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Who Participates in Democratic Revolutions? A Comparison of


the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions
Mark Beissinger, Amaney Jamal, and Kevin Mazur
Princeton University

















Prepared for Presentation at the American Political Science Association Meetings: August 29
th
-September 2
nd
, New Orleans.

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Abstract:
This paper uses highly unusual, individual-level data on protest participation in the Tunisian and
Egyptian revolutions to evaluate the leading causal theories behind the Arab Spring (and
democratic revolutions, more generally) by connecting a representative sample of the population
involved in protest activism with the conditions impelling their participation. It does so by
evaluating a series of hypotheses about who should be expected to participate in these
revolutions if specific theoretical explanations hold true. After establishing the patterns of who
participated, we compare them with those of another democratic revolution outside the region
the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The paper also investigates who among the participants
in these revolutions prioritized civil and political rights over other ends (i.e., constituted the
democratic vanguard within these revolutions). We find that explanations emphasizing value
change, secularization, and absolute material deprivation are wanting. Protesters in both Egypt
and Tunisia were predominantly males of middle class occupational and income profiles, and at
least as religious as other members of their societies. The evidence also shows that most
participants were motivated primarily by economic demands (and to a lesser extent, corruption),
not by desires for civil and political freedoms. Those most likely to champion democratic values
within these revolutions were not youth, the educated, or the middle class, but those involved in
civil society associations. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these
findings for our understanding of democratization and democratic revolution and for the
challenges posed by the nature of democratic revolutionary coalitions for post-revolutionary
governments.


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The revolutions of the Arab Spring witnessed massive political upheavals, as citizens
across a number of Arab countries rushed to the streets in protest against their respective
regimes. In a matter of weeks two longstanding authoritarian regimesthe Ben-Ali dictatorship
in Tunisia and the Mubarak dictatorship in Egyptfell, while leaders in other Arab countries
braced for the worst. As the Arab Spring unfolded across the region, both spectators and
participants labeled these protest movements as democratizing revolutions that were sweeping
the Arab world. Indeed, free-and-fair elections were held in the aftermath of protests in both
Egypt and Tunisia. To many, it appeared that democratic change had finally reached the Arab
world.
Yet these transformations leave us with many more questions than answers. For one
thing, other than impressionistic accounts from journalists or eyewitnesses, we know little about
the individuals who filled Tahrir and November 7 Squares
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and who acted to bring about regime
change, or about the individual grievances and preferences that motivated them to mobilize in
the face of likely repression. If these revolutions are rightly understood as democratic
revolutions,
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what were the attitudes of the protestors toward democratic freedoms and liberties?
Were those who participated primarily motivated by a desire for democracy, or by other matters,
such as economic concerns? Or were they primarily motivated by Islamist beliefs? After all, in
both Egypt and Tunisia Islamist partiesthe Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahdaultimately
won the first free-and-fair elections held in the wake of these revolutions. Thus, this paper asks
the following questions: who participated in the Arab revolution protests and why? How were

1
The latter square, in central Tunis, was at the time of the revolution named for the date of Ben Alis takeover in
1987. It has since been renamed Mohamed Bouazizi Square.
2
We define a democratic revolution as a popular uprising that overthrows a dictatorship and brings about some
degree of democratizing change (at a minimum, free-and-fair electoral competition and a broadening of civil and
political freedoms) in its wake. See Thompson, 2004.
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they similar or different from the societies from which they hailed? What does this tell us about
the political processes underlying democratic revolutions more generally?
Several schools of thought directly point to the important role that individuals play in
demanding democracy, and theories of democratization and revolution provide us with a basic
roadmap of expectations for predicting which individuals would likely participate in a
democratic revolution. However, rarely do we have available to us systematic information in
order to be able to evaluate those expectations. As we know, revolutions typically occur
suddenly, taking both observers and participants by surprise (Kuran, 1995). Therefore, it is
highly unusual to have a detailed cross-sectional record of the attitudes and backgrounds those
who participated in a revolution, or to be able to compare them with other members of society.
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In this paper we are able to do precisely that for two revolutions. Using an original dataset from
the Second Wave Arab Barometer, which includes surveys administered in Tunisia and Egypt
after the Arab Revolutions, we examine the extent to which the backgrounds, attitudes, and
behaviors of those who participated in the protest movements in Egypt and Tunisia map onto
theoretical expectations.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we offer a literature review on the relevant theories
linked to participation in the protest activities that often accompany and foster democratic
change, generating a number of hypotheses about who participates in democratic revolutions for
empirical testing. Where relevant, we link these arguments with the various folk explanations
that have arisen concerning the Arab Spring. Second, using unique survey data, we examine the
extent to which protesters in Tunisia and Egypt mirror these hypothesized agents of democratic
revolution within existing theoretical and folk accounts. Third, we provide some brief

3
For a discussion of why survey research has been difficult to mount in the context of protest waves, see Tarrow,
1991. For some of the few studies of revolution that utilize surveys of participants, see Lohmann, 1994; Opp, Voss,
and Gern, 1995; Beissinger, 2011.
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comparisons of who participated in these revolutions with analogous data on protestors in
another democratic revolution outside the regionthe 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine.
Fourth, we take our analysis of the Arab Spring revolutions to the next level by examining who,
among those who protested, specifically prioritized democratic demands as opposed to other
issues. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for our
understanding of democratic revolution and post-revolutionary political processes.
The paper demonstrates a number of important findings. First, we show that economic
grievances (and to a lesser extent, grievances over corruption) dominated the concerns of
participants in both revolutions, while civil and political freedoms ranked low among priorities
for the vast majority of participants. Thus, for most participating in democratic revolutions,
democratic revolutions are not necessarily about achieving democratic values, but about other
issues. This finding is consistent with Rustows (1970) well-known observation that democracy
is not the deterministic result of certain structural configurations or cultural proclivities but the
fortuitous by-product of a struggle between societal actors. Second, we show that the Egyptian
and Tunisian revolutions were composed disproportionately of middle-class males, with
professionals, government employees, private sector employees, and managers comprising a
significant portion of the participants. Third, we show that the constituencies that mobilized in
these two revolutions differed from one another in important respects. The Egyptian revolution
was very much of a revolution of the middle-aged, the middle class, professionals, and the
religious, whereas the Tunisian revolution was younger, more secular, and more diverse in its
social composition, with workers, students, and the unemployed also participating in significant
numbers (in this sense, representing more of a nation-wide, cross-class coalition). Even so, we
show that the Tunisian revolution was not as representative of various classes as the Orange
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Revolution in Ukraine, as it was not based on the kind of sharp regional and identity cleavages
that characteristic of the Ukrainian case. Thus, democratizing revolutions have a variety of
coalitional patterns that are not summed up by any single theory. Third, we find that among those
who participated in these revolutions, participation in civil society associations is the factor most
closely associated with whether participants prioritized democratic values or saw the revolution
as primarily motivated by other factors. Thus, the nuts and bolts of democratization such as
civil society are critical in underpinning the democratic direction of democratic revolutions.

Participation in Democratic Revolution: Theories and Hypotheses
The literatures on democratization and revolutions provide us with a basic roadmap of
expectations about which citizens should be playing significant roles in bringing about
democratic revolutions and why. Indeed, most bottom-up accounts of democratizationthose
that argue that societies are important agents for democratizing changecontain explicit or
implicit arguments about the types of citizens who act as agents of democratization. For
example, a large number of the classic works in the fieldfrom Almond and Verba (1963) to
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989); from Inglehart (1990) to Huntington (1991) and Putnam
(1993)linked democratization to underlying shifts in societal values and orientations
associated with modernization that pre-condition democratic change. These authors argued that
as societies become more educated and more urban, worldviews become more cosmopolitan,
more universal, and more favorable to democracy. By implication, one should expect that those
who take to the streets in order to champion democratic change would be those who are most
supportive of (and who are primarily motivated by) democratic values (See, for instance, Dahl
1971: 132-160).
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Some of these theories also posit that particular categories of citizens should be at the
forefront of democratizing mobilizations, given the nature of the value-change process. Lipset
(1959), for example, places particular emphasis on education as a key determinant of democratic
values, leading one to believe that the more highly educated citizens should disproportionately
participate in democratic revolution. In other modernization formulations, there is the built-in
assumption that societies undergoing modernization will witness cohort shifts where newer
generations will hold more modern, egalitarian, and democratic worldviews (Inglehart, 1990), so
that youth in particular should be expected to be at the forefront of revolutionary democratic
change. Indeed, several journalists, scholars, and policy makers covering the events of the Arab
Spring linked the events to a youth population that was more oriented towards a set of universal
democratic values.
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These "folk" beliefs about the Aiab Spiing emphasizeu two intei-ielateu
points: fiist, it has been wiuely thought that these ievolutions weie laigely championeu by
the youth of iegion; anu seconu, these youth weie thought to have been in opposition to
Islamistieligious politics anu to have embiaceu seculai, uemociatic values.
Civil society accounts of democratization and democratic revolution have emphasized the
important roles that civic associations play in democratic regime-change. This scholarship
examines the role of civic associations instilling key democratic values, orientations, and
commitments, as schools for civic virtues and generators of social capital, and as counterweights
to existing authoritarian rulers (Putnam, 1993). In this perspective, associational life not only can
check the powers of the state; it also encourages citizen participation, provides the critical

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For example, David Gardner (2011), writing in the Financial Times, argued that There is a lot to celebrate that
among the young [population] in an awakening Arab world there are, against all odds, democrats to democratize
with. Similarly, John Esposito (2011), writing for CNN, stated that Having witnessed the failures of Islamist
authoritarian regimes in Sudan, Iran, the Talibans Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia and the terror of the Bin Ladens
of the world, they [the youth] are not interested in theocracy but democracy with its greater equality, pluralism,
freedoms and opportunities. See also Rami Khoury, quoted in Agence France Presse, 2011. For a similar view with
respect to the colored revolutions, see Karatnycky, 2005.
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networks necessary for mobilizing individuals, and helps the development of a democratic
culture of tolerance and bargaining (Diamond and Plattner, 1989). In the Egyptian context,
Hamalawy (2011) notes that activism around the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the Iraq
war in 2003 created links among activists and a space for criticism of the regime that would
facilitate the 2011 protests. Several accounts of the Arab revolutions hold that labor unions and
mosques played critical roles in mobilizing people into the streets (Beinin, 2011). Thus, one
might expect that those most likely to participate in democratic revolutions and most likely to
champion democratic values within those revolutions would be individuals who are involved in
civic associations and who have high levels of social capital.
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Yet, civil society associations in
authoritarian settings have been known in some instances to reflect the orientations of the regime
(Jamal, 2007). There is also some question of the role played by face-to-face association (i.e.,
strong ties) in promoting democracyparticularly at a moment in history when the weak
ties of the internet have come to play such a critical role in mobilizational politics.
Another set of accounts of democratic change focuses on the role of religion in society.
The secularization thesis argues that, as modernization proceeds, people become less religious
and more secular, and more supportive of toleration and political and civil rights (Inglehart and
Norris, 2003). A related argument focuses specifically on Islam, arguing that Islam as a religion
is incompatible with democracy for a number of reasons. Some maintain that Muslims are more
likely to accept the status quo, no matter how injurious it is to them, because Islam commands
political submission (Kedourie, 1992). Others, such as Huntington (1996), argue that Islam and
democracy are inherently incompatible because Islam emphasizes the community over the
individual and recognizes no division between church and state. Still others (Fukuyama, 1992)
argue that Islam poses a grave threat to liberal democracy because its doctrinal emphasis lacks a

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On the role of civil society in the colored revolutions, see Stepanenko, 2006; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011.
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liberal democratic orientation. In a similar vein, Fish (2002) maintains that Islam hurts
democracy, because Muslims lack the necessary tolerance towards women that is crucial for the
foundations of a society based on equality. Thus, a number of theories would lead one to believe
that Arab citizens who are more religious would be less likely to champion democracy or to
participate in a democratic revolution.
Other theories focus on specific class-based actors as the likely participants in
democratizing revolutions. Both Moore (1966) and Huntington (1991), in different ways,
highlighted the emergence of new economic forces in society through economic development (in
particular, the emergence of autonomous bourgeoisie and middle-class sectors) as critical to the
democratization process. In Huntingtons account, for instance, a broad and expanding middle
class, consisting of businesspeople, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants,
managers, technicians, and clerical and sales workers, sees democracy as a means for securing
their own interests; as he writes (1991, 67), In virtually every country the most active supporters
of democratization came from the urban middle class. Others, by contrast, influenced by
developments in Latin America and Southern Europe, highlight the mobilized actions undertaken
by the working class, especially organized labor, in bringing about democratic reforms(Collier
and Mahoney 1997; Rueschemeyer, Stephen, and Stephens 1992; Bermeo, 1997). Still others
have argued that democratic revolutions rely heavily on cross-class coalitions that pull together
variegated individuals largely on a national rather than class basis (see, for instance, Thompson,
2004; Slater, 2009; Goldstone, 2011).
There has also long been a strain of thought within the study of revolution (dating from
Aristotle) that has connected revolutions with objective inequalities, and indeed the recent
literature on democratization has focused on the threat of revolution due to social inequality as a
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driver of democratization (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). On the basis of these
assumptions, one might expect that those participating in democratizing revolutions might be
predominantly the relatively disadvantaged, prioritizing economic gains and redistribution over
democratic values. By contrast, the collective action paradigm (and the resource mobilization
school associated with it) would lead us to believe that those most likely to challenge a
dictatorial government in high-risk collective action would be those who derive their income or
resources independently of the government (i.e., those not employed in the public sector) (Olson,
1971; Tullock, 1971; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Hardin, 1995; Lichbach, 1995).
Thus, based on this review of the literature, we can stipulate the following hypotheses to
be tested concerning who participated in the Arab Spring revolutions:
HI: Those who participate in democratic revolutions should predominantly be those
citizens who prioritize democratic values over other concerns.
H2. More highly educated citizens should be expected to participate disproportionately in
democratic revolutions and to champion democratic ends within those revolutions.
H3: Youth should be more likely to participate in democratic revolutions than older
generations and to support political and civil freedoms within those revolutions. Moreover, one
should find a pattern of participation and support for democracy that gradually attenuates with
age.
H4: Members of civil society associations and those with high levels of social capital are
more likely to participate in democratic revolutions and to champion democratic values within
those revolutions.
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H5: Individuals who are less religious should be more likely to participate in democratic
revolutions and defend democratic values within those revolutions, particularly in predominantly
Islamic societies.
Those participating in and championing democratic values within democratic revolutions
may or may not be predominantly from a certain class, as the literature is divided over whether
class plays a significant role in democratization, and which class, if class any, plays the leading
role. Therefore we advance four competing hypotheses:
H6A: Those participating in and championing democratic values within
democratic revolutions should be predominantly from the urban middle class.
H6B: Those participating in and championing democratic values within
democratic revolutions should be predominantly from the working class.
H6C: Those participating in democratic revolutions should constitute a national,
cross-class coalition.
H6D: Those participating in democratizing revolutions should be predominantly
the relatively disadvantaged, who prioritize economic gains and redistribution
over democratic values.
And finally, based on the collective action paradigm:
H7: Those most likely to participate in a democratic revolution should be those not
employed in the public sector.

Method and Sample
The survey data utilized in this study come from the second round of the Arab Barometer
study, a survey about political life, governance and political, social and cultural values
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administered in eleven Arab countries. The survey was fielded in Egypt in July 2011 and in
Tunisia in April 2011shortly after the revolutionary tide that swept across these countries. The
Arab Barometer survey was not originally designed as a survey aimed at studying the Arab
Spring revolutions. However, an additional battery of questions on the revolutions was added to
the survey in this round that not only allow us to identify who participated in these revolutions,
but also their attitudes toward and understanding of these revolutions. In Egypt, 1,220 people
were surveyed, while in Tunisia 1,196 were surveyed.
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In Egypt 8 percent of the sample reported participating in demonstrations surrounding the
revolution, compared to 16 percent of those surveyed in Tunisia. The difference in rates of
participation between Egypt and Tunisia may seem puzzling at first glance. However, as will be
shown below, somewhat different segments of Egyptian and Tunisian societies participated in
these revolutions. Differences in population size and dispersion also provide some basic
intuitions about why one might expect divergent rates of participation in Egypt and Tunisia.
Tunisia is a state of 10.7 million people, whereas Egypts population is 82.5 million (World
Bank 2011). Scaling participation rates up to total population (an enterprise that needs to be
interpreted with caution given our sample size in each case) would imply that over six million
Egyptians participated in the Egyptian Revolution, while less than two million Tunisians turned
out in the Tunisian Revolution. Thus, though the percentage of individuals protesting in Egypt
looks smaller, the absolute number of people on the street in Egypt was likely quite a bit larger
than was the case in Tunisia. In addition, the geographic pattern and timing of the revolutions
could also account for divergent levels of turnout. The Tunisian protests began in a small

6
The Egyptian survey was administered by Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studiesled by Gamal
Abdel Gawad. The survey was administered during the month of June (2011) and relied on area probability
sampling approach. The survey in Tunisia was administered by Sigma Groupled by Youssef Meddeb. The survey
was administered during the month of October (2011) and relied on an area probability sample.
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provincial town, Sidi Bouzid, and slowly made their way to the capital over the course of several
weeks. The Egyptian protests, by contrast, began in the countrys two major cities, Cairo and
Alexandria, and had millions on the street within four days of the first protest. Because the
Egyptian protests began rapidly in the place where all revolutionary movements aim to end up--
at the seat of power, they afforded less opportunity than the Tunisian protests for undecided
individuals to throw in with the revolution.

Who Participated in the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions

Protest participants in both Tunisia and Egypt tended to be overwhelmingly male, with
above average levels of income and education, and from professional or clerical occupational
backgrounds. The profiles of protesters in each country differed most strikingly by age. Though
protesters were younger than the overall population mean in both countries, Tunisian youth
comprised a larger portion of the demonstrators, with 60 percent of demonstrators under the age
of 35, compared with 44 percent in Egypt (This age group comprised 43 percent of the total
sample in both countries). Rather, in Egypt, the 35 to 44 year old group had the highest rate of
participation, constituting 29 percent of the protesters, but only 22 percent of the total
population. Table 1 gives an indication of the differing age compositions of protesters.
Moreover, a multivariate regression of participation on age underscores this point; no age group
is statistically different from the 35-44 year old group in Egypt, but the coefficient on the
youngest Tunisian group is both substantively and statistically significant (see Table 2).
[Tables 1 and 2 here]
The participation of students provides further evidence on the age divergence between
participants in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. Thus, students comprised 19 percent of
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Tunisian demonstrators but only 3 percent of Egyptian demonstrators.
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This difference is not
reducible to age, as Tunisian students participated at strikingly high rates. Within the 18 to 24
age group, which contains over 90 percent of the student population in both countries, 37 percent
of Tunisian students participated, compared to 25 percent of non-students. Among Egyptians of
the same age group, the figures were 8 percent among students and 8 percent among non-
students.
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The cross-tabulations alone give lie to folk theories that the Arab revolutions were
caused primarily by youth frustration or had among them a single set of causal factors; whereas
youth (and especially students) participated at high rates in Tunisia, a group nearing middle age
formed the core of the Egyptian demonstrators. The age of Egyptian protesters implies that
modernization theses emphasizing value change due to cohort effects (Hypothesis 3) seem not to
be operating in Egypt.
Explanations linking protest to absolute levels of material deprivation (Hypothesis 6D)
are similarly unsupported by the data. Given the amount of scholarly and popular attention
devoted to poor employment prospects as a cause of frustration and revolution in the Arab
world,
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one might expect unemployment to be a significant positive predictor of protest
behavior. Yet unemployment is not a statistically significant predictor of participation, even in a
bivariate logistic regression, for either country (See Table 3). Participation rates for the
unemployed track those for the general population in Egypt, with 5 percent of the total sample

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Clearly, the number of students in the sample is partially responsible for this differential; students comprised 3
percent of the Egyptian sample and 9 percent of the Tunisian sample. The importance of Tunisian students is
underscored, however, by the differential turnout rates among students (8 percent in Egypt versus 35 percent in
Tunisia). The wide divergence in proportion of students in the overall population seems to be an artifact of sampling
procedures; the Egyptian and Tunisian statistical agency reports show that 4 percent of individuals over over 18
years old in both populations are students (CAPMAS 2008, World Bank 2010, National Institute of Statistics
Tunisia 2010, authors calculations).
8
While the p value for a difference of means test between students and non-students in Tunisia is 0.053, it does not
approach statistical significance for Egypt. It is possible that the low student turnout in Egypt is an artifact of the
small sample size, as students constitute 3 percent of the Egyptian sample and 9 percent of the Tunisian sample. The
fact that most Egyptian protesters were older, however, lends support to the notion that students did not form the
critical mass of protesters there, however critical they may have been in engineering the early stages of protest.
9
See, for example, Al-Arabiyya 2011 and the UNDPs Arab Development Challenges Report 2012.
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unemployed and 5 percent of demonstrators unemployed. The unemployed constituted a far
larger share of the demonstrators in Tunisia, both in absolute terms and relative to their share of
the general population; unemployed comprised 22 percent of the Tunisian demonstrators but 18
percent of the general population.
10
Unemployment is highly correlated with age in both
countries, but the unemployed population in Egypt is on average younger than in Tunisia
(Tunisians under 35 comprise 43 percent of the sample but 66 percent of the unemployed, while
in Egypt this age category constitutes only 43 percent of the sample but 80 percent of the
unemployed). Income profiles lend further credence to the notion that absolute deprivation was
not a major factor. If frustration among the most disadvantaged segments of the population was
the primary cause of participation in the revolutions, we would expect to see high levels of
turnout among the lowest income segments. Yet as shown in Table 1, the poorest two income
quintiles had the lowest rates of participation in both countries, and a bivariate regression of
participation on income quintiles (Table 3) indicates that the likelihood of protest rises with
increasing income.
[Table 3 here]
Educational profiles provide further evidence that the poorest were not the catalyst for the
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, as protesters in both Tunisia and Egypt tended to be
significantly more educated than non-protesters (See Table 1). Those with the highest level of
education (at least some university) constituted 46 percent of Egyptian protesters, though only 19
percent of the total population. In Tunisia, this group comprised 28 percent of the demonstrators,

10
The wide gap in unemployment rates is surprising, yet reflects World Bank statistics. The World Bank reports 9
percent total unemployment for Egypt and 14 percent for Tunisia in 2008, the most recent available statistics. Youth
(15-24) unemployment in Tunisia was 31 percent for males and 29 percent for females and 55 percent for females
but only 21 percent for males (2005 for Tunisia, 2006 for Egypt, both most recent available). The relatively low
unemployment numbers for Egypt likely reflect underemployment and movement out of the formal workforce into
the informal sector (World Bank 2010).
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but only 17 percent of the total population. The bivariate regression of participation on education
is substantively and statistically significant in both cases (Table 3), and this relationship holds
when subjected to multivariate controls.
11
While statistical tests on observational data cannot in
themselves prove a causal relationship, the correlation between education and protest turnout
provides some tentative support for the theory that education creates certain predispositions
towards democracy (H2).
In view of protesters educational attainments, both Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions
could be interpreted as predominantly middle class revolutions (Hypothesis 6A). Classical
Marxist accounts of democratization, like that of Moore (1966), identified the crucial middle
actor as an active class of merchants and entrepreneurs in towns.
12
Yet the set of small
bourgeoisie opposed to landed interests in a largely agrarian economy responsible for English
industrial takeoff and democratization seem not to be present in the 2011 Egyptian and Tunisian
cases; not only is the production structure in both Egypt and Tunisia far more manufacturing-
and service-oriented than that of early developing England, but the owners of Egyptian and
Tunisian capital are to varying degrees aligned with the state.
13

Rather, in the contemporary literature the term middle class tends to refer either to a set
of relatively new urban occupations (cf. Huntington 1991) or to a certain range of individual
earnings (Ravallion 2009). Some support for the notion that these were middle class revolutions
exists according to both definitions. The Arab Barometer contains detailed occupation
information, with thirteen different categories including groups outside the labor force (see

11
The multivariate specification with education (Table 2, column II) excludes occupation and income variables
because the high degree of correlation between these three variables makes precise estimation of a fuller model
difficult.
12
Rational choice institutional accounts highlight similar intermediate actors; Stasavage (2002) identifies the
favorable balance of power between land, capital and the crown as the critical factor impelling the development of
British parliamentary institutions.
13
The close relationship between industrialist classes and the state has been documented in many Arab states. See
Soliman 2011 and Amin 2011 on Egypt, Murphy 1999 on Tunisia and Richards and Waterbury 1995, generally.
17
Occupation section of Table 1). Four of the occupational categories accord with Huntingtons
(1991) definition of the urban middle class: professional, employer or director of an institution,
government employee and private sector employee.
14
These categories are overrepresented
among protesters relative to their share of the general population in both states. Only private
sector employees in Tunisia participate at average levels for the general population (Table 1).
These four categories, if taken together as a middle class, constitute 55 percent of the Egyptian
demonstrators but only 25 percent of the general population. In particular, professionals stand
out as an especially active group in the Egyptian revolution, constituting 17 percent of
demonstrators but only 5 percent of the population. Their prevalence in the protesting group does
not seem to be an artifact of other demographic factors; an ordinary logistic regression of protest
participation on a professional dummy variable with age and gender controls shows the
professional category to be statistically significant. By contrast, the professional category is not
statistically different from zero in the same regression for Tunisia.
15
In Tunisia, the four middle
class categories comprise 30 percent of the demonstrators but only 19 percent of the population.
In this respect, while the middle class was significantly over-represented among participants in
both revolutions, the Tunisian revolution was more diverse in terms of the class background of
its participants than the Egyptian revolution, resembling more of a cross-class alliance, with

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The category professionals includes lawyers, accountants, teachers and doctors. The word used in the
questionnaire for government and private sector employees (muwazzaf) implies a clerical or administrative
position, distinguished from manual work. The educational and income profiles of these groups further support this
characterization; 79 percent of Egyptian government employees and 75 percent of private sector employees are in
the top 60 percent of the income distribution and 80 percent of Tunisian government employees and 90 percent of
private sector employees are in the two quintiles of the income distribution. Forty-seven percent of Egyptian and 38
percent of Tunisian government employees have a bachelors degree or more compared with 19 percent overall in
Egypt and 17 percent in Tunisia.
15
The z-score for the professional dummy on the Egyptian sample is 3.88, compared to 1.23 for Tunisia.
Professionals constitute a small part of the sampled population5 percent of the total Egypt sample and 4 percent
for Tunisia. This is cause for some caution, though the age and education profiles of protesters compared to the
general population, detailed above, provide some confidence that this variation is not idiosyncratic.
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workers constituting 17 percent of participants, students19 percent, and the unemployed21
percent.
The high rate of participation among government employees (21 percent of Egyptian
protesters versus 13 percent of the total population, and 12 percent of Tunisian protesters versus
7 percent of the total population) casts doubt on the resource mobilization theories predicting that
individuals whose income is tied to the state will be more likely to be quiescent (Hypothesis 7).
The most direct beneficiaries of state largesse, such as Ben Alis son-in-law Mohamed Sakher al-
Materi (who kept tigers on his personal residence and had frozen yogurt flown in on his private
jet from St. Tropez) were obviously unlikely to protest against these regimes (Raghavan 2011).
But the data show that most civil servants were given insufficient perquisites to bind them to the
regime; Egyptian government employees were at the 62
nd
percentile in the income distribution
and their Tunisian counterparts were at the 74
th
percentile.
The picture when one defines the middle class by income and consumption patterns, as
economists normally do, is less clear. The canonical definition in this scholarship is from
Thurow (1987), who locates the middle class between 75 percent and 125 percent of mean
earnings in the country. This literal middle of the income distribution seems not to have been the
crucial segment in either Tunisia or Egypt. The top income quintile was overrepresented among
protesters in Egypt and Tunisia, comprising 29 percent and 28 percent, respectively, of all
protesters; in both countries there is a steady decline in protest turnout rates moving from the top
to the bottom income quintiles.
16
Other economists have attempted to locate an externally

16
A top quintile income dummy is a statistically significant predictor for turnout in a bivariate context for both
countries, but its statistical significance disappears in both cases when a dummy for the highest level of education is
included. The coefficient on the top level of education is significant for Egypt in the aforementioned multivariate
regression (z score is 4.18), but drops to marginal significance (z score of 1.67) for Tunisia. This is unsurprising
given that the correlation between the income quintile measure and education measure is 0.4325 for Egypt and
0.5219 for Tunisia.
19
anchored line at which a middle class begins. Banerjee and Duflo (2008) argue that the middle
class in the developing world consists of people earning between $2 and $10 a day, and
Milanovic and Yitzaki (2002) draw the upper and lower bounds for the middle class at the mean
per capita incomes of Brazil and Italy ($PPP 3470 and $PPP 8000 in 2002 dollars, respectively).
Ravaillon (2009) criticizes the $2 per day lower bound for being arbitrary and low, proposing
bounds of $9 to $13 for a category of developing world upper middle class. Whatever the
exact bounds of the middle class, it is a useful exercise to investigate the participation of
individuals from an income range considered propitious for democracy in other contexts The
median per capita annual income in the Egyptian sample was $1,937, or $5.31 per day and in
Tunisia, $4,690 and $12.85, respectively; the 80
th
percentile in Egypt was $8.91 per day or
$3254 per year, and in Tunisia, $17 per day or $6298 per year.
17
On the Ravaillon definition, the
Tunisian case appears not to be a middle class revolution, as the excluded top quintile
contributed the largest share of protesters (28 percent) of any quintile in the sample. The middle
class defined by Milanovic and Yitzaki for both states, and by Ravaillon for Egypt, includes the
top income quintile and, more generally, the income groups that participated at the highest
levels. A definitive evaluation of middle class theories using these externally defined income
definitions is difficult because the actual income distributions of Tunisia and Egypt provide
insufficient variation to evaluate protest behavior at incomes above the middle class range. In

17
Updating for inflation, Milanovic and Yitzakis bounds become $PPP 4,337 and $PPP 10,000. The income figures
quoted in the are in nominal terms; accounting for purchasing power parity, the mean and 80
th
percentile for the
Egyptian sample in 2011 US dollars (PPP) are $3,941 and $6,737. For Tunisia, the numbers are $9,495 and $12,750,
respectively. Thus, most of the top half of the Egyptian distribution would be included in the middle class defined by
Ravaillon, though Milanovic and Yitzaki would exclude approximately the top quintile. In Tunisia, the top two
quintiles would seem to be excluded from both definitions by dint of being too affluent. These conversions should
be viewed with caution, however, as they are likely overstated; the 2010 GDP (PPP) per capita for Egypt was $6540
and $9454 for Tunisia. Given the inequality of income distributions, these measures of GDP per capita imply that
actual per capita incomes are a great deal lower. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to infer that the income-defined
middle classes of both countries fall in the upper regions of both income distributions, excluding only a small group
at the very top of each distribution. Figures are from Heston et al. 2012, BLS 2012, IMF 2012.
20
spite of this limitation, individuals near the top of the Egyptian and Tunisian distributions, and
therefore in the middle of the global income distribution, formed a disproportionate bloc of
demonstrators in both revolutions.
In contrast to the elusive middle class, the working class seems not to have been critical
in either revolution (Hypothesis 6b). It is true that that 58 percent of union and professional
syndicate members participated in Tunisia, compared to 15 percent of non-members; in Egypt 19
percent of Egyptian union members participated, compared to 7 percent of non-members. But an
investigation into the occupational profiles of these union members confirms that members came
overwhelmingly from the professional strata identified earlier. Only 2 percent of Egyptians who
identified their occupation as worker were members of unions, and government employees
constituted the largest occupational group of union members (39 percent of total union
members), followed by professionals (23 percent). In Tunisia, no self-identified workers were
union members, and government employees similarly constituted the largest group of union
members (44 percent of all union members), followed by the other employed (19 percent) and
professionals (14 percent).
18
Workers in fact participated at average levels in both countries,
constituting 9 percent of protesters and 10 percent of the total sample in Egypt, and 17 percent of
protesters and 14 percent of the sample in Tunisia.
As social movement theorists might predict (McAdam and Paulson, 1993), participants in
the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions were a heavily networked population. Highlighting the
critical importance of weak ties, internet usage was far higher among protesters in both Egypt
and Tunisia than in society as a whole. While Egyptian internet usage
19
stood at only 18 percent
of the sampled population, internet users comprised 49 percent of all demonstrators. The rate of

18
The findings of the Arab Barometer sample are broadly consistent with national statistics about union
participation in Tunisia and Egypt.
19
Internet usage is defined here as using the internet at least once a month.
21
internet usage in Tunisia was even higher, at 33 percent for society as a whole, and 62 percent of
demonstrators.
20
The correlation between internet usage and protest participation is robust to
inclusion of all the aforementioned markers of middle class membership in multivariate analysis
(Table 2). Clearly, the internet served as a mechanism for protesters to coordinate, as evidenced
by the importance of the We are all Khaled Said Facebook page for organizing the first protests
in Egypt on January 25
th
(Herrera 2011). But it is not clear from the cross-tabulated data on
internet use and participation alone whether internet use inculcated attitudes propitious to protest
behavior of whether it functioned merely as a conduit for logistical details. Analysis of the
relationship between internet use and participant attitudes is taken up in the following section.
As Hypothesis 4 would predict, civic association membership was strongly associated
with protest turnout in both Egypt and Tunisia, and this relationship holds up in both bivariate
and all multivariate specifications (Tables 2 and 3). Survey respondents saying they belonged to
at least one civic organization comprised 46 percent of demonstrators in Egypt, though they
constituted only 15 percent of the population. Similarly, members of non-political organizations
in Tunisia constituted 21 percent of the protesting population but only 6 percent of the overall
population (see Table 1). The large proportion of demonstrators who were members of civic
organizations, particularly in Egypt, suggests a strong correlation between civic organization
membership and protest participation. In both Egypt and Tunisia, civic organizations drew
members from various segments of society, including professional and trade unions, charitable
societies and cultural or youth associations. Unions formed a significant part of civil society
participation, with members comprising 24 percent of Egyptian demonstrators and only 10
percent of the total population. In Tunisia, unions formed a smaller part of the general population

20
The internet usage rates found in the survey are only partially consistent with World Bank (2010) internet usage
data, which suggests that 26.7% of Egyptians and 36.6% of Tunisians use the internet.
22
(3 percent), but contributed protesters at a rate disproportionate to their share of the population
(10 percent of all protesters). Though we have no direct evidence on the religious character of
civic organizations, it is reasonable to infer that many of were religious in character; Islamic
charitable societies and religious movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda
in Tunisia exemplify this tendency. Neither Ennahda nor the Muslim Brotherhood were involved
in the organization of the early protests, but civic organization membership has a statistically
significant positive correlation with religiosity (measured by a fifteen-point scale) for Tunisia
though not for Egypt.
21
Thus religious groups are likely to be among the important civic
organizations in both countries, though not the decisive actors driving protest behavior in either
country.
Secularization theses associating decreased religiosity with increased support for
democracy (Hypothesis 5) find little support in the Egypt and Tunisia data. To capture levels of
piety, we constructed a fifteen-point scale variable measuring the frequency at which individuals
perform five behaviors associated with religiosity, including reading the Quran or Bible and
praying.
22
The average score for Egypt was 9.33 and for Tunisia 6.10, indicating that Egyptians
tend to at least report higher degrees of religious piety. To assess whether piety was correlated
with turnout, we conducted difference of means test for turnout rates between those above and
below the mean piety score in each country; in neither case could we reject the null hypothesis
that more religious people had a different underlying propensity to turn out than the less
religious.
23
The evidence from a multivariate setting is even more damning for the naive

21
The Muslim Brotherhood leadership actively discouraged its members from turning out to the early days of the
Egyptian revolution, and the Tunisian protests began through local organizing in Sidi Bouzid (Slackman 2011,
Whitaker 2010).
22
The measure is gender-neutral, as it evaluates activities done by both genders. Mosque attendance, a seemingly
natural variable to include, is excluded because women are in many cases discouraged or prohibited from attending.
23
We conducted a similar investigation using just one prominent indicator of religiosity, an individuals propensity
to read the Quran or Bible. Egyptians who reported reading the Quran or Bible always or most of the time
23
secularization hypothesis, showing an inverse relationship between religious practice and
participation in these revolutions; while the religiosity variable is not significant in the Egyptian
case, it is positively associated with turnout in the Tunisian case (see Table 2). These correlations
decisively dispel the notion that Islam somehow generates in its adherents a strong aversion to
challenging any form of political authority (cf. Kedourie 1994).
Finally, a striking fact about the profile of demonstrators in both countries was that they
were overwhelmingly male; 77 percent of Egyptian and 79 percent of Tunisian demonstrators
were men. One might infer from these statistics that women were as a rule excluded from
participation in demonstrations, but disaggregating women by occupation reveals a more
complex story. Housewives comprised 77 percent of Egyptian women and only 52 percent
female demonstrators; women in the categories of professional and government employee
comprised only 10 percent of the Egyptian female population but 39 percent of the
demonstrators. In Tunisia, similarly, housewives comprised 51 percent of the female population
and only 18 percent of the demonstrators. The remaining female demonstrators were spread
across several other employment categories, including unemployed (26 percent), government
employee (15 percent) and private sector employee (10 percent).
24
The occupational distribution
of women who participated, conditional on their being in the labor market, reflects the
distribution for men; Egyptians clustered in white-collar occupations while Tunisians came from
a wider range of occupations, including the unemployed. A chi-square test failed to reject the
null hypothesis that male and female protesters came from similar occupational distributions (p-

comprised 75 percent of the general population and 83 percent of the demonstrators, while Tunisians reading the
Quran or Bible constituted 58 percent of the sample and 59 percent of the demonstrators (see Table 1). In this
respect, revolutionary participants in Tunisia were less religious than was true in Egypt, but still about as religious as
their population as a whole.
24
Bivariate logistic regressions of participation on a housewife dummy for the female population are statistically
significant in both cases (p-value for Egypt is 0.006 and for Tunisia 0.001).
24
value 0.36). That women who work participate in patterns similar to those of their male
counterparts suggests that women with the resources allowing or economic exigencies
compelling their entry into the workforce are less bound by the patriarchal norms depressing the
participation of housewives.
To sum up, this demographic sketch of the populations protesting in Tunisia and Egypt
casts doubt upon several of the theories advanced to explain these revolutions. The poorest
segments of society were among the least likely to participate, indicating that protests were not
borne primarily of absolute levels of deprivation. Similarly, cohort-based value change and
secularization seem not to be impelling participation in these revolutions; protesters tended to be
as religious or more than the general population in both cases. In many respects, these did appear
to be predominantly middle class revolutions. Demonstrators in both states had higher levels of
education and income than the general population and tended to be engaged in urban white-collar
work. There were, however, important differences between the participations in the two
revolutions. While Egyptian revolution participants were predominantly middle class, significant
elements within the Tunisian revolution came from groups outside the middle class (workers,
students, and the unemployed), making it more of a cross-class coalition than was the case in
Egypt. Tunisian protesters were disproportionately from the youngest group in the survey,
whereas the highest rates of participation in Egypt came from the middle-aged. Civil society
participation was a reliable predictor of turnout in both cases. But members of civic
organizations comprised a much greater share of the Egyptian protesters (46 percent) than of the
Tunisian participants (15 percent). In this sense, we can say that while both revolutions
disproportionately came from an intermediate segment of society (that is, not the elite, but not
those living at the margin of society), each relied on somewhat different coalitions.
25

A Brief Ukrainian Comparison
It would be helpful, in contextualizing the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, to see whether
these findings accord with those from other democratizing revolutions. The paucity of
individual-level data on participants in revolutions limits our ability to do so. It is nevertheless a
useful exercise to compare these findings with the only other case for which comparable data
exist--the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From a representative sample of 1,801
Ukrainians,
25
19 percent participated in the protests of the Orange Revolution. This level of
turnout is roughly comparable to that in Tunisia (16 percent). Protesters in Ukraine tended to be
a good deal older than in the Middle East, as the mean age of Ukrainian participants was 41
(compared to 33 in Tunisia and 38 in Egypt). Yet Ukrainian participation rates by age category
look roughly similar to Tunisia; 30 percent of 18 to 24 year olds participated (compared to 30
percent in Tunisia) and 17 percent of 25 to 34 year olds participated (versus 20 percent in
Tunisia). Of course, there are quite significant differences in the age structures of these societies.
Whereas people under 35 comprise 45 percent of the Tunisian and 48 percent of the Egyptian
populations, they are only 32 of Ukrainians (World Bank 2010). Moreover, unlike the male-
dominated Egyptian and Tunisian protests, the gender composition of the Ukrainian
demonstrators more closely resembled that of the general population, with 54 percent of
protesters male.
The occupational, educational, and income profile of Ukrainian protesters were also quite
different from those of the Arab revolutions. Workers represented the largest single group among

25
The Ukrainian data come from the March 2005 Monitoring survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the
National Academy of Ukraine. It is based on a representative sample of 1,800 adult Ukrainians (18 years or older)
using a combination of stratified, random, and quota sampling and was conducted from March 2-30, 2005 in all
provinces of Ukraine. For details on sampling procedures, see Panina, 2005: 17-18. We thank the Institute (and in
particular, Victor Stepanenko) for allowing us access to the data from the survey.
26
those protesting in Ukraine, comprising 24 percent of all protesters. Retired people comprised
the second largest group at 19 percent, and professionals came in third at 15 percent. In Egypt
and Tunisia the highest income groups were significantly more likely to participate, but the
distribution of participants by income quintiles in Ukraine bears more of a U-shape. The
wealthiest quintile comprised 24 percent of demonstrators, and the poorest quintile comprised 23
percent of protesters, with the second poorest at 14 percent and the middle quintile at 17 percent.
A smaller proportion of Ukrainian participants (17 percent) had some higher education, in large
part because participation did not drop off as sharply for the least educated, who participated at a
rate twice that of Tunisia and four times that of Egypt.
Ironically, though Ukraine is a post-communist country, religiosity was a more salient
predictor of revolutionary participation in Ukraine than it was in either Egypt or Tunisia. The
participation rate for the religious (defined here as visiting church in ones spare time) was 29
percent, compared to 17 percent for those who reported not visiting church. It is clear that
regional cleavages and national identity issues were central motivations for participation in the
Orange Revolution, and religion (particularly true for Uniates from Western Ukraine) was one of
the dimensions along which these cleavages fell (Beissinger, 2011). The driving role of identity
conflicts within the Orange Revolution sets the Ukrainian case apart from the Arab cases and
explains to some extent why groups that one might not expect to participate in a democratizing
revolution (such as retired people, or those in the lowest income quintile) turned out in force in
the Orange Revolution. In sum, the Orange Revolution participants tended to be from much more
varied class backgrounds than those in Egypt or Tunisia. The age and educational structures of
the Ukrainian population, as well as the national identity issues at stake, produced a set of
revolutionary participants that looked quite different from both of the Arab cases.
27

The Role of Democratic Motivations within Democratic Revolutions
We turn now to look at who, among the participants in these revolutions, understood
them primarily as struggles for democratic freedoms. The Arab Barometer asked respondents to
identify the most important and second most important reasons that they believed citizens
participated in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. The answers of those who also indicated
that they had participated in the revolutionary protests (n=98 for Egypt, n=192 for Tunisia) are
presented in Table 4. We turned to this question as a way of identifying participants according to
their differing motivations for and perceptions of participation in the revolutions. We were keen
to distinguish respondents who prioritized economic or other grievances from those who
prioritized civil or political freedoms. While we recognize that the question in the Arab
Barometer did not ask participants directly why they as individuals participated in the revolution,
given that the respondents were all participants, one would expect that their answers to this
question were likely informed by their own motivations and experiences. Indeed, subsequent
analysis confirmed that the groupings of opinion on this question lined up with other questions in
ways that one would expect only if respondents answered this question with their own personal
beliefs and experiences in mind, essentially falsifying the notion that respondents tended to
answer this question without reference to their own motivations and experiences.
26
Thus, the

26
Thus, for example, in the Egyptian sample those people who identified civil and political freedoms as the reason
why people protested were also (in a separately answered question) were almost five times more likely to identify
democracy as one of the top two issues facing the country or as the top issue facing the Arab world than those who
identified other reasons for the protests. They also tended to be more highly educated and disproportionately
participated in civil society organizations (as one might expect). Similarly, almost all of those Egyptian participants
who identified themselves as unemployed chose the economy as the main reason for the protests. And those who
chose the economy as main reasons for the protests also disproportionately answered (on a separate question) that
the most important features of democracy were "Narrowing the gap between rich and poor" and "Providing basic
items (such as food, housing, and clothing)." If respondents were answering the question on why people participated
in the revolutions without any reference to their own motivations, then these patterns of response to other questions
would not have been observed, and one would have instead expected no relationship between answers on these
28
question can be used as a rough indicator of motivation for participation in the revolutions. But
even if individuals did, in some cases, answer this question in ways that differed from their own
personal motivations for participation in the revolution, the answers still provide us with a way
of identifying those who perceived these revolutions as aimed primarily at attaining civil and
political freedoms versus other purposes.
[Table 4 here]
Since respondents were asked to identify both a primary and a secondary reason for why
people participated, we used latent class cluster analysis in order to identify and simplify the
groupings by which people answered the question.
27
Latent class cluster analysis is a finite
mixture approach used to identify categories of individuals who share similar characteristics.
Individuals are classified into clusters based upon the probabilities of their membership, which
(unlike traditional k-means cluster analysis) are estimated directly from the model.
28
As
suggested in the literature, we used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the Akaike
Information Criterion with a per-parameter penalty of 3 (AIC3), and the p-value for the
likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic L
2
in order to adjudicate between models with different
numbers of clusters.
29
As the results in Table 5 show, for the Egyptian participants both BIC and
AIC3 criteria suggested a 4-cluster model, while the p-value suggested a 7-cluster model (a more
complex variation on the 4-model cluster). However, given the relatively small sample size for
the Egyptian participants (n=98), the p-value criterion for the 7-cluster model may be unreliable,

different questions. In sum, covariate analysis falsifies the notion that respondents answered the question on
motivations for participation without reference to their own motivations.
27
For the Egyptian sample, the variables identifying those who saw protests as aimed at installing an Islamic regime
were excluded, since the numbers who answered affirmatively on this were so small that inclusion in the analysis
biased the results. Rather, a substantial portion of Egyptian respondents identified demands that power not be passed
on to Mubaraks son Gamal as a motivation for the protests, and we include this response in the analysis.
28
See Vermunt and Magidson, 2002. Unlike traditional k-means clustering, latent class cluster variables can be
continuous, nominal, or ordinal. Latent Gold 4.5.0 was used to perform the analyses.
29
On the appropriateness of these criteria, see Fonseca, 2008; Andrews and Currim, 2003; Vermunt and Magidson,
2004.
29
since the number of individuals in some of categories was small, and interpretation of a 7-cluster
model is cumbersome in any case. For the Tunisian participants both the BIC and p-value criteria
suggested a 5-cluster model, while the AIC3 criterion suggested a 7-cluster model (again, a more
complex variant of the 5-cluster model). For both the Egyptian and Tunisian samples all of the
models were examined in their full results; for both samples the 7-cluster models resulted in no
significant differences in interpretation from the 4-cluster Egyptian and 5-cluster Tunisian
models. Therefore, the more parsimonious, reliable, and easily interpretable 4-cluster and 5-
cluster models are reported on here.
[Table 5 here]
Table 6 reports the conditional probabilities of cluster membership for participants in the
two revolutions. The findings point to the key role played by economic demands (and to a lesser
extent, corruption) in motivating participation in both revolutions, as well as the relatively low
priority accorded to civil and political freedoms. Among Egyptian participants, for instance, the
largest cluster (labeled Cluster 1, with 38 percent of participants) consisted of those who
identified the reasons for participation as being primarily about the economy and secondarily
about corruption, while another 22 percent (Cluster 3) identified the same reasons only in reverse
order (i.e., primarily against corruption, and secondarily about the economy). Another group
(labeled Cluster 2, with 22 percent) identified the main reason for protest as being primarily
against the succession of Mubaraks son Gamal; these participants, however, were divided over
the secondary reasons that they identified. Finally, the smallest cluster (labeled Cluster 4, with 18
percent) identified the main reason for participation as demands for civil and political freedoms
(It was divided in the secondary reasons it identified). Thus, only a small core of participants
30
understood the Egyptian revolution as aimed primarily at attaining liberal democracy, whereas
most saw concerns over the economy and corruption as dominating participant agendas.
[Table 6 here]
Similarly, among participants in the Tunisian Revolution economic concerns and
concerns over corruption were top priorities. Demands for civil and political freedoms, however,
played a more prominent role among perceived motivations of participants in Tunisia than in
Egypt, as a significant group of Tunisian participants listed demands for civil and political
freedoms as a secondary motivation for participation in the revolution. The largest cluster of
participants (labeled Cluster 1, at 32 percent) identified the reasons for participation as primarily
the economy and secondarily corruption, while a second cluster (Cluster 2, at 26 percent)
understood the reasons for participation as primarily the economy and secondarily civil and
political freedoms. A third cluster of 21 percent (labeled Cluster 3) identified civil and political
freedoms as the primary motivation for participation and corruption as a secondary motivation.
Cluster 4 (15 percent), the inverse of Cluster 1, identified the main reason for participation as
corruption and secondarily the economy. Finally, a very small cluster (labeled Cluster 5, at 6
percent) identified establishing an Islamic regime as the main motivation for protest
participationin contrast to Egyptian Revolution participants. Thus, in the Tunisian revolution
approximately the same proportion of participants as in the Egyptian revolution (about a fifth)
viewed civil and political freedoms as the primary motivation for participation, but unlike the
Egyptian Revolution another quarter of Tunisian participants rated civil and political freedoms as
a secondary motivation for participation. Nevertheless, in neither revolution can one say that
concern over civil and political freedoms dominated the protest agendas of those who
participated in them, according to participants.
31
We turn now to look in more detail at the individuals within these groupings and the
extent to which other variables were associated with how individuals identified and prioritized
motivations for participation in ways that might confirm or undermine particular hypotheses
about democratic revolution. In particular, we are interested in elucidating who identified civil
and political freedoms as a motivation for participation in the revolution, as opposed to other
motivations such as economic deprivation or corruption, and whether their backgrounds,
behaviors, and attitudes correspond with what various theories of democratization and
democratic revolution might predict. We probe these questions through an examination of the
demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal covariates of cluster membership for each of the
revolutions (produced in Tables 7 and 8), comparing these to the characteristics of all
participants in the revolution.
[Tables 7 and 8 here]
One conclusion that one can draw from such an exercise is that those revolution
participants who saw civil and political freedoms as a reason for participation in the revolution
not only differed substantially from other groupings within each revolution, but differed in
certain respects across these revolutions as well. Thus, as can be seen in Table 7, those who
believed the primary reason for participation in the Egyptian revolution was to achieve civil and
political freedoms (Cluster 4) were, on average, more female, older, more likely to have a higher
education, more likely to be in the top two quintiles of income, more likely to be a member of a
civil society organization, more likely to believe that government should enact laws in
accordance with Islamic law, more likely to have trusted the Muslim Brotherhood, more likely to
have believed that democratization was one of top problems facing the country or the Arab
world, and more likely to have understood the most important features of democracy as equality
32
of political rights between citizens and the elimination of financial and administrative corruption
than other participants in the revolution. Like their counterparts within the Egyptian revolution,
those who prioritized civil and political freedoms as the main reason for participation in the
Tunisian Revolution (Cluster 3) were, on average, more female, older, more likely to be a
member of a civil society organization, more religious, but less likely to trust Ennahda (the
Islamist party in Tunisia, and equivalent of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) than other
participants in the Tunisian revolution. And those who indicated that civil and political freedoms
were a secondary reason for participation in the Tunisian Revolution (Cluster 2) were more male,
more highly educated, more likely to be professionals, less religious, and more likely to see the
most important feature of democracy as the opportunity to change government through elections
than other participants in the Tunisian Revolution.
In both revolutions the most democratically-oriented participants were, on average, older
than other participants, raising further doubts about a generational values explanation of
democratic revolutions (H3). Those who saw the revolutions as motivated by the desire for civil
and political freedoms tended to be middle-aged in Egypt, and in Tunisia there was also no
particular tilt toward youth within this group. Indeed, as Tables 7 and 8 show, the youngest
participants in both revolutions were by and large primarily concerned with the economy and
secondarily with corruption, and largely failed to see civil and political liberties as a motivation
for participation in the revolution.
Moreover, the data raise further serious questions about the secularization hypothesis. In
both revolutions those revolutionary participants who saw civil and political freedoms as a
primary motivation for participation tended to be somewhat more religious in their personal
practice than society as a whole (and in Tunisiathe more religious than other participants). In
33
Egypt, those who saw revolutionary participation as championing civil and political freedoms
trusted moderate Islamist parties and favored government in accordance with Islamic law more
than other participants. In Egypt those who believed that the primary reason for participation in
the revolution was to oppose the Gamal succession (Cluster 2) were, on average, the most
religious, though significantly, they were also less trustful of the Muslim Brotherhood, and more
critical of U.S. interference in the Middle East than other participants in the revolution. Their
high level of religiosity, combined with their disproportionate mistrust of the moderate Muslim
Brotherhood and support for resistance to U.S. interference in the Middle East, marked this
group as the likely location of Salafists within the Egyptian Revolution. Similarly, in the
Tunisian Revolution the small cluster of participants (Cluster 5) who understood participation in
the revolution as aimed primarily at establishing an Islamic regime were, as one might expect,
highly observant religiously; they also disproportionately favored rule by Islamic law, trusted the
Islamist party Ennahda, and allowed the possibility of rule by Islamic law without elections.
30

At first glance, the dominance of economic motivations among the reasons participants
cited for participation in the revolution might seem to suggest a deprivation argument. But as we
saw earlier, in both revolutions those who participated were, on average, significantly better off
economically and better educated than the rest of populationi.e., disproportionately middle
class. If we look at who believed the primary reason for participation in the Egyptian revolution
was the economy (Cluster 1), they were, on average, more likely to be unemployed and more
likely to understand the most important features of democracy as narrowing the gap between rich

30
Since Bourguibas reign, Tunisia embarked on a staunch secularist agenda, which aimed to remove Islam from not
only the political sphere but from the public sphere as well. Though the Muslim Brotherhood was subjected to a
severe campaign of suppression under Nasser, it has faced a considerably less hostile environment during the last
two decades in Egypt. Although not allowed to participate formally as a political party, the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood was allowed the right to mobilize, participate in civil society, and run its candidates as independents in
contested parliamentary elections. Tunisias Ennahda, by contrast, remained an outlawed party, and many of the
partys key leaders and influential supporters were exiled.
34
and poor and providing basic items (such as food, housing, and clothing) than other participants
in the revolution. At the same time, those who prioritized the economy were also more highly
educated than most other participants and predominantly belonged to the middle and upper
portions of Egyptian society (only 14 percent belonged to the bottom two income quintiles,
compared to 36 percent of Egyptian society). Indeed, the poorest and least educated grouping
among Egyptian Revolution participants (with 26 percent in the bottom two income quintiles and
a quarter with only an elementary school education or less) prioritized corruption as the primary
reason for participation (and only secondarily, the economy). In the Tunisian Revolution those
who prioritized the economy as a reason for participation (Clusters 1 and 2) were also more
likely to understand the most important features of democracy as narrowing the gap between rich
and poor and providing basic items (such as food, housing, and clothing) than other participants.
But they tended to be significantly poorer than other clusters (31 percent in the bottom two
income quintiles, similar to Tunisian society as a whole) and were more likely to be workers (23
percent, compared to 15 percent of society as a whole) than other clusters of participants.
Using the results of this cluster classification, we tested further for the factors associated
with prioritizing civil and political freedoms in these revolutions through a multinomial logistic
model of cluster membership (Table 9).
31
To simplify the results, we report only on those
choices within the multinomial model that involved civil and political freedoms (Secondary
choices are listed in parentheses, preceded by a plus sign). Though not reported in the table, we
found no statistically significant relationship in either Egypt or Tunisia between prioritization of
civil and political freedoms and either income quintiles or holding a middle class occupation.

31
The dependent variable in these regressions is the cluster into which our latent class analysis classified
individuals. The multinomial logistic model computes the increase in the relative risk of belonging in one category
over another category associated with a one-unit increase in an independent variable (controlling for the effects of
other independent variables).
35
Thus, while these revolutions could be characterized as middle class revolutions, the middle
class was not specifically a champion of democratic freedoms within them, challenging part of
Hypothesis 6A. Model 2 for participants in the Egyptian revolution indicates a statistically
significant relationship between education and prioritization of civil and political freedoms over
corruption as a reason for participation, lending some support to Hypothesis 2. But the
relationship becomes marginally significant when controlled for other factors. Among
participants in the Tunisian revolution we no bivariate relationship between education and
prioritizing civil and political freedoms the main reason for participation, and when placed in a
multivariate context, the results indicate that the educated actually prioritized the economy over
freedom (though the results are only marginally significant).
[Table 9 here]
Rather, by far the strongest factor predicting whether participants prioritized civil and
political freedoms within these revolutions was participation in civil society associations. Even
controlling for other factors, it retains a statistically significant relationship with prioritization of
civil and political freedoms over the economy among participants in both revolutions. The
relationship is especially strong in Egypt, where being a member of a civil society association
increased the likelihood of prioritizing civil and political freedoms over the economy by over
600 percent.
32
By contrast, internet usage had no relationship whatsoever with prioritization of
civil and political freedoms among participants in either revolution (or, for that matter, with any
reason provided for why individuals participated). While the internet may have been a major
factor encouraging participation, unlike the strong ties of traditional civil society association,

32
In Tunisia, the results also show that participation in civil society associations was associated with prioritizing
attaining an Islamic regime over economic reasons for participation (with civil and political freedoms as a secondary
reason), reflecting the fact noted earlier that religious civil society groups also played an important role in these
revolutions.
36
internet mobilization was not associated with thinking about the revolution as primarily about
civil and political freedoms. Thus, the internet may make it considerably easier to mobilize large
numbers against dictators, but unlike the face-to-face ties of civil society association, it does not
seem to be instrumental in making such mobilizations more democratic.

Conclusion
To sum up what we have found, we uncovered solid evidence contradicting a number of
key hypotheses flowing from the theoretical literature on democratization and democratic
revolutions. Participants in these democratic revolutions did not prioritize democratic values over
other concerns (H1); they consisted of different age groups in each revolution, with youth
prioritizing economic concerns over democratic values (H3); they were on average at least as
religious than other members of society, though religion had little relationship with whether
participants prioritized democratic change over other concerns (H5); they were not
disproportionately from the working class (H6B) or from the disadvantaged (H6D); and they
were disproportionately employed in the public sector, seemingly dependent on the state for their
livelihood (H7). We also found strong evidence that these revolutions could rightly be
characterized as middle class revolutions, with those who were more highly educated, in the
upper income categories, and from middle class occupations participating disproportionately
compared to other social categories. But we also found significant differences in the coalitions
that made these revolutions, with the Tunisian revolution consisting of a more diverse group of
participants in terms of class background, representing more of a cross-class coalition (H6C),
while the Egyptian revolution was more narrowly dominated by the middle class (H6A). Even
so, the Tunisian revolution was not as representative in class terms as the Orange Revolution in
37
Ukraine (the only other case for which comparable individual-level data is available), and it
lacked the defining identity cleavage that was central to driving the Orange events. Finally, we
showed that there was no consistent relationship between education and prioritizing civil and
political freedoms among those who participated in these revolutions (H2), and that while the
middle class may have participated disproportionately in these revolutions, they did not act as a
democratic vanguard championing civil and political freedoms (H6A). Instead, we found that
participation in civil society associations (H4) was the most reliable predictor of whether
participants understood these revolutions as primarily about democratic change. We also saw
that while the internet enormously facilitated mobilization, unlike the strong ties of civil
society association, internet usage was not associated with understanding these revolutions as
primarily about civil and political freedoms.
In addition to puncturing many of the folk accounts of these revolutions, these findings
raise a number of broader issues that cut to the heart of the revolutionary path to democracy
more generally. For one thing, they demonstrate empirically that democratizing revolutions do
not fit a single mold, but the constituencies that participate in them vary considerably from place
to place, their societal coalitions depending significantly on the nature of incumbent dictatorships
and the cleavages within society that their rule (or misrule) activates. For another, the findings
raise questions about the degree of commitment to democracy within the very social forces that
are purported in many accounts to bring about democratizationeven the sacred middle class,
which participated in these revolutions in disproportionate numbers, but not with
disproportionate commitment to democratic ends. Moreover, they question whether democratic
change emerges as a result of a secular process of values-change, or merely as a convenient way
of mobilizing a constituency against incumbent dictators and of containing abuses of power. The
38
findings suggest that civil society association plays a critical role in democratic revolutions. Not
only were citizens who rebelled against dictatorship more likely to have been members of civic
associations, but in contrast to others who participated in these revolutions (and those who
mobilized primarily through the internet), those citizens involved in civic associations held
stronger democratic commitments. Thus, the fundamental role of civil society (and by
implication, of civil society promotion) in bringing about democratic change is confirmed.
Finally, if most revolution participants are not motivated primarily by democratic values,
but rather are motivated more by other concerns (in the case of these revolutions, economic
grievances and, to a lesser extent, concerns about corruption), post-revolutionary governments
clearly face a tall order. As Goldstone (2011) has recently pointed out, the coalitional nature of
the Arab revolutions means that the sole theme uniting all participating groups was a desire to
remove a despised autocrat. Post-revolutionary governments committed to democratic change
will need to build public support for democracy within their publics (and even among those who
participated in bringing about these revolutions) while simultaneously satisfying the economic
frustrations of a diverse set of social actors and addressing the deep-seated practices of
corruption that played such central roles in giving rise to these revolutions in the first place. In
both Egypt and Tunisia, revolutions were followed by economic slowdown.
33
The future of these
post-revolutionary regimes critically depends on their ability to tackle the central issues that their
predecessors proved incapable of addressing and that motivated large numbers to take to the
streets, propelling new rulers to power in the first place.



33
Annual GDP growth slowed from 5.1 percent in Egypt in 2010 to 1.4 percent in 2011 and the Tunisian economy,
growing at a rate of 3.1 percent annually in 2010, contracted 0.8 percent in 2011 (IMF 2012).
39
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LoL pop demnsrLrs LoL pop demnsrLrs
!"#$!%# 8.1 16.0
&''()!*+&,
employer/dlrecLor of lnsLlLuLlon 2.1 3.1 1.8 3.3
professlonal 3.3 17.4 3.3 4.7
manual laborer 3.3 4.1 10.3 10.3
agrlculLural worker/farm owner 7.7 3.1 1.7 0.3
armed forces/pollce 0.3 1.0 1.2 0.0
owner of shop/grocery sLore 3.1 3.1 6.3 3.3
governmenL employee 12.3 21.4 6.3 12.1
prlvaLe secLor employee 3.4 11.2 7.0 7.9
crafLsperson 4.9 3.1 3.3 6.3
reLlred 6.4 4.1 6.3 3.2
housewlfe 38.4 12.2 23.4 3.7
sLudenL 3.2 3.1 8.6 19.0
unemployed 3.4 3.1 17.7 21.6
!%#
age1824 13.4 13.3 19.1 33.4
age2334 29.3 30.6 23.8 23.0
age3344 21.8 28.6 20.2 13.6
age4334 18.2 18.4 17.7 13.1
age3364 12.3 7.1 10.8 6.3
age63+ 3.0 2.0 8.3 2.6
%#,-#$
female 49.6 23.3 49.7 20.8
male 30.4 76.3 30.3 79.2
#-('!*+&,
Llem or less 38.0 13.3 46.4 20.3
Secondary/Lechnlcal 42.9 38.1 36.4 31.6
some 8A or above 19.2 46.4 17.2 28.1
$#.+%+&/+*0
quarLlle 1 (leasL rellglous) 26.9 21.4 23.8 30.7
quarLlle 2 23.2 23.3 29.1 23.0
quarLlle 3 24.3 27.6 20.8 17.7
quarLlle 4 (mosL rellglous) 23.3 27.6 24.3 26.6
+,*#$,#* (/#
noL use lnLerneL 81.8 31.0 66.8 38.0
lnLerneL user 18.2 49.0 33.2 62.0
+,'&2# 3(+,*+.#/
0-20 (pooresL) 13.3 9.9
20-40 7.2 17.3
40-60 33.7 20.4
60-80 16.9 24.1
80-100 (rlchesL) 28.9 28.4
%$&() 2#24#$/5+)
any clvlc organlzaLlon 14.7 42.9 6.0 18.8
charlLable socleLy 3.1 21.4 1.7 10.4
prof./Lrade unlon 9.9 23.3 3.1 9.9
youLh/culLl/sporL 2.8 10.2 2.3 6.8
!"#$% &'()*)+
1able 1 - 8evoluLlon parLlclpaLlon by caLegory
uependenL varlable: proLesL parLlclpaLlon.
varlable reference caLegory l ll lll l ll lll
age 18-24 age 33-44 1.14 0.98 0.92 2.98*** 2.34*** 3.33***
(0.33) (0.07) (0.19) (3.71) (3.28) (3.79)
age 23-34 age 33-44 0.973 0.911 1.000 1.189 1.067 1.326
(0.09) (0.31) 0.00 (0.61) (0.23) (0.91)
age 43-34 age 33-44 0.883 0.939 0.832 0.983 1.022 1.083
(0.36) (0.18) (0.43) (0.06) (0.07) (0.24)
age 33-64 age 33-44 0.311 0.343 0.477 0.638 0.623 0.671
(1.44) (1.29) (1.46) (1.13) (1.21) (0.93)
age 63+ age 33-44 0.309 0.27* 0.278 0.36* 0.36** 0.34*
(1.48) (1.67) (1.61) (1.94) (1.96) (1.66)
gender female 2.36*** 2.70*** 3.20*** 3.26*** 3.46*** 3.68***
(3.23) (3.76) (3.87) (8.09) (8.21) (7.67)
rellgloslLy noL rellglous 1.033 1.033 1.064 1.07*** 1.07*** 1.07***
(1.36) (1.31) (1.44) (2.61) (2.64) (2.28)
lnLerneL non-user 2.48*** 2.23*** 3.03*** 2.22*** 1.91*** 1.82**
(3.33) (2.99) (3.83) (3.89) (2.87) (2.30)
clvlc org membershlp non-member 2.93*** 2.92*** 3.00*** 3.47*** 3.46*** 3.23***
(4.04) (4.00) (3.89) (4.31) (4.33) (3.71)
occupaLlon non-mlddle class 1.72** 1.44*
(2.00) (1.69)
educaLlon elemenLary or less 1.31** 1.36**
(2.23) (2.11)
lncome pooresL qulnLlle 1.09 1.09
(0.84) (1.08)
noLes: z score ln parenLheses. Slgnlflcance codes : ! p < 0.1, !! p < 0.03, !!! p < 0.01
LgypL 1unlsla
1able 2 - Cdds raLlos for mulLlvarlaLe ordlnary loglsLlc regresslon
uependenL varlable: proLesL parLlclpaLlon.
varlable reference caLegory odds raLlo z score odds raLlo z score
age 18-24 age 33-44 0.73 (0.89) 2.99*** (4.31)
age 23-34 age 33-44 0.78 (0.90) 1.43 (1.42)
age 43-34 age 33-44 0.73 (0.91) 1.11 (0.39)
age 33-64 age 33-44 0.42 (2.01) 0.72 (0.91)
age 63+ age 33-44 0.29* (1.67) 0.36* (2.04)
unemploymenL unemployed 0.93 (0.10) 1.34 (1.30)
mld. class occup non-mld class 4.24*** (6.71) 2.13*** (4.22)
gender female 3.31*** (3.12) 4.68*** (8.18)
rellgloslLy noL rellglous 1.03 (1.28) 1.01 (0.36)
lnLerneL non-user 3.23*** (7.38) 4.26*** (8.80)
clvlc org membershlp non-member 6.00*** (8.07) 6.03*** (7.36)
occupaLlon non-mlddle class 4.24*** (6.71) 2.13*** (4.22)
educaLlon elemenLary or less 2.76*** (6.64) 2.16*** (7.31)
lncome pooresL qulnLlle 1.43*** (4.11) 1.36*** (4.90)
LgypL 1unlsla
noLes: Slgnlflcance codes : ! p < 0.1, !! p < 0.03, !!! p < 0.01. All age varlables are ln Lhe
same regresslon.
1able 3 - Cdds raLlos for blvarlaLe loglsLlc regresslon
!"#$% '( )*+, -./*0,"1, "12 3%4*12 )*+, -./*0,"1, 5%"+*1+ 67,78%1+ 9"0,747/",%2 71 ,:% 90*,%+,+ ;9"0,747/"1,+ <1$=>
"

LC?1 1unlSlA
MCS1 lMC81An1 8LASCn lreq. ercenL lreq. ercenL
uemands for lmprovlng Lhe economlc slLuaLlon 36 36.73 111 37.81
uemands for clvll and pollLlcal freedom and llberaLlon from oppresslon 17 17.33 40 20.83
uemands for auLhorlLy noL Lo be passed down Lo Camal Mubarak (LgypL only) 21 21.43 n.a. n.a.
CombaLlng corrupLlon 17 17.33 29 13.1
8eplaclng Lhe lncumbenL reglme wlLh an lslamlc reglme 2 2.04 11 3.73
roLesLlng agalnsL pro-lsrael forelgn pollcy (LgypL only) 2 2.04 n.a. n.a.
roLesLlng agalnsL pro-WesLern forelgn pollcy 0 0 0 0
CLher (allowlng respondenL Lo speclfy reason) 1 1.02 0 0
noL answered 2 2.04 1 0.32
SLCCnu MCS1 lMC81An1 8LASCn
uemands for lmprovlng Lhe economlc slLuaLlon 29 29.39 37 19.27
uemands for clvll and pollLlcal freedom and llberaLlon from oppresslon 11 11.22 36 29.17
uemands for auLhorlLy noL Lo be passed down Lo Camal Mubarak (LgypL only) 13 13.31 n.a. n.a.
CombaLlng corrupLlon 37 37.76 83 44.27
8eplaclng Lhe lncumbenL reglme wlLh an lslamlc reglme 4 4.08 10 3.21
roLesLlng agalnsL pro-lsrael LgypLlan pollcy (LgypL only) 1 1.02 n.a. n.a.
roLesLlng agalnsL pro-WesLern forelgn pollcy 0 0 3 1.36
CLher (allowlng respondenL Lo speclfy reason) 0 0 0 0
noL answered 1 1.02 1 0.32

1oLal 98 100 192 100

a
CuesLlon: A number of clLlzens parLlclpaLed ln Lhe proLesLs beLween uecember 17Lh, 2010 and !anuary 14Lh, 2011 [ln LgypL, beLween !anuary
23Lh

and lebruary 11Lh, 2011] for varlous reasons. ln your oplnlon, whaL were Lhe mosL lmporLanL and Lhe second mosL lmporLanL reason for
Lhe proLesLs?
!"#$% '( )%*+$,* -. /*,01",0-2* -. 3",%2, 4$"** 4$+*,%5 6-7%$* -. 85-+902:*
;1-2: /:<9,0"2 "27 !+20*0"2 )%=-$+,0-2 >"5,0?09"2,*


Log
llkellhood 8lC(LL) AlC3(LL)
number of
model
parameLers L p-value
LC?1
1-ClusLer -406.6199 849.9196 837.2398 8 310.6200 0.0000
2-ClusLer -333.1302 788.2449 761.3003 17 207.6807 0.0000
3-ClusLer -328.3741 773.9373 734.7481 26 134.1283 0.0000
4-ClusLer -306.8623 774.1989 718.7231 33 111.1033 0.0002
3-ClusLer -294.2304 790.1993 720.4607 44 83.8409 0.0038
6-ClusLer -282.3309 807.6631 723.6618 33 62.0420 0.0470
7-ClusLer -272.6683 829.6043 731.3363 62 42.7167 0.2000
8-ClusLer -269.0718 863.6763 731.1436 71 33.3238 0.1300

1unlSlA
1-ClusLer -733.7332 1309.3264 1491.4663 8 684.6398 0.0000
2-ClusLer -604.0043 1297.3864 1239.0090 17 423.2023 0.0000
3-ClusLer -336.0741 1208.8431 1130.1483 26 289.3413 0.0000
4-ClusLer -483.4696 1134.9316 1073.9392 33 188.1323 0.0460
3-ClusLer -460.4681 1132.2660 1032.9362 44 138.1293 0.7100
6-ClusLer -443.9213 1170.4902 1030.8429 33 109.0362 0.9700
7-ClusLer -422.0694 1170.1033 1030.1388 62 61.3321 1.0000
8-ClusLer -408.9307 1191.1833 1030.9013 71 33.0946 1.0000

!"#$% '( )$*+,%- .-/01$%+ 0/- ."-,1213"4,+ 14 5673,1"4 "48 !*41+1"4 9%:/$*,1/4+

LC?1
ClusLer
1
ClusLer
2
ClusLer
3
ClusLer
4
ClusLer Slze (n=98) 0.378 0.222 0.213 0.184
lndlcaLors
Maln reason for proLesLs: uemands for lmprovlng economlc slLuaLlon 0.963 0.004 0.004 0.003
Maln reason for proLesLs: uemands for clvll and pollLlcal freedoms and llberaLlon from oppresslon 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.932
Maln reason for proLesLs: CombaLlng corrupLlon 0.001 0.002 0.799 0.003
Maln reason for proLesLs: uemands for auLhorlLy noL Lo be passed Lo Camal Mubarak 0.002 0.933 0.003 0.003
Secondary reason for proLesLs: uemands for lmprovlng economlc slLuaLlon 0.002 0.424 0.733 0.231
Secondary reason for proLesLs: uemands for clvll and pollLlcal freedoms 0.161 0.183 0.048 0.002
Secondary reason for proLesLs: CombaLlng corrupLlon 0.363 0.384 0.003 0.424
Secondary reason for proLesLs: uemands for auLhorlLy noL Lo be passed Lo Camal Mubarak 0.242 0.002 0.096 0.221

1unlSlA
ClusLer
1
ClusLer
2
ClusLer
3
ClusLer
4
ClusLer
3
ClusLer Slze (n=192) 0.317 0.260 0.210 0.133 0.060
lndlcaLors
Maln reason for proLesLs: uemands for lmprovlng economlc slLuaLlon 0.999 0.998 0.003 0.004 0.010
Maln reason for proLesLs: uemands for clvll and pollLlcal freedoms and llberaLlon from oppresslon 0.001 0.001 0.990 0.001 0.004
Maln reason for proLesLs: CombaLlng corrupLlon 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.983 0.003
Maln reason for proLesLs: 8eplace reglme w. lslamlc reglme 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.947
Secondary reason for proLesLs: uemands for lmprovlng economlc slLuaLlon 0.001 0.001 0.396 0.378 0.347
Secondary reason for proLesLs: uemands for clvll and pollLlcal freedoms 0.001 0.837 0.001 0.307 0.433
Secondary reason for proLesLs: CombaLlng corrupLlon 0.998 0.002 0.346 0.003 0.180
Secondary reason for proLesLs: 8eplace reglme w. lslamlc reglme 0.000 0.140 0.023 0.068 0.001


!"#$% '( )$*+,%- )./"-0",%+1 2345,

LgypL--ClusLer covarlaLes
rlmarlly
economy,
secondarlly
corrupLlon
rlmarlly
Camal
successlon
rlmarlly
corrupLlon,
secondarlly
economy
rlmarlly
freedom
All
parLlclpanLs
1oLal
sample ClusLer 1 ClusLer 2 ClusLer 3 ClusLer 4
ClusLer slze 38 22 22 18
Male 0.823 0.897 0.623 0.647 0.763 0.304
Age caLegorles
18-24 0.121 0.192 0.093 0.129 0.133 0.134
23-34 0.417 0.193 0.280 0.242 0.306 0.293
33-44 0.296 0.279 0.280 0.280 0.286 0.218
43-34 0.133 0.190 0.180 0.282 0.184 0.182
33-64 0.003 0.144 0.163 0.012 0.071 0.123
63+ 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.020 0.030
Average age 33.262 38.622 39.484 39.331 37.704 39.309
LducaLlon
Llem or less 0.166 0.036 0.234 0.123 0.133 0.380
Secondary/Lechnlcal 0.282 0.661 0.412 0.192 0.381 0.429
Some 8A or above 0.324 0.284 0.334 0.684 0.464 0.192
lncome qulnLlles
1 0.086 0.098 0.163 0.123 0.112 0.189
2 0.034 0.092 0.093 0.000 0.061 0.179
3 0.363 0.339 0.222 0.136 0.286 0.271
4 0.162 0.138 0.093 0.166 0.143 0.118
3 0.213 0.233 0.186 0.390 0.243 0.139
noL answered 0.121 0.100 0.237 0.183 0.133 0.103
CccupaLlon
Lmplyr/dlr. of lnsLlLuLlon 0.034 0.092 0.000 0.033 0.031 0.021
rofesslonal 0.213 0.184 0.096 0.166 0.174 0.033
Manual laborer 0.027 0.003 0.090 0.038 0.041 0.033
AgrlculLural worker/farmer 0.034 0.046 0.093 0.000 0.031 0.077
Shop/grocery sLore owner 0.034 0.049 0.090 0.002 0.031 0.031
CovernmenL employee 0.296 0.184 0.143 0.167 0.214 0.123
rlvaLe secLor employee 0.081 0.138 0.093 0.167 0.112 0.034
CrafLsperson 0.039 0.036 0.063 0.014 0.031 0.049
8eLlred 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.111 0.041 0.064
Pousewlfe 0.040 0.104 0.232 0.187 0.122 0.384
SLudenL 0.000 0.046 0.093 0.000 0.031 0.032
unemployed 0.121 0.008 0.000 0.018 0.031 0.034



!"#$% '( )$*+,%- )./"-0",%+1 2345, 67.8,08*%9:

LgypL--ClusLer covarlaLes
rlmarlly
economy,
secondarlly
corrupLlon
rlmarlly
Camal
successlon
rlmarlly
corrupLlon,
secondarlly
economy
rlmarlly
freedom
All
parLlclpanLs
1oLal
sample ClusLer 1 ClusLer 2 ClusLer 3 ClusLer 4
Member of clvll socleLy organlzaLlon 0.363 0.363 0.281 0.741 0.439 0.131
used lnLerneL durlng revoluLlon 0.296 0.433 0.233 0.371 0.327 0.062
Scale of rellglous observaLlon (1-13) 8.781 10.384 10.447 9.677 9.704 9.330
leLy an lmporLanL for pol leader 0.242 0.282 0.464 0.171 0.286 0.443
CovL ln accordance w. lslamlc law
SLrongly dlsagree 0.034 0.092 0.048 0.036 0.061 0.038
ulsagree 0.162 0.187 0.137 0.002 0.133 0.166
Agree 0.296 0.322 0.096 0.277 0.233 0.324
SLrongly agree 0.489 0.400 0.720 0.663 0.331 0.473
Allows lslamlc govL w/ouL elecLlons 0.327 0.236 0.303 0.272 0.296 0.338
1rusLs Musllm 8roLherhood 0.233 0.146 0.190 0.293 0.223 0.199
uemoc a Lop problem ln counLry/Arab world 0.108 0.092 0.048 0.332 0.133 0.061
MosL lmporLanL feaLure of democracy
CpporLunlLy Lo change govL Lhru elecLlons 0.034 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.038
lreedom Lo crlLlclze Lhe governmenL 0.081 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.038
narrowlng gap bLwn rlch and poor 0.336 0.192 0.191 0.240 0.233 0.309
rovldlng baslcs (food/houslng/cloLhlng) 0.247 0.236 0.212 0.067 0.204 0.320
LquallLy of pol rlghLs beLween clLlzens 0.213 0.273 0.238 0.388 0.263 0.133
LllmlnaLlng corrupLlon 0.067 0.113 0.339 0.303 0.184 0.118
2nd mosL lmporLanL feaLure of democracy
CpporLunlLy Lo change govL Lhru elecLlons 0.094 0.038 0.042 0.131 0.082 0.036
lreedom Lo crlLlclze Lhe governmenL 0.034 0.183 0.001 0.111 0.082 0.030
narrowlng gap bLwn rlch and poor 0.242 0.184 0.190 0.000 0.174 0.223
rovldlng baslcs (food/houslng/cloLhlng) 0.309 0.202 0.364 0.081 0.233 0.316
LquallLy of pol rlghLs beLween clLlzens 0.133 0.092 0.048 0.277 0.133 0.149
LllmlnaLlng corrupLlon 0.166 0.282 0.333 0.400 0.276 0.184
u.S. lnLerference ln Mlddle LasL [usLlfles
reslsLance 0.336 0.706 0.303 0.476 0.320 0.624
lnfluence of u.S. on democracy ln counLry
poslLlve 0.202 0.422 0.428 0.461 0.347 0.366



!"#$% '( )$*+,%- )./"-0",%+1 !*20+0"

1unlsla--ClusLer covarlaLes
rlmarlly
economy,
secondarlly
corrupLlon
rlmarlly
economy,
secondarlly
freedom
rlmarlly
freedom
rlmarlly
corrupLlon,
secondarlly
economy
rlmarlly
esLabllshlng
lslamlc
reglme
All
parLlclpanLs
1oLal
sample ClusLer 1 ClusLer 2 ClusLer 3 ClusLer 4 ClusLer 3
ClusLer slze 0.317 0.260 0.210 0.133 0.060
Male 0.836 0.840 0.727 0.693 0.823 0.792 0.303
Age
18-24 0.377 0.300 0.329 0.434 0.300 0.334 0.191
23-34 0.311 0.240 0.224 0.171 0.263 0.230 0.238
33-44 0.113 0.200 0.149 0.171 0.173 0.136 0.202
43-34 0.131 0.200 0.099 0.203 0.088 0.131 0.177
33-64 0.049 0.020 0.174 0.000 0.088 0.063 0.108
63+ 0.016 0.040 0.023 0.000 0.088 0.026 0.083
Average age 30.948 34.432 33.974 31.376 33.382 33.281 40.104
LducaLlon
Llem or less 0.197 0.140 0.248 0.273 0.173 0.203 0.464
Secondary/Lechnlcal 0.324 0.301 0.478 0.434 0.823 0.316 0.364
Some 8A or above 0.279 0.360 0.273 0.273 0.000 0.281 0.172
lncome qulnLlles
1 0.113 0.100 0.023 0.068 0.088 0.083 0.179
2 0.197 0.140 0.124 0.137 0.000 0.146 0.134
3 0.229 0.161 0.203 0.044 0.123 0.172 0.171
4 0.213 0.180 0.273 0.171 0.088 0.203 0.134
3 0.164 0.280 0.224 0.307 0.330 0.240 0.131
noL answered 0.082 0.140 0.149 0.273 0.330 0.136 0.191
CccupaLlon
Lmplyr/dlr. of lnsLlLuLlon 0.033 0.020 0.073 0.102 0.088 0.033 0.018
rofesslonal 0.049 0.100 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.047 0.033
Manual laborer 0.148 0.120 0.030 0.068 0.088 0.103 0.103
AgrlculLural worker/farmer 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.003 0.017
Shop/grocery sLore owner 0.082 0.020 0.023 0.102 0.000 0.033 0.063
CovernmenL employee 0.082 0.140 0.124 0.137 0.173 0.121 0.063
rlvaLe secLor employee 0.082 0.060 0.073 0.068 0.173 0.079 0.070
CrafLsperson 0.082 0.100 0.023 0.034 0.000 0.063 0.033
8eLlred 0.049 0.020 0.023 0.000 0.088 0.032 0.063
Pousewlfe 0.016 0.020 0.099 0.034 0.000 0.037 0.234
SLudenL 0.164 0.201 0.230 0.112 0.300 0.190 0.086
unemployed 0.213 0.180 0.273 0.239 0.088 0.216 0.177


!"#$% '( )$*+,%- )./"-0",%+1 !*20+0" 34.2,02*%56

1unlsla--ClusLer covarlaLes
rlmarlly
economy,
secondarlly
corrupLlon
rlmarlly
economy,
secondarlly
freedom
rlmarlly
freedom
rlmarlly
corrupLlon,
secondarlly
economy
rlmarlly
esLabllshlng
lslamlc
reglme
All
parLlclpanLs
1oLal
sample
Member of clvll socleLy organlzaLlon 0.148 0.140 0.298 0.239 0.438 0.208 0.069
used lnLerneL durlng revoluLlon 0.439 0.480 0.434 0.322 0.630 0.484 0.263
Scale of rellglous observaLlon (1-13) 3.982 6.047 6.937 3.819 6.922 6.234 6.104
leLy an lmporLanL for pol leader 0.082 0.140 0.023 0.203 0.088 0.104 0.112
CovL ln accordance w. lslamlc law
SLrongly dlsagree 0.099 0.140 0.073 0.068 0.000 0.098 0.048
ulsagree 0.279 0.280 0.298 0.444 0.330 0.326 0.301
Agree 0.439 0.361 0.429 0.331 0.473 0.429 0.313
SLrongly agree 0.148 0.160 0.124 0.102 0.173 0.147 0.137
Allows lslamlc govL w/ouL elecLlons 0.099 0.140 0.073 0.068 0.330 0.126 0.226
1rusLs Lnnahda 0.197 0.221 0.106 0.180 0.362 0.203 0.179
uemoc a Lop problem ln counLry/Arab world 0.312 0.300 0.404 0.420 0.473 0.334 0.289
MosL lmporLanL feaLure of democracy
CpporLunlLy Lo change govL Lhru elecLlons 0.293 0.480 0.224 0.171 0.088 0.300 0.272
lreedom Lo crlLlclze Lhe governmenL 0.113 0.100 0.149 0.239 0.173 0.142 0.113
narrowlng gap bLwn rlch and poor 0.262 0.120 0.298 0.137 0.088 0.203 0.212
rovldlng baslcs (food/houslng/cloLhlng) 0.148 0.080 0.174 0.137 0.330 0.147 0.222
LquallLy of pol rlghLs beLween clLlzens 0.098 0.140 0.124 0.137 0.088 0.121 0.110
LllmlnaLlng corrupLlon 0.082 0.080 0.023 0.137 0.173 0.084 0.030
2nd mosL lmporLanL feaLure of democracy
CpporLunlLy Lo change govL Lhru elecLlons 0.016 0.080 0.000 0.034 0.088 0.037 0.044
lreedom Lo crlLlclze Lhe governmenL 0.113 0.060 0.149 0.102 0.173 0.110 0.077
narrowlng gap bLwn rlch and poor 0.033 0.121 0.131 0.078 0.123 0.089 0.101
rovldlng baslcs (food/houslng/cloLhlng) 0.361 0.280 0.248 0.068 0.173 0.262 0.237
LquallLy of pol rlghLs beLween clLlzens 0.197 0.240 0.199 0.342 0.438 0.246 0.233
LllmlnaLlng corrupLlon 0.279 0.220 0.273 0.342 0.000 0.237 0.230
u.S. lnLerference ln Mlddle LasL [usLlfles
reslsLance 0.636 0.300 0.429 0.488 0.362 0.337 0.634
lnfluence of u.S. on democracy ln counLry
poslLlve 0.410 0.420 0.348 0.312 0.438 0.417 0.393


!"#$% '( )*$+,-./,"$ 0.1,2+,3 4%15%22,.- .6 75,.5,+,8,-1 9,:,$ "-; 7.$,+,3"$ <5%%;./2 =:%5
=+>%5 4%"2.-2 6.5 7"5+,3,?"+,.- ,- 4%:.$*+,.-

@AB7! C,-;%?%-;%-+ :"5,"#$%2D
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo
z-
score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
Cender (0=male, 1=female)
lreedoms over Camal 3.182 (1.83)* 6.337 (1.98)*
lreedoms over Corr (+econ) 0.933 (-0.07) 1.323 (0.37)
lreedoms over Lcon (+corr) 2.416 (1.34) 4.107 (1.88)*
LducaLlon (1-3, wlLh 3=some hlgher ed)
lreedoms over Camal 2.169 (1.33) 2.347 (1.48)
lreedoms over Corr (+econ) 3.070 (2.23)** 2.831 (1.76)*
lreedoms over Lcon (+corr) 1.646 (1.06) 1.620 (0.87)
Member of clvll socleLy assoclaLlon (0/1)
lreedoms over Camal 2.438 (1.23) 2.732 (1.26)
lreedoms over Corr (+econ) 8.667 (2.90)*** 7.671 (2.37)***
lreedoms over Lcon (+corr) 3.371 (2.39)*** 7.196 (2.70)***
lnLerneL usage (0/1)
lreedoms over Camal 1.023 (0.03) 0.332 (-0.77)
lreedoms over Corr (+econ) 1.969 (1.03) 0.621 (-0.39)
lreedoms over Lcon (+corr) 1.013 (0.02) 0.430 (-1.13)









!"#$% '( )*$+,-./,"$ 0.1,2+,3 4%15%22,.- 63.-+,-*%78

!9:;<;= 6,-7%>%-7%-+ ?"5,"#$%28
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
8elaLlve
rlsk
raLlo z-score
Cender (0=male, 1=female)
Lcon (+freedom) over Lcon (+corr) 0.971 (-0.06) 1.011 (0.02)
lreedom over Lcon (+freedom) 1.991 (1.32) 1.946 (1.24)
lreedom over Lcon (+corr) 1.933 (1.33) 1.968 (1.33)
Corr (+econ) over Lcon (+freedom) 2.363 (1.34) 2.412 (1.33)
Corr (+econ) over lreedom 1.186 (0.32) 1.240 (0.40)
lslamlc over Lcon (+freedom) 1.030 (0.06) 1.039 (0.04)
lslamlc over freedom 0.327 (-0.73) 0.334 (-0.73)
LducaLlon (1-3, wlLh 3 = some hlgher ed)
Lcon (+freedom) over Lcon (+corr) 1.346 (1.06) 1.223 (0.64)
lreedom over Lcon (+freedom) 0.639 (-1.34) 0.323 (-1.82)*
lreedom over Lcon (+corr) 0.887 (-0.41) 0.642 (-1.32)
Corr (+econ) over Lcon (+freedom) 0.623 (-1.37) 0.486 (-1.86)*
Corr (+econ) over lreedom 0.949 (-0.13) 0.923 (-0.20)
lslamlc over Lcon (+freedom) 0.439 (-1.73)* 0.321 (-2.02)**
lslamlc over freedom 0.666 (-0.84) 0.611 (-0.87)
Member of clvll socleLy assoclaLlon (0/1)
Lcon (+freedom) over Lcon (+corr) 0.941 (-0.11) 0.802 (-0.39)
lreedom over Lcon (+freedom) 2.633 (1.81)* 3.066 (2.00)**
lreedom over Lcon (+corr) 2.476 (1.82)* 2.438 (1.71)*
Corr (+econ) over Lcon (+freedom) 1.933 (1.13) 2.136 (1.23)
Corr (+econ) over lreedom 0.742 (-0.34) 0.703 (-0.60)
lslamlc over Lcon (+freedom) 4.388 (2.07)** 6.811 (2.49)**
lslamlc over freedom 1.667 (0.73) 2.222 (1.09)
lnLerneL usage (0/1)
Lcon (+freedom) over Lcon (+corr) 1.647 (1.27) 1.309 (0.93)
lreedom over Lcon (+freedom) 0.937 (-0.10) 1.199 (0.36)
lreedom over Lcon (+corr) 1.376 (1.08) 1.808 (1.23)
Corr (+econ) over Lcon (+freedom) 1.143 (0.27) 1.632 (0.88)
Corr (+econ) over lreedom 1.197 (0.33) 1.362 (0.34)
lslamlc over Lcon (+freedom) 0.721 (-0.30) 0.982 (-0.02)
lslamlc over freedom 0.734 (-0.42) 0.820 (-0.26)