Alina Mungiu Pippidi* SUBJECTIVE TRANSYLVANIA: A CASE STUDY OF POST COMMUNIST NATIONALISM**

'Having some time at my disposal when in London, I had visited the British Museum, and made search among the books and maps of the library regarding Transylvania !!!" one of the wildest and least known portions of #urope !!!" I read that every known superstition of the world is gathered into the horseshoe of the $arphatians, as if it were the centre of some sort of imaginative whirlpool'! Bram %toker& 'racula"

* Alina Mungiu Pippidi is a p li!i"al ps#"$ l gis! and a % u&nalis!' T&ain(d ) !$ in R *ania and !$( Uni!(d S!a!(s +,a&-a&d Uni-(&si!#. s$( )!ain(d $(& P$D in S "ial ps#"$ l g# /& * !$( Uni-(&is!# / Iasi in 0112' S$( pu)lis$(d in -a&i us n(3spap(&s and % u&nals ) !$ in R *ania and a)& ad4 a* ng !$(&s in 5 -(&n*(n! and Opp si!i n4 T&ansi!i n4 Eas! Eu& p(an C ns!i!u!i nal R(-i(34 La N u-(ll( Al!(&na!i-(4 L( M nd(4 F &(ign P li"#' ,(& ) 6 7R *anians7 a/!(& 7817 3as !&ansla!(d in! 5(&*an )# F&i(d(&i"$ E)(&! S!i/!ung9In!(&g&ap$ V(&lag in 011: +Di( Ru*an(n na"$ 781.' S$( als au!$ &(d "$ap!(&s n R *ania n -a&i us ) 6s pu)lis$(d in B&i!ain4 ,unga&# and !$( US'

** ;u(&i(s " n"(&ning !$is ) 6 s$ uld )( add&(ss(d ! : Alina Mungiu Pippidi4 02 A Bad Las"a& Ca!a&giu4 Bu"u&(s!i <0004 R *ania4 !(l=/a> ?@09:2@ ??<A4 (9*ail: pippidiB$ !*ail'" * 1. FOREWORD Background The career Transylvania made as a centre of 'some sort of imaginative whirlpool', while the 'wildest and least known portion of Europe' is well-known. The land 'beyond the woods' of despots and vampires, of werewolves and all sorts of monsters completely occupied the Western imagination to such an e tent that attempts to show mediaeval Transylvania as an enlightened place of religious tolerance, reform and learning was not even noticed, although it is precisely this image inhabitants have of themselves. !isputed in the modern times between "ungary and #omania without the conflict ever reaching the heights of conflicts in former $ugoslavia, Transylvania survived all through the %&th 'entury as an ethnic mi of #omanians, "ungarians and (ermans. (ypsies are also there, but )uite unnoticed* +ews used to be there, but they were either decimated during the "olocaust, or they left during 'ommunist times. Encyclopedias show along time the changing image of Transylvania in the West as rooted in fre)uent changes in its history, but also the endurance of the core facts. The Encyclopaedia ,ritannica of 1-11 carries echoes of .toker's description of Transylvanian inhabitants as 'pictures)ue' e cept a few looking like (erman or /rench 'normal' peasants, when )ualifying the (ermans as 'the most advanced section of the population'. 0nfortunately they made only %11,&1-, while 'The "ungarians and the .2eklers together number 314,--4', 'but by far the most numerous element, though long e cluded from power and political e)uality is formed by the #umanians, 1,1-5,%3% in number, who are spread all over the country. The gypsies of Transylvania 6...7 are estimated at 8& &&&76...7. +ews, 9rmenians, ,ulgarians, #uthenians and (reeks are also represented in the medley of peoples'. The authors note Transylvania's incorporation into "ungary since 13:3, adding' since that time the ;agyari2ation of the principality has steadily been carried through, in spite of the bitter protests and discontent of both .a ons and #omanians. 9 "ungarian university was founded at <olo2svar in 135%* and "ungarian is recogni2ed as the official language'. =e (rand =arrousse encyclopedi)ue of 1-:4 devotes more attention than the pragmatic ,rits to the 'dark millenium' noting that so little is known of Transylvania during that time that two versions of history, a #omanian and a "ungarian one, can still present fundamental different points of view over the matter. The /rench also record Transsilvania as a #omanian name for the region, not only =atin, as in Encyclopaedia ,ritannica. ,oth acknowledge the e istence of the "ungarian name, Erdely, also used in #omanian pronunciation as 9rdeal, and the (erman '.iebenburgen'. .ince 1-11, many things happened> Transylvania was reunited with #omania by the Trianon Treaty of 1-%&, then northern Transylvania was granted again to "ungary by the 9 is ?owers in 1-4&, to return again to #omania at the end of the war. =e (rand =arousse shows the usual optimism of Enlightenment when stating in 1-:4 > '9 more liberal status granted to "ungarians seems to have settled the matter forever 6definitivement7.' This approval towards the 'ommunist solution of the minorities problem is shared by the

Encyclopaedia 9mericana 61--37, which underlines the 'more enlightened nationality policies by the 'ommunist regime@. The %1,&&& s) m reported by ,ritannica, circumscribed by the borders of the "ungarian province of Transylvania since 135: had become 1- 15% s)uare miles in the 9merican Encyclopaedia, as other #omanian contingent regions 6;aramures, ,anat7 were added to the lands between the Transylvanian 9lps, Eastern 'arpathians and the 9puseni ;ountains. The fifteenth edition of Encyclopaedia ,ritannica 61--4 ;icropaedia7 sums in four lines this 'turbulent' history, saying> '9fter forming part of "ungary 611th-1:th century7 it was an autonomous principality within the Attoman Empire 61:-15 century7 and then once again became part of "ungary at the end of the 15th 'entury* later it was incorporated into #omania. This edition also displays a beautiful 15th century oriental rug under the title of 'Transylvanian rug'* together with many others this rug made either in Turkey and imported or in some part of European Turkey once decorated a 'hristian church in Transylvania. The 9merican Encyclopaedia brings to date the demographics of Transylvania, noting that from the about 5 million inhabitants of nowadays :8 B are #omanians, %8 B "ungarians and : B (erman and other nationalities. The last inter-ethnic clash did not make its way into Encyclopedias> it dates from 1--& and left eight dead and hundreds inCured in the beautiful old town of Tg. ;ures, capital of the .2eklers 6.2ekelys7 region. The .2ekelys are the people among whom +onathan "arker was traveling> ' who claim to be descended from 9ttila and the "uns', but nowadays see themselves as "ungarian. This minor clash doesn't indeed seem noteworthy compared to other ,alkan contemporary violent disputes* it is however notable beyond the Transylvanian conte t, as the first inter-ethnic violent conflict after the =iberation year, 1-3-. Approach D started to think about this research while on a /ulbright /ellowship at "arvard 0niversity in 1--8. Dn between satisfying my need of political assertiveness by showing up at small rallies where we protested against the 0E policy towards ,osnia and the lectures of .amuel "untington on the Freligious@ motives of the ,osnian conflict, D started to wonder on the reasons of the so different approaches and understandings of the nationalism topic between us, East Europeans with a communist e perience, and our Western colleagues and friends, a difference which is marvelously mirrored in the collection of essays by =arry !iamond and ;arc ?lattner 61--37. This is not to imply that we discovered something new in our e perience> it is Cust that our communist e perience prevented us from forgetting some old truths, mainly on the human nature. ;ost of us, East Europeans, were stricken with the truth of /ukuyama's famous essay on the end of history from the first words- only to be the first to realise afterwards the tremendous distance separating political theory from the real world. ?olitical theorists have this marvelous capacity of presenting ideas, at least in retrospect, as the sole responsible of events. When reading ?opper of <edourie one really feels it was the fault of "egel or it was the fault of <ant- making one truly nostalgic of classic historical approaches, and mostly of the work of economic historians. We have little means of ascertaining, while being once and for all made sensitive by ;ar ism to the powers of ideas, how powerful were those ideas in producing actual events. Dn fact D think ;ar im-=eninism is so far the only proven case of ideology shaping society. D suspect for the rest it is safer to assume

ideology derived from social representations held by society, and their influence on those social representations was a remote and late one. The same goes today, when the validity of /ukuyama's theory has no immediate practical importance. Dn theoretical battles, such as are unfold in Cournals and academic amphiteatres he made a point so strong D think it cannot be essentially challenged. Dn the real life, however, we should have known better than e pect people in underdeveloped countries as my own to show Fenthusiasm@ over market economy and institutional reforms - these abstractions whose application mostly generate poverty and disorder in the short term. Ance the communist regime overthrown we were not to see Fenthusiasm@ e cept for national causes anywhere in Eastern Europe. /rom the rallies in former .oviet #epublics in 1--1 to the e traordinary mobili2ation in the days of the .occer World 'up in 1--3 no other cause was able to generate popular enthusiasm than national pride and solidarity, these not-at-all abstract, down to ground feelings. This is not to say that /ukuyama is mistaken > he is not. "e may seem so influential with the present age in one hundred years as "egel or <ant retrospectively seem to ?opper or <edourie. This is not to say philosophers are innocent of the responsability attributed to them> this is to say, however, that the importance of philosophy is e aggerated in our post-;ar ist era, while the importance of psychologymy own field- is underestimated. .o while liberalism remains the only legitimate doctrine at least for political theorists, people remain the same as they have ever been > keen for a collective identity, not an individual one, and la2y when it comes to choose between comple alternatives, so Fcognitive misers@ 6/iske and Taylor> 1-347. 9dding to theis the terrible impersonali2ation of 'ommunist societies 6Dnglehart and 9bramson> 1--57 there is little wonder the most basic need of people in East Europe was identity, not freedom, and it was a lucky historical development these two could go together in some places. Where they could not go together the need for identity was stronger. While the need for identity prevails over the need for freedom, D think psychology prevails over political theory. Dt is therefore such an approach that D shall take on my topic. D have, on all accounts, little or no )ualification for another. The issue Dn the rather Fcompetitive@ area of East European ethnic conflict 2ones Transylvania was until now luckier than ,osnia or <ossovo. ,esides the violent outburst of 1--& in Tirgu ;ures the region was peaceful. .ince 1--:, in an e periment uni)ue in Eastern Europe, the "ungarian 9lliance 6!9"#7, an ethnic party, became a member of the government coalition and enCoyed seats in the #omanian government. "owever, the national theme dominated the #omanian political debate since 1--& to our days, and is responsible for shaping a whole range of domestic policies - some with little connection to the national one at first sight. ,ut how can the Fnational@ problem in #omania be definedG Abviously, it means different things to different political actors. To the nationalist #omanian parties, mostly post-communist parties, but partly also anti-'ommunist, the national problem is the lack of loyalty and therefore the danger of irredentism of the 1.5 million "ungarian community inhabiting Transylvania. /or the #omanian anti-'ommunist intellectuals the Fnational problem@ seems to be the regaining of some meaning of the #omanian identity

in a world so different from the one before the %nd World War ,the last moment said, -although little evidence supports this- to have presented such a clear identity. /or the #omanian "ungarian elite the problem is to find a political formula which can accomodate their very distinct cultural identity. /inally, for the international community, the Fnational problem@ of #omania is seen only as the containment of the ethnic competition between #omanians and "ungarians in the strict legal and administrative framework of #omania and Europe. 9nalysts are also divided. .ome believe there isn@t any national problem in #omania and would rather consider it from the human rights angle, making it a problem of collective rights of a minority 6this is the aproach of human rights groups, most notably #omania's "elsinki (roup7. This tradition draws on the 'eausescu years and has adCusted little to the new realities of post-'ommunist #omania. Athers, such as Tom (allagher, point to the national problem as to the main determinant of the political life and the main negative element preventing democrati2ation 6(allagher> 1--87. The latter seems to imply that the main cleavage of the #omanian society is the ethnic one, despite strong evidence against this assertion 6both in the elections of 1--& and 1--% the public was divided on the communist-anticommunist cleavage line, a purely ideological cleavage, with the "ungarians supporting for ?resident the #omanian anti-'ommunist candidate7. Time seems so far to side with the optimists. .ince the brutal confrontation of 1--&, despite occasional increase in tension and constant hatespeech in a part of the #omanian press the situation improved steadily. The conclusion in 1--: of a bilateral treaty between #omania and "ungary led to the disappearance of the "ungarian theme in the electoral campaign of fall 1--: - and the democratic opposition, allied with the "ungarian 9lliance, won elections - the first democratic political alternance after the war, and only the second after the introduction of the universal vote in 1-13. 9fter victory the "ungarian alliance Coined the government with the winning #omanian parties. !espite these favourable developments, a maCority of "ungarians keep perceiving a Fconflict@ between "ungarians and #omanians. The immediate following of granting some self-government in the "ungarian dominated area 6the county of "arghita now has all only "ungarian leaders, either government appointed or directly elected7 lead to the intense and bitter conflict of Adorheiu .ecuiesc, where the local community instigated by the town council brutally evacuated four #omanian nuns and prevented a .wiss /oundation to start an orphanage on the grounds that this would change the ethnic composition of the region. The legal amendments, meant to satisfy the long-enduring claims of the "ungarian alliance, also had serious difficulties in passing through the ?arliament, as members of the maCority rebelled against the political agreement between party leaders and sided with the nationalist opposition. The electoral victory of Hiktor Arban@s /D!E.I in the ;ay 1--3 "ungarian elections further endangered the consociatonal e periment started in 1--: #omania. Arban had been attacking the #omanian-"ungarian treaty during his electoral campaign and at summer camps at ,alvanyos he proved repeateadly to be an outspoken promoter of self-government for the "ungarian communities abroad. !uring the /ebruary 1--- visit of #omanian ?rime ;inister #adu Hasile to ,udapest Arban insisted a separate all-"ungarian university

should be created for #omanian "ungarians. 9ll these developments show that there is more to it than the optimism of 1--: led us believe. This should have not come as a surprise, either. 'ircumstances only cannot be relied upon to solve a problem which is ill-defined and constantly marginalised. The conse)uence of the presence of a strong ethnic "ungarian party lead to a total disinterest of the #omanian parties for the topic of "ungarians. The post-'ommunist parties were in principle opposed to the policy of revendications of !9"#, considering the "ungarians have already too many rights. The anti-'ommunist parties considered that since !9"# is their ally it is to their concern only to bother with "ungarians@ problems and simply tried to find the best strategic ways of solving their punctual demands. Eo global vision was ever e pressed by a #omanian politician, and no national debate has ever taken place on this issue. Outline of this work The purpose of this book is to provide this better definition of the problem and describe the alternatives for solving it. The author is therefore not interested in seeking some definitive historical truth about Transilvania, as a historian would perhaps do, and the Transylvanian past will be mentioned Cust to the e tent that it shades some light on the present. D am not interested here in the obCective truth about the Transylvanian history, supposing such an obCective truth might be ever reached, but only in the present FsubCective@ Transylvania. ,y this D mean the current synthesis of collective beliefs, perceptions, attitudes and behaviors which, although subCective, give shape to a psychological reality more obCective than anything real in the world. Dt is the belief of this author 6as D shall show in 'hapter 17 that it is FsubCectivity@ which e plains nationalism much better than anything else, that is, the Fpolitical imagination> which turns cultural entities into political ones. Dn order to e ist, nations have to e press their political subCectivity 6+enkins J .ofos,1--: >1-7. Dt is subCectivity that feeds the substance ethnic conflicts are made of. Dt is a subCective matter of little practical conse)uence if the Kuebecois have a constitutional mention as a Fdistinct society@ in the 'onstitution, if the #omanian "ungarians can study in "ungarian in a pure "ungarian 0niversity or a multilingual one, if .outh Tyroleans have their parking tickets in Dtalian or in (erman. =ittle should it matter also for the 9merican Drish or the (erman <urds or <ossovars if their homelands are independant or not, since they no longer live there. "owever these abstract matters can lead people to behavior which is often contrary to their immediate interests. The mystery of nationalism, and its superiority towards all Fisms@ lies in this capacity to generate such disinterested behavior in the masses. To conclude, this book will attempt to give a critical overview of the contemporary nationalism theory, with a special focus on theories on East European nationalism and socio-psychological theories 6chapter 17 * to describe and interpret the collected data on common social representations of identity 6chapter %7, history6chapter 17 and interethnic cohabitation6chapter 47 in Transylvania* to outline the different trends in opinion, rhetoric

and attitude among elites6chapter 87* to establish if there is reason to talk of an ethnic conflict in #omanian Transylvania and if so, how serious this conflict is6chapter :7 * to discuss the possible solutions and ways to deal with such conflict6chapter 57. Methodological issues !ata for this study was collected between 1--: and 1--3, in a two-steps strategy. 1. Kualitative interviewing %. .urvey 6+une 13-%4 1--37 Dnteviews conducted were both group interviews 614 focus groups in transylvania, plus a control one in ,ucharest with psychology students7 and in-depth interviews with political leaders, Cournalists, opinion leaders of both communities. The material recorded during focus groups was the main basis for the )uestionnaire used in the survey. Dn order to gather the ma imum amount of significant material locations for the focus groups were selected after the conventional division of the region in three areas, each with a different cohabitation e perience, so to have a region with a "ungarian maCority 6the .2ekelys7, a region with a #omanian maCority 6'luCL<ollosvar, the old capital of the whole region7, and a a region with no distinct maCority 6Tg. ;ures, where the conflict broke in 1--& as ethnic supremacy is constantly challenged by the two groups whose proportion is similar.7 This conventional division was not taken into account for the survey, however. The sample covered all the Transylvanian counties > 9lba, ,istrita Easaud, ,ihor, ,rasov, 'luC, 'ovasna, "arghita, "unedoara, ;aramures, ;ures, .atu-;are, .alaC, .ibiu. 'ounties of ,anat were not included.The sample was made of 8-5 persons older than 18 and is representative for the age, se , and ethnic structure of the region. The si focus groups involving the #omanian population included > Dntellectuals 6holders of some academic degree7, two groups, one in Tg. ;ures, one in 'luC* ?easants, two groups, one in Hiisoara 6'luC county7,a region and a village where #omanians make the maCority. and the other in =ive2i, a small village in the .2ekely land 6"arghita county7, where the "ungarians have the maCority* Workers, one group, 'luC* 9ged (reek-'atholics, 'luC. The seven "ungarian groups consisted of>

?easants, two groups, one in 'ovasna 'ounty 6.an2iene7, pure "ungarian area, one in ;ures county 6;iercurea EiraCului7, ethnically mi ed area* Dntellectuals, three groups 6'luC, Tg. ;ures, .f. (heorghe, 'ovasna7* 9ged men, one group, .f (heorghe, 6'ovasna county7* Workers, one group,'luC* =ower middle class, one group, ;iercurea 'iuc, 6"arghita county7. Ane additional focus group interview was performed with a group of 0niversity ,abes,olyai students, 8 #omanians and 8 "ungarians. This was the only ethnically mi ed group. Dnterviews with the #omanian groups were conducted in #omanian. Dnterviews with the #omanian "ungarian groups were conducted both in #omanian and "ungarian. 0nless specified otherwise, statements reproduced in the book met the approval of the whole groups, so can de considered as stereotypical statements. 9s is it usually the case with )ualitative research our groups are not representative, but illustrative for the population and the region under study. 6,urgess 1--:7. 'omplementary use of focus groups and surveys were used before )uite successfully 6;organ > 1--1> ch. 37 Each time we considered a statement might be representative we included it in the survey )uestionnaire. The region Transylvania used to be an ethnic pu22le, with a mi of ethnic groups 6#omanians, "ungarians, .2ekelys, (ermans, (ypsies, +ews7, and religious communities 6#oman 'atholic, ?rotestant, (reek 'atholic or 0niate, 'hristian Arthodo 7, united only superficially under the same political leadership, but preserving each a sort of autonomy. This pattern was essentially changed during the 'ommunist regime > the (ermans were at first deported to the .oviet 0nion in the .talinist years on grounds of having collaborated with the .. during the war, then were allowed to immigrate to (ermany in e change for generous sums paid by the (erman state to the 'eausescu regime. Dn 1--&, when it became obvious #omania was slow on the road to land restitution and creation of a new rule of law most of what was left of the (ermans, even aged people, emigrated to (ermany. The +ews have been also submitted to persecution in .outhern Transylvania under the 9ntonescu regime and to the "olocaust in Eorthern Transylvania under "orthy. Dn the seventies 'eausescu traded them with Dsrael, the same he did with (ermans, so their number decreased until their almost total disappearance. That left Transylvania to #omanians and "ungarians, and the intermediate stratum between these historical rivals was gone. 0nlike ,anat, where historically cohabitation was closer to the cosmopolitan type, in Transylvania cohabitation was mostly of the inter-cultural type 69braham, ,adescu, 'helcea > 1--47. This means that while in Timisoara, capital of

,anat, and the surrounding border areas people of various ethnic origins 6including also .erbs, 9romanians,etc7 have traditionally lived together, keeping their cultural and national identity reduced mostly to the private sphere and often engaging in transactional behavior, people in Transylvania lived alongside each other, but not together, being separated in compact groups of different ethnic origins. 'ommunism, but mostly the blind moderni2ation imposed by 'ommunism changed Transylvania enormously. Ane maCor change was the modification of its ethnic composition > besides changes we mentioned above, 'eausescu's industriali2ation of the seventies led to subse)uent arrival of #omanians from the old <ingdom of #omania 6;oldova and Wallachia7 to urban Transylvanian areas and to large numbers of Transylvanian peasants, regardless of their ethnic origins, who too settled in urban areas. This urbani2ation was however a very superficial one 6;ungiu> 1--87. Hillages of #omania were deserted of the younger generations, while cities and towns received a large number of peasants with a very different life style than the urban one. 'omparing Transylvania with other areas of ethnic conflict also calls for some specifications. D saw fit for the present book to compare Transylvania only with other regions of the Ffirst@ world, although Transylvania belongs geographically to the second. ;ore than one reason can be summoned up to e plain this, /irst, Transylvania had an organical development > nothing happened in #omania after 1-13, or in the rest of Eastern Europe to that effect that can be compared to the mass scale social and national engineering of the former .oviet 0nion 6including genocides and mass deportation7. =ittle ground for comparison can be found with post-colonial countries, either. 9ttempts of assimilation of the other ethnic groups in Transylvania had merely an administrative character, and they were not violent. Even in 'eausescu's times the most aggressive state policy was to distribute Cobs to university graduates in areas far from their home - but even then it was not mandatory to accept these Cobs if one assumed the risk to seek a Cob by himself ..pontaneous violence between the two groups, e cepting the war times, is also lacking - the Tg. ;ures case is the e ception, not the rule. There are no records of ordinary violence or confrontational behavior in bars, night clubs or such - both groups behave peacefully. /or these reasons D think it is only correct to compare Transylvania to similar regions of the developed world, although #omania's current (!? falls far beyond this category I tend to believe that for the study of ethnic identity and conflict a cultural model as embodied in the political and institutional culture is far more more important than economical statistics. 9nd in this respect, Transylvania is undoubtely a European region > both by its rich European past and by its present culture. There is also no party in #omania's today ?arliament not to have in its political program the goal of achieving the European integration of #omania. Ane last e planation is perhaps necessary to Custify our decision to discuss elites apart from ordinary people. ?ost-'ommunist #omania has a limited e tent of participant political culture > the interest in politics is the lowest of the 41 countries reported by Dnglehart in the World Halues .urvey 6Dnglehart >1--37. Dn these circumstances the political culture of the elites, of people closer to the centers of political decisions matters enormously 6"ague, "artop and ,reslin, 1--%>817 and may differ substantially from the

political culture of ordinary citi2ens. .ocial representations of history 6what "allbwachs would have called 'collective memory'7 such as we describe in 'hapter 1 can be found at elites members as well. "owever we can easily differentiate in elite members between the shared common representations, their own personal cognitions organised by a logic closer to political opportunism and their political rhetoric, often closer to the former than to the latter. What is internali2ed in an ordinary citi2en and member of an ethnic group is often a consciencious e ercise of the use of common beliefs, representations and images by an elite member, who may even have a distance from these views. 'an a work about a conflict fail to have a fate other than conflictual G We doubt so. "owever, we felt a local view was necessary in order to understand Transylvania better. (eorge .chopflin was right to warn Westerners that for many of East 'entral Europe inhabitants the hypothesis their ethnic identities are conte tual and not essential, artefacts of a cultural and nationalist heritage and not inherent is unnacceptable.6.chopflin > 1--3>117. ?sychologically, there are good reasons for that, as D shall attempt to demonstrate. Dn practice it matters little the reason for what people believe something, but the intensity of their beliefs and the personal risks they would assume to protect them, be they rational or not. D chose a region in a moment of peace only to show that fundamentals of the conflict are always there, and that what should be adressed by policy-makers is not the acute attack but the disease itself, to the e tent that such diseases can find a cure. Acknowledgements The research for this book was generously supported by the European 'ommission 6the ?"9#E program7, the .oros /oundation 6#esearch .upport .cheme ?rogram7, and E9TA. D am indebted to .orin Donita and ;onica ,otnaru for the survey data, to 9lice !umitrache, =evente .alat, Teddy .ugar and #afael "eckman for support with the focus groups, and to 9urora =iiceanu for making me read "enri TaCfel when a doctoral student. /inally my gratitute goes to my husband, historian 9ndrei ?ippidi, who was the first reader and critic of this work both in ,ucharest and at "arvard.

2. Nation and identity in Contemporary Europe 1. Theoretical conte t of this study Df one looks the item called 'nationalism' in the ,lackwell !ictionary of ?olitical Thought one will find out that, although it is still debatable if nationalism is a political ideology, it is beyond doubt the most successful one ever. This contradiction in terms may alone e plain why such a vast literature of many scholarly fields have tried to e plain nationalism and nationalism> and why there is so little agreement to nowadays on what this theory has produced that is valuable in creating a policy to manage national conflicts,

1&

now that the fren2y of ethnic-or rather national- revivals seems to have moved from the Third World to the old Europe. This chapter does not mean to review the vast body of literature on the topic of nationalism and ethnic conflict. Dnstead it will focus on the theories that most influenced the present work and try to work out a typology of nationalism out of these theories, one that would also provide a framework for East European nationalism as D see it. D shall therefore challenge more than one of the current assumptions on either ,alkan or West European nationalism> and in doing so D shall draw more upon the work of social psychologists than to the other students of nationalism. D agree, however, with Edwards and =iebkind 6in ,reakwell> 1--%7 that nationalism cannot be approached from the perspective of only one academic field, ignoring the others* and that anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers and political scientists need to interact more in order not to seclude the theoretical and empirical data within the boundaries of each discipline. #eviewers of this huge body of literature agree there are two main trends within the sociological and anthropological theory of nationalism> the primordialist and the instrumentalist ones. "istorians and political scientists, even when not attempting to e plain nationalism as an entity, but rather to coin its specific features in one society or another are in their turn either influenced by or influential in providing arguments for one of these two theories. The almost infinite number of cases and faces under which nationalism displays itself prevents theories from providing a typology to encompass them all 6.mith> 1-31. "owever one can find reliable knowledge on nationalistic behavior of groups in a large body of facts historians, anthropologists and psychologists managed to put together. 9nthropologists are very influential and their mark on nationalism theory is a strong one. .ocial psychologists are less so. The only theoretician to acknowledge some social psychology influence is !onald "orowit2, who was influenced by the ,ristol school. "orowit2, in turn, provides important arguments for a social psychological approach to ethnic identity and nationalism. =iebkind 6in ,reakwell> 1--%>1317 was however right to point that > 'While social psychologists may need to know more about research in ethnic identity within other disciplines, no other discipline can do without the social psychology of ethnic identity'. ;y point goes even further> D think it is social psychology that provides the in-between approach to primordialism and instrumentalism, and D shall try to prove my point here. Eation and nationalism are the key concepts of social theory. Ethnic or national identity is the key concept of social psychology> when other theorists use it, as in 9nthony .mith's 'Eational Ddentity' they simply confuse 'nation' with 'national identity'. 6.mith> 1--1>> p 147. The same goes for the synonymous use of 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic identity' in sociological literature. .mith defines both 'national identity' and 'nation' as a named human population sharing an historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members'. The difference between 'ethnie' and 'nation' is at the core of many polemics. T.<. Aomen revised this literature in 1--5 in a comprehensive study essentially focus on the difference between nation, state and ethnie. 9ccording to Aomen, only the territory seems to differ in the case of 'nation' and 'ethnie'. #emoving a national group from its

11

territory, 'cleansing' it, as it is fashionable to say today, is to 'ethnificate' it, according to Aomen, who blurs the distinction between national groups with some e perience with a state of their own and others who were never in possession of a state. Eowadays, when so many groups with little or no previous e perience of a national state -,osnia, 0kraine, .lovenia, .lovakia- actually got a state of their own the potential of every ethnic group in becoming a nation seems very powerful. "owever the stress on territory of Aomen is an e aggeration. .mith, like 9nthony (iddens, emphasi2es not so much the territory per se as the political conse)uences of legally controlling a territory, that is, of having a state. The definition of 'nation' and 'ethnie' seems however to have become more 'subCective' lately, under the influence of the influential criti)ue of authors like Walker 'onnor. Dn the .mith and "utchinson anthology on ethnicity the subCective elements prevail. Ethnicity is therefore defined by> 1. a common proper name, to identify and e press 'the essence' of the community* %. a myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact, a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnie a sense of fictive kinship, what "orowit2 terms a 'super-family' 6"orowit2, 1-38,*ch. %7* 1. shared historical memories, or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events and their commemorations* 4. one or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs or language* 8. a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnie, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaporas peoples* :. a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnie's population 69.!..mith, 1-3:> ch.%7. What, then, about nationG Ds the difference between the two as fragile as being an ethnic .lovene in $ugoslavia and a national .lovene in independent .loveniaG To be sure, the difference is fragile enough. Dt mainly consists in subCective elements, as Walker 'onnor pointed out> With but very few e ceptions , authorities have shied from describing the nation as a kinship group and have usually e plicitly denied any kinship basis to it These denials are customarily supported by data showing that most nations do in fact contain several genetic strains. ,ut this lines of reasoning ignores the dictum that it is not what but what people perceive as is which influences attitudes and behavior. 9nd a subconscious belief in

1%

the group's separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology. 6'onnor >1--4, 1-57 Walker 'onnor is right to stress the failure of theory to e plain the ethnic revival in developed Europe. Dt is the minority nationalism in the West, not in the East, which rises the most serious )uestions. Would nationalism be found entirely in the underdeveloped world the instrumentalist theories would e plain it all. .ince, however, Wales, .cotland, 'orse, the ,as)ue country and .outh Tyrol cannot be accommodated in the framework described for the Third World by ,enedict 9nderson we have to look for another e planation. /urthermore, we have to search for a single e planation, even if comple and manifold, to e plain nationalism in both worlds. .ince 'nation' is so disputed a term 'nationalism' has also at least two maCor different contemporary interpretations. Ane is the definition employed by (ellner and <edourie 6shared by 9nthony .mith as well7, which has the advantage of e plaining historical and contemporary nationalism as well. 9ccording to this view nationalism is the political principle which states that the national and political units must be congruent. The other, laid out by ,rian ,arry in ,lakcwell's !ncyclopaedia of "olitical Thought takes a rather different approach> What is central to a nationalist movement is that it claims to represent members of the nationality in virtue of the material and the cultural interest that they share. Dt calls on its supporters to subordinate the common interests 6based on class, religion or party, for e ample7 that they share with their fellow citi2ens to those that they share with other members of the national group 61817 ,arry's definition either applies only to contemporary societies, or implies that there are movements who seek to reali2e the confluence of political unit-national unit without e ercising this type of pressure- and others who do not. This brings us back to the 'good' and 'bad' variants of nationalism, which D think is a theoretical failure. #ather D would see nationalism as a single phenomenon in various shapes according to societyLstage of development upon which one can look as a 'negative' phenomenon 6as <edourie does7 or 'positive' one as ;elluci 61--7. The main problem for the psychologist is not why nationalists calls their supporters to subordinate interests they share with other fellow citi2ens to the more basic national loyalty but why they succeed so often in this enterprise. Walker 'onnor bridged the division between primordialism and instrumentalism when answering this> The first few manifestations of ethnonationalism within post-war Europe 6among the .outh Tyroleans, foe e ample7 could be e plained away as vestigial or uni)ue. ,ut as ethnonationalism has become unmistakably evident on the part of several peoples whose ethnic counciousness has hitherto been considered none istent, or, at the least, political inconse)uential, scholars have proffered a variety of theories to e plain this unanticipated transsocietal phenomenon.6'onnor> 1--4> 1:37

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Ane e planation which comes close to the psychological understanding of nationalism is one's bond with one's culture. We see the world from the perspective of our culture and cannot see it differently. Aur thought is shaped by culture- notably by language and everything entailed by it. (eert2 was right to assert that 'a country's politics reflect the design of its culture'> ''ulture, here, is not cults and customs, but the structure of meaning through which men give shape to their e perience, and politics is not coups and constitutions, but one of the principal arenas in which such structures publicly unfold.' 6(eert2 1-51> 111-1%7 'ulture, is, however, achieved by sociali2ation. ?rimordialism came under attack for its understanding of 'culture' as a 'given' thing, as a 'primordial attachment'. 6Eller and 'oughlan >1--17 ',y a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens'-or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens'-of social e istence> immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, and even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. Ane is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer ,ipso facto* as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to time. ,ut for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural -some would say spiritual - affinity than from social interaction.6(eert2, 1-:1, 1&3--11&7 ?rimordialism was strongly attacked for what was seen as a confusion made by primordialists between something e isting and something primordial, so without a sociogenesis . /or my purpose D think it is useful to purify the 'givens' of this 'metaphysical' origins and see them simply as 'psychological givens', ac)uisitions of an early conte t that prove unshakable for most people during their lives. We can safely assume these 'givens' will be the main identity-providers for most people, so their use or misuse will be more influential and stronger than any later affinities or affiliations 6as political parties evoked by ,arry7. The focus of the debate, in my view, should not be not on the innate character of the 'givens'. Dt is rather on the ethnic or national identity as 'given' or 'invented'. Df we see the 'given' in cultural terms, as the only lens we can look

14

upon the world through and 'create order out of chaos' as in cosmogenesis reported by historians of religion such as Eliade, then identity is more 'given' that 'invented'. Dt is certainly 'learned' but learned does not mean invented. Everything is learned, including knowledge about the self. The self is there before we learn about it> and identity is part of the self, and is simultaneously personal and collective. 9llport's concept of 'in-group' is perhaps the most useful here> 'Dt is difficult to define an in-group precisely. ?erhaps the best that can be done is to say that members of an in-group all use the term 'we' with the same essential significance. ;embers of a family do so, likewise schoolmates, members of a lodge, labor union, club, city, state, nation. Dn a vaguer way members of international bodies may do the same. .ome we-organi2ations are transitory 6e.g. an evening party7 some are permanent 6e.g. a family or clan7.' 69llport > 1-84> 117 The main thing is that members of the in-group tend to favor the in-group and stereotype and discriminate against members of the out-group. .ince this attempt to a definition by 9llport many evidence was gathered to e plain this behavior. "ere is where social psychology, notably "enri TaCfel and the ,ristol school make their important contribution to the theory of ethnic and national identity, seen as a particular form of social identity in general, social identity being originally defined by TaCfel as a person's knowledge of group membership. The 'minimal group paradigm' added to this an important element of social comparison, as TaCfel asserted that groups define themselves by comparison with other groups. 'ompared to earlier e periments of .heriff and "ovland who organi2ed a competition between two groups for an uni)ue pri2e, TaCfel's e periments showed that even when social membership is established arbitrarily 6by a coin toss, e.g.7 it significantly influences behavior. Even when assigned randomly in a group TaCfel's subCects displayed immediately strong in-group favoritism and out-group preCudice. This behavior is also little influenced by the presence of an uni)ue reward, so it cannot be e plained by a 'scarcity of resources' hypothesis. Dn one of the e periments, for instance, the possible rewards are distributed between groups as follows> 1. in-group and out-group profit combined is ma imal %. profit of in-group is ma imal 1. difference between in-group profit and out-group profit is ma imal. .ubCects tend to choose the third variant, so they are more interested to have the superiority of their group ma imal than earn more in absolute terms. Dn order to illustrate this theorem TaCfel uses a #ussian proverb 6which, by the way, in different variants, is e tremely common in the ,alkans as well7 with a benevolent (od offering to grant a wish to Dvan 'but only you have to remember your neighbor will get twice what you get'. 9fter a long meditation Ivan asks #od to remove one of his eyes. !eveloping this theory further, Turner 61--47 increased the weight given to cognitive aspects of identification. 9ccording to Turner social identities are defined as 'cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same...in contrast to some other class of stimuli@ 6Turner at all> 1-35> 447. 'ategori2ation is fundamental in our understanding of identification. categori2ation is our main tool of 'make-meaning'. 9llport had already stated that we need categories, we even need stereotypes to put some

18

order in the world that would otherwise appear to us as an anarchical pu22le of informations. /urthermore, people are lately seen by psychologists as 'cognitive misers', so prone to give in to the easiest, effortless alternative when making a cognitive choice. 6/iske and Taylor> 1-347 The fact that groups seek ma imal differentiation lead TaCfel and his followers to the elaboration of what is known as the social identity theory. (roup strife for positive social identity, and this is obtained via differentiation and competition among groups. 6TaCfel> 1-547. TaCfel also considered that social categories carried important affective meaning, and he spoke of 'great heights of intensity that social identification may involve 61-3%7. /or TaCfel affect operated primarily through self-esteem. .ocial identification is thus desirable because it is seen as a source of self-esteem . (roups need to be high on selfesteem, and members develop various strategies to cope with its scarcity., culminating with deserting the group when everything else fails 6TaCfel and Turner> 1-5-7. ,at 'hava and .teen 61--8, )uoted by <ay !eau 7 also found moderately strong correlation's between ethnic identification and self-esteem that are consistent across age, se , and a number of ethnic groups. Ethnic identity is )uite an accessible form of social identity so we may reasonably e pect people to develop some form of it. We can further speculate that ethnic attachment will be strong since ethnic groups are both accessible and have distinct cultural markers to differentiate them from other groups. 9 'cognitive miser' is therefore prone to be a happy 'ethnic' or 'national' group member. Walker 'onnor hit even more than he intended, D guess, when he wrote the famous formula> ';an is a rational national animal.' Dn this perspective nationalism is 'natural'. !enying this truth will only lead to confusion and errors of Cudgment. 9ccepting it does not mean, however, granting legitimacy to discriminative behavior. ?sychologists do not e)uate 'natural' with 'legitimate'. Kuite on the contrary sometimes. 9ccording to ,rown and Turner 61-31, )uoted by =iebkind7 there are important differences between the actions of individuals as individuals and their actions as group members. The transition from personal to social identity is the psychological process underlying the shift from interpersonal to inter group behavior, which implies interaction in terms of group identifications. "owever, occasionally some specific social identify may function nearly to the e clusion of all other identity dimensions 6Turner, 1-3%, )uoted by =iebkind7. ,reakwell considers the whole dichotomy of social and personal identity to be a temporal artifact, as social identity becomes personal seen across biography. Ethnic identity may vary in definition and identity from group to group. "owever, selfdefinition, a sense of belonging and pride in one's ethnic group seem to be the norm. "ow does one, however, select one's ethnic group when more than one choice is possibleG .tudies tend to look upon language as the main cultural marker. =anguage is the main connection vehicle between personal and collective identity. 9ccording to =ange and Westin 61-38, )outed in ,reakwell7 there are five conditions promoting this

1:

connection> 1. e istentially language is very significant to the individual as an instrument for naming the self and the world %. essentially primary sociali2ation is a matter of linguistic interaction 1. social representations as the cognitive connection tissue of a culture are e pressed in language 4. language is the medium of the ethnic group's 6more or less7 mythological conception of its common origin, and 8. of all ethnic markers language is one of the most salient. 6)uoted by =iebkind, in ,reakwell, 18&7. /ishman also comments on why the language is such as salient dimenssion of a group's identity> Dt becomes clear why language is more likely than most symbols of ethnicity to become the symbol of ethnicity. language is the recorder of paternity, the e presser of patrimony and the carrier of phenomenology. 9ny vehicle carrying such precious fright must come to be viewed as e)ually precious, as part of the freight, indeed, as precious in and of itself. 6in (iles, 1-557. /urthermore, as studies by (iles and his colleagues prove, ethnic group members identify more closely with someone who shares their cultural background. 9s (iles 61-557 puts it > '/or instance, Welsh bilinguals would consider themselves more similar to an Englishman who spoke Welsh than to a Welshman who spoke English. Dt seems that one's behaviour, and in particular one's language behaviour, is a truer reflection of one's ethnic allegiance. '61%:7 Eow this sounds as old a truth as humanity. Ane's language is the main provider of identity. Dt is based on the observation of this fact, however unsupported at the time by scientific knowledge, that states forced their linguistic policies upon linguistic minorities in order to obtain good subCects or good citi2ens. .o when <edourie puts the essential )uestion> why are groups based on linguistic difference entitled to states of their own G the answer is> for convenience. "umans seek convenience, and we tend to look upon this as rational behavior. 9gain, is convenience enough to claim legitimacyG 'ertainly not. ,ut one should not disregard the force of a drive based merely on convenience-seeking and be assured it will always prevail in front of more comple and more soliciting types of motivation. The theories of TaCfel and (iles go well together. /urthermore, there is evidence that it is the e posure to another language which strengthens the feelings of identity and the loyalty towards one's ethnic group or language. Weinrich 61-54, )uoted by (iles, 1-557 observed> Dt is in the situation of language contact that people most easily become aware of the peculiarities of their language as against others, and it is there that the purity of the strandardi2ed language most easily becomes the symbol of group integrity. =anguage loyalty breeds in contact Cust as nationalism breeds on ethnic borders.

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'hapman et al 6in (iles, 1-557 make the same point, )uoting a study which shows that the strongest feelings of language loyalty among the Welsh were in the English-speaking counties of Wales. This induces the conclusion that e posure to the difference is actually increasing nationalistic feelings, making one aware of the distinction between the self and the others' group. Ddentity is seen in terms of social comparison> any element of competition will only further differentiate and oppose the two groups. The vaguer the borders, the greater the chances the two groups will interact in real-life competition, the stronger the nationalistic feelings bred by the groups. Eo classification of nationalism or ethnic conflict should ignore this factor of outmost importance. $.$. !astern and %estern !uropean &ationalism Ane of the most important challenges for the theorists of nationalism is to create a typology that would encompass all national and historic peculiarities. The further challenge for an East European is to understand the difference between 'Western' and 'Eastern' type of nationalism. Dndeed this difference is at the core of all nationalism classifications. The review of the e isting literature would prompt one to say that it is Eastern Europe, beyond any doubt, which turned good 'Western' nationalism into evil 'Eastern' one. ,ut things are indeed more complicated than that. D shall insist here only on three of the large number of theories pointing to the differences among Western and Eastern European variants of nationalism. Ane is the theory of "ans <ohn, which focuses on the relationship between state and nation. The second is the theory of Ernest (ellner, who sees a structural difference between the East and the West. The third is the theory supported by students of political development, of which (eorge .chopflin gave, in my view, the best account and ?eter .ugar the best typology. D shall not delay in discussing theories focused on the genealogy of ideas, whose brightest e ponent is Elie <edourie. /or one thing, <edourie is not so much concerned with the difference between the two Europes> in fact he rightly stresses the uni)ueness of the principle at work here, which leads to different results according to the society where it was tried. /or another, the influence of one philosopher or another - notably "erder and /ichte, whose writings are so unanimously considered the source of all evils- matters less than one would think in the political development of Eastern Europe. To be sure, EE elites copied the West and the moment where the 'Western' model simply broke into the East was the 1343 #evolution. This pragmatic desire of bringing independence and prosperity to their countries via a model already tried in the West was the driving factor in the East> ideology was secondary. Ddeology was built in order to attract the masses into it> the development plans of the elites were otherwise too abstract to have found any followers. The abstract doctrine of collective self-determination, as derived from #ousseau and the /rench revolutionists was the main inspiration source for moderni2ing elites in Eastern Europe. The nationalist ideology was simply the initial propaganda coat for self-determination. "ere comes the revivalist ideology of the past, the historicism, the nostalgia for a golden age in the small East European countries included in large absolutist multinational empires. "ere lies the maCor difference between them and (ermany, where <edourie's genealogy fits perfectly.

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.o it was a conscientious act of building an ideology for instrumental puposes, but those who started it in the East- the "ungarian <ossuth and the #omanian ,ratianu, to )uote only two names- were pragmatic men. Eo wonder they were seen in their countries as 'liberal'. They were liberals guided by a liberal idea, and to be sure it was an imported one. ;ill had not written yet his famous passage, but it was in the air since the previous /rench #evolution> Dt is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality....Where the sentiment of nationality e ists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely to say that the )uestion of government is to be decided by those governed. 6135%, in ?rinciples of #epresentative (overnment7 <ohn's typology is based on a simple distinction. The nation precedes the state in the West, but the state is precedent in the East. Eationalism in the West was therefore 'a reality'* in the West it was based on myths and dreams. Eationalism in the West arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and struggle of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past* nationalists in central and Eastern Europe created, often out of myths of the past and dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present and e pected to become sometimes a political reality. Then they were at liberty to adorn it with traits for the reali2ation of which they had no immediate responsability , but which influenced the nascent nation's wishful image of itself and its mission...6<ohn, )uoted by .ugar 1&7 <ohn is right to point at the differences of political development, although D think he underestimates the role of the absolutists empires playing the little nationalities ones against the other and preventing an homogeni2ation process on the Western European type to develop. "e also overestimates the degree to which the nations were formed in the West> more recent evidence, such as the works of Eugen Weber and Eric "obsbawn, point to the fact that nation-building was a task consciously assumed by Western governments and elites as well. Where <ohn is undoubtedly right is when attracting our attention to the 'wishful image of nation' created by these elites. Dndeed what might well have happened and it did happen was that these powerful representations, elaborated by elites in the act of building an ideology, became afterwards real mass representations, so powerful that they took over when the political franchise was instituted. The theory of Ernest (ellner is perhaps the best known. (ellner masterfully combines features of political and cultural development. "is final outcome, however, fails into the classical image of the East which only perverted a Western idea> we feel all through the work of (ellner the regret that the small Eastern states, deprived of any important

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cultures, ever came to life as states, and the underlying opinion the world would have had more to gain had '2echs, for instance, continue to write in (erman than in '2ech. (ellner is not, however, to be treated lightly, despite his 'entral European nostalgias. To the theory of <ohn he adds a strong 'cultural' element and a finer delimitation of Europe when writing> #oughly speaking and allowing for certain complications Europe falls into four times 2ones, resembling those global maps one sees at airports, which indicate the different time in the various vertically defined stretches of the globe. 6...7 The Westernmost time 2one is that of the 9tlantic coast of Europe. The point about this 2one is that from the late ;iddle 9ges, if not earlier, it was occupied by strong dynastic states, which roughly, even if only very roughly, correlated with cultural areas. Df nationalism re)uires the marriage of state and culture, then in this 2one the couple has been cohabiting long before their union was acclaimed by nationalist ;anifest !estiny.6...7 Eationalism did not draw on peasant cultures so as to invent a new literate one> rather it strove to replace peasant idioms by an e isting court or urban speech6...7 ?easant had to be turned into proper speaking nationals, but no national "igh 'ultures had o be forged from peasant materials.6...7 The ne t 2one to the East was different. far from possessing ready-made dynastic states, it was an area of )uite e ceptional political fragmentation, endowed with effective political units much smaller than the geographical e tension of the two locally dominant "igh 'ultures. The maCor metapolitical unit of the area, the "oly #oman Empire, had long ago lost any effective reality, and by the time of the coming of the age of nationalism had ceased to e ist even in name. ,ut if the region lacked pre-e isting political units ready for the nationalist re)uirements, it was e ceedingly well e)uipped with pre-e isting, codified, normative "igh 'ultures.6...7 .o here was indeed a need for polity-building, though not for culturebuilding. Dt was the ne t time 2one to the East which presented the greatest problems from the viewpoint of the implementation of the nationalist principle of one culture, one state. 6...7;any of the peasant cultures were not clearly endowed with a normative "igh 'ulture at all. .ome even had no name. "igh 'ultures had to become co-e tensive with entire societies, instead of defining a restricted minority. "ere both cultures and politics had to be created, an arduous task indeed. Eationalism began with ethnography, half descriptive, half normative, a kind of salvage operation and cultural engineering combined. Df the eventual units were to be

%&

compact and reasonably homogenous, more had to be done> many, many people had to be either assimilated, or e pelled, or killed.' 6118-1157. 9ccording to (ellner, we have therefore similar nationalism in ,ritain, /rance and .pain, the first time 2one- he admits independent Dreland was however a political novelty in the area. We then have the (erman and Dtalian cases- a second time 2one, and Eastern Europe- the third. The fourth is #ussia, with all the small nation enclosed first by the '2arist Empire, then by the .oviet 0nion, seen as a successor. The theory of (ellner is bright. "e is right to notice the difference between the widespread "igh 'ulture in the West and its confinement to a much smaller elitist group in the West. "e is right to notice both polity and culture had to be created in the East, polity only in proper 'entral Europe, and only minor adCustments of the two in the West. "owever, there are important points in which this theory fails to provide ade)uate answers. 1. (ellner does not account for the strong recurrence of ethnic revival movements in the West. he sees Dreland as an e ception and notes with some satisfaction the failure of the new Drish state to create a new culture as well. "owever, the Welsh, the .cots, the ,as)ues, the 'atalans, the 'orsicans are falling behind Dreland in their effort to find a suitable political form to e press their -perhaps minor- cultural difference from their fellow citi2ens in the states they belong to. %. (ellner fails to e plain nationalistic behavior of ,ritish and /rench beyond the limits of Western Europe, in, say, Transvaal, 9lgeria, Dreland. %. (ellner's theory does not e plain why the worst nationalism developed in (ermany and to some e tent in Dtaly. We are left without a clue to that. 1. (ellner considers political models were lacking from the tradition of Eastern Europe. D think he is again wrong to generali2e this assumption. Dn .outh East Europe the ,y2antine model was a strong model all through the ;iddle 9ges, as ,ulgarians, .erbs and #omanians tried to reproduce it in their own polities and even to e pand it to the neighboring areas under their political domination. D fail to see any notable difference between the ,y2antine model and 'harlemagne's one depicted for Western Europe. Anly the Attoman occupation confiscated this development. ?oland also had a state tradition before being partitioned between great powers, and a strong one, too. The typology which comes closest to the grounds in ?eter .ugar's. .ugar has a much more nuanced version than (ellner's. "e considers East European nationalism, for instance, similar to the Western one due to its anticlerical, egalitarian and constitutional approach. ,ut the degree to which the model was pursued in Eastern Europe was dependent on the development of EE societies. .ugar considers the '2echs came closer to a Western version of nationalism- although not similar, labelling it 'bourgeois nationalism'. ?oland and "ungary lacked a middle-class as developed as the '2echs so their nationalism couldn't be but aristocratic, and so it stayed until the end of the second

%1

WW. Dn #omania nationalism was a state proCect, in fact a government one, and .ugar sees it as 'the proCect' of the government, subordinating all the others. #omanian, (reek and Turkish nationalism are coined as *bureaucratic'. /inally, .erbia and ,ulgaria, which lacked an aristocracy, a bourgeoisie, and a state as well, developed a populist, mass nationalism, animated by the low, peasant clergy and the small traders. This e cellent typology is highlighted further by (eorge .chopflin's understanding of the differences in political traditions between East and West Europe. .chopflin asserts bluntly but orrectly the backwardness as the central feature of Eastern Europe, and opposes the political development of the two Europes balancing the weight between state and society, the city and the countryside, the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. 9utonomy and the separation of spheres is identified as the Western way of development, discretionary power of the state over the society as the Eastern way. #ule of the law and separation of powers, due to the initial opposition between the secular and the religious rulers became the norm in the West* church subordinated to the state the norm in the East. The cities were at the heart of the Western development -not only economical, but political as well- with their entailed concept of citi2enship, while the East had no cities in the proper sense> the peasants and the peasant mentality continued to dominate politics even after 1-13, while states were the e pression of a skillful bureaucracy, able to survive thorough political change, but with little ability for anything else. .chopflin goes into much more detail, and his application from country to country is Cust> D consider however that the core elements mentioned here are enough for the purpose of this work. The key word here is development> development of the society, its economy and its political institutions. .ugar and .chopflin provide such good theories because they point at key issues of development. (ellner is right to stress this development is culturally dependent. .ugar points out an essential e ternal element in the political development of Eastern Europe, more and more under evaluated nowadays> the 'e ternal pressures 6(erman, #ussian, ,y2antine, Attoman7' that 'never ceased' 6p 187. "e is then right to notice that if initially this prompted local nationalism, it then turned to negative effects, as all strangers were seen as threats 61:7. Ather authors remarked nowadays how this e ternal factor, decisive in many cases, disappeared from the Western conscience. Df ,alkani2ation was initially described as a fragmentation of cultures and polities in a backward environment,' a prey to the machinations of the great powers' 6?aul .cott ;owers, )uoted in Todorova 147 today's A ford !ictionary dropped all allusion to the historical role of autocratic powers so ,alkani2ation is seen as a phenomenon entirely entailed in some structural default of the people or the region- or both. "owever, as political scientists know, for comtemporary emerging democracies the strongest influencing factor is not an internal institutional or cultural one, but the e ternal conte t. The undemocratic turn of all Eastern Europe at the end of the %nd WW was not entailed in its history and not a conse)uence of its failure to attain a democratic regime> it was the conse)uence of the influence first of Ea2ism, then of .oviet #ussia, on these small, inbetween countries. D think the same can be said about historic Eastern Europe. The decisive role in the evolution of these countries was played by (ermany, #ussia, the Attoman and the "absburg Empires. The legacy of East European nationalism is to a

%%

large e tent their legacy, too. Df one looks at the roots of conflicts between nationalities in the ,alkans, for instance, one will always find out the Attomans manipulation of elites at the heart of it. Dt is a grave delusion to indulge ourselves with the idea that these empires were tolerant political entities struggling to keep peace among small savage tribes 6in all the ,alkan wars infinitely less people died than in the massacre of 9rmenians by the Attomans in the same period7. They were autocratic underdeveloped states themselves playing divide et impera, encouraging conflict and political corruption in order to dominate. 9ny ,ritish colony in the world received more in terms of a viable political and social order model than East Europe got during its whole history of subordination, even if an hierarchy of legacies can be sketched, with the "absburgs on top with some positive achievements as well and the Attomans at the botttom. The two criterias D underlined all along are the identity and the political development. ?erceived threats to identity are the source of nationalism. This factor tends to be underrated, but it is crucial. Dt@s also impossible to change via policy- or almost. ?olitical development, seen in a full geert2ian meaning 6politics as an e pression of culture7 can either ease or aggravate the perception of this threats and the answer to them. D tried accordingly to range a few cases of nationalism, however as diverse as to include the usually hard to classify ones, according to this two criterias in /igure 1. The combination of the two criterias can make us both range with relative easiness the cases and predict a certain type of nationalism and nationalistic behavior as well. Dn describing the types of nationalism resulting D used both the <ohn and .ugar classifications. D also noted two important elements> what is the social basis of nationalism resulting from this situations 6elite andLor massLandLor state7 and its resilience 6e pressed in the pair of opposites transitory-lasting7. The main advantage of this classification is that it ranges cases seen in a specific historical moment. Dt is not enough to compare nations> one has to compare nations in similar phases of development to make some sense of nationalism. !espite the wide variety of cases, and the specificities of each case authors complain about nationalism can be framed. 9 national group can be roughly e posed to another group in four ways> either aliens are living in neighbor states, or in another national group inside the same state, they can be rulers or the dominating elite, or they can be the immigrants. 9ccording to the stage of development of the respective society, this e posure leads to a pattern of nationalistic behavior. Dn cases of advanced development and distance of any possible rival group 6situation 17 we deal with a national group high on self-esteem that can display only a form of Fcivic@ nationalism. Dn case problems of development appear nations start looking over the borders, but they obviously tend to settle when their problems are settled. "aving the others in another state is obviously the best situation-only history did not provide many cases of the sort. When groups are inside the same state the problems is the most serious, because it is lasting. The third situation, of having foreigners as rulers, is usually a transitory one> a war of independence will sooner or later come and relieve the group in an inferior position. When, however, the group which is better-off is not made of foreigners, but of locals, the conflict is terrible 6the e ample of "utu and Tutsi7. Eeither e)uality not

%1

seggregation have proven to be great solutions so far. The situation seems to be manageable only in conditions of advanced development and practice of consociatonalism 6the ,enelu is a good e ample7. 'onsociatonalism seems to have worked in =iban, too, in difficult circumstances. =ow development and territorial separation leads from civil war to war among neighbors- so it is not a solution. Dn the case of newly independent states, which used to be ruled by foreign elites, the main type of nationalism is centered on state-building. 9 fair dose of insecurity in these new states will persist for a while, so former ruling elites turned into minorities will be discriminated against. 9s it looks this is Cust a historical phase that we witness now in the ,altics, but it was e perienced by the rest of the world as well in similar situations 6 most of eastern Europe, for instance, after countries became independent at the end of the last century and beginning of this one7.

(igure )! Types of nationalism

$*%#% 3est #urope4 Modern and contemporary Britain, (rance Modern 6ermany,, 7apan, /ussia interwar Hungary contemporary (rench $anada Belgium Bas9ues, %cots, 3elsh, Irish, /omanian Hungarians

#+,-%./# ,-LITI$*L T- TH# '#1#L-,M#0T 'I((#/#0$#

T2,# -( 0*TI-0*LI%M

0eighbor states

*dvanced

$ivic nationalism liberal, based on citi5enship"

0eighbor states

Low

%tate nationalism aggressive while underdeveloped8 transitory

0eighbor groups in one state

%imilar:advanced Lasting elite nationalism focused on symbolic grounds

%4

&multiethnic postcolonial states &Hungary in the Habsburg #mpire, $roatia and %erbia in former 2ugoslavia &,ost& $ommunist, /ussia, %erbia,, /omania /omania, Bulgaria,6reece, under -ttoman rule8 ,oland, $5ech, $roats, /omanians under 6ermans, /ussians Hungarians Italy during *ustrian occupation8 Baltics during %oviets

0eighbor groups in one state

.neven:low

Lasting mass ethnic nationalism

*lien rulers or elites

Low

#lite, then state nation&building8 more or less ethnic nationalism depending on the e;posure

*lien rulers or elites

*dvanced:even superior

#lite, then popular support for state nationalism directed against former ruling groups

3est #urope, .%, $anada

Homogenous but for immigrants

*dvanced:more or less prosperous

Low support for nationast ideology:dependent on the economic capacity of absorbtion

%8

Irish, <urds, *lbanians, ,oles before the )st 33 7ews Italians

diasporas

Low development Mild to important of the homeland

*dcandec development of the homeland

Mild to low

$.'. (omanian nationalism and )ungarian nationalism* conclusions for the +ear $,,,Dn the proceedings of a conference at the .chool for .lavonic and East European studies dedicated to 'Transylvania and historians' the leading "ungarian historian !omokos <osary complained bitterly about the alleged parti-pris of the founder of the school, #.W. .eton-Watson, for the #omanians. <osary )uoted a conversation he once had with the ,ritish historian in which he accused .eton-Watson of making a difference between 'good nationalism' such as the #omanian nationalism, and 'bad' nationalism, the nationalism of "ungarians. .eton-Watson simply replied that, had <osary been older and ac)uainted with the "ungarian politicians around the years 1-&& he could not have failed to loathe them in the same manner, as they were the most terrible nationalists ever. The reference to the 'aristocratic' nationalism made here by .eton-Watson came to dominate in time the literature on "ungarian nationalism. ;ar ist "ungarian historians complained, for instance, that "ungarian aristocrats monopoli2ed for hundreds of years the "ungarian nationalism, as they were the only group endowed with political rights > 'the political nation'6/rank Tibor,in .ugar> 1--47. The #omanian nationalism was also marked forever by the e clusion of #omanians from this basic Transylvanian chart known as FThe pact of three nations' 6"ungarians, .2ekelys and .a ons7- 0nio Trium Eatiorum of 1413, which was never dissolved. The 13th century nationalism of #omanians started in Transylvania and was built on the conscience of this discrimination, as #omanians found themselves unable to account for their e clusion otherwise but by some structural inferiority of their own. Dt was a tremendous effort from the part of the emerging Transylvanian elites to endow this maCority of peasants, clearly a psychological 'minority' in the taCfelian sense 6that is, a group with low self-esteem, who internali2ed the negative image of themselves from the larger society7 with a sense of self-pride. <atherine Herdery was right to note that '0nlike the ;agyars and (ermans, who from at aleast 13&& on were using ethnic identification to e clude others and protect privileges, #omanians built into theirs a yearning for inclusion, for e)uality and dignity that implied admiration as well as resentment for those with whom they interacted.' 6Herdery> 1-31> p.14-7 9lthough the Trianon Treaty and the inclusion of Transylvania in modern #omania brought important changes and reshaped practically the nationalism of both nations, one can still trace this fundamental #omanian inferiority and feeling of reCection and this fundamental superiority and pride of "ungarians as the basis of nationalistic feelings of today. To this respect the creation and consolidation of (reater #omania, but even more the aggressive nationalist ideology of the 'eausescu times played on this low self-esteem to build a paranoid vision of the world into a full blown enophobic nationalism, a massive change from the initial datum. Territorial losses, constant siding %:

with the losers of the two world wars and the terrible represion of 1-8: alienated more and more "ungarians from the initial aristocratic nationalism> however it did not change the character of this nationalism where it lasted. (eorge ,aranyi was right in this respect to assert that the remarkable thing about the "ungarian nationalism is that 'the more it changes, the more it remains the same'.6in .ugar> 1-:-> p. %8-7. "ungarian nationalism was the only aristocratic-type of the area> former minorities in (reater "ungary 6'roats, .lovaks, #omanians7 all presented a combination of state and peasant nationalism, which favored the development and success of populist peasant parties between the two world wars. "ungarian %&th century nationalism was built on the idea that the Trianon Treaty is unacceptable, so it was revisionist in its essence. ,aranyi recalls how twice a day millions of children were re)uired to recite, long with their prayer before and after the school, the ';agyar 'reed'> D believe in one (od, D believe in one /atherland, D believe in one divine eternal Truth, D believe in the resurection of "ungary. 9men' 6in .ugar> 1-:-* p.%337. 'ommunism appeased "ungarian revisionism in a large e tent 6although a simple search of the word FTransylvania on the Dnternet produces more revisionist materials than anything else7. "owever, its echos were clear in the rhetoric of anti-'ommunists who came to power after 1-3-. /irst +os2ef 9ntall, ?rime ;inister from 1--& to 1--4, declared that he is the ?rime ;inister of all the "ungarians, including those living as minorities in border-states, then Hiktor Arban, the younger generation of conservatives, made similar declarations in his electoral campaign for the 1--3 elections that he won. The policy of acting as an advocate of the "ungarian minorities rights and notably to their right of self-government can be seen, in this respect, as a more liberal form of the same nationalism. (eorge ,aranyi already noted that 'the issue of the ;agyar minorities may be more deeply interowen with the larger )uestion of ;agyar nationalism than is generally assumed' 6in .ugar> 1-:-* p.1&:7. There is, however, an important change in the "ungarian nationalism to be recorded, but this is due to the maCor historical change "ungary undergone after the 1st WW. /rom the absurd dreams of assimilating a population larger than its own 6'Who is either naive or stupid enough to believe that - million "ungarians are able to assimilate the other half of the countryG' asked Askar +as2i, the most liberal "ungarian politician ever, in 1-1%. 6in .ugar> 1-34> %&:7, "ungarian nationalists turned to a dream of elaborating a network of self-governed "ungarian minorities in the bordering countries which would make Trianon superflous and come the closest to bring all the "ungarians again together without going against "elsinki and re)uiring a modification of the borders. The most important document, in this respect, is ?rofessor /erenc (lat2's 6now ?resident of the "ungarian 9cademy7 (uide for a 'onduct towards ;inorities 61--1 for the English version )uoted here7, a basic document created to endow "ungarian diplomats with a

%5

coherent proposal at the European organi2ations. The essence of nationalism in this selfgovernment proposal, which is not otherwise deprived of all merit, is however the insistence of having "ungarian an official second language and giving up the legal obligation of all "ungarian minorities in learning the official language of their home countries.Dt is significant this policy proposal did not originate in HoCvodina, or Transylvania, or with a "ungarian minority, but came from a semi-official "ungarian office in ,udapest. This is revisionism in a well-mannered, polished contemporary European form. #omanian nationalism, as D already asserted, was much more changed- and it was not a change for the better. The state nationalism after the formation of the (reater #omania was directed towards builing the state and the nation and integrating together #omanians who had belonged to different states and political traditions for hundreds of years. Dt is unanimously considered to have been a clumsy policy, which alienated both Transylvanian #omanians and ,essarabian #omanians, treated as second-ranked #omanians. ;inorities also received less than they had been promised in terms of selfgovernment, but they kept their cultural autonomy intact. This state nationalism was however very close to the Western type liberal bourgeois nationalism> its stronger accents were due to the backwardness of the political institutions and society both, that the state desperately tried to solve in only one generation. The #omanian elite, however, turned more and more from this design towards another type of nationalism. We have both psychological and sociological reasons to account for that, in the words of two famous nationalists of the interwar times> The bourgeoisie used to be a pioneer of the whole nation, this is why nationalism automatically had a bourgeois hue6...7. Anly later, in our times, nationalism started to break free from the charm of liberalism and ceasing to be mingled with the interests of liberal capitalist bourgeoisie stepped into its autonomous full blown form which is totalitarian nationalism. 6;ihail ;anoilescu, economist and theorist of corporatism, 1-4%7 Aur enophobia is reasonably grounded in the historical ine)uality between minorities and us. Were we a formed nation, our fight with them would be less dramatical in shape. 6#omanian born Emil 'ioran, symphati2er of the fascist Dron (uard, later a famous /rench essayst, in 1-1:7 9cknowledging the historical handicap of #omanians but surpassing it via an act of will 6'Aur nationalism has to start from the wish to revenge our historical sleep, from a messianic idea, from the will to make history, wrote 'ioran7 was the basis of this 'new' nationalism. Dt was to be as short-lived as the "ungarian 'neo-nationalism' of 'ount <lebelsberg based on education. With the dissapearance of the bourgeois bureaucratic

%3

state under the blows of first fascists, then 'ommunists, the #omanian liberal nationalism was gone forever. The #ight was completely destroyed in prisons or its representatives emmigrated as ;ircea Eliade and Emil 'ioran. The #omanian fascists had also killed in 1-4& the spiritual father of the #omanian nationalism, historian Eicolae Dorga. Aften portrayed as an anti-.emite and a fierce nationalist Dorga was in fact a 'nation-maker' character on the type of ;asaryk. Dn his famous 1-%4 conference on nationalism Dorga speaks more as a civic than an ethnic nationalist, declaring national minorities have a right to their own culture, and asking for 'a political solidarity with nations who live alongside us'. "e actively opposed tearing down of "ungarian statues and monuments in Transylvania, even when they comemorated characters who allegedly played a negative role in the #omanian history. The simple fact that almost all the "ungarian monuments survived shows that the main trend politicians of the interwar times 6Dorga was also a prime ;inister and leader of a small nationalist party7 weas still closer to the bourgeois nationalism thant to the totalitarian nationalism decribed in 1-4% as an emerging victor by ;anoilescu.Df one is to analyse this time one has to look at facts more than at the rhetoric. 9 far-right enophobic rhetoric is to be found in this epoch 6rasist Eichifor 'rainic is its foremost e ponent7, but it never succeeded in becoming a main trend, not even in the newspapers. "owever, this literature was a source of inspiration for the 'ommunist times new nationalists 6veritably 'new', this time7 as <etherine Herdery proved in another book.6Herdery> 1--47 Ane can easily imagine what happens to a young nation, formed mostly by peasants, when submitted to the heavy repression and uniform education of the 'ommunist age. ?revious research D did in 1--% and 1--4 led to the surprising conclusion that collective memory of #omanian peasants stops in the fifties, and the stalinist years are seen by the survivors 6who were usually speared by repression7 as 'a golden age'. 'eausescu sei2ed the opportunity of winning this rather brain-washed population in the early seventies, when his speechwriters started to )uote #omantic 1-th century nationalists and invented an original ideology labeled afterwards as 'national-communism'. This ideology presented the past in a simplified and mistified version, making the unity of all territories inhabited by #omanians as the main goal of national history, something that never was 6,oia>1-337 The success of #omanian sportsmen and women 6Eadia 'omaneci is the most famous e ample7, the independent stand of 'eausescu from ;oscow when '2echoslovakia was invaded in 1-:3 all led to the consolidation of this 'new' nationalism. Eot to be mistaken, it was an 'ethnic' version, praising the values of '#omanianess', presented as the historical 'e ception' of a =atin 'hristian people who defended the West from the Dnfidel Turk, resisting both the "ungarian nationalism and the .lavic attempt to con)uer it, an island of Europeannes among barbarians. Hia television, movies, and te tbooks, this version prevailed over a tradition e tinguished in 'ommunist prisons with the almost one million #omanians affected by the stalinist repression. 'urrent national social representations as displayed in the #omanian contemporary mass-media belong with this tradition, not the old one Herdery is speaking about. While the "ungarian nationalism changed to remain )uite similar in essence, the #omanian one was entirely reinvented and forged anew. This new ideology made Transylvania from a central feature of the national theory the central feature as the cradle of the !aco-=atin population. This accounts for the fierce nationalism concerning the Transylvanian )uestion both in 'ommunist and post-

%-

'ommunist times compared to the low interest and involvement in the ;oldova 6former ,essarabia7 province, even in 1--1, when chances were for a possible reunification. (aspar ;iklos Tamas, the contemporary leading "ungarian political theorist went to the heart of the matter when deacribing the 'etno-anarchists', the 'apolitical and anti-political' new type of nationalists. "is e amples range from ;ilosevic to ;oldovan politicians who came to say they are not omanians, but a 'new' nation, to identify this breaking with the tradition and forging of 'new' nationalism. 9long with communism this new ideology, e)ually created to suit the purpose of an elite 6namely the same7 is only another particular form of what Tamas sees as an incessant attack on 1-th 'entury European =iberalism. 6Tamas> 1--:7 This is not to say that in the present-day #omanian and "ungarian elites only one type of nationalism can be found. We shall discern many others in the chapter dedicated to elites. We needed to trace, however, the most important trends in the %&th century history of both nations in order to make some sense of the present day #omanian and "ungarian nationalism.

3. National or Regional? Contemporary Identity Attribution in Contemporary !ran yl"ania The group interviews and the survey were concerned with answering a set of related )uestions, such as> What is the Fnation@ the "ungarians from #omania identify themselves withG What geographic entity do they consider their countryG !o they feel closer to coregionals, or to conationals, regardless of the regionG What stereotypes are used to portray their ethnic group, and the others@ groupG This chapter will also challenge on one of the important assumptions made by a cultural and political trend which considers Transylvania in itself a separate Fsociety@, displaying a culture which is different from the rest of #omania, and a separate identity of its inhabitants - the FTransylvanian identity@. This hypothesis implies that nationalities living in Transylvania, #omanians and "ungarians mainly, have more common than distinctive features, that can be discerned in their current perceptions of their civili2ation and behavior. Dn other words, this means Transylvanians tend to form an in-group with other Transylvanians, regardless of their ethnic origin, towards the rest of #omanians, and, respectively "ungarians. The Fseparate identity@ hypothesis relies mainly on the different historical development of Transylvania from the other #omanian inhabited regions. #omanian nationalist politicians, but many scholars also, protested at the line dividing Transylvania from the rest of #omania in .amuel "untington@s Fmap of civil2ations@ from his famous and

1&

controversial essay on the clash of Fcivili2ations@. Eo doubt "untington was right, in terms of development, to point at Transylvania as to a distinct region, closer to 'entral Europe than to the ,alkans. ,ut the many ambiguities due to the way the concept of Fcivili2ation@ is used in this conte t show here. Tramsylvania is the homeland of at least three distinct cultures 6"ungarian, #omanian, (erman7, with the #omanian 'hristian Arthodo population enCoying a relative maCority since at least the Emperor@s +oseph DD first census in the area 615-17. This pattern is in fact a multicultural one, with the #omanian culture closer to the ,alkan Arthodo one, and the "ungarian and (erman closer to 'atholic and ?rotestant 'entral Europe. !ue to the absence of geographically clustered communities 6e cept the .2ekelys area7, resulting in the very poor segregation of ethnic groups 6#omanians and "ungarians mingle inside the same counties, cities, villages, blocks of flats even7 we tend to look upon Transylvania as to an uni)ue society shared by various 6mainly two7 cultures. .o what is perhaps true in terms of historical development may be less so in contemporary social reality. -rom the historic .cradle/ to the contemporary .margin/ The results of our survey show that #omanian "ungarians have a distinct national identity 6"ungarian7, but acknowledge their contract as #omanian citi2ens with a large maCority and consider #omania is their country 6/igures %,17. 9fter 3& years of being incorporated in the #omanian .tate practically no "ungarian defines himself as F#omanian@. The 18 B "ungarians and 1& B #omanians who look upon Transylvania as their Fcountry@ are a restricted minority in the total sample. Eone of the respondents indicated "ungary as their country. .ince Transylvania has been the homeland of Transylvanian "ungarians for almost a millenium, and they are outnumbered by #omanians in the region 6 the report is 1 >17 the result is hardly surprising. Transylvania is a part of the #omanian state, but is their homeland also. .eton-Watson was right when describing the situation in the seventies to point that the maCor conflict was that the #omanian 'ommunist state wanted in e change for its liberal policies that "ungarians admit they are "ungarian-speaking #omanians, and they would not, considering themselves part of the "ungarian nation, altough they accepted their #omanian citi2enship as a fact 6.eton Watson> 1-55> 1347 Table 1 and % about here To be a Transylvanian "ungarian means to share your loyalty between state and country. Dt is not an easy life, with "ungary Cust across the border. "owever it is the e perience of the freedom to travel to "ungary after 1--&, to an e tent unprecedented before, that plays an essential part in self and heteroidentification and stereotyping. 9s focus group participants put it 6each paragrapgh indicates a different speaker7> 0ntil 1--& D lived in #omania as in a foreign country, until 1--&-D thought D belonged to the ethnic "ungarian minority, and that between "ungarians in "ungary and myself there is no difference but in the past : years D reali2ed there is something else.

11

Even by saying that D@m a "ungarian from Transylvania D admit somehow that D have less rights than "ungarians from "ungary, but that is a situation D share with every citi2en of #omania who is "ungarian. .ince D am born and come from a long line of ancestors in Transylvania D say D am a "ungarian from Transylvania and that makes me very proud. When D say "ungarian from Transylvania that says it all> the nation D belong, the fact that D am a #omanian citi2en and most of all to what part of #omania D belong. 6"ungarian intellectuals@ groups, 'luC and Tg. ;ures7. D am "ungarian and all the other possible answers are not correct. The "ungarian nation is only one. Dt has subdivisions, for instance we are .2ekelys, but mainly we are "ungarians, ;agyars. 6"ungarian old men group, .f. (heorghe, .2ekelys7 The old men from the .2ekelys were considerably more nationalist than the intellectuals from multicultural 'luC. /or the latter, #omania is their country since Transylvania is a part of it and Transylvania is their homeland, the historical Fcradle@ of the civili2ation they belong to. They feel close only to other "ungarians who share this specific e perience, that is, other "ungarians from Transylvania. /or the old .2ekelys, who evoked nostalgically the short reunification with "orthyst "ungary during the war years, stating a difference between "ungarians from #omania and "ungarians from "ungary was politically incorrect, since the F;agyar nation is Cust one@. Eational identification is much stronger than regional identification 6for both ethnic groups7, and national identification is not however done with the country 6"ungary7, but with a national group 6"ungarians7. What are the main determinants of self-ascriptionG /irst, the language. .ince D can hardly e press myself in #omanian or in any other language then the logical result is that D can't get dressed in that coat. Therefore D can be a whole only when D am at ease in my language and culture. D think that says it all. 9nd if D feel "ungarian so D want to stay until my death. D had two maternal languages, if you want, my father is a #omanian who came from Timisoara here to the .2ekelys area where 3& B are "ungarians, and my mother is "ungarian and D spoke no #omanian at all until 1% when D started to learn it in school, and D feel "ungarian, even my father learned "ungarian after staying here so long. D don't know, if they have gone to ;oldova instead now D would be #omanian 6workers, Tg. .ecuiesc7. ?eople interviewed in the groups stated it is e tremely rare if not at all unlikely for someone to have a double identification, even if it comes from a mi ed family and is bilingual. Everyone with a mi ed background in our groups identified himLherself as

1%

"ungarian. #eligion is seen as important for ascription, mainly for the #omanian group, but not essential, while other characteristics such as physical appearance are disregarded, although there is some perception of a difference> D had fun once with a colleague> we waited at the e it of the 0niversity trying to guess who was "ungarian, who was #omanian. 9nd in most cases we guessed right 6"ungarian students, 'luC7. ?eople e pressing this view were however Cust a few and isolated by the rest of the groups. =ower educated groups especially insisted Fall people look the same, it doesn't matter what they are@. 9 poll done in 1--5 by the ,abes ,olyai 0niversity showed that language was an important element of identification for 5- B of the "ungarians, self ascription for 34 B, Fhaving a "ungarian parent@ for 55B and being Fclose to the "ungarian culture@ for 53 B. .elf-ascription was considered as important as the maternal language also on the #omanian sample of the same poll 60,,* #esearch 'enter for Dnterethnic #elations> 1--37 The most common feeling associated with this identification is pride. We here are the cradle of the "ungarian civili2ation. We come from a very civili2ed region, with traditions in religious tolerance which was unknown to Western Europeans. "ere is the place where freedom of religion was first legali2ed. We speak a more pure "ungarian that "ungarians in "ungary, Cust as #omanians from Transylvania speak the best #omanian language in #omania. 9s TaCfel stated, self-evaluation is always made by comparison with other groups, and the pride of being a "ungarian from Transylvania is reported to #omanians from outside Transylvania, "ungarians from "ungary and even the Freligious intolerant@ Western Europeans. 9longside pride this identification is related to various frustrations. ,orders kept changing in this part of the world, this is not people's fault. D have some friends in a ;aramures village who never changed home, but during the time they were in four different countries. 6workers, 'luC7 "owever it is not the comparison with #omanians or the treatment they@re subCected by #omanians which make #omanian "ungarians feel inferior. Dt is their relationship with "ungarians from "ungary, which disturbs them>

11

When D was in "ungary D said F"ello@ to an old man who happened to know D was from Transylvania. D saluted him in "ungarian and he answered me in #omanian. .tupidity can be the only e planation for this, in my view. When D was in "ungary D visited the fathers-in-law of a friend of mine. 9nd they were surprised D speak such a good "ungarian. D never felt so insulted in my life. The most significant fact is that we're not even called ;agyars, as they are, when we go there. We're called #omano. 9nd #omanians are called Wallachs, when not dirty Wallachs. 6Workers@ group, 'luC7 The conclusion of these negative e perienced was very well synthesi2ed by an intellectual of Tg. ;ures> We, Transylvanians, sometimes feel like second rank "ungarians when compared to "ungarians from "ungary and second-rank #omanian citi2ens when compared to #omanians. We sometimes feel betrayed by both@ 6"ungarian intellectuals, Tg. ;ures7. What seems like an irreversible loss for Transylvania and is strongly resented is Transylvania@s presence as a cultural, political, spiritual 'center'. Either from ,ucharest or from ,udapest today@s Transylvania is a marginal region. Even the memories of old men from the "orthyist times, otherwise seen as a golden age, display this frustration Transylvania was treated as a margin and all the civil servants positions emptied by the severance of #omanians were occupied by "ungarians from "ungary and not locals. The '.2ekely' identity survived only as a Flocal@ identity. With one e ception, the rest of the F.2ekelys@ we discussed with considered Fit is the #omanian nationalists who say .2ekelys are anything else than "ungarians@. !ue to their homogenous presence in their areas, .2ekelys are in fact less interested in cohabitation than other "ungarians. The young ones ignore completely the fact that .2ekelys have a different ethnic background, and the older ones invented imaginative e planations in order to e plain the traditionally different way of writing which persisted until the 1-th century saying Fshamans only wrote like that@. #omanians want to put this .2ekely coat on us but anytime and to anyone we .2ekelys here we tell we belong to "ungary. Df #omanians from ;oldova and #omanians from #omania are unable to unify, to put the same hat on their heads as they should there is no need to put .2ekelys coats on us. There is a different tradition here, but is mostly social. "ere we had no nobles and no serfs, only e)ual people, warriors defending the border.

14

That e plain why we are different form the rest of the "ungarians in Transylvania. 6workers, Tg. .ecuiesc> old men, .f (heorghe7. !efenses built during the 3& years of #omanian domination make even intellectuals deny the original ethnic background of the .2ekelys was different 6the writing was close to Turkish7 and consider the idea as Fa propaganda thesis of 'eausescu@. When confronted with the "istory of Transylvania edited by the "ungarian 9cademy 6and bitterly disputed by 'eausescu@s historians7 they were stunned to discover this is not propaganda, but history, and tried to e plain it as a mistake, or a concession 6interview with "ungarian ;? by the author7. .tereotypes of "ungarians from "ungary compared to "ungarians from #omania develop easily> They are more concerned with their Cobs and their well being, while we are more patriots than they are. "ere the national feelings, the feeling that you belong to a nation is stronger than in "ungary. We're not so open to the rest of the world as they are, but this local patriotism, this love for these grounds are more intense at us 6Ald men, .f (heorghe7. ?eople from the homeland always feel superior to the rest of us. The same goes with #omanians from ,ucharest towards the rest of #omanians. 6"ungarian intellectuals, 'luC7 D was concerned for si years to understand why this treatment from their part. 9nd D think they are envious, envious because we work harder, we're more persevering, we know more languages. They had more liberties than we had in the past %& years and they lived better and that's why they know better their way around, but this is only because conditions were different. They're afraid we're going to take their Cobs and to eat their bread so they consider us a sort of strangers when we go there. We worked harder than they to be what we are did, and even if we are considered second class "ungarians in "ungary D know D am better than they are. ,ut immigrants from here don't feel at home in "ungary, where they get to meet socially only other "ungarians from #omania. We speak the same language for nothing if ideas are not common. We're more communicative than they are. We learned that from the #omanians, we're more welcoming, friendlier, more =atin, if you want, they are colder than we are.

18

We're tougher than they are, because we had to survive more problems than they did. 6'luC, Tg. ;ures, all "ungarian groups7. To summari2e, one of the maCor problems of the "ungarian identity for the #omanian "ungarian minority is the treatment they are subCected by their fellow "ungarians from "ungary. This is a widespread negative first-hand e perience, since everybody either tried to work in "ungary for more money in the past years or had a close ac)uaintance that did. They felt unwanted, often because they volunteered for hard work for a lower pay so becoming the unwanted immigrants who lower the price of the work. Dn the case of "ungary, national solidarity was manifested occasionally only at the !epartment of /oreign 9ffairs or by political parties such as /D!E.I, and not as a widespread attitude. This lead to various attributions meant to e plain "ungarians@ behavior, such as envy towards their fellows from Transylvania. Dn fact, the perception of this FreCection@ lead to an increase of group ties and ethnic solidarity and a strengthening of the Fin-group@ feelings. The group identifies itself by comparison with other groups, so #omanian "ungarians feel superior to "ungarians from "ungary 6because they speak a more Fpure@ language, allegedly7 superior to the #omanians from outside Transylvania 6FTransylvania is the cradle of civili2ation, it@s 1&& yeard ahead from the rest of #omania@7 and superior to West Europeans, who allegedly have no such tradition of Freligious tolerance@ as Transylvania enCoyed. "owever, the hard trials of the #omanian "ungarians self-esteem did not push them closer to #omanians, but increased their national sensitiveness. .ince they are a small community, which recently discovered they can not really rely on the other "ungarians from the mother country their need of protecting their identity from #omanians and their sensitivity to appeals at group status and prestige is even greater. Eot only "ungarians are defensive when they have to picture themselves as a group. 9ma2ingly, so are Transylvanian #omanians, although they are three times as many as "ungarians. #omanians we talked to were preoccupied the interviewer could misunderstand they are somehow not #omanians, so, if asked FTransylvanian #omaniansG@ they answered FEo, Cust #omanians@ or F9re there more categories of #omaniansG D don't think so@. 6(reek-'atholic, 'luC7 or F#omanians will tell you they@re #omanians. 9sk "ungarians, they@ll tell you they@re Transylvanians@. #omanian worker, 'luC7 Ance established nobody is contesting them being #omanians, it comes out some traces of regional identity e ists, associated with a feeling of pride. Dt's more honorable to be from Transylvania than from any other part of #omania. When D am sometimes ashamed of being a #omanian D feel better when D think D am from Transylvania 6intellectual, 'luC7. The #omanian national group is mainly interested to make clear they are related to the rest of #omanians. They would never allow their regional identity, however present, to go against their national identity, since the fear of "ungarian irredentism is widespread.

1:

"owever, when it comes to stereotyping #omanians from the rest of #omania their representations are )uite similar, although milder, to those of the "ungarian group, as we shall see. The Image of the Other .tereotypes are politically incorrect. 9ma2ingly, all the groups seemed aware of this, peasants perhaps less than urban groups. 'ompared to a control focus group in ,ucharest with political science students with no previous ac)uaintance of any other ethnic group all the groups in Transylvania showed e treme caution when describing the others, including the usual negative-labeled (ypsies. The ,ucharest students characteri2ed the (ypsy as Fbarbaric@ and the "ungarians and #ussians as Fenemies of #omanians@. /inally, the stereotypical portrait of the #omanian from Transylvania as seen by a "ungarian mi es positive and negative traits> it is a Fwarm@ and Fcommunicative@ person. The (ermans and us learned from the #omanians to sit in front of the gate to speak with passers-by. 9nd we still don't do this enough. The "ungarian once returned home shuts the gate and starts working without further delay 6"ungarian peasants, ;ures 'ounty7 #omanians are also perceived by "ungarians as Fpatient, more peaceful, they endure more@. FThey are more obedient towards authorities@, while "ungarians are Fmore impulsive@, Fcolder@, Fless patient@, and Ftougher@. ,oth are perceived as hard working, although "ungarians feel #omanians get more out of their work, and the .2ekelys tend to feel they work harder than anyone does. "ungarian teachers in our groups complained "ungarian students are less ambitious, and while #omanians learn two-three languages, they are happy if the "ungarians at least learn "ungarian well. "ungarians see themselves as more Fcivili2ed@, but only when compared to #omanians from outside Transylvania, as they like to point out. ,oth "ungarians and #omanians from Transylvania are perceived as superior to the #omanians outside Transylvania, seen as a Fbackward@ group> FWe here are prouder people@. ;any "ungarian respondents apologi2ed when asserting the civili2ation in Transylvania was at least one hundred years in advance compared to the civili2ation in the <ingdom of #omania 6Tg. .ecuiesc, workers7. The difference between the elite and the ordinary people was bigger at #omanians than at "ungarians. The #omanians aristocrats were all right, but they were Cust a handful, and the people were much less civili2ed than the "ungarian people 6'iuc, "ungarians, and middle-class7. The e planation for that is Fbecause we are closer to the West, people are more civili2ed as they are closer to the West@. This geographical attribution is more popular in loweducated groups. #omanians from outside Transylvania are therefore seen by "ungarians as Funcivili2ed@, Fspeaking too loud@, Fintolerant@ Fvulgar@, and Fcrooks@. Everybody,

15

#omanians and "ungarians, seemed to agree F.outherners@ are faster and noisier. #omanians, however, point out this is Cust a different life style. When D go to ,ucharest D keep asking myself FWhat are these people arguing aboutG@ and then D reali2e it's Cust their way of speaking.@6'luC, #omanian intellectuals7. ?easants travel so little they can hardly have enough material to create stereotypes, so they tend to generali2e usually one e perience 6a wedding they attended or any other single trip7 and the generali2ation is either positive or negative, as the e perience. The overall image of both groups is that #omanians are warmer, more communicative, while "ungarians are more serious, distant, proud. 9n interesting problem with both #omanians and "ungarians is that in low-educated milieus Fnationalist@ is a positive attribute. When asked FWho is more nationalistic, #omanians or "ungarians@ the answer was FWe both areM. We all care about tradition here in Transylvania@. The Fbad nationalists@ are in fact called Fe tremists@ and both sides agreed they can be met among #omanians and among "ungarians as well. FThere is no garden without its weeds@6peasants, ;iercurea EiraC, ;ures county7. #omanians envy "ungarians for their stronger national awareness> Wherever one of them is born he is a "ungarian, and he will be a "ungarian in %&& years still. #omanians have less personality, they're more conformist, and they don't stand like "ungarians. 6#omanian workers, 'luC* peasants, =ive2i"arghita7 "ungarians agree with this view, both workers in Tg. .ecuiesc and old men in .f (heorghe mentioning the case of #omanian ;oldovans Fwho no longer admit they're #omanians@. /or the #omanian (reek 'atholics this is e tremely shameful and humiliating. #omanians in "ungary were assimilated. =ook at the #omanians who go to 0nited .tates, they become 9merican, while the "ungarians are still "ungarian. Dt's the same with the millions who were (reek 'atholic when 'ommunists forbid it and who became Arthodo without any problem. The (reek 'atholic group displayed the attitudes of a minority persecuted group, which despised #omanians 6with an intensity close to self-hate7 and resented and feared "ungarians. They complained the Arthodo 'hurch 6which is in fact the state church, and was close to the 'ommunist regime7, in order not to give them back the churches confiscated in 'ommunist times, was spreading rumors of them as being F"ungarians@. Ane more reason to be nationalist> to differentiate themselves from "ungarians. 9 very difficult and psychologically uncomfortable position.

13

Eot only .outherners are considered Funcivili2ed@ by Transylvanians, especially by "ungarians. .o are newcomers, who are blamed with all the interethnic problems and intolerance, both in 'luC and Tg. ;ures, towns where #omanians were a minority in the 1-th century and which have now an important #omanian population 65& B in 'luC, 8& B in Tg. ;ures7. These newcomers who were brought here to shut us down when factories were built in the seventies. They know nothing of our history, our common history. They don't understand why streets carry so many "ungarian names. They've lived only among #omanians so when they hear us speaking "ungarian with our children in the streets they feel insulted@ 6'luC, "ungarian workers7. The temptation to blame it all on newcomers Fpeople who were not raised here, in the spirit of Transylvanian tolerance@ 6"ungarian intellectuals, Tg. ;ures7 is indeed very great, and academic milieus such as the ,abes ,olyai 0niversity faculty members tend to endorse this very simple e planation despite any lack of evidence. Aur e perience points to the contrary> old inhabitants of Transylvania, therefore locals, tend to be more intolerant and distrustful towards the other ethnic group, regardless if they are #omanian or "ungarian. ,oth our third age groups 6#omanian (reek-'atholics, 'luC, and "ungarians, .f. (heorghe7 displayed fierce nationalism, having their personal memories to support their preCudices. "ungarian intellectuals believe in a sort of Transylvanian Fidentity@ or at least Fspecificity@, although they admit this is not crosscutting the much stronger national loyalties. We people here changed states and were alternatively maCorities and minorities, we're more used to the Fotherness@.'iuc, middle-class7. ,ut there is also a dark-side of the Transylvanian identity. We here have a permanent feeling a danger, while people in "ungary never think they have to preserve their language, their culture, their identity. 9lso the West got there before getting here, we're here in a sort of province, protected by Western influences@ 6Tg. ;ures, intellectuals7. ,oth groups tend to consider the cohesiveness of the other group as superior to their own. #omanians are actually scared of the fact that F"ungarians are more united@, while "ungarians perceive that F#omanians care about each other more, they help each other more than we do@. There are actually two different types of Funity@ perceived here. What #omanians fear is the political cohesiveness of the "ungarian group, much superior in fact to the #omanian groupG /or instance, in Tirgu ;ures, although the two groups are e)ually numerous the mayor is "ungarian because "ungarians vote according to the ethnic criteria with the

1-

"ungarian 9lliance 6!9"#7, while #omanians divide their votes politically among several #omanian parties 6Eationalists, .ocialists and 'hristian-!emocrats mainly7. The distinctive group conscience of the "ungarians as a minority scares the #omanians, who, although they form the maCority, are not organi2ed as a self-conscious group. The few constituents of FHatra #omaneasca' 6'The #omanian 'radle'7 the #omanian national preservation association are attracted on the basis of this fear. Their mobili2ation is a reaction against the "ungarian mobili2ation, and is constantly used by #omanian nationalist politicians. Dn simple words, here is a description of this Fmirroring@ mobili2ation mechanism in the words of a #omanian peasant from the 'luC 'ounty> D have this good neighbor and friend of mine, "ungarian, and we get along fine, only she says> F$ou, ;ariut2a, D can understand everything e cept one> why is your husband in the Hatra. Then D tell her> you go with my husband to Hatra and D'll go with yours to !9"#. 9s a physician from Tg. ;ures told this author back in 1--&, a few weeks before the violent clashes in Tg. ;ures> $ou people from the .outh don't have to worry since the pattern in Transylvania goes as follows> once "ungarians start to organi2e #omanians follow behind. The Funity@ of #omanians as perceived by "ungarians is very different. Dt is mostly a form of sociability, an increased participation to the others@ life, which is perceived as unity. 9 maCority which is divided and has no clear direction is weaker than a homogenous, goal-oriented minority 6;oscovici > 1-3%7 and somehow #omanians perceive that, and that makes them feel , in their own words Fcomple es@ towards the "ungarian group. They never give up. They pursue their goal like we're not around. 6#omanian peasants, workers, 'luC7 When the "ungarian classes wanted to separate the school and to send us, #omanian classes, to some building to be found, "ungarians from my class who had learned in #omanian until then, sided with them, although we have been colleagues for years, we were in the same basketball team and they would have to leave with us. 6#omanian student, ,abes 0niversity, 'luC7 Ather #omanians interviewed pitied the "ungarians for this Funity@ which they perceived as a perpetual state of mobili2ation. Dt is tiresome to always respect the commands you are given in church, the place where all the important commandments for the "ungarian

4&

community are given. Dt's tiresome to go to a show, which you don't understand. Dt's an effort to be in a constant state of mobili2ation. The unity of "ungarians is imposed from upside down and it needs a lot of effort to keep Dt.6#omanian intellectual, Tg. ;ures7. This e ceptional state of mobili2ation is confirmed by "ungarians. "ere is an impressive statement from the "ungarian intellectuals@ group in Tg.;ures, a comment on the violence outburst of 1--&, which ended with do2ens of severely inCured people > Dn a way D@m glad it happened, since back then in 1--& there was a lot of trust in the development of the #omanian democracy among "ungarians, ?eople were confident and off their guard,for the first time #omanians were a positive e ample, and D am sure a fast assimilation would have followed. When the assimilation is not forced, it@s more dangerous. 6Tg. ;ures, "ungarian intellectual7. An the other hand, #omanians cannot admit "ungarians keep their distance from fear of being assimilated 6see demographic statistics below7 and complain of constant reCection > Dnstead of having a "ungarian girl marry a #omanian boy the parents would rather see it dead.6Hiisoara, peasants7. "ungarians stick together at work and after work, and by speaking only "ungarian they e clude the #omanians. 6'luC, workers7. Table 1 about here The #omanian students at ,abes-,olyai were concerned #omanians and "ungarians will become two totally separate groups with the separation of universities and, as they say, We won't even go for a drink together. Dt will happen what happened with schools > "ungarians in mi ed schools where "ungarian-taught classes coe ist with #omanian taught-classes know more #omanian and have #omanian friends, while "ungarians in pure "ungarian schools have no #omanian friends at all. The concern of losing ties with the #omanian community was not present at the "ungarian students of the ,abes-,olyai 0niversity, who considered nothing will change if they separate the universities completely 6students' group, 'luC, ;ay 1--57. 'ommunication seems to be the main concern of #omanians, while fear of being assimilated is the main concern of "ungarians. ;i ed families are an e ception in this picture of the two ethnies living alongside each other without any real communication between, but mi ed families also tend to get separated along ethnic lines > ;y brother is a #omanian (reek-'atholic priest and he married a "ungarian. They have two children, one is a (reek 'atholic after his

41

father and the other one is #omano-'atholic after his mother. An the Eew $ear night, the father with the Arthodo child watches the #omanian program on one THs, while the mother with the other watches !0E9-TH 6the ,udapest satellite channel7 in another room, all night long@ 6'luC, workers7. 9sked if they would approve a mi ed marriage the peasants in Hiisoara said 'Ah, yes, only they wouldn't be happy, families will make them split apart sooner or later'. 9s parado ical as nationalism is the perception of the others' religious behavior. Dn loweducated "ungarian groups #omanians were perceived as Fmore religious@ because, allegedly, of the more impressive rituals of the Arthodo 'hurch. "owever, in the same "ungarian groups some members considered the Arthodo religion as Fmore recent@ than 'atholicism and Fmore primitive@. Dn the group of intellectuals we were told F#omanians look more religious than us, because our religion is so much simpler than theirs 6meaning rituals7@. Dn the #omanian groups, however, "ungarians were considered more religious, because they Fdo what they are taught at the church@ and because of the large number of associations connected with the church, non-e istent in the Arthodo 'hurch. #omanians feel their religious participation is more formal, although many told us they disagree that in "ungarian churches Fthey do so much politics, priests tell them whom to vote and even raise money for !9"#@ 6workers, peasants, 'luC7. ?easants are, on the contrary, inclined to say "ungarians are less religious because they work on holidays, when the #omanians take several free days 6for instance, on Easter7. #omanians don't work even during "ungarian holidays, while the opposite doesn't happen fre)uently. ;ore interesting than stereotypes of each other are stereotypes of the difference between the two groups. When my granddaughter upsets me D'm able not to talk to her for two days. #omanians are not so, they do not keep anger long.6"ungarian intellectual, Tg. ;ures7 #omanians need less than we do to feel satisfied. They watch TH and they feel happy, while we are concerned by one or by other and we can't get over it so easy. We "ungarians are so deadly serious. 6;iercurea 'iuc, middle-class group7. The importance of this perceived difference of character and its impact on the normal social competition was e cellent put by a "ungarian trainer of a handball team in ;iercurea 'iuc > The evening before the match with the #omanian team D send my boys Cogging and then put them to bed early stressing the importance of the ne t day match. The #omanian team occupies the porch of the hotel, smokes a little, drinks a lot of beer, dances in the near-by disco, goes to bed at two in the morning and the ne t day we are better than they but they win.

4%

The FobCective' disadvantage of belonging to a minority group is here transformed into a FsubCective@ disadvantage, perceived as already internali2ed in the behavior of the two groups. This e emple highlights the "ungarian usual perception that #omanians do better with less effort, that "ungarians receive less gratifications than they deserve and fortifies the drive to create a separate society where competition with #omanians is e cluded for ever and "ungarians will no longer be cheated of what is rightfully theirs. The most telling fact is, perhaps, that a social representation of nations living like a family within #omania is simply missing, so difficult it is to imagine an in-group including both #omanians and "ungarians. When asked FWere #omania a family, how would it look like@ most "ungarian groups told us they cannot conceive it as a family For we would be the intruders' 6intellectual, ;iercurea 'iuc7. Even #omanians had difficulties. FDt would be like a mother-in-law with the daughter-in-law@ 6classical image of conflict in the #omanian folk-stories7 6peasants, 'luC7. 9t the other e treme is this beautiful representation of a young #omanian student in 'luC> The father should be a (erman, the "ungarian the cook and the #omanian should take care of the house. Eow it's not working because the father is #omanian, not (erman. (ermans are the most admired by #omanians of all national minorities 6D;9.> 1--:7. (roup participants also stressed the difference they perceived between (ermans and "ungarians. (ermans never push like "ungarians. Dt's a terrible pity they left 6#omanian intellectual, 'luC7. (ermans are loyal, unlike "ungarians. Watch their (erman show on #omanian TH. Dt's fairly decent, while at the "ungarian show they say one thing and they translate another6 #omanian workers, 'luC7 Dn the same time we should not forget the modern dinasty of #omania was of (erman 6"ohen2ollern7 descent. 9lthough far from perfect, the life of different nationalities in the kingdom of #omania is viewed retrospectively with some nostalgy by both groups, as showed mainly in our low-educated participants to group interviews. The <ing is seen as an arbiter who kept balance and peace. .uch an arbiter seems to miss today, although in polls both communities agree ?resident Emil 'onstantinescu is the political character who did most to improve relations among the two groups. To conclude, "ungarians of #omania emerged from the post-'ommunist period with a national identity enforced by the comparison with "ungarians in "ungary 6they see themselves as Fbetter "ungarians@ than those7 and frustrated because of the lack of national solidarity among the Funi)ue ;agyar nation@. The e posure to an enlarged communicational environment only increased the group@s desire Fto preserve its separate identity, and this is further reinforced by an interaction between the Finside@ and Foutside@ attitudes and patterns of social behavour@ 6TaCfel> 1-31 >1187. Eational, not regional

41

identity seems to be the main concern of #omanians also, as they are preoccupied with the alleged "ungarians lack of openness towards them and loyalty towards the #omanian state.7. #omanians and "ungarians from Transylvania do try to see each other obCectively> but the harder they try, the more they notice their difference. #. $OCIA% RE&RE$EN!A!ION$ OF &A$! AND 'I$!OR() !'E *+E$! FOR $EC+RI!( 0.1. Motivation1 Theoretical assumptions Eationalism would be unconceivable without history. ?erceptions of the common history by nationals feed national identity, pride, solidarity, and attitudes towards other national groups. Df history is invented or not it matters little. What is important is that the need for a historical identity is there, as a part of a need for a positive social identity. "istory is positive social identity that already passed the most difficult test> the test of time. Dt is not the se)uence of particular events, however outstanding they might be, which makes a nation, but the perception by nationals that something specific to their group endured along history, during times of hardship and golden ages as well. Dn other words, it is not the 9merican #evolution in itself that makes 9mericans feel proud, but the inherently 9merican values people perceive were at stake then. Dt is not <ossovo as a specific event or location- historically <ossovo was a defeat, and demographically .erbs are no longer a maCority for more than one century- but the whole self2image of the 3erbs as defenders of 4hristianity that makes .erb people so enraged over the autonomy of 9lbanian ;uslims in that territory. !efending a specific version of history is seen as enraged nationalism, but in fact it is rational behavior> people defend the consistency of their identity, of their self-image. Dndividuals may see themselves as unimportant or even as failures, but few people see their nation and history this way> usually national ideology has some convenient e planation- historical, of course- if that particulate nation is not doing very well at the time. ?ositive social identity compensates for low individual self-esteem, so people really feel the need to have one. Dn any event, history and national identity are so deep interacted that telling them apart is difficult sometimes. =et us take, for instance, "utchinson and .mith's definition of ethnicity, and we shall see that at least three of the si elements are strongly related to history, that is> 1. 9 myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact, a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnie a sense of fictive kinship 6"orowit2, 1-38> chapter %7 %. .hared historical memories, or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration 1. 9 link with a homeland, not necessarily in physical occupation by the ethnie, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with !iaspora peoples. 6.mith and "utchinson> 1--:* 57

44

"istory is directly connected to these three, but has some connection to the other elements of this definition such as the common culture and the sense of solidarity as well. Dt is oral history which preserves and shapes in the collective memory of ethnies the social representations of common ancestry, founding myths, homeland, and makes an essential contribution to the widespread feelings of sharing a common culture and e periencing solidarity in the present on the model of the past. Written history, as an instrument of national self-awareness or even nation building is e)ually important, as studies of Eugen Weber 61-5:7 and Eric "obsbawm 61-317, among others, proved brilliantly. Ethnicity is essentially Foriented to the past, to the origins and ancestors of the community and its historical formation, including Fits golden age@ 6"utchinson and .mith, 1--:> 57 "istory is therefore an essential element of sociali2ation in the framework of a national culture. D shall discuss here social representations of the history and the past. ;y choice of terms needs some specifications. .cholars and Cournalists use commonly ;aurice "albwachs@ notion of Fcollective memory@. Dn "allwachs@ 61--%7 theory memories are said to be formed and organi2ed in a collective conte t. #adley had furthermore added that people@s way of remembering the past should be dependent of their relationship to their community 6#adley> 1--&7, while classical psychoanalytical theory considers people repress inconvenient memories. While D consider these theoretical foundations essential for the understanding of this research, D however use the notion Fcollective memory@ a bit differently, in order to be able to distinguish both the source of recollections and their sharing by the group. Therefore D make a distinction between Fsocial representations of history@ and Fcollective memory@, and another between Fpast@ and Fhistory@. D mean by Fpast@ here only events from the recent history, which were e perienced by the subCect directly and have in the same time enough social relevance to have generated a social representation. ,y Fhistory@ D mean that period placed out of the reach of subCect@s e perience, and known to him only via other sources, either ancestors or other more or less speciali2ed persons. .ocial representations of history have a double source> on one part the authentic e perience of a community propagated by collective memories of families or larger groups, on the other hand representations and beliefs ac)uired in the sociali2ation process 6school education, mass media, cinema7. To preserve some collective memories in a community it is necessary that the family and the group can survive in the same environment through social and political change and discontinuity. Where this failed to happen 6as in the case of deplaced populations, immigrants from rural to urban areas7 it is very likely social representations will be influenced more by outside sources and the public discourse on history. 9 previous research in #omanian villages of ;untenia showed 'ommunist moderni2ation, and especially the process of Fvillage systemati2ation@ managed to Ferase@ collective memory, now reduced and confined to the 'ommunist years 6;ungiu> 1--87 Dt is already evident that by Fcollective memory@ D mean here not the whole set of representations on the past shared by the members of a community, but only the recollections socially reconstructed on the basis of some direct e perience of the community on the length of two generations at outmost 6living memory7. .ocial representations of the past and mainly of history are, however, due more to sources other

48

than the familyLgroup, being shared by large collectivities such as ethnic groupLnation. We are not in any event interested in their original Fauthenticity@ or lack of it> we are interested in their instrumental aspect mainly, that is5 their role in forming and maintaining current attitudes and behavior. The topic of history is constantly absent from sociological and anthropological research in Transylvania, with a few notable e ceptions 6Herdery> 1-31* ;itu> 1--57. Dt is )uite natural, since anthropologists are less concerned with actual history, historians, even historians of mentalities, limit themselves to documents and do not go into field research, while sociologists are bound by clients and tend to measure only present and futureoriented attitudes. Dn our group interviews participants considered discussions on history a natural and organic part of the larger #omanian-"ungarian topic. Dn the everyday discussion fre)uent historical themes are invoked, such as continuity of #omanians in Transylvania, inCustices suffered by #omanian in the 9ustro-"ungarian empire, historical inCustice done by the ?aris Treaty to the "ungarian nation, and so on. .ome of those themes, such as treatment of the ever-changing minority group by the ever-changing maCority ethnic group during the %nd World War feed continuously historical propaganda on each historical anniversary, mostly on the #omanian but also on the "ungarian side. 9ppealing to historical resentments to blame difficulties of the transition during the past seven years was a constant policy of the #omanian post-communist governments 6(allagher> 1--8* ;ungiu> 1--87. The 1--& violent clashes of Tg. ;ures were also fueled, among others, by the #omanians discontent with the mass celebration by the "ungarians of the ;arch 18 1343 anniversary, date considered by the #omanians as frustrating for their history. 0.$. Two versions of history Dt is perhaps not uncommon for a territory claimed by two or more countries to have a disputed history. Transylvania is however an uni)ue case> the historiography of both countries was dedicated in modern and contemporary times primarily to the task of proving the legitimacy- or lack of it N of Transylvania@s belonging to one state or the other. The #omanian history, starting with Enlightenment, considered the #omanians as direct heirs of the #oman colonists in !acia and of their mi ed marriages with the native !acian population. The homeland of !aco-#omans, the =atin-speaking population resulted from the #oman occupation, was Transylvania, where the two capitals, of native !acia and #oman !acia are to be found. The #oman emperor 9urelian 6%5:7 abandoned !acia, which had become a difficult position to keep in front of barbarian invasions. The #omanian historiography claims that soldiers and clerks only left with the official retreat, colonists, farmers, and families with children remaining in !acia. There is little archeological evidence to support this assumed presence of !aco-=atins, at least a massive presence, in Transylvania, but there is little trace of them south of !anube either. =inguistic arguments are richer, but some are also interpretable in various ways. The fact

4:

is that the first census in Transylvania made by Emperor +oseph DD 615-17 discovered the #omanian ethnic group to be the largest. Dn the other two provinces Wallachia and ;oldova #omanians also formed a large maCority. ,y 15-1 Transylvania could almost )ualify as an ethnic-ranked society. /eudal lords were, with few e ceptions, only "ungarian. The urban middle class was formed by germans 6.a ons7. .2ekelys were free landowners, performing a military function 6defending the border7 9lmost the entire #omanian population and some "ungarians were serfs. #omanian historiography claims that "ungarians arriving in the eleventh century as a migratory people defeated the local scarce chieftains, who were #omanians, and became for almost -&& years the upper class. ,loody peasants' revolts combined during ;iddle 9ges this social and ethnic element. 9t the end of the /irst World War, a war in which #omanians sided with the winners, Transylvania was occupied by #omanian troops* some of them made of Transylvanians who deserted the 9ustro-"ungarian army. The popular assembly of ,laC proclaimed the unification of Transylvania with #omania after the consent of (erman and "ungarian communities was asked and granted under certain conditions. ,y that time #omanians made of Transylvania's inhabitants more than all the other ethnic groups taken together 6%.31&.&4& of 8.%:1.:&%, 81, 3 B in 1-1& N source =ive2eanu> 1--4> 1187. The Trianon treaty ratified the unification of Transylvania with #omania. Dn 1-4&, after more years of "ungarian official revisionist policy, and the defeat of /rance, fascist (ermany and Dtaly decided to return to "ungary northern Transylvania in a decision which was labeled by the #omanian historians as the FHienna !iktat@, and is mentioned by the "ungarian historians as the@ /irst Hienna 9ward@. #omanian historians also claim the take over of Eorthern Transylvania created the opportunity of massacres of #omanians in several villages, as some proof was published. The "ungarian historiography tells, of course, a different story. 9ccording to the maCority of "ungarian historians, "ungarians, at their arrival in the 11th 'entury found a Transylvania that was mostly uninhabited e cept by small groups of .lavs. They started to coloni2e it, imported (ermans and .2ekelys to build cities and guard frontiers and created the Transylvanian civili2ation. #omanians, originally very few and living in the mountains, started to come in large numbers crossing the 'arpathian passes from the 11th 'entury. When "ungarians fell defending their country and Europe in the ;ohacs battle against the Turks in 14%: the "ungarian .tate ceased to e ist for almost 18& years and the cradle of the "ungarian civili2ation remained the autonomous Transylvanian ?rincipality, subordinated to the Attoman Empire. 9fter that the demographic situation started to change )uickly, due to the continuos immigration of #omanians, to their reproductive capacities, and to the great number of "ungarian men who died in the war against Turks. "ungarian historians do not claim #omanians came from the south of 'arpathians, but from the .outh of !anube, where, allegedly, all !aco-#omans retreated after 9urelian's decision to leave !acia. Evidence consists in predominance of .lavic names of rivers in Transylvania, scarcity of archeological proof showing #omanian presence during the Fdark millennium@ in Transylvania, and presence of FWallachs@, who

45

are also called F9romanians@ in small ethnic groups scattered all over ,alkans, in ;acedonian, .erbia, (reece, ,ulgaria, and so on. With few e ceptions, historians in both countries built cohesive versions of history, carefully leaving out all that could contradict or leave some doubt on their theories. /ew attempts were made to bridge the gap and even recently an attempt of the Apen .ociety Dnstitute to create a common F"istory of Transylvania@ failed. Dn both countries Transylvania and its history is considered a central issue in the national formation theory. #evising the two versions, "ugh .eton Watson concludes> These rival theories are of course inspired by nationalist motives, and neither can be proved by ade)uate evidence. Dt seems more probable that considerable numbers of =atin-speaking people remained throughout the centuries in these lands than that they all disappeared and a completely new lot took their place a thousand years later. This does not of course e clude the probability that there was large-scale immigration also at the later date. Dn any case, certainty will never be attained. What concerns us in this work is that already before 14&& people speaking this language formed a maCority of the population in ;oldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, and that from them emerged the #omanian nation. 61-55> p 158-15:7 The 9merican anthropologist <atherine Herdery humorously complained about the difficulties of doing some Fvalue-free@ work in Transylvania, since most topics touch the e plosive #omanian-"ungarian dispute. 9s she puts it> Transylvania@s history is one of the most politically e plosive topics in any conversation with #omanians and ;agyars 6"ungarians7 because both countries claim or have claimed rights of sovereignty over the region. The more D have read on Transylvanian history, the more convinced D have become that an obCective rendering of this history is almost impossible. D am not concerned to whether Transylvania Freally belongs@ to either #omania or "ungary N a point D have had to argue with countless people, from #omanian villagers to ,udapest writers to "ungarian car salesmen in ,altimore. 6Herdery> 1-31> p.1-7. Eeither am D.. ,ut it is not easy, as we shall see. 0.'. 3ocial representations of the founding myth1 moderates5 e clusivists and pragmatics This absolute division between the two national schools of history was perfectly mirrored by our focus groups. /irst, regardless of the knowledge of history people assess or actually have, their opinions on history are nevertheless strong. 9fter an initial defensive reaction met in most of the groups F"istory is the business of historians@ or Flet's leave

43

that to historians and politicians, we know only what our parents told us@ everybody was aware of the core of its national theory. This is not surprising for #omanians, because in 'eausescu's last years national indoctrination rivaled 'ommunist indoctrination to be finally synthesi2ed in an uni)ue doctrine 6see Herdery> 1-537. ,ut this good knowledge is rather surprising in "ungarians, who, even in "ungarian schools, learned history from #omanian 'ommunist te tbooks. 9n e ception can be made for the counties that were part of the "ungarian 9utonomous #egion from 1-4- to 1-:4. 9 separate "ungarian history te tbook circulated in this area and allegedly it carried some of the "ungarian version of history. !uring that period #omanians were also compelled by the .oviet 0nion to accept what was called Fthe #oller theory@ which claimed #omanians are, in fact, .lavs, therefore a part of the big .lavic family. The theory corroborated well with the "ungarian claim that it were .lavs, not #omanians that had been found by the first "ungarians at their descent in Transylvania The e cellent knowledge by "ungarians of their dissident theory shows the effectiveness of a parallel sociali2ation process, helped by the pro imity of "ungary 6#adio, and more recently "ungarian Television can be received almost everywhere in Transylvania7. 9ll the "ungarians in our group, with one notable e ception 6a worker in a group in 'luC immediately singled and labeled as Ftraitor@ by two more radical members of the group7 consider the #omanian founding myth a Fpure myth@ and "ungarians the first to have settled in Transylvania. This belief is e pressed in various ways, according to the degree of education, and displays several nuances as well. 9s group participants stated 6different paragraphs indicate different speakers7> The conviction of the "ungarian intellectuals is that the !aco-#oman theory is wrong, the immigration theory Oof #omaniansP is the best of two. We believe that in 15th-13th centuries the number of the two was balanced, but afterwards, from various reasons, the number of the #omanians grew faster and more than "ungarians. We believe more "ungarians than #omanians lived in the ;iddle 9ges in Transylvania and it is very strange the #omanian official version of history doesn't accept that. We also believe "ungarians were the first settlers here, although none of the two theories has enough proof@ 6intellectuals, .f. (heorghe, county of 'ovasna7. Everybody agrees about the date of our arrival, only the arrival of #omanians is controversial. What matters is to bring some light here, especially for the #omanians, who had only a source for their history, while we had two. 6Dntellectuals, 'luC7 What D know is that the history of the #omanians which was taught to us in the school is not true and D think this is a punishment for the #omanians not to know their real history, that is what D think. "ungarians came here first, when here was a desert, an empty large space. ,urial grounds show that, nothing is older than 11th century, each village

4-

has its history on who carved the first stone, and it is always "ungarians who did. The first wave of "ungarians came here three centuries before +esus 'hrist, the second around the year 4&& and the third after the year -&&. 6Workers' group, Tg. .ecuiesc, county of 'ovasna7. The latest myth is not original, but is a theory, less important and accepted, of a "ungarian historian, somehow picked by this low-educated member of our group, who couldn't recall where he first heard it. The other members of this group, although some looked skeptical, did not argue with him on what even when asked if they share this view. 9ttributions tend to have )uite a comple elaboration on this matter> D think #omanians don't know their history because they didn6t want to know it. They invented their whole history, which is a fake, in order the hide something shameful connected with their birth. And what might that be7 6;oderator7 The #omanians come from #omans convicted and deported to live here, their ancestors were criminals, no wonder they fake their history. 6=ower middle class, 'iuc, 'ounty of "arghita7. This is another minor theory of a "ungarian writer. The woman who told us that slightly disapproved by other members of the "ungarian group, was the only one in the group to believe #omanians were the first settlers, but only under these dubious circumstances. The story was consistent with her own traumatic history> born in the .2ekelys area, she decided to leave this homogenous "ungarian region and Fto mingle@. .he went to school to 'luC where she enlisted to the #omanian-English /aculty. .he had serious problems with her #omanian language that was faulty and she claims professors constantly told her she should have tried the "ungarian section instead. .he was unable to graduate, returned to the .2ekelys region and took a Cob she despised in the private sector because she didn't own a university diploma. .he e pressed bitter frustration for having tried to Fbecome #omanian@ and having failed. "er attribution was constructed as a defense. .he initially Fhad bought@ the idea that #omanians are heirs of #omans, a noble people, nobler than "ungarians - but after feeling reCected by them she could not reCect it altogether> so the Fgood #omans@ became Fbad #omans@- convicts of the #oman Empire. The rest of the group, partisans of the Fclassical@ "ungarian theory, listened skeptically to this person. ;obili2ation against the #omanian theory was spontaneous and almost general in all our group interviews. The basic idea of the "ungarian group is that not only is it the first to have settled, but also were the only civili2ed population until the import of (erman settlers. D know when "ungarians became 'hristian* D don't know when #omanians became 'hristian.

8&

We have a saying about that, put the man on the tomb of his grandfather and you'll find out who was here earlier. Why are so few !acian words in the present #omanian languageG "ow could a !acian mother fail to teach her children the !acian languageG 6"ungarian group, intellectuals, Tg. ;ures7 #omania should have been called !acia if the #omanian theory were true. #omanians are not !acian descendants. The !acians were assimilated by the #omans and left this country. They are descendants of .lavs, #omans and "uns. #omanians came here around 15&&, in villages around "uedin the first #omanian names appear after 15&&. 6"ungarians workers, 'luC7 #omanians, on the other side, are strong believers in the F!aco-#oman theory, although they are persuaded F"ungarians will never accept it@. Dn the 'luC urban groups, opinions were far more nuanced. Dt looks like #omanians were here forever. We are %1 millions, they are less than % million. 6'luC, #omanian intellectuals7 Df you learn #omanian history you will say #omanians are the first settlers, if you go to a "ungarian school, they'll tell you "ungarians. 6#omanian Workers, 'luC7. This Frelativism@ disappears in lower educated groups> "istory says the Thracians were the first, than the !acians. We were born here from !acians* we didn't immigrate. We grew up here* we never attacked anyone. The "ungarians attacked us, together with #ussians and (ermans. They were a migratory people and invaded ?anonia, not us. 9nd now they want it all. #omanians were the first. Then came the migratory peoples and attacked them, shamed them. 6#omanian peasants, village in the 'luC county7 Why should we have left !acia and returned laterG 9nd would they let us in like this, without a fightG 9ll their theory is nonsense. 6#omanian workers, 'luC7. ,efore discussing the importance the groups attribute to their historical theories D@d like to point out a few things. /irst, we should notice the self-assurance and superiority of "ungarians when it comes to this topic. They Ffeel sorry@ for #omanians who don@t know their real history, unlike them who do and have evidence to support it in their immediate environment 6such as tombstones7. We did not fall upon any image of the #omanian as

81

Fimmigrant', despite the overspread belief in this theory among "ungarians. An the contrary, #omanians have largely shared images of "ungarians as invaders> They came on horses and they brought a lot of illnesses, because people who travel a lot usually bring illnesses they take from all places. 6#omanian workers, peasants, 'luC7 #egardless the historical truths, "ungarians display more confidence than the #omanians, who react defensively and tend to distribute their group in the role of the victim. We can consider both representations are actually attributions, trying to 'give a meaning' to the ;iddle 9ge hierarchy, turned into contemporary preCudices. "ungarians try to avoid the guilt of their superior status by invoking their previous settling and their 'civili2ation'. #omanians try to Custify their inferior position implying they were violently forced into it by ' migratory barbarians '. Dn our poll Transylvanian #omanians and "ungarians could choose one of the three options> 1. E clusive nationalism 6whoever settled first has more rights and the others have to play by his rules 6first two answers7 %. ;oderate nationalism 6they consider historically proven their group was the first to settle, but that group rights should be e)ual 1. ?ragmatism 6they rule out any association between the moment of the settling and the group rights7. /igure 4 6cahart7 comes about here 1. Anly %1B of #omanians and no "ungarians chose this alternative. 9lmost a )uarter of #omanian "ungarians therefore considers they should have superior rights to other ethnic groups due to their first arrival. Dn other words, this group sees itself as a first-class category of citi2ens and the others as 'lesser rights' groups. "ungarians although so articulate in focus groups about their historical theory chose overwhelmingly the alternative 1. .ince they have been numerically inferior in Transylvania for more than two hundred years they do not dare to challenge the #omanian superiority. %. 1% B of #omanians and 18 B of "ungarians are convinced their theory is Cust, but do not think this should affect the rights of the other groups. -B of the "ungarians and almost no #omanians 61.8-B7 accept the other group's historical theory. 1. 51.3 B "ungarians and 1- B #omanians 6the relative maCority7 refuse to associate in any form the national birth theory with the distribution of rights, choosing the alternative that rights should be e)ual regardless of when the settlement took place.

8%

To sum up, only a )uarter of the #omanian population in Transylvania identifies with nationalist slogans such as '"ungarians are tolerated by the hospitality of #omanians in Transylvania'. 9nother third might feel provoked by "ungarian nationalistic slogans that "ungarians are the first and the founders of the "ungarian civili2ation. The "ungarian community feels disadvantaged by the use of this topic under any circumstances so they choose the most defensive alternative, although group interviews suggest many more are strong believers in their theory. The displayed attitudes in group interviews towards the importance of the national birth theory were either denial or minimalism. 'ommon sense was the prevailing attitude> What matters now is how to make a happier life for our children, either #omanian or "ungarian, than we had ourselves. 6Workers@ group, #omanians, 'luC7. Aur main problem now is that we get poorer and our managers get richer daily by stealing, regardless if they are #omanians and "ungarians. 6Workers@ group, "ungarians, Tg. .ecuiesc7. This is a very primitive manipulation of politicians who want us to get at each others' throats* D'm not interested who came here first. 6Tg. ;ures, "ungarians, intellectuals7 ;obili2ation appears immediately, however, when the other group uses the argument> When D am told> speak #omanian, because you are on #omanian land D get mad 6'iuc, "ungarian middle class group7 Dt is important only when we're told we are the immigrants or guests here, and that #omanians were here forever and we came later. This is as much my homeland as it is for #omanians 6'luC, workers, "ungarians7 D hate being told my ancestors came from 9sia. 9ll right, if this is the case, then D am proud they survived as a nation after such a long way. 6'iuc, "ungarian group, middle class7. D am not interested who came here first, or only to the e tent that D consider myself at home and somebody might consider me a stranger. 6'iuc, "ungarians7. This comes up only when a group wants to stripe the other of its rights@ 6"ungarians, Tg. ;ures7. The logical se)uence of thought in both #omanian and "ungarian 'pragmatics' runs as follows>

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1. Dt doesn't matter who settled here fist, we're all people, now we're here together, so we have to make the best out of this, only politicians like to make a big fuss about this %. "owever we were here first and the others migrated here, then managed somehow 6by higher reproduction rates, "ungarians on #omanians* by imposing themselves as masters and making the rule, #omanians on "ungarians7 to become stronger than we are 1. That's why it matters we are not immigrants here, but natives, so we do not have lesser rights 4. .o when D see it matters to the others then it starts to really matter for me too. ,oth groups seem today to resort to their national theory not in order to dominate the other group, but to protect themselves- they were tried so hard and so often on the basis of this argument. They become immediately defensive when it comes to it. 9lthough both groups deny the national theories are important, both are reluctant to admit it was not their group to settle first and their theory is as relative as the other group's. The only outspoken groups on the matter were #omanian (reek-'atholics and peasants of Hiisoara, "ungarian old men and partly workers in Tirgu .ecuiesc. "ow can it not be important who settled first, dear ladyG Dt's like you stay in the house and you have to share the house, and the person you share with, it is important who is he, what is his culture, his behavior, if you can get along with him by the same rules. 6Worker, Tg. .ecuiesc7. Dt is very important because we were the first here. 6(reek-'atholics7 Dt is important because who came first has more rights and decides what rights to share with the newcomers. 6"ungarian old men, .f. (heorghe7 The topic is in fact a maCor producer of discriminative representations and attributions even among pragmatics. The way the two theories are built they can hardly fail to be discriminative. #epresentations of this type can be grouped in four maCor recurrent themes> 1. The reproductive potential of #omanians !o you know that sayingG The smarter people are fewer children they have. The "ungarian overlord had only one heir, while the #omanian serfs had ten, and this is how #omanians ended by outnumbering us in Transylvania'. 6Tg. .ecuiesc, "ungarian workers7 ;y old man told me they believed in this booklet which used to circulate in the forties that #omanians multiply as rabbits. 6"ungarian intellectual, Tg. ;ures7.

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The issue of the #omanians higher reproductive potential came spontaneously in every conversation with the "ungarians. ;ore educated "ungarians, however, tend to blame themselves rather than #omanians. Dt is our fault, we don't have enough children, that's why our number decreased by the years 6"ungarian intellectuals, 'luC and .f (heorghe7 %. The lack of 'civili2ation' of the #omanian group "ungarians tend to think of their culture as superior. .ome apologi2e when stating that, others see no need, but it is an overspread belief their civili2ation in Transylvania is older and better, a belief enforced by the scarcity of #omanian monuments when compared to the "ungarian ones. D somehow understand the #omanians* we have so many tombstones and churches to show while they have nothing. 6"ungarian intellectual, 'luC7 "ere in town we have a 14th century church made by a #omanian grof 6'lord'7 who married a "ungarian, but that's about it. Df D look around in Transylvania, what do D seeG 'astles in !eva, in 9rad, in "unedoara, everywhere. Dn "ungary and 9ustria they have even more castles, as you go towards West, is itG ,ut south of 'arpathians, in the other #omania, there are no castles. D know #omanians say Turks tore them down, but the fact remains. The old men in .fintu (heorghe synthesi2ed this argument perfectly> We are the first because there is overwhelming evidence of this fact, but even assuming we are not we're the only state-building nation in Transylvania and had been the only civili2ation for centuries. 1."ungarians as oppressors This is a widespread stereotype among #omanians, inside and outside Transylvania as well, since history te tbooks and maCor #omanian literature pieces by Transylvanian authors such as =iviu #ebreanu promoted this image. #omanians resorted to it as the obvious defense when discussing about the large number of monuments "ungarians have in Transylvania. The #omanian civili2ation was Fa wooden one@, as old churches in ;aramures still show. Where #omanians were richer they built stone churches, like the one in !ensus, made of old #oman carved stones and older than "ungarian churches. #omanians were serfs at the "ungarian lord 6grof7. "ow could #omanians build stone churchesG

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#omanians weren't allowed to live in cities, they weren't allowed to build churches. Eo wonders there are few.@ 6#omanian intellectuals, 'luC7. Df "ungarians do have more monuments, #omanians claim this was done at the e pense of #omanians, with their work and on their land. "istorically, the #omanians claim that they are the only natives in Transylvania developed in a time when they were deprived of elementary rights 6The #omanian Arthodo 'hurch did not enCoy an e)ual status with the other denominations in Transylvania, being considered an inferior church7. 4. "ungarians as invaders The stereotype of "ungarians as invaders, who came from 9sia and con)uered Transylvania, is also due to #omanian history books. Therefore it is widespread among #omanians and provokes strong defense reactions in "ungarians. The group of peasant women in a village near 'luC still remembers they told their "ungarian neighbors the second day after the Tg. ;ures violent clashes in 1--& F$ou should go back to "ungary or wherever you came from and let us leave peacefully here@ and they were surprised to be answered FWhy should D go to "ungary when my ancestors are buried in this land@. Two other observations deserve to be made concerning the topic> 1. "ungarians are e tremely defensive and reserved when it comes to this topic and the interviewer had to spend time to persuade them they can tell whatever they want regardless of conse)uences. This is reflected in the large share of pragmatics, but also in the following se)uence of a group interview 6Dnterviewer's interventions are in Dtalics7> This is a political game... D'm persuaded the "ungarians were here fist, and all the rest came after them 6...7 Who ever is first comes up as an argument to critici2e somebody's domination...Dn the last 3o years, it was the domination of #omanians...9nd to persuade you don't have e)ual rights... %hy5 who came later has less rights7 .ome think so. That's why /unar digs all around 'luC to find trace after trace... -unar has been mayor of 4lu8 for 9 years only1 this is an older argument... !iggings 6archeological7 were made all over Transylvania in the past %& years. .ome consider they can dominate this way... They're looking for proof.

8:

Df we answer to these we would walk into a trap. We would allow ourselves insulting affirmations... %ell5 I meant only... That's how we see it, that's how we live this, that it can turn against us. %. Everybody, #omanians and "ungarians included, seems to be aware it is politically incorrect to consider the first settlers have superior rights. This prompts group to be cautions and defensive. "owever people have strong views despite that fact and the use of discriminative stereotypes derived from the national 'history' theories is common practice. ,oth groups are defensive and do not even need the other group to trigger defense mechanisms, since nationalist politicians and the media do the Cob almost daily. Ardinary people have to face the conse)uence of these provocations, immediately converted into behavior> the #omanian women in Hiisoara fought with the "ungarian women after seeing on television the Tg. ;ures conflict, although they had a peaceful coe istence until the conflict.

0.0. 3ocial representations of history 0.0.1. .3ocial5 not ethnic conflict/ The ;iddle 9ges was a dark time indeed for our respondents. <nowledge of history, e cepting some intellectuals - especially "ungarians - lack on a large scale. ?eople even refuse to discuss history, and say it was not a topic in their families. They prefer to stick to what fathers and grandfathers told them about more recent times. The only e ception seem to be the #omanian (reek-'atholics, from two main reasons> the advanced age of this group 6corresponding to the national character of this aging group7, and the past of this denomination, closely associated with the national emancipation of #omanians in Transylvania. Dt was the (reek 'atholic more than the Arthodo 'hurch, perhaps also in need to Custify its own unity to #ome, which fought for the revival of #omanians' conscience as a =atin nation. Therefore, it is not surprising this group has a higher interest and knowledge of history, displaying stronger preCudicial attitudes towards "ungarians. /or the mediaeval history of Transylvania can hardly fail to be other than traumatic for #omanians and it can easily provide the basis of frustration and preCudiceG !eprived of any political rights Transylvanian #omanians could climb the social scale only by ethnic assimilation, abandoning their ethnic Flosing@ group and Coining another. .uch was the case of Dancu de "unedoara, a #omanian born noble who became regent of "ungary and is claimed as self by both national groups. This is the FobCective@ basis for frustration. ,oth groups try to shape it in order to fit their general system of beliefs. "ungarian intellectuals, since ordinary people have little

85

knowledge or interest in the matter, choose to believe that the Transylvanian mediaeval ranking system was purely social and not ethnic. "ungarian intellectuals, with minor differences among them 6groups in 'iuc, .f (heorghe, 'luC, Tg. ;ures7 also consider the big riots of #omanians peasants during feudal times were predominantly Fsocial, not national@ and consider these cannot be made a part of the conflicting #omanian"ungarian history as official #omanian history puts it. !o ordinary people perceive it soG Dndeed they do. 9lthough 13th century peasants barely defined themselves as F#omanians@ and bore no national ideal but rose only to fight for elementary social-not even political- rights- populari2ation of the riot of "orea, 'losca and 'risan got roots in the #omanian public opinion. 9 favorite theme of the national communist school of history, which used this superimposition of cleavages to blame it all on the "ungarian feudal lords, the riot and its bloody repression remains the first traumatic moment of direct confrontation. Dts contemporary portraying in movies and TH series endorsed this image as well. This memory generates a very simple representation -and therefore a very powerful one - which is also consistent with the whole history of the #omanians in the "absburg Empire - as they see it - with "ungarians the e ploiters and #omanians the e ploited, although there were also "ungarian serfs on the side of the rioters. .imple, even rudimentary representations are stronger since they respond to the need of people of attributing a clear e planation to comple historical backgrounds. Averall, the riot of "orea raises more emotion in #omanians, while the 1343 moment meets more the feelings of "ungarians. 9nother mediaeval issue completely erased from the collective memory is the fact that .2ekelys were a different ethnic group from the "ungarians. The official history of Transylvania edited by the "ungarian 9cademy of .ciences assumes .2ekelys were a tribe of Turkish origin who came together with "ungarian tribes but had a separate language and conserved for centuries a separate alphabet and writing. .2ekelys were finally completely assimilated by the "ungarians, but the mere mention of this fact provokes nationalist angry reactions, even from the part of intellectuals. The fact that .2ekelys are not entirely "ungarian is a thesis of the 'ommunist propaganda. .2ekelys were always "ungarians* we "ungarians didn't assimilate anyone. 6"ungarian politicians, ,ucharest7 0.0.$..The )absburgs played each against the other/ The ne t important moment is the 1-43 #evolution, with its failure of bringing a historical agreement between the "ungarian revolutionary bourgeoisie and the #omanian one. The level of knowledge on this matter would probably scare a history teacher. 9lthough details are scarce, the general overview is of a national emancipation war than of a social revolution N of the "ungarians against "absburgs and of the #omanians against "ungarian lords. The whole story finished with a blood bath after 9ustrians were skillful enough to play nationalities fears and frustration over the "ungarian domination

83

against emancipated "ungary and asked the '2ar's troops in. The compromise that was eventually reached later between 9ustria and "ungary, creating the "ungarian national state allowed unprecedented displays of "ungarian nationalism on behalf of minorities, namely .lovaks and #omanians. "ungarians honor <ossuth, the leader of the #evolution, although admitting half-heartily> F"e started to reali2e minorities should be a part of all these only when it was too late@ FWhen <ossuth met with ,alcescu it was already too late@.@<ossuth would have granted minorities more rights later, now it was important for the "ungarian #evolution to win@. "ungarians in our groups, even the less educated ones, had more idea about the 1343 moment, due also to the fact that "ungary's Eational !ay is the anniversary of ;arch 18, 1-43.They also had the recent opportunity to reconsider this historical moment due to the #omanian nationalist mayor of 'luC, (heorghe /unar. /unar raised in 1--1 in the middle of the town, now 5&B inhabited by #omanians, in 1343 almost a pure "ungarian town, the statue of 9vram Dancu, the military leader of the #omanians in 1-43, with an inscription saying forty thousands #omanians were killed during those battles 6of course, by "ungarians7. This provoked huge protest from the part of "ungarian political organi2ations. #omanian democratic parties also blamed this Fprovocation'. Aur respondents were still furious remembering this. Dn the whole revolution there were 4&&&& deaths, including "ungarians and 9ustrians, and all these are regular troops, not civilians, as /unar is implying@. The only ones to blame are the 9ustrians* they promoted the usual "absburg policy of Fdivide et impera@. The #omanians were victims of this policy, they helped kill the "ungarian revolution, and in the end they gained nothing@ 6'luC, 'iuc, .f (heorghe, "ungarian intellectuals7. FThe #omanian participation in 1-43 was actually a counterrevolution. We can't blame <ossuth he didn't give much thought to the national topic, nowhere in Europe at the time the national topic wasn't yet discussed..."e didn't understand until it was too late what a danger was lying here. "e didn't understand that nationalities within "ungary, #omanians, .lovaks and 'roats, reached, however late, the formation of the bourgeois nation. The "ungarian nation had formed earlier while in the 9ustrian Empire@ 6.f (heorghe, intellectuals7 =ess educated "ungarians freely interpret facts to their advantage. 9t the time there were two #omanian ?rincipalities> ;oldova and Wallachia. 9nd when the #omanians of Transylvania gathered at ,laC and

8-

shouted FWe want to unite with the country@, what country could they have meantG "ungary only. 9vram Dancu, when finding out he was manipulated by 9ustrians to turn against "ungary got mad. #ecent clichQs borrowed from the TH analysis of the !ecember 1-3- revolution are applied to the 1-43 one Dt was a spontaneous revolution well organi2ed with the #omanians manipulated by the 9ustrians...0nfortunately it ended by the defeat of the #evolution...6workers, 'luC7. Ald (reek-'atholic #omanians consider the 1343 #evolution Cust one more episode in the long history of reCection of #omanians by "ungarians. #omanians in 1-43 saw the maCor danger in "ungarians. The two #omanian churches and 9vram Dancu thought them better to become allies of the Hienna emperor against "ungarians, who were in a period of nationalism. The politics of <ossuth e cluded order nationalities, that is why 'oats and (erman were also against "ungarians@. F#omanians tried to reach a common view with them, ,alcescu tried, but they couldn't succeed because of the "ungarian position of dominant nation. There were also #omanians on <ossuth's side, who hoped they could change his orientation but failed. "ungarians have this pride of a small nation, a people which always keeps towards others, at least #omanians, a distance. This reCection feeling is very common in the #omanians' version of the common history. "ungarian peasants in 'ovasna and ;ures were the least informed, knowing only about the celebration of ;arch 18, considered the birth of the "ungarian national state. .tudents in ,abes ,olyayi 0niversity in 'luC, both #omanians and "ungarians, showed not only ignorance but total lack of interest to the matter, and they were unanimously blaming /unar for giving the city Fsuch a poor statue, looks like shit@ 6#omanian students, 'luC7. What then is keeping the participation rate in the ;arch 18 "ungarian celebration so highG 48B of the Transylvanian "ungarians say they attended it in 1--&, and 1: B attended it in 1--560,, poll7. This former official national day in "ungary is still respected in Transylvania and gives birth to popular holidays in every village and town, although few people know what actually happened on ;arch 18 1-43. Ane e planation is the opportunity it gives to "ungarians, especially in the .2ekelys area, to use this traditional moment to display their national flag and reassert their separate

:&

identity. This e plains why the sudden decline in 1--5, the first year when the "ungarian 9lliance 6!9"#7 was participating to government, so the need for identity politics dropped. An the other hand, the strong participation of the "ungarian elite can account for this massive participation> not only are the church and the local governments associated in organi2ing the event, but high-ranked "ungarian politicians from #omania and "ungary attend it. /ormer /oreign 9ffairs ;inister (e2a +essensky used to come on a regular basis, and so was current "ungarian ?rime ;inister Hiktor Arban. Dn 1--& the celebration in Tg. ;ures fueled the rising tension in the city, #omanians considering insulting the pompous celebration of a revolution which failed to grant them the right of being recogni2ed as a nation. ;any #omanians share the view Ffreedom of "ungarians in 1-43 meant only further enslaving of #omanians@ 6worker, 'luC7. "ungarians, in their turn, dislike the #omanian Eational !ay, the 1st of !ecember, the day when in 1-13 the #omanian popular assembly at 9lba Dulia decided the unification of Transylvania with #omania, therefore cutting Transylvanian "ungarians from their mother country. This national holiday e cludes us. #omanians should have chosen another day. Each year when politicians make speeches about the unification they never think what the unification meant for us. 6.f (heorghe, intellectual7. These mutual e clusive holidays, in fact celebrations of national victories on the behalf of the other nation or nations, are however )uite different when it comes to popular participation. The "ungarian celebration is a community celebration> civil society is involved to a similar e tent as politicians. The #omanian celebration is an official, Fstatelead@ holiday, generating no widespread popular emotion, although #omanian politicians as prete t for nationalist speeches constantly use it. #omanian Television displays on such occasions only official speeches and ceremonies, and even the traditional celebration from Tebea in Transylvania is more and more organised by officials. Dn !ecember 1--3 ?resident Emil 'onstantinescu organised the first military parade of the post-'ommunist era on this occasion. Eone of these can compensate the fact that !ecember 1 is not a popular celebration turned into a national one, but an official national one, with little or no involvement of the public and the civil society. 4.4.1.F#omanians were no worse than the rest of peasants...@ 'oming closer to our times, recollections of family histories recreate for #omanians the picture of an oppressive rule, close to a colonial vision of Transylvania. ;y grandmother told me how they were working for the grof. They were very poor. The grof's children never played with the other children, who were #omanian* they didn't even know #omanian. 6#omanian intellectual, 'luC7. Dn all Transylvania there were only two #omanian high schools and there were %.5 million #omanians. 6#omanian, (reek 'atholic, 'luC7.

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"ungarians do not share this view, their bottom line being Fit was bad, but not as bad as #omanians complain. 9fter all, .lavici 6#omanian writer from Transylvania7, when in prison for anti-"ungarian articles in his newspaper was allowed to visit his wife who was giving birth. The education law passed by the "ungarian government was bad for minorities, but it was never applied as such. 6Tg.;ures, "ungarian intellectuals7. Dt was a time of economic development, road were built. Dn the rest of #omania they built such roads only after the fifties. #omanians were not promoted easily. ,ut they could study at ,udapest or in Hienna. 6'luC, "ungarian intellectuals7. .ources of these recollections for the two groups remain )uite different. #omanians )uoted mainly what parents and grandparents told them about the distant past 6therefore the collective memory7, while "ungarians 6intellectuals only, since the rest knew nothing, e cept that Fit was better for the "ungarians@7 )uoted mainly books and written history. The essential attribution of the "ungarians is that #omanians were discriminated on social, not ethnic grounds. They were no worse than the "ungarian serfs 6.f (heorghe, intellectuals7 were Dt was a region like any other that lived a normal life. ?roblems that afterwards surfaced in the ,alkans were under control. ?roblems started only after 1-13, although perhaps it was not the best way of solving them even then... 6Tg. ;ures, intellectuals7. D think it was up to individuals, if the grof 6landlord7 was treating serfs well or not 6"ungarian intellectuals, 'luC7. D could not find any trace of collective guilt from the part of the "ungarian intellectuals over the harsh discriminative treatment #omanians and other nationalities suffered under the "ungarian domination, especially after 13:5 when "ungary became a sovereign state and e)ual partner in the !ual ;onarchy. There is not even a recognition of the situation, so how could any guilt be foundG ;i ed families were the only ones with a bilateral vision. D think "ungarians perceive those times only for their bright side and they cannot understand what did they not directly e perience. D suspect

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minorities were persecuted to the last degree. Dt's the same to when we are e plaining #omanians who do not understand why we suffered more during 'eausescu than they did. 6'luC, "ungarian intellectual, from a mi ed family7. #omanians complain "ungarians look upon these times as a golden age. Eostalgia with the "absburg Empire is deed present> $ou could travel without a passport from ,rasov to <iev and from <rakow to ?redeal...it was an empire, but the area e perienced more problems after the empire was over. Dt was somehow the 0nited .tates of Europe...and it is interesting how states resulting from it went to pieces after 1--&... "ungarians complain the fact that #omanians remember these times as times of national oppression, and feel pointed at even if they were not born at the times. When D go here Tg. ;ures in the Arthodo 'athedral D see the picture of 'hrist who is whipped by "ungarian hussars and beyond it says F?oor ,ishop@ 6the picture represents probably .ava ,rancovici, an Arthodo ,ishop who was persecuted for refusing to convert to 'atholicism7. !o you think D like thatG F6"ungarian intellectual, Tg. ;ures7 9 golden age for some, a terrible time for the others. Two perfect opposites. Anly oblivion and ignorance are common, but they are constantly disturbed by nationalistic propaganda. FF/or us it is not the Trianon treaty, but the Trianon !iktat@ The ne t crucial moment in the collective memory of both, but mostly of the "ungarians, is the Trianon treaty, which after months of negotiations and military operations acknowledged Transylvania as a part of the #omanian <ingdom. "ere the two versions collide more than ever. ,ut "ungarians remember it better* it was more a topic in their families than in the #omanian families. Trianon is remembered in Transylvanian "ungarian families as a maCor disruption, a change of all the societal norms. Dt was a big disaster then, and promises made to us were not kept. What felt the #omanians when #ussians took ;oldova 6actually ,essarabia, our note.7G Dt was the same we felt then. Dt started like a good thing, like a rapprochement of nationalities, but...6Tg. .ecuiesc, "ungarian workers7. "ungarians were punished because they lost the war 6"ungarian workers, 'luC7.

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Dt was a catastrophe, the end of the world. 6"ungarian peasants, 'ovasna county, village of .an2iene7. Dt was the original tragedy* all our troubles originated then 6"ungarian intellectuals, Tg. ;ures7. The catastrophe described in low-educated groups has )uite an elaborate representation in high-educated ones. "ungarian intellectuals see in Trianon a twofold act of treason> treason of the West, which punished "ungary for losing the war and was unable to make agreements on minorities@ treatment respected, and treason by #omanians, who promised at 9lba Dulia a different status of minorities. We can't however say it is Custice only if you belong to your national state. Then it would imply it was very unCust what happened to the "ungarians in 1-13 and it was only Custice in 1-4&. ,ut D think the problem should be seen under a different angle. Aur problems originated into a certain policy. Dt was the policy of the #omanian government at the time, but we can't make, D don't know, some metaphysical connection between #omania in general and that particular government 6"ungarian intellectual, Tg. ;ures7. Educated "ungarians' recollections present important differences compared to less educated ones. /or the present "ungarian politicians, as to the nowadays-"ungarian intellectual living in #omania, Trianon means mostly the breaking of the trust between the "ungarian minority and the #omanians. This was embodied in the so-called F9lbaDulia statement@ which granted Fnational autonomy@ to Transylvanian nationalities. The #omanian 'onstitution of 1-%1, the first official act, however, defined #omania as a nation-state. The truth is the #omanian national state, 4& years only after its independence and having to cope with the difficult problem of integrating three new regions, each with its minorities, was too insecure to be able to promote a federal form of government and respect entirely the promises made to minorities by the #omanian Eational party, swept from power already by 1-%1. The F9lba-Dulia .tatement@ promised nationalities e actly the same rights #omanians had been asking unsuccessfully from "ungary for the past 8& years. .ome of it was granted, but not, as the leader of the #omanian Eational ?arty put it later, the Fnational autonomy@, and only the Fcultural autonomy@. Ance (reater #omania was formed #omanian politicians pursued as political ideal the Western nation-state on the type of /rance or ,ritain, #omania's allies in the 1st World War. #omanians are not aware of the importance "ungarians attach to the 9lba-Dulia statement. Two maCor representations of 9lba-Dulia shape even today the attitudes of "ungarians towards the #omania .tate. 1. Alba Iulia as the first moment of the (omanian2)ungarian relationship

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/or most of the "ungarian politicians in nowadays #omania, the situation of the #omanian maCority in pre-war Transylvania is not an issue, although it was the determining factor of the #omanian policy in the area after Trianon. The 9lba Dulia statement is considered the starting point of the common #omanian"ungarian history, therefore a starting point with "ungarians being frustrated by the #omanian state. The "ungarian politicians complaining back in 1-%4 did not forget to add this touch of bilateral approach, assuming "ungary@s guilt as well> this is over today. The unilateral reconstruction of the past is necessary in order to build a strong demanding policy, while a more comple approach would certainly mine the aggressive touch of this frustration-based policy. $. Alba Iulia as a broken contract 9lba Dulia is seen as a contract broken by the #omanians, therefore freeing "ungarians from their obligation to be loyal towards the #omanian .tate. #omanians broke their word. /irst, in the 1-%1 'onstitution they put it that #omania was a nation-state. Then, the 9ngelescu education laws reduced almost all the "ungarian schools to confessional and religious schools. 6Ald "ungarians, .f (heorghe7. Dntellectuals and ordinary people both have two traumatic recollections connected to the event. Ane is the massive e odus of "ungarians leaving for "ungary. "undreds of thousands of "ungarians left Transylvania then and most of them never came back. The number of "ungarians therefore decreased, to the loss of everyone. 6.f (heorghe - Dntellectual7. The second is the fact that public servants had to swear loyalty to the #omanian .tate in #omanian, a language. "ungarian intellectuals recall those moments> They asked them to swear even before the ?aris Treaty and they refused since they still had some hope the treaty will give Transylvania to "ungary. 9nd afterwards they were fired. ;y grandfather learned enough #omanian to keep his Cob for a while, than he was finally replaced with a #omanian, and with a .outherner, not even a Transylvanian. We consider those times as times of coloni2ation. #elations between #omanians and "ungarians then started to degrade. We were forced to accept building of orthodo 'hurches, even here, in the .2ekelys area, where there were almost no #omanians, on the grounds that #omanians had no means to build churches before. 6Dntellectuals, .f (heorghe7.

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The agrarian reform also hit the "ungarians harder, since they had more land. 6"ungarian old men, .f. (heorghe7 #omanian old men 6(reek 'atholic7 tell a different story. The professors of the "ungarian 0niversity in 'luC refused to swear a fidelity oath to the #omanian .tate* that's why the 0niversity had to be shut down. ,ut for most of our low-educated "ungarian respondents, besides the 1-13 disruption the inter-war time was a good one, superior to the present times, economically and politically. Dt was a time of economic boom, especially for the peasants, and my grandfather told me all would have been good had the times stayed the same as then@ 6"ungarian intellectual, 'luC7. Would there have been a better solutionG Af course, here all "ungarians agree the solution chosen by the ,ig ?owers was the worse. The Fideal solutions@ indicated by our respondents vary from an Findependent Transylvania@ and a FTransylvanian state@ to a Ffederal #omania, like .wit2erland@. 9nother controversial issue is which of the two ethnies made the maCority back in 1-13. Anly some educated "ungarians acknowledge it was a #omanian maCority in Transylvania. /or the rest of the "ungarian respondents, e cept that man in 'luC singled out by the group, the "ungarians were the maCority in 1-13. That firmly grounded conviction makes the inCustice even greater in their eyes and their loss even harder to endure.

4.4.4.FThere were times of hate, of revenge, there were evil times then@ The most serious traumas undergone by the two communities originate the %nd World War. Eothing in the collective memory can compete in terror with the 1-4&-1-44 period for the Transylvanian #omanians, and to a less e tent to the end of war for the "ungarians, as northern Transylvania was first occupied by "ungary, than reoccupied by #omanian and .oviet troops. ?ersonal recollections are still present, and so are the defenses in remembering a version of the past, which would make one guilty. The situation is further complicated by two historical facts> the support "ungarians received from the .oviet 0nion after 1-48 to build an autonomous region, and the strong national communist campaign during 'eausescu's times - and even after - which concentrated on the commemoration of the year 1-4&. These two events affected the personal recollections and attitudes of people. #omanians associate, for instance, the 'ommunist "ungarian 9utonomous #egion with 'ommunism, even .oviet 'ommunism and hate its memory, while "ungarians reCect any criticism of the "orthyist regime in Transylvania because they were so indoctrinated with it during 'eausescu. Hery few

::

cared to comment on the issue* most of them underlining that even if some atrocities really happened they were greatly e aggerated by the #omanian propaganda. Hery few #omanians -almost none- also accepted the idea that in 1-44 some #omanians, organi2ed in paramilitary groups, tried to revenge what happened in 1-4&. "owever, some #omanian intellectuals, both in 'luC and Tg. ;ures showed critical distance towards recollections of other respondents, such as> FThat's what your grandfather told you, you had no means of checking@. ,ut overall none of the groups is prepared to accept a bilateral view of the events. #omanians evoke the FHienna 9ward@ when (ermany and Dtaly decided Eorthern Transylvania 6including 'luC7 is to return to "ungary and the conse)uences for the #omanian population. D was a student in the high school in Easaud, which was the only high school with #omanian as a teaching language. Dn a few months, all teachers were replaced with "ungarian teachers who didn't know #omanian. The only #omanian teacher left was the teacher who taught #omanian language, who was an assimilated #omanian. They changed names into "ungarian names, even today in the 'luC phone book you can find 4& names of .2ylagy, spelled #omanian 6.ilaghi7 with #omanian first names. D went to high school in Aradea during that time and at the admission they didn't record me as (lodeanu, but as (lodeyan. 9fter 1-45 it was still difficult to change those names, since most 'ommunist authorities here in 'luC were "ungarians and refused to change names. We cannot succeed in a hundred years to do something similar to the "ungari2ation they did in four years only. 6(reek 'atholics, third age, 'luC7. Everything was done and written in "ungarian language only, "ungarians were appointed in every position, administration, health, and education. 6#omanian workers, 'luC7 We had to pack everything and leave town in only a few hours, while "ungarian soldiers guarded the house. When we left they told my mother F!on't leave the dog behind, because he's also a Wallach 6#omanian intellectual, 'luC7. ;y grandfather lived in a #omanian village, which was separated from town by a "ungarian village. 9nd one night the "ungarians attacked them and he was wounded with an a e to his head, and he died later because of the blow. They always carried some arm when having to cross that village

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at night. 9fter '3- the same happened, because you still have to cross this "ungarian village to get to Tirgu ;ures 6#omanian priest, Tg. ;ures7. The (reek-'atholic #omanian school was closed. The "ungarians surrounded the Theology .chool, they broke in, and they beat the #ector. The (reek-'atholic ,ishop was asked to come the ne t day to the bishopric, The crowd was gathered when he got there, and a "ungarian broke the policemen' ranges and spat in the face of the ,ishop, then turn away and fled. 6(reek-'atholics, 'luC7. ;y grandfather was a priest and they made a hole under the living room table and hid him there until a neighbor told "ungarians he's there, and then they took him first to .ighet and then to 'luC and then he succeeded to evade and to cross the mountains on foot to #omania. They were after priests and teachers, especially, =awyers, too. 6#omanian intellectuals, 'luC7. The difference between these recollections, most of them personal or family inherited to the social representations of the #omanians who did not actually lived through the events is spectacular. 'ollective memory was organised by national 'ommunist propaganda to a large e tent. Eot only the television populari2ed the atrocities of the "orthyist army, but also 'luC students remembered that their schools used to organise yearly trips to Dp and Tra2nea, the places of events, in order to educate children. 9t Tra2nea soldiers stabbed pregnant women with their bayonets, old people from the village told us when we were there. 6#omanian peasants, Hiisoara7 D've seen a poster reproduced in a book, soldiers were told to kill the #omanian children in their mother@s' belly@ 6#omanian intellectuals, 'luC7. "ungarians poured gasoline on the #omanians and they put them on fire. "ungarians were throwing priests into holes full of paint. 6#omanian peasants, Hiisoara7 These social representations are often to be found outside Transylvania in the other #omania as well. 9lthough we do not doubt events were indeed terrible, it is easy to tell apart the real, e perienced traumas from these Flegendary@ pictures, having all in common the idea of total, symbolic destruction of the other ethnic group> unborn infants killed in their mothers@ belly, people put on fire. "ungarians have similar images from the end of the war.

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The #omanian army gave ba2ooka to the children and taught them to burn "ungarians 6Tg. ;ures, "ungarian intellectuals7. Who did itG #ecollections are unclear and contradictory. /or the #omanians, it was mostly Fthe "orthyst army@, not locals. Dt is true 'ommunist propaganda blamed it all on "orthy and "ungarian fascism. /or the only survivor of one of the famous massacres in Dp, it was a part of the local "ungarians who killed all the #omanian inhabitants, women and children included. "e even recalls that a week later, after order was reinstated and he was able to leave his hiding place he heard a "ungarian soldier from "ungary telling a villager FD don't know what could these #omanians have done to you for you to hate them so.@6#eported by the #omanian news weekly E presLno1%L1--47. This version, different of the #omanian official one is shared by many middle-aged "ungarians but is strongly opposed by the old "ungarians> 9ll the troubles were due to personal rivalries. Whoever had something to revenge took that opportunity and they did it immediately after the retreat of the #omanian army and the coming of the "ungarian one, since they knew that afterwards anarchy will no longer be possible. 6.f (heorghe7 The story of the only survivor from Dp is also worth telling for something else. Dn many of these tragic stories about ethnic hatred and violence human understanding and solidarity makes, strangely, a part of the same story. "ungarian neighbors warned the family of the Dp survivor that something bad was about to happen. They didn't leave the village, having no other place to go. The man himself, only a small boy then, witnessed the savage killing of his brothers and sisters from the barn of a "ungarian neighbor who helped him hide. 9nother #omanian remembers his father, a railroad clerk, was protected by a "ungarian friend. "ungarians in 'iuc also recalled that after Trianon the #omanian peasants told a #omanian grocer who refused to help a "ungarian child who didn@t know #omanian they would boycott his grocery if he behaves this way. 9 "ungarian in 'luC recalled how his father protected a #omanian priest from an aggressive "ungarian gang. "ungarian students at ,abes-,olyayi remember that when a furious #omanian came to their block after the 1--& Tg. ;ures violent clashes asking #omanians to Fgo after "ungarians@ who shared the same block it was a #omanian who sent him away. 9lthough most of the "ungarians we talked to deny almost everything considering it Fheavy e aggerations@ the point they make is very similar to the point of the #omanians. The people from outside did that, not the locals. "ungarian intellectuals in 'luC put it like this> Each change of regime, either it was #omania which took over, or "ungary, was bad for the locals, both #omanians and "ungarians, each of them were replaced from their positions with people brought from the mother country, who were each time considered better and smarter. Dt seems, in fact, that people prefer to believe it was outsiders who did it all, because this helps them cohabit further with their neighbors. The same mechanism goes for the 1--&

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Tg. ;ures clashes, as Tg. ;ures inhabitants blame politicians, 'eausescu@s secret police, villagers from outside Tg. ;ures, everyone but locals. 9nyway, if ever a settlement was a disaster, so was the Hienna settlement which made the #omanians from Eorthern Transylvania -which went to "ungary- flee to #omania in massive numbers, and the "ungarians from .outhern Transylvania flee to "ungary. The memory of this one more e odus is well remembered by both. The only lucky ones where those who happened to be in the right country, as the old .2ekelys from .f (heorghe who pictured a golden "orthyst time> We must understand the year 1-4& from the perspective of what had happened in the inter-war times. 9t Hienna (ermany and Dtaly made the right decision to return Eorthern Transylvania to "ungary. D'm not a doctor in international law, but D think that mediation was a Cust one. When the radio announced it here in .f (heorghe it was a real euphoria the taking over by "ungarian authorities was made peacefully. The #omanian was compulsory in "ungarian schools during "orthy...#eprisals against #omanians were only in the vacuum of authority, between the departure of #omanian troops and the arrival of "ungarian troops, because the "ungarian administration couldn't stand disorder. Hiolence was the work of private persons, who had their own vendettas. They broke the windows of the #omanian doctor, several times. 9nd they beat an old, retired Arthodo priest...9s for the army, what we know is that the army was met with machine-guns fire, a lot were killed, that's why the population was afterwards decimated. 9nyway, what happened was not in this area, because here there are only a few #omanians. 9 lot was built during these four years. #ailroads, roads, streets. The food supply was very well organi2ed* everybody had food tickets for bread, sugar, and so on. Those four years are remembered by everyone as years of order, discipline, tidiness, and punctuality. The local administration had an orderly style* it was the rule of pedantry even. 'ulturally speaking, children learned songs, which the 8& following years were unable to make us forget. 'hildren were told even in a #omanian village now order is coming after %8 years of ,alkanism. We felt well because we felt as first rank citi2ens, that is it. The evaluation of the "orthy times was totally uncritical in this group. 9sked if they still think there were good times considering what happened to the +ews they answered

5&

(ermans, not "ungarians, deported +ews. Abviously this did not make them see those times less as a Fgolden age@. The reoccupation of Eorthern Transylvania by #omania is also remembered differently by #omanians and "ungarians. /or #omanians, it was liberation, but not a Coyful one> .oviets were there and an uncertain future. Eobody from the "ungarian groups had a first-hand recollection to tell. ,ut they were well documented to tell about abuses "ungarians suffered, perhaps because they had to reply for years to the #omanians stories about the 1-4& abuses. ;ost of the stories about the paramilitary #omanian troops 6the so-called ;aniu's guards7 and their abuses in 1-44 were therefore second-hand memories, e cept for the old men in .fintu (heorghe, who remembered without any visible emotion that Fthey cut off the heads off of two boys F. 9 woman in the "ungarian working class group in 'luC remembered their mayor in a village near ,laC, a (ypsy who tried to F"ungari2e@ a #omanian village and in the end was killed by women. .he recalled her mother and the rest of women F hit him with the spoon in the head until he was dead because he had humiliated us too much@. The se)uence of violence as perceived by the #omanian intellectuals in 'luC, a group that was perhaps the most tolerant and trying to be obCective, goes as follows> "ungarians say in 1-44 the #omanians paid them back dearly, the ;aniu guards killed people...What have you heard about that in your familiesG There were no actual murders in 1-44, more like putting fire to barns, scaring, threatening the "ungarians... Handalism, like a vendetta, sort of, it wasn't the army* they were villagers, people who had lost someone. Their only e cuse although there can never be an e cuse to behave aggressively is the fact that they were reacting to what had happened previously to them. 3o it was the )ungarians who started it7 $es, but you can never tell how far the revenge goes. The "ungarian armies started it all in 1-4&, that are not theory, that's fact. .o there were some debts to be paid, see. Dt's a big difference. The "ungarian army met in villages a population which was almost entirely #omanian and they did what they did, and when the #omanian armies came thousands of people took revenge on "ungarians, but there were fewer cases, because the guilty "ungarians left, they retreated with the "ungarian army.

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Women in Hiisoara reCected angrily the suggestion some #omanians paid it back to "ungarians in 1-44 and declared it was all a "ungarian lie, an invention. .ome of the stories look )uite unlikely, even stories told by intellectuals> @The #omanian army gave guns and ba2ookas to children and taught the children to shoot "ungarians... That is why .talin suppressed the #omanian administration in Transylvania and took over.@ 6"ungarians, Tg. ;ures7. "ungarian peasants in the ;ures 'ounty knew little about the events, but had a fair opinion on it> The "ungarians came and killed children and then the #omanians came and killed in revenge, but that's not nice and it should be blamed by the ones and by the others@ 6;iercurea EiraC7 /rustration with the others along history is important today, even more important than today@s competition. Dt is on this theme that nationalist propaganda plays more often. Aur survey tried to measure frustration and coping with it. #espondents had to three alternatives to choose from> 1. unilateral attribution of guilt 6either one group, or the other had a preCudicial attitude and wronged the other group7 69,,7 %. bilateral attribution of guilt 6'7 1. positive reconstruction of the past with elimination of the guilt 6!7 'hart 8 !istribution of the answers went as follows> 1. 41.3 #omanians compared to only 1.3B "ungarians considered their ethnic group was persecuted during history by the other group. /rustration of Transylvanian #omanians and blame of the "ungarians for past wronging has important dimension. Whatever the reason Npersonal recollections or nationalist indoctrination the figure is high. This group associates history and past with a negative affect and is prone to e perience fear and defensive attitudes which can de mobili2ed either by "ungarians campaigns of national assertiveness or by #omanian nationalist propaganda. %. %. -.3B #omanians and %&.3 B "ungarians agree the two groups wronged each other during history. 9ssuming guilt is difficult. "owever these #omanians and "ungarians admit their own group id wrong towards the other. 9 higher figure of #omanians would be indeed surprising, since both #omanian history and propaganda present a unilateral view of the events. "ungarians were in fact subCected to the same history and propaganda themselves, as they had been #omanian citi2ens for the past 3& years, with limited access to alternative sources.

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1. reCection of guilt and positive reconstruction of the past 55B of the "ungarians in the sample and 44 B of the #omanians choose to reorgani2e the past by eliminating conflicting elements and retaining of those favoring a peaceful cohabitation. This population is probably avoiding to meet conflicting evocations and e presses frustration when those are forced upon it 6such as the endless sessions of the #omanian ?arliament commemorating the Hienna 9ward7. 4.4.8. 9 time of common enemies .oviet authorities thought proper to regulate the #omanian-"ungarian relationship by creating an autonomous "ungarian region. This included the homogeneously populated .2ekelys areas, but also heterogeneous areas with many #omanians living within. The "ungarian autonomous region failed to satisfy "ungarians, since Fit was 'ommunists who run it@ or Fit was called autonomous but it was run from ,ucharest like everything in 'ommunist times@. Dt created rather traumatic memories to #omanians, old (reek'atholic complaining about the fact that "ungarians would not answer if said F"ello@ in #omanian and that public signs were in "ungarian only. The important presence of "ungarians apparatchiks in the structures of this region also contributed to the #omanians@ impression that F"ungarians were more 'ommunist than #omanians@. 6Workers, (reek-'atholics, 'luC7. The times of 'eausescu are perceived differently again. /or the "ungarian intellectuals it was a disaster, as the 'ommunist government reduced "ungarian classes in high schools, replaced high bureaucrats in the party and administration of "ungarian descent by #omanians, and forced university graduates to take Cobs outside their native area. #omanians, e cepting some intellectuals in 'luC, refuse to accept the last years of 'eausescu's rule had this particular nationalist touch directed against "ungarians, and complain this is Cust lack of solidarity from the part of "ungarians. Together we were )ueuing for food, together we suffered the lack of heat and electric light, and "ungarians always claim it was them alone who suffered, they even imply we made them suffer, when it was 'eausescu who made everybody suffer 6Workers, 'luC7. #omanian graduates were also forced to take the mandatory Cobs offered at the end of their university studies. This was the same for everybody. 6#omanians intellectuals, Tg. ;ures7. They lived better than #omanians did, they has relatives in "ungary who sent them provisions. 6Tg. ;ures, intellectuals7. 'hart : Dn fact, only a fifth 6%1B7 of our small "ungarian sample consider "ungarians were worse off during 'eausescu than #omanians. Anly 8 B

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of #omanians admit "ungarians had a even harder time, while 3& B of #omanians think #omanians suffered more. The results are not surprising> people react more to economic deprivation in times of severe hardship than to symbolic issues. Even today the hierarchy of needs e pressed by both groups look very much the same 6D;9. poll7 Dn fact, 'eausescu@s times seem to have been beneficial for ethnic cohabitation, since the maCority of #omanians and "ungarians consider their relationship degraded after 1-3-. /reedom allowed resentments and claims to surface, leaving behind the good times the time when "ungarians and #omanians had a common enemy to busy with. When "ungarians and #omanians had a common enemy to busy with. 0.0.: On history "istory raised a lot of interest in our groups, e cept in the young generation. Even if knowledge is scarce people display not only interest but also strong preCudgments. 9lthough we constantly pointed to them it is not the historical truth we are after, but their personal memories and impressions discussions turned into real debates immediately and a lot of controversies occurred. Everybody agreed writing of a common history of Transylvania is necessary, #omanians more skeptical than "ungarians. Dn one group the idea of a common history written by "ungarian and #omanian historians came up spontaneously. We display this part of the interview entirely, since it is relevant for the chances of such a history to be written and accepted 6Dnterviewer's )uestions are in italic7 3o5 in your view5 who were the first settlers7 +our personal opinion5 you needn6t ;uote anything or anyone... $es, here's the debate, but D don't think it is still very influential on people's lives as it used to be, we got used to such discussions. This was never a topic in lower circles, such as my family, this is a topic of higher circles, they try to provoke us with that...Well, and since borders change, it's obviously a political debate. D'm not interested in the topic either, but D think a history should be written by #omanian and "ungarian historians, a history which would be accepted both by #omanians and "ungarians. Oh5 and what would history tell at this point to be accepted both by (omanians and )ungarians7 Dt should tell the reality as it is. #omanian and "ungarian historians should write it. %hat if you would write it5 what would you write in this chapter7 Each stands by his ideas.

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9 "ungarian lady, teacher in 'iuc put it bluntly> D can't see why my children should learn the #omanian history at all, at least not in any detail. Every nation should learn its own history, and Cust a few basic things about the history of others. The same lady showed a lot of obCectivity during the earlier interview, contradicting the others and telling them #omanian villages in "ateg are at least as old as "ungarian villages. .he was obCective towards the cohabitation> only she was not interested in it. The way it looks today the #omanian and "ungarian histories can only be sources of preCudice and frustration towards the other national group. The idea, which circulated lately to teach minorities separately the history of their own group, is not the best, either. The difficulty is to address the #omanian-"ungarian relationship and not to build separate histories, which are a part of the problem as they are and would be only false if they avoided the topic. 9n ideal version, accepted by everyone is impossible. ,ut one to show theories, not absolute facts, wherever the two versions collide and to try to teach bilateral thinking instead of unilateral one might be possible. 0ntil the time such a history is written #omanian and "ungarian children find out more often about the conflict from the school or the media than from their direct e perience with neighbors and colleagues.

,. O!'ER -A.OR $OCIA% RE&RE$EN!A!ION$ AND !'EIR CON$E*+ENCE$ 8.1. On sharing The maCor problem of Transylvania is that territory is shared among ethnic groups. E cepting villages that are pure #omanian, "ungarian or (erman, the pattern for most of the Transylvanian villages and towns is intricately mi ed. #omanians and "ungarians mi inside neighborhoods, streets and blocks of flats. The intermediate national group the (ermans -left so massively before and after 1--& that in many places their retreat is visible, as an open wound. Dn many cases in the place of the (ermans left (ypsies were settled, following a policy initiated by 'eausescu, but which only generated more conflict. The presence of (ypsies doesn't somehow matter for #omanians and "ungarians, often united in their resentment and contempt for them. 'When a #oma shows up and starts with their tricks we immediately unite with #omanians against him@ 6"ungarian student, 'luC7. #oma 'simply don't matter@ 6#omanian villagers, Hiisoara7. The retreat of the (ermans left Transylvania a field for ethnic competition between #omanians and "ungarians. .haring of physical space between the two groups has a twofold signification> symbolic, as Transylvania is the 'cradle' of both groups, and geographical, as in this e ample> Aur land is uphill and theirs is downhill. The houses are, however, ne t to each other, and we often cross to their gate if we run into some need. ,ut

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at church and at the fields, when we're more than one, we stick with ours and they stick with theirs'. 6Hillagers, Hiisoara, 1--:7 To understand cohabitation one has to understand at first this territorial disposition. Dt has its advantages, like in this e ample of nowadays-natural economy, where it fosters e change based on complementarity> We here in the hills can grow only potatoes* we have to cross the mountains to ;oldovans and change potatoes for corn and others. 9ll my business partners are #omanians from across the mountains' 6.2ekely peasants, .an2iene, 'ovasna county7 Dt has disadvantages where people are not separated into different villages, but compelled to share the same village> The "ungarians have the better lands. They never sell any land, even if we have money to buy it, they sell only to "ungarians. They hire (ypsies to work their lands. 6#omanian peasants, Hiisoara7 Dn this type of situation competition and envy from the part of whoever feels is losing the economic and social competition is likely to occur. The same happens in the cities, where competition is fierce. Ane of the most troubled political problems, the issue of school separation 6"ungarian oppose mi ing inside the same school of #omanian and "ungarian classes and demand to have separate #omanian and "ungarian schools, as the tradition used to be7 is in fact a competition for scarce space> Aur children are 18 in one classroom, while the "ungarians are only 18. Why do they want their old schools back, now that there have so few children leftG Df they take the old high-school back they'll have two classes to fill while #omanians won't have where to learn. 6'luC, #omanian workers7 The competition also turns ethnic when it comes to employment> Df one manager decides to lay off 1&& workers in a mi ed factory he will say usually> half #omanians, half "ungarians, to be e)uitable, that's the rule. Anly "ungarians may be half of the workers in that particular factory but since they are less than #omanians are their shares of unemployment from the total will be much greater. 6#etired economist, ?resident of the 9ssociation of "ungarian workers, 'luC7 !istribution of economic gratifications also gets an ethnical interpretation>

5:

.ince it's the state that runs everything even here in the heart of .2ekelys auctions and privati2ation are arranged from advance. ;y wife and D were among the first workers since this factory was built. Eow they're privati2ing it and we won't be able to get any shares, people from ,ucharest will help their friends take everything* they will push "ungarians out legally and even with finesse. 6Worker, Tg. .ecuiesc7 #omanians don't understand why most of commercial spaces, shops and others in the center have "ungarian owners and managers. That's because /unar is a nationalist only in words, when it comes to business whoever gives him a larger share takes either the license or the space. 6"ungarian workers, 'luC7. ,ut the most visible competition is the one for social power and recognition> "ungarians used to complain they suffered more than us during 'eausescu but if you looked around in Tg. ;ures all directors and managers were "ungarian 6#omanian intellectuals, Tg. ;ures7. There's not one "ungarian manager in a former state factory in 'luC left and if you ask the government they'll tell you appointments are done based on competence only, like that's not one competent "ungarian to be found to run #omanians 6?resident, 9ssociation of "ungarian workers, 'luC7 We know that there are positions we will never be granted access to. D can be very good, D can be better than any #omanian, he will run the Telephone 'ompany, D may eventually rise to be his deputy. 6"ungarian intellectuals, 'luC7. There are several "ungarian ?rofessors in the faculty, there is even a !eputy #ector who is "ungarian, but they cannot run things entirely their own way, that's why they want a separate 0niversity 6#omanian intellectuals, 'luC7. Dt doesn't bother me we shall always have a "ungarian mayor, since "ungarians are united and we're not. What bothers me is that people do not vote taking into account competence, but ethnic criterias only 6#omanian intellectuals, Tg. ;ures7. E ceptionally people take into account competence above ethnic affiliation, as happened in a community in 'iuc, including several "ungarian villages and one small #omanian one 6=ive2i7. Dn this environment where all local councilors are "ungarian 6"ungarian was the language spoken by local authorities already back in 1--: when this was still not legal7, "ungarians overwhelmingly voted a #omanian as mayor in +une 1--: elections since he had the reputation of being a good organi2er. #omanians in the small village of =ive2i were flattered, but remained cautious. =ike most of the #omanians we talked to,

55

e cept intellectuals, they resented the fact that !9"# presented a candidate for the office of ?resident of #omania in 1--:, although the candidate spoke perfect #omanian and he had been for year a representative of the ?arliament of #omania at the 'ouncil of Europe. 'They dare too much' we were told. Dntellectuals were more liberal, some confessing they would vote for a "ungarian candidate who proved better than a #omanian 6some even did7, but #omanian peasants and workers admitted they would never vote for a "ungarian as ?resident were he better than any #omanian, because 'here is #omania, not "ungary'.

9.$. On traumas The years of the .econd World War- between the Hienna 9ward and the entrance in Transylvania of .oviet and #omanian armies - had the highest traumatic impact on #omanians. 'We did the school years - in a "ungarian high-school - mostly in the hall, because each time the air was bad it was the fault of 'stinky #omanians' and we were all sent outside' 6old man, (reek-'atholic, 'luC7. /or "ungarians, the same effect was produced by 'eausescu@s last years, when he started to cut "ungarian schools and classes, replaced "ungarians from leading positions with #omanians and shut down all the radio local stations, a decision which left the "ungarian community without its "ungarian-language radio programs. ,ut the most traumatic act was the forced work placement of "ungarian graduates in all-#omanian ;oldova, while graduates from the main ;oldavian 0niversity were sent to "ungarian areas. #omanians, e cepting a few intellectuals, usually fail to grasp the intensity of the threat the "ungarians perceived on that occasion and the e tent to which their present behavior is based upon this traumatic e perience. The insistence of "ungarians to separate the schools completely in "ungarian and #omanian schools is partly based upon this negative e perience 6once a mi ed school "ungarian classes could be downsi2ed easily7. ,ut since #omanians do not fully comprehend what "ungarians e perienced during 'eausescu they tend to attribute this re)uest to bad intentions such as separatism or disdain towards #omanians. The #evolution of 1-3- brought times of shared traumas. The ethnic cohabitation, at least as perceived by #omanians, seemed to have been better during 'ommunist times, since 'ommunism, on one hand, was everybody's common enemy, and on the other hand, it had its own policy of affirmative action. ,oth #omanians and "ungarians agree ethnic cohabitation deteriorated after 1-3-, which is confirmed by the D;9. survey 6D;9.> 1--4 and 1--87. This happened because of 'that air of liberty'* each national group attributes to the other the responsibility for the deterioration.

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"ungarians rushed to re)uire too much without caring what would happen to others. They asked their schools back before knowing if #omanian children have another place to go to'. 6 'luC, intellectuals7. The days of the 1-3- Frevolution' as lived in the .2ekelys area seem to have been more traumatic than elsewhere in #omania. The #omanian nationalist propaganda tried to e aggerate and distort them> the "ungarian official version tried to deny this e ceptional character altogether. "owever, there it was, a social and national uprising combined, unlike the rest of #omania, where the maCority of the population was made of #omanians. Dn these "ungarian dominated areas of the .2ekelys the representatives of the 'ommunist political order had been #omanians, notably the policemen. The superimposition of the ethnic difference on the political one certainly mattered. /or weeks all the elements of social and political order seemed to have disappeared forever all around #omania, and the same went for the national order in some "ungarian dominated counties, where "ungarian flags were displayed on official buildings, #omanian policemen and .ecuritate officers were beaten and some savagely killed. !9"# claims they were identified as symbols of the 'ommunist persecution and killed on political, not national, grounds. "owever, if policemen had to flee in the rest of the country, too, they were killed only in the .2ekelys. #omania's nationalist former government turned this into a demonstration of "ungarians' intolerance and irredentist behavior, and a booklet was printed to prove #omanians were chased from the .2ekelys area after 1--&, although evidence is pointing people who left were graduates who had been compelled previously to take Cobs in the area. 9nyway, the climate at the #evolution was confusing and dangerous, no doubt about that, and this contributed to the state of mind inhabitants of Tg. ;ures had in ;arch 1--& when the tension finally turned into violence. ?ermanent inhabitants of the area, who of course did not flee with graduates at the first chance, as the peasants from =ive2i, reconstruct by their recollections 'the days of the #evolution' in the .2ekelys> > %e were hiding in corners of the trains...%e didn6t dare speak (omanian until home... They revenged themselves on policemen... Was it serious G %ell5 isn6t enough a few policemen were killed 7 The policemen had to leave5 because groups of hooligans attacked them5 they threw them out of houses with children5 with everything. %e hid them5 gave them civil clothes so they could leave5 they took a train and left5 they were from Bistrita...

5-

"ad they been really bad, these policemen G %ell5 they didn6t treat them worse than they treated us. They destroyed everything those people possessed... And after they revenged themselves on policemen they took on to (omanians... What did they do G %ell5 if there was a (omanian school director5 they made him leave...And in factories5 all (omanian managers were dismissed... I come home one night in 6<= and I find my wife fully dressed. I say 6%here6re you going 67 And she says 6>on6t undress5 )ungarians will come to kill us tonight6 -inally we stayed...But wild rumors went around5 (omanians were in panic5 if these rumors had not stopped a disaster could have happened.. I have telephone5 I was speaking with someone from Mihaileni ?the near village@ )e called me because he had heard (omanians are on their way to them. )e called to ask what6s going on because rumors in their village said people from AiveBi are coming to put Mihaileni on fire. I told him to mind his business5 because we knew they were coming at us to put fire. )e told me a group of drunkards were shouting in the street Aet6s go to AiveBi to make 8ustice. But more serious people told them to stop5 because they would only seek trouble coming here. I told him to let them come5 we have 1$ hunters in this village. The operator heard the conversation5 she had a son who had already devastated the police head;uarters5 and after that conversation everything calmed down... I was at work at (eghin and heard the bells tolling at noon5 and they told me 6(omanians started killing )ungarians6. They had courage5 in 4iceu they put they )ungarian flag and it stayed for weeks on the railroad station5 nobody dared to get it down5 including authorities... It6s their blood5 you can6t help that. They couldn6t stand even during 4eausescu not to sing their national hymn on &ews +ear6s night...

3&

And did that bother you 7 Actually it did5 A little common sense5 what is the point in singing the )ungarian hymn at midnight when we were half and half5 what5 do I start singing 6That6s the (omanian way6?popular song in Transylvania@7 That6s their character5 I don6t know what (omania means for this people. This story from =ive2i is very telling for the mood in the .2ekelys region during the #evolution and the traumas it left behind, which were afterwards used by nationalistic leaders and the government. =ive2i, a 1:th century village, has less than 1&& houses and is isolated among hills. .ince it is close to an important railroad crossing men work mostly at the railroads. ,eing state owned, the #ailroad 'ompany traditionally hires #omanians in that area, to help them survive, they told us. This was true even before the war. Dnhabitants of =ive2i know "ungarian )uite well, since local authorities are "ungarian. ,esides them as old inhabitants, only few #omanians live there, those considered by the .2ekelys representatives for the state of 'occupation' > policemen, army officers, a few bureaucrats and clerks. Dn 1-3-, after 'eausescu's discriminative policy there is no wonder all these people were replaced. /or weeks workers all over the country were 'democratically' electing their managers, and since here most of the workers were "ungarians, naturally #omanians, and representatives of the 'ommunist establishment were chased. ,ut what was in the rest of #omania a revolution against 'ommunist establishment in the regions where "ungarians had the maCority turned into a revolution against the #omanian domination as well, took on a national character so #omanians felt threatened. #omanian peasants are especially known for their patience and submission to authorities and were particularly frightened by the chase after policemen, although the 'ommunist policemen were universally hated.

9.'. On violence Eobody is guilty of violence. Eo violence could happen in one's community where everything goes so well. Dt is surprising how reluctantly people let themselves be reminded that, despite the alleged instigation of the .ecuritate it was however ordinary #omanians and ordinary "ungarians who actually did the fighting in 1--& at Tg. ;ures. =ocal people point to the fact that it was #omanian peasants, brought from the nearby villages, mobili2ed by priests and transported in official buses and "ungarian (ypsies who fought savagely. 'There was no inhabitant of this town there' insisted blindly the intellectuals in Tg. ;ures, both #omanians and "ungarians. "owever, a day before, on ;arch 1-, #omanians, always instigated, attacked the head)uarters of !9"# and hurt people, while "ungarians won the 'battlefield' by their savagery on %&. Even today outside the intelligentsia circles some macho pride surfaces>

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'Dt is true there were more #omanians hurt finally than "ungarians, but we didn't start it, they started it' 6!9"# leader, Tg. ;ures7 '#omanians learned their lesson, they didn't have courage to go to town or to cross our village for months after', 6"ungarian peasants, ;iercurea EiraCului7. We did not provoke the fight, but we won it' 6;iercurea EiraC7. Dn Tg. ;ures, considered a city 'deeply hurt' both #omanian and "ungarian intellectuals refuse this approach> 'We all lost.' "ungarians are especially frustrated because later on police started to summon for investigation "ungarians who allegedly took part at the rally on ;arch %&, 1--&. The only few people convicted were (ypsies, and !9"# lead a long lasting and obstinate campaign for the release of the only "ungarian who suffered a longer imprisonment, a man who savagely kicked a fallen old peasant, while filmed by a television crew. The image went all around the world as one of a #omanian beating a "ungarian and two days later when everybody was identified it proved to be the other way round. The victim suffered serious trauma, not entirely recovered until today, and was populari2ed as 'a victim of the "ungarians' by the #omanian .tate television until saturation. !9"#, on the other part, filled several complaints to European organi2ation asking for the release of the aggressor on the grounds that he only kicked the fallen man so he was not really the author of the damage. When finally released, the 'abused' man was met at the prison door by his lawyers, who were also !9"# ;?. 'Eo big deal. 'ofariu 6the victim7 shouldn't have been there in the first place. '2eresnyes wore sport shoes, he only hit him twice with his foot, he saw he was not moving and went further There's no point for him to be in prison, when all the friends of 'eausescu were released in a few months'. 6Dntellectual, .f (heorghe, approved by the rest of the group7. 9lthough everybody denies Tg. ;ures could happen again or that it could have happened in his or her town, a few doubt and fear the future 'Df once again they bring from outside, people who were trained to hate, we don't know what will come out. ,ecause we have our e tremists, #omanian have theirs and if these people get face to face we do not know what will happen'. 6'luC, "ungarian intellectuals7. Athers saw the good part of Tg. ;ures, like another "ungarian intellectual, from Tg. ;ures this time, who ranked the value of "ungarian identity a lot above the desire of having #omania a democratic state or avoiding the violence of Tg. ;ures> Dn a way D'm glad it happened OTg.;uresP, since back then in 1--& there was a lot of trust in the development of the #omanian democracy among "ungarians. ?eople were confident and off their guard, for the first time #omanians were a positive e ample, and D am sure a fast assimilation

3%

would have followed. When the assimilation is not forced, it's more dangerous' Dn the .2ekely area this feeling of mobili2ation is widespread> 'Df #omanian e tremists like /unar ever try to start something here, we're ready for them. D know .f (heorghe well* nothing will start here, but if somebody from outside comes (od preserve him. D think my colleagues will approve when D say that here it couldn't have happened what happened in 1--& when miners came to ,ucharest* no miner would have left alive. We wouldn't stay like people in ,ucharest with our arms crossed to look while they butcher our children@ 6old man, .f (heorghe7 Tg. ;ures tore Transylvania apart, in a way. Eobody tried to discuss it with #omanian or "ungarian friends, apparently. ?eople took refuge in their own camps and blamed it all on the others, then on the government, .ecuritate, whoever e cept themselves, of course. There were few, if any attempts to discuss the events with the other group, even with good friends belonging to the others. ?eople attributed the guilt to the government 615 B "ungarians and %8 B of the #omanians blamed 'Don Dliescu and his government'7, 13 B "ungarians and - B #omanians believe that #omanian local government authorities are to blame, and %1 B #omanians and 5 B of the "ungarians blame "ungarian local government 6the mayor of Tg. ;ures was a "ungarian7 11 B of "ungarians blame #omanians compared to 1- B of #omanians who blame "ungarians. %& B of #omanians and %1 B of "ungarians display a more bilateral attitude, blaming both F#omanians and "ungarians@. The maCority of each national group, however, blames it unilaterally on the other group> either directly on the people, or indirectly on the administration identified with the others' culture. /igures 5 and 3 about here ?eople consider it is the business of the state to contain violence, which is normal. 9 little more than :& B of each national group consider it is the state who should intervene in events like Tg. .ecuiesc. 9bout 8 B of each group think that in similar situations citi2ens must take Custice in their own hands while %8 B think it is wiser to give up. This about a )uarter of each population is probably able of having a bilateral view of the situation. The e perience of Adorheiu showed incidents similar to Tg. ;ures can actually happen again. Dn pure .2ekely area, even in the town 6Adorheiu .ecuiesc7 where the most radical autonomist wing of !9"# is based 6a wing which is in minority but provoked serious discussions opposing mi ed marriages or asking for the organi2ation of a regional poll to decide about autonomy7 a serious incident occurred, covered by nationalist #omanian press e tensively. The 'ity 'ouncil granted the permission for a .wiss charity to build an orphanage. Hersions clash if the orphans were supposed to be only "ungarians, as the city council claims, or simply orphan, as the .wiss charity pretends. 9nyway, the orphanage was built with considerable e pense, a few #omanian nuns, (reek-'atholic were installed there, when the mayor heard orphans are going to be from all #omania

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instead of Cust .2ekely area. 9fter a stormy meeting the local government claimed back its land and, what is worse, the building. 9 court in ;ures ruled in favor of the .wiss charity, but that didn't prevent the council members from inciting the population to chase the invaders, accused of wanting to ruin the ethnic composition of the region. 9 mob went to the orphanage, evacuated by force the nuns and sei2ed the building. !9"# officially disapproved the incident, but local "ungarian councilors remained firm on their position. The local press into icated the public opinion with rumors claiming some hidden design was behind the orphanage. Dt was written that the .wiss charity is only laundering 'eausescu's money, that the plan was to bring #omanians in the pure "ungarian Adorheiu town, that they envisaged bringing in criminal youth and #omanian whores, and so on. The scandal that followed only strengthened the locals in the idea trouble was brought about by foreigners and that the mistake was made when granting the first license, not when deciding to take it back. This 1--5 incident shows that, despite opposite opinions, Tg. ;ures could happen again. "ad Adorheiu .ecuiesc had also #omanian inhabitants, they would have probably run to the defense of the nuns and confronted the "ungarian mob. !espite the fact that pictures were published showing the evacuation and the "ungarian minister of ;inorities, ;r. (yorgy Tokay, said it is shameful this could happen and never in their history did "ungarians treated women and nuns so badly, the inhabitants of the town are mostly on the mayor's side than on ;r. Tokay's. 9ttitudes towards the incident fitted well the pattern of F#omanians as invaders@ of the .2ekelys. '?eople ne t the border with "ungary know better #omanian than some people from the .2ekely area, who are in the middle of #omania...The .2ekelys kept their identity by isolating themselves from everything around, sometimes including the nearby village. Those who do not work in some other place don't even know #omanian@ 6"ungarian intellectual, Tg. ;ures7. 'ohabitation in the .2ekely area is viewed differently than in the rest of Transylvania, especially in towns, since at the countryside there are almost no #omanians e cept one policeman per village. Town-dwellers consider #omanians as occupants, who want to change the demographic status )uo, 'Each officer comes here with his family and they get a higher pay to come here because we're considered dangerous here. Then they give Cobs to the relatives of the officer, then houses and so they settle. 9n officer married a "ungarian girl here and his children speak only "ungarian but he doesn't know a word of "ungarian' 6Tg. .ecuiesc, workers7. Ane of the rumors still going on is about the supplementary pay policemen in the .2ekelys is allegedly receiving for working in a 'risk area'. This seems to be a main concern both for ordinary "ungarians and for opinion leaders in the area. 9fter discussing with #omanian police officers that denied it we finally met a "ungarian police officer who volunteered to show us his receipts to prove it is Cust a rumor. .uch rumors, however, keep people mobili2ed.

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8.4 On communication 'omplaints about misunderstanding from the others occur often, although the meaning of misunderstanding is very different from 'luC, a true multicultural city, to traumati2ed Tg. ;ures or isolated .2ekelys region. Dntellectuals attribute it to the little knowledge the two national groups have of each others' culture. 'Why should we learn the history of #omanians, while they know nothing of our history or of the other minoritiesG@6"ungarian teacher, ;iercurea 'iuc7 'The truth is we're not very curious to understand the "ungarian culture' 6#omanian playwright, Tg. ;ures7. The situation is, however, more parado ical. Eot only ethnic conflict is grounded in misunderstanding and lack of knowledge, but ethnic peace as well. .uch is the case of many intellectuals who are strong promoters of a reconciliation without understanding nothing of the essence of the conflict...;ost of the #omanian liberal intellectuals never read a "ungarian history book> while reCecting the nationalists propaganda they do not try to supplant this biased information with some first-hand knowledge. There are real differences in the approach of #omanian and "ungarian intellectuals but they are not even known reciprocally, mutual understanding being based on the total ignorance of the others' views. #omanian liberals -most of them- build their friendship for "ungarians on the hate for the common enemy -the national-communists - and choose to ignore the problems and aspirations of "ungarians in #omania cannot be all satisfied keeping #omania as they know it, even with them in power. An the other hand, "ungarian leadership rarely tried to make it e plained. The most telling fact is, perhaps, that a social representation of nations living like a family within #omania is simply missing, so difficult it is to imagine an in-group including both #omanians and "ungarians. When asked 'Were #omania a family, how would it look like' most "ungarian groups told us they cannot conceive it as a family 'or we would be the intruders' 6intellectual, ;iercurea 'iuc7. Even #omanians had difficulties. 'Dt would be like a mother-in-law with the daughter-in-law' 6classical image of conflict in the #omanian folk-stories7 6peasants, 'luC7. 9t the other e treme is this beautiful representation of a young #omanian student in .ibiu> 'The father should be a (erman, the "ungarian the cook and the #omanian should take care of the house. Eow it's not working because the father is #omanian, not (erman'. (ermans are the most admired by #omanians of all national minorities 6<ivu and (alat > 1--:7. '(ermans never push like "ungarians. Dt's a terrible pity they left' 6#omanian intellectual, 'luC7.

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Dn the same time we should not forget the modern <ings of #omania were of (erman 6"ohen2ollern7 descent. 9.9. -ear of e tinction The most mobili2ing issue of the ethnic politics in #omania as made by !9"# in recent years - and by several "ungarian E(A's and lobby groups inside and outside #omania is the danger of e tinction. 'Dn 8& years no word in "ungarian shall be heard in Transylvania, or at the most it will be spoken only in the back rooms of the houses' 6!9"# ?resident, 9ttila Ionda, Tg. ;ures7. This catastrophic prediction seems as least strange considering the fact that in the last 8& years the "ungarian community resisted )uite well, and is now doing better than ever. There are no facts to suggest assimilation is under way -by any means - and the slight decrease of the population after 1--& can be attributed to immigration to "ungary or to Western countries. =ow fertility rate is invoked as hurting the "ungarian community only, even though after 1--8 #omania on the whole presented a negative natural growth, due to poor economic and social conditions. "owever, "ungarians imply that this will lead to a demographic catastrophe sometimes in the future, a pattern perfectly similar to the one e perienced by the /rench community of Kuebec.6,reton* 1-33* -1-1&%7 ,ishop =as2lo Tokes also went on speaking of 'cultural genocide' as in 'eausescu's times even after 1--&, especially when abroad, but also at the famous 'ernat meeting of .eptember 1--3. The evolution of the number of "ungarians since the unification of Transylvania to #omania is shown in the following figure>
)=>? 4 )!>@>!ABC )=@C 4 )!@DB!CB@ )=CC 4 )!C)=!@=A )=BB 4 )!B?@!D)? )==A 4 )!CAE!=@=F

'ata from 'The Hungarians in /omania' edited by the $enter for Transylvanian %tudies, $luG&0apoca, )=EE

The irrational core of this belief that "ungarians are 'disappearing' is shown in its coe istence with the belief the number of "ungarians is underscored in official census figures. "ungarians thus saw the presidential elections of 1--: as an opportunity to know 'their real number' assumed higher than the 1--% census' figures. Hotes in legislative elections are difficult to trace, since "ungarian independents run beside !9"#, which has usually around 5 B of the total vote. "aving a uni)ue presidential candidate was seen 3:

as the only opportunity to do a 'honest census' 6peasants, ;iercurea EiraC7, but the results were deceiving, "ungarians are no more than the figures of 1--%, the only good news being a few #omanians voted the "ungarian candidate as well. The danger of e tinction is invoked especially associated with e clusionist demands, such as school separation, as it is common in all similar cases and therefore supports "orowit2 e planation it is proCection-based 66"orowit2 > 1-38* 3&7. Dn other words the repression of the idea that what the "ungarian community really needs is the whole space for itself in order to survive leads to the transfer of this desire to the #omanian community, accused of assimilationist policies, of an overall attempt to chase and eliminate "ungarians from #omania.

9.: On language The language and the linguistic difference lie at the heart of the Transylvanian problem. In the same way territory prompts communication between the two groups the language seems to be pushing apart (omanians and )ungarians. =anguage is the main instrument of self-ascription, as we have seen. Dt is also the key to convenience> support for language policies derive from what seems to be the determination of each group not to learn another language but have all possible facilities in itw own. The !9"# campaign to allow "ungarians to use their own language in administration and Custice is however not entirely grounded in functional reasons. 9s it is it is fully Custified. "owever, weight is attached also to the demonstration that the "ungarian language is not inferior to the #omanian one 6so based on prestige grounds7. ;y e perience confirms the theory of Walker 'onnor that fighting for obCective issues such as the use of the language in administration is e plained by the need for selfidentification and political affirmation of a group of people who consider themselves to be different 6'onnor, 1-5%7. =anguage is then the crucial vehicle of ethnic mobili2ation 6#oss, in (iles> 1--%7. The fist s)uabble in Tg. ;ures in 1--& started from the fact that a "ungarian pharmacist wanted to replace the #omanian sign with a "ungarian one. Dn 1--8 !9"# was able to gather 4%& &&& signatures for their proCect of amending the Education =aw. Even peasants we talked to knew by heart the demands of !9"# 'The government must give us the language'. 9nd when asked what do they mean by that, since in their village 6;iercurea EiraCului7 a large one, there were a few schools, all in "ungarian, and even a "ungarian high-school, they answered '$es, but history and geography are taught in #omanian. We want everything taught in "ungarian, otherwise our children, who don't know #omanian, learn by heart and then forget everything they learn'

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The obCections !9"# made to the Education law had this twofold legitimi2ation. We can describe as functional the obCections referring to the possibility of having vocational education in "ungarian or having a full education cycle 6from elementary schools to graduate studies7 in this language. We see as 'symbolic obCections' those which are concerned with the creation of an e)ual status of "ungarian with the #omanian official language. These types of obCections are directed towards the elimination of the superiority of the #omanian language, seen as depreciation in itself of a "ungarian language. F.econd-ranked language, second-hand citi2ens who speak it@ this is how it runs the logical se)uence behind this political attribution. !9"# claimed that the article specifying that education in the native language of all minorities regardless the level will be provided is 'canceled' by the e istence of the previous article specifying that in every town a class in #omanian should be organi2ed 6?rofessor .2ylagy, unpublished paper7, insisting #omanian children should not be favored under any circumstances and that in places where there are not enough #omanians to form a class 6at least 187 they should learn in "ungarian.6The 'iorbea government accepted the modification of this article as proposed by !9"# in 1--57. Even in this line of argument one can notice it is not the securing of the rights for the "ungarians that make the maCor concern, but the care to prevent the #omanian language, the only official one, to enCoy any special status. The origin of symbolic issues in the language campaigns is twofold. An one hand, as Walker 'onnor noticed, it is an attempt of self-assertion. An the other, it is based on a post-traumatic logic. That class of #omanians shouldn't e ist even as a legal possibility because when a nationalist government will come he might force "ungarians to enroll * schools must be separated in pure "ungarian and pure #omanian because otherwise, as already happened during 'eausescu, the number of classes taught in "ungarian will be reduced sometime in the future, while in a pure "ungarian school they will survive even with less students * and so on. This post-traumatic logic is not meaningless, albeit an attempt to search for rational grounds of symbolic behavior makes no sense. Ane idea springs forward> that for !9"# and for most of the "ungarian elite in #omania education has one supreme task > to preserve the national identity of children. 9ll the other roles education might and should have become secondary or subordinated to this one, and they consider the communication and interethnic sociali2ation, not only as subordinated obCectives, but actually as threats to the "ungarian identity. 'The #omanian language always wins in the schoolyard or in corridors, regardless if classes are taught in "ungarian. That's why we need to separate the schools' 6!9"# education advisor7. '!uring 'eausescu you couldn't write in the literature te tbook "ungarian names without their #omanian translation in a parenthesis. D said for instance Eagyvarog, but you had to put 'Aradea' ne t, like we did not know this was the same town. Dt was very humiliating' 6;iercurea 'iuc, middle-class7, 'Why should our children learn #omanian denominations G They won't remember them, for them it's like birds language...They'll learn them later

33

if they will need them, at school they should learn geography in "ungarian, with "ungarian denominations'. #omanians, on the other hand, have their own complaints> 'The "ungarian Television, when showing the weather, gives a map without borders and all the names are in "ungarian, names in Transylvania, in $ugoslavia, and so on, like everywhere it's "ungary. 9nd when our !epartment of /oreign 9ffairs complained about this they claimed "ungarians across the borders watch "ungarian television so it's normal to put the names in "ungarian'.6#omanian intellectuals, 'luC7. ';r. /runda 6the "ungarian candidate for presidency7 repeatedly stated that he knows #omanian the same as English and /rench and he is sorry he does not know the (ypsy's language for he would speak it also...This type of internationalism wants to reduce the importance of the #omanian language.'6#omanian intellectual, 'luC7. 'They always compare #omanian to any language and say > what do you care if we learn or not, it's not your concern, who needs it will certainly learn it' 6#omanian student, ,abes-,olyayi 0niversity7. Ane obCective problem is, indeed, the fact that "ungarian names for places are entirely different than #omanian and .erbian ones. This makes the issue of studying geography in "ungarian such a political issue, and this lead to the bi2arre specification when liberal amendments to the Education law were proposed by the 'iorbea government that geography shall be taught in "ungarian e cept for denominations which will have to be given the #omanian version also. The problem is indeed a political one> should the official language be compulsory, or should it be left to the free will of citi2ens to decide if to learn it or notG ,oth ordinary "ungarians and political leaders are against the former and endorse the latter. 'D want a separate "ungarian state university run by "ungarians with "ungarian teachers. This doesn't imply #omanian should not be taught at that 0niversity. D want to learn #omanian, as D want to learn English or (erman, it's useful to know languages'6"ungarian student, /aculty of +ournalism, "ungarian section, ,abes-,olyayi 0niversity7. 'We think the person should make the decision if he wants to learn the #omanian language or not, not to be compelled to learn it' 6Tamas .andor, "ungarian ;?, advisor to =as2lo Tokes, ?resident of !9"#7 The autonomy to decide if one should or not learn the official language is the framed in the general philosophy of 'subsidiarity', meaning in this specific circumstance that the maCority cannot decide for the minority in any matter concerning language and education 69nton Eiculescu, comments on '?entru o democratie transetnica',unpublished paper7.

3-

,ut in practice, learning #omanian is not seen as one of the duties implied by the #omanian citi2enship, although the #omanian state, as any state, could raise this legitimate claim 6Eeier >1--:7. !9"# fights to eliminate any form of testing the knowledge of #omanian, because they say 'Df there is an e am in #omanian, the admission to 0niversity, the degree, or anything else parents will send their children to a #omanian highschool because they fear children won't otherwise pass the e am' 6!9"# ;?, ,ucharest7. '.omebody who graduated after 1% years of "ungarian school does not stand a chance to go to the =aw .chool where competition is fierce because he doesn't know #omanian enough, so having a "ungarian =aw .chool is the only way for me to become a lawyer'. 6"ungarian student, ,abes-,olyayi 0niversity7 This is why the !9"# insisted for having every possible discipline taught in "ungarian in state universities 6including =aw, although laws are not issued in a "ungarian version also7. "owever, the fact that a few parents, even if they have the alternative close, will choose a #omanian instead of a "ungarian form of higher education is a constant fear of !9"# and many radicals consider this a form of national treason. Dn our 1--3 poll the two communities were split over this issue> the maCority of #omanians 653,-B7 thought some test of #omanian knowledge should be undertaken by "ungarian, compared to 13 B "ungarian. The maCority of the "ungarians 68: B7 were however against it. '"9#T - 9,A0T "E#E Dn the present system #omanian is in fact learned only outside the education system, the few hours of #omanian in the "ungarian schools being highly ineffective. ''hildren from .2ekelys learn #omanian in the army. They learn there in one year more than they learned in 1% years of school, because they live among #omanians'. 6;iercurea 'iuc, "ungarian teacher7. 'D admit te tbooks of #omanian might be too complicated and should be simplified but D do not agree with !9"#'s demand #omanian should be studied as a foreign language in "ungarian schools' 6schools' inspector, ;iercurea 'iuc7. ';y daughter made this summer two #omanian friends, and now she's interested in learning #omanian, but at school she used to hold her hands on the ears saying 'it's too difficult' 6'iuc, middle-class "ungarian group7. Df schools are to be totally separated and conscription waived if #omania Coins E9TA the "ungarians in #omania would be pushed to live even in a closer ethnic community than they do now since they would have no opportunity to learn #omanian from their

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environment. !9"# disregards this danger, consider the survival of their minority language is more important. 9nd indeed it is> only we can't compare "ungarian in Transylvania, spoken by at least % million "ungarian and #omanians, with several private and state-supported maga2ines and newspapers, broadcasting programs, and numerous contacts with neighboring countries with e tinct languages such as the ,as)ue or the Welsh which had to be revived. The linguistic policy of !9"# is rather inspired with the policy of the seventies pursued by =e ?arti Kuebecois, a fight to have bilinguism official, to have the e)uality between the two languages officially granted. Transylvanian #omanians are aware of this and act defensively, considering the language #omanians in fact lose rights won by "ungarians. $ounger people tend to look favorably upon the introduction of bilingual signs, but old people like the (reek 'atholic in 'luC feel threatened> !o you think (heorghe /unar has the right policy towards "ungarians G )e e aggerates. )e understands problems5 but makes serious mistakes. If it hadn6t been for -unar the last four years here...a catastrophe would have happened. %e would have now every sign in two languages... Aet6s not e aggerate. What if the signs are written in two languages G Why does that bother you G %e can6t admit that now5 with the present relations between (omanian and )ungarians...Maybe in 1, or $, years...)ungarians provoke us permanently. And we don6t know how to react... They want this only to earn grounds for a future territorial separation... "ow could the %& B "ungarians in 'luC hope that G They can5 from bilingual signs they would pass to signs in )ungarian only. D saw in ,rasov they put signs in 1 languages and all is fine... #ermans never contested the (omanian 3tate5 #ermans are loyal...

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Aook at minorities shows on (omanian television...The #erman one is decent while in the )ungarian one they say one thing and they translate another5 ,ut how come in ,russels they can have everything in two languages and nobody cares G But what about )ungary5 they don6t have signs in two languages. Bilinguism is dangerous. !o you fear this is the step towards something else G +es5 it feeds ideas and feelings... %e have an official language they should have signs in this language only. If we would have two languages in 4lu8 postcards with 4lu8 will disappear5 we would have only Collosvar... Automatically they compel you to learn )ungarian. #omanians oppose and fear bilinguism on the grounds that > i. is a step to territorial separation ii. "ungarians will not content themselves to that and they will afterwards force #omanians to learn "ungarian, since they will hire only people who know "ungarian if it's up to them. 'They will obtain that the #omanian language should be completely chased from administration...Eow we speak #omanian from time to time, then we would not be able to do so...9nd they will care that no work is available for who is not "ungarian' 6#omanian peasants, .2ekelys area7. Even #omanians who know "ungarian well, such as a group of three doctors we discussed to in Tg. ;ures who approve bilinguism have a negative perception towards the language problem > ';y e perience as a doctor, especially a "ungarian speaking-doctor, in face of "ungarian patients is )uite sad...D have colleagues who do not know "ungarian and they were accused by patients they do not know it'. ';any "ungarians refuse to speak the #omanian language even if they know it. D know a few "ungarian words and D am not ashamed to use them' 6#omanian doctors, Tg. ;ures7.

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What scares #omanians so much is not even the history of Transylvania, is the "ungarian determination and constant offensive, which is strange for the 'laisse2 passer' life style of #omanians. This fragment from the group interview with #omanian workers in 'luC 6who approved bilinguism7 says it all > Who in the group thinks "ungarian may have their cultural autonomy G 6moderator7 &o problem5 if they make a contract with the government and then respect it...If everything is... If everything is clearly specified. They can have all they want5 the )ungarians5 but in each of us persists the doubt * are they not going to grab Transylvania 7 >o you think they could 7 &o &o. That would be a mistake. %e would have to speak only )ungarian then. 'ould they grab it G Think. I keep thinking5 I had this baby sitter5 )ungarian5 but she spoke good (omanian5 I left the child years with her5 she didn6t teach him a word of (omanian. At 1, years he knew almost no (omanian5 only )ungarian... Maybe that6s not bad5 now he can learn (omanian and he knows two languages... +es5 but I was paying her and I asked her... "eople who want Transylvania are in minority even in )ungary. If they do not give us comple es... 4an the 1.: million )ungarians make the 0 million (omanians of Transylvania ac;uire comple es 7

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I think they can. If in the seventies you asked somebody in a crowded bus 6>o you get down at the first station76 the answer was 6&em todo (omano6. And as we hear these times are coming back... %e6d feel bad if they had so many liberties. Why is that G They never consider people6s feelings5 they go their own way without looking around. They want always to impose their point of view. ?arado ically, although #omanians have a comfortable maCority they still fear "ungarians will finally eliminate the #omanian language and have only the "ungarian. 9lso a parado is the fact that even if historically "ungarians were the culture with the highest assimilation potential 6Herdery >1-3%7, today their policy is Custified by the fear of being assimilated. ,ut this is only a part of the story> what runs deeper is the need to have the two languages e)ual, to end the supremacy of the #omanian language. 'When the ?resident of #omania will be able to speak "ungarian D shall stop feeling as a second-rank citi2en' 'Aur number decreases daily while the number of the #omanian grows, and that's a threat to our language and thought. D have a %-years old kid and when D think D might send him to a #omanian school D am terrified'6middle class group, 'iuc7. '!uring the "orthy regime you could learn #omanian in the "ungarian schools, now you can't learn "ungarian in #omanian schools...Dn the international train station in ,udapest they also announce in the #omanian the destination of trains, because there are always some 1&& #omanians around...while in Aradea, where daily %&&& "ungarians cross the border to #omania they don't announce anything in "ungarian'. 6old men, .f (heorghe7. The different view was also e pressed, but only once > 'We should know the language of the state, but since we do not have the children to learn it when they're young it becomes increasingly difficult later. Df you don't speak English in 0nited .tates...;aybe that's not the way to Europe'6"ungarian intellectual, ;iercurea 'iuc7 =egal developments had caught the reality by 1--5 and amendments proposed by the 'iorbea government to the education and local administration law were intended to make

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"ungarian almost an official language. Dt was not however called so, from fear of nationalist reactions from the part of #omanians. The first ?rime ;inister after the 1--: victory of the centrist coalition, Hictor 'iorbea, a Transylvanian #omanian, was sincerely willing to 'do Custice to "ungarians'. The "ungarian language was anyway used in administration before being legali2ed* in Tg. .ecuiesc, for instance, from the local 'ouncil only one member is #omanian, so the meetings of the 'ouncil were held in "ungarian in 1--:, despite the law. Dn Tg. ;ures the #omanian authorities and part of the #omanians population were against bilingual inscriptions although Tg. ;ures has a "ungarian theater and opera 6attended by many #omanians as well7, "ungarian newspapers, cultural associations, and so on. When the 'iorbea government had for the first time since the "ungarian 9utonomous region the name of the city written in two languages the "ungarian version was erased with paint in only a few hours after the sign was installed 6+uly %4, 1--57, while in 'luC the opening of a "ungarian consulate long prevented by /unar provoked no adverse reaction, but even applause from the population. This supports the idea that /unar's provocative nationalist behavior somehow immuni2ed the city, but also the idea that #omanians react mostly when the #omanian language is challenged, being very tolerant for the rest. The e perience of the "ungarian autonomous region is also recalled negatively by the #omanians. Even people from outside Transylvania, claim that when crossing the region they were faced with a total refusal of the inhabitants to answer in the #omanian language. 'oe istence of nationalism with a command economy led to the reCection of the others' language, since there was no incentive for communication whatsoever. Today, when private trade flourishes it is, on the contrary, e ceptional that the vendor and the buyer don't find a way to communicate, despite a few complaints from #omanians in Tg. ;ures. "owever, where this incentive doesn't e ist, communication is difficult. 'There are people and people. 9 car from ?rahova broke here in Tusnad and our peasants didn't help the driver because he was not speaking "ungarian'. 6"ungarian middle-class group, ;iercurea 'iuc7. "ungarians, in their turn, complain that if they speak "ungarian outside Transylvania, even between themselves, people look at them without sympathy or even ask them to speak #omanian, especially at the countryside. 6.f (heorghe, intellectuals7 The whole battle for self-government is actually a battle around language. The whole logic of self-government evolves around language> 'Df an old "ungarian woman who doesn't know #omanian because she was born under the 9ustro-"ungarian Empire goes to the 'ity "all because she needs a certificate, and nobody there speaks "ungarian she will not be able to solve her problem and they may even mock her' 6!9"# ?resident, Tg. ;ures7. ,ut nobody could in fact be alive today who went to school under the 9ustro-"ungarian regime, so if the old lady, or anyone else, doesn't know enough #omanian to ask for a

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certificate it is because she did not want to know. Af course "ungarian-speaking clerks should e ist in all institutions in regions inhabited by "ungarians, but this because it is obvious "ungarians living in compact areas do not know #omanian and because finally the state is meant to function, so to provide services, and not to teach the official language to recalcitrant students. "owever, if any form of testing the #omanian language will be e empted from the education system a young girl from the .2ekely area will know in :& years as little #omanian as the old lady mentioned, even less because she will know in every institution she will find somebody to speak "ungarian. The stake of the second official language is that this in all probability prompts also the reorgani2ation of the state along linguistic lines. This type of policy can be noticed in ,elgium and Kuebec 6#oss, in (iles >1--%7 and implies the demand for the reform of the political system and a decisive change of the rule of the game.6;elluci >1-3-7. Df "ungarian becomes an official language in "ungarian-inhabited areas self-government is under way. /or 2ones where #omanians and "ungarians are in similar proportion such as Tg. ;ures this would probably increase ethnic resentment and bring more voters to #omanian nationalist parties. /or the rest of Transylvania it would probably make little difference from the present situation. Dn our survey the #omanian community showed relative tolerance towards bilingual signs, an all-"ungarian section of ,abes-,olyai 0niversity or even the study of history and geography in "ungarian. Dmportant reservations were made however towards the idea that #omanian civil servants in "ungarian dominated areas should pass a "ungarian language test when applying for the Cob. /D(0#E 1& 9,A0T "E#E 9.: On state5 citiBenship5 government and self2government The #omanian .tate is of the unitary-fused type, copied after the /rench, with central and local government fused in the office of prefect. !uring the post communist years the prefect enCoyed more authority and power than the mayor did, several mayors, especially from the political opposition being dismissed by prefects by 1--:. =ocal ta es were introduced in 1--% but they represent an insignificant amount of the ta es raised from the inhabitants. Ta es are collected by local agencies of the /inance !epartment and redistributed by the government. 0ntil 1--- no law of financement of local governments e isted, so each mayor's budget was at the mercy of the central government. ;ost local institutions are also centrally subordinated > health, police, and education. These specifications are necessary in order to understand the amount of frustrations local governments - named, by the way, 'administration' because in the view of many #omanian politicians 'local governments e ist only in federal systems' 6#omanian .ecretary of .tate, !epartment of Dnformation, 1--:7 - accumulated during the postcommunist transition. ?olitics in #omania is a central game and due to the proportional system and the voting on party lists only ,ucharest politics matters, where party lists are made. The 'national' element, be it politics, television or culture carries away in front of the local one. This political order is firmly grounded in the social structure created by the

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'ommunist system that leveled regional and social differences to a surprising e tent 6,ote2 > 1-3: * ;ungiu >1--87. "ungarian respondents were unanimous in their blame for the 'state'. The state is 'nationalist' because 'They claim they want to integrate into Europe but they do Cust the opposite'. The state is 'sucking the blood' of the counties, because it takes large ta es and returns insignificant parts of them. 'We should have ta es for the development of state, of region and of town. Eot like this, all money are put in the central purse and then...Dt matters when you put meat in a soup if you get some of it finally or you get li)uid only'.6;iercurea 'iuc, middle-class group7 'Df a "ungarian family has economic difficulties -the same #omanian families have- then the "ungarian says > it's not my fault, since D am a hard worker. ,ut whose fault is it G Dt's ,ucharest R' 'D work here, D do my Cob, why shouldn't D benefit of my work and my money G Why should D give it to ,ucharest G' 'The state kills us. They laid off some bureaucrats, but the rest still sit on the country. They come here at the end of the month and take our money' 6"ungarian workers7 '$ou know the Coke > why does the .outherners have a long neck > to look over the mountains in Transylvania. They take all the goods for ,ucharest people from here. Whoever is appointed here doesn't go back to ,ucharest...'6"ungarian peasants7 'Anly 4 B of our ta es came back for the county last year. 9nd the prefect decided to give more money to =udus 6#omanian town7 to help them build an Arthodo church, while in Tg. ;ures money is not enough even for street sweepers.' 6Dntellectuals, Tg. ;ures7 9lthough the comple ity of these discourses varies greatly their construction is similar in many points. ,oth intellectuals, ignorant of the way the budget is designed but able to draw on figures to make their point, and ordinary peasants resorting to sayings in order to do the same were in fact constructing an attribution for a resentment. The resentment against the state is Custified by the situation we described above. ?eople feel little of their money come back to them in the form of some valuable service, and are willing to pay more local ta es than national ones 6;ungiu and Donita> 1-337. Dn the view of our "ungarian respondents, duties towards the state as a citi2en are ta paying and lawabiding. .ince they pay their ta es they consider the state - which is usually considered the '#omanian' state 6only now !9"# is associated to government7 owes them. Dn the .2ekelys area, at least, none of our respondents considered for a moment some of the public goods the state provides reaches their area, 6although e cept peasants and the middle class group they all worked in the state sector7, via at least education, defense or public order, but considered they could live a completely autarchic life if their ta es come

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back to local governments. 9fter complaining too many garrisons are located in their region and the #omanian policemen don't know "ungarian well 6but "ungarians traditionally don't enroll as policemen, they told us7 of course they considered these two fields unworthy of their financement. ?aying for education is also frustrating, since education is subordinated to ,ucharest. 'When inspection comes from !epartment of Education in ,ucharest here they don't understand anything. Why should ,ucharest inspect us G They're interested only if children know #omanian. 9nd of course children almost don't'6"ungarian teacher, ;iercurea 'iuc'. ?reCudices of both the #omanian nationalists and the citi2ens from the .2ekelys area mirror each other perfectly. They are both based on stereotypes> the #omanian stereotype of the "ungarian as a traitor citi2en who has to be kept under constant surveillance and the "ungarian stereotype of the #omanian state which takes from "ungarians to give #omanians. "owever the post-'ommunist state took from everybody with little discrimination in order to support the massive state sector and avoid unemployment for both #omanians and "ungarians.6Iamfir> 1--47 9lthough #omania did not have after 1--& a strategy of regional distribution of resources 6a law to this effect was passed in 1--5, but with little practical conse)uences7 inhabitants of Transylvania, not only "ungarians but some #omanians too are persuaded they support the rest of #omania. few people reali2e that due to a large central budget they benefit still of important subsidies in the cost of energy and gasoline and pay insignificant amounts for education or health care. Af course, self-government is seen as the solution of all problems 6e cepting 'luC, where "ungarians fear /unar will become even more aggressive had he more autonomy from the central government7."ere opinions are different from the working and middle class "ungarians we discussed to in the .2ekelys area, who are radical autonomists and intellectuals in Tg. ;ures, 'luC, and even .f (heorghe, who reali2e the matter is more complicated. The complicated system of 'autonomy steps' built by !9"# is not even known e cepting "ungarian intellectuals, and not understood even by them since it is )uite confuse but people we talked to knew well enough what kind of self-government they want. ' What's good for us' ' Dt means laws that concern us shouldn't be passed if we do not approve' '!ecentrali2ation, for us and for the #omanians as well' "ow to do it is a more complicated problem. Dn the .2ekelys area most "ungarians, regardless of education share the political model > ethnic-grounded territorial autonomy. ' Why can't we do it as in .wit2erland G They should split the country into regions > ;oldova, ;untenia, ,anat, Transylvania into two parts, ours

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with 'ovasna, "arghita, ;ures and eventually ,rasov, it doesn't matter, another one in Eorthern Transylvania, each with his own laws and interests, that's federali2ation, that's what we need'. 6workers, Tg. .ecuiesc7. Dntellectuals share this ideal, but are more aware of its difficulties > 'We cannot create two categories of "ungarians, ones inside, the others outside a "ungarian autonomous region. The only solution is a more autonomous Transylvania as a whole' 6!9"# leader, 'luC7 'Territorial autonomy on ethnic grounds is difficult to achieve, impossible. ,ut still the solution would be the .outh Tyrol model, with the rights of #omanians and "ungarians who make a minority in a community being firmly ensured' 6Tamas .andor, !9"# ;?, advisor of =as2lo Tokes7 'We can't think of a separate solution for the "ungarians living here. We can solve it only with the #omanians living here' 'Df the #omanians would want to emancipate from ,ucharest together we could work something out'.6Dntellectuals, Tg. ;ures and .f (heorghe7. ,ut this is precisely what the #omanians fear> that normal decentrali2ation will only further complicate the national problem, bringing an escalation of the "ungarians drive towards some form of ethnic-based territorial separation. The present structure of 45 counties is a compromise between the even more fragmented inter-war administrative organi2ation and the 'ommunist one. The 'iorbea government planned to return to the inter-war structure, although the proCect was strongly critici2ed. Dn any event, an administrative organi2ation on larger regions and provinces is absent from the #omanian tradition, e cepting a brief and failed reform of administrative organi2ation attempted by 'harles DD. .teps towards normal decentrali2ation were constantly blocked in the 1--%1--: ?arliament 6the most nationalistic until now7 which prevented the reform of the administrative system in the whole country on the grounds that "ungarians might benefit from it in their interest. This is one of many cases5 but a very significant one5 of the pattern according to which development of democracy in (omania is hindered due to the national problem. The .2ekelys do not make the maCority of "ungarians in Transylvania, however., although due to their compact presence they are of the the main initiators of political attitudes. The rest of the "ungarians in Transylvania, slightly more numerous, have a different point of view. 9ccording to our survey self-government of the .2ekely region by itself does not meet the approval of the maCority of "ungarians. Dt would be surprising if it did, since the maCority does not inhabit there. 4& B, however, would like to see a special status region in the .2ekelys. .ince #omanians are against it, 55 B of our sample made of #omanians and "ungarians scored against the special status region. The opinion is much more balanced when it comes to consociative solutions> 13 B #omanians favor and 15 B oppose the appointment of "ungarian prefects in "ungarian dominated areas,

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although D;9. polls from 1--4-1--: showed a larger opposition. The same D;9. polls made however clear that #omanians tend to endorse whatever rights minorities already have and to oppose the granting of new ones. Dn 1--3 the "ungarian prefects had already been in place for almost one year and a half so the population had grown accustomed to them. /D(0#E 11 9,A0T "E#E ?articipation of !9"# to government, although strongly critici2ed by advocates of selfgovernment meets the approval of "ungarians and of a minority of #omanians as well. 18 B of #omanians, however, believe !9"# participation to the government as having a negative impact on the #omanian-"ungarian relationship. /D(0#E 1% 9,A0T "E#E #omanians show disbelief when it comes to the "ungarian attachment to the #omanian .tate > 'We all here approved to what the ;? ;r. #atiu said when asked by the "ungarians why can't they have a state university the way .wedish minority has in /inland. Well, he said, when /inland and .weden play football together .wedes in /inland cheer for the /innish team, while in #omania "ungarians do the opposite,' 6workers, #omanians, 'luC7 '"ungarians will never accept #omanian domination, never will they accept the fact that are part of the #omanian state. To them the nation is more important than everything is, they are disciplined and listen to national commandments in ways #omanians cannot dream of. They killed, proportionally, maybe even more +ews than the (ermans in order to have the (ermans support them, then in 1-44 they were told > you are "ungarians you shouldn't be subordinated to #omanians, enroll in the 'ommunist ?arty early and you will occupy the key positions...Dn 1-8: D was working in Hatra !ornei and subordinated to a very tough "ungarian apparatchik...When the #evolution started in "ungary we were all touched and we hoped it will start in #omania, too, but that man was telling us defiantly '#omanians are not capable of something like this. Even this fantastic moment, which D think is one of the very important moments of the European history they couldn't help using only to e ult their pride' 'The #omanian people resented 'ommunism. Dn 1-44 almost no #omanian enrolled in the 'ommunist party...Then the leaders of the "ungarians in #omania understood the importance of that moment and they saw in 'ommunism a double opportunity > to defend their interests and to continue the fighting against the same #omanian state, in the same time escaping the responsibility for what they had done in the last 4 years 61-4&-1-447'. 6Ald #omanian intellectuals, 'luC7

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!9"# is right in theory when e plaining that asking "ungarians to prove their loyalty towards the state is similar to giving up the presumption of innocence. 6;arko ,ela> 1--37 "owever even the more moderate #omanians 6like the workers in 'luC7 would feel better that autonomy would be a 'contract' and loyalty the trade-off. ,ased on the logic summed up by ;# ;arko ,ela none of the legal proposals of !9"# does even allude to the matter of loyalty, which only feeds the an iety and fear of the #omanians. 9.D. On !ast and %est ?oliticians and intellectuals both often said that #omania's path can no longer be distinct from the general trend towards European integration. The theme was also constantly invoked in our focus groups. The European integration of #omania is by no means certain> but people's choice of a political way is nevertheless highly relevant for a certain value-system. Aur survey provided three options to be chosen by respondents> option West 6best foreign policy is seek speedy integration in E9TA and the 0E7, option East 6best foreign policy is seek an alliance with the 'ommunity of Dndependent .tates7, and national option 6best policy is to pursue its own original path unlike the East or the West7. '"9#T 11 9,A0T "E#E Twice as many #omanians as "ungarians, as one can notice, believe that #omania should indeed seek an 'original way' and a third of the whole sample representative for Transylvania share this belief. The maCority, however, is inclined towards the option FWest@. Af the 11 B who chose the national option the most are highly educated people. To what cause can we attribute this factG The higher awareness of the difference between the #omanian and the Western systemsG The fear of being reCected, or to compete with the WestG ?rovincialism, higher among educated people, more eager to protect their culture and their roleG !ifficult to answer. ,ut is it certain that the discourse of conservative intellectuals is directly linked with this national option. 9s "ungarians #omanians also noticed immigrants in Western Europe end up in the black labor market. 'ontact with the few multinationals landed in #omania also increased the perception that work attitudes are different in the ,alkans than in Western Europe or 0nited .tates. "ungarians identify themselves more with the civili2ed West, and most #omanians share the perception of a barbaric East. .ome want to keep the differences embodied in the original 'third way. some are afraid of that> Df neither E9TA nor the 0E will accept us in 1---, if Westerners do not come here massively as investors as managers to compel us live with them and by them this nation will disappear or will become Cust a populace.6officer, 9rmy Af Transylvania7 Transylvania wants to belong to the West but stumbles over the doubt it is 'West@>. ?eople fear for good reason their values and attitudes might be closer tot he realities of a under-developed post-totalitarian country than to Western Europe. :. 0se and abuse of the identity need> the role of elites

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The victory in Eovember 1--: elections of the centrist coalition in #omania-the only alternative to the post-communist and nationalist alliance which had rules since 1--&brought an area premiere that remained if not unnoticed than little analy2ed. 9s a conse)uence of the victory the ally-since 1--1- of the winner !emocratic 'onvention of #omania 6'!#7, the "ungarian alliance 6!9"#7 Coined the new-formed government. The event has a twofold importance> in broader European terms, since !9"# is the largest ethnic party in Europe, representing the 1.5 million "ungarians and enCoying almost 5 B of the total seats in the #omanian ?arliament, and in the ,alkan area, where such collaboration is rarer and rarer. Ane would e pect that such a move would appease nationalists in both camps. "owever, the presence of !9"# in the government proved to be a daily struggle, of the government with the media and a rebellious ?arliament, of the !9"# leaders with various discontent wings of their party, of the #omanian coalition leaders with their ;? and followers. 9lthough the maCor improvements in the "ungarians@ self-government promoted by the government 6such as appointment of "ungarian prefects in "ungarian dominated-areas of Transylvania7 brought no popular discontent, the debate on what the status should be of the "ungarian community in #omania was only reopened. The maCor conflict is between those who see the "ungarians participation at government as an end in itself, while others, notably the "ungarians, see it as a means towards their program of full self-government. The ?resident of !9"#, while on one hand strongly keeping its party together and in the ranks of the larger coalition is currently describing the situation as a F'atch %%@ one. SDn short, despite the maCor achievements of these two years nationalists on both sides find good reason to claim the e periment had failed. This chapter will analy2e by looking into this issue the composition of nationalistic elites in present-day #omania and the perception by the public of the elites@ role in the national conflict. Dt is widely admitted that the elites, most notably what in Europe is called Fintellectuals@ play an important part in the articulation of ethnic and national revival political movements, and their involvement is often a conse)uence of failed assimilation and frustrations over perceived reCection from the part of the dominant culture.. 9s 9nthony .mith put it >@ The intelligentsia, or professional classes, in the widest sense, play a special part in the process of politici2ing nascent ethnic sentiment6M7/ewer and fewer of the educated elites from different ethnic groups are able to find positions which match their professional )ualifications6M7Dn fact, the process of politici2ing the intelligentsia cuts across the distinction between ethnic and territorial nationalism. We find it at work in nineteenth century Eastern Europe, post-1-48 Western Europe, and among the territorial nationalism of contemporary sub-.aharan 9frica. 6M7 6.mith>>1-3%>p 1&,117

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#eCection or perceived reCection plays a part, but in the case of nationalists in #omania we should say reCection is only a part of a larger game, strengthened by the habits ac)uired during 'ommunism, of avoiding or reducing competition by all means. The intellectual class is especially good at this game. "ungarian intellectuals feel as second class citi2ens often from symbolic reasons only Nthat their culture is a minority culture. #omanian intellectuals also have a serious inferiority comple towards Western Europe. The result is that nationalism is a common feature, the rule rather than the e ception, in both camps, its fiercest accents to be met mostly in parliamentary debates and the #omanian media. ,ut it would be wrong to assume that the top opinion leaders are cut from their base. /rustration over ethnic competition is resented )uite often. Ane focus group participant, a "ungarian coach, complained about it in the following terms> The evening before the match with the #omanian team D send my boys Cogging and then put them to bed early stressing the importance of the ne t day match. The #omanian team occupies the porch of the hotel, smokes a little, drinks a lot of beer, dances in the near-by disco, goes to bed at two in the morning and the ne t day we are better than they but they win. We would like to stress that if "ungarians feel #omanians do better with less effort #omanians, in their turn, mostly Transylvanians, still e perience the comple of being politically and culturally dominated for hundreds of years. 9s members in a focus group of 'luC #omanian intellectuals put it. FTheir cultural heritage is richer because they were the masters here. #omanians were not allowed to live in cities and build churchesMWhat they boast with was done on our e pense@ $. %ho makes the .elites/7 D understand by Felite@ in the present work three categories of persons> 1. =eaders and political class. "ere one can find the full spectrum of the #omanian elite, comprising politicians with ideologies varying from e treme nationalist to liberal regionalism and part of a political spectrum for the "ungarian politicians, as ideological differences are less important since their main program is focused on the welfare of the "ungarian community. %. outstanding opinion leaders 6Cournalists, intellectuals, clergymen7 1. Apinion leaders, either regionally or locally influential 6priests, teachers, other locally acknowledged intellectuals or public figures7. Dt is always difficult to discern between the real problem of the national or ethnic group, mirrored by leaders or elite, and the problems the leaders help subsist in order to take advantage on them and consolidate their position. .ome politicians can be described as

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pro/e ional nationali t as they are directly interested not to solve an ethnic conflict on whose behalf their career is made. Ather persons with political ambitions denied by their position in society Nsuch as priests and Cournalists- also discover nationalism as a Fcause@ they pretend to embrace in a non-political and non-partisan manner, in order to gain primarily political influence. This last category likes to show itself as prophets and defenders of some endangered cause, ranging from the protection of an e tinct language 6like the Welsh, the ,reton, the ,as)ue7 to the protection of a well-to-do language they claim is abused 6the movement to make English an official language in 0.* the movement to protect the /rench language from anglicisms* the Fcrusade@ to protect the #omanian language by writer and senator (eorge ?ruteanu. These are the voluntary soldiers of nationalist causes, t0e 1ru ader nationali t . Their cause is most of the times a language N but they can also focus on a minority religion or denomination, even on the genetic heritage threatened by mi ed marriages. The third and the largest category of nationalists are, however, the 1on/ormi t . (roup conformity is a vital element in the understanding of the mobili2ation and support building of nationalism. ;any influential people in a community would never have nationalist initiatives or would support personally such a movement, but since they are dependent of the groupLcommunity they are willing to pay to have their identity as good group members confirmed by nationalists who speak in the name of the group. This leads to the subordination of elites which otherwise have both the money and the wit to do their own politics to the nationalist leaders. ;any middle-class and business characters find themselves passive supporters of nationalism due to this mechanism, although they are disinterested by the nature of their occupation in linguistic battles and prestige wars, favoring communication over e treme differentiation. They end by sponsoring nationalist movements by group conformity only, seeing it even as duty of the well-to-do community members towards the rest. Each of these three categories can be found within the two elites, #omanian and "ungarian. The situation is obscured even further by the absence in #omania of a class of professional politicians. The background of people serving as politicians in these times of Ftransition@ are either as lawyers, or, )uite often, as intellectuals and priests, so e actly from categories aspiring to reach political influence by nonpolitical means. Dt is a well known fact that writers tend to be nationalist leaders in the first stages of a nationalist movement> in the former 0..# #epublics ?opular and Eational /ronts were mostly lead by writers in late F3&@s and early@-&@s, and so was !9"# 6the !emocratic 9lliance of "ungarians #omanian7. The supreme office of !9"#, the presidency, passed from one writer, !omokos (e2a, to another, ,ela ;arko. The most popular !9"# character is still the ,ishop =as2lo Tokes. The most notable characters of #omanian nationalism are poets such as 9drian ?aunescu, (rigore Hieru, =eonida =ari, 'orneliu Hadim Tudor, priests such as ,artolomeu 9nania, literary critics such as (eorge ?ruteanu. 9nd these are only the famous ones> Transylvania is full of people like them, but least known, school principals, union leaders, history professors and librarians, all guided by the ambition of being protectors and leaders of their community, all voluntary to share with me their view on the essence of the national problem in #omania.

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:.$. The )ungarian political class1 ideology5 evolution5 trends The creation of !9"# in 1--&, immediately after political pluralism was allowed was a natural phenomenon. .imilar "ungarian parties were forming at the time in all the neighboring states including "ungarian minorities. =as2lo Tokes had had a powerful start as a hero of the #omanian #evolution, which helped him emerge as a political leader of the "ungarian community in those days. 9lso essential was the fact that 'eausescu's policy of denationali2ation of the last years had prepared the program of !9"#. While #omanians were confused and divided in their new une pected freedom, "ungarians were united and so !9"# became the largest opposition party in the 1--& ?arliament. Dts first leaders had been actually the leaders of the community already in the 'ommunist times. !omokos (e2a, the first president, had been ?resident of the "ungarian section of !9"#, an establishment position. Athers like <arol <iraly had been members of 'eausescu's ?olitical ,ureau and had protested openly against its national policies. !espite individual contestings this group held together well> ama2ingly when one considers later attacks against !9"# as an ethnic party that no essential contesting was directed against it that days. The strange informal coalition governing #omania at the time, made up of 9rmy, secret service officers, former nomenklatura and the former 'ommunist newspapers supporting them seemed more concerned to prevent the creation of a real #omanian opposition challenge to post-communist establishment, than to counteract the creation of an ethnic party. This lack of interest from ,ucharest lead to the creation in Transylvania first of 'Hatra #omaneasca', a political and cultural nationalist association, then to its political wing, the ?arty for the 0nity of #omanians 6?0E#7. Dt is important to establish that the first #omanian nationalist post-'ommunist movement started in Transylvania. ?0E# managed to win a few seats in the 1--& 9ssembly, but since they registered as a party barely a month before elections, their performance can be considered a success. !9"# is indeed a political alliance, as its name shows. Dt was never recorded as a political party according to the #omanian parties@ legislation. Dn fact it included parties, E(A's, and cultural associations as well. 9lthough ideological trends within !9"# vary from 'hristian !emocrats to =iberals, !9"# acts and is perceived more as an ethnic party. Dts constituency is either 'centre', or cannot say what it is 641B, 0,, poll7. The "ungarian community lacks an ideological orientation even more than the #omanian community, )uite disoriented itself and having as only political option a party with a national more than a political program. 9 large body of literature in #omania and abroad, mostly written by Cournalists, point to the e istence inside !9"# of a 'radical' and a 'moderate' group. This discussion originated in the sanctions given by !9"# leadership to the presence of two ;? at a conciliatory meeting with the #omanian government in 1--1 at Eeptun 6organi2ed by the 9merican ?roCect on Ethnic #elations7. Ane of the ;? to receive a party sanction then was the future candidate to ?residency, /runda (yorgy.

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9fter ,ela ;arko as ?resident of !9"# replaced !omokos (e2a the alliance entered a more radical stage, which lasted from 1--% to 1--:. The 9lliance between !9"# and the #omanian opposition at the 1--% elections brought !9"# nothing, and #omanians electoral losses. =ater on, the government party, post-'ommunist ?arty for .ocial !emocracy 6?!.#7 associated itself with nationalistic ?0E# and the more recent (reater #omania ?arty 6?#;7, thus leaving "ungarians no hope their claims can be resolved in the framework of the #omanian political system. !uring this time !9"# adopted important documents such as the 'luC .tatement 61--%7 and the .tatute of ?ersonal 9utonomy 61--:7. These documents proclaimed "ungarians in #omania as a separate 'political subCect' and asked for the internal 'self-government' and 'self'determination' of the "ungarians as a political community. Dn 1--:, after becoming partners of the government coalition with their long times allies, #omanian center-right parties, !9"# abandoned this language and pursued their claim for cultural autonomy via general laws 6amendments to the laws of Education, =ocal (overnment7. This history helps us emphasi2e a distinction, which may prove instrumental to classify trends within !9"#. We therefore consider as 'moderates' the !9"# leaders who seek the fulfillment of the "ungarian community problems in the adoption and enforcement of the legal provisions comprised in the framework of European institutions such as the 'ouncil of Europe and the European 0nion minority and minority language regulations. This group sees "ungarians in #omania as a minority and considers its problems can be resolved without a reform of the #omanian political system or the state structure, only by the establishment and protection of individual and derivative rights 6rights deriving from the appurtenance to a community7. /runda (yorgy and Herestoy 9ttila were the most outspoken representatives of this group until now. We consider as nationalist or 'radical' the "ungarian politicians or ideologues who look upon "ungarians in #omania as a 'nation', or a separate political subCect as it is specified in the ?ersonal 9utonomy .tatute. This group includes =as2lo Tokes, 'sapo Dos2ef and ,orbely Dmre. They dislike !9"# being treated as a minority only* its rhetoric makes from the large number of "ungarians a decisive issue and they consider a difference should be made between "ungarians and other minorities in #omania and this difference should be embodied in the recognition of "ungarians as political subCects. The political system must be reformed in order to accommodate this separate 'political subCect', either by creating a special status region on the model of .outh Tyrol in Dtaly or a federal state instead of a unitary one with Transylvania as a federal unit. This policy line was never very much agreed by the other minorities, who have presented their own draft for a minorities' law, in which, needless to say, treatment of minority group is non-differential. .ince !9"# became a member of the governing coalition incentives for a consociative formula increased and most of !9"#'s ;? and establishment became 'moderate'. The attempt of ?astor Tokes to organi2e in .eptember 1--3 a meeting to discuss !9"# leadership in critical terms and ask for a change in its policy failed as most of the "ungarian political establishment boycotted the meeting. Dn his speech Tokes was bitter

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against the moderates, whom he portrayed as 'opportunists' and the liberal "ungarian newspapers from ,udapest that did not support his wing. Where is the promising spirit of our internal ?arliament that adopted the 'luC .tatementG Eot to mention the oath taken in .t. ;ichael's 'hurchR Anly with bitter irony can one call this body our internal ?arliament, the one said to embody the self-government of our community 6...7 What does the "ungarian nation of Transylvania wishG This e pression of our political wills is organically integrated in the historical .2ekelys tradition, same as the popular assembly at =utita in 1343 that we commemorate these days... ,ishop Tokes than critici2ed a "ungarians columnist for attacking !9"# leaders who want to )uit the government coalition and retreat to their ethnic Fghetto@, and (yorgy /runda for playing by the rules of the European 'ouncil before concluding> /rom here, in 'ernatul de +os, one can clearly distinguish how much our point of view, Transylvanian and healthy, is different from the official vision of !9"#, of ,ucharest, ,udapest, ,onn and WashingtonR What do European documents and Western diplomats do to be so disliked ,ishop TokesG Ane thing mainly> they do not encourage unilateral actions, even if they are not opposed to self-government. Ar the .tatute of ?ersonal 9utonomy was close to turn into a unilateral action as steps were taken by radicals to organi2e a referendum and adopt it in the .2ekelys area in 1--:. !ue to important international-in fact, 9merican- effort and to the eagerness of both "ungarians and #omanian leaders to be granted international recognition as stable countries -both were applying to become members of E9TA- a bilateral treaty was eventually concluded after many difficulties in 1--:. The treaty included European provisions for protection of the minorities such as the 'harter of ;inority =anguages and the 1%&1 #ecommendation of the European 'ouncil - with the specification asked by the #omanian side that in no way interpretation of these documents could compel the #omanian state to grant ethnic-based territorial autonomy and collective rights to members of "ungarian minority. This cut the grounds from under "ungarian nationalists' feet in #omania. "appily, their allies, the #omanian center-right won Cust two months later the elections and they invited them to Coin the government. 9s violent as =as2lo Tokes against moderates is <iraly <aroly, the old 'ommunist turned nationalist in the eighties. "e accuses the "ungarian ;? of controlling the 'ouncil of #epresentatives, the body including both central and local !9"# leaders supposed to become a F?arliament@ of the "ungarian minority. !9"# officials want to have their positions for the life 6...7 These persons practically represent only themselves at every level. 6...7This represents the greatest danger for the e istence of "ungarians in #omania. Eot (reater

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#omania ?arty, not /unar, not Dliescu are the danger. Kuite on the contrary, they are of help to us.6in .2ekelyfold,no8L1--37 The nationalists were influential enough back in 1--: to have the ?ersonal 9utonomy .tatute approved. 9 few e cerpts of this document are telling> An the basis of internal self-determination, which by the way of selfgovernment inside the state guarantees the preservation of the national identity of the "ungarian community, the individual and collective practice of rights specific to persons belonging to these minorities 'hapter 1, article 1 The national "ungarian community of #omania, from now on national community, as an autonomous political subCect is the e)uivalent of the "ungarian body, inferior in numbers but safe keeper of historical , territorial, cultural linguistic, religious traditions on the native homeland, whose members affirm their belonging to the community by their free will 'hapter %, art 8 ?ersonal autonomy included all minority rights, which can have an individual practice, all the specific rights which can be e ercised collectively only, therefore the rights which rest upon the national autonomous community as a political subCect6...7. 9rt. 1& in the territorial administrative units where persons belonging to the minority group make a maCority their language are e)ual to the state language. 9rt, 14 ?ersonal autonomy guarantees for community and its members> a. /ull and real e)uality as citi2ens b. self-government inside the state, according to the historical and territorial specificity c. E)uality of chances' 6reproduced by #ompres, Eational ?ress 9gency, 114L&1L1--:7. The most striking feature of this document is the mi of two types of rhetoric. Ane is the liberal rhetoric also used in the language of international law* provisions for minorities, a long list of them, make actually the opening statement of the document. "ere belong unmistakably e pressions such as 'e)uality of chances'. The other is based upon 'tradition', and 'historical and territorial specificity' -whatever that means- and is therefore a national rhetoric. .enator 'sapo, considered the author of the document, volunteered some e planations in an interview with #adio ,ucharest.

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Why is autonomy 'personal'G ,ecause it points to a community recogni2ed by the state as an e istence inside the state and points to the selfgovernment of this community as a person, so the community is considered a person- a legal or political person6...7 ?ower must be granted to the authorities that are closer to the respective community. The society should therefore reflect if a federal form of government does not provide better decentrali2ation and e ercise of the authority... Why are we present, why do we insist G To claim our rights, to be able to create the necessary framework to e ercise the minority rights, collectively or privately....This is our mandate and goal, since the "ungarian community has its historical and territorial traditions, specific territorial, historical, number6R7 traditions inside the #omanian state. 6#adio 9ntena ,ucurestilor interview, )uoted by #ador of ;arch 1, 1--:7. .enator 'sapo insisted after 1--5 that 0!;# should )uit the government coalition, but lost the final vote in the 'ouncil of #epresentatives 6#omaniai ;agyar .2o, %:L&:L-37. "is rather complicated and wordy program was in fact inspired largely by a policy proposal written by ?rofessor /erenc (lat2, a ?resident of the "ungarian 9cademy 6(lat2>1--17 and adopted also by other "ungarian parties in the region 6such as in HoCvodina, part of $ugoslavia7. The proCect for minorities@ law drafted by the !epartment of ;inorities that D consulted in the summer of 1--3 was however not inspired by these documents but rested more upon a consociative logic, securing positions for minorities inside government offices. ;arko ,ela, on the other side, declared in /ebruary 1--5 that !9"# did not give up its autonomy program, but instead sees its participation in the government as a gradual approach towards it 6#omanian daily #omania libera, :L&%L-57. 9long the years an approach trying to balance between the two wings of the party seemed the best policy to keep the party united around its current leaders. !espite scandals and temporary setback of symbolic issues such as the "ungarian 0niversity, most of the "ungarians claims from 1--: were resolved via participation in government. =ocal government appointees are now "ungarians* the "ungarian language can be used in Custice and administration* local communities are better financed. 9ll these positive developments were possible only by amending general laws such as education and =ocal 9dministration law, and by passing new laws 6such as /inancement of =ocal (overnments7. The mere idea of having a "ungarian prefect in "ungarian maCority areas was viewed as heresy in 1--:, so important steps forward were possible by consociatonalism. "owever, "ungarian nationalists will probably disagree with minorities' law that makes no difference between "ungarians and other minorities and abandons the self-government rhetoric. "ungarian nationalists point often to the "ungarian law for minorities, built around the concept of minority self-government. They tend to forget, however, that in "ungary minorities have no reserved seats in parliament as in #omania, and are too few to be able to have parliamentary representation. The Fselfgovernments@ of minorities are therefore only able to supervise and distribute funds for cultural activities and fail to take any other actions, even when necessary 6The Economist

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of ;arch 1-L1---7. "owever, this attitude complies moderates to act with e treme caution. ?olitics is the art of realism, but few people can be realists when it comes to nationalism. "owever, this makes the difference between ;arko ,ela and Tokes =a2slo. ,ack in 1--& their language was not so different as it is today. They both shared the ideas of FTransilvanism@, this nostalgic trend of the thirties now revived in a more political form> F9ccepting Transylvania as an independent entity, the recognition of its specificity, of its historical and geographical determinations leads us unwillingly to the most modern European theories and purposes, such as territorial and regional autonomy, the making of a continental unity possible through concerns regarding autonomous regions and federalism6...7 Df we reason in large European conte t, it doesn't matter to which state Transylvania belongs, more important is that Transylvania, together with the whole #omania, becomes an organic part of Europe and the surrounding space. An the contrary, within a national undemocratic state, intolerant,6...7 all these aspiration cannot be accomplished@. 6Tokes =as2lo > To be a Transylvanian "ungarian, in 'umpana 1, 9ntologia revistei <orunk7 FTransilvanism means common and separate e istence. The common being of separate e istences. To the e tent that culture is involved this already e ists. ,ut not in the fields of Custice, politics, administration. ,ut it should R 6...7There is no alternative to the common e istence of separate e istences...D know, this is Cust a metaphor. ,ut think of it as a political program@. 6;arko ,ela- the Transylvanian cat, in 'umpana 17. 9ctually it became a political program because the same arguments are used for the motivation of the Fautonomy@ program in 1--4. While the concept of territorial autonomy remains obscure in the )uoted document, other specifications made by ;r. ;arko ,ela are relevant > the fact that the Fautonomy system' is inspired from the Fmediaeval traditions@ of Transylvania and that present institutions only create a Fcoercive coe istence@ FEeither the forced coe istence nor the forced separation are practicable ways@ states ;r ;arko ,ela, considering therefore the current situation a Fforced cohabitation@. 6,ela ;arko 1--4 > The 9utonomy ?rogram of 0!;#7. These difference of views inside !9"# is often mirrored by its reactions to various challenging events. Dn the case of Adorheiu .ecuiesc orphanage, for instance, Tokay (yorgy, minister of minorities and one of the Fsanctioned@ ;? from Eeptun gave a public apology for the behavior of locals towards (reek-'atholic nuns are stated bitterly that never in their history "ungarians failed to be courteous toward women, not to speak of nuns. The official reaction of !9"#, however, signed by influential e ecutive president Takacs 'saba slighted the fault of "ungarian local authorities for the incident and laid the blame on the intervention 6late after the events7 of the governmental 9gency for =ocal (overnment.

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The view of the "ungarian 9lliance seems to have been closer to ;r Takacs than ;r Tokay. !uring and after a television talc-show D organised and moderated in .fintu (heorghe on this issue all the "ungarians present Neither appointed by the 'entral government or directly elected- sided in declaring #emus Apris, head of =ocal (overnment 9gency was the only one to blame. They all refrained to comment the fact that the government stepped in pushed by the #omanian media only months after waiting for the local authorities Nfor the first time, all-"ungarian- to act and censure the behavior of the =ocal 'ouncil of Adorheiu. Ethnic solidarity proved a lot stronger than either the desire to prove "ungarians can be obCective and allowed to rule themselves, and the usual understanding of Custice in a market economy 6the =ocal 'ouncil tried to sei2e the building of the .wiss /oundation and use if for its own purposes7. When asked about the #omanian public opinion and the negative conse)uences of the laws still waiting to pass and bring further good provisions for minorities they told me@ we know this is not tactful, but we can@t step back. 9 minority can never step back@. .i months later, in the summer of 1--3 !9"# politicians present at the 'luC 'ouncil of #epresentatives meeting were interviewed by my team and asked about the incident. Af fifteen interviewed only four laid some blame on the =ocal 'ouncil, 1& blamed the .wiss /oundation, 5 #emus Apris and : Fthe #omanian nationalist press@. Ten of these considered .outh Tyrol and two 'atalonia as political models for Transylvania, and chose as the main !9"# priority Fto find a suitable territorial autonomy for regions where "ungarians have a maCority7. Dt is difficult to speculate who has the maCority inside !9"#, nationalists or moderates. Hotes@ results in 1--3 on staying in government showed the moderate trend grew since 1--:. "owever, the 'ouncil of #epresentations looks divided and perhaps having a nationalist maCority, while the ;? clubs look like having a definite moderate maCority. This is easily e plained since ;? are the main beneficiary of consociatonalism, while local political leaders see no advantages in cooperating with ,ucharest and prefer to enhance their power. !espite some differences, the entire "ungarian political class in #omania wishes that #omania will give up seeing itself s a nation-state, and conse)uently remove this e pression from the 1--1 'onstitution. The !9"# leader of Tirgu ;ures, 9ttila .2ondi, e plained> The #omanians have to give up the phrase from the 'onstitution saying #omania is a nation-state. We@re more than % millions, the (ypsies are %-1 millions, what kind of nation-state has more than 1& B minoritiesG The 1--1 census recorded only 1.: million "ungarians and around 4&&.&&& #oma 6although other estimations suggest 1 &&&. &&& may be closer to truth7. !espite this fact, fantastic e aggerations like this one are necessary in order to make the point. The nationalist argument for self-government relies on the numbers when stating we cannot treat "ungarians as a minority, but as a nation.

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The #omanian political system is however a democratic one. 9llowing "ungarian representation in ?arliament and bringing them in a close alliance with #omanian parties was worth, since at all times, when !9"# was dominated by nationalists as since it was dominated by moderates the national problem remained in the framework of the law. Anly one in ten years did !9"# asked for civil disobedience, when re)uesting parents to boycott schools to protest against the 1--8 Education =aw. Dt was the opportunity for them to measure the ethnic mobili2ation. ?assive mobili2ation had been a success> 4&&&&& "ungarians signed for modifications to be made in the Education law. "owever, very few followed the appeal to civil disobedience so active mobili2ation failed. ?arents so no reason not to take their children to schools, in almost al cases "ungarian schools. :.'. (omanian political class and nationalism The e ercise of discovering the ideology of the #omanian political class is a difficult one. 9ligica and Donita, who tried to measure the economic vision of the 'hamber of !eputies, were the first to point to the ideological incoherence of the #omanian political class. The 1--: parliament, for instance, passed with a maCority of only one vote the support letter for E9TA in the <ossovo business, after endless bargains and fierce nationalistic speeches made by all parties* the same ?arliament had passed earlier, in 1--5, the law granting foreigners the right to buy land in #omania, which would have been unconceivable a year before. The same ?arliament was at least ambivalent, if not opposed, to the 'iorbea legislation meant to satisfy "ungarians@ demands on education and local government, and strong authoritarian party leadership of the government coalition was needed in order to pass the government@s drafts. The 1--%-1--: ?arliament, where post-'ommunists and nationalists formed a maCority, displayed no less parado ical behavior> it passed most of the European legislation concerning minorities, and the treaty with "ungary. The 1--&-1--% ?arliament, which had a strong post-'ommunist maCority also approved an article in the 'onstitution that made international legislation prevail over domestic one in human rights matters. Dn all these ?arliaments the rhetoric was far more nationalistic than the actual vote. Taking into account as F#omanian political class@ party leaders who are not necessarily ;?, local representatives, and top bureaucracy besides ordinary ;? we can distinguish )uite clearly a few well-differentiated nationalist trends. 1. The assimilationist nationalists This group of enophobic nationalists include the voiciest (heorghe /unar and 'orneliu Hadim Tudor, but also Doan (avra, Haleriu Tabara, ;ihai 0ngheanu, #adu Theodoru, ?etre Turlea. ,y Fassimilationism@ D mean the denial of any particular pluralistic claims, even if minimal@ 6.imon>1--&> p.%&-7. 9ccording to the ideology of this group "ungarians are or ought to be, in fact, F#omanian@. They see the political organi2ation and self-awareness of the "ungarian minority as a perpetual cause of instability and dissent inside the #omanian .tate. They consider ethnic parties should not be allowed to e ist and cultural difference should be reduced as not to have any political implications. This political view is

11%

well matched with a paranoid theory on the political history of #omanians, considered to be the eternal preCudiced and scapegoats of international conspiracies, which leads to the rehabilitation of various authoritarian leaders, ranging from right-wing ;arshall Don 9ntonescu to left-wing 'eausescu, both praised in the (reater #omania weekly, the main ideological manifesto of the nationalists. This vision, unfortunately, dominates from far in many circumstances the whole of the #omanian press, due to the persistence in the #omanian press of many Cournalists who served 'eausescu@s national-communist ideology campaigns or to former .ecuritate 6secret service7 officers who continue to have key positions in the #omanian press. ;embers of this group also had during the Hacaroiu government 61--%-1--:7 key positions in the !epartment of 'ulture. 9lso in those times some of this ideology could be found in the government@s own mouthpiece, FHocea #omaniei@. "owever the Fassimilationism@ of this group also characteri2ed more the rhetoric than the actual policy. ?oliticians of the group were never in really influential positions. /unar, who has been a mayor of 'luC since 1--% was the most influential and tried everything he could as a mayor- which was not a lot> he changed streets names from "ungarian to #omanian, threatened to evacuate !9"# from the buildings they held as tenants from the local government, "owever when his party was at government as an associate of ?!.# this policy did not become a government policy. <atherine Herdery FEational Ddeology under 'ommunism@ sums up the archeology of national-communist ideology in the e cellent book. 9na analysis of this type of rhetoric and its stereotypes can also be found in my previous book F#omanians after F3-@. %. .tatist Eationalists D find necessary to adapt the /rench word 'etatisme' 6the noun7, ' etatist' 6the adCective7 because an ade)uate English e)uivalent is missing. The term is meant to design a conception, more than an ideology in which the state is the supreme value. #omanian political class is 'etatiste'- post 'ommunist mainly, but not e clusively, since most politicians were sociali2ed in the 'ommunist regime. .tatist nationalists do not identify the state with the dominant nation necessarily, but they consider regions should be clearly subordinated by the center, and of course the center is the e pression of the dominant culture. Their view is that control by the state is the important thing, other notions such as accountability or effectiveness being ranked under control. They see the prefects appointed by the government as the real powerful men in the regions, more powerful than elected local governments, the budget as being decided with the national priorities above regional or local ones, the army and the police playing an important political role. .overeignty is seen as the main values in this ideology and subsidiarity a form of anarchy. .tatist nationalists are against any devolution of powers and believe that as e pression of the popular vote the central government is the only one supposed

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to have real power, the rest of the administration having only to implement its policies. Dn theory they accept a plural society* in practice they reCect institutional pluralism. ?lural societies are anyway, as "orowit2 mentioned Fpregnant with conflict@, as one culture dominates the others. The instability that characteri2es plural societies is based on a conflict opposing different value-systems. The only way to maintain the balance of such societies is the enhanced control of the state over the dissent regions or areas. The #omanian post 'ommunist .tate did e actly that, controlling "ungarian maCority regions by appointment of #omanian nationalist prefects and maintaining a strong presence of the army in the region. These strategies cannot reduce the conflict, but only amplify the hate towards the state, seen by "ungarians as a state belonging only to the dominant nation or culture. The favorite model of solving a national dispute )uoted by this group is the solving by /rance and (ermany of the 9lsace-=orraine (erman speaking population dispute. /ormer ?resident Don Dliescu used to )uote this e ample often. #omanian "ungarians reCected it. 1. 'onservative Eationalists or autochtonists This trend is to be found mostly among aged members of the so-called Fhistorical parties@, intellectuals and the (reek 'atholic clergy 6the Arthodo clergy is closer to the first trend described here7. This residual, nostalgic trend is based upon an identity problem. The value of being #omanian is one hand overvalued, and on the other a reason for an iety as the #omanian culture is crossing a difficult time in being recogni2ed as a European culture. To be a #omanian, a 'hristian, peasant-born becomes a value in this ideology. To defend the Feuropeanness@ of #omanian and to render Custice to east Europeans when compared to Western ones conservative nationalists overestimate the value of the #omanian culture as an European culture and display the belief that #omania could have been a sort of /rance under more favorable circumstances. Essayist and liberal senator 9le andru ?aleologu made a point, for instance, from the fact that .ocrates and 9ristotel were also F,alkan@. They can be tolerant towards "ungarians if only "ungarians openly dissuade the #omanian culture under-evaluation line of the "ungarian classic nationalism. Eationalist conservatives see themselves as mere Fpatriots@ and think of themselves they are representatives of civic nationalism. "owever, since all the battle for emancipation of "ungarians is based upon the fact that they do not admit the cultural superiority of #omanians and do not wish that citi2enship had any cultural connotation the conflict is finally unavoidable. The creed of conservative nationalism is the belief in some Fgood #omanianess@ to be showed to Europe and the world. Df "ungarians reCect it at home there is really little hope the rest of the world will accept it. :.4. 'rusaders and conformists Dn the first line of the national battle, today as ever, we find the 'hurch, or best, the 'hurches. Eothing could be more natural> of all institutions the 'hurch is bound to be

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sensitive to symbolic issues, prestige and traditions. The 'hurch perceives the national status war as a war for its own status, since the 'hurch identifies itself with the community. 'ompetition for restitution of real estate nationali2ed by the 'ommunist regime and for state funds is also an important part of the rivalry among churches. Eot only the "ungarian churches, but also "ungarian civil society protested against the preferential treatment granted by the #omanian .tate to the Arthodo 'hurch 6reported by ;ediafa Eew 9gency on ;arch %1L1---7. The "ungarian 'hurches started to recuperate their former schools and other buildings with great difficulties only in 1--3. The Arthodo 'hurch felt threatened by the coming out of illegality of the (reek'atholic 'hurch in 1--&, since most of the (reek-'atholic buildings have passed in the Arthodo hands when the 'ommunist regime forbid the 0niate denomination in 1-43. "istorically the Arthodo 'hurch had indeed the worst situation> it was the only denomination discriminated against in Transylvania. Arthodo priests had the same obligations towards the grof as serfs did. The Arthodo 'hurch is insecure enough to become e tremely self-assertive> in 1--3 Arthodo priests refused to evacuate churches and restore them to (reek-'atholics. Dt also likes to point at itself as the only F#omanian@ church. The (reek-'atholics often have to face rumors that they are F'atholics@, therefore @"ungarian@. FThis is such a shame@, a 'luC prelate confessed to me, @when we were the ones to fight "ungarians even more than the Arthodo did@. Therefore the 0niate 'hurch, who tries to recuperate from the Arthodo not only the churches, but the tenths of thousands believers who turned Arthodo meanwhile- is almost compelled to accentuate its difference from the "ungarian churches and "ungarians. 'ases of direct political involvement of the 'hurch are many. The most outstanding e ample is ,ishop Tokes himself, who often uses the 'hurch infrastructure to combine religious with political events. 'laude <arnouh also reported in F!ilema@ the presence of bishops of "ungarian churches at revisionist rallies in ,udapest. 9fter the e pulsion of the 0niate nuns from Adorheiu .ecuiesc, the "ungarian churches asked the 0niates to meet for mediation. The statement was signed '"istorical 'hurches of Transylvania@, an irritating fact in itself for the #omanian churches. The 0niate bishop refused, saying that the Custice is called to resolve the conflict of the orphanage in Adorheiu .ecuiesc. "ungarian priests were e tremely active in the Fcivil disobedience campaign@ of 1--8. .ome of them volunteered their churches as places where hunger strikers could be observed and gathered signatures for the amendments to the Education law. The connection between the national mission and the "ungarian churches is so deep because, in the words of the 'atholic spokesperson from 'luC@ 'hristianism made us a nation. The "ungarian national hymn we sing in 'hurch says> '(od, preserve the "ungarian nation@. . 'hurch and nation are conflated in this vision so intimately they can@t be told apart. Ather trends, such as ?rotestant priests more involved in social than political work are also present, but are less influential. Dn its turn the Arthodo Transylvanian 'hurch is involved in prestige wars and tries to make its own symbols dominant. Dts most active presence is ;etropolyte ,artolomeu

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9nania of 'luC. 9nania is an outspoken partisan of 'hurch involvement in politics and lead in 1--3 a F.ilence ;arch@ against the Fabandon@ of the Arthodo 'hurch by the state 6an interpretation of the winning by (reek-'atholics of many restitution trials7 and was stopped only by Eational "eritage from building in the 'luC historical 0nirii .)uare a new Arthodo 'athedral to defy the e isting "ungarian one. 'entral Arthodo authorities also encouraged a campaign for the rehabilitation of churches in 'ovasna-"arghita, said to have decayed because of state negligence and disinterest from the part of "ungarian local authorities, Eot once did they mention in this campaign that the main cause for the decay of the 'hurches was the absence of communities- most of the 'hurches involved were built by the #omanian state after 1-13 in regions with little or not-at all #omanian population. 9nother ;etropolyte, !aniel, also complained the 'hristian !emocrat regime is doing less for the 'hurch than the ?ost-'ommunist one, and blackmailed the 'hurch of Transylvania, which allegedly supported 'hristian !emocrats will retreat its support. The priests are however not the only Fcrusaders@ of the region. Dntellectuals, doctors, Cournalists and writers Coin them mainly. The mob that attacked the orphanage of Adorheiu .ecuiesc was only following the lead given by the =ocal 'ouncil, whose meeting was broadcast live by a local television station> attackers were lead by local intellectuals. #omanian intellectuals are also present in Hatra #omaneasca, from ,abes ,olyai 0niversity ?rofessors to elementary schools teachers. ?easants from Hiisoara participate to FHatra@ as to a club, from conformist reasons mainly* intellectuals, however, are well aware FHatra@ is more than a club and is stuffed with retired 9rmy officers and former 'eausescu@s .ecuritate agents. Dntellectuals also bet on Fmulticulturalism@ instead of more practical Finter-culturalism@. ;ulticulturalism is understood by "ungarian intellectuals as complete separation of the two cultures, and by #omanian intellectuals as keeping the control in the cultural affairs of the "ungarians. ,oth groups discourage neutrality. Dn 1--:, when we toured the .2ekelys area, school inspectors complained of the pressures put upon them by nationalists. "ungarians have trouble for not being as radicals as !9"# wanted them to be* #omanians were pressured by FHatra@ to be harder on "ungarians. The pressure was especially hard on people who founded mi ed families and had to face daily conflicts of loyalty. .ometimes one can find neutrals in influential positions. Dt is ironical former 'ommunists are often more tolerant towards the national problem. The mayor of Hiisoara, for instance, was e tremely upset to find out about our research and blamed #omanians from the village for envying "ungarians and attributing a Fnational@ correlation to their social envy. The ?resident of the "ungarian Workers@ (roup, a former 'ommunist apparatchik, "ungarian this time, complained the good times of 'ommunist Faffirmative action@ are gone. F9t least they r4espected then the percent of "ungarian@. 9nd indeed 'ommunist affirmative action seems to have been effective. :.0. "erception of the elites role by the public ?articipants in our focus groups have unanimously pointed at Fpolitical leaders@ as the main responsible of the ethnic conflict. The elite was described by terms such as Fthe

11:

bosses@, the @press@ Fthe politicians@. An the other hand people acknowledge they are sensitive to provocations by press, mainly television, but insist they be for nothing in this conflict. This is the bosses business, politics that is* we ordinary people get along fine. 6"ungarian workers, 'luC7 Dt weren@t for politics we wouldn@t even know who@s #omanian, who@s "ungarian, as it was in 'eausescu@s times, we were all alike then. 6#omanian workers, 'luC7 $ou Cust can@t imagine how well we get along with people here O#omanianP. ?olitics doesn@t let us live peacefully. 6"ungarian peasants, ;iercurea EiraC7 The truth is all these groups tend to form national in-groups, but are politically passive. Df #omanian peasants from Dbanesti had embarked in buses to be brought to Tg. ;ures they wouldn@t have had this initiative. They set to this Courney blessed by the local priest and persuaded they were going to save Transylvania. "ungarian inhabitants from Adorheiu also heard from people they respected best that the presence of the nuns was part of a diabolic conspiracy meant to change the ethnic composition of the region. FDnstead of the orphans they planned to bring here #omanian prostitutes and criminals@ a "ungarian Cournalist in the public broadcasting told me in 1--5. Df fed with this type of information the locals could not fail to run Fsave@ their town. ,eyond active or passive mobili2ation when summoned by elites the two communities are )uite different when it comes to estimate the performance of political leaders. "ungarians consider as Fe tremists@ only #omanian politicians. The only "ungarian leader with some negative appreciation is =as2lo Tokes N%: B of "ungarians see him as Fe tremist@ in our poll, while other 13 B answer@ somehow e tremist@. #esults are consistent with the 0,, poll, %8 B agreeing that he amplifies tensions between #omanians and "ungarians. The relative maCority however denies that. D;9. polls of 1--8 and 1--: also showed tokes as having the highest rate of confidence lack- %- B, but the highest rate of confidence also, which placed him the second after ,ela ;arko as the most trusted "ungarian politician 6by the "ungarian community7. Dn my survey #omanians considered as Fe tremists@ leaders as =as2lo Tokes 6:1B7, ;arko ,ela 64&B7, /runda (yorgy and Tokay (yorgy 618B7, but also the #omanians (heorghe /unar 641B plain yes, 18 B somehow e tremist7 and Hadim Tudor 64% B yes, 18 B somehow7. 1& B consider as e tremist and somehow e tremists also (eorge ?ruteanu and Haleriu Tabara. With few e ceptions "ungarian attribute the conflict to #omanian e tremists. They also pick as Fe tremists@ #omanian politicians such as Don Dliescu, 9drian Eastase, ?etre #oman. #omanians blame both sides. ,oth groups consider Emil 'onstantinescu* the 1--: elected ?resident, as the political leader who does the most to appease the conflict.

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Transylvanian #omanians see things under a more bilateral angle than "ungarians do. "owever this obCectivity functions only in order to blame #omanians nationalists, and fails to make accepted "ungarian moderate politicians or !9"#, widely seen as an organi2ation that protects only "ungarians and even has an Factivity directed against #omanians' 6D;9., 1--:7. !iscontent with e tremist politicians showed often in group interviews, too. ?eople live intensely and tend to remake conflicts at the top. This discontent point to the idea that attributing the whole responsibility to leaders is not Cust. Df D see at TH that Tokes said something, or /unar said something, my "ungarian neighbor and D barely speak to each other the ne t day. 6"ungarian worker, 'luC7 9ppeals by e tremist politicians would fail to raise such an echo if groups would not be ultra sensitive in their turn. "owever groups are ready to feel preCudiced, although they do not admit so. !istance from e tremist nationalist policies is showed only at polls. We would never vote a /unar here. This means afterwards we@ll have to be at "ungarians@ throats daily and they at ours. 6#omanian peasants, =ive2i7. ?oliticians are also blamed for the Tg. ;ures conflict. Dt is because of them that people in the rest of #omania think we kill each other here in Transylvania. Well, we don@t. ,ut we don@t look very nicely at each other either 6#omanian workers, 'luC7.

2. I$ !'ERE an inter3et0ni1 CONF%IC! IN RO-ANIAG

D.1. "erception of the ethnic conflict ,oth political parties and ordinary citi2ens in #omania do not like to admit any ethnic conflict e ists. /oreigners, ranging from organi2ations like the ?E# mentioned to the 9merican embassy in ,ucharest point out usually that there is a serious amount of ethnic competition going on, but refrain themselves from )ualifying it as 'conflict'. Dn connection with a country neighboring $ugoslavia the use of this term risks being politically e plosive. Ardinary people show even more restraint> their first reaction in all the focus groups was similar to this line of a "ungarian peasant in 'ovasna > 'Dt's only the bosses, they make the trouble, the bosses and the television, we ordinary people get along fine'.

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,ut the 'bosses' are there and so is the media, always ready not only to show nationalist speeches, but to amplify all kinds of incidents, real or fictitious, bringing the national problem daily in the house of every #omanian or "ungarian and therefore prompting a further need of security. ?eople who discard easily the idea of an 'ethnic conflict' imagine a conflict is necessarily and always violent. Dn fact it is not> many ethnic conflicts, from Kuebec to ,elgium, from .outh Tyrol to .lovakia are not violent. ,ut they are nevertheless conflicts, that is, fights to attain obCectives and simultaneously to neutrali2e, affect or eliminate rivals 6"orowit2> 1-347. Ardinary people feel that you can have a conflict without violence> 58 B "ungarians and 48 B #omanians 6absolute and relative maCorities7 consider a conflict e ists between "ungarians and #omanians 60,, poll, 1--57. Why then in every group people were reluctant to admit itG ,ecause the logic of the group discussion was centered on one's community. To admit an ethnic conflict e ists would have been to accept it e ists in the close vicinity, therefore to assume some kind of personal involvement. 9sked for a global evaluation Transylvanians admit the conflict, asked for a personal one they reCect it and attribute the responsibility to elites. This is a national conflict, centered on national symbols at the scale of the two communities as whole, and not a daily communitarian conflict for small rewards or resources. /rom this point of view it is indeed an elite-engineered conflict. #omanians and "ungarians do not fight in .aturday night discos and pubs> instead they are reminded via media by their leaders that they belong to a group and should act as such. $ouths who should be the most susceptible to engage in daily aggressive conduct are in fact the most disinterested. Why do more "ungarians feel a conflict e ists than #omanians doG We can think of two complementary answers here. Ane answer is the minority status of "ungarians* being in minority "ungarians feel more easily threatened by nationalist and enophobic speeches constantly made in the #omanian ?arliament. The other is that "ungarians are dissatisfied with the status-)uo and want more rights than the #omanian state is willing to grant them so it is natural they feel more than #omanians a conflict e ists. #omanians being satisfied with the present situation they tend to react only at the e cessive publicity of nationalist statements by some !9"# leaders. /or the rest they consider there would be no problem at all if !9"# does not make one. Dt is clear, however, that the public debate around the problem feeds the problem. This is why people consider in polls that the relations between "ungarians and #omanians degraded after 1-3-, although the problems of the "ungarian community were greater before> but before it was clear 'eausescu was the cause and any public discussion of the matter was impossible. 9ccording to D;9. only half of the "ungarians, compared to a large maCority of #omanians share this view. This only strengthens the idea that #omanians were in fact ignorant of the problems of the "ungarians so they considered there was no

11-

problem at all. "owever, a maCority of both "ungarians and #omanians consider that improving the relationship between the two groups is am emergency 6D;9. poll> 1--:7. The relationship between the groups is only the top of the iceberg in the e)uation of the conflict. The relationship would be good if "ungarians cease to ask for more rights, #omanians believe. The relationship would be good only if #omanians grant the rights the "ungarians desire, "ungarians think. 9nd it is not easy for an observer to say who is right. Would bilinguism and self-government solve problems, or create othersG Would it bring together the two communities or would it only estrange them furtherG =et us review the sources of conflict before answering this )uestion.

D.$ The language battles !espite several discussions on the topic, #omania has not yet adopted a minorities' law. The life of the ethnic minorities and their entitlement to a public sphere of their own is regulated by the 1--1 'onstitution 6)uite liberal7, the =aw of ?ublic 9dministration, and the =aw on Education. The 'iorbea government coalition of which !9"# is a member proposed in 1--5 amendments to the public administration law 6Ardinance %%L1--57 and the Education =aw 6Ardinance 1:L1--57. 9mendments to the administration law legali2ed for the first time the use of minorities' language in the state administration, although its practice, especially in "ungarian dominated regions, was widespread. The law also specifically re)uired all mayors in regions where minorities make more than %& B of the population to display signs carrying denominations of towns or other important notices in the "ungarian language also. This e isted previously only in the .2ekelys region, where the "ungarian population makes up to -& B in certain places. The two laws can be considered to fulfill at last the spirit of the 1--1 'onstitution, which granted minorities full rights of representation and education in their language, under the abstract general provision that #omania is 'a unitary, national and indivisible state'. ,oth laws have had a strange fate since their promulgation as emergency ordinances. The government chose this way because ordinances start being active from the moment of their promulgation by the government > the ?arliament is entitled to reCect or approve them later, but it cannot discuss them article by article if an emergency procedure is re)uired. 9lthough the application of the ordinances in Transylvania met no opposition or unrest from the part of the #omanian population their fate in the ?arliament was rather different. ;?s insisted in discussing them by article and despite an agreement within the government coalition these laws brought the first maCor defections inside the coalition ranks and most notably inside its leading Eational ?easant 'hristian !emocratic ?arty 6?ETcd7. The party's club in the .enate, authoritatively led by a #omanian literary critic and host of a popular TH show on #omanian language, ;r. (eorge ?ruteanu sided with the opposition and started a crusade for the #omanian language. The most contested

1%&

article was the !epartment of Education proposal that history and geography should be taught in "ungarian in all-"ungarian schools. !espite the practical common sense of the provision - in "ungarian schools children simply do not know enough #omanian to be able to learn comple matters in this language - it was met with harsh opposition at the .enate. Trips were organi2ed by the leftist nationalist opposition to "arghita and 'ovasna counties in 1--5 in order to prove that "ungarian children have little or no knowledge of the #omanian language, which is often the case. The findings resulted from those trips were afterwards used as more arguments that the study of the official language should be enforced. The government proposed a compromise allowing the study of geography and history in "ungarian under the provision that children are compelled to learn geographic denominations in the stateLofficial language also. "owever the proposal did not pass as such, the .enate reversing again to the study of the two disciplines in #omanian. 9lso the proposal that special te tbooks be made for "ungarians allowing them to learn #omanian as a foreign language was downgraded from the secondary school level 6eight grades7 to the elementary school 6four grades only7, since senators considered ten-years old "ungarian children should be capable of addressing #omanian not as a foreign language anymore. The law is still to be discussed in the 'hamber of !eputies, and if a different version is adopted it will be mediated between the two 'hambers. The version adopted, however, allowed professional education in "ungarian, admitted that #omanian language education is not compulsory in a village with no #omanian inhabitants and created a framework with practically no e amination of the #omanian language, since all important e ams 6capacity, high-school graduation and university admission7 can be taken in the maternal language. "ungarians consider this version still inferior to the 'ommunist 'onstitutions of 1-43, 1-8% and 1-:8 which all provided mother tongue education at all levels, Cudiciary and administration in the language of minorities. This is perhaps the logic behind =a2slo Tokes' demand that the 1--1 'onstitution be revised and terms and paragraphs directed against minorities be eliminated 6?ress 9gency ;ediafa , /ebruary %% 1--57, since there are no such terms or paragraphs. "owever, the 1--1 'onstitution only makes the general statement >' The state acknowledges and protects the right of persons belonging to different nationalities to preserve, develop and e ercise their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.'69rticle : - The right for identity7. The %% Ardinance suffered a worse fate. !espite being adopted with relatively mild discussions, a provision concerning e ?rime ;inister Hictor 'iorbea -granting the right of enCoying simultaneously the position of ?rime ;inister and ;ayor- lead to the reCection of the Ardinance in the .enate. 9lso the 'ourt who ruled in its favor accepted a petition to the 'onstitutional 'ourt denying the Femergency@ character of this emergency ruling. The Ardinance was still applied in 1--3, although the government had turned it into an ordinary bill and submitted it again to the ?arliament. Dt is worth mentioning that the article allowing "ungarians to use their language in the public administration and compelling authorities to hire "ungarian-speaking personnel were passed encountering no serious difficulties. ,esides the chronic ineffectiveness of the #omanian ?arliament - which alone Custifies the approach of the government to make such provisions emergency rulings - the debate on education e posed the deep cleavage in the battle for bilinguism. #omanians are not

1%1

prepared to accept "ungarian as a second official language. "ungarians do not present their claim as such, being aware of this fact. ,ut, in fact, their attempt of having the papers of the schools, 'ourts and the administration written in "ungarian and the general idea that the learning of the #omanian language should be a right, not an obligation 6.2ilagy E. .andor > 1--3 > 1187 points to the real issues > making "ungarian an official second language. 'Dt is like one would put a provision asking citi2ens not to waste their money needlessly' claims .2ilagy .andor, who says that the phrasing of the Education =aw 'The study and learning of the #omanian language in school as a state official language is compulsory for all citi2ens regardless the nationality' - article 3>17 is insulting for the minorities. =obby has been going on concerning another provision of the Education law, that #omanian-language education should not be organi2ed if there are too few children to make a class. The government finally agreed with this and established #omanian children in a "ungarian environment should group from different villages to form a class, but the argument had been that they should accept to go to a "ungarian language class if a #omanian one was not at hand. Dn short, the fight is to make the two languages e)ual, that is, having "ungarian as a second official language. The language battles were the toughest of the past years. The diaboli2ation of the Education =aw 34L1--8 as an instrument of 'cultural genocide' for introducing a test of #omanian at the admission e ams in the 0niversity was however an e aggeration. Dt was a poor law, making steps back, which could only lead to revolt. The "ungarian political elite decided at the time to make it an e ample. ?eople were instigated to civil disobedience, white flags hanged above "ungarian schools and 4%& &&& signatures gathered to support !9"# amendments to the law. "owever, a referendum of the boycott of schools was dropped because !9"# had clear signals there would be no mass following on this issue. "ungarian leaders went so far as to ask "ungarians to go on hunger strike in order to obtain the amendments debated. 9lthough few registered as re)uired as strikers the protest form is no less radical. The protest also showed the deep alliance between "ungarian educators, politicians and 'hurch - the 'hurch lead the 'rusade against the education law recording people who decided to strike and encouraging people to take part in the protest. 9 group of youngsters marched on foot across Europe to protest in front of the 'ouncil of Europe at .trasbourg. The Education law was a mistake of the Hacaroiu government. ,ut the debate and the unrest surrounding it only worsened the daily, usual relations between "ungarians and #omanians. #omanians mention always with fear this e ceptional mobili2ation of the "ungarian community. The e aggeration also laid ground for the )uest for 'defending' and 'preserving' the #omanian language of ?ETcd .enator (eorge ?ruteanu already mentioned. When ?ruteanu was e pelled from the party in 9pril 1--3 at the re)uest of !9"# the public television, host of his grammar show, was invaded with protests and accusations it did not take his part more because being subordinated to the government, subse)uently to ?ETcd and their allies, the !9"#. The masterwork inspiring every "ungarian community, ?rofessor 's /erenc (lat2 of the "ungarian 9cademy policy proposal towards minorities '?rinciples for a 'ode of 'onduct' 6(lat2 *1--17 is clear on this point. ;inorities ought to have, in his view, full

1%%

language autonomy regardless their number in a community. This includes addressing in their mother-tongue the officials, Cudges, and the media, the costs of translation being supported by the state andLor local budget. When a minority makes more than 81 B the minority language should become the first language in the specific territorial unit the minority lives on, and the maCority language -state language- is to be treated as a minority language. (lat2 mentions in his proposal, however, that knowledge of the language and culture of the maCority is important, although not compulsory. The system conceived by (lat2 is e)uitable, although great costs are re)uired in order to protect minorities from learning the maCority language. Dn a richer country and with a stable political situation it could eventually be tried. Dn a country with a bankrupt state and nationalist parties always accusing minorities for their refusal to learn the official language, a government attempt to set up the (lat2 system will probably bring votes to nationalist parties only. 9 resolution of the "ungarians' demands via special laws has indeed a weak spot "ungarian usually point out. 9 nationalist government to revert these modifications or pass even more restrictive amendments can use the same way a liberal government modified the education =aw to serve its purpose. 9 minorities law would be harder to modify from fear of international scandal if not from other reasons. "ungarians do not agree within !9"# and do not agree with other minorities on the contents of such a law. The draft of the =aw concerning Eational ;inorities and 9utonomous 'ommunities proposed in 1--4 by the !9"# club in the 'hamber of !eputies is based upon the ?ersonal 9utonomy .tatute, claiming that> Eational minorities and autonomous communities as political subCects together with the #omanian nation constitute the state.69rticle %7 This paradigm change from a state made of individual citi2ens to a state made up by nations and communities stands little chance of being adopted. Dts main problem is that it practically forces the reorgani2ation of the #omanian unitary state into a federal state. #omania was, however, an unitary state during its whole e istence as a state. #egions have a weak identity and even the designation of a region capital would create controversy. /urthermore, despite well-grounded criti)ues directed against the ,ucharest bureaucracy in a state of this si2e devolution of powers to the regions might mean more bureaucracy and more corruption before anything else occurs. The current system enCoys legitimacy, and its fundamental challenging can only bring about controversy but not compromise. Kuestioning the regime 6republic or constitutional monarchy7 and the state structure 6unitary or federal7 is unpopular. Eo referendum is needed in order to find out what #omanians think about that. ?olls show clearly they endorse the current system and consider destabili2ing the endless discussion on its essential revising. This revising was debated without being even possible during ten years> a law on referendum is only now, in 1---, ready, and without it any modifications of the 'onstitution would have been impossible. "ow could !9"# refrain from proposing constitutional modifications, when the change of the paradigm 'nation state' from the #omanian 'onstitution is one of their main goalsG

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What was the point to push this claim instead of, more modestly, push for a referendum lawG Anly symbolic and prestige motives can serve as a Custification for this policy. 0nfortunately its side-effect was an escalation of nationalist rhetoric on both sides, and for little reason. "ad the 1--1 'onstitution a different phrasing ?!.# would have still allied itself with nationalist parties and !9"# would have acceded to government also via its alliance with #omanian centrists. ,ut unfortunately the energy invested in symbolic politics and national assertiveness seems to surpass by far the more applied policies, with immediate conse)uences on people's lives. D.' A war of political symbols The national topic dominated the political debate since 1--% till 1--:. The conclusion of a bilateral treaty with "ungary represented a maCor setback for nationalists, deprived in the electoral campaign of 1--: of their maCor asset. Dronically, among the conse)uences of the treaty the immediate one was the loss of power by the #omanian party, notably by ?resident Don Dliescu. "is party tried until the last day to impress voters with the old feararousing appeals. /or instance a map was published from .amuel "untington's article 'The clash of civili2ations' showing a line separating Transylvania- considered as belonging to 'entral Europe, from the 'Arthodo ' rest of #omania, with a note saying that if the centrist coalition wins the Western powers would divide #omania along the line. 1--5 was a year of dQtente- as the treaty had left weaponless the #omanian nationalists, the participation of !9"# to government did the same for the "ungarian nationalists. "owever, the inability of the government coalition to pass the two government ordinances in due time and form led to the reemergence of nationalist dissent within !9"#, 'hristian !emocrats and .ocial !emocrats. The position of !9"# moderate leaders became difficult as nationalists asked them to leave the government. !espite carrying the vote on this by the moderates the nationalists grew in influence and managed to have the minorities minister, Tokay (yorgy, sacked in early 1---. The main conflicting issue remains the claim of a part of !9"# to have #omanian "ungarians as a separate 'political subCect'. Dn this respect the ?ersonal 9utonomy .tatute was inspired by the "ungarian legislation, but it entirely disregarded the fact that "ungary practically has no minorities, so in the conte t of the "ungarian political system the minorities law has no practical importance. What can however be considered only minor legislation in "ungary would pose a serious challenge in the case of #omania, which accommodates the largest minority in 'entral Europe. 9ccording to this draft, the regulatory body of "ungarians in #omania would become the 'ouncil of #epresentatives, directly elected on a four years term. The 'ouncil would decide over budget subventions, propose Cudges, control "ungarian public media, organi2e and supervise the autonomous educational network of all-"ungarian schools, deal with "ungary and the #omanian officials, and oppose a veto on the decisions concerning "ungarians it disagrees with. Dt is not clear what would be the relationship of this body with the large number of ;?s directly elected in the national elections. The problem did not e ist in "ungary, where the 'onstitution, unlike the #omanian 1--1 'onstitution does not grant seats for each minority and minorities are not large enough to pass the electoral threshold. Echoes of this debate became more familiar since the granting of a

1%4

.cottish ?arliament. 9nalysts and conservative politicians opposed it on the grounds that .cottish ;? in the "ouse would have the right to vote in matters concerning England, while pure .cottish matters would be confined to the .cottish ?arliament, thus giving .cots a privilege over the English. The main political problem is however the claim of a part of "ungarians that this group constitutes a 'nation', not a 'minority', and must be accepted as a constitutive unit of the state in corpore. This claim is not entirely groundless. Dt is based on the fact that the first Transylvanian state was "ungarian, so it is a historical claim. 9lthough "ungarians have been in minority in Transylvania for over at least 1&& years, princes of "ungarian descent ran the state between 1:-15th centuries, and after the "absburgs 613:5-13137. Dt is on this basis that <iraly <aroly, in a public letter addressed to =as2lo Tokes in 1--3 asks !9"# to revive its claim to the self-government of the .2ekelys. 9lthough the .2ekelys region accommodates roughly half of the #omanian "ungarians it is the only region where their presence is more compact. The .2ekelys are anyway a highly isolated and parochial community. The train from ,rasov, the most important city in the region, makes seven hours to .f. (heorgheL'ovasna because of detours and needs two transfers 6the same distance by car is of only one hour7. #omanian governments keep complaining the region is isolated but do nothing to help it out. E(As organi2e summer camps, but these help little, being disconnected from the life of the population. Eobody is sober here after 5 p.m. There is nothing else to do but drink. 6worker, Tg. .ecuiesc7 !rinking is so much part of the local culture in this isolated villages or small towns off the .2ekelys that each of the focus groups had to end in a sot of on spot party. Dt was sometimes difficult to persuade participants to postpone drinking alcohol and try our 'okes instead until the end of the interview. .haring at least one drink with them became afterwards compulsory and we had trouble trying to protect at least our driver from the local brandy. ?oor communications and infrastructure links, different language and culture, and a terrible weather on top of it- the .2ekelys are the 'Eorth ?ole' of #omania, temperatures falling easily to -1&' only isolate further this region. This increases the perception of inhabitants they are different from the rest of #omanian and makes the rest of #omanians look upon them as different as well. Even within the "ungarian community an endless debate is going on between those who side with the 'scattered' versus the 'gathered' "ungarians. =ocal authorities after 1--: were almost entirely of "ungarian descent. ,oth the demands for a special status for the .2ekelys and the refusal to grant it are politically grounded. #omanian politicians oppose it from the following reasons> i. the general perception of #omanians is that "ungary and "ungarians were the traditional enemies opposing the unification of #omanian-inhabited regions. 9ny attempt to fragment the #omanian state, even through a mild federal formula is seen as an antistate attempt. .ince #omanian regions show little or no cultural difference, such an

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attempt would single out the "ungarians as being the only interested in 'dismantling' the unitary state. 9 more regional approach towards the administration of #omania would be the only one to make acceptable such an approach towards the .2ekelys. 9t the present time this is still )uite an unlikely approach. ii. a minority of #omanians inhabit the .2ekelys 6proportions vary between 1& B in ;iercurea 'iuc and under 1& B in Tg. .ecuiesc or Adorheiu7. Dn the event of a special status 2one on the model of .outh Tyrol this group would become a minority. 9ccording to the (lat2 proposal they would be then treated as such and granted the same rights "ungarian have. Ar, as we showed, the times of the "ungarian 9utonomous #egion bring about bad memories. #ather the consociative way of the 'iorbea-#adu Hasile governments that tries to accommodate "ungarians in the framework of the e isting system - appointing "ungarian prefects in the "ungarian dominated districts could work if "ungarian bureaucrats would consider themselves public servants, not only "ungarian public servants, as in the Adorheiu case. .ince we live in a post-modern world, however, communication across borders is common. The isolated from #omania .2ekelys are in fact connected and well connected with towns and villages from "ungary. The #omanian governments do not oppose it. Things go so far that the 'ity "all of Tg. .ecuiesc displays the "ungarian flag in the meeting hall, for instance. =ocal authorities e plained 'this is the flag of the "ungarian nation, not of the "ungarian state'. Dndeed besides the "ungarian flag they had the #omanian and the county flags. "owever the #omanian government fears that if this happens without any special status the special status would practically make the .2ekelys a '"ungary' inside #omania. The theme of the separation drive of "ungarians is a dear one for #omanian nationalist or post-'ommunist leaders. 9fter blaming !9"# for years for a policy of promoting a 'ghetto' for the "ungarian community former ?resident Don Dliescu launched in 1--3 the 'Transylvania ?roclamation' accusing !9"# of separatist plans 6Aradea, +une 1-7. The appeal of this type of discourse is less grounded in the rhetoric of ;r. Dliescu as in the e perience of Transylvanians. .mall-scale separatism such as the school separatism laid out a pattern of one ethnic group retreating in order to leave the space to the other not very different from the general pattern people fear would follow the special status granting. "ungarians claim with good right the school belonged to the "ungarian community and should be returned regardless the number of students today. #omanians claim "ungarians had so many schools because they were in control before 1-13, discriminating the #omanian maCority. The appeal to the past only makes more resentments surface. #omanian dislike the separation even in instances when the space is not an issue. #omanian students complain of the perfect segregation between #omanian and "ungarian students, and blaming it most on the graduates of pure "ungarian highschools. #omanians claim that if the 0niversity would split #omanians and "ungarians would not get together at all. "ungarian students admitted it is a risk but e plained the risk is not important considering the other advantages a pure "ungarian university would

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grant them. The /rench anthropologist 'laude <arnoouh who taught at ,abes ,olyai 0niversity is favoring its separation, saying that students are already perfectly segregated even in the present form. 6<arnoouh, 1--:7. The topic of a separate 0niversity also fuels conflict. Dt almost pushed !9"# out of the government coalition in the fall of 1--3. The attempt to solve it by making a "ungarian(erman university failed. (ermans refused to be used as cover saying they are happy with the current system, and the institutions involved in the evaluation of the proCect had been in fact opposed for a long time. 0nfortunately the debate was again centered on symbolic issues. !ata show proportions of "ungarians in key disciplines inferior to #omanians 6there are fewer "ungarian than #omanian lawyers, for instance7. ,ut the argument was not built on e)uality grounds, but again on the past. Dt mattered less the idea that such an university is necessary in order to solve the disadvantage "ungarians are at, but the idea it is the old "ungarian university finally recuperated. Dn 1-13, this pure "ungarian 0niversity had no #omanian students, although #omanians made the maCority of Transylvanian inhabitants. The #ector not only refused to swear allegiance to the new #omanian state, but declared no #omanian will ever learn there 6=ive2eanu > 1--57 The 0niversity was therefore nationali2ed by the #omanian state, while "ungary settled at .2eged across the border a ''luC 0niversity' which became a symbol of revisionism. When "orthyst troops occupied 'luC in 1-4& after the (erman arbitrage, the #omanian 0niversity, still bearing the same name, retreated at .ibiu. 'ommunists put the two universities together after 1-8:, and event seen as a drama by the "ungarian community> a vice-#ector committed suicide in protest. .ince 1--& due to a liberal #ector the 0niversity multiplied its languages 6including now a #omani language section7 and denominations 6it is the only 0niversity in #omania where a theology student can graduate from a #eformist, 0niate, Eastern Arthodo or #oman 'atholic section7. E(As and independent analysts favoring the restitution of a "ungarian university used mainly affirmative action arguments. !9"# ;? we interviewed were against setting it anywhere else but 'luC. .o the (erman-"ungarian ?etofi-.chiller, this sad compromise of the #adu Hasile government failed without regrets, since it satisfied nobody. The idea of splitting ,abes ,olyai also failed, because #omanian professors opposed it and #omanian students threatened with rallies. "ad ,abes ,olyai being split it would have been the end of this multicultural university, since "ungarians would have probably enrolled all in the new "ungarian one. These two topics are far from settled. The maCority of "ungarians want a separate university, although they do not endorse a special status region. Ane certitude emerges, however> if the issue is not addressed focusing on its practical side but on the symbolical side, if is seen as a flag-issue, in other words, then chances of a resolution look dim. ;ore advocacy and less appeal to mass mobili2ation would be a good start. Df mass mobili2ation remains the real target we shall continue to have a dramatic split in the public opinion. Aur survey showed Transylvanian #omanians against a separate "ungarian university 65%B7 and "ungarians in favor 634B7.

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/igure 14 "ungarians would perhaps accept easier the e isting system would the %% ordinance and the =aw of local budgets be finally passed by the ?arliament. #omania still needs badly the normal, ordinary decentrali2ation of a contemporary state. Eot to be mistaken, however, the 'autonomy' !9"# asks is not, as even many "ungarians in our groups seemed to think, ordinary decentrali2ation, but an attempt of modifying the e isting territorial administration. The most serious issue, however, lies in the future. The decision of the E0 to invite "ungary to Coin, while keeping #omania on the black list of visas could well turn into a nightmare. Df Coining the .chengen agreements "ungary will have to introduce a visa for #omanian citi2ens, including the 1.: million "ungarians the situation might get out of hand. .ince no "ungarian government - and especially not /ides2, a rightist party, would forbid access to "ungarians, the solution proposed might be what radicals from !9"# had been long asking for > the granting of double citi2enship for #omanian "ungarians. The "ungarian government is aware of this problem and advocates for a "ungarian integration simultaneous with a removal of #omania from the 'black' visa list. Apinions inside !9"# are split between the radicals' group, which long advocated the granting of double citi2enship to the 1.: million "ungarians in #omania, and the opinion of the moderates who oppose it.. The status wars make the strangest part of the conflict. They have the largest popular mobili2ation, at least from the "ungarian part, and they meet the more lasting resentment. #omanian newspapers on ;arch 18, 1--& when "ungarians for the first time were allowed to celebrate reminded that 4& &&& #omanians were killed on the occasion of the historical event celebrated. An the list of claims =a2slo Tokes makes the teaching of history ' of the "ungarian nation' 6;ediafa ?ress 9gency7 can be found, in a phrasing )uite different from the official one of !9"# that mildly asks for a 'history of minority groups'. The !9"# claim that the 'onstitution be modified in order to specify #omania is a multinational state shows that 'nation', in "ungarians view, means 'ethnic' and cannot under any circumstances have a civic meaning. This might be based on the "ungarian elite's belief that the #omanian state is identifying with the dominant ethnie without admitting so, but shows also the ideological conviction that generally speaking the state cannot fail to be an ethnic state so multinational states are the only democratic states. Ardinary #omanians had little participation to the status war. Dnstead, #omanian authorities such as ;ayor (heorghe /unar helped to escalate it. 9n outspoken assimilationist in his propagandistic speeches, but a pragmatic local governor, /unar changed street names from "ungarian to #omanian and built #omanian statues while on the other hand encouraging business regardless of nationality and contributing to the city's development. /unar's attempts have been mocked constantly in the #omanian press. ,ut his policy was doomed even without that, since he tries to fight a spontaneous mass behavior 648 B of "ungarians declare in the 0,, poll they participated to the ;arch 18 celebration in 1--1, a figure decreased to 1: B in 1--57 with a top-down state organi2ed national enthusiasm, Dn the same poll only a handful of #omanians declare they take part

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in ceremonies celebrating the #omanian national day, which is an official celebration. Dt is natural that the "ungarian minority shows a superior mobili2ation when it comes to national events, since "ungarians feel a superior need to assert themselves, living in another state. The #omanian authorities, both local and central, regard with enough suspicion this type of manifestations - mostly because leading "ungarian politicians from "ungary, such as (e2a +es2ensky and Hiktor Arban attend them. Even democrat ?resident Emil 'onstantinescu felt the need in 1--5 and 1--3 to endorse celebrations of the #omanian 1343 #evolution - in order to balance the large attention given to ;arch 18 by the "ungarian leaders, This type of escalation, however, does no good to the cohabitation and e plains why both #omanians and "ungarians answer in polls 6D;9.7 that cohabitation was better during 'eausescu, when manifestations of this kind were simply forbidden. 'ommunities cannot see on television e amples of mobili2ation from rival communities without this raising their an iety. Even if organi2ed with the best intentions, the ostensible display of national celebrations and anthems have something offensive for the other community, especially in a region where history is so mutually e clusive - when not really offensive. Dt is relevant that the "ungarian participation to the ;arch 18 events decreased significantly from 1--: to 1--5 and 1--3 60,, poll7, so the participation of !9"# to the government led to a decrease in national mobili2ation. The participation of #omanians in celebrations such as Tebea and ,laC has always been reduced. These celebrations are always state-organi2ed. While "ungarian nationalism is grass-rooted, even if lead by the elite, #omanian nationalism is mostly formal and centrali2ed. An !ecember 1 e cept for the big rally at 9lba Dulia attended by the ?resident and the ?atriarch there is no spontaneous manifestation from the part of the #omanians > rather, as a multiplication of 9lba Dulia, prefects, mayors and the 9rmy all over the country enlist themselves in the boring ritual of deposing flowers to some official monument. "ungarians in #omania consider themselves a 'nation'. 9ttempts made by 'eausescu to 'ethnificate' them, to use the e cellent term of T.<.Aomen 6Amen > 1--:7, that is, to deterritoriali2e them, failed. The "ungarian community in #omania considers itself a nation, has a homeland it has been inhabiting for centuries - Transylvania - a common language, culture, a myth of common descent, a strong nostalgia for the times when they were the dominant culture, and so on. 9ccording to Aomen they would )ualify as a nation, although according to 9nthony .mith 61-5- > 437 or 9nthony (iddens' definitions they would not 6(iddens 1-38 > 11:7 The only thing missing to "ungarians of #omania is their own state, which in various forms is what some leaders feel is missing and what they seek. The essence of the ethnic conflict between #omanians and "ungarians lies here > to the fact that people of "ungarian descent seek, lead authoritatively by their political elite, that the whole #omanian political system be reorgani2ed in order to accommodate them better, that #omania becomes if not a federal state at least something close so the 1.: million "ungarians enCoy full self-government, and the #omanians give up the claim #omania is a national state on the model of /rance or ,ritain. 4onclusions

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To sum up, can we say that a perceived conflict is real G 9fter all, besides this perception we have only elite-engineered issues. .ome specifications and distinctions will perhaps help us clear this issue> 1. Ds it right to confound the #omanian state with the #omanian people, since most of the struggle of !9"# is directed against the state G D think it is, from two reasons> i. #omanians, although not very involved or interested in the conflict, are nevertheless supportive towards the state policy when it comes to minorities > all the polls since 1--&, with the notable e ception of the Tg. ;ures conflict, when the population blamed the government for not intervening in time, showed clear support for the government's status )uo policy. 9ll these polls, notably the D;9. and '0#., but also in ours, the most recent one, showed that the #omanian people is endorsing the government even if slight changes of policy occur, in the same time considering the claims of the "ungarians e aggerated. ii. most of the struggle, due to the strong presence of !9"# in the ?arliament, is located in the two 'hambers, as, for instance, the battle around the 1: ordinance in the .enate. Ar, proportionally elected #omanian ;?s can be considered representative for the #omanian people %. Ds it right to consider the 'rivalry' aspect, despite the fact that most of the "ungarians claim policy pretends to be only a legitimate e ercise of rights, without impeding on the rights of the others G $es, it is, since most is not all. Df several "ungarian rights claimed are in fact rights that can be e ercised without affecting others' rights 6the right to have a 0niversity * the right to professional education in "ungarian* the local autonomy * the use of their language in local government7, others fall far beyond this category and are closer to a nationalist policy than to the )uest for e)ual opportunities. Dn this category fall the demand for separating schools into pure #omanian and pure "ungarian, eliminating the system of parallel classes in either one of the two languages functioning in the same school * reorgani2ing the entire #omanian administrative system in order to accommodate the .2ekelys area better, although this affects many #omanians living there * modifying symbolic constitutional wordings such as 'national state' and considering it directed against minorities * campaigning against the fact that #omanian is the official language, that its study must remain compulsory and can be checked when applying for certain positions in #omania without considering that a discrimination* creating political structures to prepare and govern the future autonomous region when its creation is not decided yet and it cannot be decided by unilateral decision only. 1. Ds the mobili2ation along ethnic lines present at all times and issues of conflict G $es, it is. The mobili2ation on the "ungarian side is 1&&B. The mobili2ation of the #omanians is weaker, but however consistent. 9s the case of Adorheiu shows, it is indeed evidence of mobili2ation along ethnic lines regardless the particular circumstances or the responsibilities that come with it. 4. !oes this elite-dirven conflict enCoy mass support G

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9gain the answer is> yes, it does, with some amendments. i. in most polls "ungarians and #omanians complain of the same social and economic issues* the ethnic issue is rarely mentioned spontaneously and most of the people have no initiative in this direction ii. most of the people are afraid of conflict and feel that the politicians go too far iii. however, when an issue is present, such as Adorheiu, people endorse their politicians and their positions and they would do the same in a referendum. 8. What are the chances of this conflict to become violent G 'hances of ethnic violence are scarce, but real. Df border regions and 'luC display more tolerance, in Tg. ;ures or the .2ekelys area violent conflict may yet occur. Triggers of violence are always the same > attempts of one side to occupy the territory of the other. .o it started at Tg. ;ures, when "ungarians pushed #omanians to retreat from a school which had been a pure "ungarian school before * at Adorheiu, where fear #omanians will 'invade' the town by means of the orphanage lead to the mobili2ation of the local community and the e pulsion of #omanian nuns. :. Ds the claim of !9"# that "ungarians in #omania are 'a distinct society' a reality, or merely a political program G Df so, what bearing does it have on the conflict G We think !9"# is wrong here, "ungarians in #omania are not a different society, although they are obviously a distinct culture. ;ost polls show a remarkable similarity between concerns, an ieties and values of #omanians and "ungarians inhabiting Transylvania. We could not find between the two groups a deep division. .ome communities in the .2ekelys area, it is true, are e tremely isolated, but this is why such isolation shouldn't be encouraged. Their isolation is not Cust one from the #omanian society, but, as the Adorheiu case proves, shows all the characteristics of parochialism. The #omanian-"ungarian conflict is a basic one, and satisfying one or the other of punctual demands may improve people's lives but it will not solve the conflict, as it did not in Kuebec after constitutional changes made /rench the first language of the province. The conflict is not a recent one, it has centuries of history, and has a maCor motive > two peoples are forced to share a state. Kuebec is indeed the closest model for Transylvania. Dn both cases, a past-oriented minority considering itself as 'state builder' and owner of an older, alternative culture felt as a second-rank participant in the state and engaged on a process of national revival and finally separatism 6 ,reton > 1--%7. Af course, "ungarian Transylvanians are not so outspoken on separatism> with the "ungarian state close at hand any such open policy would not be regarded favorably by the international community. The #omanian debate around "ungarians is centered on two basic ideas, each e cluding each other, each wrong > i. either that they want Transylvania to return to "ungary 6#omanian chauvinistic parties and Cournals, nationalist #omanians7, ii either that they seek 'normal, ordinary, human rights' 6#omanian and "ungarian intellectual Cournals7. Eone is true, although each would simplify somehow the matter. The matter is not simple at all, it involves two countries, a strong ethnic party with a national proCect to

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accomplish, several post-'ommunist groupings with roots in the secret services and the 'ommunist propaganda in bad need of survival tactics - and what can be better than turning nationalistic G - and at least : million inhabitants of Transylvania. ;inimi2ing the issue is only enhancing chances of deterioration in the future.

4. -ACRO &O%I!ICA% -ODE%$5 IN $EARC' OF A 6IA7%E AND E*+I!A7%E $O%+!ION The e periment of governing with the "ungarian alliance since 1--: is a remarkable one. The presence of "ungarians in the #omanian government is not limited to the seats !9"# had in the 'iorbea and Hasile governments starting with 1--:. 9 permanent board made of parties heads or their deputies in fact settled important matters. What this ?olitical 'ouncil decides 6the name changed repeatedly, but the attributions stayed the same7 is what the government turns into policy. "owever, this e periment in itself cannot be considered a 'model' of solving the minorities problem. Even if one is inclined to see it as a success one cannot fail to see its frailty. ,y 1--- polls already showed serious drops of support for the coalition, mainly because of its inability of solving economic problems. Df centrists lose elections, which is a plausible development and cannot fail to happen sometime in the future, the whole e periment is endangered. Dt is highly unlikely post-'ommunists will govern with !9"#> for ten years they were allies of nationalists and displayed strong nationalistic attitudes themselves. ,oth !9"# radicals and the #omanian nationalists wish the e periment to fail, and unfortunately even the initiators of the e periment have little idea what to do ne t. D believe that the temporary participation to the government did not succeed in solving the conflict-and it could not have even if things had worked out more smoothly. This conflict depends on the political and economic situation and will evolve with it. .ince #omania has the worse economical situation of east Europe many hardships are yet in store so populist nationalist rhetoric may have a future still. This is why a more permanent solution of the "ungarian problem is desirable. The regime settled in 1--: provided a dQtente between #omanians and "ungarians, despite conflicting issues. ;oderates still hold the leadership of !9"# although they shall lose it if #omanian nationalists return to power. Dt is perhaps the last time that such a solution can be sought. 9 nationalist government will immediately eliminate the "ungarian prefects and all administrative forms of consociatonalism and may start legal procedures to revise the laws of Education and =ocal government as well. This is why is so important to move before that, to negotiate an agreement between #omanians and "ungarians, a roundtable as !9"# asked for in its 1--- meetings, and have the blessing of the international organi2ations for it as well. "ungarian radicals need #omanian radicals, and vice versa. This would be the best way of eliminating both.

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"owever such a proposal does not e ist. !9"# asks for a round table, while being accused by leaders of other minorities of speaking on behalf of all the minorities when making anti-constitutional statements 6reported by ;ediafa on ;ay 15,1---7. To design a model acceptable for all the parts one has to establish a few minimal obCectives to be solved. We have to assume, however, that no proposal can entirely satisfy everybody. Dn my view the obCectives of a permanent solution should be the following> 1. to secure the right of the "ungarian minority to a shared public sphere of its own, that meaning 'a communal domain that is constructed not only as an arena of cooperation for the purpose of securing one's interests but also as a space where one's communal identity finds e pression' 6Tamir> 1--1> 547. This space already e ists to a large e tent> all that is needed are supplementary legal guarantees. %. to eliminate by a policy of affirmative action the disadvantages "ungarians still e perience 6proportion of "ungarian students compared to #omanians* proportion of "ungarian policemen, and so on7 This was started in 1--5, when the 0niversity of 'luC 6babes-,olyai7 reserved seats for "ungarians applying for the =aw .chool> this allowed them to be accepted with a much lower threshold than the #omanians. 1. 'reating incentives for the "ungarian elite to choose moderate instead of radical policies 4. The same for the #omanian Transylvanian elite 8. Eliminating unnecessary competition between the two national groups as groups wherever this can be avoided :. ?reventing a deepening of the division between the two national groups and keeping a decent level of communication and interactivity between them in order to create at least occasionally a 'in-group' of both #omanians and "ungarians, instead of having them permanently e clude each other. 5. Eliminating the "ungarian theme from the #omanian internal political debate 3. 9dCusting the political system in order to satisfy the listed re)uirements with reasonable costs and at a pace that would not endanger the stability of the political system 6so often threatened both by ethno-regionalism and by the #omanian nationalist reaction7. Everybody agrees there are no universal models for the solving of ethnic conflicts. There are no permanent solutions, either> constitutional modifications in 'anada and selfgovernment for the (ermans of .outh Tyrol did not prevent them from seeking separation. Ddeal linguistic e)uality is also a passing dream> the /rench became the first language of Kuebec, and the 'atalan is on its way to make the 'astilian a second language in 'atalonia. Dn the name of times when it was discriminated the regional language is pushing the national language or the language of the maCority in a second position. Ar, the language of the maCority is the main language of communication. Dn the

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case of Kuebec or 'atalonia it is a language of universal circulation, much more useful than the regional language. Dn the case of #omania, its is the language %& millions speak, compared to Cust two. Even if Transylvanian #omanians should know some "ungarian the #omanian language cannot be replaced as language of the state. ?ure bilinguism is a delusion> the case of ,russels is relevant in this respect. Df people are given a choice people will stick to their own language. Ethno-regionalism is on the rise. Even former terrorist movements had found a way in the legitimate part of the political spectrum. ?olitical wings of terrorist movements, both in Dreland and the ,as)ue country have become associated with government parties. This shows mainstream parties consider they can no longer allow this trend to remain isolate and eventually turn against them. These developments occurred in the framework of institutional Europe> it is obvious separatist movements find here rather favorable grounds for their policies 6=ynch> 1--:* p.14-187. The 'liberation' of east European states from either the .oviet 0nion or $ugoslavia also provided further legitimacy to minority nationalism in Western Europe, as one nationalist leader puts it>

#ight across Europe, nations are asserting their right to self-determinationa fundamental principle enshrined in international law. The newlyliberated nations of Eastern and 'entral Europe- many of them smaller and all of them poorer than .cotland- are )ueuing up to Coin the European 'ommunity, alongside many of the former E/T9 countries. Eone of them would settle for some sort of second-rate regional status* all insist on becoming independent member-states in their own right. Ale 3almond M"5 leader of the 3cottish &ational "arty5 1==$ ?;uoted by Aynch*1==:*1@ !espite the varying circumstances three models are worth discussing in an European conte t and in the conte t of Transylvania as we described it. Those are multiethnic democracy 6other authors name it )uite properly hegemonic control7, federalism and consociatonalism. 1. T"E 9#(0;EET /A# "E(E;AED' 'AET#A= "egemonic control or multiethnic democracy is the most common way of solving an ethnic conflict. The term 'hegemonic control@ belongs to =ustick 6)uoted by A'=eary and ;c(arry> 1--1> %17 and it coins regimes which either by coercion or cooperation manages successfully to control an ethnic challenge to the political order. 'ombining some degree of domination with some degree of inclusion of the elites seems to be a successful formula. Dts undemocratic variant is the regime described by =in2 as the Fmultiethnic democracy without consensus@, a regime which makes use of force in order to contain an ethnic minority that challenges the 'onstitution. 'ommon e amples are Eorthern Dreland and Dsrael 6=in2> 1-557.

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This was also the form the 'ommunist states used in the last period, after the great repression had passed. This is true even for the 'eausescu regime> 'eausescu did not imprison nationalist leaders and until the attempt to compel ?astor Tokes =a2slo to change his parish only moderate coercion was necessary in order to keep #omanian "ungarians under control. "ungarian leaders remained in the running bodies of the 'ommunist ?arty until the end, with the notable e ception of <iraly <aroly. The inheritance of this model showed its limits after 1--&. The #omanian post'ommunist leaders tried to respect the framework of procedural democracy* in the absence of other repressive policies the nationalist and anti-minority discourse e panded until it became the official discourse 6since 1--% to 1--:7. The state, represented at first by the party-state transitional Eational .alvation front, then by the ?arty for .ocial !emocracy 6Don Dliescu's party7 was characteri2ed by the hypertrophy of a nationalist discourse, centered on the theme of state protection in front of separatist "ungarian movement. This was however mainly a reaction to the impossibility of making further use of the hegemonic control the way the 'ommunist regime had done. 'hances of the dark side of this model have not vanished. 9 return to the government of the coalition that ruled in 1--1-1--: 6socialists with nationalists7 would throw #omania further out from Europe. ,ut one must consider the admiration many #omanian ;? e pressed for the courage of .erbs to confront the whole world, e pressed during the <osovo crisis on 1---. 9s former ?resident Don Dliescu, perfectly positioned to win ne t elections as well, put it during a gathering of peasants in ,aragan in ;ay 1---, discussing the $ugoslav situation> '9 man beats his wife and here comes one who calls himself a friend of democracy and knocks him down 6reported by 9drian 0rsu in 9devarul7. %. T"E 9#(0;EET /A# /E!E#9=D.; .ince 1--1 - although unofficial demands are older - the "ungarian elite has constantly asked for a 'special status'. This 'special status' can be understood in various ways, although we think the (lat2 document gives us a fair and more detailed account on how this should be interpreted. ,eing a general document, made to fit every state, the (lat2 documents doesn't say what modifications specific political systems should undergo in order to adCust to the system it proposes. This is left for each state to evaluate. 9s we see it, the (lat2 proposal, and the '2apo Dos2ef proposal for a minorities' law 6making the "ungarian community a 'political subCect'7 can be accommodated only in a cantonalfederal type of political system 6.wit2erland was often pointed to us in discussions with "ungarian politicians as a suitable model7. The key word of this system is subsidiarity, the 'atholic word for devolution of powers to the lowest, most appropriate level in the political hierarchy. Edmund ,urke was the first to e plain subsidiarity that is not e)ual to the modern decentrali2ation of a liberal state, but it is closer to the ;iddle 9ge philosophy and organi2ation. ;r. ;arko ,ela pointed again and again the model of mediaeval autonomy was useful in constructing !9"#'s own model of autonomy. The difference between cantonisation and ordinary decentrali2ation or devolution is its organi2ation 'on an ethno-territorial basis.6...7 'antonisation must be distinguished from

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mere administrative decentrali2ation, common in unitary states > it is built upon the recognition of ethnic difference and allows for asymmetrical relations between different cantons and the central government' 6A'=eary J ;c (eary > 1--1*117. 'antonali2ation and its larger version, federali2ation presuppose the e istence of geographically clustered communities. Where communities are well segregated indeed the e perience often shows 'good fences make good neighbors'. ?roblems usually arise when communities which are not well ethnically segregated try to become so in order to seek some political design, as was the case of former $ugoslavia. 'The reason why federalism proved totally insufficient as a conflict-regulating device in $ugoslavia was because the insufficient geographical clustering of the relevant ethnic communities. 6A'=eary J ;c(eary > 1--1>117. The model of .wit2erland is )uoted ignoring a few essential facts. 9mong 'preCudices or errors contained in the '.wiss model' one can count> 1. implying this model was attained peacefully, a historical error* many wars were needed to create .wit2erland as we know it today %. confusing the stability and endurance of a state formula reached organically compared to an artificial model imposed on a society, as we've often seen it happen in the Third World 1. confusing between a regional-ethnic identity and nationalism. Eationalism tends to stop only when he nation-state is attained. Ar, in the .wiss case there are many linguistic and ethnic identities, buy none of a national intensity. 9t the opposite e treme of the .wiss model federalists in #omania constantly bring up the '(agau2ia' model. (agau2ia is a small region in .outhern ;oldova6118.&&& inhabitants7. Dts inhabitants have a remote different ethnic origin 6presumably Turkish7, but #ussian is their native language. !ue to separatist tactics supported by the 14th .oviet -than #ussian - 9rmy between 1--1 and 1--1 both (agau2ia and the !niestr #epublic broke free from ;oldova and were finally granted a 'special status' embodied in the new ;oldovan 'onstitution. The mention of these models in support of "ungarians' claims for autonomy is at least surprising. The legal framework for (agau2ia and The !niestr #epublic - whose main fear what the possible union of ;oldova with #omania 6a highly unlikely possibility7 was not meant to accommodate the national identities of the two regions, since they have none, but only to secure post-.oviet elites that ;oldova's freedom to choose the reunification path with #omania is reduced. The two regions were visited by several Western Cournalists, especially during (eneral =ebed' stage as 'ommander of the /ourth 9rmy and was rightly depicted as the last bation of hard-line .oviet 0nionists, eventually combined with most wanted criminals who became leaders of paramilitary troops in this wonderful refuge place 6see for instance coverage of the !niestr war by /rench Cournals =e ;onde, =e ?oint and the Dnternational "erald Tribune7. D interviewed president Topal

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of (agau2ia personally in 1--1 * the ?resident spoke no (agau2 language, admitted he was a former apparatchik, complained Turkey is not answering properly to the (agau2 friendly tentatives and strongly recommended to the group of Western Cournalists to visit the Eational (agau2 ;useum, 6which we did7. The museum contained a rather limited stock of .oviet-times displays such as medals and awards for surpassing the production plan, but nothing more > it was the typical .oviet-type identity revival attempts made only in order to control the real attempts for national emancipation of nations, which "elene 'arrere d'Encausse so masterfully described in her books 6 7. .ince then efforts have been made to reinvent the (agau2 language, but the population remains closer to the name it is usually given in press agencies reports > #ussophone. Dn any event, theoretically and practically, comparing a post-.oviet environment with the rest of Europe is a mistake. Eowhere else in Europe 6until <osovo7 have entire populations been displaced, deported, eradicated, cleansed and denationali2ed in the recent past- to amount finally to an artificial, unstable ethnic composure- as in .talin's .oviet 0nion. !uring his most oppressive time 'eausescu went so far as to compel 0niversity graduates to take Cobs outside their native areas, an e periment which failed, since refusal did not lead to prison, but only to the loss of the Cob. 'omparing post-'eausescu #omania with post-.oviet ;oldova is therefore groundless, while comparing #omania with any other European country where national and ethnic groups evolved naturally, and national feelings are genuine can be useful. The models of (agau2ia and the !niestr are even less worth mentioning because they represent attempts of institutionali2ing by undemocratic means undemocratic regional units - leaving a helpless population at a mercy of the local oligarchy, living on arms' and drugs' deals. Dn the case of this artifact to speak of 'the practical application of subsidiarity' as #enate Weber does 6Weber >1--57 makes little sense. .ubsidiarity, a concept understandable in (ermany due to the tradition and organi2ation which allowed the survival of 'lander' cannot apply to .outhern ;oldova, a strong #ussified region with no political tradition of the local 6non-#ussian, but #ussian speaking population7 and where even the term of traditionalism makes no sense. 9bstract models help little in the solving of an ethnic conflict > rather, it is the ground conditions that impose the solutions. /urthermore, self-determination is Custifiable if seen as democratic collective rights seeking. ,ut often, as Tamir points out, it 'is not a search for ;illian liberties and civil liberties, but for status' and this is done '9t the cost of relin)uishing their civil rights and liberties' 6Tamir 1--1> 517. This is obviously the case of the two regions mentioned. The most important argument for federalism cannot be found in (agau2ia. #ather it is made by the commitment of an important part of the "ungarian elite to it, as the case of Adorheiu showed. =ocal authorities behaved in their dispute with ;r. #emus Apris as if the .2ekelys area is autonomous already> his arbitration was seen and is seen by the "ungarian elite as the gravest offense. The local tradition is in favor of cantonalism> a town like Tg. .ecuiesc again displays the ;iddle 9ge flags of the 'Three 'hairs' together with the "ungarian and the #omanian flags. =arger towns with larger #omanians minorities do not dare to do so openly but the spirit is there. The second important argument, connected closely to the first, is the presence of an ethnic regional party. 9fter the disappearance of the 'ommunist party the new political

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system was unable to create trans-ethnic parties. Ane reason is the prompt, almost immediate founding of !9"#, but also the lack of interest of the #omanian parties for this problem. Dnterest in shown either in the worst possible way by nationalist parties, or in electoral years as #omanian parties remember they need the votes of "ungarians for their presidential candidate. "ungarians voted in fact at each presidential elections 61--&, 1--%,1--:7 with the #omanian challengers to Dliescu agreed by !9"#. #umors about a split of !9"# on doctrinal or ideological lines have been going on for years, but despite the e istence of ideological clubs inside the 9lliance it is highly unlikely one day the =iberal 'lub, for instance, would Coin the #omanian =iberal ?arty. The structures !9"# created in 1--8 -like the 'ouncil of #epresentatives- were also seen at the time with good reason as anticipating a federal organisation. These structures have functioned within the limited possibilities of the e isting legal and administrative framework. The 'ouncil gained some e perience to be able to function as a regional ?arliament, for instance. ,ut of what regionG The main advantage of federalism as "ungarians see it is the elimination at least for a restricted area of the continuous bargain with #omanian authorities over various issues. .trict delimitation of powers between central and regional government is the main incentive of federalism, while the structure of the #omanian unitary state allows even the most liberal government a strong hand in local affairs, or at least the need for the local government to communicate to the center if not seek approval for many regional matters. Where the local authorities seemed to have abused their powers the government, in the person of ;r. Apris stepped in immediately. The argument against federalism is also strong enough. ;ost important, the geographical segregation is not complete. Even if homogenous "ungarians pockets can be found in the .2ekelys area, other #omanian pockets, mi ed villages and towns, and the fact that half of the "ungarians live in #omanian maCority areas outside the .2ekelys' complicate and attempt to cantonali2ation. The 'special status' area would create two categories of "ungarians and two categories of #omanians - the ones inside and outside the special status area. Would democracy and cohabitation profit from this or rather would new problems arise G The most outspoken promoter of a federalist solution, Will <ymlicka, cannot fail to notice that while federalism offers ethno-cultural minorities the best conditions possible, it stops short from providing the bonds of solidarity necessary to keep together even a federal state> ethnic-based federations seem doomed to separation sooner or later.6<ymlicka> 1--37 The #omanians, not only the #omanian government, do not agree to this solution. Even the liberal 'iorbea government had reserves. ,esides obvious reasons, the most likely outcome of such an attempt would be a strong nationalist mobili2ation on the #omanian side, to the benefit of #omanian nationalist parties. ?ublic opinion is against federalism both from fear of irredentism - the interwar revisionist times are not so far - and also from conservatism. #eshaping the #omanian entire administrative organi2ation in this radical form never e perienced before, in order to find a solution to provide the .2ekelys area with some form of territorial autonomy would be unpopular, regardless the guarantees the #omanian minority in the area might receive. Even now the #omanian press runs strong

113

campaigns accusing the government it does nothing to prevent the denationali2ation of #omanians in the area. .ome "ungarian leaders in favor of decentrali2ation hope that the ne t years will bring an increase in the regional identity feelings of #omanians and somehow and agreement can be reached among Transylvanians to seek a special status together. !espite minor incidents such as the attempt of the mayor of Dasi to create a ';oldovans ?arty' 6with no following7 this development is highly unlikely. the #omanian situation rather verifies the theory of Walker 'onnor. 'onnor was amending the !eutsch model by pointing out that while' increased sectional contacts tend to dissipate sectional differences among diverse ethno-national conscious groups appear more apt to cement and reinforce the divisive sense of uni)ueness'6'onnor >1--4* 1517. Dn this respect the assimilationist attempts of the 'ommunist regime directed against "ungarians failed, while the policy of the #omanian monarchy and then the 'ommunist #epublic to create a homogenous #omanian population succeeded. Where e posure to communications revealed a minor difference, as among #omanian regions, the difference was gradually eliminated. Where it made people 6"ungarians and #omanians7 aware of an important difference 6as in the case of a common 0niversity7 the e posure to the others only enforced the separate group identity. 1. T"E 9#(0;EET /A# 'AE.A'D9TAE9=D.; 'onsociatonalism arose at first an e traordinary enthusiasm, only to be then submitted to hard trials. Dn its complete form as =iCphart described it is rather a complicated mechanism, which can accompany or not the federal organi2ation of the state. Dn any event, consociatonalism does not e)ual federalism as some authors think, pointing to the case of ,elgium. ,elgium is rather a model of conflicting federalism -at least constitutionally, but also politically. We side with ;c (eary and A'=eary that consociatonalism is rather an alternative to federalism, also it can be a complement sometimes as well. The essence of consociatonalism is power sharing, and it was tried by !utch and =ebanese politicians mainly, but also e perimented in ;alaysia, /iCi and Eorthern Dreland. 0nder consociative rule as =iCphart described it 6=iCphart> 1-557 minorities enCoy community autonomy in matters that concern them and have the right to a constitutional veto. The country is governed by a grand coalition featuring every sector of the divided society, and the same rule applies to employment in the public sector. 9s it was often pointed consociatonalism can function only in proportional systems, being difficult if not impossible to accommodate with Westminster-type democracies. What are the arguments is favor of consociatonalism in #omania G The strongest one is that it is already under way. 'onsciously or not, completely or not, this was the way tried by the winners of the Eovember 1--: elections when inviting !9"# to the government coalition and dividing public positions proportionally in order to accommodate them. The fact that this was done rather on a party basis than on an ethnic basis - since !9"# was not the only party invited to participate, but the .ocial !emocrats also, is another proof of consociatonal rule, since the most important cleavage of the #omanian society after 1--& was between the post-communist left and the anti-'ommunist right.

11-

'onsociatonalism rises serious obCections as well. The main one is the lack of knowledge surrounding it. While both #omanians and "ungarians have some understanding of federalism - "ungarians to praise it, #omanians to fear it - #omanian politicians have never debated the advantages and disadvantages of consociatonalism. The politicians of the centrist coalition are no longer committed assimilationists as the post-'ommunists, but they are little aware of what they are. Eo party ever organi2ed a serious debate on the accommodation of the "ungarian minority in #omania. ?arty programs address very superficially the problem, in a few lines usually encouraging the conservation of the present situation. 'onsociatonalism re)uires the absence of a will to assimilate the minority and a commitment of politicians to make it work 6;c (arry and A'=eary >1--1 > 147. 9dmitting the first point is met now to an e tent still unprecedented in #omania, the second raises doubts. #omanian politicians are only vaguely committed to governing with "ungarians -the !emocratic 'onvention, their old allies, the most, and the !emocrat ?arty, as their votes in the ?arliament show, the least. "ungarian politicians, in their turn, are divided. ;ost of them favor the cantonali2ation-federali2ation solution, although they reali2e it is not a realistic one. "ungarians intellectuals also push for more radical approaches, as ,ela ;arko reproached them in his +une %5, 1--3 speech at the 'ouncil of #epresentatives meeting at 'luC. The commitment for consociatonalism is thus reduced only to "ungarian politicians involved directly with the government, the division line cutting across parliamentary clubs as well, as ;r. ;arko admitted in the same speech 6)uoted by #ompres Eews 9gency7. "owever, if cultural autonomy could be achieved and, some form of veto for the "ungarian community institutionali2ed, consociatonalism would become more popular. Dts main advantage remains its feasibility, while 'antonisation is difficult and risky. !9"# itself might be the main obstacle in front of consociatonalism. ;r. ;arko was right to say that !9"# is the 'the main achievement' of the "ungarian community after 1--&, due to its unity, so unlike the other "ungarian communities in the 'arpathians, bitterly divided over power. "owever, what was an advantage during the post-communist regime might turn into a disadvantage in the long term. Ethnic parties, as "orowit2 showed, start by mirroring ethnic conflict, but end by giving it more depth it 6"orowit2 > 1-347. The presence of a strong !9"# as a permanent partner, a third partner in what should be a state to state relationship between #omania and "ungary, discourages any attempt at any organi2ations cutting across the ethnic line. /ew of these are now left. .ince the main goal is not inter ethnic communication, but the preservation of the "ungarian cultural identity common cultural organi2ations are not encouraged. Dt is obvious this strong policy of cultivating the national identity only increases the division between the two national groups. Eeither !9"#, nor the #omanian state have made from ethnic cross-cutting organi2ations and inter-culturalism a policy. !9"# openly avoids this, while the #omanian state confuses it with an organi2ation dominated some way or another by #omanians. Dt may seem as )uite a long shot, still cohabitation based on power sharing and civic nationalism looks like the only solution possible. Dn this formula a new form of communication between the two groups needs to be designed. Dn contemporary Europe we should conceive communication as something more than Cust acknowledgment of

14&

some innate difference. The policy of escalating national celebrations and displaying national anthems, encouraged by politicians of both groups, should be given up and left to e tremist nationalists only. .eparation of borders only mirrors the psychological separation> preventing the latter is essential in order to keep the peace between the two national groups. 9 Coint effort to create that 'larger circle' which avoids clashes of 'loyalties of identical scope' 69llport >1-84 > 417 is not only necessary, but has a historical opportunity to be fulfilled in the present political conditions. 'onsociatonalism has the advantage of not referring to territory in any way, henceforth it can stand easier attacks from #omanian nationalists. ,ut in order to succeed it needs the full commitment of the "ungarian elite, and of the #omanian centrist parties. Eeither of these e ists today. A final word Will Transylvania find finally the peace and become only the legendary cradle of vampire stories, or will it turn into another <osovoG The answer to this is difficult. =ooking at Transylvania as it is now, a peaceful region where inhabitants share both rewards and hardships it would be tempting to say Transylvania will never again see another nightmare as the ones in its past. "owever not much is needed to make this peace vanish. Dncreasing economic and social hardship, nationalistic elites, and a selfgovernment program of the "ungarian minority are not elements of a good prognosis. Eationalism is there in Transylvania. Dt e ists on the "ungarian side, in the desire to circumscribe a territory where "ungarians should not have to share power with #omanians. Dt e ists on the #omanian side, in the attempts to hinder the e pression of national identity of "ungarians and deny them the right to use their maternal language in administration or any other part of the public sphere. ,oth can be controlled in normal times, both can escape control if some international development creates e ceptional situations, in which anything becomes possible. The commitment of the entire #omanian political class to European and E9TA integration is a positive element>, but the entire #omanian political class, including democrats, would unite against a "ungarian attempt to proclaim self-government unilaterally of some part of the Transylvanian territoryS. Transylvania is, unfortunately, more a part of the ,alkan area due to its present ethnic configuration than a part of 'entral Europe. Dts problem can be solved only if #omania succeeds in politically becoming ''entral Europe' and escaping the ',alkans'. 9ttempts of shaping a separate destiny for its "ungarian minority would only trigger disaster. The effort to find a common solution for all the national groups may however create a new successful model of solving an inter-ethnic conflict.

/#(#/#0$#% )! *braham, ', $helcea, %, BHdescu I )==@" Interethnic Relations in Romania, #ditura 0apoca, $arpatica

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/elaJiile interetnice Hn /omLnia, IM*%, )==C Rom&ni $I maghiari 'n tran.i%ia post6comunist' 6Imagini mentale $I rela%ii interetnice 'n Transil)ania, Irina $ulic, Horvath Istvan, Marius La5Hr,

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Magyari 0andor Las5lo, $entrul pentru /elaJii Interetnice, .niversitatea BabeI&Bolyai, $luG 0apoca, )=DD /eviste Si 5iare,

-de)'rul -ltera, >;;C6 Dorun 1agropress 1onitorul 2#1R, colec%ia >;;E6 Racial and Ethnic Studies R3EFR* Research Bulletin Rom&nia liber' Transition

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