North American Philosophical Publications

Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How They Justify Author(s): Matthew S. Bedke Reviewed work(s): Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 2008), pp. 253-269 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20464416 . Accessed: 05/10/2012 18:15
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Volume 45,Number 3, July 2008

WHAT

ETHICAL INTUITIONS: THEY ARE, WHAT THEY ARE NOT, AND HOW THEY JUSTIFY
Matthew S. Bedke

onmoral epistemology In recentliterature thereare two ascendant views that tryto answer the followingquestions:What are ethical intuitions? How do they justify? On a view defendedbyRobertAudi (1997, 1998, 1999, 2004) andRuss Shafer-Landau(2003) intuitions are understandings of self-evident where suchunderstanding alone propositions, is sufficient for view justification. On another defendedbyMichael Huemer (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) intuitions are sui generis seem ing states,termedinitial intellectualseem which are likeotherkindsof seemings ings, (e.g., thosebased on sensoryexperienceor memory) in the way they justify. Assuming that thereare undefeated, in tuitively justifiedethical beliefs, thispaper ofwhat that thesedominanttheories argues ethical intuitions are and how theyjustify are inadequate. After arguingthat Huemer's intellectual seemingsaccount is an improve ment over self-evidencetheoriesin section 1, section2 draws some distinctions among seemings.All agree that when it seems to one thatp one is taking some attitudeto ward content,among other things perhaps. What has not been sufficiently addressed, however,iswhere to locate theseeming. For any given seeming,one should askwhether it is located in a special seemingish attitude
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taken towardcontent, whether it is located in theverycontent underconsideration(and not in a seemingishattitude), whether it is located somewhereelse entirely, perhaps as a phenomenologicallysalientcharacterthat attends theattitude-content pair (which by itself doesn'tmake anything seem tobe the case), whether theseeming features a com binationof theseoptions,etc.A commonly held position-that all seemings consist in takentoward special attitudes (propositional) contents-strainsthefacts upon examination. Some seemings are located in thecontents underconsideration, the verycontents are that tobe thesubject of justified while other belief, seemings are located in phenomenological characteristics attending attitude-content pairs. Some so-called intellectual seemings are competence-driven and ill fit anyof these not all seem categories.The upshot is that ingsare cut fromthesame cloth,and this has some ramifications for and the whether, way in belief. which, anygiven seemingjustifies Section 3 argues that seemings in eth ics-ethical intuitions-are no more than positive phenomenological qualities upon considering ethical propositions.! In these cases theseeming of an intuition isnot quality constituted by a special seemingishattitude, nor is it featuredin thevery contentunder

254 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Fair enough.But it is not yet clearwhat it is tounderstand a propositioninaway thatis sufficient for justifiedly An agent believing it. can understand the propositionthat all crows are black, but thatalone is hardly sufficient for justifiedly believing it.How, then,are certainethicalpropositions different, or how is thenotionof understanding different, that would distinguishintuitively justifiedethi cal beliefs?Analytic truths might get by on understanding alone, but ethical intuitionists (rightly) deny thatsubstantive ethical truths are analytic. Without anyexplanation of how thisis supposed to of self work, the grasping I. SELF-EVIDENCE THEORY AND evident propositionsis inadequateas a theory THE MOVE TO of intuitions and intuitive justification. INTELLECTUAL SEEMING THEORY In addition to thisundischargedexplana tory burden,self-evidencetheoryis vulner BothRobert Audi andRuss Shafer-Landau to an objection based on thefallibility able isgrounded in maintain that ethical intuition It is typically thatself thought self-evident Audi proposes the of intuitions. propositions. evident propositions are true, which entails as canonicalviewof a self-evident proposition that ethical intuitions can only be had for true "a truth" "an adequateunderstanding such that ethicalpropositions (which isconsistent with inbe of itis sufficient both for being justified This defeasibility). is far too To see strong. it if one lieving and for knowingit believes it consider a why, classic case. trolley on the basis of that To make understanding."2 thisa sufficiently of self illuminating theory A trolley ison course tohitandkill Trolley: it more needs to be said about what evidence, on thetrack fiveindividuals ahead.You are is toadequately a proposition,3 understand and on a bridge above the track. standing The what is specialaboutself-evident propositions onlyway for you to save thefiveindividu can conferjustification suchthat these through als is topush the man in front of you from alone.Unfortunately, friends of understanding thebridge onto the track, killinghim, but theview spend far more timetelling uswhat activating the trolleybrakes so it stops isnot rather thantelling self-evidence uswhat short of thefiveindividuals. Question: Is it itis. ThusAudi argues that self-evidence does permissibletopush the man offthe bridge, notentail indefeasibility,4 thatthesupport for killinghim but saving five others? self-evident can be strengthened propositions Most have theintuition that man pushing the orweakened via non-intuitive modes of justi is Even if morally impermissible. deontology a suitably that humble intuitionism is fication,5 one can false,and consequentialism true, one see a proposition's, does not requirethat have this intuition. An adequate theory of orhave any intuitively self-evidence, justified intuitions needs toaccount forthis, and self beliefs about a proposition's self-evidence,6 evidence does not.A self-evidence theory and thatone can adequately understand a theorist might grantthepoint and claim that and yet fail toassent self-evident proposition truthis required,not to have an intuition, to it,or believe in it.7 Shafer-Landau makes but for an intuitionto confer prima facie similarremarks (2003: chap. 11). This epistemicclaim also seems justification. consideration. The more detailed theory of on offerhas some impli ethical intuitions cations for the strength of intuitive ethical justification, and thedefeasibilityof such justification (implications that might not In some apply tootherskinds of intuitions). respects,ethical intuitions aremore vulner able todefeat thanotherkinds of seemings, but inotherrespectsthey are lessvulnerable. After discussing some of these subtleties, section 4 ends with a final remarkon the evidential statusof intuitions and seeming more broadly. states

ETHICAL INTUITIONS /255 can false-beliefs based onTrolley intuitions be prima facie justified. Section 3 contains a more detailed treatment of intuitive justi ficationin cases like this, but the important point fornow is thatself-evidencetheoryis inadequate insofaras it introducesa truth at all. conditionon having an intuition At this toself-evi point,thosesympathetic dence theory might lodge a couple of replies. the The first Trolleyexample is ill replyis that chosen. Intuitionists, thethought is,propose certain mid-level principlesas theobjects of intuitive and theTrolley case justification, on a hypotheti provides only an intuition cal particular. That is true, but any adequate of intuitions must incorporateintu theory itions on particulars like that given in Trolley, fortheseseemepistemically probativeifany intuitions are. Moreover, not all intuitionists who endorsetheintuitive mid justification of of levelprinciplesdeny intuitive justification W. D. Ross was a particularist on particulars. in time is the this issue: "What comes first of the self-evident apprehension primafacie of an individualact of a particular rightness toap From this we come by reflection type. prehendtheself-evident generalprincipleof primafacie duty" (1930, p. 33). In any event, thebasic point is that the truth featuredin self-evidence requirement theoriesis too strong, and thispoint stands with respect tomid-level principles, too. Consider someonewho finds Ross's prima Preventdistri faciedutyof justice intuitive: butionsof happiness thatare not in accord withmerit. Surely one can have an intuition of justice (and can when considering the duty even if have justified beliefsbased thereon) are not just thereis no such duty.Intuitions defeasible.They are deeply fallible,and yet forall that. conferring justification The second complaintfromthose sympa thetic to self-evidence is thatthetruth theory isnot essential to theview. Why requirement notdrop itand salvage thecoreof thetheory? The shortanswer is thatthere doesn't seem tobe any theoretical work forself-evidence todo.Alternativeaccountsof justifi theory cation explain all thereis to explain.To see thisit helps toconsidertherivalseemingstate defendedbyMichael Hue theory, recently mer.Huemer classifiesall intuitions as a sui generiskindof seemingstate(or appearance and intellectual, but state)-one thatis initial not a belief (2005: 99). Ethical intuitions, then,are initialintellectual seemingsabout ethicalmatters (2005: 102).And intuitions beliefs insofar as they justify corresponding thegeneralprincipleof phenom instantiate enal conservatism (PC): "If itseems toS that in theabsence of defeaters, p, then, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p."8 As compared toself-evidence theory (even one thatlacks a truth requirement), seeming state theory more perspicuously identifies and explainscases of intuition. Self-evidence theory earns itskeep only if thereis some theoretical work for it to do. Here are three obvious roles: 1) self-evidencecould help to characterize some intuitions thatdo not featureseeming statesat all; 2) itcould be thatin some cases of intuition self-evidence capturessome elementneeded inad theory dition to a seeming state; or 3) it could be that in some cases self-evidenceaugments intuitions otherwise constituted by seemings. Itdoes none of thesethings. does First,there not seem tobe a good exampleof an intuition that does not feature a seemingstate(and no who has intuitive good example of an agent justificationfor some belief thatP that is not based on a seeming).The self-evidence theorist needs toproduce such a case ifself evidence is to takeup theslack.Second, it is are constituted possible thatsome intuitions by seemingsplus somethingelse thatself Here again evidence theory helps tocapture. theonus is clearlyon advocates of self-evi toproduce examples of ethical dence theory that cannotbe fully understoodin intuitions of seemings. terms Or if intuitions are fully

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constituted by seemings, but they justify only when theyalso featurea graspingof some thing theself-evidencetheorist self-evident, must saymore about thepositive accountof justification. cases in which Third, are there understanding a self-evidentproposition understood might augmentone's intuition, as a seeming state, which might thenaug ment one's intuitive This would justification? certainlyleave some room forself-evidence but again it is difficultto think theory, of cases that feature some psychological or residue left justificatory unaccounted forby seeming theory, and evenmore difficult to see how self-evidence might fillthegap.The onus ison theself-evidence theorist. Thus the provisionalconclusion is thatit will bemore promisingtopursue seeming state theory if one is tounderstand what ethical intuitions are and how they justify.

concerned torebuttheview that only certain classes of seemingsjustify. A more nuanced question is whether different seemingsjustify indifferent ways. On thenaturalreadingof PC all varieties of seemings bear on justifica tionin thesameway regardless of anydiffer ences between thespecies of seemings. This merits criticalattention. And a good place to startiswith thenatureof various seemings.

2.1 Sensory Experience Consider firstsensory experience. On Huemer's view, a sensoryexperience would feature one speciesof a seeming-type propo sitionalattitudetakentowardsome proposi tionalcontent. Though othershave tendedto agree, theview does not hold up on inspec tion.Firstly, what is perhaps a minor point, it isquestionable thatthecontents of sensory experienceare propositions. The contents of sensoryexperiencesare typically quite rich, and their naturedoes not seem to qualitative 2. DIFFERENT KINDS OF SEEMINGS be the nature ofpropositions. A moremoderate Seeming state theory'sperspicuity and view is preferable-thatsomeof thecontents explanatory power can be improved by ex of are at least sensory experience proposition aminingthenatureof theseemings involved alizable. Prima facie this amendment friendly indifferent kinds of cases. ThoughHuemer thejustificatory work that distinguishes types of seemings-intellectual, does not threaten are sensory experiences to do. supposed sensory experiential,memorial, etc.-his and isdubi more it Secondly, importantly, view is thattheyare all constituted by atti ous that sensory experience features a seem content where the tude-(propositional) pairs, ing-type (propositional) as opposed attitude, nature of the propositional attitude determines to contents that in themselves make things which species of seeming is instantiated in seem a certain To see this way. choice clearly, vein he says: any given case. In this considera case where a representative agent, I take statements of the form "it seems toS that Abraham, looks at a stick that is placed in p" or "it appears to S that p" to describe a kind somewater causing inhim a sensory expen of propositional attitude, different frombelief, ence it seems to whereby that the Abraham ofwhich sensory experience, apparentmemory, stick is bent.The question here iswhether intuition,and apparent introspective awareness theexperiential mental statefeatures a non are species. This type of mental statemay be doxastic attitude in addition to the bentish termed an "appearance." PC [phenomenal con content,and in virtueof which it seems to servatism] holds that it is by virtue of having an appearance with a given content thatone has Abraham thatthestick is bent. Importantly, justification forbelieving thatcontent.9 thequestion is notwhetherAbraham can withhold doxastic acceptancewhen itseems all (See also Tolhurst[1998],who holds that thatthestick isbent-clearly, ifhe believes states with propo seemings are intentional the stickonly looks bent because it is that sitionalcontent.) Huemer ismore generally

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placed inwater he can fail to believe that the stick is bent. The question iswhether taken theseeming is in some special attitude A towardthecontent, or in thecontentitself. littlereflection reveals the second option as the natural way to think about thecase. If the thenitshouldbe were in theattitude seeming Abraham tohave thevery same possible for bent-stickexperiential contentbefore his mindwithoutitseemingthatthestickisbent. offand place Justtoggletheseemingattitude in itsstead. someotherattitude Yet thisisnot a genuine possibility.Even someone with ideal imaginative capacities thatcan bring content the bent-stick beforehis experiential mind cannotdo sowithoutitthereby seeming At most he can tohim thatthestick is bent. withholddoxastic acceptanceof thecontent, he buthe cannot withhold theseemingnessif The seeming,then,is built has thatcontent. intothecontent of sensoryexperience,as it were, and not tobe foundin some attitudinal stance towardthecontent.10 If so, and ifa seemingthat to p is sufficient one's belief that p (absentdefeaters) justify as the of phenomenalconservatism principle of of thecontent holds, thenit is a character sensory experiencethat justifies beliefsbased on thatsensory experience,and not any atti tudethatis involved. Indeed,thisseems right. When Abraham forms belief that thestick the is bent (without knowing thatit is placed in water) based on his sensoryexperience it is thecontentof the sensoryexperience that justifies thebelief-the bent stickishness beforehismind. This view of experiences can be challenged if it turns out thatany given sensoryexperi ence content can be held constantwhile varyingwhether thatcontent seems to be thecase. There are some interesting cogni tivedisorders that might be probativehere. One disorder,known as face blindness, or prosopagnosia, causes individuals to lose their ability to recognize faces.1'The disor der can come invarying degreesof severity,

thoughit characteristically leaves the abil ity to recognizeotherobjects intact. Some prosopagnosicsclaim that facesdon't "make sense" to them, and they cannot make similar when presented ityjudgments with faces for Others cannotidentify faces that comparison. have seen in thepast, even thefacesof they and friends. family What isgoingwrong here? It is interesting tonote thatsubjects who areunable to make familiarity judgments when givenwould-be and unfamiliarfacesunconsciously familiar exhibit emotionalresponsestofamiliar faces, asmeasured physiologically by skinconduc tance.'2 to make familiar Thus, their inability to a ityjudgmentsshould not be attributed defectinemotional This leavesus processing. with twoobvious alternatives forexplaining the inability: eithertheir sensoryexperience of faces lacksa certain or the content, normal is there content butprosopagnosicsfailto take attitude toward the up some characteristic contentthat enables themto make thesimi larity judgments.If thissecond explanation is right, thenit looks like theseemingdoes not inherein thecontentalone. The first explanationis more plausible ifthe goal is to account for the inabilitytomake The secondexplanation judgments. similarity forsubjects to assumes that, make similarity some is attitude judgments, required inad dition to the way the faces look.There is no reason to think thatthisis thecase. To make a similarity judgmentbetween two faces it would seem thatall one needs are the two facesbeforethe mind.Things mightbe differ ent ifthe to goal is toexplainan inability form a belief aboutwho thesepersons are. That But plausibly requires a doxastic attitude. thequestion here concernsprosopagnosics' and inabilitytomake similarity judgments, withoutsome reason toadopt the more com plicatedexplanationthatincorporates special attitudesinto the story, thesimplerhypoth not esis is tobe preferred. Though certainly decisive, thebestworkinghypothesisis that

258 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY prosopagnosics do not consciously experi experiences would have therequisite charac ence faces ina normal way. If thisis right, itis tertogenerateand justify beliefswith some not thecase that prosopagnosics have sensory propositionalized content of the sensory with propositionalizable content experience. experiences P (havingtodowith individual faces) and yet The best explanation to date, which is itdoes not seem to themthat P. certainly open to change, does not impugn theview thatthecontents Perhaps individualsthatexperienceCap of normal sensory gras delusion are more probative of the experiencesare ladenwith seemingness. question. Subjects with thisdisorder think 2.2 IntellectualSeemings that otherwisefamiliarfamily members and Intellectualseeming statespresenta strik friendshave been replaced with identical ing contrastto seemingsof sensoryexperi lookingimposters.13 Unlike prosopagnosics, ence.The different nature of non-experiential these individualsdo not exhibit emotional will to lead a different seemings of conception arousal upon seeing familiarfaces,and it is how intuitions if even all justify they satisfy thatthis makes their thought sensory experi theprincipleof phenomenalconservatism. ences of family members and friends feel Consider thecase where it seems to some wrong in some way, which thenexplains agent, Anne, thatsome deductive argument have been why theybelieve such familiars is valid, perhaps afterdue reflection.It is replacedby imposters.14 natural to say that,prior to the argument What is goingwrong here?One explana seeming valid, Anne is doing something tionis that onewithCapgras has experiential contentsthatincludesomepropositionalized like consideringwhether the argument is valid, or entertaining whether it is valid, or or propositionalizable contentP (where P perhaps thatit is valid. So the hypothesizing might be something like 'my husband is content is a proposition about the validity before standing me') and yet itdoes not seem Focusing on just these two toher that P. If so, theseeming is not in the of theargument. elements-the attitude and thecontent-it is There is some support experientialcontent. the seemsvalid forthis hypothesis,like thefactthat subjects notyet thecase that argument to Anne. In the is not in particular, seeming thatthe believed imposerslook identi report the content like it was for the case. perceptual cal to familiars. However, thesubjects' lack as a or And, result, merely hypothesizing of emotional, physiologicalresponsesis also For thissuggeststhat what they lack is wonderingabout a propositionisnot enough telling. tojustify a belief in that For the proposition. notan experiential butan emotional seeming, to seem valid and to argument belief justify seeming-upon seeing someonewho should more must be added. be familiarsomethingdoes not feel right, something remarks about GeorgeBealermakes similar and this blocks an otherwise natural doxastic of laws first consider logic: you "[W]hen acceptance of the experiential seeming. If one ofDe Morgan's laws,"'5] often itneither this is roughlyright,thencases of Capgras nor seems tobe false; after delusion are consistent with thethought that seems tobe true a moment's however, something reflection, experientialcontentscarry seemingnesson it now seems happens: true;you suddenly their sleeve. In thesecases thesensoryexpe see" that it is true. Of "just kind course, this rientialseemingcompetes with an emotional is of not or seeming intellectual, sensory where theemotionalseemingleads seeming, The introspective (or imaginative). subject to a dogged refusaltoaccept thatthings are (Bealer as they seem tobe.And absent here is a priori(or rational)intuition" experientially The 1996: same can be said for 123). ethical thefunny emotional seeming, theirsensory

ETHICAL INTUITIONS /259 intuitions. Ethical contents do notcarrytheir seemingness on their face,and consideration whetherp isnot sufficient tojustify the belief that p. What, then, is the nature of these other seemings,and how do they justify? Once sensory experiential seemingsare set to one side, it is common to assume thatall intellectual seemingsare cut fromthesame cloth.Ross, forinstance,said thatintuitions ofprimafaciedutiesare self-evident "justas a mathematicalaxiom,or the validity of a form of inference, is evident" (1930, p. 29). And Huemer frequently appeals to non-ethical intuitions to illustrate what intellectual seem ingsare.This is amistake.There aredistinc tions to be made within thebroad category of intellectual seemings between, e.g., it one of deMorgan's laws seemingtoone that is true versus it seeming toone that pushing the case is man off thebridge in the trolley impermissible. The distinctions do not merely content, but structure, and thishas concerm ramifications forjustification. For instance, some (butnot all) intellectual have somethingto do with one's seemings and applicationof competent understanding a proceduralruleor a concept.Reflec either XYZ isnot tionon thefamiliar example that water, andBealer's logic example,will help sharpenintellectual seemingsrelatedtocom will draw forth other varieties petence,and it that are not so related of intellectual seeming onPutnam's tocompetence. that Recall, then, twinearth thereis a watery substance (one that fallsfromtheskies, is clear and potable, etc.) that is not composed of H20, but is chemicalcompound, composedof someother abbreviated XYZ.16 Given that watery stuff on here is around consideringthetwin H2O, XYZ isnot water. earth case itsureseems that what itgoing on Psychologically speaking, here is somecompetence based performance, XYZ is notH20 i.e.,when one judges that one competently applies theconcept 'water' (given some potentiallyfallible information about the of our acquaintance) watery stuff to a hypothetical case. It is partof how that concept works that, givencertain background assumptions aboutwhatwatery stuff around here is,XYZ on twinearth simply fails to meet an applicationcondition of theconcept 'water.' And lackof theappropriate intuition belies a failuretograsp theconcept,or a fail ure toapply itcompetently. This intuition is tosupport typically taken variousother views: that water isnecessarily H20, thattheterm or concept 'water'rigidly designatesthestuff of our acquaintance,and so on. Bealer's Somethinglike thisis goingon in case, too, albeit the competency involved need not be informed by empirical infor mation. Nevertheless,when one considers one of deMorgan's laws and things "click," one isbringingto psychologicallyspeaking, bear a certaincompetence (perhapspurely with the logical operators.This syntactic) same roughaccountalso captures what goes onwhen amathematicalaxiom or theorem is orwhen a deductive intuitive, argument seems valid, at least in theusual circumstances.In thesecases one brings tobear a procedural much competenceinapplyinga ruleof logic likebringingtobear linguistic knowledge to judge a sentencegrammatical. There is more to say about thestructure of incases like these. intuitions These seemings differ from thoseinsensory experienceinthat the intellectual seeming that p is notpartof thecontentp, for in thecase of intellectual seemings it is possible to hold thecontent fixed(e.g., one ofDeMorgan's laws, or the XYZ iswater) and toggle proposition that theseemingon and off,something that can not be done in cases of sensoryexperience. How about theotheroptionsmentioned at the outset-locating theseemingina special content attitudetoward p, or some phenom that attendstheattitude enological character content pair?Consider thelatter option first. In thecases under considerationthereis a when feltappropriateness orfeltveridicality one considersthe propositionsinquestion. It

260 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY feelsappropriatetodeny that XYZ iswater ficationthatthe mere feelingof confidence and theformula A iff v or feels q) (-p) for (-q) appropriateness, upon consideringthe -(p right aftersome reflection. So thereis some twinearthscenariowith sufficient attention thing of a phenomenologicalcharacterthat any priorjustification conferred by an intu attendsconsiderations whether p, and that itionconstituted by feelingsof confidence might constituteseemings in some cases. or appropriateness isdefeatedby thecompe But thereis also a sense inwhich one takes tence-driven intuition that XYZ is notwater. these intuitive This happens in other cases as well. One judgmentsto be requiredby theconceptor rulebeing applied. When one a certain might find mathematicalaxiom tobe ofdeMorgan's laws"clicks," orwhen itseems intuitive insofar as there isa felt confidence or XYZ is notwater, thesejudgmentsfeel veridicality that to it, but ifthings "click" and one competence-driven, which is something more "sees" thatis itfalse thecompetence-driven thanthe dispositiontoapply theconcept,and intuition epistemicallydefeats theprevious which showsup inphenomenology as some judgment. more thana mere feltappropriateness thing This story might satisfyan accessibilist or veridicality. Consider, for instance,that intemalist, but onemight think thatthefeel Abraham findsthefollowingintuitive: of ing being competencedrivenhas superior given thatthe of our acquaintance is watery stuff power only when justification-conferring H20, 'water'could referto something other it attendsactual competence (or indeed, it than H20.'7 Perhaps he hasn't heard of the countsas a psychologicalintuition when only twinearthcase, or hasn't attendedto it suf competence driven).On thisview thebest In anyevent,itis ficiently. that case, epistemically widely thought speaking,is toexperience Abraham is not justmistaken,but that he is the feltveridicality or appropriateness of p tocompetently failing use the concept 'water,' upon consideration,tohave thefeeling that which suggeststhatthe widespread intuition one's judgmentthat p is competencedriven, XYZ isnot water iscompetence-driven.'8 and (what is not accessible to theagent) for that One can say this withoutdenying Abraham it tobe thecase that one's judgmentthat p is his intuition. He might have an intuition, competencedriven.Some of theseelements but what likely constitutes it is some felt are phenomenological,but thereis the fact or appropriateness. Either that or of being drivenby competence, veridicality which does he really is applyingsome different not fit well into the categories of locating concept thanthosepersonshe disagreeswith. the seeming in content,attitude, or accom So the main suggestion here is that, when it panyingquality. Instead, it might be best to think appears, thephenomenalqualityof takinga of competencyas kind of successful tobe competence-driven judgment constitutes non-inferential performance that enables the (perhapspartially) an intellectualseeming, extrajustificatory of a power seeming.This or intuition, where therelevant phenomenal retainsthe theory view that theseemingitself qualityattends some relevant attitude-content is justification while acknowledg conferring whetherp. pair likeconsidering of otherfactors ingtheepistemicrelevance as Concerning the epistemic statusof such conditions that must be met fortheseeming intellectual toconferjustification. seemings, thereare a varietyof options.One option is to findthefeelingof It is beyond thepurview of thispaper to sufficient being competence-driven toprima defenda positiveaccountof intui thoroughly facie justifybeliefs. One normally takes tivejustification forthese intellectual seem such items to justify one's beliefs, and one The important ings. point is thatintuitionists normallytakes themtodelivergreaterjusti working with these examples have a rich

ETHICAL INTUITIONS /261 setof resourcesonwhich tobuild a positive theory, and some element of competence drivennessseems todeliver relatively strong justificationas compared to phenomeno logical qualities of feltappropriateness and Even ifall intuitions veridicaltiy. satisfythe principleof phenomenal conservatism,the intellectualseemings just canvassedmight do so in a verydifferent way thanseemings of othersorts. 3. ETHICAL INTUITIONS With these distinctions inmind, what story shouldbe toldabout ethical intuitions? What resourcesare available to theethical intuitionists? While it ispossible that ethical intuitions are a mixed bag without a uni fiedepistemic account, this section argues are of thatall substantive ethical intuitions thephenomenological sortand theyare not competencedriven. This resultserves todis ethical intuitions from other kindsof tinguish intellectual seemings,and itplaces a burden toprovide a squarelyon ethical intuitionists with the compellingaccountof justification resourcesavailable. There arevariouspossibleobjectsof ethical intuitions. There are intuitions aboutparticu of larcases, such as the moral permissibility various actions in trolleycases. There are intuitions aboutmid-levelmoral principles, such as Ross's prima faciedutiesof fidelity, reparation, gratitude,justice, beneficence, self-improvement,and non-maleficence. And there most are intuitions concerningthe moral principles, suchas actutilitari general anism,or abstractformal principles,such as some supervenience thesis. Along another dimension, thevarious objects of intuitions can featurethin ethical concepts, like right ness, to thickconcepts, like cruelness.The here is to consider some probative strategy cases along bothdimensions,argue thatthey of feature only the phenomenological variety seeming whereby theseeming is constituted or the by feltappropriateness, veridicality, like,and suggestthat theaccountgeneralizes tocases not considered. For a particularist ethicalintuition recallthe Trolley case,where one considers whether it is right topush aman offa bridge in front of an oncoming trolley, him but saving killing five others further down theline. Without aim ingfor historical accuracy,supposeBentham finds itintuitively permissible, andKant finds in intuitively impermissible (or fails to find it intuitively permissible). If theconceptual competencestory applieshere,at leastone of them would have thefeelingthattheverdict iscompelledby the use of thecon competent of cept permissionor impermission. If so, at leastone of them must think theotheris fail ing tograsp these moral concepts,or failing tocompetently But that doesn't apply them. in thiscase (and seem trueto the intuitions here thereaderis invited to introspect on any he or she intuitions might have on thecase). is fartooheavy-handed. That treatment Both and employ thecon partiescan understand andwrong (imper ceptsof right (permission) mission) perfectly well, and simply manifest a theoretical about what is right disagreement andwhat iswrong. Indeed, ifone partyfails to competently cannot apply concepts there be a genuinedisagreement here at all, just as thereis no disagreement between those who use theconcept 'water' to refertoH20 and twinearthers who use theconcept 't-water' torefer to XYZ. But surely genuinedisagree ment is a possibilityin the ethicalcase,which is evidence thatthe intuitions thereare not At most, each side to the competencedriven. and appro disputehas some felt veridicality priateness accompanyinghis consideration of thecase and his favored verdict. Of course, contemporary intuitionists advocatemid-level principlesas theobjects of intuition. But thesame generalcomplaint shouldapply tothese cases aswell as the more Consider first generaland abstract principles. the mid-level principlethatindividuals have some prima facieduty topromotepleasure.

262 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Again,withoutaimingfor historical accuracy, suppose that Epicurus findsit intuitive that thereis reason topursuepleasure foritsown sake,while Plato has the intuition thatone does not have reason topursue pleasure for itsown sake. If theconceptual competence theory applies here,one of them must either fail to grasp the concept of a prima facie or fail tocompetently duty, But that apply it. is fartooheavy-handedin this treatment case as well. Both can understandand employ theconcept of a reason perfectly well, and simply manifest a theoretical disagreement about what duties (or reasons) there are.This putativedisagreement does not entail that at leastone of themlacksnon-normative infor mation, or theveryconceptof reason,or that one of them simplyincompetently applies the concept to thiscase. If itdid thenthese two could not have a genuinedisagreement. Perhaps there areethicalcases that are more plausibly competence-driven. Consider the principle thatit is alwaysmorallywrong to torture others for fun,or the weaker claim that there is always a moral reason not to Itwould be hard to torture others for fun."9 take someone who denies theseprinciples but forall thestrength of convic seriously, tionincases like this,theylack certainchar acteristicsof the intuition, say, thatone of When the logical deMorgan's laws is true. formula"clicks" the intuitionincludes the ofbeingcompetence-driven, phenomenology and thatthose without theintuition must fail tocompetently applyconceptsor ruleson this particular occasion. There can be no genuine Yet those who think itis disagreement. wrong to torture othersforfuncan and do genuinely disagreewith a nihilist-one who does not believe thereare any normativeproperties in theactualworld. The nihilist instantiated buthe need notneces rejectsthe principles, or sarilydo so because he fails tounderstand apply theveryconcept ofmoral wrongness or amoral reason. Alternatively, consider a consequentialist who does not find"It alwaysmorallywrong to torture othersforfun"intuitive.20 Must this rare birdfailtounderstand whatmoralwrong An even stranger ness is? character mightdeny thatthereis always a moral reason against hemighthold a conceptionof the torture, for good andwhat thereis reason topromotethat does not include or imply a reason not tocause pain ineverycase. Does he notknowwhat a moral reason is?Here I thinkthe most one can say,andwhat people usuallydo sayabout hypothetical characterslike this,is thatthey exhibita corrupt mind. This brings to bear one's normative commitments incondemning thesepeople. One might notwant to engage with sucha person,and onemightnotbe able toconvincehim,but it is too much to say that one cannotgenuinelydisagreewith him. There might be somethingin thearea of when we turn competence-driven intuition to thicker concepts, likecruelty. How about the intuitionthat torturefor fun is cruel. Here the clear-headed thing to say is that there can be descriptive desiderata that must be met to apply the concept of cruelty to a case, and failure to abide thedescriptive criteriaexhibits incompetence.Something like this might occur if we emphasizemoral in moral duty-moral duties might refer toa resemblanceclass of duties, where sufficient resemblance to the class is needed to call a duty moral. But on thecrucial normative question, such as whether there is always reason not to torture, competency requires no particularverdict.This explains why it makes sense to ask: I know torture is cruel, but should I refrain from doing it? When we turnto the most general prin ciples of ethics, such as act utilitarianism, it is fairly clear thatany intuitions here are not competence driven.All this suggests that substantive ethical intuitions of all sorts do not include thephenomenologyof being and cannotgarneradded competencedriven, epistemic importon thatbasis. That said,

ETHICAL INTUITIONS /263 purelyformal, non-substantive ethical might be competencedriven.Consider some that Huemer lately defends: 1. Ifx is betterthany and y is betterthan x isbetterthanz. z, then 2. If x and y are qualitativelyidenticalin non-evaluativerespects,thenx and y are alsomorally indistinguishable. 3. If it ispermissibletodo x, and it is per missible todo y given that one does x, then it ispermissibletodo both x and y. A's having a substantive ethical intuition that p is fully constituted by a) A's consideringwhether p, and upon doing so b) A experiences positive phenomeno the logicalfeatures attending consideration, suchas a felt veridicality, appropriateness, with p, etc.22 confidence, familiarity

The bestway toarticulate the nature of ethical intuitions is in terms of sui generis, special phenomenology thatdoes not attend mere and that need notattend mere considerations, 4. If it iswrong todo x, and it iswrong to belief. Ethical intuitions are unlike sensory do y, thenit iswrong todo both x and y. experiential seemings in that the seeming that p is not located in thecontent p.And in 5. If two statesof affairs, x and y, are so contrast to claims all are that propo seemings related that y can be produced by adding Huemer and valuable tox,withoutcreating sitional attitudes,taken from something it would be odd tocall these Tolhurst, positive anything bad, loweringthevalue of any features the manifestation of a special non of value thingin x, or removinganything doxasticattitude takentoward p. Inhavingan from x, then y isbetterthanx. ethical intuition all that need be on thescene 6. The ethical status(whether permissible, is theattitude of considerationtoward p with wrong, obligatory, etc.) of choosing (x special positivephenomenologicalfeatures. of And thoughthepositive features and y) over (x and z) is thesame as that might give choosingy overz, given the knowledgethat rise todispositions tobelieve p, they are not x exists/occurs.21 themselves dispositions. tosome One whose judgments do notconform On thisview, ifethical intuitions it justify, of the ethical on the non-ethical is these supervenience characteristics that phenomenological (judging thattwo acts identical in all non would do all theepistemic work.As with the ethical respectsdiffer ethically, capturedby intellectual competence-driven seemings,the confused. ethical intuitionist Huemer's (2)) is likely conceptually has options. One option is Even ifintuitions on some suchprinciples are to maintainthat these phenomenological quali itisdoubt groundedincompetence, however, tiesattending theconsideration whether p are can be ethical theory fulthat any substantive sufficient to supporta prima facie typically squeeze outof such intuitions. Disagreements justified beliefthat when the belief is p, at least that matterinethicsarenot likelytobe settled based uponpositivefeatures intheright way.23 on purelyformal grounds. Reflectionon some of thecases considered With substantive the above suggests thatsome ethical intuitions ethicalintuitions, then, developingpictureis thattheseemingnessis arevery and one psychologically compelling, ap wholly constituted by a felt veridicality, normallytakesthemtoconfersomedegreeof or confidence upon propriateness, familiarity, justification. Perhapsone has no reasontotreat considering an ethical proposition.Let us themotherwise. This would be amenable to as accordinglyspellout theethical intuitions Anotherpossibilityis epistemic intemalism. thesis: positivephenomenologicalfeatures toborrowa suggestion given forcompetence

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was suggestedthat drivenintuitions. There it actual competence can enable the greater justificatory power of attendantseemings. Analogously, one can argue thatsomething power likereliability enables thejustificatory of ethical intuitions; thatis,ethical seemings onlywhen theyare partof processes justify thatreliablyproduce truebeliefs.To vindi cate thejustificatory power of theseemings themselves, this would differfromclassical confers where reliability process reliabilism, -would be that Here the thought justification. might enable otherfeatures-phe reliability qualitiesthat arepart of reliable nomenological confer justification.24 processes-to here admitsof the The general framework and epistemolo kindof nuances intuitionists, want tohave. Intuitions gists more generally, located in phenomenal qualities can be strengthened (e.g., by engaging in reflective support)attenuated equilibriumand finding (e.g.,when we search forfeaturesin a situ our or corroborate ation that would support but find those features missing), intuitions, are or defeated(e.g.,by discoveringthatthey causedbyprocesses that haveno positiveepis And though a detailed treatment temic status). of all theoptionswould takeus beyond the status paper, thejustificatory purviewof this with context or speakerinterests. might vary What is for most important present purposes is that, satisfythe even if ethical intuitions they principleof phenomenalconservatism, do so in a different way thanotherkinds of seemings. Compared to other intellectual have fewer resources tofeature they seemings, inanypositiveaccountof epistemicjustifica tion. Thus somedefensesof ethical intuitions inreply available.For instance, areno longer tothe whetherthese phenomenologi question cal characteristics are justification conferring at all, even to a slightdegree, the typical response is unavailable. The innocence-by associationmove is now suspectbecause of tobemade among theimportant distinctions As a conse seemingsand among intuitions.

aboutethicalintuition and quence, skepticism thephenomenologicalqualities theyfeature can be disassociated fromskepticismforall One can questioncertain seemingstates. kinds of seeming states withoutquestioning them on seemingsthat all, and one can standfirmly deliverstrong while questioning justification thejustificatory force more weakly of other, kindsof seemings. justifying, With a clearer view of what ethical intu are andhow they itions mightjustify, it would seem thatsome defeaters apply to this brand of seemingsthat do not apply toother brands of seemings and vice versa. The simplest kind of defeat forethical intuitions iswhen countervailing evidence overwhelms them. If thenon-ethicalcases are any guide, we must acknowledge thatintuitions exhausted by thesephenomenological characteristics deliverweaker justificationthan intuitions that are competence-driven,or seemings that are located in thecontenttobe justified. So ethical intuitions aremore vulnerable to when evidence outside of ethics un defeat dercuts intuitive For instance, justification. explanations of why one has ethical intu of itions, explanations recently given in terms bias and othercognitiveerrors,25 mightmake one seriouslyconsider abandoning some of his ethical beliefs. Intuitionsgrounded in are not conceptualcompetence,by contrast, so easily defeated. When itseems toyou that XYZ is notwater,or that -(p A q) iff(-p) v thejustification have (-q) is true, you thereby isnotundermined by a story about thesource of the intuition unless the storysomehow underminesthe thought thatthe intuition is grounded incompetence. we arenot left with skep Having said that, ticismabout ethical intuitions. Interestingly are not enough, because ethical intuitions normative required by the concepts involved, one of the big sourcesof concernhistorically forethical intuition-ethical disagreement between competentpersons-might not be suchaworryafter all. If twoindividuals have

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a disagreementoverwhetherwater counts asH20, and each thinks theothercompetent with the concepts involved, thatproduces seriouspressureforeach disputantto recon by siderhis orher judgment. Intuition driven competence typically delivers strong justifi with disagreeing cation,but iftwodisputants they each are informed intuitions believe that at least they must believe that and competent, one person has erred.This generates some By pressuretodouble-checkone's intuition. ifgenuinedisagreement can happen contrast, with incompe without chargingone party tence thereis less pressureon each party to reconsider.Such disagreementswould be more like theoretical disagreements in the Each view has tobe mea various sciences. sured against otherstoseewhich countsas the mere fact of disagreement best theory, and the isno evidence that someonehas erred(except in failingto render a true judgment). 4. A FINAL REMARKON How SEEMINGS JUSTIFY Beforeclosingitis worthconsidering notjust whetherintuitions are justification conferring, countas evidence.Intuition but whetherthey have istsrather deny thatintuitions uniformly evidential status. Huemer explicitlydenies
that seemings that p count as evidence that p

in a way thatsupportsthebelief that p, and with foundationalism this claimhe associates Conservatism more generally:"Phenomenal are forms of andmy versionof intuitionism hold that we arejustified foundationalism: they insomebeliefs withoutthe need for supporting Audi espouses a similar evidence."26 position conclusions when he distinguishes of inference which are"premised on propo (non-intuitive), sitions notedas evidence," conclusions from of from which not do emerge (intuitive), reflection the isjustified, but that seeming justifies or as he otherwise "evidential putsit, belief premises," the Thus reflection on cases belief. particular information."27 represented "propositionally supportstheevidentialview of seemings. matters tonote thatthereis Itwill clarify Second, if some particular seeming that a verynatural way to characterizeevidence P is not evidence thatP, and so no reason

according towhich intuitions, and seeming states generally, count as evidence. That natural way of thinking is this: evidence that p just is a considerationthat epistemically sup ports p and provides some reason tobelieve that p.Reading evidence this way, ifintuitive seemingsthat p are not evidence that p, then intuitive seemingsthat p do notepistemically supportthe belief that p, and they do notpro vide some reason tobelieve that p. If intuitive justification requires intuition nonetheless, just what is relationtheintuition bears to this kind of justification? It looks like theonly answer left is that intuitions are necessary conditionson intuitive without justification actuallycontributing to intuitive justification by supporting propositions and providing reasons tobelieve in those propositions. Call thisthe intuitions as conditionsview. Let us call thealternative the intuitions as evidence view.Here are two argumentsfor accepting the intuitionsas evidence view over the intuitions as conditionsview. The first, cheap argumentis thattheevidential view of seemings is intuitively while right, is theintuitions as conditions view intuitively wrong. If so, intuition itself primafaciejusti fiestheintuitions as evidenceview.To make this less cheap considerparticularcases of as conditionsview intuition. The intuitions licensesparticular claims like thefollowing: "It looks like thereis a glass ofwater on the table,but I have no evidence thatthereis a glass ofwater on thetable; indeed,I have no reason tobelieve thereis a glass ofwater on thetable." At thelevelof particular examples like this,itcertainly seems like theintuition a rea counts as evidence,and so constitutes son to believe theglass is there. When one on the believes theglass is there justifiedly basis of the seeming, it is not just thatthe

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 266 / tobelieve thatP, it is hard to see why there wrongwhen epistemically would be anything P in the face of the one fails tobelieve that of course. Of course, seeming, ceterisparibus as conditionsview sayswhat the intuitions is rightabout thebelief should you have it, But why formthebelief? viz., it is justified. considera sensory To sharpenthecomplaint, Anne that experientialseeming. It seems to a glass ofwater is on the table (via a visual percept)butAnne is on thephonewith her and theroom roommate, usually trustworthy mate tellsher thatthereis no glass ofwater clearing on thetable (because he remembers day). On the a glass on the tableearlier that Anne be basis of theroommate'stestimony If the is glass on the table. lieves thatthere no Anne's as conditionsview is right, intuitions seeming is not itselfevidence, and she has with her roommate's no evidence inconflict and no reason tobelieve anything testimony, with theroommate'stestimony. inconsistent Anne has reason to Plainly, thatis not right. viz., itlooks her roommate'stestimony, reject like thereis a glass on thetable. Why do intuitionistsresist the eviden
tial view of seemings? Huemer thinks that

Direct awareness of things provides evidence for, and so a reason tobelieve in, propositions about those things. Though one's belief must be based on therequisite intuition tobe justified, the basing relation need not be inferential. It can be merely causal (thoughnot just any causal chain will do). do not fea And if Audi is right thatintuitions ture information, propositionally represented why not say thefollowing. The non-propositional character of in tuitions gives us evidence for, and so reason tobelieve in,certainpropositions. does not Evidentially based justification entail inference-basedjustification,and so intuitionists have no reason todeny the evidentialvalue of intuition. The view thatevidence entails inferenceis undermotivated, and it just doesn't follow from one verynatural way of thinking about evidence. 5. CONCLUSION In theend, all ethicistsappeal to intuition.
They can do no other. But it has been too

something like the evidential view would conflict with his position on direct realism, which sensoryexperiencesand according to our awareness of ex intuitions "constitute thattheevidential ternalthings."28 He thinks be internal viewwould requirethat seemings states, not awarenesses of external things, fromwhich one non-inferentially infers beliefs about "extra-mental reality."This connectionbetween evidence and inference Audi. Audi thinks thatintui is also foundin arenot based conclusionsof reflection tively would neces based on evidencebecause that tobelief. sitatenon-intuitive inference If But why does evidence entail inference? aboutdirectrealism, why not Huemer is right say thefollowing.

easy to gloss over thedetails of what these are andhow they This paperhas things justify. triedtoremedythat situation with thebegin nings of a more detailed view about ethical intuitions,contrasting themwith sensory seemings seemings and competence-driven structure both in terms of their and how they beliefs.The hope is thatthis justify provides an improved point forfurther inquiry starting in ethical epistemology.The views given on how ethical intuitions can here shed light be genuinely evidentialof ethical proposi tions without supporting thosepropositions inference. And they on also shed light through of substantive thestrength ethical intuitions and potentialdefeaters.29 University ofArizona

ETHICAL INTUITIONS /267 NOTES

1. For continuitywith the literature,thispaper takes the contents of intuitions tobe propositions. One could take them to be external things like objects and events as well. The literaturedoes not do so, which is likely due to an inclination to be epistemic internalistshere. 2. Audi 2004, p. 49. See also Audi 1999, p. 206; Audi 1998, p. 20; Audi 1996, p. 114. Note that Audi does not think that all intuitionshave self-evident propositions as theirobjects, though he does argue that ethical intuitions have self-evident propositions as their objects. Because ethical intuition is the primary focus here, this section only discusses his theoryof intuitions insofar as it involves understand ing the self-evident. 3. For a start see,Audi 2004, pp. 49-50. 4. See, e.g., Audi 2004, p. 44.

5. Audi 2004, p. 54. 6. Audi 2004, pp. 42^14. 7. Audi 2004, pp. 49, 54. 8. Huemer 2007, p. 30. For an earlier statement see Huemer 2005, p. 99. 9. Huemer 2007, p. 30 (footnotes omitted). 10. The following objection is not a good one: one's experiential seemings can change as one's doxastic makeup changes; therefore, the seeming is in an attitude.Doxastic changes only affect an experiential seeming thatp by affecting the content of the seeming. In the Muller-Lyer illusion, for instance, ifone line does not seem to you to be longer than the other, then the content of your experience must differ from thatof others. Either thator when you say 'I've learnedmy lesson - itdoesn't seem thatone line is longer anymore' you mean thatyou've learned towithhold doxastic acceptance of the proposition thatone line is longer. 11. See Whiteley andWarrington 1977 for a classic study. 12. See Bauer 1984. 1994.

13. See Ellis, Whitley, and Luaute 14. See Ellis and Young 1990.

15. An example of one such law is: ~(p a q) iff(~p) v (~q). 16. See Putnam 1975. 17. Huemer (2006) discusses a case like this, though he is concerned to show that introspective beliefs about the contents of one's intuitions can be false. 18. The issue might be more complicated than indicated. Some argue that the concept 'water' is like the concept 'jade' in that it can refer towatery stuffthat is not of our acquaintance, was not part of the baptism, doesn't regulate out use of the term,or what have you. Fortunately the taxonomy given and the epistemic options discussed do not depend on the outcome of this debate. If it turns out that the

XYZ is notwater is not competence-driven in the would not have ways discussed, then it judgment that the epistemic status accorded competence-driven intuitions, and the logical and mathematical cases would be more apt. 19. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to address an example like this.

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What is important 20. Note thata consequentialist's moral theory might influencehis intuitivereactions. is that the influence not render the justification inferential. Intuitions are meant to be non-inferential sources of justification. 21. Huemer 2008, p. 386. For some of these principles there is theworry of overgeneralization. For instance, (1) articulates some form of transitivityfor thebetter than relation.While many cases exhibit certain counterexamples seem to hold (see, e.g., Rachels 2006). Particularly telling is the transitivity, atomist-holist debate, related to the particularist-generalist debate, where holists argue that the value

of an itemX varies with X's context. If so, one can expect deviations from the unqualified transitivity principle in (1). 22. A negative ethical intuition,or a case where ethical proposition p seems false, is a case where there are negative features, such as felt doubt and concern, unfamiliarity, etc., or at least a case where there are no positive features, attending the consideration whether p. 23. Though thebasing relationship is absent fromHuemer's book, itdoes get included in some of his otherwork (see, e.g., Huemer 2007). Other ethical intuitionistsalso include a basing relationship. See, e.g., Audi 1999, p. 220. 24. A reviewer also suggested requirements of proper function, or Alstonian doxastic practice con straints,for these intuitions to justify.These are options, though theywould need to be enablers of the intuitions themselves, rather than factors thatdirectly contribute to justification, tomaintain a robustly intuitionistalternative to these views. 25. See Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, chap. 9. 26. Huemer 2005, p. 120. 27. Audi 2004, p. 45. 28. Huemer 2005, p. 121. 29. Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on a previous draft.

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_2008. "Revisionary Intuitionism," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 25, pp. 368-392. Kirchin, S. 2005. "What Is Intuitionism andWhy Be an Intuitionist?" Social Theory and Practice, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 581-606. athttp://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=7604. Putnam, H. 1975. "The Meaning of 'Meaning,'" inPhilosophical Papers, vol. 2:Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Rachels, S. 2006. "Counterexamples to theTransitivity of Better Than," inRecent Work on Intrinsic Value, ed.Michael Zimmerman and Toni R0nnow-Rasmussen (Dordrect: Springer), pp. 249-263. Ross, W. D. 1930. "The Right and theGood" (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing). Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe toEach Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press).

Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press). W. 2006. Moral Skepticisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Sinnott-Armstrong, Tolhurst,W. 1998. "Seemings," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 35, pp. 293-302. Whiteley, A. M., and E. K. Warrington. 1977. "Prosopagnosia: A Clinical, Psychological andAnatomical Study of Three Patients," Journal ofNeurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, vol. 40: 395^03.