) as such, as it is per se (li-nafsihi, li-ddtihi). "The existence of atoms and accidents has no meaning save the existent Selves the individual entities - which they are (Id ma'nd li-wugudi al36 gawhari wa-al-'aradi ilia datuhuma)." Thus it is that Abu alQasim al-Isfara'lni says that "the true meaning of the existence of an instance of the accident black is an existence that makes the subject black (wugudun yusawwidu al-mahall: S.Ir, fol. 42r, In sum then, as independent nouns 'dot', 'nafs', and ''ayn' mean entity or being (ens). As descriptive predicates ('ibarat or awsaf) equivalent to 'mawgud' they are universal and are said of all actually existent entities, both those which are independent beings and those which must exist in a subject. As universals, neither 'existent' (mawgud) nor 'being/entity' (say', dat, etc.) is considered to be equivocal. "The validity of being described as existing is not particular to something eternal as opposed to something contingent" (sihhatu al-wasfi bi-al31 wugudi Id yahtassu qadiman min muhditin). This is important if one is rightly to understand the metaphysics of classical As'arite kalam. They distinguish independent beings from those that are not and therefore must exist in another, but the former are by no means conceived as primary entities (ouaiat) in the Aristotelian sense. That is to say, 'being' (i.e., existent/exists) is not held to be said of independent entities in a primary sense and in a secondary or derived sense of those beings that must exist in another; 'mawgud' is said equally of the one and of the other as having actual existence. And this is true even though, of contingent beings, the one general class is termed 'gawhar' (which in the translation literature renders ouaia) and is described as qd'imun bi-al-nafs (which is equivalent to
36 Gn, fol. 13r, 9. Thus "the atom's being an atom is, in our view, identical with its being an entity: Sam (69), p. 132, 14, where with T read 'aynu kawnihi datan for gayru kawnihi datan. 37 Mug, p. 139, ult. The indefinite, 'qadiman', is used here because God's eternal attributes are distinguished from His Self.
177
auGvmapxxov) and the other "arad' (which renders TO aufifleftrjxoc). To render 'gawhar' by 'substance' is at best misleading in connotation. Nowhere, in short, do the As'arites suggest that 'say" or 'da? or 'mawgud' is said in one sense of independent beings and in another of those that exist in them.38 The universality of 'exists/existent' is, however, in the realm of words {al-'ibara) and logic. Thus Abu al-Qasim al-Isfara'Inl is cited as saying that that existence which is common is nothing other than the verbal expression that is true of every actually existent being (innama al-wugudu al-samilu huwa al-'ibaratu al-salihatu li-kulli mawgud). He describes this as existence in an unrestricted sense and says that it is used of words (alwugudu al-mutlaqu yansarifu ila al-'ibara: S.Ir, fol. 42r, llff.). So too, 'dat\ 'nafs\ and "ayn' in the realm of words (logic) are universal and true of every actually existent entity, while in the realm of the real (in metaphysics) every entity is, in itself and as such, a particular existence, an entity whose Self/existence does not extend beyond itself. Real existence is not something common or shared but is the actuality in being of the particular entity itself. ** *
Some formulations might, on first reading, give the impression that independent entities (al-qd'imu bi-al-nafs) are in some way beings in a primary sense, as for example where al-Baqillani speaks (Tarn, p. 222, 18) of "the entitative attributes which exist in entities" (al-ma'dni al-mawgudatu bi-al-dawdt). Again, al-Quayri says "alqadimu la yaqumu bi-datihi haditun li-anna man qabila datuhu al-hawadita lam yahlu minha" (al-Fusul ft l-u'sul [hereafter Fusul], ed. R.M. Frank in MIDEO, 16 [1983], pp. 59-75, at p. 62, If.) and Abu Sa'd al-Mutawalli "al-sifatu mawgudatun ma'a al-dati qd'imatun bi-al-ddt" (K. al-Mugnl, ed. M. Bernand, Supplement aux Annales islamologiqu.es, no. 7 [Cairo, 1986], p. 31, 7); and similar usage is found in R. M. Frank, "Al-Ustadh abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, an 'Aqida together with Selected Fragments," [hereafter al-Isfara'ini], MIDEO, 19 (1989), pp. 129-202, Fr. #71 and elsewhere. 'Dat' is employed here, however, simply to designate the unnamed "other," i.e., the entity which is the subject or locus in which reside those beings whose existence is to reside in another (yaqumu bi-gayrihi, yugadu bi-gayrihi). Thus it is that al-Guwayni speaks (Sam (69), p. 174, 11) of "those entities (dawdt) which we call accidents" and says (ibid., pp. 180f.) that in the case of some kinds of accidents we know their reality as entities immediately, i.e., without the need of drawing an inference (na'lamu anna duruban min al-a'radi tatbutu dawdtani idtirdran). For the etymological explanation of the use of "arad' see below, n. 72. That the gawhar and 'arad of the classical kalam have conceptually little to do with the ouma and <Tvi|jL3ePi)xoc of Aristotle, v., e.g., Joseph van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschras, [hereafter Th.u.G], 6 vols. (Berlin, 1991-97), 3, pp. 68f. One might note here also that according to Avicenna (al-Hudud, in Tis' rasd'il fi alhikma wa-al-tabi'iyydt [Cairo, 1908], pp. 71-102, at pp. 87f.) 'gawhar' may be said of God; it is also used of God by the sufi, Ibn Karram who described God as "ahadiyyu al-ddti ahadiyyu al-gawhar" (v. Th.u.G. 4, p. 367).
38
178
RICHARD M. FRANK
If then we ask what a particular entity is, we ask in effect what it is for it to exist in itself and as such, to be a being whose existence, if it is a created being, instantiates a class, membership in which it shares with others of its like. This, in the terminology of the texts, is to ask concerning what it really is, its true Being or essential reality (haqiqa), its specific characteristic (hassiyya), and its Definition (al-hadd). These expressions are virtually synonymous, as they designate what is meant (alma'na) when an entity is named or referred to. Here the meaning of these terms differs from that of their more common usage. In their usual occurrence, that is, they are, with the exception of 'hassiyya', commonly employed to talk about words and expressions, as 'haqiqa' signifies the strict or lexically most proper meaning of a word, 'hadd' its definition, and 'ma'na' its meaning, as al-As'arl, speaking of the proper meaning of 'existent' as a universal, says that God and a man are not alike "even though they do coincide in their sharing the proper lexical sense of 'existent'" (wa-in kana qad ittafaqa fi haqiqati almawgud).39 In the formal use with which we are presently concerned, however, they refer not to words or intentions but to the objective reality of beings as such. Grammatically, 'wasf and 'sifa' both are masdars of wasafa, yasifu and as such may be taken as equivalents in the sense of 40 describing/description. "According to some lexicographers," however, they are not synonymous, since properly speaking 'wasf' is the masdar while 'sifa' denotes the feature or property (hilya) signified by the description (Lisdn al-'arab, s.v.). AlGawhari, for example, says (s.v.) that "sifa is an attribute such as knowing or blackness, but this is not what the grammarians
Ta.gr, p. 94, 4ff. (= p. 67, 2ff., deleting the ta' marbuta erroneously added to almagwud in the Cairo edition). Similarly, distinguishing between what is meant by existence in metaphysics and 'existence' as a general expression, al-HarasI says (fol. 38v, Iff.), "The particular characteristic of a being (hdssiyyatu al-say') is its existence and its existence is its particular characteristic and nothing more; 'existence' is simply a loose expression that is common to disparate beings (laqabun 'amma almuhtalifat) since it is a concept (qadiyya) generally applicable to disparate beings." If one consider the morphological form of 'hassiyya', 'hdss' with its suffixed -iyya, it might be more appropriate to render it by 'being a particular entity' and in some places this would suit very well, even though 'specific/particular characteristic' or the like is generally more convenient in translating. One should, in any case, keep this (in English) ambivalence in mind. 40 'Wasf and 'sifa' are not everywhere interchangeable, however, since 'sifa' lacks the verbal force of 'wasf and therefore cannot take an accusative object.
39
THE AS' ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES
179
mean by 'sifa' since in their usage a sifa is an adjective (na't), an adjective being an active noun such as 'ddrib', or a passive one such as 'madrub'." So too Ibn al-Sarrag gives a general definition of 'sifa' as "anything that effects a distinction between two descripta that share in the same verbal expression" (kullu ma farraqa bayna mawsufayni mustarikayni fi al-lafzY1, and goes on to distinguish five kinds of sifat, the first of which is that which is "a feature or state that either exists in the thing described or in something related to it" (hilyatun li-al-mawsufi takunu fihi aw-fi say'in min sababihi) and gives as examples, blueness, redness, length, etc. (cp. Tarn, p. 235, 9ff.). 'Wasf is mentioned only in the third and fourth definitions. Following the common lexicography, then, the As'arites make a formal distinction between the wasf as what is spoken by one who describes an entity {qawlu al-wasif) and the sifa as the property or attribute that characterizes or belongs to the entity as described.42 The way in which they understand the distinction between the two words is analogous to that which al-Slrafi
41 Abu Bakr ibn al-Sarrag, al-Usul fi al-nahw, 3 vols., ed. A. al-Fatli (Beyrouth, 1985), 2, pp. 23f. 42 Cf., e.g., Tarn, pp. 213f. and generally ibid., 213-24. Al-Ansari reports (S.Ir, fols. 134v f.) that the distinction was made already by Ibn Kullab. Ibn Furak reports (Mug, p. 39, 6) that al-A'ari did not distinguish the two words and al-Bagdadi (Usul, pp. 128f., cited by al-Ansari, S.Ir, fol. 134v) that he held the two words to be synonymous in the sense of entitative attribute. These reports, however, have to do with but a single question that is of importance in the A'arite understanding of the Names of God but is not pertinent to our present discussion; what is meant is that the wasf- the act of describing, which is the actuality of the descriptive term - is an attribute of the describer (al-wasif, al-musammi) in describing, and so of God's as He describes Himself (cf. the references cited in n. 45 below concerning the discussion of the Name, the naming, and the named). In al-AS'ari's normal use of the words, he employs 'sifa' consistently in the sense of attribute (e.g., Tagr, pp. 93f. (= pp. 66f), al-Hatt 'aid al-baht, ed. R. M. Frank in MIDEO, 18 [1988]: 135-152, at p. 135, 8; in the edition of R. McCarthy under the title R. fi istihsdn al-hawd, in The Theology ofal-Ash'ari [Beyrouth, 1953], p. 88, 2, and K. al-Luma' [hereafter Luma' (A)], ed. R. McCarthy [Beyrouth, 1968], pp. 14, 17f., 24, 4ff.) and at the same time employs 'wasf in the sense of a descriptive expression (e.g., Tagr, p. 95, 2 (= p. 68, ult); the distinction is made fully explicit where he says (ibid., p. 95, 5 = p. 69, 3f.), "these are descriptive expressions that are derived from the most precise names for these attributes" (inna hadihi awsafun mustaqqatun min ahassi asma'i hadihi alsifat; in the Cairo edition of Tagr, p. 68, 2, read al-ilahiyya for al-ahliyya with the Istanbul edition; one suspects that yahrugu in the same line might better be read laharaja, though both editions have the same reading); cp. Luma' (A), p. 22, 9ff. (where with the MS read li-dalika for the editor's dalika in line 9). That the formal use of the words is rigorously observed does not mean that the word 'sifa' is not, where appropriate, used in the sense of adjective or adjectival qualifier, as where, e.g., alGuwaynl speaks of "general qualifiers"(al-sifatu al-'amma: Sam (69), p. 317, 13f.).
180
RICHAKD M. FRANK
draws between 'kalim' and 'kalam' following the principle that verbs, being semiotically more complex, are secondary to and so derived from their verbal nouns (masdars, which are marked neither for time nor for action and passion). In the present case, al-Baqillani, for example, takes 'wasf as intrinsically verbal (since syntactically it can have a subject and/or an object) and 'sifa' as a pure noun and then, speaking in terms of the referents of the two words, says (Tarn, p. 213, 4ff.) that the sifa exists in or belongs to the being that is described "and bestows on it (yuksibuhu) the wasf, which is the descriptive expression that derives from the sifa (al-na'tu alladiyasduru min al-sifa)," i.e., from the noun that names the particular attribute. Here we see one feature of the important place of the Arabic language and of the analysis of the classical grammarians in the intellectual background of the mutakallimun and of the role they played in their thought. The attribute that resides in or belongs to a being is the origin or ground of the true description of it and the word for the latter is derived from the noun which names the former. The usage of these expressions varies contextually and may at times appear odd or not wholly consistent. A brief consideration of the context, however, will almost everywhere resolve any difficulty. It might be worthwhile to cite here a couple of examples. One often says that a being is "aid wasfin',i.e., is as described by a given predicate. Al-Baqillani, for instance, says (Tarn, p. 10, 9f.) that "a statement that a being exists and that it is as described by a certain predicate (annahu 'aid ba'di al-awsdf) must be true or false." Thus al-Isfara'ini says (p. 134, 4f.), that God knows eternally all contingent beings "under the various descriptions that may be said of them as such and in themselves" ('aid awsdfihd fi dawdtihd), phrasing the statement in this way because in some cases the essential nature of an entity may be presented in different formulations, as for example, one says of the atom that it "occupies space" or "receives accidents." Again, al-Isfara'ini says ('Aqida, p. 138,14f), "The proof that [God] has life, power, ... is that it is logically inconsistent (mustahil) to assert [His] existence under these descriptions ('aid hddihi alawsdf: 'lives', etc.) while denying these [entitative] attributes."43
Al-Guwayni's formulation in Sam (69), p. 152, 8f., seems somewhat strange as he says of an atom that "when a particle of life resides in it... then there reside in it also various kinds of accidents such as cognitions, ... , etc., and other awsafi al-haya. The
43
181
Likewise, one finds the expression that something is "fi was fin" as al-Guwaym talks of an hypothesis that posits the possibility of "a contingent being that does not require a subject but nevertheless does not fall under the descriptions of atoms" (haditun gayru muftaqirin ila mahallin lakinnahu laysa fi awsafi al-gawahir: Sam (69), p. 141, 4f.). So too one says that something is said to be "bi-wasftn" in the sense that it is as described by a given predicate (is validly so described) or that the given description is true of something. Al-Isfara'ini says, for example (p. 137, 14), "If this description were true of it (law kdna bi-hdda al-wasf), then it would follow that...;" and so also (ibid., 1. 4), "if these two descriptions are eternally true of them (in kanat lam tazal bi-hadayni al-wasfayn), then ..." One says, however, that something is described 'bi-sifatin' in the sense that it is described as having the particular attribute. Thus "[God] is from eternity and unto eternity described as having these attributes (lam yazal wa-la yazalu mawsufan bi-hadihi al-sifat) and none of them is similar to the attributes of ceatures" (Isfara'ini, p. 134, If.). In sum:
We hold that the description entails the attribute just as the attribute entails the description, so whoever these attributes are asserted actually to belong to is necessarily to be described as having them and so also whenever the subject is necessarily described as actually having it the existence of the attribute is necessarily asserted.44
That a given description is manifestly true "entails" or requires the actual reality of the attribute and the manifest actuality of the attribute entails the truth of, and so requires the assertion of, the description.
problem here is that he cannot say "other attributes (sifat) of life" since cognitions, volitions, etc., are themselves distinct accidents and cannot exist in the accident life. The descriptions which implicitly assert the existence of these accidents ('knows', 'wills', etc.) are true, however, only when life exists in the subject. 44 Gn, fol. 61v, 23f.: iqtida'u al-wasfi li-al-sifati ka-iqtida'i al-sifati li-al-wasfi faman yutbat lahu hadihi al-sifatu wagaba wasfuhu biha kadalika ida wagaba wasfuhu biha wagaba itbatu al-sifati lahu (reading li-al-wasfi for bi-al-wasfi in line 23 as is required by the context; note that one could vowel man tatbut lahu rather than man tutbat lahu, but the following itbat would seem to indicate the former, though either validly states the basic intention of the sentence.) The context here concerns God's "essential attributes" (knowing, life, etc.) but is equally valid with regard to the entitative attributes of creatures and to essential attributes that are not distinct or distinguishable from the Self (nafs/dat) of a being.
182
RICHARD M. FRANK
As we have already noted, it should be kept in mind that 'sifa' is often used in the sense of adjectival qualifier, as where, in Tahblr (p. 33 = fol. 55r, 4f.), a work on the meanings of the divine names as descriptive expressions, al-Qusayri says that 'al-gabbdr' is "min sifati datihi li-annahu ihbarun 'an wugudihi 'aid wasfi al-su'dud," that is, it is a descriptive expression (sifa) that, predicated of God, describes Him essentially, sc, one whose use states God's existence under a given description. Much to the amusement of their opponents, al-As'ari and his followers make an analogous distinction between tasmiya (the naming or describing) and ism (the "Name"), holding the former to be a word or expression and the latter to be the essential characteristic of the being that is meant or the attribute referred to and asserted, explicitly or implicitly, by the tasmiya.45 Though this latter distinction is commonly asserted on the grounds of the analogy with the distinction between 'wasf and 'sifa' and the complexities of its application in specific instances explained (e.g., Isfara'ini, Fr. #67), it is otherwise almost never actually employed, probably because prima facie it does violence to common lexicography and so sounds absurd. 'Ism', in short, they consistently employ in its usual sense of noun/name despite the formally asserted distinction. So too 'ma'na', which most commonly occurs in the sense of meaning or intention, is frequently employed by the AS'arites and Mu'tazilites alike in the sense of 'something' that one has in mind or refers to explicitly or implicitly, and so sometimes as the referent or what is intended in the use of a name or description (e.g., in S.Ir, fol. 54r, cited below). It occurs very frequently in the expression 'ma'nan za'idun 'aid al-ddt' (something distinct from the subject described).46 We shall shortly have occaE.g., Tarn, p. 227 ( 383), Insaf, pp. 60f., MutawaUi, pp. 3 If. and Sam (81), p. 45, 8ff. So al-Ansari says that 'wasf and 'sifa' are "bi-matobati al-tasmiyati wa-al-ism" (Gn, fol. 96r, 7, q.v. ff.). The use of 'ism' here conforms fully with that of the other terms we are considering (sc., hadd and haqiqa); see the example presented in n. 86 below. The usage is discussed in Tarn, 383ff., though the best account of how the thesis is understood and how treated in terms of various classes of the names of God is found, together with a discussion of the distinction between 'wasf and 'sifa', in alKamil fi ihtisar al-Samil (author unknown), MS III Ahmet no. 1322, fols. 120v ff. [hereafter Jhi]; cf. also S.Ir, fol. 134r and al-Harasi, fols. 145v f. 46 E.g., Sam (69), p. 129, translated above and Mug, p. 16, 3, translated below, & alibi pass. It is thus that 'ma'na' is frequently employed as a term for entitative attributes (which are sometimes referred to as ma'na attributes (sifatu al-ma'na,
46
183
sion to look at this more closely. Here there remain two terms yet to examine. "All the leading masters hold that the Definition (hadd) is the attribute of what is denned" (sifatu al-mahdud: Sam (81), p. 45, 2), i.e., the objective property, characteristic, or Being of the thing as defined.47 The Definition here is not a formula or description. "Formulae (al-'ibarat) are not sought for their own sake; they are not Definitions but rather present Definitions and true natures" {hiya munbi'atun 'an al-hududi wa-al-haqa'iq: Sam (81), p. 54, 6f.; cp. also ibid., p. 45, 5f. and 80, 8, cited below). "The Definition and the denned are one and the same" (S.Ir, fol. 42r, 10). "'Definition' refers to the very Being of what is defined and its essential characteristic" ('aynu al-mahdudi wa-sifatihi aldatiyya: Kdmil, p. 2, 6f.).48 According to al-Guwayni thus,
in the formal language of the theologians, what is intended in giving a definition (al-qasdu min al-tahdld) is to present the particular characteristic of a being and its true nature (al-ta'arrudu li-hassiyyati al-say'i wa-haqiqatihi) by which occurs the distinction between it and something else. The master [Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini] says what is meant is that because of which [the entity described] is as intended in the description offered (ma'ndhu alladi liaglihi kana bi-al-wasfi al-maqsudi bi-al-dikr). If someone were to say the Definition of a being is its meaning (ma'ndhu) and stop there, that would be right or if he said the Definition of a being is its true nature or its particular characteristic that would be good.49 sifatun ma'nawiyya), since 'sifa' is also commonly employed for essential attributes (sifatu al-dat, sifatun ddtiyya/nafsiyya) which as such are distinguishable aspects or features - specific characteristics: hassiyyat - of the essential natures of particular beings. 'Ma'na' occurs thus as two distinct lexemes where, in denning 'accident', al-
Ansari says: "ma'na qawlina innahu 'aradun annahu ma'nan qa'imun bi-algawhar" (the meaning of 'it is an accident' is that it is a something that exists in an atom: S.Ir, fol. 47v, 19; cp. Mutawalli, pp. 5, 12 and 6, If.). 47 Cf. also ibid., p. 80, 8, Gn, fol. 59v, 13, and S.Ir, fol. 54r, 17, cited below. In some places, as will be seen in several of the texts cited here and below, where one is speaking of definition in the usual sense of the word, 'tahdid' (to give, present, assert, a definition) is used instead of 'hadd' in order to avoid all chance of misunderstanding. In rendering the word we have used 'definition' with lower case {d} when 'hadd' is used in the sense of a verbal definition and 'Definition' with uppercase where it means an essential property of a being. There is little discussion of these terms in the shorter manuals. They are, however, discussed at length in al-Guwayni's, al-Kafiya fi al-gadalKed. F. Mahmud (Cairo, 1978), pp. Iff. and Sam (81), pp. 42ff., as well as in Gn and S.Ir. 48 Cf. also Mug, p. 10, 23f., cited below. 'Al-sifatu al-datiyya' here means a feature or property which belongs to and characterizes the individual entity in its being essentially what it is, as such and in itself. 49 S.Ir, fol. 54r, 6ff.; cf. generally ibid., fols. 54r ff. and Sam (81), p. 83, 14ff., where the identical citation from Abu Ishaq is found with the reading kana asadda (would
184
RICHAED M. FRANK
Of the several expressions under consideration in the present context 'haqlqa' is, in some respects at least, the most significant, the overarching one so to speak. There are several ways that 'haqiqa' might appropriately be rendered, by 'essential nature', or 'essential reality', for example or, if one wished to retain the semantic resonance and clear overtones of 'haqq' (true/truth), by 'true nature'. In any case, the meaning is clear enough:
What is sought in defining something (al-tahdid) is to present the true nature (haqlqa) of the thing by which it is distinct from other things (bihd yatamayyazu 'an gayrihi). A being is only distinct from something else by its Self and its true nature, not by something somebody says (S.Ir, fol. 54v, If.).
Thus, for example, "acts of speaking (kalam) constitute a class [of accidents] as such and have a true nature and by their true nature they are distinct (yatamayyazu) from other classes [of mental acts] such as cognitions and volitions (Gn, fol. 74v, 12f). It is as "true natures" or essential realities, that beings are intelligible as what manifestly and in truth they are:
The assertion that there is knowledge is ordered to (mutarattibun 'aid) the assertion of the true natures of beings and their characteristic properties. There is no class and no subclass of existent beings iginsun min al-kd 'inat) save that it has a true nature and a characteristic property by which it is distinguished from any other class and whoever grasps its true nature knows it (Gn, fol. lv, 18f.). Cognitions are related to a being as it really is ('aid md huwa bihi) and by 'as it really is' we refer to the true nature which is inalienable from a being and characterizes it specifically (tuldzimu al-say'a wa-tahussuhu). Were this not
be more exact) instead ofkana hasanan at the end. Al-Guwaynl employs 'al-hadd' in both senses (e.g., tahdid is clearly intended in Sam (81), p. 42. 19fF. and appears explicitly p. 43, 7), though he plainly takes it as the essential characteristic of an entity at ibid., pp. 45, 2, 47, 15ff., and 80, 8ff. (cited above) as do al-Isfara'inl and Ibn Furak. The discussion of definitions in Sam (81), pp. 42ff. is complex and not everywhere easy to follow as it shifts back and forth between the implied disputational contexts and also views of various authors with none of whom al-Guwayni fully agrees, as his own understanding and analysis of the topic is integrally linked to his conception of real ontological "states" (which allows him to speak of general and particular attributes), a concept which they do not recognize as valid. Al-Guwaynl's polemically elaborated opposition to Ibn Furak's describing the haqiqa and the hadd of a being as its 'ilia (pp. 47f.), for example, is largely due to the latter's refusal to recognize the reality of "states." On the other hand, he disapproves the position of al-Baqillani, who held a theory of states, but identified the hadd with the statement of the one who defines (qawlu al-haddi: v. ibid., pp. 45, 5f. and 47, llf). This whole discussion of definitions in Sam (81) deserves a thorough analysis.
185
the case, to speak of knowing would be meaningless (la-ma 'uqila al-'ilm): S.Ir, fol. 158v, Iff.; cp. Sam (81), p. 58, 6f., cited below.
It is only as qualified by their specific or essential characteristics 50 that beings are intelligible. The "Definition" or "true nature" is that aspect of a being which is its being what essentially it is. Speaking of this formal sense of the words, al-Guwayni says, "The fellows of our school are agreed that 'the true nature' of a being and its 'meaning' designate its attribute (ragi'ani ila sifatihi), not what is said or spoken by some one" (Sam (81), p. 45, 6f.).
The proper precision and precise distinctness [of definitions] is not something that occurs by virtue of verbal expressions (al-hasru wa-al-imtiyazu laysa yaqa'u bi-al-'ibarati) but occur by virtue of the referents of the expressions (bi-ma'anl al-'ibarat). The verbal expressions disclose them, signify them and make them known (taksifu 'anha wa-tadullu 'alayha wa-tu'arrifuha) and were these referents and attributes not in the things spoken of the verbal expressions would serve to reveal nothing and their established use among those who employ them would be ineffectual and have no intelligible object (ma'lum).51
Said of a particular entity as a member of a primary class of contingent entities - of an atom or of a particular accident 'haqiqa', in contrast to 'dat/nafs\ might appropriately be rendered by 'essence' as "it is that which specifically characterizes a being and does not extend beyond it" (haqlqatu al-say'i ma yahussuhu wa-ld yata'addahu: Gn, fol. 62v, 13f.). It is what
50 Al-dawatu la tu'qalu gayra mawsufa (Iht, fol. 227v, 16). The intended sense of 'mawsufa' here is clear enough (cp. the use of 'sifat' in Kdfiya, p. 4, llf., the translation of which follows immediately here, and see generally below). A being is intelligible only as qualified by its essential attributes (as mawsuf Imuttasifun biha), but since on the other hand knowledge (cognition) is considered as prepositional, a being is known as mawsuf, i.e., as that of which a given description is true. That knowing is prepositional does not entail that it be articulated. 51 Kdfiya, p. 4, llff. 'Al-hasr' here is the distinctness required for a conceptually precise definition, i.e., its embracing the thing defined in such a way as not only to exclude beings of any other class but also not to exclude any given instance of what is defined; cf., e.g., Sam (81), pp. 75, 6ff, 46, 4ff., and 55, 12ff. 'Al-imtiydz' is that it presents the thing as distinct in its true nature from things that differ in any essential respect; cf., e.g., Iht, fols. 248r, 16 and 253r, 6, where it seems to be basically equivalent to 'tamayyuz'. Note the use of the singular verb following al-hasru wa-al-imtiydz; the two are taken together, if not as equivalent, then at least as constituting a single feature of correct definitions. By "referents and attributes" (al-ma'dni wa-al-sifdt) here he does not mean entitative attributes or accidents, which are often referred to by the same words, but the entity of whatever kind or class which is named or referred to and the essential properties of its Being.
186
RICHARD M. FRANK
unites (gama'a) essentially similar entities as belonging to a single class (gins). The As'arites (ashdbund) "hold that even though cognitions differ [i.e., individually as they have different objects] the essential nature of being a cognition unites them and that given this they share in the common essential nature" (qdlu al'ulumu wa-in ihtalafat fa-haqlqatu al-'ilmiyyati gdmi'atun laha fa-hiya ma'a ddlika mustarikatun fi al-haqlqati al-gami'a: Gn, fol. 64r, 5). Thus Ibn Furak says that what unites two cognitions "is that they both deserve to be called cognitions" (al-gdmi'u baynahuma istihqdquhumd li-an tusammaya 'ilmayn).52 It is for this reason that 'haqiqa' may, in such contexts as these, be rendered by 'true nature' or 'essence'. "What is sought when one asks for a definition is the statement of an attribute shared by the individual instances of the thing denned" (sifatun yastariku fihd dhddu al-mahdud: Sam (81), p. 80, 8; v. also ibid., p. 45, 5). It is, thus, a principle held by the majority of As'arites (i.e., by those who reject the notion of "states")
that entities (dawai), if they differ, differ per se (tahtalifu bi-anfusiha) and, if they are alike, are alike per se. Cognitions share in what it is to be a cognition (al-'ilmiyya); it is the attribute by which cognitions are distinct (al-sifatu allatiyatamayyazu biha al-'ilm) from any other class (S.Ir, fol. 55r, 7ff.).
The true reality or essence (haqiqa) of a being is the "ground" Cilia) of its being what it is. The majority of As'arites, that is, "make no formal distinction between the ground [of its being what it is as such] and the true nature and the Definition...; everything that has a true nature is grounded by its true nature" (kullu di haqiqatin mu'allalun bi-haqlqatihi: S.Ir, fol. 46v, 6f.) and consequently they allow that 54 one can say "grounded in itself as an atom is an atom per se.
Sam (69), p. 634, 7f. Concerning something's "deserving to be named/described by 'x'" see below. Note that 'ilmiyya' is formally understood to be a masdar, i.e., to be a cognition; it names the reality which is the truth condition of "Urn' when it is used to describe an entity, just as the occurrence of the event named by the masdar is, according to the grammarians, the truth condition of ordinary verbs. In the language of classical kalam, such forms are not to be understood as abstracts. 53 With this cp. Sam (81), p. 50, 9ff., where al-Guwaynl, arguing from the perspective of his doctrine of "states," attacks this thesis polemically saying that it means that two instances of a single class, e.g., two cognitions which have different objects, if they differ per se (li-datayhima), will simply be unique existences (wugudani fardan) each of which is different from the others in every respect. For the traditional position cf., e.g., Gn, fol. 64r, 5, cited above. 54 Wa-ld yamtani'u 'inda nufati al-aliwali ta'lilu al-say'i bi-nafsihi id la farqa bayna al-'illati wa-al-haqiqati wa-kdna Id yamtani'u an yakuna gawharan U-nafsihi
52
187
The interplay of the ambivalences of these expressions and the analogous resonances of the various forms that are etymologically and semantically associated with them is of some importance to our understanding of the character, sense, and coherence of the As'arite ontology. Lexically, al-haqq is the truth of a statement or assertion that is true, the opposite of al-bdtil (e.g., Maqdyis and al-Gawhari, s.v.). In ontological discourse it "means existent and actual, what is neither non-existent nor non-actual and in an absolute sense has lexically the meaning 'existent'" (al-haqqu bi-ma'na al-mawgudi wa-al-kd'ini laysa bima'dumin wa-ld muntafin wa-al-haqqu al-mutlaqu bi-ma'na almawgud: Tahblr, fol. 96v, 5ff.; cp. Fusul, p. 68, 17 and Mug, p. 25, 14ff.). Of an entity, thus, it is that whose actual existence is in fact the case (huwa al-mutahaqqiqu kawnuhu wa-wuguduhu: al-Bayhaqi, Asma', p. 310, 22). Tahaqqaqa, yatahaqqaqu means here to be actual or real, as one says of atoms, "since their existence is not actual before the existence of contingent entities [sc, of accidents] and is actual together with them, it is obvious that they were not and then came to be" (ida intafa wuguduha qabla al-hawaditi wa-tahaqqaqa wuguduha ma'a al-hawaditi fa-bana annaha lam takun fa-kanat: Sam (69), p. 221, llff.). "Haqlqatu al-mutahaqqiqi wuguduhu" (Lisdn al-'arab, s. HQQ, citing Ibn al-Atir). 'Tahaqqaqa' is thus often equivalent to, and is used interchangeably with,, hasala, yahsulu (e.g., Ir, p. 5, 9f.) and to tabata, yatbutu (e.g., Sam (69), pp. 312, 5f. and 313, 5fvand (81), p. 56, 6 and 10) and so may mean to be the case (Sam (69),
wa-la yamtani'u anyuqala ma'lulun bi-nafsihi: ibid., fol. 48r, 7f. = Gn, fol. 58r, 3f. In accord with this Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini is cited as holding that 'hadd', 'haqiqa', 'ma'na', and "ilia' are synonymous since the ground and what is grounded are one and the same (Gn, fol. 59v, 20f.; cf. also Sam (81), p. 47, 17ff., where the same formula is cited by al-Guwayni only to be rejected on the basis of his understanding of "states"; v. also ibid., p. 48, 7ff. against Ibn Furak and cp. Sam (69), pp. 715f. On the basis of an analogous notion of "states" al-Baqillani takes the same position as alGuwayni regarding 'ilia; cf. Gn, fol. 57r, 14ff.). Al-Guwayni accepts the equivalence of 'haqiqa' and "ilia' in Kafiya (18) since it is valid in law, even though he does not allow it in kalam. Concerning the origin of the identification of "ilia' and 'haqiqa', etc., see below. Note that the formulation in the preceding citation of Gn (fol. 46v, 6f.) is valid both as these terms are employed in speaking of primary entities and with regard to the presence of entitative attributes in a subject. It is obvious t h a t ' 'ilia' as it occurs in classical kalam texts, were better not translated 'cause'; "ilia' * 'sabab'. We may note here that the As'arites make no distinction between 'li-nafsihi' and 'binafsihi' in the sense of 'per se' (cf. Mug, p. 214, 21f.), nor did al-Gubba'i (cf., e.g., Iht, fol. 64r, 8), against al-Ka'bi who refused to use 'li-nafsihi' on the grounds that it implied the presence of an 'ilia (cf., ibid., fol. 70r, 6ff.).
188
RICHARD M. FRANK
p. 331, llf., citing al-Baqillani), whether of existence (e.g., ibid., p. 194, 7f.) or of non-existence as what was the case before an entity's existence (al-'adamu al-mutahaqqiqu qabla al-wugud: ibid., p. 226, 4f.).55 Haqqaqa, yuhaqqiqu thus means to confirm the truth of a proposition, to show or prove what has been supposed or asserted. Al-Isfara'ini, for example, says that God is like no created being "and this is shown by the fact that he cannot be conceived in imagination while this is possible of all other beings (tahqiquhu annahu Id yusawwaru ft al-wahmi wa-md diinahu yaqbalu hddihi al-sifa: 'Aqida, p. 133,16; cf. also ibid., p. 130, 7) and speaks thus {ibid., p. 135, 19f.) of "tahqiqu al-'uquli wa-aldalala." So, al-Guwayni introduces the thesis that contingent beings cannot have existed from eternity saying, "there are several ways to show that this is true" (tahqiqu ddlika awguh: (Sam (69), p. 215, 9f.; cf. also Baydn (H), p. 95, 9f.), while al-Qusayri says (Tahbir, fol. 102r, If.) that something is given by tahqiq "and is 'irfdnu al-qalb."56 One says that "perception does not in fact have the non-existent as its object nor can it be so posited" (gayru muta'alliqin bi-al-'adami tahqlqan wa-ld taqdiran: S.Ir, fol. 7r, 11). 'Muhaqqaq' is used also, however, as a term for a being as that whose reality is grounded in its true nature (S.Ir, fol, 46v, 6f., cited above). "When one does not know the essential nature [of a being], he does not know the being to which the essential nature belongs (man Idya'lamu al57 haqiqata Idya'lamu al-muhaqqaqa bihd), sc, du al-haqiqa. It
Thus one cannot properly talk of an existing atom as an object of God's power, "since the entity continues to exist and to view it as something merely posited [i.e., possible] makes no sense when its existence is a known fact" (id al-datu mustamirru al-wugudi wa-ld ma'na li-taqdirihi ma'a tahaqquqi wugudihi: Sam (69), p. 181, 19f; T here reads tahqiq for tahaqquq, but this is most likely an error induced by the preceding taqdir). A contingent entity is, strictly speaking, an object of God's power only at the instant of its coming to be (huwa maqduruha hala hudutihi: Iht, fol. 174r, 14; cp. (69), p. 694, 9f. 56 'Tahqiq' is employed by the grammarians in the sense of positive or affirmative as opposed to negative; e.g., "following a negative 'ilia' introduces an affirmation and following an affirmative introduces a negation" (takunu tahqiqan ba'da al-nafyi wanafyan ba'da al-tahqiq) Zaggagi, Huruf'al-ma'ani, MS Laleli, no. 3704/7, fol. 62r, 18f.; cp. Abu al-Hasan Rummani, Ma'ani al-HurufXed. A. Salabi [Jidda, 1987]), p. 33, 10 and Zaggagi, Gumal, p. 106, 2f. 57 Sam (81), p. 51, 18f.; cf. also ibid., p. 47, 21: kullu mayuhaqqaqu wa-yuhaddu fahaqiqatuhu 'illatuhu wa-hadduhu haqiqatuhu. There is general agreement that the muhaqqaq and the haqiqa are one and the same (Sam (81), p. 48, 9f. and Gn, fol. 55v,
65
189
is "impossible that two distinct essential natures be joined in one and the same entity with its single essential nature" (istihalatu igtima'i haqlqatayni mutabayinatayni ft muhaqqaqin wahid: S.Ir, fol. 69v, 12; cf. also Gn, fol. 105v, 6f. and cp. Mug, p. 267, 13f.). The evocative richness of the equivocities of these expressions - of 'sifa' as a descriptive (i.e., predicate) expression (= 'tasmiyd' I'wasf) and as the objectively real characteristic or attribute of the object described or named, of 'mawsuf as the entity described or as its being as qualified by the essential attribute presented in the description or naming, of 'hadd' as the verbal definition of a noun or object (= tahdld) and as the essential characteristic of the object defined, and of 'haqiqa' as the true (i.e., strict and proper) meaning of a word and as the essential nature or characteristic of that which is truly named by the given word, and so also that of 'haqq', 'mutahaqqiq', and 'muhaqqaq' - is of no little importance for our understanding of the As'arite ontology as it manifests a very basic aspect of their thought.58 The veracity of the naming (haqiqatu al-tasmiya) presents the verity of the named (haqiqatu al-musamma). The essential reality of a being (dat I nafs) is intelligible as its essential attribute (sifatuhu al-datiyya) is presented to the mind in the truth of the name (tasmiya) by which, being essentially what it is, it "deserves (yastahiqqu) to be called." Thus it is that the two senses of 'haqiqa' and of 'sifa' are formally distinct but are nevertheless inseparably linked the one to the other, as knowing (al-'ilm) is inseparably linked to speech (al-kalam),59
58 One should keep in mind that we are, in the present context, talking only about primary entities as such and the words {tasmiyat I awsaf) that name them (i.e., the particular class) as such and so present the specific characteristics (al-hassiyyat) that belong to them per se as primary entities. Consequently, the haqiqa of a particular word cannot here be that of words such as "alim' (knows) that imply the existence of two beings (an entity together with an entitative attribute), as where al-A'arI says that the fact that such predicates are true of two beings does not necessarily imply (la yugibu) that the two entities are essentially similar, but only that they are alike in the true sense of "alim' (Tagr, pp. 93f. [= pp. 66f., where for ittifaqa haqiqatin ila in p. 66, ult. f. read ittifaqan ft haqiqati with the Istanbul edition, p. 94, 3 and delete the ta' marbuta erroneously added to al-mawgud in the Cairo edition]). The AS'arite understandings and descriptions of the "truth" and implications of expressions such as these are complexly diversified and so will have to be examined in a separate study. 59 On how, according to the AS'arites, speaking and knowing are related, cf., e.g., alIsfara'ini, Fr, #52 and al-Harasi, fol. 225r, f. Also concerning this, cp. the grammarians' understanding of interpretation (ta'wil) discussed in our "Meanings are spoken of in many ways," Le Museon, 94 (1981), pp. 259-319, at pp 294f.
190
RICHARD M. FRANK
The objectively existent is necessarily primary, however: what joins two cognitions is not the name (al-tasmiya); what joins [them] is, rather, that they deserve to be called cognitions (Sam (69), p. 634, 7f, cited above). The A&'arites do not speak of abstraction or of forms; the true natures of real beings (haqa'iqu al-dawdt) are not universal "forms" in the Peripatetic sense. They are said to be shared (mustarakun fihd) as individually they exist in single entities (Selves) that, being essentially identical to one another (mutamdtila), deserve to be called by the same name. The haqiqa is formally identified with the true nature or essence of an existent individual - its hdssiyya or sifatuhu al-ddtiyya and so also with the name that most truly presents it as such.
We hold that our calling an atom and an accident by these names (awsaf, sc., 'atom' and 'accident') is nothing more than to assert the actuality of the individual entity to which belongs an essential characteristic by which it is distinct (yatamayyazu) from anything else. These words signify (hadihi al- 'ibaratu dallatun 'aid) this essential characteristic, sc., being a volume (alhagmiyya) in the case of the atom and being a [particle of] black for instance in the case of the accident. The essential nature of a being is what is particular to it and does not extend beyond it (haqiqatu al-say 'i md yahussuhu waIdyata'adddhu: Gn, fol. 62v, 12ff.).
In the realm of contingent beings then, there are two principal classes or categories of primary entities: atoms (al-gawhar) and accidents (al-'arad). Al-Bagdadi says (Usul, p. 33, 13f.), "The world is every being other than God (the Mighty, the Glorious) and the world consists of two kinds [of beings], atoms and accidents. Elsewhere (ibid., p. 35, 9ff.) he describes the two thus:
Beings that are unitary entities (al-mufradu ft ddtihi) are of two kinds; the one is the single atom (al-gawharu al-wdhid), i.e., the indivisible particle (alguz'u alladi Id yatagazza'). Every one of the world's bodies is such that through division (bi-al-qisma) one arrives ultimately at an indivisible particle. The second kind of indivisible is every accident as such (kullu 'aradin ft nafsihi), for it is a single being that requires a single substrate. As for beings that constitute a unitary class (al-mufradu bi-al-gins), it is as the fellows of our school say, for example, that atoms constitute a single class, even though they vary in shape and appearance because of the variation of the accidents that are in them. Of the accidents, every kind is a specific class iginsun mahsus).60
60 Cp. Mug, p. 29, 19f. (inna al-gawahira mutaganisatun wa-a'raduha muhtalifa) and the discussion ibid., pp. 208f. Al-Bagdadi's use here of 'naw" (rendered by 'kind') is vague, as at the beginning of the section he speaks of two "kinds" of single beings that exist in the world and subsequently uses the same word to speak of subclasses of accidents.
191
Among contingent beings, all primary entities are thus understood to exist as discrete minimal quanta of the kind of being that each is. So it is that al-As'ari says that two "particles" belonging to the same basic class of entitative attributes cannot exist simultaneously in the same atom (yaqulu fi sa'iri al-ma'anl innahu layasihhu wugudu guz'ayni min ginsin wahidin minha fi mahallin wahid).el Ibn Furak speaks (Baydn (K), p. 18, 18ff.) of the single instances, of "particles" both of the atom and of the accident black (al-guz'u min al-gawhari wa-al-sawdd) as "the least of what is little and the smallest of what is small" (aqallu al-qalili wa-asgaru al-sagir) and goes on to cite the instance of a single atom and a particle of the accident black (al-gawharu alwdhidu wa-al-guz'u min al-sawdd); and al-vGuwayni speaks of "a particle of life" (guz'un min al-hayat: Sam (69), p. 152, 7. Similarly one speaks of al-'arad al-fard (ibid., p. 149, 19) and of al-'arad al-wdhid (ibid., p. 149, 8 and 24 and p. 151, 10, inserting al-wdhid with T). In short, since they exist singly in individual atoms, accidents too exist as discrete "particles." As we have seen, the atom is conceived as an independent entity (qd'imun bi-nafsihi). It is sometimes (e.g., Mug, p. 203, 12) referred to simply as "the particle" (al-guz') and so occasionally defined as "the particle that is indivisible" (al-guz'u alladi Id yatagazza': Bagdadi, loc. cit. or alladi layaqbalu al-inqisdm: Gn, fol. 9v, If., a definition found already with Mu'ammar; v. Th.u.G. 3, p. 68). This, however, is too vague to stand by itself as a formal definition, since accidents too are conceived as "particles" and as such indivisible. The atom is sometimes more specifically defined as that which receives one instance of each class of accidents (e.g., Tarn, p. 17,17f. and Bagdadi, pp. 41f.).62 From
61 Mug, p. 16, 3; note that one should read makanayn for mahallayn in line 1. Cf. also Sam (69), p. 156, 6ff. 62 This is sometimes abridged to say that it has (or, more strictly, must have) at least a color and a single locational accident (kawn); cf., e.g., Mug, p. 243, lOff.; al-As'ari's preferred formula for denning the atom is "qabilun li-lawnin wahidin wa-harakatin wahida" (ibid., p. 210, 21f.). The first definition given by al-Guwaynl in the section on the basic nature of the atom (Sam (69), p. 142, 5ff.) is simply "what receives accidents" (mayaqbalu al-'arad), for this is sufficient to present the essential nature of the atom, its hassiyya. It is interesting to note the thesis that since the atom cannot exist without a unit of a color it follows that not all colors are visible (cf. ibid., pp. 210f.), as in the case of air and water (ibid., p. 214, 8ff.; cp. Gn, fol, 18v, 25ff. That the atom cannot exist without inherent accidents (a single instance of jeach class or its contrary if the class has or includes contaries), cf. also Ir, p. 23, Iff., Sam (69), pp. 204f., and Gn, fol. 17v, 16f.). This is a question the details of which we need not go into here; for further information see D. Gimaret, La Doctrine d'al-Ash'ari (Paris, 1990), pp. 43ff.
192
RICHARD M. FRANK
another angle it is denned as "that which has a portion of surface" (ma lahu hazzun min al-misdha: Sam (69), pp. 142, 18f. and 156, 11, citing al-Baqillani). That the isolated atom have an actual portion (hazzun tdbit) of surface area "is not dependent upon there being another atom contiguous to it; it has a quantity (qadr) [of surface], but its quantity is not divisible into parts; an atom is measured by an atom" (laysa li-qadrihi ba'dun wa-al-gawharu yuqaddaru bi-al-gawhar: ibid., p. 159, 13f., where with T read min al-misdha for fi, al-misdha in line 13). Albeit having some surface, the atom has no shape (sakl), though some AS'arite masters spoke of it as if in some way it resembled a circle and others (including ai-Baqillani in one work) as if it resembled a square. In his Naqd al-naqd, however, al-Baqillani said that "since the fact is that the atom has no shape at all, it makes no sense to liken it to something that has shape (Id ma'nd li-tasbihihi bi-di sakl).e3 One cannot speak of the top or bottom or side of a lone atom. "Of itself it has no face or direction (fi ddtihi 'aid al-infirddi la gihata lahu), but when another atom is created together with it and joined to it (ma'ahu mudamman lahu) that one becomes a side of it as it also is a side of the one adjacent to it. [...] The atoms that surround an atom are the atom's sides." Thus alAs'ari says, "The outer edge of an atom is its side and its limit (haddu al-guz'i gihatuhu wa-nihdyatuhu) and its side is 64 another atom." Accordingly, al-Ansari (Gn, fol. 33r, 1) menCited in Sam (69), pp. 158f. Concerning the speaking of the atom as a two dimensional figure see Alnoor Dhanani, The Physical Theory ofKalam, Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Mu'tazili Cosmology (Leiden, 1994), p. 98 et alibi. 64 Mug, p. 203, 12ff.; cp. Gn, fol. 102, 20f. 'Indimam Imuddmma' in this context is equivalent to 'ittisal' (Gn, loc.cit.) and to 'igtima", 'mugdwara', and 'ta'lif; cf. Mug, g. 245, 13 and Sam (69), p. 462, 3ff., quoted in Gn, fol. 39r, 8ff., citing al-Baqillani. In Sam here omit the dittographied wa-ida ihtassa bi-hayyizihi in line 5, and with Gn insert fa-al-akwdnu mutamatila following al-hayyizu al-wdhid in line 6 and ilayhi after al-gawhari in line 7 and with Gn and T omit haraka in line 8 and read wa-ldkin for wa-laysa in line 10. Shape (sura) and sensible (physical) characteristics (hay'a) cannot be used to describe the single atom. 'Sura' (form, shape, configuration) is identified by alBaqillani (Insdf, p. 32) with a composite body (al-gismu al-mu'allaf), and is defined by Ibn Furak (Baydn (H), p. 14, 8) as al-ta'lifu wa-al-hay'a (cp. Istiqdq, p. 424) and by al-Bayhaqi (Asmd', p. 289, 3) as al-tarkib (cp. Ibn Furak, Baydn (H), pp. 19f., where read sd'i'an for sd'igan in line 19 with V.). 'Sura' is also used of the physical (acoustic) structure or configuration of spoken sentences (cf., e.g., Luma' (A), p. 78, 9, Insdf, p. 156, 21f., and al-Mutawalli, p. 27, 6f.), as the sound of a spoken word, phrase, or sentence is a composite (mu'allaf) and has, as audible, a perceptible character (hay'a). Concerning body as a composite of two or more atoms see below.
63
THE AS'AEITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES
193
tions the atom along side past eternity and future eternity as "among those things that may be grasped by the mind but not by imagination" (mimmd yudraku bi-al-'aqli duna al-wahm). The essential characteristic of the atom is that it occupies a minimal volume of space. According to one formulation "the atom's occupying space is the very Being of the atom" (inna tahayyuza al-gawhari nafsu al-gawhar: al-Harasi, fol. 70v, I).65 As it is necessarily located in and so occupies a unit of space {hayyiz) and has some surface area (misdha), it is a girm, a corpuscle. Al-Guwayni says:
What we understand by 'mutahayyiz' is a corpuscle {girm) and its being a corpuscle does not vary, even though its spatial location and its accidents do vary. [...] The fact that its being a corpuscle does not vary shows that it is not something affected by the locational accidents (akwdn). [...] One thing by which this may also be demonstrated is that essential attributes (sifatu al-nafs) are distinct from entitative attributes (sifatu al-ma'na) by the fact that the entity itself cannot be conceived apart from its essential attribute (bi-anna al-nafsa la tu'qalu duna sifati al-nafs) and the essential attribute cannot be conceived apart from the entity itself, while one may conceptually posit the entity itself without the entitative attribute (wa-sifatu al-ma'na
yaguzu taqdlru al-nafsi dunaha 'aqlan).66
65 This statement is based on the common kalam definition of the gawhar as "that which occupies space" (e.g., Ir, p. 17, and S.Ir, fol. 52r); v. also Sam (69), p. 142, 13ff. (where with T read tahayyuz for hayyiz in line 15), where this is given as a second definition, one that is "held by some of our leading authorities." A. Dhanani is most probably correct in suggesting (The Physical Theory of Kalam, p. 59) that since the word 'gawhar' occurs in the translation literature for Greek ouoia, its use for the atom may derive from the conception of oiiaiot as substrate (vmoxei(jvov, e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028a6f.). That the description of the atom as qa'imun bi-nafsihi may well derive from the hellenistic description of the ouaia as auOimapxTov was suggested above. It is interesting to note that al-As'ari held that, used of the atom, 'gawhar' is a laqab, i.e., it does not properly name or describe the atom (tasmiyatun 'aid al-talqibi la 'aid al-tahqiq), but is so used "in the technical usage of the mutakallimun since it is something that can receive accidents and they exist in it" (Mug, pp. 29, llf. and 291, 2f.; one should perhaps read fa-yugadu bihi for wa-yugadu bihi at p. 29, 12). Though originally a loan word from Persian, in ordinary Arabic a gawhar is a substance, not in the sense of an Aristotelian ouaia, but rather in the more usual sense as that of which something is made or composed, e.g., clay (Slbawayh 1, p. 274, 17f.; cp. SK, ad Sibawayh 1, p. 228, 22ff.) or iron (Mubarrad 3, p. 272). Concerning the atom's occupying a minimal volume of space, see Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalam, which though focused primarily on the Mu'tazila gives a very good analysis of the concept and its background. 66 Sam (69), p. 157, 5ff., where with T, E, and Iht read bi-al-mutahayyiz for bi-altahayyuz in line 5 and with T add 'aid following dalla in line 8. Al-Baqillani defines the atom (lnsdf, p. 16, 20) as what has a volume of space (alladi lahu hayyiz) and in Tarn (p. 205, 17) speaks of it as du hayyiz. The akwdn are a class of accidents that
194
RICHARD M. FRANK
Earlier in the same work he reported that "some of our leading authorities say the atom is the corpuscle (al-girm) and this is the best of the definitions; it includes 'what occupies a space' but is clearer in expression."67 'Girm' is commonly defined (e.g., Maqayis and al-Gawhari, s.v.) by 'gasad', which is employed occasionally by the As'arites as a synonym of 'gism'.6S When employed by the As'arites to define or describe the atom, however, 'girm' cannot mean body igism or gasad in the usual sense), for as we shall see body is formally defined as the conjunction of two or more atoms. Alongside 'girm', the atom is also termed a hagm, a material volume or bulk.69 The two words would seem to be taken as basically equivalent in this context. Thus al-Guwayni, after discussing the occupation of space as an essential attribute of the atom (Sam (69), p. 157, translated above), goes on to say (ibid.,
determine position in space, sc, motion and rest, conjunction, contiguity and discontinuity (on this see our "Bodies and atoms: the Ash'arite analysis," in M.E. Marmura (ed.), Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani [Albany, 1984], pp. 39-53, at pp. 44f.). The use of 'kawn' in this sense is taken from the description of an atom as being in a particular position in space; see below, n. 88. 67 Sam (69), p. 142, 17f. (reading girm for guz'r with K, T, and E; also with T read tahayyuz for hayyiz in line 15); cf. also, e.g., S.Ir, fol. 47v, 18f. & alibi pass. AlGuwayni says (Sam (69), p. 156, 9f.) that al-Baqillani preferred this definition. Juxtaposition and contiguity can only occur with a pair of corpuscles (innama taqarrara dalika fi girmayn): ibid., p. 198, 17ff. It is said that sound (i.e., a single quantum of the accident sound) can exist in an isolated corpuscle iyaguzu qiyamu al-sawti bial-girmi al-fard: Iht, fol. 210r, 2). Al-Ansari says (Gn, fol. 24v, 16f.) that what is meant by 'locations' is the surfaces of atoms and their dimensions as corpuscles (almuradu bi-al-ahyazi misahatu al-gawahiri wa-aqddri agramiha)... and it is impossible to posit two corpuscles in a single location." (I have paraphrased in order to avoid barbarous English or something which would be more an exegesis than a translation.) By the plural 'gawdhir' he means bodies and by 'agrdmuhd' the individual atoms of which they are composed. In the previous line he spoke of "mutasakkilun aw girm" and immediately following the passage of Sam (69), cited above, he goes on to say that al-Baqillani often spoke of the atom as "md lahu hazzun min al-misdha." The other AS'arites, however, do not speak of the atom's having surface area. 68 Cf., e.g., Gn, fol. 36r, 12. 'Gasad', however, unlike 'gism', is most often used specifically of a living body; cf., e.g., Ta'wil, fol. 119r, 17 and Gn, fol. 36r, 16. In translating a paragraph on definitions of the atom given in Sam (69), p. 156, 4ff.), Dhanani (The Physical Theory ofKaldm, pp. 63f.) renders 'girm' as "corporeal object," which is at best vague and misleading. I have chosen to use 'corpuscle' here in order to convey the sense that it is a minimal solid, the basic component of bodies, though not by itself a body and also because it fits well with hagm. (I was not so meticulous in "Bodies and atoms," p. 44, where I also mistranscribed misaha). 69 Hagm in ordinary usage is commonly taken as a tangible protuberance of a body; v., e.g., Maqayis, al-Gawhari, and Abu al-Hasan ibn Sida, al-Muhkam al-muhit ala'zam fi al-luga, ed. M. al-Saqa and H. Nassar, 6 vols. (Cairo, 1958-1972), s.v.
195
11. 13ff.), "Since this is correct, we think about the occupation of space understood in terms of the atom's being a solid {hugm) and so know [its occupying space] to be an inalienable property of the atom such that one cannot posit the atom as ceasing to occupy space (fa-wagadnahu laziman li-al-gawhari hatta la yuqaddara al-gawharu harigan 'an al-tahayyuz), just as it cannot be conceived as ceasing to be an entity and a being (datan say'an)."70 All these definitions come together in S.Ir (fol. 62r, If.) where the atom is described as "a volume that is an independent entity which occupies space and receives accidents" (hagmun qa'imun bi-nafsihi mutahayyizun qabilun li-al-'arad). Accidents are not independent entities; they exist (tugad), are (taqum), or reside (tahill), in atoms. Al-Guwayni in one place defines them as "created beings that have no volume of space but exist in the locus of an entity that occupies space" (alhaditu alladl la hayyiza lahu wa-yugadu bi-haytu datun mutahayyiz: Sam (69), p. 185, 18f.;71 v. also ibid., p. 199, 5f., cited below). That it is called an "accident" ('arad) is explained by its being "something that happens to occur in bodies and atoms."72 Although it may be that bodies {gism, gasad) are here and elsewhere (see n. 100 below) mentioned alongside atoms
70 That is, an atom cannot cease to occupy space and yet be an atom, just as it cannot cease to be an existent entity and yet be an atom. In Ir (p. 17, 7f.) al-Guwayni defines the atom saying, "It is that which occupies space and whatever is [or has] a volume (hagm) occupies space." The MSS employed in the Cairo edition and in that of Luciani are equally divided between reading kullu hagmin and kullu di hagmin. S.Ir, fol. 47v, 18f, has wa-ma'na qawlina innahu gawharun annahu hagmun wa-girm. 71 Here reading bi-haytu with the MS and T for the editor's bi-hasabi in line 18. For this use of 'bi-hayt' cp. Gn, fol. 14r, 7 (kullu hagmin wa-girmin wa-guttatin ... yastahilu taqdiru tubuti ahadihima, bi-haytu al-tani bi-hildfi al-'aradayn) and fol. 32v, 14, translated below. God has no locus (hayt: Gn, fol. 18v, 6). (Note that in our "Bodies and atoms," p. 43 and p. 290, n. 16, the treatment of 'girm' and 'gutta' is quite wayward due to a simplistic assumption of the more ordinary uses of the two words and a simultaneous failure to read the texts with sufficient care.) In the present citation (Gn, fol. 14r) the three words are employed simply as synonyms for a material entity of some kind. Lexically 'gufta' is commonly taken in the sense of a living human body, sahsu al-insdn: e.g., al-Gawhari and Abu 'All al-Qali, al-Kitdb albari' fi al-luga, facsimile of MS British Library, Or. no. 9811, ed. A. S. Fulton [London, 1933], s.v.). The AS'arites' use of words that commonly mean body is interesting in that only 'gism' is formally defined as a body in more or less the ordinary sense of a corporeal object. 72 Bi-annahu ya'ridu fi al-gismi wa-al-gawhar: Mug, pp. 211, 4; "it is the being that occurs in the atom, whose ceasing to exist in it is possible while the subject continues to exist" (yasihhu butlanuhu minhu ma'a baqd'i al-hamil: ibid., p. 280, 7);
196
RICHAED M. FRANK
simply as things that are most commonly given to our ordinary experience as opposed to theoretical reflection, it is possible that they are mentioned in passages such as Mug, p. 211 (cited in the previous note), despite the principle that no accident can exist in more than a single atom (e.g., Mug, pp. 30, 6f. and 207, 10, Sam (69), p. 406, 3ff., and Gn, fols. 13v f. and 39v, 2f.), because one subclass of the locational accidents (akwdn) entails the conjunction of two or more atoms so as to constitute a body.73 "Accidents," however, are plainly not conceived after the manner of what are termed accidents in the peripatetic tradition, where health, for example, is an accident as being a quality or state of an entity (an OUCTIOO and as such may be said to be something - a being (6v TI) - only in a secondary or derived sense. What the mutakallimun refer to as accidents they understand to be monadic entities whose existence is the basis of the truth of certain descriptions as they entail, effect or produce {iqtada, awgaba) "qualifications," each of its individual subject, such as its being black or being in motion or being alive, states of affairs that do not belong to the subject as what essentially it is as such and in itself, sc, a spatially extended particle. A single quantum iguz') of black (sawad) is an existent entity that residing in the individual atom is the ground of the truth of its being described as black (aswad) and a quantum of "rest" (sukun) is the ground of its remaining for one instant in the same location (giha,
"because it is something that occurs in bodies and does not endure": ibid., p. 291; cf. also Tagr, pp. 95f. (= 70, 8ff.), and Ir, pp. 18, 13ff. and see our "Bodies and atoms," pp. 40f. The sense of 'occurs' here is that the particular accident comes to exist momentarily in the atom. The two words 'gawhar' and ' 'arad' are intimately associated as categorial terms. So it is that al-AS'ari (along with most of his followers) normally uses "arad' in conjunction with 'gawhar' and 'sifa' in conjunction with 'mawsuf (e.g., Mug, p. 29, 9f.; see also n. 125 below), for though referents of each pair may coincide, the two are not equivalent in what is intended. "Arad' was taken along with 'gawhar' from the translation tradition, while 'sifa' and 'mawsuf as formal terms are taken from the lexicon of ordinary Arabic. In ordinary Arabic usage ' 'arad' commonly refers to something whose occurrence is in one way or another undesirable, e.g., as an illness or misfortune (Abu Yusuf ibn Sikkit, Islah al-mantiq, ed. A. M. Sakir and A. M. Harun [Cairo, 1970], p. 72; cp. Insaf, pp. 16fl). Interpreting Slbawayh 1, p. 8, 4, al-Sirafi says (SKad loc.) that by "arad' he means "things that occur in sentences in such a way as to violate the normal rules." 73 Cf. our "Bodies and atoms" pp. 43ff. (where at p. 49, 2 add 'are formally strict' which was dropped by the printer following 'two predicates'). In the present context we need not be concerned with the dispute over whether what are called almugawara and al-mumassa are one and the same or are two distinct kinds of accident, discussed, e.g., in Sam (69), pp. 456ff.
THE AS'AKITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES
197
hayyiz) it occupied in the previous instant and so of the truth of its being described as being at rest (sakin).14 What is important for our present context is that no individual accident is ever a lasting (baq) or inalienable (lazim) associate of the atom which is its subject. Each comes to be (yahdutu) in it in the instant it (the accident) is created, ceases to be and is immediately replaced as God75 creates its like or its contrary in the next succeeding instant. The being created (halq) or being made to come to be (ihddt) of any contingent entity is the actuality of an individual existence (wugud, dat, nafs). The accident, therefore, though not an independently existing being, is nevertheless an existent being {say'un mawgud) "because it is something that actually occurs and whose continuance in existence is not possible" (li-annahu 'aridun Idyasihhu baqa'uhu: Mug, p. 291, If.).
Not one of them can exist for more than a single moment and when it ceases to exist it ceases to exist neither by a contrary nor by an agent who makes it cease to exist (bi-mu'dim); on the contrary, that it cease to exist in the second moment is altogether necessary (yagibu ...la mahala)" (ibid., p. 13, If.; cf also Tom, p. 18, 4f.).
In contrast to accidents, atoms continue to exist, albeit the presence of accidents in each individual atom is the condition of its existence.76 According to al-As'ari and his followers the atom cannot exist without having a color and one of the akwan, i.e., of the 77 accidents that determine its momentary position igiha) in space. There is, however, some disagreement concerning the ontological ground of the atom's continuance in existence and what precisely may be the cause of its ceasing to exist.
Our fellows state three views concerning the atom's ceasing to exist: the first is that they cease to exist when continuance is no longer given them (bi-qat'i al-baqa'i 'anha), by God's not creating continuance for them; this is the view of Abu al-Hasan [al-As'ari]. The second is that they cease to exist when the
74 Contrary to the usage of al-Guwaynl, what is meant by 'hukm' in the context of the present study is not an ontologically distinct "state" of the Being of the subject, but rather the fact or state of affairs constituted by the presence of the accident in the subject. The AS'arite treatment of this matter is complex and, since it lies beyond the scope of the present study, were best taken up elsewhere. 75 Cf., e.g., Mug, p. 13, If., Insaf, p. 16, ult, and Sam (69), p. 175, 7f. 76 Cf., e.g., Sam (69), pp. 711f., citing al-Baqillani; on p. 712, 11 read agradihim for a'radihim. 77 v E.g., Mug, p. 246, 5ff., et alibi and Bayan (K), p. 20, 7ff.; the akwan are denned (Sam (69), p. 198, 9f. and Ir, p. 17, lOf.) as ma. awgaba tahassusa al-gawhari bimakanin aw taqdiri makan.
198
RICHARD M. FRANK
akwan are no longer given them. The third is that they cease to exist by God's making them cease to exist (bi-i'dami Allahi iyyaha). The last two ways are given by the Qadi [al-Baqillani] (S.Ir, fol. 130r, 18ff. = Gn, fol. 93v, llff.).
The first position, taken by al-As'ari, is that continuance in existence (al-baqa') is an accident which God creates in the 78 atom. The second, which may well have been introduced into the school by al-Baqillani, is based on the common As'arite doctrine that the atom cannot exist without some color and a kawn. Exactly what al-Baqillani meant by annihilation (i'dam) in the 79 third is not clear. The thesis that al-baqa' is an accident, distinct from the existence of the atom was accepted by a large number of the As'arites, while a few held that it is simply the continued existence of the atom (istimraru al-wugud: e.g., alMutawalli, p. 21, 4f. and Ir, p. 138f.); the atom continues to exist
God creates the accident so that the atom continues to exist instead of ceasing to exist. The way this is formulated in Gn, fol. 92r, 6f., "hatta sara bi-kawnihi baqiyan awla minhu bi-kawnihi faniya" is noteworthy, as it emphasizes the determination (tahsis) of the occurrence of one of two possibilities with respect to the particular atom, sc. its remaining existent or its ceasing to exist, as depending on the choice and action of God. Since al-baqa' is an accident, al-A'ari (Mug, p. 239, 7ff.) speaks of particles of baqa'. (The occurrence of anwa'uhu in line 7 here with reference to al-baqa' is strange to say the very least; the sentence states that the accident al-baqd' has no contrary (Id didda lahu) but that its instances are contrary to one another since two cannot exist simultaneously in the same atom. The presence of the 'anwa" is most likely an error, though how it came about is difficult to imagine.) "In the case of contingent entities [God's] making [them] continue to exist and continuance in existence (al-ibqa' wa-albaqa') are one and the same, just as causing to move and motion and causing to be black and [the accident] black are one and the same" (Mug, p. 238, llf.). In hearing this sentence one could focus narrowly on the entity described and hear the masdars 'ibqa", 'tahrik', and 'taswid', as passives: being caused to continue in existence, being set in motion, and being made black, but this comes down to the same basic conception as the active reading. That is, just as the existence of the atom is God's causing it to exist which is its being caused to exist (igaduhu), so also the atom's continuing to exist is God's causing it to continue to exist by His creation of the accident, baqa'. The exploitation of the equivocities of this and other masdars is significant. 79 Speaking of the second position, al-Ansari says (S.Ir, fol. 130v, 5ff.) that in the passage cited al-Baqillam mentions only the akwan because this was most convenient within the context of his argument against the Mu'tazila. Al-Baqillani's thesis that God annihilates the atom recalls that of the Mu'tazila, according to whom God makes atoms cease to exist by creating their contrary (didduhu), sc, a ceasing to exist (a fana') that occurs in no substrate; cf., e.g., Ibn Mattawayh, al-Tadkira fi ahkam algawahir wa-al-a'rad, ed. S. N. Lutf and F. B. 'Awn (Cairo, 1975), p. 213, 4ff and generally ibid., pp. 208ff. and M 11, pp. 441ff. One notes al-Baqillani's conception of "states" he most likely took from that of Abu HaSim and it is possible that he took from him as well the notion of the annihilation of the atom whether with modification or without. On the question of continuance in existence generally, see Iht, fols. 73v ff., S.Ir, fols. 124r-130r, Gn, fols. 90r ff.
78
THE AS'AKITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES
199
so long as God creates accidents in it and ceases to exist when 80 He stops. Accordingly, in reply to the thesis that in the atom's continuing to exist as such no action of God takes place in it, alGuwayni says that "their continuing to exist does not entail their being no longer through God's power; they are His very actions - their being is His causing 81 them to be - and He may make them cease to exist if He wills." Atoms are, from one perspective, independent entities, but by and of themselves they cannot exist. They continue to exist as independent entities only so long as God continues to create in them beings that are not independent entities.82 In the universe of created beings there are only monadic existences. Nothing is indefinite, undetermined, or unlimited.
Cf., e.g., al-Mutawalli, p. 31, 15ff., Ir, p. 140, 7ff. and, citing al-Baqillani, Sam (69), pp. 270, 3ff. and 716, 2 and al-Bagdadl, p. 90, 3. The basic reason for which continuance is asserted to be an entitative attribute (accident) is that it is not identical with existence; i.e., 'continues to exist' is not synonymous with 'exists', since the former is not true at the first instant of the atom's existence (cf., e.g., Tarn, p. 263, 8ff. and Gn, fol. 91v, 8ff.). Al-Ansari says (S.Ir, fol. 35r, 7ff. and Gn, fol. 90r, 20f.) that the doctrine that al-baqa' is "an entitative attribute distinct from the existence [of the subject]" (ma'nan za'idun 'aid al-wugud) is the position of al-As'ari and "most of our fellows" ('dmmatu ashabina). The thesis that al-baqa' is simply an entity's continuing to exist is in part based on the commonly accepted principle that continuance in existence has no contrary since if the atom does not continue to exist it ceases to be a subject for any accident (cf., e.g., Sam (69), p. 204, 17ff. and S.Ir, fol. 61v, 5f.). Accordingly, one says that whatever continues in existence does so of itself (al-baqi baqin bi-nasfihi: ibid., 35r, 8f.). 'Perdures', that is to say, has no referent other than the existence (the Self) of the particular entity (cf., e.g., Ir, pp. 138f.). Al-As'ari's views on this question varied; cf., e.g., Mug, pp. 43, 6ff. and 237ff. and al-Mutawalli, p. 31, 15ff. and the texts cited below in the discussion of his several opinions concerning God's eternal baqa' and that of His essential attributes. The position of alBaqillani in Tamt p. 263, is contrary to that commonly attributed to him by later authors (cf., e.g., S.Ir, fol. 35r, 13f.) and presented (Gn, fol. 62r, 21f.) as "what he preferred," nor are "states" of being (al-ahwdl) a constitutive part of the ontology set forth there, as they are in Hiddya. 81 Baqd'uhd Idyuhriguhd 'an wuqu'ihd bi-qudratihi fa-hiya 'aynu afdlihi wa-lahu ifna'uhd in shd': Iht, fol. 196v, 14ff. Elsewhere he says (Sam (69), p. 175, 6f.) that "in the moment of its continuation in existence the atom is not correlated to [God's] power and will." That is to say, He does not re-create the Self of the atom in each succeeding instant, but since its continued existence depends on His ongoing creation of accidents in it, it is yet dependent on his power and will. 82 It is worth noting_that, in speaking of the impossibility of the atom's existence without accidents, al-Guwayni says "yastahilu wugudu al-gawhari bi-ld 'arad" (Ir, p. 140, cited above), using 'yastaljlV, which is normally used of the logically impossible. Similarly al-Ansari says "al-gawharu al-'ari 'an al-a'rddi gayru mumkin" (S.Ir, fol. 26v, 4), using mumkin rather than gd'iz.
80
200
RICHARD M. FRANK
There are only discrete quanta of existence, finite in number and in every other respect (cf. al-Isfara'ini, p. 137, 18, translated below). Each atom is, at each and every moment of its existence, determined in its every qualification (hukm) and in every relation it has to those other atoms to which it is concretely related by contiguity or remoteness by a finite set of accidents created in it and in the others in every successive instant.83 One might suggest that since atoms are independent entities and as such continue in existence over time, they have per se (li-anfusihd) a kind of potency to receive new accidents in succeeding instants. It is obvious, however, that any such notion is alien to the As'arite system. The atom is an independent entity only in the sense that it does not exist in another. "Independent" though in one sense it be, it can exist only as and so long as it is the locus or substrate (mahall) of accidents that come to be only when and as God wills and whose existence perdures but for an instant. If one would speak of the atom's potentiality to receive accidents, then what is meant by potency can only be that the atom is the presently actual locus of a possible act of God's power in the immediately following instant, for it must necessarily cease to exist the instant that He ceases to create new accidents in it. The existence of each accident is particular (muhtass) to the given atom which is its subject. According to some, including alAs'ari in several of his works, each accident belongs uniquely to the particular subject in such a way that its existence in a different subject may not be posited (Id yaguzu taqdiruhu fi gayri mahallihi) and if God were to create it anew it would occur only in the self same atom in which it was originally created. According to others, however, God determines the particular accident's existence in the particular subject (ihtisdsuhu bi84 mahallihi) and could have willed to create it in another. The former thesis would seem most probably to be based on the principle that God knows eternally the existence of the particular accident in a particular atom and to posit its existence in an atom other than the one in which it actually occurs is to posit an
83 It is characterised by number, limits and dimensions (... ittisafuhu bi-al-'adadi wa-al-hudiidiwa-al-aqtar: Sam (69), p. 571, 8). 84 Cf., e.g., Sam (69), pp. 174, 16ff., where read bi-mahallihi at p. 175, 5 against the editor's emendation and in 1. 6, omit the sukun on al- 'arad and read mqtd for mqtdy with K and T.
201
impossibility in that it is to posit as not being that which in God's eternal knowledge is. Furthermore, if the self same accident is to be re-created, it will have in its re-creation to exist in the same subject in which it originally existed, otherwise it would not be the very same entity it was originally - not 'aynu ddtihi - since its existence (its Self) is to exist in the particular atom. The latter thesis, on the other hand, is most likely based on a rigid interpretation of the principle that the re-creation of an entity is, like its original creation, an initial coming to be out of nothing (e.g., Mug, p. 242, 12ff.). Accidents, colors, for example, are simple, monadic entities which exist, each one of them, in an individual atom. So also, accidents such as cognitions and volitions, which by their natures are correlated to other entities beyond the single atoms which are their subjects, are also essentially finite and determined (muhtass) in their correlations. A created cognition, existent in its particular substrate, is the presence of a single true proposition concerning a single object, whether an individual entity, a composite or conglomerate, a class or subclass of entities, or a complex state of affairs. No human cognition or belief goes beyond the proposition it presents, as any further judgement, sense, or inferrence, true or false, is a new and different cognitive event, willed and created by God in a given subject at and for a particular instant. The As'arite identification of what are beings (mawguddt / dawat) in the proper sense of the word is to a large extent based on the grammarians' analysis of predicational sentences. The noun which is the initial term {al-mubtada') - the primary subject of the sentence - is taken as given, that is, as naming something known to the person addressed (cf., e.g., Slbawayh 1, p. 22) and it is on this noun that the predicational sentence as 85 such is formed. The assertion, strictly speaking, is the predicate (al-habar) and accordingly it is in the predicate that truth
85 Al-mubtada'u kullu ismin ibtudi'a li-yubna 'alayhi al-kalam: Slbawayh 1, p. 278, 4. It would seem reasonably clear that the Basrian grammarians view the mubtada' as the logical subject of the kabar, not merely as "in focus." That a kaldm is a complete sentence, cf., e.g.. Ibn Ginni 1, p. 17. With the AS'arite analysis we have to do here only with propositions about actually existent beings. Sentences whose initial subject refers to things that are not considered beings in the formal sense of the term (e.g., relations: ta'alluqat and ansab) have, in order to achieve logical and conceptual precision, to be recast in a form in which one or another of the relata is presented as the subject term (v. infra).
202
RICHARD M. FRANK
or falsity resides (cf., e.g., al-Mubarrad 3, p. 89 and Ibn al-Sarrag, Usul 1, p. 62, 9ff.). Since it constitutes the assertion, the habar has a subject term of its own, either one whose referent is identical with that of the initial subject and which therefore need not be explicitly presented or one whose referent is something other than that of the initial subject and so must be made explicit, "otherwise the sentence is incoherent (muhal)" (Mubarrad 4, p. 128, If.; cf. also Ibn al-Sarrag, Usul, 1, p. 64, 3ff.). The atom is featureless, save for its essential characteristics (sifatu datihi), sc, its occupying a minimal volume of space and its being such that it can receive accidents. When, then, one predicates 'occupies space' or 'receives accidents' of an atom, the implied subject term of the predicate is the 'it' of '<it> occupies space' (<huwa> mutahayyiz) which refers to the atom itself, since 'tahayyuz', the noun that underlies the description (from which according to the grammarians 'mutahayyiz' is derived), names nothing distinct from the atom itself. Save in definitions one does not say 'lahu tahayyuz'; to do so is simply to say that the atom exists, since its occupying space is its existence. The predicate thus is said (is true) of the atom li-nafsihi, by virtue of the Self of the atom, for to assert the actuality of the essential attribute of any being is to assert its existence.86 Again, since the subject term of the predicate presents (refers to) the reason or ground ('ilia) of the truth of an assertion concerning the primary subject, one sees the analytic basis on which a number of As'arites will say that a contingent entity is "grounded in itself, since the 'ilia and the haqlqa of a being are one and the same and are identical with its existence (v. n. 54 above). Similarly 'is a contingent being' (hadit I muhdat) is said li-al-nafs, since its existence is its being created.87 That an atom be black, on the other hand, is not an essential attribute, wherefore the ground of its being black must be other than the ground of its being an atom. The predicate of 'the atom is black' (al-gawharu aswad) is analysed therefore as 'a [particle
One has here again an example of one and the same expression's serving significantly on two distinct, albeit intimately related planes. It may also serve as an excellent illustration of the thesis that al-ismu huwa al-musamma: as the masdar, 'tahayyuz' underlies the description/predicate (al-wasf = al-tasmiya) so the Name (alism) is what is named, sc, the atom's actually occupying space, which is its essential attribute and the ground of the truth of the description. 87 Cf., e.g., Mug, p. 28,10f., Sam (69), pp. 328f., and Abu Bakr al-Furaki, al-Nizdmi fi usul al-din, MS Ayasofya no. 2378, fol. 66r, 17.
86
203
of] black belongs to it' {lahu sawadun) and the particle of black referred to by the subject term of analysed predicate must be an entitative attribute whose existence in it is the ground of the truth of the description or proposition (al-wasf). The same logic is applied to the atom's being located in a particular position, for "the kawn, according to those who use the word in its most proper sense, is that which effects a being's location in a particular space and position (huwa alladi yugibu tahsisa al-kd'ini bi-hayyizin wa-giha) and by this attribute it is distinct iyatamayyazu) from other classes of accidents."88 The atom's being in the same unit of space it occupied in the immediately preceding instant is the basis of our saying that it is at rest (sdkin) or its occupying another, adjacent location is the basis of our saying that it is in motion (mutaharrik).S9 'It is in motion' yields on analysis 'a motion belongs to it' (lahu harakatun) and the second subject has a referent distinct from that of the primary subject. In another move we may, for example, make the motion the primary subject: 'this motion exists in this atom'. Here the analysis of the predicate yields 'the existence of this motion is in this atom', but the existence of any accident is to reside in a particular atom (wuguduhu = qiyamuhu fihi) wherefore the second subject is identical with the primary subject. The consistent logic of the system is seen in the As'arites' thesis that when two atoms are conjoined a unit of the accident conjunction (igtimd', ta'lif, indimam, mumassa) resides in each. is conjoined with Atom/ is analysed as 'Atom^ to it
Sam (69), p. 198, 9f., citing al-Baqillanl. This is the common definition, save that generally one finds 'gawhar' or 'guz" rather than 'ka'in'; cf., e.g., Mug, p. 203, 4f. and Sam (69), pp. 157, 2,198, 9f., 451, and p. 451, 2, where he employs a particularly good formulation. On the origin of the use of 'kawn' in the theology of Abu al-Hudayl see Th.u.G 3, pp. 234f. Van Ess renders 'kawn' by 'Befindlichkeit', a very felicitous rendering, but one for which we have no simple equivalent in English. Note, however, that the AS'arite conception differs somewhat from that of Abu al-Hudayl for whereas he conceived the kawn as something distinct from motion and rest, for them the word is a general term for motion, rest, conjunction, and disjunction as they constitute a distinct class of accidents (just as 'color' is for black, white, etc.). The details of this (on which see Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 99ff.) we need not go into here. 89 Cf., e.g., Mug, pp. 204, 17ff. and 243ff., Sam (69), pp. 432, lOff. (citing alBaqillanl) and 444f. At p. 432 with T read tahsis for tahassus in line 15 and for al-tanl ma'a taqdiri baqa'i al-gawhar in line 16 read al-kawnu al-tani min tahsisi al-gawhar (T has al-kawnu al-tani min taqdiri al-gawhar). The AS'arites' conception of motion is rather more subtle than the commonplace definition here cited; cf. ibid., pp. 453f. and 462f., where several earlier masters are cited.
88
204
RICHAED M. FRANK
belongs a conjunction with Atom2' (lahu igtima'un bi-...), where the referent of the second subject is not identical with that of the primary subject and therefore must be distinct from Atom,. In order to take formal account of Atom2 as conjoined with Atom, it is necessary to consider a new proposition of which Atom2 is the primary subject: 'Atom,,: to it belongs a conjunction with Atom/, where again the second subject refers to a being distinct from the primary subject. Since it is impossible that a single accident exist in two atoms, the proposition 'Atom, and Atom2: to them belongs a conjunction' (lahuma igtima'un) is necessarily false. The conjunction of Atom, with Atom2 is distinct from that of Atom2 to Atom,; they are distinct entities {datan, mawgudan). A body is commonly denned as a composite 90 consisting of two or more atoms. Al-Ansari, however, states that "according to our masters, a body is what is composed or is that in which there is a composition and a conjunction (al-mu'talifu aw-mafihi al-ta'lifu wa-al-igtima': Gn, fol. 35v, 13; cp. alFuraki, fol. 44r, 5). In the minimal composite, then, there are two atoms in each of which exists a conjunction and each, by virtue of its own ta'llf, is conjoined to the other. Following the logic of the system, then, "a body, in the terminology of the true believers, is that which is conjoined (al-mu'talif), so when two atoms are conjoined they are two bodies, since each one is in conjunction (mu'talif) with the other".91 "Every one of our really competent masters (kullu muhaqqiqin min a'immatina) holds that the two atoms are two bodies (Sam (69), p. 402, Iff., citing al-Baqillani). The same principle holds in the case of non-contiguity or separation (iftiraq, tabayun, tabd'ud). That a particular instance of separation must exist in each of a pair of atoms is obvious. But why posit such an accident in the first place? The reason is that as an accident - a distinct kawn - conjunction must, within the system, have a contrary by which it may be supplanted. Separation, thus, is not conceived simply as the non-conjunction of any two atoms that are not conjoined, but only of particular atoms under particular circumstances. Separation according to al-As'ari is "one atom's being with another atom (kawnu alCf., e.g., Mug, p. 206, 15, Bayan (K), p. 20, 6 (where with V read almuwahhiduna for 'Imwgdwn in line 5) and al-Mutawalli, pp. 15f. 91 Ir, p. 17, 12, reading gismayn with three MSS against both editors. This thesis, alas, I failed to note in "Bodies and atoms."
90
205
gawhari ma'a gawharin) insofar as it is possible for a third to be between them while they remain exactly as they were or that there be a third between them" (Mug, p. 30, 4ff.). According to some, on the other hand, "separation" is disjunction, that is to say, an accident that exists only in the case of two atoms that were conjoined in the immediately preceding instant.92 Like the other akwan, separation is a distinct non-essential attribute - a contingent ma'na, sc, an accident - that God creates in the individual atom and which, as created is say'un mawgud. God alone is an agent in the strict sense of the word and, since to act is to cause something to exist and make it come to be {al-igadu wa-al-ihdat: Iht, fol. 170v, 12ff.), all God's actions are entities properly speaking.93 "What it means to say that a being is an act [of God's] is that it was a [potential] object of His power and came to exist" {annahu kana maqduran lahu fa-wugid: Gn, fol. 24r, 14). And so it is that 'continues in existence' (baq) is treated in the same manner as are the akwan and other accidents by those who hold that, since continuance in existence cannot be an essential attribute of a contingent being, it must be distinct and therefore an accident. It is something that God "does" to/in an atom - a distinct act. According to the As'arites, in sum, 'being' {say' I mawgud) is not said of contingent entities in many ways. 'Tabit', on the other hand, is equivocal (and so noTiXaxoc Aeyo^evov) since 'has actuality [in being]' may be said not only of entities (asyd') but also of relations and states of affairs (and of the ahwal, according to those who recognize them as ontologically distinguishable features of independent entities). 'Mawgud' is not coextensive with ltabit\ They speak of "accidents" as entities that are distinct from the independent entities in which they exist but, as we have seen, nowhere suggest that 'say" or 'mawgud' is said of
92 Cf. Sam (69), pp. 458f. All of this is important, e.g., in the discussion of the atoms that make up a body because when a body moves the interior atoms remain in the same positions relative to one another while the surface atoms move with respect to those to which they had been contiguous; cf., e.g. ibid., p. 454, 7ff. Being apart or disjoined is, thus, not a simple spatial relation (nasab/nisba), since such relations are not accidents (and therefore not beings, mawgudat). Some authorities distinguish between mugawara, mumassa, indimam, et al.; cf., e.g., ibid., pp. 456ff. 93 Kullu ft'lin say'un wa-ddtun: Sam (69), p. 170, 14 (where with T read fa-yuqalu for fa-qdla in line 13; E has fa-qulna). Note also that in many contexts one may read the noun 'fV either as the simple noun, 'fiT, or as the masdar, 'fa7', and this as either active or passive, while in some it must be the one and not the other.
206
RICHARD M. FRANK
them in a different sense from that intended when it is said of the spatially extended atoms. As 'mawgud' is said of all existent beings, so 'muhdat' (contingent entity) is said univocally of atoms and accidents alike.94 And similarly, 'qa'imun bi-nafsihV (an independent entity) is said of all independent entities and so of atoms as such and 'qa'imun bi-gayrihV of all accidents as such. Al-qiydmu bi-nafsihi, on the other hand, is, like existence, always particular, as the atom's being an independent entity is its existence and also in the case of each individual accident, its residing in another is its individual existence. Al-Qusayri says that "God initiated the Being of beings not on the basis of a prior model... He is the one who brought forth not on the basis of any model; ... He makes beings beings and enti95 ties entities." "It is He who made them entities and atoms and accidents" (alladl fa'alahu nafsan wa-gawharan wa-'aradan: Mug, p. 254,13f.). "He made the different classes of beings to be different one from another" (hdlafa bayna al-agnas).96 We have, thus, to examine briefly how the AS'arites speak of classes. It should be noted at the outset that the vocabulary the A'arites employ to speak of classes and subclasses - kinds, sorts, types, varieties - is, to say the very least, inconsistent. 'Qabir is commonly used to designate a very general vclass and 'darb' for lowest subclasses, as al-Guwaynl speaks (Sam (69), p. 204, 9ff.) of accidents as a qabil, colors as a gins, and white as
94 Note that though formally a passive participle, 'muhdat' is generally understood as a synonym of the intransitive 'hadit' (e.g., Ibn Furak's Hudud, #16), being denned as that whose existence has a beginning (e.g., ibid., Mug, p. 37, 7f., Tarn, p. 194, 3; and Fusul, # 3 (p. 60). 'Muhdat' occurs more commonly than does 'hadit'. 95 Mubdi'u al-a'yani la 'aid mitdlin taqaddama... al-munsi'u la 'aid mitdlin... ga'ilu al-'ayna 'aynan wa-al-ddta ddtan: Tahblr, fol. 126v, 13ff. (Only the first sentence is found in the printed edition, p. 92). Note that one could hear the participle 'mubdi'u' as present, in which case it is indefinite (and the following word therefore implicitly accusative): "God creates..." or as past, in which case the participle is definite by virtue of the annexed definite: "God is the one who created ...". Al-Quayri takes care to note here that said of God 'mubdi" means to carry out an action that has no precedent (cp. al-Gawhari, s.v.) whence it would seem likely that the past definite is intended. This might also suggest that in the present world the exemplars of ongoing and future creation are all given. This, however, is a complex question which I will not go into here. 96 Tagr, p. 93, llf. (= 65, 9); cp. Ta'wil, fol. 108v, 6f. Ibn Furak says (Baydn (H), p. 2, 1 = (K), p. 9, 6) that God created "anwd'an mutafarriqatan wa-agndsan muttafiqa." 'Gdyara' is employed in the same way where al-QuSayri says (Latd'if 4, p. 313, ad al-Qur'dn 25.53) of salt water and fresh water that God made them different in their characteristics (gdyara baynahumd fi al-$ifa).
207
a darb and speaks (Sam (81), p. 27, 3f.) of "darbun min durubi al-kalam" and "darbun min durubi al-akwan." The most common terms are 'gins' and 'naw". Though in contrast to the Mu'tazilites the As'arites often employ 'naw" to refer to a subclass of a gins, the use of the words is nowhere consistent and may vary in a single paragraph.97 Al-Ansari, for example, speaks of classes (or subclasses) using 'naw" at Gn, fol. 74, 9 and then but three lines later uses 'gins' in the same sense without distinction, while al-Bagdadi in one place (Usul, p. 35, 12ff.) uses the two alternatively several times in a single paragraph. 'Sinf (or 'sanft), a somewhat vaguer expression, is^also used in the sense of class or subclass, as al-Ansari says (S.Ir, fol. 40r, If.) that the speakers of Arabic make 'lawn' a general name for the varieties of color (isman ya'ummu asnafa al-lawri) and make "orad' a name that embraces the varieties of contingent entitative attributes (isman yasmalu asnafa al-ma'ani al-muhdata).98 What is important for our present context is that one keep in mind that the use of the terminology is not consistent, even with a single author in a single context, and that one cannot discern what is considered a class and what a subclass on the basis of the terminology but only by how they are presented in the particular passage. The beings that make up the created universe are divided into two classes, atoms and accidents (aqsamu al-muhdatati naw 'ani gawahiru wa-a'rad).99 These, that is, are the basic "divisions" or categories of primary contingent entities. Occasionally one finds bodies igism) included in the list or substituted for atoms. Bodies, however, since they are composites of atoms and accidents, do not constitute a class of primary entities.100 As we saw earlier, what joins - i.e., what is, strictly speaking, common to two cognitions (al-gami'u bayna al-'ilmayn) - is not the name,
'Naw" is defined as the name for a subclass of a gins by al-Gawhari, s.v. and this use would seem to be implied in Maqdyis, s.v. 98 With this, cp. the statement of al-Qusayri (Latd'ifS, p. 216, ad al-Qur'an 13.3) that God made animals to be of various kinds (nawwa'a) and flowers and fruits to be of diverse sorts (sannafa). 99 Al-FurakI, fols. 71v f. (note that the plural 'aqsam' indicates that 'naw'an' here means the most general classes); cf also Tarn, p. 22, 4f (usinggins), Bagdad!, pp. 33, 14f. and 35, 9ff. (using naw'), and Sam (81), p. 27, 15ff. (usinggins). 100 In Tagr, p. 93, lOf. (= p. 25, 7f., where with the Cairo edition read agsamihi for agnasihi), al-As'ari divides contingent beings into bodies and accidents as, e.g., does Ibn Furak in Baydn (K), p. 19, 13f. and al-Baqillanl in Insaf, p. 17, 8ff., because it is bodies, not atoms that are the objects of our experience and immediate knowledge.
97
208
RICHARD M. FRANK
but rather their essential nature, sc, "that they deserve to be called cognitions" (Sam (69), p. 634, 7f.; cf. also Gn, fols. 55v, 7ff. and 64r, 5, also cited above). It is the "Definition" that unites the class of what is denned and excludes from it what does not belong to it.101 The Definition, what it is to be a knowing, for example, is common tov all cognitions whether their content be the same or different (Sam (81), p. 82, 7).
It is not excluded that different cognitions fall together under a single definition by virtue of the fact that a single essential nature unites them and encompasses their varieties (tadbutu asnafahu); and so also in the case of speaking (al-kalam) it is not excluded that a single definition be common to its varieties (S.Ir, fol. 91v, 18f, citing al-Baqillani).
Atoms, as we have seen, constitute a single class every instance of which is essentially identical to every others (e.g., Mug, p. 256, 22f. and Sam (69), p. 153, 19f.), while accidents are divided into various classes and subclasses. There are, for example, five subclasses of sense perception (anwa'u al-idrak) each class being defined as having a particular class of accidents as their percepta (mudrakun mahsus).102 Longing (al-tamanni) and desire (al-sahwa) are subclasses of volition (Mug, p. 45, 5).
(The single atom is not perceptible.) Thus, although al-Ansari will speak loosely of bodies as belonging to one and the same class (taganusu al-agsam: Gn, fol. 73v, 10), he states clearly (ibid., fol. 35v, 14ff.) that 'body' is not the name of a class (laysa min asma'i al-agnas) in the strict sense of the term, but is so employed in a kind of loose or improper sense (as a laqab). What he does here is, in effect, to set aside the lexicographers' sense of class names as formally improper in kalam. It is following the latter, ordinary sense of the words that one speaks (Mug, p. 82, lOf.) of structure and appearence (al-kayfiyyatu wa-al-hay'a) as "a class (naw') of accidents." So Ibn Furak, following common usage and that of the grammarians in speaking of class nouns, says that bodies are of two classes (naw'an), living and non-living and that the former consist of two classes (naw'an), plants and animals, and finally speaks of men, angels, and jinn as "classes of rational animals" (Bayan (H), pp. 10f.). Similarly following ordinary usage one speaks of "the other questions that belong to this class" (sa'iru ma ganasa hadihi al-masa'il: Mug, p. 260, 17) or of two ways of understanding an expression (naw'ay ma'nahu: ibid., p. 28, 2). Similarly, when al-Guwayni speaks of subclasses of speaking (Sam (81), p. 27, cited above) he doubtless means various genres, as al-Baqillani speaks of such as poetry, rhymed prose, ordinary prose, oratory, etc. (Hidaya, fol. 185r, 2ff.). 101 Cp. Mug, p. 10, 23f.: al-haddu ma yagma'u naw'a al-mahdudi faqat wayamna'u ma laysa minhu anyadhula fihi. On the "Definition" as the essential characteristic of the defined, see above. Note the play of the ambivalence of the word in this and the following citation and see below concerning universals. Regarding the use of gama'a, yagma'u here, note that common nouns ("class nouns") are sometimes termed asma'un gami'a by the grammarians; e.g., Sibawayh 1, p. 267, 2. 102 Mug, p. 17, 13ff. On the same page read makanayn for the second mahallayn in line 1.
209
Classes are conceived and identified in terms of the characteristic likeness or unlikeness of beings. Al-Guwaynl gives three common As'arite definitions of being alike:
Those who hold what is correct take the position that two likes (al-mitlan) are any two beings the one of which is the same as the other in the attributes it must or may have. The leading masters often formulate this as "every pair of existents that are the same in the positive attributes they may have (kullu mawgudayni mustawiyayni fima yaguzu min sifati al-itbat) and often they say "they are any two existents for the one of which is necessary what is necessary for the other and for the one of which is possible that which is possible for the other and what is impossible for it is impossible for the other." 103
Under these definitions, being the same or alike may be interpreted more or less narrowly depending on how and at what level one takes 'must', 'may', and 'impossible'. True cognitions (al-'ilm) may be considered to form a class (e.g., Gn, fol. 64r, 5), while the a priori principles of reason (mabadi 'u al- 'aql) are a subclass of those cognitions that are given without drawing an inference {min naw'i al-daruriyyat: Mug, p. 18, 8f.). Likeness may, on the other hand, be defined much more narrowly, as al-Isfara'inl, for example, says ('Aqida, p. 137, 16) that being alike (al-tamdtul) entails sharing in all essential attributes; and so too al-As'ari offersv a definition of being alike that is much like those reported by al-Guwaynl, but adds at the end that if one of the two beings in question is unique in any description that cannot be true of the other it is unlike it.104 Thus, for example, "every pair of true cognitions that present one and the same object in the same way are alike (mitldn)" while "any pair of cognitions that have two [distinct] objects are unlike regardless of whether the two objects be alike or unlike, as the question is that of the number of objects known not their being unlike" (Gn, fol. 68v, 19ff.). Similarly regarding the akwdn, al-As'ari held that "motion from a place is the cessation of rest in it and is a contrary of [rest in it] and motion from one place is a contrary to a motion from another place" and the obvious sense of this, says Ibn Furak is that two motions which are identical in every respect (mutamatilan) form a class (gins), all others being different.105
Sam (69), p. 292, 5ff. Cp. Insaf, p. 32, 12f. Concerning the meaning of 'sifatu alitbat' see above. 104 Ida istabadda ahaduhuma bi-wasfin Id yaguzu 'aid sdhibihi... kdna muhdlifan lahu: Mug, p. 209, 9ff.; cf. also ibid., p. 266, 2ff. and Baydn (K), p. 16, llff. 105 Mug, p. 214, 3ff., where read al-mawgudayni al-muhdathayn for al-mawgudina al-muhdathin in line 7. (The reading tagdnusi al-harakdti wa-ihtildfihd of Mug,
103
210
RICHARD M. FRANK
Though the likeness and unlikeness of certain beings is discussed in very precise terms according to the perspective and focus of the particular context, the general taxonomy of the classes and subclasses of contingent beings does not seem to have been a topic in which the AS'arites had much interest, for not only is the terminolgy for classes and subclasses used indiscriminately (a habit not unfamiliar to Arabic!) but nowhere is the matter taken up for its own sake in general and in detail.106 The question of classes involves that of universals and in this the A&'arites are very precise. Stating the common AS'arite doctrine al-Ansari says, against al-Guwayni:
We do not assert the reality of that in which actuality and existence is not truly the case (ma la yatahaqqaqufihial-tubutu wa-al-wugud). A being (alsay') is sometimes known in conjunction with something else and is sometimes known singly, apart from anything else. This is what is meant by general and particular (al-'dmmu wa-al-hdss). This is in accord with the established usage of the language (istilahu ahli al-lisan), as they make 'color' a general name for the various kinds of colors (isman 'amman liasnafi al-alwan) and make 'accident' a name that embraces the various sorts of contingent entitative attributes (asndfu al-ma'dni al-muhdata). 'Generality' and 'particularity' refer to names, for there is no generality or particularity in a single entity (al-ddtu al-wahida). We hold that colors are not common at all {laysat mustarakatan aslan). A [particle of] black's being a color has no meaning (Id ma'na li-kawni alp. 214, 5 would seem to be correct in that there is nothing to indicate the contrary. Motion, however, is nowhere mentioned in the paragraph, wherefore one should perhaps read taganusi al-akwan..., since this would more precisely have presented the basic intention.) Al-Ansari, says (Gn, fol. 38r f.) "... fa-al-kawnu al-tani min ginsi alkawni al-awwali fa-inna hassiyyata al-kawni igabu tahassusi al-gawhari bimakanin... wa-ida awgaba al-kawnu al-tani ma awgaba al-kawnu al-awwalu fa-qad tabata tamatuluhuma," i.e., they all determine the atoms being in a particular location in space. This would seem perhaps to mean that some motions are essentially the same as some restings if at different times they determine one or several atoms being in one and the same place. 106 There is a lengthy discussion in Bagdad!, pp. 40ff., where he lists thirty classes (anwa1), but I have not noted such a discussion elsewhere. The numeration of alBagdadi here is not coherent since, with his usual sloppiness, he distinguishes simple belief (i'tiqad) from knowledge (p. 42, 2f.), but does not number it separately. Contrary to Mug, p. 17,13ff. (cited in n. 102 above and S.Ir, fol. 153r, 16), he also lists each mode of sense perception as a distinct class. One may note in this context that where the Mu'tazilites held knowing, error, opinion (the judgement that such and such is likely or may be the case) to be varieties of belief (sc, of assent to a proposition) the AS'arites distinguish them vas distinctly different accidents. In Bagdadi, p. 44, 8 read al-zann for al-nazar; cf. S.Ir, fol. 77v, 3ff. and Sam (69), pp. 99f (where on p. 99, 12, following wagh add al-dalalati yatadammanu al-gahla kama anna alnazara fi waghi with T.
211
sawadi lawnan) other than its being a [particle of] black, nor does [a particle of] white's being a color have any other than its being [a particle of] white. In a color there are not two ways of being a color (laysa fi al-lawni gihata lawniyya). Sharing in the noun 'color' has no precise meaning (al-istirdku fi ismi al-lawni laysa lahu tahqiqun),101 for 'color' in an unrestricted sense without any specification of what is particular - is unintelligible {al-lawnu al-mutlaqu... laysa ma'qulari). Indeed, it is a general expression (lafzun 'amm) that embraces a plurality of individuals while what actually belongs to each of these individuals is a particular characteristic (hazzu kulli wahidin minhd hdssiyya)... If they say that the general unity of colors in being color is an intelligible concept (igtimd'u al-alwani fi al-lawniyyati ma'nan ma'qul), we reply that being a color is not at all intelligible by itself and unspecified {'aid irsdlihd); it is understood in its true reality (tu'qalu 'aid haqiqatihd) only when we understand being black and being white and the like.188
Or, to put it another way:

The more particular and more general occur only in words. Generality and particularity are inconceivable in a single entity (Id yutasawwaru fihd). Being an accident and being a color belong to the convention of language and so also existence, for the existence of a [particle of] black does not belong to the existence of a [particle of] white insofar as the essential nature is concerned. (Gn, fol. 27v, If.; cp. also ibid., fol. 27r, Iff. and Tarn, pp. 233f.)
Similarly al-Guwayni says:

Particularity and generality have reality only in utterances (innamd yatahaqqaqdni fi al-aqwdl). A single expression (lafza) may be general or particular. Generality has no reality in the essential attributes of actual entities (Id tatahaqqaqu fi sifati al-anfusi qadiyyatu al-'umum), since the
107 By 'tahqiq' here he means a strict or precise sense as distinct from a loose or imprecise sense; cp. al-Baqillani's distinction of the use of an expression "'aid altahqiq" - its haqiqa strictly considered - as opposed to its use in a loose and imprecise sense ('ala al-magdz): Hidaya, fol. 147r, 14ff. 108 Gn, fol. 55r, 4ff. = S.Ir, fols. 39vff. Contrary, thus, to the doctrine of al-Guwayni and of al-Baqillani, the common AS'arite teaching is that 'being a color' (al-lawniyya) and the like are simply verbal expressions that of themselves do not signify ontologically distinct aspects or features of the Being of the entities of which they are said. AlGuwayni too says that as such names are said of beings only on the basis of linguistic convention (itilahan wa-tawqifan: Sam (69), p. 134, 14f.): "particularity and generality have reality only in verbal expressions (innamdyatahaqqaqdni fi al-aqwdl: ibid., pp. 305f.). Nonetheless, on the basis of his theory of "states" he holds that being a color is an ontologically real aspect of the being of every existent color (see generally ibid., pp. 292ff. and the very succinct discussion in S.Ir, fol. 39v, 9ff.). This is not explicitly discussed in the earlier AS'arite manuals that are available, perhaps simply because those that we have are all very elementary, though it may be that it became a topic of serious debate within the school only with al-Guwayni. There is a lengthy discussion of the varying degrees of generality and particularity of names and descriptions in Tarn, pp. 218f.
212
RICHARD M. FRANK
attribute of every Self belongs to it alone and does not extend to another (lazimatun lahu la tata'addahu ila gayrihi).109
Howbeit the available texts do not offer an adequately systematic presentation of how the majority of As'arite masters formally conceived classes and subclasses, certain basic facts are reasonably clear even from the somewhat limited data we have examined and can be briefly summarized. The case with units of the accident black is clear enough. Its particular characteristic (al-hdssiyya) is its essential nature (al-haqlqa) and this is, of every instance, its being a unit or particle of black. As such each one is identically the same (mumatil) as every other. Each is an accident and must exist in a single atom and could in principle have been created in any atom, given the absence of its like or contrary. And the same is true of cognitions, with the qualification that they can only exist in atoms in which there also exists a unit of the accident life. The individual's being existent and its being a color are not distinct from its actual reality in and insofar as it is a [particle of] black. The essential nature is common (gami'a) and so, in a proper sense, "shared" {mustarakun fihd) as it is the basis of their together constituting a basic class of contingent entities and of their "deserving" to be named by the noun 'black'. They are distinguished (tatamayyaza) as a class by their having, each one, the common essential nature, not by the name. The reality of the essential nature is the existence of the individual and has no real being apart from its individual instantiation; it "does not extend beyond it." General descriptions such as 'existent', 'accident', and 'color' do not, according to the common view, name ontologically distinct features or aspects of the individual instance of black. One may, in the case of cognitions, distinguish subclasses according to the sameness or difference of their content, but the nature of being a cognition is common and the basis of their constituting a basic class of contingent entities.110 ** *
109 Sam (69), pp. 305f. (with this cp. Gn, fol. 62v, 13f., translated above). 'Qadiyya' here is used as an equivalent to 'hukm'; tadadd is described as a qadiyya in Gn, fol. 17v, 10) while 'qadiyya' and 'hassiyya' are contextually employed as equivalents ibid., fols. 102v, 13 and 102r, 20 respectively. 110 Involved here is the correlation (ta'alluq) of every cognition to what is known. This, however, is a matter that involves a number of questions that will have to be taken up in another context. Because of the inadequacy of the available data it is not clear whether 'perception' is a general term like color so that each mode of sense perception (e.g., sight) is a basic or essential class like cognition, subclasses of which may
213
It will be appropriate to outline here, before we go on to consider the being of God and his essential attributes, the origin and sense of the word 'ma'nd ' as a formal term for what I have chosen to call entitative attributes, sc, those that as such are, or may be, described as themselves existent and so are held to be distinct (or at least distinguishable) from the Self (nafs, dot) of the being to which they belong. In the case of contingent beings, as we have seen, the expression means, in effect, an accident. Albeit there is more or less general agreement regarding what basically is meant by the term, the precise sense has not been clarified and there is little consensus on how it is best to be rendered.111 'Al-ma'na'', while in ordinary language properly and most commonly employed in the general sense of English 'meaning', is frequently used as a rather vague and general expression much like English 'something'. Thus, for example, the grammarian all Kissa'I, explaining that one may not omit the hamz of di'b\ ends by saying "and there's something else {wa-fihi ma'nan ahar): the hamz may not be omitted either in the singular or in the plural" and goes on to cite a verse of poetry to prove his point.112 That is, there's something else he had in mind and wished to say. It occurs again in a vague sense where al-As'ari says that Aristotle is quoted as saying, "the soul is something (ma'nan) too exalted to be subject to external influences and growth and decay and is imperishable" (Maq, p. 336, 2f.). Similarly, Aristotle is quoted (ibid, p. 337, 4) as saying that the soul is something other than the spirit (ma'nan gayru al-ruh).
be distinguished according to particular classes of objects or whether they took perception as an essential class, distinguishing subclasses of two levels. The former alternative would seem to be the more consistent with the general notion of essential attributes and specific characteristics. 111 Several scholars regularly translate 'ma'nd' by 'entity' (entite). It seems to me, however, that the rendering is not wholly suitable even though the ma'ani are considered entities (mawgudat, dawat). That is, the normal extension of 'entity' is far too broad for it to be appropriate here, since in these texts atoms are conceived as entities, at least in the normal sense of the word, and to stipulate (or simply to assume) a formal restriction that would exclude independent beings would do violence to its most basic sense. I have for a time now chosen to render 'ma'nd' generally by 'entitative attribute' since this seems rather precisely to render the technical sense of the word in this use and that is our primary concern. It also allows one to retain the implicit presence of the equivocal 'sifa' while specifying the distinction intended by 'ma'nd'. 112 Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b. Yusuf al-Qifti, Inbah al-ruwdt 'aid anbdt al-nuhdt, ed. M.A. Ibrahim, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1955-1973)1 vol. 3, p. 259.
214
RICHARD M. FRANK
In some places 'ma'na', as what is meant, has the sense of referent, as Ibn al-Sarrag says, "The noun is what signifies a single referent {ma'nan mufrad) and this referent may be a corporeal object (sahs) or a non-corporeal object, a corporeal object being 113 a man or a stone..." We have seen already a number of examples of the use of l ma'na' in the sense of accident, as where the accident is defined as a ma'na that resides in an atom (S.Ir, fol. 47v, 19, cited in n. 46 above). The A'arites' need for an expression such as 'ma'na' was due to the equivocity of 'sifa'. There is no ambiguity where al-Bagdadi (p. 33, 14f.) defines accidents as attributes {sifat) that reside in atoms, but in other places there is, most particularly in the expression 'sifatu nafs/daf when speaking of God's attributes. The use of 'ma'na' as a term for entitative attributes originates doubtless in an abridgement of the expression 'ma'nan zd'idun 'aid al-dat'. Al-Guwayni citing formulations of Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, quotes him as saying, "a sifatu al-nafs is every attribute to describe a being as having which refers to the Self of the being and not to something distinct from it and a sifatu al-ma'na is every attribute to describe a being as having which refers to something distinct from the Self, as in the case of 'knows', 'has power', and the like."114 Just as we saw in the case of 'is black' or 'moves', 'knows', is analysed as 'lahu 'ilmun' (a cognition belongs to him), and the cognition which is the referent of "ilmun' is distinct from that of the subject term of'<he> knows'. It would seem likely, thus, that the basic sense or connotation of 'ma'na' here - most conspicuously in the phrase 'ma'nan zd'idun 'aid al-ddt' - is that of referent or, if you will, of a "something" understood as the referent of one of the terms, whether explicit or implicit, of the proposition in question. This fits directly with the obvious role of the formal analysis of predicates borrowed from the grammarians that is employed to verify precisely what is implied or asserted in formal descriptions of independent entities and fits as well with the adaptation and use of other expressions taken originally from the grammarians
Usul 1, p. 36 and Idah, p. 50. Other examples of the word's use in the sense of referent are given in our "Meanings," pp. 272ff. 114 Sifatu al-nafsi kullu sifatin dalla al-wasfu biha 'aid al-ddti duna ma'nan za'idin 'alayhi wa-sifatu al-ma'na kullu sifatin dalla al-wasfu biha 'aid ma'nan zd'idin 'aid al-ddti ka-al-'dlimi wa-qddiri wa-nahwihimd: Sam (69), p. 308, 9ff., reading kullu sifatin for kullu wasfin with T in line 10.
113
215
and lexicographers such as 'wasf, 'sifa', 'haqiqa', etc., in ontological contexts. Thus it is, for example, that al-Guwayni says (Sam (69), p. 129, 18f.) that "the essential reality of an entity is to exist; existence is not something distinct from the entity (haqiqatu alddti al-wugudu wa-laysa al-wugudu ma'nan za'idan 'aid alddt). What is here understood by ' ma'nd' is altogether clear where al-Ansarl says (Gn, fol. 94v, 14) that continuance (albaqa') is "ma'nan zd'idun 'aid dati al-bdql" and (ibid., fol. 90r, 21) is "sifatun li-al-bdqi zd'idatun 'aid wugudihi." From this, then, 'ma'na' comes to be used alone as the unequivocal expression for an entitative attribute, as in the sentence, "What we mean in saying that something is an accident is that it is an entitative attribute that exists in an atom" (ma'na qawlihd innahu 'aradun annahu ma'nan qd'imun bi-al-gawhar: S.Ir, fol. 47v, 19). Parallel to the statement of al-Guwayni just cited, al-A'ari is reported to have said (Mug, p. 28, 9ff.), "An existent being does not require an entitative attribute by virtue of which it is existent in the way that what is in motion requires an entitative attribute by virtue of which it is in motion" (almawgudu... Idyaqtadi ma'nan bihiyakunu mawgudan... kamd yaqtadi al-mutaharriku ma'nan bihi yakunu mutaharrikan). From this, then, arose the expression ''ma'na attributes' (sifatu ma'nan, sifatun ma'nawiyya) where 'ma'nd' is employed as a qualifier in order to make the sense of 'sifa' unambiguously 115 clear. God too exists and therefore is properly termed a being (say'), an entity (ddt), and an existence (wugud). God is eternal. Albeit in one of his works al-As'ari followed Ibn Kullab in saying that God is eternal by virtue of a distinct attribute, i.e., through a
115 The background in the usage of earlier mutakallimun is, alas, not very clear as we have but few citations and one is never sure as to how exact they are in reflecting the original vocabulary and language of the individual cited. It is reported (M 6/2, p. 5, 6f., cited by van Ess in "Ibn Kullab und die mihna," Oriens 18/19 [1967]: 92-142, p. 116) that Sulayman b. Garir held "that God's will is a ma'nd that is neither God or other than God." Abu al-Hudayl is reported to have used 'ma'nd' to describe motion and rest (Muhit 1, p. 32, llf.) and also perception (M 5, p. 55, 15). It would certainly seem to have been used in the later formal sense by 'Abbad, as he is quoted (Maq p. 307, 6ff.) as distinguishing descriptions said of a being li-nafsihi and those (e.g., 'is in motion') said li-ma'nan and also to have used 'li-'illa' for the latter, something that is common with later writers. That al-Salihl also used the word in this sense
216
RICHAKD M. FRANK
being eternal (bi-qidam), in most of his works he followed his master, al-Gubba'I116 in saying that He is eternal per se and this is the universal opinion of his followers.117 Particular existences differ and God's existence is absolutely unique:
The Eternal differs per se from contingent beings and His Self is different from them and so too He is other than they per se and His Self is other than they (inna al-qadima muhalifun li-al-hawaditi li-nafsihi wa-nafsuhu hilafun laha wa-kadalika <huwa> gayrun laha li-nafsihi wa-nafsuhu gayrun laha: Mug, p. 215, 4f.).
"Things' being alike entails their sharing in all essential attributes (al-istirdku ft gami'i sifati al-nafs) and one essential attribute that contingent beings have of themselves (li-anfusiha) is coming/having come to be (al-hudut)" (al-Isfara'mi, p. 137, 16f.). Thus al-Guwayni says that contingent existence is a single truth that belongs to all contingent entities (al-hudutu haqiqatun wahidatun li-gami'i al-hawadit).118 As formulated the statement reflects the analysis of the Basrian grammarians, according to whose teaching descriptive forms (verbs, participles, etc.) are derived from the verbal noun or masdar that names the event or fact referred to or implied in the descriptive word or expression (cf., e.g., Iddh, pp. 56ff.). Coming/having come to be (al-hudut) is thus the ground ('ilia) or Meaning (ma'nd) and so the truth (haqiqa) of the predicate 'comes/came to be' (hadit) and so also of
would seem clear enough from the report in Maq, p. 396, 3ff. Prof, van Ess called my attention to the report (Maq, p. 496, 9) that Ibn Kullab "said that God is an other unlike others but would not say that He (it?) is a ma'nd " (wa-la yaqulu innahu ma'nan). The sense of the first proposition is clear enough, but the second, is not clear at all. One is tempted to read this along with the statement attributed to unnamed Mu'tazilites (Maq, p. 181, 6f.) who hold that "God is per se a being unlike beings but one does not say that He is other by an otherness (li-gayriyya)." To take the pronoun of 'innahu ma'nan' in the statement attributed to Ibn Kullab as referring implicitly to something like "God's being other" may seem somewhat questionable, however, given the way the report is cast, but does at least offer plausible sense. (One might, on the other hand, read li-ma'nan for ma'nan, again taking the pronoun to refer to God's being other, but no such variant is listed.) This interpretation would seem to gain some support from al-A'ari's report (Maq, p. 178, 6f., cited by van Ess, op. cit., p. 122) that some of Ibn Kullab's followers said that God's being God (alilahiyya) is a ma'na, while others denied it. Cp. their analogous disagreement (cited Maq, pp. 170, 4f. and 547, Iff.) on the question of whether God is or is not eternal by virtue of "a being eternal" (bi-qidam). 116 Cf, e.g., Abu Muhammad b. Mankdim, Ta'liq 'ala Sarh al-Usul al-hamsa, ed. A. 'Utman under the title, Sarh al-Usul al-Hamsa (Cairo, 1965), p. 182, 13f. 117 Cf., e.g., Mug, pp. 28, 13ff. and 326, 8ff. and al-Bagdadi, p. 90, 7f. 118 Sam (69), p. 329, 8f, where with T read wuguh for al-wuguh in line 7 and bal for the editor's <li-anna> and li-gami'i for <yahtassu> bi-gami'i in line 8.
217
'is a contingent entity' (muhdat). For the mutakallimun, however, the assertion is not simply lexical, for the essential truth (haqiqa) of any being is its existencevand is not distinct from the particular entity, its Self (cf., e.g., Sam (69), p. 129, 18f., cited above), wherefore 'hadit I muhdaf is said of contingent beings as such (li-al-nafs): they are per se contingent entities. And one recalls here that the coming to be of a contingent entity (hudutuhu) is its being created, its being caused to come to be, which is God's act of creating it. Unlike contingent beings, God exists necessarily (cf., e.g., Luma' (A), p. 18,17 and S.Ir, fol. 9v f.). His existence is unique in that His non-existence is impossible (mustahil).119 Classes are constituted by pluralities of Beings (existences) that, having the same true natures (haqa'iq), are essentially alike. Likeness, however, occurs only between contingent entities (al-tamdtulu layaqa'u Hid bayna al-muhdatat: Mug, p. 214, 7f.), as they are, all of them, per se contingent entities (muhdatdtun li-anfusihd). God belongs to no class (laysa bi-di gins: e.g., Luma' (A), p. 32, 5f. and Gn, Ms. 29r, 19f. and 32v, 14f.). Similarly, al-Baqillani says with regard to the question 'What is God?', "If by 'what is He?' you mean to what class does He belong (md ginsuhu), He has no class (fa-laysa bi-di ginsin)."120 So it is that "even though God is described as a being (bi-kawnihi say'an) one may not say 'He is a being' or 'is one among beings' (innahu ahadu al-asyd'i aw-say'un min al-asyd'), for that is to designate a class and to assert similarity" (Sam (69), p. 348,16f.). "God is a being unlike beings" (say'un Id ka-al-asyd', e.g., Ta'wil, fol. l l l v , 10 and 14, and Baydn (H), p. 16, If.). 'Being' (say'), therefore, though it is a designation for every existent (simatun li-kulli mawgud: Ta'wil, fol. l l l v , 15), is not said univocally of God and of contingent entities. Used of contingent beings it names a universal class, but God's Being - His Self/
Cf., e.g., Tqgr, p. 82, 13f. (=35, 14f.), Luma' (A), p. 17, 9ff., al-Isfara'Im, 'Aqida, p. 138, 17, and Sam (69), p. 186, ult. 120 Tarn, p. 263, 15f.; cf. also ibid., pp. 193f., cited in n. 30 above and cp. Qusayri, Risdla 1, p. 66. Cf. also the citation of Khalil b. Ahmad in Th.u.G 2, p. 223 and see our "Elements in the development of the teaching of al-AS'ari," Le Museon, 104 (1991): 141-90, p. 157, n. 40. Ibn Furak reports (Mug, p. 66, 14) that al-As'ari said of God that He is the only possible member of His class: inna al-qadima al-azaliyya fi naw 'ihi la yaguzu an yakuna aktara min wahid. This seems initially to be inconsistent with what he explicitly says in Luma' (A). The context here in Mug, however, is that each of God's essential attributes is one and unique, as He cannot have two speakings, two knowings, etc., whence the use of 'naw", though loose or metaphorical, is not wholly out of place.
119
218
RICHAED M. FRANK
existence - is unique, belonging to no class of beings. Considered as "the most universal of positive nouns" (Mug, p. 252, cited above), 'say", like 'mawgud', is unequivocal and does not name a class. Al-Baqillani says (Insaf, pp. 72f.) regarding God's being termed a being, however, "if you mean by 'He is a being' that He exists and has actuality in being (innahu mawgudun tdbit), that is alright; but if you mean that he is a being like beings in that He comes forth from non-existence like beings that exist after nonexistence, this we will not say." When God's Being is considered, the univocity of 'being/ existent' must be qualified. As we saw earlier, God is commonly described as an "independent entity" (qd'imun bi-al-nafs). In its basic sense "an independent entity is an existent being which has no need of a subject in whichto exist" (al-mawgudu al-mustagnl 'an mahallin yaqumu bihi: Sam (69), p. 573, 3f.; cf. also ibid., p. 526, 7 and concerning the expression see also n. 38 above). 'Independent entity' is not said univocally of the atom and of God, however, for God's Being is such that He exists in no location or volume of space (cf., e.g., S.Ir, fol. 160r, 12ff., citing al-Isfara'ini, and Baydn (H), p. 119, llf.). He is an independent entity in the sense that
He requires no substrate and no place and no particular determination nor has He any kind of need: He transcends spaces and locations and limits and physical characteristics (istigna'uhu 'an al-mahalli wa-'an al-tahslsi wa-'an gumlati al-hagati wa-huwa bi-ta'alihi muqaddasun 'an al-ahyazi wa-alnihayati wa-al-kayfiyya).121
The statement here is made directly against the notion that God is a kind of material entity that exists somehow in space. This is spelled out in the second sentence, where volume, location, limit, and configuration (kayfiyya) are specifically denied.122 The
m Gn, fol. 18v, 4f.; cf. also ibid., fol. 36v, ult. and al-Isfara'Ini, p. 134, 13 and cp. v Sam (69), pp. 573f., where al-Isfara'Ini is cited. Note that while as a technical term 'mahall' is used as a name for the subject or substrate of an accident or entitative attribute (e.g., Mug, p. 246, 17ff), it also occurs occasionally in its ordinary meaning of the place or location where one stops or resides, as "it is impossible that two atoms be in a single mahall" since no two entities belonging to a single class can reside in one and the same mahall simultaneously" (Mug, p. 207, lOff.). 122 Al-As'ari (Mug, p. 82, lOf.) defines al-kayfiyya as "a class (naw') of accidents, viz., composition [of parts] and physical appearance (tarkibun wa-hay'a), something which is characteristic of created beings;" cf. also, e.g., Insaf, p. 29, 2ff. and alQusayri, al-Luma' fi l-i'tiqad, ed. R.M. Frank in MIDEO, 15 (1982): 59-73, at p. 60, 19f. This lexical understanding of 'kayf is found already with al-Khalil b. Ahmad (cf. Th.u.G 2, p. 223). Concerning the As'arite analysis, see our "Elements in the development of the teaching of al-As'ari," pp. 154ff. and "The science of Kalam," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 2 (1992): 7-37, pp. 24f.
219
implications of the term 'particular determination' (tahsis) in the first sentence are far more general however. On one level it denies the presence of accidents in God, first of any of the akwdn, sc. of those accidents which determine (tuhassis) the individual atom's specific location in space (cf., e.g., the definition in Ir, p. 17, lOff, and also Sam (69), pp. 157, 2f., 198, 9f, et alibi). Moreover, the existence of a particular accident in a given atom is specifically determined by an agent (e.g., Sam (69), p. 175, 4ff.). The actuality of any contingent entity or state of affairs is determined by the choice of an agent (cf., e.g., ibid.) and the act of determining (al-tahsls) is the act of the will of the agent who causes it to occur precisely when and as it does (ibid., 123 p. 270, 12f.). Its being specifically determined (al-tahsls) evidences the act of the agent's will, its coming to be (al-hudut), His power, and its being well-done (al-itqan), His knowledge (Sam (81), p. 66, 12f. and (69), p. 522, 12f.). God's Being is eternally necessary and the actuality of what is necessary does not depend on the determination of an agent.124 So, for example, whereas a human cognition has, through the determination of God's will, one rather than another object, God's knowledge being infinite and necessary is not specifically determined and therefore needs nothing to give it specification (Id yufradu fihi ihtisdsun fa-Id yaftaqiru ila muhassis: Gn, fol. 68v, 12f.; cf. also ibid., fol. 64r, 13f., where al-Isfara'ml is cited). In some works al-A'ari asserted that
of created beings one does not say 'they are independent beings' because there is no being that exists of itself save God (the exalted); created beings
123 Cp. S.Ir, fol. 27v, llff.: wa-min ashabina man qala al-fi'luyadullu 'aid qasdi alfa'ili wa-iradatihi, fa-inna al-ga'iza tubutuhu wa-intifa'uhu layahtassu bi-al-tubuti badalan min al-intifa'i al-mugawwazi Hid bi-muhassisin qasidin ila iqa'ihi (omitting al-gd'iz after tubutuhu and reading min al-intifd'i for min intifd'i). Thus one says that it is impossible that a contingent entity come to be without the one who determines its existence to a specific time and location (istihalatu al-huduti duna almuhassisi ma'lum: Sam (69), p. 541, 4). Concerning the will and intention of the agent (creator), see Sam (81), p. 66, 12f., (69), pp. 270, 12ff. and 273, 12ff. (citing alAs'ari) and 541, 2, (citing al-Baqillani). 124 Sam (69), p. 269, 5, reading bi-fd'ilin muhassis for bi-al-fd'ili wa-al-muhassis. In the same general passage read wagaba (with T) for ywgb on p. 268, 17; on p. 269 add ga'iz before aytfan in line 12 with T and tahaqquq with T and K following iltazamtum in line 16 and read yatahaqqaq with T for yata'allaq in the last line; on p. 270, T reads al-'adam for al-ma'dum in the first line and both T and K add Id following lima in line 11 and T contains the kawna inserted by the editor in line 14.
220
RICHARD M. FRANK
are because of the one who has made them be, continue in existence because of the one who has made them continue in existence, who brought them forth and made them exist (la qa'ima bi-nafsihi ilia Allahu ta'ala wa-inna al-muhdatati qa'imatun bi-man aqamaha bdqiyatun bi-man abqaha waansa'aha, wa-awgadaha: Mug, p. 29, 5f.; cp. ibid., 43, 6ff. and also pp. 28f., translated above).
Qdma, yaqumu is here taken as meaning simply to be or exist.125 Atoms are not truly independent; they do not exist of and by themselves. Thus, while 'independent being' is commonly employed in a general sense of a being whose existence requires no substrate, used of God it means that He is "the independent being in the strict and proper sense {al-qa'imu bi-al-nafsi 'aid al-haqiqa), other than whom there is no independent being... and [this] 126 is preferred by the Master [Abu Ishaq alIsfara'ini]." If this sense of the word is taken as primary, then, it will be said of atoms only in an extended sense (tawassu'an: Gn, fol. 14r, 8ff.).127 God "is neither within the world nor outside it" (S.Ir, fol. 160, 14f.). So too He is described as eternal (qadim), which is to say
125 p o r (.jjg u s e o f tjj e v e r b m j-jjjg s e n s e by the Mutakallimun, cf., e.g., Sam (69), pp. 141, 11 and 199, 5f.: Id ma'nd li-qiyami al-'aradi bi-al-gawhari ilia anyugada bihaytu wugudi al-gawhar. Though he sometimes employed the expression, al-As'ari generally refused to say 'al-'aradu qa'imun bi-al-gawhar' or 'al-sifatu qa'imatun bial-mawsuf (cf. Mug, 213, If.), preferring the use of 'mawgud' (ibid., p. 29, 7ff. and 265, 2ff.). Similarly, he disapproved of the use of 'halla ft' to speak of the accident's being in the atom, on the grounds that 'hulul' is synonymous with 'sukun' and therefore is properly used of something's occupying a place (makdn), whence is it most properly said of the atom and only in an extended sense of the accident's existence in the atom (ibid., p. 212, 14ff.). It is thus appropriately rendered by 'reside' or 'exist' as may seem most suitable in terms of the particular context. One should note concerning al-As'ari's use of 'qdma bi-' that reports given by later authors tend in many, if not most cases, to present his position ad sensum rather than verbatim.
126
Al-Isfara'ini, Fr. # 2 6 , where for 'Imhs at p. 150, 8, read al-muhassis;
cp. Sam
(81), p. 65, 20ff., (69), pp. 423, 8f. and 573^ 20ff., and al-Mutawalli, pp. 20f!
127
In some disputational contexts al-As'ari denied that 'qa'imun bi-al-nafs' may be
used of God (cf., Mug, pp. 29, 3f. and 43, 6f.) and is reported to have asserted in analogous contexts that the expression has no strict or proper meaning (haqiqa) either with reference to contingent entities or to the transcendent (cf. Sam (69), pp. 423, 9ff. and 574, 13f.). Much of this is directed against the use of 'gawhar' by Christians (cf., e.g., Tarn, pp. 75ff. and Sam (69), pp. 524ff. and 571ff). Al-Guwayni acknowledges the Christians' claim that in their use the word is equivalent to Greek ouaia not to Arabic 'gawhar' as the latter is normally used and understood by the mutakallimun, but he nevertheless refuses to allow the validity of their use (ibid., p. 572, 13ff.; cp. Ir, pp. 46f.). It is possible that al-Guwayni may also have had the philosophers in mind in this polemic (v. Avicenna's view, cited in n. 38 above). All this is, in any case, but disputational dialectic that is basically irrelevant to the normal use and sense of the expression.
221
yunasibu al-mutandhi: ibid., fol. 20r, 3).130
that in His existence He is "without limit or temporal extension anterior to everything that has existed through a coming to be" (annahu mutaqaddimun bi-wugudihi 'aid kulli md wugida bial-huduti bi-gayri gdyati wa-ld mudda: Mug, p. 42, 19f.); "His existence has neither temporal extension nor duration; it is not subject to intervals of time" {laysa li-wugudihi imtidddun wa-ld istimrdrun wa-ld yahinu 'alayhi al-ahydn: Gn, fol. 19r, 22).128 Its having any bound or limit is logically impossible (mustahll), since limitation implies one 129 discrete quantum or more of magnitude or of time or of both. There is no temporal or spatial relation between God and contingent entities, "for that which makes it possible to speak of temporal and spatial relations is finitude" (la nisbata bayna al-qadimi wa-al-hdditi bi-al-zamdni wa-al-makdni id al-musahhihu li-qawlin bi-al-ansdbi al-tandhi: Gn, fol. 19v, 23f.) and whatever is infinite in its essential Being is not related to what is finite (ma la nihdyata li-ddtihi Id God is in every respect infinite, without limit:
He is infinite in His Being in the sense of the negation of spatial position and localization; He is infinite in His existence in the sense of the negation of his having a beginning, for He is eternal without beginning or end and perdures forever (azaliyyun abadiyyun samad).lsl So also His essential attributes are
Cf. also ibid., fol. 106r f. and also fol. 19v, 4: ida lam yakun li-wugudihi muftatahun fa-la yu'qalu fihi al-tandhi wa-al-imtidad. Cf. also Mug, p. 239, 16ff., translated below. This thesis is significant also in that it applies also to God's foreknowledge of what with respect to our now was and what is and what is to be. 129 Al-Isfara'ini, p. 137, 18: al-dalilu 'aid istihdlati al-haddi wa-al-nihdyati 'alayhi anna al-nihdyata tugibu miqddra al-guz'i fa-md fawqahu. I have rendered 'guz" here by 'discrete quantum of magnitude' in order to allow for instants of time as well as "particles" of accidents and atoms. Cp. Baydn (K), p. 19, lOff. 130 Cp. Gn, fol. 32v, 14f.: al-muqtadi li-al-ansdbi al-nihdydtu wa-man Id niydyata lahu fi ddtihi wa-ld fl wugudihi Id yunasibu al-mutandhiya fi al-makdni wa-alzamdni wa-man Id haytu lahu Id yunasibu md lahu hayt (omitting the waw following wugudihi in line 14). What is meant when we speak of an instant or moment of time (waqt) is a number of events, sc, of created realities, that exist simultaneously (cf., e.g., Ir, pp. 32f.). Thus there is for creatures (for us) a now and a before, but all created entities are, for God, immediately present in the actuality of their Being (cf., e.g., Gn, fol. 67r, 6ff.). Note that the use of 'hayt' in Gn, fol. 32v, 15, makes it clear that, though it has no position in space (giha) or place (makdn), the accident has "locus" as it exists in the locus of the atom (cf., e.g., Sam (69) pp. 185, 18f. and 199, 5, and Gn, fol. 18v, 6, cited above in n. 71 above). With this, cp. the phrase "al-makdnu waal-haytiyya": Gn, fols. 33r, 4f., translated immediately below. 131 The same phrase is found also at Gn, fol. 73r, 5. Various interpretations are given for 'samad' (whose meaning in al-Qur'dn 112.2 was a mystery to the lexicographers). Though not offered by the lexicographers (it is not given, e.g., Istiqaq, pp. 441ff.) 'who perdures' or 'who perdures forever' is found, e.g., in Ta'wil, fol. 115v,
128
222
RICHARD M. FRANK
infinite in their Being, since they belong uniquely to a being that is infinite and are infinite in their existence because their being eternal is necessary and so also they are infinite in the objects to which they are correlated, since His knowledge is correlated to an infinity of objects and so also his power...: Gn, fol. 33r, 4ff.; cp. Sam (69), p. 534, 5f.).
God's Being can be neither depicted by thought nor grasped by understanding (Id yusawwiruhu al-wahmu wa-la yuqaddiruhu al-fahm).132 That God must have ontologically distinct attributes of life, knowledge, will, power, etc., which are analogous to the entitative attributes that occur as accidents in contingent beings, is known "by reasoning from what is phenomenally given to our observation to what is hidden from it."133 These are termed "essential attributes," for
God's existence cannot be conceived apart from His essential attributes, not because they are attributes of His Self, but because they exist necessarily as His (wugudu al-ilahi la yu 'qalu duna sifati datihi la li-kawnihd min sifati ddtihi bal li-wugubi wugudiha lahu: Gn, fol. 25r, 9f.).
That is to say, because God's "essential attributes" are complements of His Self, their existence is necessary. His Self can be
12f.; it is the first interpretation given in Tahblr (fol. 109v, 13f. = p. 80) and is plainly intended in the present context, where the word may perhaps stand last as a term that combines the first two. It is commonly employed by al-Quayri (e.g., Lata'if 1, pp. 57, 129, et alibi), but is not given by al-Guwayni in Ir (p. 145). Maqayis, as usual, gives only the established basic meanings, saying that there are two stems; one meaning al-qasd and the other al-salabatu fi al-say'. The latter serves as the base of one commonly accepted meaning of 'samad' as it occurs in al-Qur'an (112.2) that is followed, e.g., by al-Isfara'inl (p. 134, 7f.), while the former is the base for the more commonly accepted interpretation, given in al-Gawhari (s.v.) which is followed, e.g., by al-Zaggagi (Istiqaq, p. 441). Al-Guwayni (Ir, p. 154), along with other AS'arites, gives but the usual lexical definitions. On this see generally Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 320ff. 132 Al-Quayri, al-Luma' fi l-i'tiqad, p. 61, 18f. This is quite common with A&'arite theologians (cf., e.g., Insaf, p. 42, 17ff, al-Isfara'Ini, p. 133, 16f., and Gn, fols. 32v f. and 65r, 8), even though they hold that certain aspects of His Being are accessible to the mind through rational inference (ma'qulu al-dalili gayr mawhumin wa-la muqaddar: Gn, fol. 32r, 20). For the sense of 'wahm' as thought, cf, e.g., Isfara'ini, p. 136, 22f and Ta'wil, fol. 115r, margin. In Gn, fol. 29r, 14 one reads Id yusawwiruhu wahmun wa-la yuqaddiruhu fikr. 133 M-istidlalu bi-al-sdhidi 'aid al-gd'ib: Mug, p. 14, 7ff.; cf. also ibid., pp 69, 7f. and 286, 13ff. and Sirazi, p. 21, 9ff. For a detailed discussion of the matter along with the conditions and methods of such reasoning, cf, e.g., Sam (81), pp. 63ff. It is on this basis that one says that the existence of created entities manifests God's will, power, and knowledge (e.g. ibid., p. 66, cited above). The possibility of such reasoning is grounded in the haqd'iq of names and descriptions; on this see below.
j | j
223
abstractly considered and defined as the necessarily existent (alwagibu al-wugud, al-mustahilu 'adamuhu) apart from His life, power, etc., but given the fact that these attributes are complements of His necessarily existent Self (nafs, dot), His Being can134 not be rightly conceived apart from them. Since God's essential attributes exist, they are termed "beings."
Our leading authorities are agreed in allowing the formula 'God's knowledge and His existence [i.e., His Self] are two existent beings (say'dni mawgudan)' and so also one may describe His knowledge and power and all His essential attributes as beings.135
His attributes are, thus, denumerable as such. That is to say, though one may not number God amongst other beings, since to do so would imply that He belongs to some class of beings to which He is similar (tagnisun wa-tamtil) and also because this is a usage that is not sanctioned by the revelation, al-As'ari and others allow that His attributes may be counted.136 Although considered in itself as such, God's Self is without any conceivable division, His essential attributes can nevertheless be distinguished from His Self and from one another. God's attributes exist together with His Self (al-Mutawalli, p. 31, 7f.). "It is impossible that any of these attributes have come to be" (inna say'an min hadihi al-sifati la yasihhu an yakuna muhdatan: Tagr, p. 94, 12 = 67f.); they are "eternal by His being eternal and exist by His existence" (qadlmatun biqidamihi wa-mawgudun bi-wugudihl: Insdf, pp. 73, 9 and 80, 12f.) and continue in existence through His continuance in existence (Mug, p. 43, Iff.). Although distinguishable from His Self and from each other, God's essential attributes, unlike the entitative attributes of creatures, are not other than He, for to be
These attributes are described as some of (or among) His essential attributes (min sifati ddtihi), because they are distinct from (za'idatun 'aid) His existence, which is the primary attribute of His Self, The essential attribute, if you will. 135 S.Ir, fol. 68r, 4ff; cp. Gn, fol 65v, 2ff. and also, e.g., Mug, pp. 66, 8 and 194, 13f. and Iht, fol. 6r f. 136 Cf., e.g., Mug, p. 58, 4ff. and Sam (69), p. 351, 8f., citing al-Baqillani, where with T read tamdniya for nihdya in line 9; cp. Gn, fol. 64v, 9. Concerning its not being sanctioned by the revelation, cf. Sam (69), p. 350, 7ff., where with T read bi-al-'adad for bl'd in line 7, yumdtil for yugdnis in line 8, add fa-yu'adda minhd following alma'duddt in line 9, and read wa-raddada for wrd in line 13; see generally pp. 350f., where with T add ahaduhumd anna following ma'nayayn at p. 350, 2 and read sifati Alldhi subhdnahu asyd'u for al-$ifdti laysat in line 6; the argument cited from alIsfara'ini (pp. 350f.) makes there no sense in the reading of the printed text. Cf. also Luma' (A), p. 32, 5f.
134
224
RICHARD M. FRANK
other is to be in some way separate or separable from what is other (e.g., Luma' (A), pp. 12f.); that is, one or both may exist without the other (cf., e.g., Mug, p. 40, Iff., and Tarn, 357). It is impossible, however, that God's attributes be separable from Him in any way whatsoever, since their being separable is something that would imply His being a contingent entity and His not being God.137 Accordingly, one does not say of God's attributes either that they are He or that they are other than He {Mug, p. 38, 20, Insdf, pp. 25f., al-Mutawalli, p. 31, 5ff., and Gn, fols. 65r, 17ff. and 96r, 6ff.). In the formulation of al-Isfara'ini, "one says neither 'they are He and are not other than He' nor 'they are not He and are other than He'" ('Aqida, p. 134, 2; cf. also, ibid., p. 138, 23ff., Ir, p. 137, 5ff., Gn, fol. 96r, 6ff., and alBayhaqi, Asmd', p. I l l , 2f.). And "as one does not say that His attributes are other than He and does not say that they are He, so also, since the two negations cannot be joined, one does not say 'they are not He and are not other than He' (... wa-ld yuqdlu laysat hiya huwa wa-laysat gayrahu)."138 Nor can one say that God's attributes differ from Him, for to say, e.g., that His knowledge is different from Him {muhdlifun lahu) implies not only that it is other than He, but also "that it belongs to one class and God belongs to a different one." On the contrary, God and His attributes are not distinct as are members of two different classes of contingent entities (i.e., as are an atom and accident that resides in it) and neither are they different or the same (laysd bi-ginsayni wa-ld muhtalifayni wa-ld muttafiqayn).139 So too, though God's attributes may be said to differ one from another in some instances (Sam (69), p. 331, lOff., citing al-Baqillani, and Ir, p. 137 11 and Gn, fols. 28v f., both citing al-Isfara'ini; cf. also Hiddya, fols. 128v f.), they are not said to be other to one another or different or the same (agydrun aw137 Tagr, pp. 95f. (= 70, 12f.): ... li-anna mufaraqataha ma yugibu hudutahu wahurugahu 'an al-ilahiyya (where read gayriyya for gayruhu at p. 96, 1 and add lahu following mufaraqataha at 96, 2; and read nafs for tafsir at 96, 3 of the Istanbul edition and tagyir at 70, 14 of the Cairo edition and mimma for lm' in the following line of both editions). Cf. also Luma' (A), loc. cit. 138 Gn, fol. 65r, 19f., citing al-As'ari; cf. also Iht, fol. 66r, 14ff. The double formulations of al-Isfara'ini are significant from a logical point of view, albeit he is cited by al-Harasi (fols. 128v f.) as saying that the argument is chiefly over words; see the general discussion ibid., fols. 128r ff. 139 Tarn, p. 211, 7ff., reading wa-ld followingginsayn in line 14 with the variant; on the use of 'muttaftq' see the discussion of the question in Sam (69), pp. 330ff.

140
225
muhtalifatun aw-muttafiqa: Mug, p. 40, 7f. It is thus that God is not an object that can be imagined or conceptually grasped by understanding. One sees here why, in Mug, pp. 28f. (translated above), al-As'ari divides existent entities into those that are independent beings (God's Self and the spatially extended atoms) and "those that require a substrate or something to which they are related" in order to avoid the formula "those that exist in another," since the 'another' of the latter would, in the context, imply that God's essential attributes, are other than He.141 There are problems that arise concerning God's "continuing to exist." That is, had the As'arites to deal only with 'eternal' as an exact and proper description of God's Being (His Self) and His attributes, things would have been easier. 'Continues/remains' (baqiya, yabqa, baqa'an) occurs in the Koran, however, not only as a description of created beings (e.g., 26, 120) but more importantly as a description of God (55, 16), and so must be dealt with as one of the revealed "beautiful names." As we have already seen in the discussion of accidents, some AS'arite masters, most notably al-Mutawalli and al-Guwayni asserted that to continue in existence (al-baqa') is simply the continuance of existence (istimrdru al-wugud), and this is the position preferred by alBaqillani with respect to God's baqa', in good part because of difficulties concerning the eternity of God's essential attributes if one takes the position that it is an entitative attribute (cf., e.g., Gn, fol. 92r, 7ff. and cp. Sam (69), pp. 428f.).142
Cf. also ibid. p. 58, 4ff. and Gn, fol. 65r, 17, Tarn, p. 211 and Insaf, p. 39, 7f. (inna sifati datihi laysat bi-agyarin lahu wa-ld huwa gayrun li-sifatihi wa-ld sifatuhu mutagayiratun ft anfusiha). A similar formulation is given by Abu al-Qasim alQusayri, in al-Mu'tamad, MS Murat Buhan, no. 210, fol. 74r, 10f.: ... Id agydrun lahu wa-ld fi anfusiha mutagdyira. 141 This is not the case with the 'gayrihi' of yaqtadi md yata'allaqu bihi min mahallin aw-gayrihi (Mug, p. 28, discussed above), since the '-hi' of 'aw-gayrihi' here refers to 'mahallin'. Cf. also ibid., p. 29, 9f., where employing 'sifa' as a general term used either for God's attributes or for accidents, sc, the entitative attributes of creatures, he says al-sifatu mawgudatun bi-al-mawsufi bihd. Cf. also Tarn, pp. 259f. 142 In Tarn (p. 263, 7ff.), which, as we have noted, is a quite elementary and so standard AS'arite handbook, he asserts the more common thesis. The divisions of the school concerning God's baqa' seem in some degree to parallel those concerning His face (e.g., in al-Qur'dn 55.15f.: "All who are on the earth shall perish; the face of your Lord, glorious and majestic, perdures..."). Abu al-Hasan al-Tabari says (Ta'wll, fol. 127v, 7ff.) that "the face of a being is the being itself (waghu al-say'i huwa <huwa> bi-'aynihi) and so also al-Baqillani, using 'ddt' rather than "ayn' (Insdf, p, 38, If.), while in an equivalent formulation al-Guwayni says that 'face' here means existence
140
226
RICHARD M. FRANK
The main problem with taking al-baqd' as an entitative attribute arises because of difficulties in maintaining certain consistencies in the general conception of entitative attributes and their relation to the independent beings in which they have their existence and to one another within the single subject. There is a problem, that is to say, concerning the eternal existence of God's other essential attributes (His sifdt ma'nawiyya), life, knowledge, &c, that does not arise concerning accidents that reside in one and the same atom, since by their very nature none of the latter can exist for more than a single instant. It is thus that al-Mutawalli argues (p. 31, 12ff.) that were al-baqd' an entitative accident distinct from the particular existence that continues to exist (ma'nan zd'idun 'aid al-wugudi al-mustamirr), God's essential attributes could not continue to exist. According to al-A'ari "what continues to exist is that which continues to exist by a continuance which resides in its Self (yaqumu bi-ddtihi); the Creator (be He praised) continues to exist by a continuance that resides in his Self (bi-baqd'in yaqumu bi-ddtihi) whereas his attributes continue to exist by God's continuance (be He praised)" (Gn, fol. 90v, 5ff.; cp. ibid., fol. 62v, 22f.) Or, according to the report of al-Harasi (fol. 142r, 7ff.), he said.
For my part, I hold that the attributes of God (the exalted) continue to exist by the continuance of His Self. The Self continues to exist by a continuance which resides in it, viz., an entitative attribute which is distinct from it, while the attributes continue to exist through the continuance of the Self. (and aqulu inna sifati Allahi ta'ala baqiyatun bi-baqa'i al-dati wa-al-datu baqiyatun bi-baqd'in qdma bihd huwa ma'nan zd'idun 'alayhd wa-al-sifdtu baqiyatun bi-baqa'i al-dat).
(Ir, p. 155, 14f.; cf. also ibid., p. 157, 9ff.). Ibn Furak, by contrast, says (Bayan (H), p. 172,18f.) that "our fellows take the position that God has a face and the face is one of His attributes that exist in His Self (sifatun min sifatihi al-qa'imati bi-datihi)" and, having rejected the thesis that 'wagh' means the Self or existence of a being (ibid., pp. 172f., where V adds hadd waghu al-tariq following bi-qawlihim at p. 172, 14), asserts (p. 222, 5ff., where V adds huwa after alladi and correctly lacks al-tani in 1. 7) that there is no lexical basis for the thesis that 'face' means dot. Al-As'ari's position on this seems to have been somewhat inconsistent. Al-Guwaynl says (Iht, fol. 125v, 6) that "the sounder of his two responses (asahhu gawdbayhi) concerning the face is that it is the dat," while al-Ansari reports (Gn, fols. 99v f.) that of his two positions the predominant one (azharu qawlayhi) is that it is an attribute distinct from existence (sifatun za'idatun 'aid. al-wugud)." Al-QuSayri seems to attempt an intermediate position in Lata'if 5, p. 85 (ad al-Qur'an 28.88) and 6, p. 76, 5ff. (ad alQur'an 55.26f.).
227
In order to clarify the sense of continuance in existence where the referent is the timeless eternity of God's existence, al-As'ari
rejected the assertion of those who hold that the meaning of 'al-baqV is that over which pass two moments of time (ma ata 'alayhi waqtan), saying that, were this true it would be logically impossible to describe anything as continuing to exist other than that over which pass moments of time and this would make it logically impossible that God continue to exist (wa-ddlika yuhilu kawna al-bdri'i baqiyan).143
Since, however, continuance in existence is considered by most As'arites to be an entitative attribute distinct from the Self or essential Being of the entity that continues to exist,144 there is a problem concerning God's attributes of life, knowledge, &c, because entitative attributes as such must exist in independent entities and so, not being independent entities, cannot themselves be subjects of the existence of entitative attributes.
Al-As'ari distinguished between al-baqd' and attributes such as knowledge and the power of voluntary action and other entitative attributes which have contraries, and held that a condition [of the existence] of the latter is that they exist in the subject that is qualified by them (qiydmuhd bi-al-mawsufi bihd)... but he did not hold it to be a condition of al-baqd' that it exist in that which continues to exist, since continuance in existence has no contrary {li-anna albaqd'a la didda lahu): Gn, fol. 92v, 2ff.; cp. Mug, p. 239, cited in n. 78 above).
God's continuance, he holds, continues to exist per se (inna baqa'ahu baqin bi-nafsihi: Mug, pp. 326f.) or in the formulation of al-Isfara'Inl (cited in Gn, fol. 98, 8f.) "the Creator's attributes continue by His continuance and His continuance continues by a continuance which is its Self {sifatu al-bdri'i baqiyatun bibaqa'in wa-baqa'uhu baqin bi-baqd'in huwa nafsuhu). This is explained elsewhere in the following terms:
Mug, p. 239, 16ff. With this cp. Istiqdq, p. 347, where he says that predicated of any being other than God, 'al-baqi' has always an explicit or implicit reference to a limited period of time, wherefore it is said truly of God and only metaphorically (magazan) of creatures. Concerning the association of contingent existence with intervals or periods of time, cf, e.g., Gn, fol. 19v, 21ff. 144 Cf. Gn, fols. 90r, 21 and 94v, 14, cited above. In Sir, fol. 35r, 14f. he says that this is the common view of the school save for al-Baqillani. Regarding the thesis that baqd' is an entitative attribute it is interesting to note that al-Qusayri at the beginning of his discussion of 'The Living' as one of God's Beautiful Names (Tahbir, p. 76) says, "His life is one of His essential attributes and is distinct from His baqa'." This seems curious at first, but lexically life is defined as the opposite of death (e.g. Maqayis and Istiqdq, p. 168) and on this basis Abu Ishaq al-Zaggag says (Tafsir asma' Allah, ed. A.Y. Daqqaq [Cairo, 1975], p. 56) that as a description of God "al-hayyu yufidu dawama al-wugud" and this is followed by his pupil, al-Zaggagi (Istiqaq, loc. cit.).
143
228
RICHARD M. FRANK
[al-As'ari] said, "The essential attributes of the creator (the exalted) continue to exist by a continuance that exists in the Self of the creator, and if it were the case that a condition of the [existence of the] continuance is that it exist in that which continues to exist, it would follow that an entitative attribute exists in an entitative attribute and this is impossible." He said, "A condition of [the existence of an instance of] continuance is its existing in something that is not other than that which continues to exist; and between God's existence and His attributes there is no being-other, whence it is not precluded that they continue to exist by His continuance {la yamtani'u kawnuha baqiyatin bi-baqa'ihi), whereas it is precluded that the accident continue to exist by the continuance of the atom, since it is the case that they are other to one another.145
Al-baqa' is not commonly discussed as one of God's essential attributes, but it is clear from "a continuance that exists in the Self of the Creator" that it is considered an essential attribute, even if one that is in some respects singular compared to the others taken together. That is, in contingent beings (atoms) knowledge, for example, is an accident that as such has contraries, opinion, error, unawareness, &c, and the condition of the existence of any one of them - of any accident, indeed - is the absence of its contrary in the particular atom. God's essential attributes, however, are eternal since they are not other than His eternally existent Self and therefore can have no contraries. 'Ma'na' (or 'sifa') in the sense of entitative attribute is therefore, like 'qa'imun bi-al-nafs', equivocal, since God's attributes, like His existence (wugud = nafs, ddt), are essentially different from those of contingent beings. Consequently, it is possible that God's essential attributes continue to exist by a continuance that exists in a being that "is not other than they." Al-Ansari also reports that al-As'ari at some point held a position regarding the eternal existence of God's essential attributes that differs notably from that which we have just examined.
S.Ir, fols. 124v f. In the sentence Id yamtani'u kawnuha baqiyatin bi-baqa'ihi the phrase 'kawnuha baqiyatin' is used instead of the simpler 'baqd'uhd' in order to avoid the ambivalence of the noun 'baqd" i.e., because the latter may be heard as a simple noun which names and refers to the attribute, whereas what is intended is not the attribute but the verbal noun in a gerundive sense: continuing [to exist]. The 'kawn' functions, in short, as a syntactical particle which serves to nominalize the sentence 'huwa bdqin' so as to make it the subject of la yamtani''. This use of 'kawn' is quite common and has carefully to be distinguished from that in which it is semantically significant, as in phrases such as 'kawnuhu 'dliman' in the work of al-Guwayni who speaks of ontologically real "states" (ahwal) of the Being of entities.
145
229
In several of his works he said the [essential] attributes of God (the exalted) of themselves continue to exist. Their Selves are a continuing to exist for them. [His] knowledge is of itself a continuing to exist and so too with the rest of his [essential] attributes. 146
Al-Ansari offers no explanation that would clarify the exact sense and implication of this statement fully. The sense, however, would seem clear enough. Even though the Self (nafs/dat) of a being is its existence, continuance is not here simply identified with continuing existence (istimraru al-wugud) as it is with al-Mutawalli and al-Guwayni. That is, because God's essential attributes are not other than His Self, their non-existence is impossible (mustahil) and each one of them is of itself therefore its own continuance in existence. Though evidently not accepted by any of al-A'ari's followers, this is nonetheless a quite coherent theory of the perpetual existence of God's essential attributes and one that is consistent with al-As'ari's ontology. The more common thesis, sc, that His attributes are "essential" and therefore continue to exist because they are not other than His eternal Self, is based in part on the idea that the existence of entitative attributes is secondary to, that is, bound to that of their subjects, albeit differently in the case of God's and in that of those belonging to created entities (atoms). Regarding God's Being and His attributes we have seen a number of negations intended to confirm His transcendence: He is a being unlike beings; He resembles no created being; infinite He has no relation (nisba), temporal or spatial, to what is finite; His entitative attributes are neither He nor other than He nor are they other one to another or the same; He cannot be precisely grasped by human understanding. Many of these negations were asserted by theologians prior to al-A'ari. Within the As'arite context, however, the idea of transcendence they convey is limited, compromised in a sense by the simultaneous insistence on God's entitative attributes, as beings {asya')\ His Self and His knowledge are two existent beings (say'ani
S.Ir, fol. 125r f.: qala fi ba'di kutubihi sifatu Allahi ta'ala baqiyatun bi-anfusiha wa-anfusuha baqa'un laha wa-al-'ilmu baqa'un li-nafsihi wa-kadalika sa'iru sifatihi (reading baqa' for mq' and for 'ilmun, the first of which is a simple scribal error and the second a lapse, the correct reading for which is obvious. See also Gn, fol. 90v, 10f., where the same basic report is given verbatim, though without the final sentence, and where also he goes on to say that Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'Ini holds the same position. Whether by the phrase 'fi ba'di kutubihi' he means in several of his works or in only one is uncertain, though the latter would seem more likely.
146
230
RICHARD M. FRANK
mawguddn). Al-As'arl and his followers reject the position of alGubba'I according to which what is asserted to exist {al-mutbat) when one says "God has power to act" is God's very Self (datuhu) (cf., e.g., M 5, p. 205, llff.) or that to say "He knows" is to assert that He exists (itbdtuhu) and that He is unlike whatever cannot know and so to assert that there are things He knows (cf., e.g., Maq, pp. 167, 20ff., 524, 8ff., and 531, 9ff.). Against this the As'arites insist that if the truth of a description - the subject's truly being as described - requires the existence of a ground Cilia) distinct from the subject when said of a contingent being, then it must likewise require a distinct ground when said of God. To deny this is logically inconsistent (alIsfara'ini, p. 138, 14f., cited above).147 That is to say, were this not so the basic principles of the linguistic analysis of descriptive expressions - of verbs and verbal adjectives - would not be universally valid; they would, strictly speaking, have no "true meanings" (haqd'iq) and consequently it would not be possible to reason from what is phenomenally present to our148 understanding to what is not phenomenally presentable. The As'arites, in short, are fundamentally bound to the linguistic theory of the grammarians. The Koran presents God's eternal speaking "in a clear Arabic" (bi-lisanin 'arabiyyin mubin: 16.103, et alibi) and therein He describes Himself as hearing and seeing (22.61 et alibi), wherefore His hearing and His seeing must be "two of His essential attributes and distinct from 149 His knowing." The As'arites can finesse the analysis of 'qadim' since it does not occur in the Koran as a description of God,150 but they have, as we saw above, rather serious difficulCp. Gn, fol. 61v, cited in n. 44. "Al-ismu ida istuqqa min ma'nan istahala ahduhu min gayrihi fa-al- 'alimu istuqqa min al- 'ilmi wa-yastahilu itbatu al-ismi almustaqqi bi-duni itbati al-mustaqqi minhu" (Iht, fol. 71r, 13f.). For the sense of 'mustahil' here, cp. the use of 'muhal' in Slbawayh 1, p. 8, 13, which is followed in Istiqaq, p. 292, 18f. 148 Cf. al-Mutawalli, pp. 21f., Sam (69), pp. 297f, (81), pp. 63ff. and 72f.; with regard to the reasoning itself see the references given in n. 133 above. 149 Tahbir, fol. 72, Iff.; cf. also Luma' (A), 15ff., Insaf, p. 37, Iff, and Ir, pp. 72ff (where he has then to get rid of taste, smell, etc, as essential attributes, pp. 76f.). 150 'Qadim' commonly means old or ancient: that the time of something is anterior (zamdnuhu sdlif: Maqayis, s.v.; al-qidamu al-'atqu, masdaru al-qadim: Lisan al'arab, s.v..); "'new' (hadit) is the contrary of 'qidam' (al-Gawhari, s.v.). "God is the qadim in an absolute sense" (Ibn Sida and Lisan al-'arab, s.v.). According to al-As'ari, thus, when said of God "it means that His existence is, without limit or duration, antecedent to every being that exists through a coming to be" (Mug, p. 42, 19f; cp. ibid., p. 27, 17ff, where read al-wugud for al-mawgud in line 19); it is therefore
147
231
ties in treating 'baq', which does occur. Theologically the questions and issues involved here are of great importance and the teaching of the As'arites on the topic needs to be examined thoroughly and compared with that of the Hanbalites as well as that of the Mu'tazila. So - we have reviewed some of the most basic metaphysical theses of classical As'arite teaching and in the process have examined several small sets of words and looked at a few texts that appear plainly to display their formal meaning as technical terms, all in hope to see how they reveal certain elemental presuppositions and commitments that guided the elaboration of A&'arite thought and underlay its differences of their theology from that of the Mu'tazilites and of the Hanbalites. While much remains to be done in this area, I hope that the present effort will prove of some help.
taken to mean "His existence has no beginning" (la awwala li-wugudihi: e.g., Insaf, p. 99, 6, Bayan (K), p. 19, llf., and al-Mutawalli, p. 12, 8ff.). In this al-A'ari followed his master, al-Gubba'i who held that when said of God 'qadim' means His existence is antecedent in a preeminent sense and that it has no beginning (for al-Gubba'i's discussion of the semantics of the term cf., e.g., M 5, 233). It may be, in part at least, because these interpretations of the word appear to imply a temporal relation of God's Being to that of contingent entities, that 'qadim' is frequently defined as meaning that God's existence is necessary (e.g., Sam (69), pp 504f.), that His non-existence is impossible (e.g., Ta.gr, p. 82, 11 [= 35, 14] and al-Isfara'ini, p. 138, 17; see generally Sam (69), pp. 254ff.). It is noteworthy for our present context that al-HarasI says (fols. 72v f.) that both 'qadim' and 'wagib' are here negative.

The As'arite Ontology - I-Frank

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

The As'arite Ontology - I-Frank

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 9 (1999) pp.

163-231 Copyright 1999 Cambridge University Press

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

Discussing the semantics of 'mawgud' (existent/exists) alAs'arl

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES

In accord with this common usage, Ibn Furak says:

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES

THE AS' ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS' ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'AEITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

yaguzu taqdlru al-nafsi dunaha 'aqlan).66

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'AKITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES

THE AS'AKITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

Or, to put it another way:

Similarly al-Guwayni says:

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS' ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

Al-Isfara'ini, Fr. # 2 6 , where for 'Imhs at p. 150, 8, read al-muhassis;

In some disputational contexts al-As'ari denied that 'qa'imun bi-al-nafs' may be

THE AS'AEITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

yunasibu al-mutandhi: ibid., fol. 20r, 3).130

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES

THE AS'AEITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen