1971 War Introduction

With 1971 commenced the most tragic year of our history. Failing to resolve a political problem by political means, a Martial Law regime, manipulated by some megalomaniac politicians, resorted to military action in East Pakistan on night 25/26 March. Widespread insurgency broke out. Personnel of two infantry divisions and Civil Armed Forces with weapons were airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines planes, over-flying about 5000 miles non stop via Sri Lanka in the first week of April 1971 the longest operational air move by Pakistan Army. By May near normalcy had been restored, thanks to the fast reaction, dedication and cool courage of our soldiers, sailors and airmen operating in a hostile environment under adverse climatic and terrain conditions, without adequate logistics and medical support. India's immoral covert armed intervention having failed, by October it had concentrated four times our strength in over 12 divisions (400,000) supported by five regiments of tanks, and about 50,000 activists trained and equipped by Indian Army. Indian Navy's one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers/frigates, two submarines and three landing crafts, against our four gunboats, eight Chinese coasters and two landing craft supported them. Eleven Indian Air Force squadrons 4 Hunter, 1 SU-7, 3 Gnat and 3 MiG 21 from five airfields around East Pakistan faced our one valiant Number 14 squadron of F-86F Sabres based on a single airfield around Dhaka . On 21 November, Eid day, when our fatigued soldiers had been operating in the most hostile environment for almost ten months, including a month of fasting, the Indian army felt emboldened enough to launch a full scale invasion at over twenty fronts in the east, west and north of East Pakistan . Divisions attacked our brigade positions; brigades attacked our battalion, company and platoon positions, supported by their armour, artillery and lair force. When most of our defensive positions, rooted to the ground, could not be overrun, Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. The aggressors could not capture, till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. For the Pakistani soldiers this was their finest hour, fighting against heavy odds with their backs to the wall inflicting heavy casualties, bloodied but unbowed when an Indian commander, through a messenger asked for our Jamalpur battalion to surrender, encircled by two brigades, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat of 31 Baloch replied in a message wrapped around a bullet which read, I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little; in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight. Similarly 4 Frontier Force under 205 Brigade (Brigadier Tajammul Malik) held out at Hilli for l19 days against 6 battalions, inflicting heavy casualties, till withdrawal on 11 December, after getting outflanked. Similar hard fought actions took place at Bahaduria and elsewhere by Punjab, Baloch, Frontier Force and Azad Kashmir units all arms and services, and Civil Armed Forces including West Pakistan Rangers and police units. 107 Brigades (Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Sitara-i-Juraat) held at bay a division of 5 brigades and 2 armour regiments at Khulna inflicting heavy casualties till 17 December and ceased fighting only after repeated orders of our Eastern Command. On the West Pakistan front, on 3 December 1971 , India attacked with the main effort against Shakargarh sector with three infantry divisions supported by three armoured brigades against our 8 Division front, operating under our 1 Corps (Commander Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan). The attack was halted in the tracks, inflicting heavy casualties. 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Mohammad Ahmed, Sitara-i-Juraat) effectively blocked and destroyed enemy penetration our minefield and saved Zafarwal from being outflanked by enemy armour. In Jammu and Kashmir , Chhamb, Lahore , Kasur, Sulemanki and Rajasthan sectors, war was carried into Indian territory , with success at some points, not so successfully at others due to inadequate forces and air support. For the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force this conflict was their finest hour. Fighting against overwhelming odds in both wings of the country raged with full fury. Before our counter offensive could be launched in West Pakistan , India asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. The Ghazis and Shaheeds proved in their supreme hour of trial all the military virtues of Faith, Honour, Valour, Fortitude, Endurance, Loyalty, Group

Cohesion and Unlimited Liability, and above all, the spirit of Jehad. On 4 December 1971 , the United States moved a draft resolution calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces, which was vetoed by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thereafter, another six resolutions including one by China were introduced calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, some of which were accepted by Pakistan. However, due to behind the scene political machinations by India and her allies their passage and implementation was stalled till Dhaka fell on 16 December 1971 and the cease-fire had been perfidiously converted to surrender. I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading which read Instrument of Surrender' writes Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, Chief of Staff, Indian, Eastern Army. (Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, Surrender at Dacca : Birth of a Nation). Flawed national and operational strategy proved to; be disastrous for Pakistan , both politically and militarily. Power, national and operational strategy, the methodology of crisis and conflict management, and higher direction of war in which we had been found wanting in 1971.

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1965 War Introduction

The Indian forces intruded into Pakistani area in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. In a sharp and short conflict, the Indian forces were ejected. Both the armies had fully mobilized, with eyeball to eyeball contact. Pakistan proposed cease-fire, India accepted. An agreement was signed: the forces disengaged. The Award by the Arbitration Tribunal vindicated Pakistan 's Position. Past midnight on 5/6 September, without a formal declaration of war, Indian Army crossed the international border and attacked Lahore and Kasur fronts. Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force halted the attack in its tracks, inflicting heavy casualties on the aggressor. On 7 September a single Pakistan Air Force Pilot, Squadron Leader M.M. Alam, Sitara-i-Juraat, in his F-86 Sabre shot down five Indian Air Force attacking Hunter aircraft in a single sortie, an unbeaten world record On night 6/7 September three teams of our Special Services Groups were para-dropped on Indian Air Force bases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara to neutralize them. To relieve pressure on Lahore front, on night 7/8 September, after crossing two major water obstacles in a bold thrust, Pakistani armoured and mechanized formations supported by artillery and Pakistan Air Force overran area Khem Karn, 6 to 8 miles inside Indian territory. Vital Indian positions at Sulemanki and across Rajasthan and Sindh were also captured in bold, swift attacks.

On night 7/8 September, 1 Corps of Indian Army launched its main effort east of Sialkot with one armoured and three infantry divisions on our extended 15 Division front, screened only by gallant 3 Frontier Force and B Company 13 Frontier Force (Reconnaissance & Support). 24 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier A.A Malik, Hilal-i-Juraat) on the move in area Pasrur, rushed 25 Cavalry (Lieutenant Colonel Nisar Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat), on 8 September to delay and disrupt enemy thrusts. As soon as the presence of Indian 1 Armoured Division was confirmed, Pakistan Army rushed forward to stop the onslaught on a 30mile front. The biggest tank battle since World War II was fought on the Chwinda front by 6 Armoured Division with under command 24 Infantry Brigade Groups and valiantly supported by 4 Corps Artillery (Brigadier A.A.K. Choudhry, Hilal-i-Juraat). The main effort of the Indian Army was blunted, inflicting heavy and troop casualties. Pakistan Air Force support helped turn the tide of the battle. Before a counter offensive by 6 Armoured Division on 22 September could be launched, Indian asked for ceasefire in the United Nations. India 's aggression against our international borders without a formal declaration of war had cost it, apart from heavy personnel, material land economic losses, 1617 sq. miles of territory as compared to 446 sq. miles of our open and undefended territory. Pakistan Army captured 20 officers, 19 Junior Commissioned Officers, and 569 Other Ranks.

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Chumik Operation Introduction

The Siachen dispute was added to the roster of major issues in IndoPakistan relations for the first time in April 1984. During the month, Indian Army airlifted mountain trained forces into position over-looking key passes in the Baltoro Range , a spur of the Karakoram Mountains , flanking the Siachen Glacier's southern rim, setting in motion a spectacular high-altitude military struggle with Pakistan that has continued unabated to the present day. Confronting one another in some areas at altitude over 6000 metres, the two armies contested for possession of a largely uninhabited, wedge-shaped piece of territory, about 2500 square kilometers in size, situated just south of the Chinese border. The struggle is on till today and a number of operations have been executed by both sides for occupation or retention of key areas / posts.

Background
Chumik is a minor sub sector of Bilafond Sub Sector, which has remained quiet since 1984 with the exception of Chumik Operation in 1989. Forwarded posts of the sub sector overlook Gyong Glacier and also dominate by observation, enemies Baniya Base. A Pakistani post was established in the Location of present Sher Post in 1985. The post was later withdrawn suffering heavy losses due to avalanches and enemy artillery fire the same year. The post was re-established in 1988 by 9 Northern Light Infantry on the order of Commander Force Command Northern Area. In the early spring of 1989, there were signal intercepts indicating enemy activity in the area. On 22 February 89 , enemy helicopter's conducted reconnaissance of the area followed by inaccurate artillery fire. Reconnaissance was conducted by Helicopter and it revealed that enemy had established five new posts/bases. Enemy had also occupied off shoots of point 22158 (the highest peak in the area which came to be known as Naveed Top after this operation). This gave enemy, the vital observation over our entire sub sector which could create serious problems in holding and maintenance of own posts. Enemy started engaging our forwarded posts, Ashgar Base and escalated the situation in the sub sector , forcing us to react.

Conduct of Operation
Relative strength and deployment in the area is as under:

Enemy
Enemy had intruded into Chumik area and occupied the area. Enemy's one complete battalion supported by different calibers of artillery and complete flight of Lama Helicopter took part in the operation. She established the following posts/bases which were supported through administrative bases of Bniya and Rani: GANGA One platoon SADHU One platoon (minus) AGRA -I One Section AGRA-II One Section with an artillery observer MG Position One Section with heavy Machine Gun Support Troops One Company in support role (for back up support).

Own
A company of regular troops was detailed to relieve Northern Light Infantry troops in the Chumik Sector on 10 April 1989 . The force was further strengthened later, which was necessary for the final eviction of the enemy from the Sector. Activities in this sector had intensified considerably and constant vigil was kept on the enemy activities. Risk of weakening of our forces in this area could therefore not be taken. Guns and mortars of available artillery in the area supported the operation. One company of Northern Light Infantry on relief from the sector was provided for assistance. Ten men of Special Services Group were provided for technical assistance and expertise. Four Lama Helicopters of Arms Aviation were provided to support the operation.

The Initial Plan

Company minus ex 9 Azad Kashmir was holding Chumik sub sector which was subsequently augmented by another company for offensive role. Helicopters were also provided for the operation, along with Special Services Group troops and additional 81 millimeter Mortars. It was planned to occupy the area to check the further movement of enemy. The out line plan was as follows:

Mission
To occupy the area by engaging enemy Ganga Base with observed artillery fire to interdict her Line of Communication.

Execution
The plan/task was to be accomplished in following phases: Phase-I Establish Kausar Base. Phase-II Establish Kausar 1, Kausar 2 and Kausar 3 Bases. Phase-III . Occupy the area.

First Attempt
Aerial reconnaissance of the area was carried out on 16 April 1989 . The expedition was sent out in establishing Kausar Base by mid night the same day. Kausar 1 was established on 17 April at a height of 17000 feet and in the same evening Kausar 2 was also established. It was found that movement thereafter was not possible due to extreme difficult nature of terrain. The expedition was immediately called off to avoid detection by the enemy.

Second Attempt
Force Commander Northern Area decided to drop Special Services Group persons on Saddle by helicopter. Effort was made to drop the persons but helicopter could not hover at such a low level where persons could jump basically because of poor weather and configuration of ground. The mission was once again aborted.

The Modified Plan

After failure of two missions, the plan was modified as under: Persons ex 9 Azad Kashmir and Special Service Group) to be sling dropped at the base with the aim of occupying the area, facilitating ultimate eviction of enemy. Two platoon size expeditions to make efforts for link up from two directions (One platoon each from 9 Azad Kashmir and 6 Northern Light Infantry).

Execution of the Plan

On 19 April 89 , the first helicopter took off. Lieutenant Naveed, a volunteer officer ex 9 Azad Kashmir was sling drooped at the Saddle. Captain Seghal and Captain Zia(got shahdat as Lt colonel on a UN mission), the pilots of helicopter also did a wonderful job and were able to release the slung officer at a flat place on the base (Naveed Base). Subsequently Naik Yaqoob, Special Services Group was also dropped to join Lieutenant Naveed. Some stores were also dropped in next sorties. But soon weather deteriorated making further drops impossible. It was 21 April when weather cleared and more persons were dropped. Then it was race between Indians and us to reach the top. Our troops made it to the top (Kamran Top) earlier than the enemy thus gaining the victory at a highest point in the world where battle has ever been fought. Eight Indian soldiers were discovered only 300 400 meters from Kamran Top who were forced to withdraw under own fire.

6 Northern Light Expedition

The expedition having left on 18 April was close to saddle on 25 April. Three officers with one Jawan were buried alive under tons of snow. This marked the end of expedition.

9 Azad Kashmir Expedition

The expedition under Captain Tariq took a good start on 22 April 89 . Its fire raided enemy's Agra I forcing her to vacate the base. Then proceeded to close with Agra II but could not succeed due to difficult terrain. The post was however engaged with artillery fire.

The First Blow

Enemy's intention of dominating Chumik Glacier began to fail when Ganga Base also known as Thappa Base was effectively engaged by artillery. The enemy was forced to shift the base. Destruction of Ganga Base probably forced enemy to give a second thought to her plans.

The Raid
On 30 April 1989 , a raiding party consisting of 11 persons including 4 officers was organized by Major Abdul Rehman Bilal. The party closed in with enemy machine gun position at approximately 1900 hours. The fire was opened which caught enemy by surprise. However, enemy soon retaliated with small arms and rocket fire. Own troops were relatively safe since Kamran Post was protected by a boulder. The raiding party in the meantime inflicted heavy damages to the enemy. This final blow forced enemy to withdraw asking for a meeting where almost all of our terms were accepted. The area was vacated and declared as de-militarized zone.

Casualties
Enemy Own Dead 34 6 (Shaheed) Wounded 150 44

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