Issue 2 • 2009 Vo l 6 N o 2

SP’s
LandForces
AN SP GUIDE P U B L I C AT I O N

Sponsor of International Seminar - BMS - organised by Indian Army and CII

WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET ROUNDUP
In This Issue T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s
Smerch BM-30 can be M-109 has been A Battle Management
used as an independent continually upgraded and System would provide
artillery system, improved to today’s current situational awareness
with shoot-and-scoot version, the M-109A6 to a unit/subunit/
capabilities, in the high- “Paladin”, which is used in detachment commander
altitude mountainous US Army in its armoured and networking him
areas of Jammu and and mechanised divisions. down to an individual
Kashmir soldier or a tank

BRIGADIER (RETD) LT GENERAL (RETD) LT. GENERAL (RETD)

6 VINOD ANAND
? 7 R.S. NAGRA
? 10 V.K. KAPOOR
?

EEdi
d ittorial
orial Fa c e t o Fa c e
The situation in Pakistan is
deteriorating rapidly. While
on one hand we have seen
the assertion of the popular
will in the reinstatement of
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary,
on the other hand the inter-
nal security situation in
Pakistan is in shambles. The suicide bombing of
a mosque in Jamrud in Khyber agency on March
27, 2009, was followed by an audacious assault
on the Police Training Centre at Manawan on
March 30 on the outskirts of Lahore. Sunday
April 05, saw yet another suicide blast this time
by a teenager, in a Shia mosque in Chakwal in
Punjab which was executed a few hours after
the targeting of the security forces near the UN
office, in the heart of Islamabad.
It is obvious that Pakistan’s capacity and
will to tackle Al Qaida, Taliban and other jihadi
groups is lacking.
Analysts in New York and in Washington
who are already putting forward apocalyptic
timetables for Pakistan feel that the US is run-
ning out of time to help Pakistan change its
present course. David Kilcullen, a specialist
in guerrilla warfare and counter insurgency,
who advised Gen. David H. Petraeus when he
was the American commander in Iraq, has said

‘Common
that Pakistan could be facing internal collapse
within six months.
President Obama’s new strategy for Af-Pak
region calls for a virtual remaking of Pakistan’s
institutions and even of the national psyche.
While officially, Pakistan’s government wel-
comed Mr. Obama’s strategy, with its massive
dose of monetary aid of $1.5 billion a year for
5 years, however its people and the official
machinery including the military are continuing

communication
to deny that a threat from Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, is so imminent.
In light of the above India needs to effec-

policy vital’
tively protect it’s economic and security
interests from the menacing developments
in the neighbourhood. India should hone its
intelligence gathering capabilities in all dimen-
sions and virtually seal its land and maritime
borders with rapid reaction forces available to
manage crises within and to strike across the
border based on real-time intelligence.
Publication and release of this issue is coin-
ciding with the Battle Management Systems
(BMS) Seminar in mid-April 2009 and hence
it carries the interview of the Director General
Information Systems along with two articles
on BMS and other interesting pieces includ-
ing Limited Wars in Asia, Chinas Asymmetric In an interview to SP’s Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal and Editor
Warfare capability, Multi Barreled Rocket
of SP’s Land Forces Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, Director
Photographs: SP Guide Pubns

Launchers, Self Propelled Guns in artillery and

the status of the Army Air Defence in India. General Information Systems Lt General P.C. Katoch, UYSM,
AVSM, SC, pinpoints the loopholes and challenges facing the Indian
Army in its quest to achieve network centric capability.
LT GENERAL (RETD) PRAN PAHWA
EDITOR Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

2/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 1


SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): Network Centric
Warfare (NCW) is an information superi-
ority-enabled concept at the heart of which
lie digital communication networks. How
is the Indian Army (IA) visualising trans-
formation to this type of warfare?
Director General Information Systems
(DGIS): The IA is undergoing a phase of
transition from conventional warfare to
information-enabled warfare, that is, from
platform centric to network centric warfare.
The full realisation of any such revolution
is possible only with technological develop-
ment, organisational adaptation and, most
importantly, a national will. An effective
and technologically sound information tech-
nology (IT) force, along with robust com-
munication networks, have been created to
facilitate real-time sharing of information
and quick decision making so as to achieve
information superiority. A road map has
been formulated by which we can progress
steadily towards being a potent IT force.
Next, we have identified development
of C4I2 systems as a major thrust area for
modernisation of the army. Development
and fielding of automated operational infor-
mation systems for various levels of opera-
tions from Army HQs to Battalion HQs and
down to individual soldiers is in progress.
Command Information Decision Support
System, Artillery Combat Command Control
System, Battlefield Surveillance System,
Air Defence Control and Reporting System
and Battlefield Management System are
the major projects under development.
Integrated together with requisite communi-
cations, these systems will provide near real
time ‘Sensor to Shooter’ links to make the
army a network centric force.
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
SP’s: The absence of NCW capabilities is
already being felt in the military. What is
the current progress within the army and
among the three services?
DGIS: The hurdles in sharing information
among the various agencies of the country
are not only because of lack of media or
infrastructure, but also due to organisation-
al and procedural hurdles. These are being
addressed at appropriate levels by con-
cerned agencies. War fighting is a continu-
ously evolving affair and a Net-Centric force
2 SP’ S L AN D FO RC E S 2/ 2 0 09
is the requirement of the day. We are mak-
ing a headway towards achieving such a
force keeping the primary focus of protect-
ing our borders and sovereignty. Fighting
terrorism/insurgency effectively would be
a tremendous spin-off acquired through
Net-centric capability. At present, we have a
number of projects working towards obtain-
ing NCW capabilities, which are following
a road map and are at different stages of
development. Even the networking at Tri
Service level has been worked out and is
being implemented.
SP’s: The military instrument of NCW will
have to be forged on suitably integrated
organisations, induction of new technolo-
gies, joint operational concepts and doc-
trines and joint training. Your comments.
DGIS: Interoperability is a problem facing
not just the IA but many other armies the
world over. Since the systems were con-
ceived and developed in standalone modes,
their integration into a system of systems
in a seamless manner is a technological
challenge. We are working towards identify-
ing appropriate solutions and a common
Network Centric Operations philosophy
is being worked out. Integration at HQ
Integrated Defence Staff level is ensuring
interoperability and synergy at the inter-ser-
vices levels.
SP’s: NCW will also demand a Defence
Communication Network (DCN) to
derive the full benefits of the synergy so
acquired. What is the status of this proj-
ect?
DGIS: DCN is a futuristic project to provide
communication connectivity for all the
three services. The project is progressing
well and will be incorporating the aspira-
tions of the three services.
SP’s: How are India’s advanced software
capabilities being exploited by the IA?
DGIS: As I said earlier, all our projects are
being executed by leading IT players in the
industry who have established credentials.
Some packages, such as various mission
critical Operational Information Systems,
are being designed by the DRDO and Bharat
Electronics Limited, who also have advanced
skills in their respective fields. We also
have a Tri-Service Defence IT Consultative
Committee which incorporates leaders from
the industry and academia for advice on
important IT matters to the services.
SP’s: The terrorist attacks in Mumbai
revealed that while even terrorists were
using technologies easily available in the
market to achieve effective communication,
India’s elite counter-terror outfits had
failed to master technologies which could
lend the winning edge. Where do we lack
in capability? What is the status in terms
of ISR capabilities? What can be done in
the interim till the IA acquires full spec-
trum Command, Information and Decision
Support System (CIDSS) capability?
DGIS: The reasons for failure to detect/
intercept the intrusion of terrorists into
Mumbai are being investigated by other
agencies. I cannot comment on those issues.
The IA is among the most advanced armies
to have sophisticated surveillance systems.
These surveillance devices are being net-
worked in a phased manner for better syn-
chronisation, speedy transfer of information
and efficient decision making. Let me assure
you that the IA is modernising itself to meet
the challenges of the future.
SP’s: The IA’s CIDSS involves development
of the following:
• Artillery Command and Control, and
Communication System
• Air Defence Control and Reporting
System
• Electronic Warfare System
• Battlefield Surveillance System, and
• Battle Management System
What is the current status of each project?
DGIS: The projects are at various stages of
development—from systems study stage,
as in the case of Battlefield Management
System, to fielding stage, as in the case of
Artillery Combat Command Control System.
SP’s: Does the IA’s overall concept cater for
100 per cent NCW capable formations or is
the pan to selectively transform the army
formations. By when will the force be capa-
ble of engaging in NCW?
DGIS: The IA will completely network for-
“In a network centric
environment, where
we are looking at
seamless integration,
communications policies
need to be formulated
and implemented
centrally.”
mations and achieve network enabled status
by about middle of the next decade.
SP’s: Are we prepared to deal with the
threats that the networks are going to face?
DGIS: Our networks have robust inbuilt
security and will be operating on secure
gateways. However, national expertise
toward tackling the embedded threats is at
present limited and needs to be developed.
SP’s: Is the IA planning to network all
weapon platforms for ‘situational aware-
ness’ or is this going to be done selectively?
What are the costs involved?
DGIS: Networking in the army is being
planned right from the Army Headquarters
level down to the individual soldier and the
tanks. This networking, however, will be
done in a phased manner. Costs involved
are as per the long term perspective plans of
modernisation of the army.
SP’s: Apart from digitised communica-
tions, what are the other essentials neces-
sary to convert the army’s stand alone
weapon systems into situational awareness
platforms? What could be the cost incurred
for digitising a formation, like a division?
DGIS: The systems to get seamlessly meshed
with the overall NCW environment require
equipments and weapon systems which are
network enabled. In other cases, a human
interface is being adopted as an interim
measure. The complete digitisation process
is being done in phases and procedures
are being networked selectively. The costs
incurred are as per the long term perspec-
tive planning funds allocated by the army
for this purpose.
SP’s: All advanced countries have
some forms of Soldier Modernisation
Programmes. How has India’s F-INSAS
been designed and how much progress have
we achieved?
DGIS: F-INSAS is a multifaceted programme
which aims at making the soldier an inte-
gral part of the war fighting system. This
involves provisioning of state-of-the-art
weapon system, communication equipment,
and so on to make the soldier more effective
and survivable in war.
SP’s: Software-Defined Radio (SDR) is a
rapidly evolving technology and over the
last few years, analog radio systems are
being replaced by digital radio systems.
How is the IA proposing to implement it?
DGIS: In my opinion, so far as IA is con-
cerned SDR is the future of military commu-
nication. It has definite advantages over the
present family of radios in the IA. It is only
a matter of time before SDRs are inducted in
the army.
SP’s: Communications policy has to be
uniform and the equipment should be
compatible to ensure standardisation and
networking. How can this be achieved in a
force as large as the IA?
DGIS: In a network centric environment,
where we are looking at seamless integra-
tion, communications policies need to be
formulated and implemented centrally. You
are right when you mentioned that policies
based for different arms are no longer ten-
able. I strongly feel that we need a common
communication policy not just for the army
but also for all three services. SP
GR EAT PERF OR MANCES.

SMALL “ITEMS”.

DESIGN AND PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC DEFENCE SYSTEMS.

 A i r Defence
Photographs: SP Guide Pubns, Rheinmetall and Raytheon
Fighting Obsolescence
A candid review of the incumbent government’s achievements in the
context of modernisation reveals a rather sorry state of affairs
LT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND
S
ince World War II, Army Air Defence
(AAD) has emerged a vital compo-
nent for any modern army. The Battle
of Britain, for instance, showcased
the use of airpower in the 1940s wherein
the German Air Force made a sustained
effort to gain air superiority over the Royal
Air Force, especially the Fighter Command.
In a speech made on June 18, 1940, in the
House of Commons, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill said: “The Battle of France is
over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about
to begin...” The first major campaign to
be fought entirely by air forces, the Battle
of Britain witnessed the largest and most
sustained bombing campaign attempted
till then. Britain employed pure air power
to counter Germany primarily because the
ground-based AD weapons had not reached
the level of maturity required to effectively
engage and destroy an aerial target moving
at great speed in three dimensions simulta-
neously. The development of radar and mis-
siles added teeth to the existing gun systems
and since then AD has not looked back in its
march towards becoming an effective coun-
ter to air power. Nor has the development
of air power and aerial platforms—includ-
ing supersonic fighter aircraft with superior
avionics and aeronautics, beyond the visual
range armament, UAVs, cruise missiles and
ballistic missiles—stopped.
Alarmingly deteriorating security environ-
ment in the immediate neighbourhood and
relentless terrorist strikes have compelled
Indian government to get its act together to
defend the nation from all types of external
and internal threats. With a new regime
likely to be in place in about two months, it
would be pertinent to review the incumbent
UPA government’s achievements during its
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
Skyshield 35 by Rheinmetall
4 SP’ S L AN D FO RC E S 2/ 2 0 09
full tenure in the context of defence moderni-
sation and the challenges it leaves behind for
the future government.
Current AD scenario
AAD of the Indian Army at present compris-
es systems of varying vintage ranging from
45 (L70 gun) to 15 years old (Tangushka).
However, a majority of the remaining guns
and missiles are about 20 to 25 years old.
The technology, especially in the field of
ammunition, missiles, sensors and active
seekers, has advanced very rapidly, thereby
necessitating upgrade and replacement of
AAD of the Indian Army
at present comprises
systems of varying
vintage ranging from 45
(L70 gun) to 15 years old
(Tangushka)
the existing AD weapon systems at least
every 10 to 15 years so that these remain
current. Considering the vintage, the current
AAD picture is rather dismal when reviewed
system by system.
L/70 Gun system: L/70 is the mainstay
and has been the war horse of AAD since
1964. It was to be completely replaced by
2000; however, there has been no progress.
The Defence Research and Development
Organisation’s (DRDO) effort has kept its
replacement at a limb for about two decades.
Not many gun systems are currently avail-
able but a possible choice is Skyshield of
US Patriot Air Defence missile
Rheinmetall Defence which has an effec-
tive range of 4 km and rate of fire of 1,000
rounds per minute. A match for any fire
control radar, its most redeeming feature is
the Advance Hit Efficiency And Destruction
(AHEAD) technology—ammunition which
contains 152 heavy tungsten metal, spin sta-
bilised sub-projectiles, ejected by a time fuze.
It is reportedly very effective against small
targets. There is a strong case for transfer of
technology for the gun for manufacture at
Jabalpur’s Gun Carriage Factory after reviv-
ing the defunct L/70 production line as a
large number of guns are to be replaced.
The same system can replace ZU-23mm
twin barrel guns, if found suitable, and
thereby reduce the inventory. A project for
its upgrade with a better optronics sighting
system and a ballistic computer has been in
progress for more than five years, but as to
when it will fructify is anybody’s guess.
Schilka System: A highly mobile system
for supporting armour formations, the
Schilka has been in service since the early
1970s. One regiment of its successor, the
Tangushka, was procured, but subsequent
procurement of additional mounts got mired
in hassles and tussles, consequently the AAD
now has to make do with limited equip-
ment that does not meet current operational
requirement. Worse, there are hardly any
choices globally. One option is to take dispen-
sation for diluted operational requirement
and ‘single vendor’, and procure more num-
bers of Tangushka mounts. Alternatively,
Skyshield gun, fire control radar and a suit-
able missile can be co-mounted on a chassis
like T-72/ T-90 through a joint venture of the
Ordnance Factory Board and Rheinmetall
Defence, thereby rendering it an indigenous
flavour. Meanwhile, the Schilka has reported-
One regiment of
the Tangushka was
procured, but subsequent
procurement got mired
in hassles and tussles,
consequently the AAD
now has to make do with
limited equipment
ly been successfully upgraded with an Israeli
radar and is in the final stages of induction.
Quick Reaction SAM system: The current
QR SAM system is OSA-AK, a highly mobile
system for the defence of armour forma-
tions that is more than 20 years old and
hence, needs to be replaced. DRDO’s efforts
to develop the Trishul system did not suc-
ceed and a RFP has been issued. Among the
contenders, Israel’s Spyder has already been
tried and selected by the Indian Air Force
(IAF), but its mobility is yet to be proved.
Raytheon’s HAWK XXI is a more advanced
and compact version of HAWK PIP-3
upgrade integrated with a swanky new
3D MPQ-64 Sentinel radars. The missiles
are upgraded MIM-23K standard with an
improved blast-fragmentation warhead that
creates a larger lethal zone. Raytheon’s other
system is SLAMRAAM which is the land ver-
sion of air-to-air missile about to be inducted
into the US defence forces. Other systems are
Russia’s TOR M-1 which has a range of 12
km and Aster15 with a range of about 30
km, both seem to fall in the category of either
less or more range than required. There are
reports that the DRDO has entered into a
joint venture with MBDA for the Mica missile,
christened Maitre (friendship), under a Short
Range SAM (SR SAM) system programme to
replace the QR SAM.
Medium Range SAM (MR SAM) system:
The current system, the Kvadrat, is more
than 35 years old and has the technology
of the early 1960s. An RFP was issued but
later withdrawn due to poor response. The
DRDO’s Akash has not succeeded in mobile
role although the IAF has procured limited
numbers to replace the ageing Pechoras,
but additional procurement appears to be
through a joint venture of the DRDO and IAI
of Israel. The contenders could be Russia’s
BUK-M1, Aster30, Israel’s Barak ‘Next
Generation’, MBDA’s MICA, Patriot Advance
Capability-3 (PAC-3). The PAC-3 system
incorporates many changes to the ground
equipment and the missile, and is fielded
in incremental steps, called Configuration
1, 2, and 3. The ultimate PAC-3/Conf.3
includes upgrades to the radar (now desig-
nated AN/MPQ-65) to increase detection in
high-clutter environments, and to improve
discrimination of closely spaced objects (bet-
ter decoy recognition). Patriot is the obvious
frontrunner as it is war proven, incorporates
hit-to-kill technology, can engage aircraft,
helicopters, UAVs, cruise and tactical ballis-
tic missiles deployed with 10 nations, includ-
ing the US. Since production
began in 1980, 170 Patriot units
and 9,000 missiles have been
supplied globally.
Shoulder Fired SAM systems:
The current system Igla is in ser-
vice with the Indian Navy and the
IAF. It was to be replaced with a
latest version, the Igla-M, which
had a better ‘approacher mode’
capability, but there was some
delay. It may still be in the reckon-
ing along with Starstreak from
Britain, Stinger Block 2 of the US
and the Mistral of France.
Quite evidently, the army,
bureaucrats and the ministers
have to work in synergy and with
complete transparency to ensure
the process does not become
‘king’—and modernisation is
taken to its logical conclusion. SP
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Photo courtesy of S&H
 R ocket Ar tiller y
Lethality & Precision
India should continue to develop its indigenous rocket launching systems and produce MLRS
with capabilities similar to that of Smerch or even better
BRIGADIER (RETD) VINOD ANAND
Photograph: www.military-today.com
The 9A52-2T Smerch MLRS is an upgraded variant of the original Smerch based on the Tatra chassis
A
cquisition of multi-barrel rocket
launching systems has been consid-
ered mandatory to add punch to the
artillery support fires. In the initial
stages, India had acquired 122 mm multi-bar-
rel GRAD BM-21 rocket launching systems
(MRLS) from Russia to provide fire support to
the country’s assaulting echelons and neutral-
izing the enemy positions. Aim was to cover a
wider area with saturation fire in a very short
time—the large number of unguided free
flight rockets provided the required dispersion
and the shock effect at the target end.
Of late, however, there is a trend in the
new MRLS to have a smaller number of
larger-diameter rockets, often using cluster
sub-munitions rather than a large number of
small rockets. Further, to improve their accu-
racy and lethality there is a trend towards
providing guidance to the rockets. Together
with the 122 mm MRLS, the Russians had
also given GRAD (P) Increment, a single rock-
et launching system which was not required
by India. However, nowadays such single bar-
rel rocket launchers have become common
weapons of choice for militants with little
accuracy but a great deal of portability.
The Pinaka MBRL
The MRLS are generally grouped with the
corps level artillery. These systems are light
and, therefore, highly mobile and provide
flexibility to the commander for both employ-
ment and deployment. The MRLS are light
because they are not burdened with the
heavy recoil systems of the artillery guns.
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
However, 122 mm GRAD has a limited reach
of 20 km compared to medium guns like 155
mm which have a maximum range of 40 km
with rocket assisted projectiles. Therefore,
the Indian Army needed longer range rocket
systems. Combined with the necessity of
indigenising the country’s defence produc-
tion, the Defence Research and Development
Organisation commenced research and devel-
opment (R&D) on a longer range multi-barrel
rocket launcher (MBRL), christened Pinaka.
Not only was the R&D successful in devel-
6 SP’S LAND FORCE S 2/ 2 0 09
oping Pinaka, it was also the first major
weapon system which was contracted to
private enterprises for production. In April
2006, the Advanced Material Division of Tata
Power and the Heavy Engineering division
of Larsen & Toubro bagged orders to produce
around 40 Pinaka MBRLs each. Pinaka 214
mm MBRLS is all weather, indirect fire, free
flight, area saturation weapon system. It
consists of a vehicle mounted with 12 tubes,
three replenishment vehicles, a loader-cum-
replenishment vehicle and a fire control
system. It can fire rockets with a range of 40
km, in a salvo of 12 rockets with 1.2 tonnes
of high explosives within 40 seconds. It can
be fitted with a variety of warheads ranging
from blast-cum-pre-fragmented high explo-
sives to anti-tank anti-personnel mines.
In the Kargil conflict of 1999 a develop-
ment version of Pinaka had been used. Some
of the shortcomings identified then and in the
range tests later were improved upon before
handing over the same for series production.
However, one of the critical needs felt during
Kargil conflict was the lack of Indian artillery’s
ability to bring down mass fires in rear areas
of the adversary and on terror camps which
were outside the range of artillery. If a MRLS
with a range of 70 to 90 km, like the Russian
Smerch, had been available then the terrorists
logistic support infrastructure, for instance,
at Muzaffarabad and Skardu could have been
attacked with positive results.
The Russian Smerch
After a great deal of negotiations with
Russians, India signed a deal in end December
2005 to acquire Splav’s Smerch-M BM-30 or
9K58. The system is designed to defeat man-
power, armored and soft-skinned materiel
in concentration areas, artillery batteries,
command posts and ammunition depots in
depth areas. The Smerch-M contract includes
D 28 wheeled MAZ-543A vehicles with 12-
tube 9A52-2 launchers, plus logistics sup-
ply and fire-control vehicles. It has six types
of ammunitions. In addition, several of its
rocket types have sub-munitions warheads
that can cover wide areas with anti-armor or
fragmentation munitions, neutralizing con-
centrations of armour and troops well beyond
the range of any of India’s present artillery
systems. There is also thermo-baric warhead
however it is not clear whether that has been
included in the contract.
Smerch BM-30 has also been tested for its
Smerch BM-30 can be
used as an independent
artillery system, with
shoot-and-scoot
capabilities, in the high-
altitude mountainous
areas of Jammu and
Kashmir
transportability on high mountain ranges,
including half-way up to Leh. All operational
and qualitative parameters were met during
the trials. It can be used as an independent
artillery system, with shoot-and-scoot capabili-
ties, in the high-altitude mountainous areas of
Jammu and Kashmir. First contract of Smerch
was for 38 systems; a second contract for sup-
ply of 18 additional systems was concluded
last year. It is believed that new systems would
have munitions with the extended range of
90 km and improved accuracy. The projectile
with extended range is known as 9M528- uses
high energy composite propellant and it can
also carry and scatter 25 anti-tank mines.
Smerch also has ‘smart’ munitions fitted with
infra red sensors for terminal guidance and
kinetic energy fragment warheads which can
defeat armour of 70 mm at 30 degrees angle.
To reduce costs, the Indian version, Smerch
9A52-2T, uses indigenous vehicles.
However, acquisition of a long range
weapon system with guidance capabilities is
of no use without matching real-time sur-
veillance and target acquisition capabilities.
Therefore, it is necessary to develop corre-
sponding capabilities by acquiring suitable
UAVs and satellite systems that can provide
continuous surveillance. Russians are devel-
oping a miniature aerial vehicle with stabi-
lised camera which can be launched from the
Smerch launcher to enable the Smerch com-
mander to obtain real time battlefield surveil-
lance data. The aerial vehicle uses Global
Positioning System and has the same range
and can transmit data up to 30 minutes.
Guided MLRS
While the Russian MRLS have only moved
recently towards providing terminal guidance
capabilities to munitions and less accurate
inertial guidance to rockets during flight,
the American MRLS have not only honed
capabilities for terminal guidance but have
gone a step ahead by providing GPS guid-
ance to the rockets during flight. Improved
accuracy results in a lesser number of rounds
required to neutralise a target. Further, this
also reduces the logistic burden for both
maintenance and supply of munitions. The
Americans, as part of their guided MLRS
(GMLRS) programme, have also developed a
Guided Unitary Rocket that is equipped with
a guidance package, and carries a warhead/
payload which provides them the capability of
attacking a variety of targets to include those
that require low collateral damage.
The US and NATO troops in Afghanistan
have used 200 pound GPS-guided GMLRS
frequently to avoid collateral damage. The
British have deployed several of GMLRS in
Hemland province of Afghanistan. The GPS
guided rockets contain the latest advanced
computer technology, affording them unsur-
passed accuracy. Precision capabilities have
also earned these the sobriquet of ‘70 Km
Sniper Rifle’ from combat troops. According to
NATO reports, a GMLRS fired in Afghanistan
killed Taliban Commander Mullah Dadullah in
2007. An earlier version of GMLRS was also
used during Operation Iraqi freedom in 2003
with successful outcome. Precision warfare
has become one of the key elements in counter
insurgency operations for enabling minimum
collateral damage.
Pak eyes China’s A-100 MLRS
Closer home, it is believed that Pakistan is in
the process of acquiring A-100 MLRS from
China to offset advantage gained by India
through acquisition of Smerch. The A-100 is
a long-range 300 mm multiple launch rocket
system developed to meet the requirements of
the People’s Liberation Army. The A-100 MLRS’
development was inspired on the impressive
Smerch MLRS deployed by the Russians. A-100
has similar capabilities as that of Smerch.
Therefore, what India needs to do is to
continue to develop its indigenous rocket
launching systems and produce MLRS with
capabilities similar to that of Smerch or even
better. Matching surveillance and target acqui-
sition assets also need to be acquired/indige-
nously developed. Above all, there is the critical
need to develop robust satellite positioning and
navigation system that may be regional to start
with. Such an MRLS would give India options
of carrying out long range surgical strikes in
the least response time (as compared to the air
force strike aircraft) against terrorist camps, in
addition to employing it for a wide variety of
military missions. SP
The author is a senior fellow in USI of India.
 Skyranger E 260x191.qxd 12.03.2009 17:05 Uhr Seite 1

New tasks, new solutions

The Skyranger gun system is a self-propelled multi-mission system for protecting mobile units and stationary
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On Tracks
S P Ar tiller y

or Wheels
A synopsis of some of the modern
self-propelled 155 mm/52 calibre
gun systems
LT GENERAL (RETD) R.S. NAGRA

and Engineering (owned by improved to today’s current version, the

Photographs: US Army

BAE Systems since 1999). It M109A6 “Paladin”, which is used by the US

was first delivered in 1993. Army in its armoured and mechanised divi-
Used by five regiments of the sions. The gun can fire tactical nuclear pro-
M-109 Paladin - 155 mm Howitzer British Artillery, it has replaced jectiles, cannon launched guided projectiles
the 105 mm FV433 Abbot (CLGP or Copperhead), rocket assisted projec-

M
odern self-propelled guns are
either tracked or wheeled. Further,
these guns may have different
design configuration, that is to
say, gun turret mounted on a tank hull with
crew inside the hull, or, turret mounted on a
tracked or wheeled platform and crew lodged
in separate cabin or compartment/s with full
protection from shrapnel and small arm fire.
The latter design makes the system safe for its
crew who remain completely out of reach of
any potentially dangerous mechanics of the
gun and autoloader, plus the crew is protected
from gases generated during firing. Some of the
modern self-propelled 155 mm/52 calibre gun
systems are described here.
SPG, the M109 155 mm SPG
and the FH-70 155 mm towed gun. In 2002,
The development the BAE systems were contracted to upgrade
programme of the K-9 96 British Army AS-90s to a 52 calibre gun.
M109A6 “Paladin”: The M109 is an
artillery system has been American-made self-propelled 155 mm how-
underway since 1989 in itzer, first introduced in the early 1960s. The
gun had its combat debut in Vietnam. Israel
South Korea used it in the war against Egypt in 1973 and
in the Lebanon wars of 1982 and 2006.
Iran used this gun in the Iran-Iraq war in the
Tracked Systems 1980s. The M109 saw service with the British
AS90: The AS-90 (Artillery System for the Army, the Egyptian Army and Saudi Arabian
1990s) is a lightly-armoured self-propelled Army in the Gulf War of 1991. It saw service
artillery piece used by the British Army. It was with the US Army in both wars against Iraq
designed, developed and manufactured by the (1991 and 2003).
Armaments Division of Vickers Shipbuilding It has been continually upgraded and
tiles, scatterable mines and improved conven-
tional munitions.
With the cancellation of the Crusader
Program, the Paladin remains the principal
self-propelled howitzer of the US until the Non-
Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) from the US
Army’s Future Combat Systems programme
comes online.
PzH 2000: The Panzerhaubitze 2000
(PzH 2000) is a German 155 mm self-pro-
pelled howitzer developed by Krauss-Maffei
Wegmann GmbH (KMW) and Rheinmetall for
the German Army. It is particularly notable for
a very high rate of fire; in burst mode, it can
fire three rounds in nine seconds, 10 rounds in
56 seconds, and can fire between 10 and 13
rounds per minute continuously, depending on

2/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 7

 barrel heating. The replenishment of shells is
automated. Two operators can load 60 shells
and propelling charges in less than 12 minutes.
PzH 2000 has also been selected by the
armies of Italy, The Netherlands and Greece,
and more orders are probable as many NATO
forces replace their M109 howitzers. Ability of
this gun to provide accurate fire at 40 km has
been a major selling point.
Rheinmetall designed the 155 mm 52-
calibre barrel, which is chromium-lined for its
entire 8 metre length and includes a muzzle
brake on the end. The gun uses standardised
bi-modular charge system. Primer is loaded
separately via a conveyor belt, and the entire
loading, laying and firing is completely auto-
mated. Wegmann supplied chassis, sharing
some components with the Leopard 1, and
the turret for the gun. The system has superb
cross-country performance and considerable
protection in case of counter-fire. The turret
includes a phased array radar on the front
glacis for monitoring outgoing rounds and
correcting for windage. Laying can also be
The PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzer by Rheinmetall, Germany, is said to be the world’s most advanced artillery system. It is expected to play a crucial role
in conventional and crisis reaction operations alike.
automatically provided via encrypted radio
links. A crew of three— commander, layer and
driver—is needed for full operation.
The PzH 2000 was used for the first time
in combat by the Dutch Army in August 2006
against Taliban targets in Kandahar Province,
Afghanistan, in support of Operation Medusa.
Since then it has been used regularly in sup-
port of coalition troops in Uruzgan province,
also in Afghanistan. The PzH 2000 was also
used extensively during the Battle of Chora. It
is known as “the long arm of ISAF”. The gun
has been criticised by the Dutch in Uruzgan
province as the NBC system designed for use
in Europe cannot cope with the high level of
dust in Afghanistan. Nicknamed the ‘Beasts of
Tarin Kowt’ by the Taliban, the guns have been
modified with additional armour being fitted to
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
the roof to protect against mortar rounds.
2S19 Msta: The 2S19 Msta (Russian: t,
named after the Msta River) is a conventional
self-propelled 152 mm howitzer designed
by Russia/Soviet Union and entered service
in 1989. It is based on the T-80U tank hull,
weighs 42 tonnes and is powered by the T-72’s
diesel engine. There is also a NATO 155 mm-
compatible version, the 2S30 Iset, which is
intended for export by the Russian Federation.
The gun is operated by Belarus, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Georgia, Russia and Ukrain.
8 SP’S LAND FORCE S 2/ 2 0 09
Though 155 mm/39 calibre
gun system is outside the
purview of this article,
it is worth mentioning
the development of an
armoured artillery piece
155 mm/39 calibre NLOS-C
by BAE Systems (Land
and Armaments) for the
US Army.
K-9 howitzer: The development programme
of 155 mm/52-caliber self-propelled howitzer,
called K-9 artillery system, has been underway
since 1989 in South Korea. In 1996, the first
prototype was tested. The contract was award-
ed to Samsung Aerospace Industries (SSA)
by the Korean Government on December 22,
1998. The Republic of Korea Army received
the first production batch of K-9 from prime
contractor SSA in 1999.
K-9 has an all-welded steel armour con-
struction which is rated to withstand impact by
14.5 mm armour piercing shells and 152/155
mm shell fragments. State-of-the-art mobility
subsystems include a 1,000 horsepower engine
with potential for growth and hydropneumatic
suspension unit—a requirement for Korea’s
rugged mountainous terrain.
T-155 Firtina: T-155 Firtina (Turkish: Storm)
is an indigenously-designed 155 mm self-
propelled howitzer produced by the Turkish
Army, which shares many technologies with
the South Korean K-9 howitzer such as the
German designed MTU-881 KA 500 power
pack, the South Korean designed 155/52 cali-
bre gun system and the ammunition feeding
mechanism—all of which are also produced
under licence in Turkey.
Even though the T-155 looks similar to the
K-9, the Turkish howitzer has considerable
differences in its turret design, navigation
system and electronic systems (such as the
radio and fire control system) which were
developed in Turkey.
DONAR: Germany’s KMW and General
Dynamics European Land Systems with
Corporate Headquarters in Spain, have jointly
developed a new generation, air deployable
(<32 tonnes), fully automated and remotely
operated 155 mm/52 calibre, tracked self-
propelled artillery system. The special feature
of the gun system that makes it stand apart
from other conventional self-propelled tracked
guns is that the cabin for the crew and tur-
ret are placed separately, both well protected
from shrapnel and light/heavy machine gun
fire. The system is integrated on a tracked and
proven 720 Hp (530 Kw) powered platform
with automatic transmission.
DONAR has a reduced crew of two with
armour protection. The cabin is also NBC pro-
tected with fire suppressant system. It can be
fitted with add-on armour kit, if required by
the customer. It has state-of-the-art fire control
system capable of remote control and easily
connectable to central command and control
system. The system has high degree of reliabil-
ity due to the use of modified proven systems
of PzH 2000 and ASCOD2 IFV. It has reduced
re-supply needs, has worldwide transportability
due to its lightweight and can operate in all
types of terrain. It is targeted to replace legacy
systems, for instance, M109, AS90, and K9, to
name a few, in service with modern armies.
Wheeled Systems
G6 howitzer: The G6 self-propelled howitzer,
developed and manufactured by LIW division
of Denel company of South Africa, entered
production in 1987. It weighs 47 tonnes and
achieves a range of 30 km with conventional
artillery shell to 67 km with V-LAP round. It is
developed around the ordnance of the G5 how-
itzer with 155 mm/52 calibre. It is in service
with South Africa, Oman and UAE.
In addition to the logistical mobility afforded
by a wheeled chassis, the G6 is protected against
counter battery fire and is able to defend itself
in an unsecured area. The chassis is mine-pro-
tected. The G6 saw limited action in1987/88
during the South African Border War, notably
in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. It was selected
by the Indian Army in 2004 after extensive tri-
als, but the contract could not be signed due to
the infamous “kickback” scandal.
ZUZANA: The 155 mm self-propelled wheeled
gun/howitzer is a modern Slovak artillery
system with a 45 caliber (now upgraded to 52
calibre) gun and automatic loader for loading
of both, a projectile and charge. It is also avail-
able in tracked version. The system is mounted
on a modified TATRA 8x8 chassis.
Latest Development
Though 155 mm/39 calibre gun system is
outside the purview of this article, it is worth
mentioning the development of an armoured
artillery piece 155 mm/39 calibre NLOS-C
by BAE Systems (Land and Armaments) for
the US Army. Part of the US Army’s Future
Combat Systems project, it flaunts state-of-the-
art features available in most modern artillery
guns and uses technology from the aborted
XM2001 Crusader.
An 18-tonne class vehicle, it’s a replace-
ment for the current vehicle system in the 40
to 60 tonne weight class. The proposed system
is designed to introduce capabilities that the
current Crusader M-109 systems do not offer.
One of the unique features of the system is its
ability to switch shell types quickly on a one by
one basis, for example, allowing an illumina-
tion round to be followed by a point detonation
round, to be followed by an area effect round.
This would give the system the ability to fire dif-
ferent rounds as required by different fire calls
or to change types of shells.
The gun will have a higher rate of fire
using autoloader from the aborted Crusader
project. This will allow more fire power per
system than is available with the current M-
109 system, besides providing Multiple Round
Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) capability.
Improvements in the refuelling arrange-
ments and automation of ammunition
reloading allow reduced downtime for logistic
functions. This also allows the system to be
manned with a crew strength of two instead
of five. This is desirable as staffing continues
to be a major contributor to life cycle cost of
any combat system.
The first prototype was expected to make
its public appearance in mid-June 2008. A
total of eight prototypes will eventually be
delivered to Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona,
by 2009. By 2010, the US Army expects to
take delivery of the first six prototypes at Fort
Bliss, Texas. There, the Army Evaluation Task
Force will begin its evaluation and develop-
ment of tactics, techniques, procedures and
doctrine for the gun. The task force is sched-
uled to receive six vehicles a year, between
2010 and 2012—a total of 18—and the US
Army expects the NLOS-C to be ready for field-
ing to combat units in 2014. SP
 R e gional
China’s Asymmetric Capabilities
Outmatched by the West in cutting edge military technology, China predictably has taken
the simpler and cost effective route to interfere with their critical military networks vital for
communication, surveillance, reconnaissance and other strategic purposes
SANJAY KUMAR
E
ven as the world debates China’s
quest for capabilities required to proj-
ect its power beyond the Asia-pacific
region, China’s asymmetric military
capability growing significantly in critical
areas has drawn considerable global atten-
tion in recent times. The employment of
asymmetric tactics as a means to gain elec-
tromagnetic advantages in the early stages
of war is part of the Chinese military strat-
egy to compensate for its technical inferior-
ity. China’s present military thinking on the
use of asymmetric capabilities in war gets
sufficiently reflected in Unrestricted Warfare,
a book published in February 1999 in the
Chinese language by two senior colonels of
the People’s Liberation Army. Affording a
clear insight into the present Chinese mili-
tary thinking, the book unequivocally sug-
gests the need for China to develop skills and
weapons in stealth warfare in order to spring
surprise and deception on adversaries who
are technologically superior to it.
Outmatched by the West in cutting edge
military technology, China predictably has
taken the simpler and cost effective route
to interfere with their critical military net-
works vital for communication, surveillance,
reconnaissance and other strategic purposes.
China’s efforts in developing asymmetric mili-
tary capabilities, extending from outer space to
cyber space, is part of the two pronged strat-
egy Beijing seems to have adopted with regard
to its military modernisation. On the one
hand, the Chinese military is intensely beefing
up basic infrastructure that supports conven-
tional warfare capabilities; on the other, it is
aggressively pushing for capabilities aimed at
exploiting technical vulnerabilities of its adver-
saries. At present, China’s military technology
is at least a generation behind that of the US.
Although the Chinese military is doing every-
thing possible to gain technological parity with
other advanced militaries of the world, it is still
a long way off the desired status.
The geo-strategic dynamic of the Asia
Pacific region, coupled with its own economic
rise contributing significantly to it, makes it
necessary for China’s military to maintain
a state of constant combat readiness. The
Chinese military, however, is in the throes
China is believed to have
developed capabilities to
interfere or incapacitate
foreign satellites in
ways such as electronic
jamming or blinding
using ground-based laser
weapons
of the biggest transformation in its history.
Transforming everything—from doctrine
to strategy, and training to equipment—the
military can ill afford to wait till it has
gained technological parity with the western
nations. It needs to rapidly develop a stop-gap
arrangement. With latest military technology
from Russia increasingly becoming scarce
and the country’s own conventional warfare
capabilities yet to reach the desired level, it is
expected that China’s asymmetric war-fight-
ing capabilities will only grow with time.
Race to Conquer Space
By far the most alarming military threat that
China currently poses to other advanced
nations is in outer space. Fact is, Beijing has
developed capabilities in space which might
seriously cripple not just military networks
of other nations but also their financial and
industrial infrastructure. Even before China
shot down an obsolete weather satellite in
January 2007 using a ballistic missile 537
miles above the Earth, there were speculations
it had used ground-based lasers against US
satellites. The satellite kill in 2007, however,
was a complete stunner. The ballistic missile
used by China as direct assent anti-satellite
weapon (ASAT) in 2007 carried a “kill vehi-
cle” and destroyed the satellite by ramming it,
demonstrating in the process China’s acquired
capability in tracking and bringing down an
orbiting satellite from stand-off positions on
Earth. Next to the direct assent ASAT weapon,
China appears to be moving in the direction
of a co-orbital anti-satellite weapon.
China’s possible efforts at developing a
co-orbital ASAT weapon gets credence from
the fact that Shenzhou-7, China’s recently
launched satellite, also carried a micro-satel-
lite, BX-1 weighing 40 kg and measuring 40
cm on each side, which some believe to be
prelude to the development of another anti-
space weapon of some kind, possibly to be
used for the purpose of head-on collision with
a hostile satellite. Although the stated purpose
of BX-1 was to take pictures of the orbiting
mother satellite in co-orbital motion, a small
incident which occurred at the time BX-1
was released—the micro satellite had begun
to drift away before it was pulled back after a
series of manoeuvres to an elliptical track of 4
km multiplying 8 km—has since given rise to
speculations whether the erratic handling of
the accompanying micro satellite was intend-
ed to test manoeuvrability required in devel-
oping a co-orbital ASAT weapon. According
to Chinese official sources, it is the first time
China succeeded in engineering this kind of
space orbiting. Unlike India, the military con-
trols China’s space programme. Hence, it is
quite likely that Beijing’s recent space mission
did have some military objectives to achieve.
Apart from using micro satellites as anti-
satellite weapons, the Chinese military would
also be tempted to employ these for non-kinet-
ic communication or surveillance missions.
Since most space technology used by China
is dual use and the country’s military has
dominant interest in space, it would be pru-
dent for countries like India to closely monitor
Beijing’s every move in space, as also to devel-
op more sophisticated means to keep their
satellites out of harm’s way. China is believed
to have developed capabilities to interfere or
incapacitate foreign satellites in ways such as
electronic jamming or blinding using ground-
based laser weapons, electronic pulse weap-
ons, space mines, debris rings, high-altitude
nuclear bursts and “parasitic” satellites.
Caution & Precaution
China’s continued focus on development of
Beijing has developed
capabilities in space
which might seriously
cripple not just military
networks of other
nations but also their
financial and industrial
infrastructure
anti-satellite weapons could certainly lead to
an arms race in space. Beijing’s persistence
to weaponise space certainly has Washington
most worried not only because the US has the
widest network of satellites in the world, its
global military deployment capabilities to a
great extent depend on these satellites. Other
countries, like India, Japan and Australia, are
no less concerned on account of the looming
threat in space. The decision taken by India
in June 2007 to set up an Integrated Space
Cell to function as a single window for inte-
gration among the armed forces, the depart-
ment of space and the Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO) appears to have been
largely influenced by China’s experiment
with ASAT weapon in 2007. Elsewhere,
Japan’s parliament passed a law on May 21,
2008 that would allow its military to launch
advanced satellites for intelligence gathering
and missile defence.
A disturbing fact related to Shenzhou-7
that surfaced recently is that it had orbited
dangerously close to the International
Space Station (ISS), flying to a distance of
about 45km (27 miles) from it. Shenzhou-
7’s close presence to the ISS has the inter-
national community worried. America and
Russia spend huge amounts of money to
keep the ISS safe from homing objects in
space, as such they have developed capabili-
ties required to manoeuvre it away before
any object actually hits it. Similar efforts
would be needed by developing nations
who intend to put up space stations in the
future or even by those nations who already
have their satellites orbiting in outer space.
Besides China, at least three other Asian
powers—India, Japan and South Korea—
have planned ambitious space missions,
including manned lunar missions and set-
ting up of space stations at some point of
time in the future. While it is not necessary
that all space missions must have military
objectives to achieve, it would be imperative
for the nations involved in space explora-
tion to gear up for challenges arising from
China’s asymmetric capabilities in space.
Cyber Wars
Next to space, China is contemplating using
cyberspace as a weapon to destabilise its
adversaries. The White Paper on China’s
National Defense in 2004 explicitly under-
pins the critical role the country’s emerging
‘informationalised’ force is seeking to play in
the present techno-scientific battle spectrum.
According to a Pentagon Report in 2007,
Beijing views cyberspace—attacks, defence
and exploitation—as critical for achieving
“electromagnetic dominance” early in a con-
flict. As digital wars are becoming more of a
routine, the Chinese military is increasingly
focused on developing information warfare
capabilities. It is believed to have already
raised globally the most capable band of
hackers in the military domain, trained and
equipped in cyber attack and counter-attack
capabilities. In fact, a US congressional advi-
sory panel recently stated that Chinese abil-
ity to cyber attack is “so sophisticated that
the US may be unable to counteract or even
detect the efforts” of the attacks.
Cyber attacks on countries inimical to
China are increasingly becoming more
routine and widespread these days. Most
recently, about 75 per cent of the computers
in major military base in Afghanistan were
reported infected with a worm which could
be possibly traced back to China. In 2007,
Niprnet the unclassified e-mail system of the
Pentagon was thought to have been invaded
by hackers operating from China. UK, France
and Germany are among other nations who
faced network-based cyber attacks from
China in the past. In so far as the invasion
of India’s cyberspace by Chinese hackers is
concerned, it is stated to be even more ram-
pant and carried out almost on a daily basis.
However, the Chinese military is not alone
in pursuing cyber warfare. According to one
estimate presently there are about 120 coun-
tries which are engaged in such activities. In
the most recent example, Russia and Georgia
are engaged in a ‘cyberwar’ of sorts, attack-
ing each others networks and websites.
Cyber security threat perception generally
revolves around malicious computer software
in the form of Trojans worms, bots and so on.
There is, however, also the real possibility of
microchip in a computer and other external
devises, like printers, scanners and data trav-
elers, being designed or modified in such a
way as to program it to do nefarious things.
Since China is a major exporter in computer
hardware, there is a need to remain vigilant
about every possible intrusion points. The
Indian military as it evolves increasingly into
a network-enabled force stands particularly
vulnerable to Chinese cyber threats. Cyber
attacks are dangerous for India also because
of the Country’s growing reliance on net-
works and technology to control critical sys-
tems that run power plants, transportation
and financial systems.
Concerned about the growing Chinese
threat in cyberspace, the Indian army has
decided to create cyber-security organisations
down to the division-level to guard against
cyber warfare and data thefts. This can hardly
be stated as adequate. India at present lacks
a decision making authority at the highest
level in cyber warfare. Since the cyber secu-
rity forum of the National Security Council
in India has become almost defunct after the
US spy incident, there is need to put in place
a structure similar to Integrated Space Cell at
the tri-services level with setting up of a cyber
security force drawn from experts in military,
IT sector, academia, private enthusiasts and so
on. Ideally, what is needed is not just defence
against Chinese cyber threats but also counter-
offensive capabilities in cyber warfare. SP
The writer is Research Assistant, Centre for Strategic Studies and
Simulation, USI of India.
2/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 9
 Te ch nol og y
BMS: To Collate,
Co-relate Battle Data
In the Indian context, a Battle Management
System would provide situational awareness
to a unit/subunit/detachment commander and
networking him down to an individual soldier
or a tank
LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR
V
iolence has no face, only character.
So while it’s quite impossible to
parenthesise the perpetrators, the
genesis of a terror threat can be
largely attributed to global or regional crises,
or loopholes in internal security. Ethnic and
sectarian violence, insurgencies, narcot-
ics/drug wars, illegal immigration, religious
fundamentalism, terrorism (local and inter-
national variety), territorial disputes over
unsettled boundaries, conflicts due to great
power rivalries, proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, WMD falling in the hands of terrorists,
wars to secure resource areas, and piracy and
terrorism at sea, on land and in the air—all
of that make it mandatory for India to adopt
a more pragmatic view towards its future
military capabilities. The differing nature of
the above conflicts and the emerging trends
in the battle field environment requires flex-
ibility, mobility, quick response capability
and exploitation of the technology spectrum
to secure war winning advantages in future
military endeavours.
Rapid advances in recent times and count-
less instances from the past illustrate that
technology is one of the principle factors that
drives the change in the method of war fight-
ing. Facing an entirely new technological
era—generated through advancements in the
field of miniaturisation, digitisation, material
science, bio-technology, sensor technology,
stealth, communications and information
technology—India needs to integrate new
technologies as warfighting systems. The
dominant technology trends which impact
the land forces are:
• Long range precision firepower
• Integrative technologies, includ-
ing Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
• Stealth technologies
• Communication technologies
• Lighter, more mobile strike vehicles with
greater firepower to replace tanks for out
of area contingencies and power projec-
tion
The advances in the field of communica-
tions, computers, command and control,
information and interoperability (C4I2) have
provided military capabilities to view the
battle space as one composite whole and thus
be tackled jointly or singly by any weapon of
any service which is within range. Inter-oper-
ability will be the essence for the different
C4I2 systems of the three services (army,
navy and the air force). This system, together
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
with the tactical communication system, will
allow network enabled warfare. At the unit
level, there will be certain distinct character-
istics which will require comprehension to
understand the change that will come about
in the method of war waging at the tactical
levels of a battalion/regimental group.
General architecture
A Battle Management System (BMS) is
designed for the battalion/regimental level
group. It enables operational planning, estab-
10 SP’S LAND FORCE S 2/ 2 0 09
lishes a common language across all combat
elements and allocates boundaries and areas
of responsibility. It automatically updates the
intelligence within the combat group and
distributes target information and alerts to all
concerned. Thus it enables flexible planning
and operation. When integrated with on-
board networked computers, every platform
becomes a networked sensor and a shooter.
Weapons can be slaved by remote users, to
remote sensors, therefore empowering the
system with more flexibility. This ensures fast-
er tempo of operations, and effective employ-
ment and distribution of firepower without
risking fratricide. A BMS integrates built-in
navigation and communications functions
which are fully integrated with the platform,
To minimise clutter, BMS
units are set to filter
information, presenting a
limited data set including
local units, and targets
relevant for immediate
engagement
FELIN
LandWarrior - US Army
on-board sensors and weapons.
When embedded in armored fighting
vehicles, or infantry combat clothing, these
systems become the basic level of the tactical
C4I network. BMS commonly rely on infor-
mation collectively gathered by the unit’s
combat echelons (tanks, APCs, reconnais-
sance and surveillance elements and so on) to
populate its databases with information about
the location, status and intentions of own
and enemy forces. Specific targets are marked
on the BMS displays, providing clear and
specific situational pictures to each sub-unit,
allocating tasks and coordinating fire and
maneuver over a large area, without the need
for visual coordination.
The integration of own force tracking
further improves situational awareness and
minimises the risk of fratricide. Displays used
on AFVs must have high intensity illumina-
tion, to overcome direct sunlight as well as
very low illumination, for night operations.
A soldier models the Land Warrior system
Photographs: www.defenselink.mil, wikipedia
Operation usually supports touch screen or
pushbuttons, activating a limited number of
preset functions, with an embedded pointing
device and virtual alphanumeric keyboard.
This layout is designed to meet the require-
ment of operation with full combat gear,
in harsh hot, cold and humid conditions,
including under full NBC protection suits.
To minimise clutter, BMS units are set to
filter information, presenting a limited data
set including local units, and targets relevant
for immediate engagement. Yet, for planning,
situation analysis and providing a broader
view when necessary, BMS can present larger
views of the area, supporting automated
functions of terrain analysis, route plan-
ning, generating of orders, status reports,
maintain tracks of inventories and so on.
Such information can automatically be sent
to the brigade, where it is used to create real-
time situational reports at the headquarters.
When used with mechanised infantry units,
BMS can be detached from the vehicle to sup-
port dismounted infantry operations. In this
application, wireless (WiFi) links are becom-
ing vital for the integration of the services
available on the vehicle, its crew and the dis-
mounted element.
Israeli System
In Elbit’s Battlefield Enhanced Smart Training
architecture, the BMS system is embedded
with simulation and debriefing capabilities.
This approach enables combined training
of live, simulated and virtual forces, at mul-
tiple locations and different levels (battalion,
brigade and other units). The Israeli Defence
Force has trainers for battalion combat team.
The Merkava Mk4 main battle tank has on-
board trainers for providing full simulation
environment for commander and the gunner.
It supports training from the individual tanks
up to the combat team level.
US Army System
The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade
and Below system: The FBCB2 provides
the US Army software and hardware tools
that support operational situations at the bri-
gade level and below, down to the individual
soldier and for the single platform level. The
system integrates subscriber sets covering
the brigade’s entire area of interest, includ-
ing Bradley or Stryker combat vehicles, M-
1A2 (Abrams Main Battle Tanks), AH-64D
attack helicopters, OH-58D and Black Hawk
helicopters, artillery and combat support
elements. The system’s coverage extends far
beyond the line of sight and visual commu-
nications ranges provided by previous com-
mand and control systems. The system relies
 In Elbit’s Battlefield
Enhanced Smart Training
architecture, the BMS
system is embedded with
simulation and debriefing
capabilities
on advanced communications devices, which
integrate position navigation and reporting
capability with the help of GPS. Some battle-
field identification capability is embedded to
generate instant alerts in situations where
engagement between friendly forces is at risk.
The US Land Warrior: An integrated fight-
ing system for individual infantry soldiers,
it gives the soldier enhanced tactical aware-
ness, lethality and survivability. The systems
integrated into Land Warrior are the weapon
system, helmet, computer, digital and voice
communications, positional and navigation
system, protective clothing and individual
equipment. The Land Warrior system will be
deployed by infantry, and combat support sol-
diers, including rangers, airborne, air assault,
light and mechanised infantry soldiers. The US
Army launched the Land Warrior programme
in 1994. An engineering and manufactur-
ing development contract was awarded to
Raytheon Systems, then Hughes Aircraft
Company. Plans were drafted to build an initial
capability (formerly Land Warrior Block 1)
and then a Land Warrior Stryker Interoperable
(formerly Land Warrior Block 2).
The US Army is speeding up a wider
deployment of high-tech soldier gear so that
it arrives about the same time as accelerated
Future Combat Systems equipment, said Lt
General Ross Thompson, Military Deputy to
the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. The
Ground Soldier Ensemble, which emerged from
the Land Warrior programme, includes a hel-
met-mounted display showing troop locations.
The Land Warrior system relies on lithium bat-
tery technology for its light weight, high ener-
gy density and extended operating time. At 7.2
pounds and with two major subsystems, the
ensemble is lighter than its predecessor.
French Army Systems
GIAT industries have developed SIT, also
known in its export configuration “Finders”.
Developed as part of a comprehensive combat
vehicle digitisation programme, this BMS is
deployed with French Army AMX-10P and
Leclerc tanks, and is expected to be fielded
with the future VBCI armoured infantry
carriers. A large number of SIT units are
currently deployed with the French and UAE
armies. The system is designed to support
units up to battalion level.
The system runs on militarised or rug-
gedised PC workstations operating under
Window OS. Each unit uses common soft-
ware modules shared by all systems, and role-
specific modules developed for every type of
application or vehicle, including reconnais-
sance, armor, armored infantry carrier, light
armored vehicle and command post vehicle.
These specific modules enable the system to
integrate with the vehicle’s navigation, com-
munications, optronics, and weapon systems.
All systems use common tactical terminals
and graphical displays.
FELIN—Infantry Soldier System
Schedule: Under the FELIN contract, Sagem
will deliver up to 22,500 FELIN V1 sets for
20 infantry regiments and an additional
9,000 FELIN sets for use by the troops of the
armoured, engineering and artillery regi-
ments of the French Army. In September
2007, 50 pre-production FELIN systems were
delivered and trials with these are underway.
Further, 358 pre-production FELIN sets are
scheduled for delivery in 2008 for operational
evaluation. Three infantry companies will
undertake a series of trials of the pre-pro-
duction systems of the FELIN systems. The
trials are scheduled to last 12 months. The
first 1,089 production FELIN systems were
Soldata - Italian Future Soldier
ordered in May 2006 and full-rate produc-
tion is scheduled to begin in September 2008.
First deliveries of production FELIN units are
scheduled for early 2009 with initial deploy-
ment in mid-2009. In April 2008, Sagem
received an order for 5,045 FELIN systems
for the French Army, to be delivered between
An integrated fighting
system, the US Land
Warrior gives the soldier
enhanced tactical
awareness, lethality and
survivability
mid-2009 and the end of 2010. It is esti-
mated that all French infantry troops will be
equipped with FELIN V1 by 2010. Production
of FELIN V2 is planned to begin in 2015.
For the FELIN System the DGA (procure-
ment agency of French Ministry of Defence)
has provided a target weight for the system of
less than 25 kg, to include the entire FELIN
system, weapons, ammunitions and 24-hour
energy, food and water provisions. Effort is
also being directed to the selection of the
energy supplies and the method of recharg-
ing batteries.
The system will be delivered in five con-
figurations for different levels of command.
Each of the 20 regiments will be supplied
with 1,000 systems. The FELIN system
includes portable computer, a voice and
data radio, new combat clothing with body
armour and a new ballistic helmet.
Italy’s Soldier System
An industrial team, led by Selex
Communications (formerly Selenia
Communications), is developing the Italian
Soldato Futuro, future soldier system. The
industrial team includes Aero Sekur, Beretta,
Galileo Avionica, Larimart and Sistema
Compositi.
Sistemi Compositi is leading the devel-
opment of the helmet, clothing and pro-
tection system. The combined combat
vest and universal support module, being
developed by Sistema Compositi and Selex
Communications, includes cables for the
integration of the electrical components
worn and carried by the Soldato Futuro.
The Soldato Futuro body armour provides
stab protection and protection against 9 mm
rounds. The use of wire links reduces the
volume of electromagnetic radiation, making
the soldier less vulnerable to detection and
surveillance and also the systems less vulner-
able to electronic countermeasures such as
jamming. A new disruptive pattern material
has been designed for temperate and desert
environment versions of the combat uniform.
The soldier will also have a camouflage ver-
sion of the nuclear, biological and chemical
protection suit. Boron carbide plates can be
fitted to the body armour to provide protec-
tion against the penetration of 7.62 mm
armour-piercing rounds.
Developments in the Indian
Army
Currently the Indian Army is organised,
equipped and trained for traditional, second
and third generation, industrial age, low and
medium technology, conflicts and for counter
insurgency and counter terrorist operations
within. The nature of wars, in the future,
is going to compel us to think big but with
smaller, more maneuverable, more precise,
more agile and networked forces.
In an interview to SP’s Land Forces, the
Director General of Information Systems of
the Indian Army Lt General P.C. Katoch said,
“The Indian Army is in a phase of transition
from conventional warfare to information
enabled warfare, that is, from platform cen-
tric to network centric warfare (NCW). The
full realisation of any such revolution is pos-
sible only with technological development,
organisational adaptation and, most impor-
tantly, a national will.
“An effective and technologically sound IT
force along with robust communication net-
works has been created to facilitate real time
sharing of information and quick decision
making so as to achieve information superior-
ity. A road map has been formulated by which
the army can progress steadily towards being a
potent IT force. We have identified the develop-
ment of C4I2 systems as a major thrust area
for modernisation of our army. Development
and fielding of automated operational and
information systems for various levels of oper-
ations from Army Headquarters to Battalion
Photograph: Selex Galileo
Headquarters to individual soldiers are in
progress. Command Information and Decision
Support System, Artillery Command, Control
and Computer System (ACCCS), Battlefield
Support System, Air Defence Control and
Reporting System and BMS are the major proj-
ects under development. Integrated together
with requisite communications, these systems
will provide near real time ‘sensor-to-shooter’
links to make army a network centric force.”
In the Indian context, a BMS will be a
system providing situational awareness to
a unit/subunit/detachment commander
and networking him down to an individual
soldier or a tank. It will be addressing the
command control and information needs of
the Tactical Battle Area and will be a build-
ing block in the overall NCW architecture.
It will be a situational awareness system
having a terrain platform in the form of
Geographical Information System and tools
for data fusion and passage of information.
It is currently in the inception (study) stage
of development as opposed to some other
systems such as the ACCCS which are being
fielded for trials.
Future Infantry Soldier as a System: The
F-INSAS will be a part of the BMS for the
infantry. The infantry soldier has to a have
multi-terrain, multi-environment capability
to fight as an autonomous combat platform
networked into the overall war fighting
system architecture. The F-INSAS project is
aimed at giving the infantry soldier exactly
this capability. This project would provide
the infantry soldier enhanced capabilities
in terms of lethality, mobility, survivability,
situational awareness, sustainability and
battle command, so as to improve his opera-
tional adaptation. F-INSAS perceives the
soldier as a part of the system—a multi-mis-
sion, multi-role war fighter consisting of the
individual soldier along with his integrated
soldier system set that contains numerous
modular but integrated components. Rapid
deployment and frequent manoeuvre of
forces would require the soldier to rely more
on information superiority to locate, identify,
track and effectively engage opposing forces
while at the same time ensuring higher
degree of own survivability. F-INSAS will
focus on requirements specific to the Indian
context of terrain, adaptability, tactical doc-
trines and so on. SP
2/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 11
 Te chnolog y
US Command Systems: A Synopsis
The Army Battle Command System of the US is the key
system along with many sub-systems that have successfully
automated the battlefield
LT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND
M
odern battlefield is fast becom-
ing highly mobile and dynamic
due to the nature of operations
and lethality of weapons. Force
projection, hybrid operations (simultaneous
involvement in various types of conflicts, peace
operations and humanitarian operations)
information warfare, joint operations and so on
further add to the complexity of warfighting
which require situational awareness and rapid
exchange of information to enable faster syner-
gised decision-making.
Automation command and control tools
consisting of hardware platforms and software
applications, thus, become a critical aid for
commanders for warfighting where the vertical
networks link command echelons while hori-
zontal connections connect all combat units.
Such systems also effectively integrate the tacti-
cal and strategic command levels. Army Battle
Command System (ABCS) of the US is the key
system along with many sub-systems that have
successfully automated the battlefield.
Army Battle Command System
ABCS integrates the command and control
(C2) systems found at each echelon—from
ground force commanders at the theater or
joint task force level to the individual soldier
or weapons platform. Whether an army force
is deployed for land combat or is conducting
peace operations, providing humanitarian
assistance or giving aid to civil authorities,
ABCS supports the mission by integrating the
battlespace automation systems and com-
munications which functionally link strategic
and tactical headquarters. ABCS is interoper-
able with joint and multinational C2 systems
at upper echelons across the full range of C2
functionality, and is vertically and horizontally
integrated at the tactical and operational lev-
els. ABCS comprises three major components:
• The Army Global Command and Control
System
• The Army Tactical Command and Control
System
• The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below
In the battlespace, ABCS enables every
stationary and moving platform to be con-
nected in a digital battlefield. It employs a
mix of fixed/semi-fixed installations and
mobile networks that will be interoperable
with theater, joint, and combined command
and control systems. It’s supporting systems
and subsystems are:
Global Command and Control
System-Army
The GCCS-A is the army component of the
Global Command and Control System-Joint
(GCCS-J) which provides strategic, tacti-
cal and theater command and control. A
key component of the ABCS, it provides a
seamless link of information and data from
the strategic GCCS-J to the army corps and
below by providing a common picture of
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
army tactical operations to the joint and
coalition forces while facilitating interoper-
ability of systems with the army command.
Specifically, it provides:
• Force readiness, planning, projection and
situational awareness
• Force employment
• Joint common operational picture with sup-
porting status and intelligence information
• Local Area Networks in client/server con-
figurations with an interface to the Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network, a system
12 SP’S LAND FORCE S 2/ 2 0 09
of interconnected computer networks used
by the US Department of Defense and the US
Department of State to transmit classified
information up to the level of ‘secret’
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System
The AFATDS provides army and marine corps
digitised, automated and totally integrated
fire support C2 system designed to replace the
Tactical Fire Direction System. It processes fire
mission and other target related information,
from corps and below to coordinate and opti-
mise the use of all fire support assets, including
mortars, field artillery, cannon, missile, attack
helicopters, air support, and naval gunfire.
Air and Missile Defense
Workstation
The AMDWS supports the Surface Launched
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
system by supplying the user with an air
defence picture through the depiction of
tracks of aircrafts, UAVs and deployed mis-
siles, thereby providing an automated defence
planning capability.
All Source Analysis System
The ASAS is an army programme to automate
the processing and analysis of intelligence data
from all sources. It is a tactically deployable
Automated Data Processing system designed
to support management of intelligence and
electronic warfare operations and target devel-
opment in battalions, brigades, armoured regi-
ments, separate brigades, divisions, corps and
echelons above corps. The ASAS is a “linchpin”
system that forms seamless intelligence archi-
tecture between and across echelons.
Battle Command and
Sustainment Support System
Formerly the Combat Service Support Control
System, the BCS3 supports the warfighting
C2 and battle management process by rapidly
processing large volumes of logistical, person-
nel and medical information. The BCS3 will
facilitate quicker, more accurate decision mak-
ing by providing a more effective means for
force-level commanders and Combat Support
Service (CSS) commanders to determine the
sustainability and supportability of current and
planned operations. Qualitative improvements
attributed to the BCS3 will be measured by
positive assessment by a substantial majority of
commanders and their staffs. The BCS3 will col-
lect and process selected CSS data in a seamless
manner from CSS Standard Army Management
Information Systems, manual systems/pro-
cesses and other related sources. The BCS3 is
employed at the battalion, brigade, division,
corps, separate brigade, armored regiment,
non-divisional brigade, group and regiment and
echelons above corps.
Combat Terrain Information
Systems (CTIS)
Army terrain teams must produce a wide
range of topographic products and analyses to
support mission planning for military opera-
tions. Digital Topographic Support System
(DTSS) is thus designed to support the army’s
requirement by building around the latest
commercial technology. CTIS in turn and
has developed a range of systems to provide
the required terrain analysis support to the
battlefield commander. By taking advantage
of two powerful commercial software pack-
ages, ESRI’s ArcInfo and ERDAS Imagine, the
Soldiers use the Tactical Airspace Integration System for
real-time views of aerial battlespace and operational flight paths
DTSS configurations can generate Tactical
Decision Aids from input terrain data and out-
put as map overlays for use on other systems
that use the Command and Control PC, ABCS
and Commercial Joint Mapping Toolkit view-
ers. CTIS systems are deployed from brigade
through echelons above corps.
Force XXI Battle Command,
Brigade-and-Below
The FBCB2 provides situational awareness and
command and control to the lowest tactical
echelons. It facilitates a seamless flow of battle
command information across the battlespace
and will interoperate with external command
and control and sensor systems, such as ABCS.
The end result is the vertical and horizontal
integration of the digital battlespace and the
brigade-and-below tactical unit levels. FBCB2
provides speedier C2 capabilities to Force XXI
units at brigade and subordinate echelons.
Tactical Airspace Integration
System
TAIS is a mobile communications and digitised
battlefield automated system for airspace man-
agement which is replacing the AN/TSC-61B
Flight Operations/Coordination System. It is
planned for employment in any theater of oper-
ations and will be the army system to meet both
Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2)
and Air Traffic Services (ATS) requirements. The
TAIS will provide the Force XXI battlefield with
automated A2C2 planning, enhanced A2C2
execution, improved theater and intra- and
inter-Corps/Division ATS support in war and
military operations other than war. Although
the TAIS was originally designed primarily as an
airspace management tool but it has the capa-
bility to enhance the lethality and survivability
of army aviation after integration into the Army
Tactical Command and Control System family.
Real and near real time battlefield information
integrating the battlefield functions of intelli-
gence, fire support, air defence, aviation maneu-
ver and airspace management would almost
ensure that all air borne platforms, including
the ones transiting through the battle space, are
properly directed, protected and controlled.
Maneuver Control System
MCS is an integrated architecture of hardware,
software, Standardized Integrated Command
Post System, personnel and procedures.
Army Battle Command System
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The MCS is designed as a set of modular
applications that “sit” on top of the Defense
Information Infrastructure Common Operating
Environment which contains government-off-
the-shelf and commercial-off-the-shelf tech-
nologies. It will also contain features and tools
which will allow addition of specific staff-officer
oriented applications, like operations order,
maps and overlays module. MCS will provide
the battlefield commander with a Common
Tactical Picture as applicable to him with the
aim of making the force more lethal and surviv-
able on the battlefield. MCS will primarily do
this by providing the planning and executing
functions and the integrating capability previ-
ously unavailable in an integrated manner. For
example, MCS-Light provides corps through
battalion force level commanders and staff the
ability to collect, coordinate, and act on near
real time battlefield information and to graphi-
cally visualise the battlefield.
AN/TMQ-40 Integrated
Meteorological System
The IMETS is the meteorological component of
the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare subsys-
tem of the ABCS. IMETS is a mobile, tactical,
automated weather data receiving, processing
and dissemination system which provides com-
manders at all echelons with an automated
weather system to receive, process, and dis-
seminate weather observations, forecasts, and
weather and environmental effects decision
aids to all Battlefield Operating Systems. The
IMETS is an US Army-furnished and main-
tained system operated by USAir Force weather
team personnel.
Integrated System Control
The ISYSCON provides an automated, theater-
wide system that signal units can use to man-
age multiple tactical communications systems
and networks in support of battlefield opera-
tions. It overcomes all shortfalls identified dur-
ing Operation Desert Storm and other recent
deployments. The ISYSCON facility carries out
the following functions:
• Provides an automated capability for man-
aging the tactical communications network
• Establishes an interface with each technical
control facility in the ABCS architecture
• Enables automation-assisted configura-
tion and management of a dynamic
battlefield SP
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 Te chnolog y
A
s the Indian armed forces embark
on digitization of the battlefield and
a transformation from the Fire and
Maneuver (FM) operations towards
a more digital and network-centric warfare
(NCW) doctrine, the soldier of the future
will be increasingly dependent upon mission
critical technology to perform his functions.
The military will have increased reliance on
interconnected and interdependent networks
that will link sensors, commanders, soldiers
and their weapons in real time from strategic
planning to tactical execution levels. The com-
manding hierarchy will need to simultane-
ously integrate and analyze data from multiple
sensors and sources and use this to make deci-
sions affecting all elements of combat power
in real time. Reliable computing will become
the backbone of these networks for Command,
Control and Communications.
Users must carefully
define the requirements
taking into account the
specific environment in
which the computer will
be deployed.
They cannot do their jobs if their comput-
ers stopped working at the critical moments
or if data is lost. They must be able to receive
the intelligence and successfully be able to
communicate their command decisions.
These are requirements needed to achieve the
mission objective.
When the collection, analysis and dis-
semination of the information is just as criti-
cal as having reliable weaponry, we have an
absolute obligation to provide soldiers with
dependable equipment that will allow them to
succeed in their jobs. Equipment that the sol-
diers will have full confidence in. – Equipment
that is expected to work under harsh battle-
field conditions every time, when it’s needed
most. Anything short of this will adversely
impact the ability to carry out the mission. Or
worse, affect their morale.
Any Battlefield, Any Time, Any
Border
The Indian military faces unique operational
and environmental challenges in protecting
its borders, which range from high mountains
to rain forests to deserts and everything in-
between. Overcoming these challenges does
not mean subjecting their equipment to tem-
perature extremes of hot and cold, but also to
the extremes of dust, sand, rain and humidity.
Increasingly, soldiers are operating in rugged
regions where there are no roads, subjecting
their vehicles and equipment to extreme vibra-
tion and shock conditions. Mitigating foreign
material such as soil, sand, dust, moisture or
liquids is paramount to protect the internal
sensitive electronics and storage media.
Operational commonality, training and
logistical considerations dictate that the
military must deploy systems that will work
in any place and under any extreme envi-
ronmental conditions. Battlefield computers
face unique challenges and require unique
solutions. They must deliver the operational
performance required to support the battle-
field command, control and communications
needs. Any time. Anywhere.
Rugged Computing. Is Good
Enough, Good Enough?
Soldiers are not only fighting external enemies,
they are also battling enemies caused by harsh
environments. Battlefield situations, whether
exposed to the elements or within vehicles and
command posts, subject the soldiers and their
equipment to unfavorable conditions.
Temptations to stretch the defence bud-
gets, force procurement decisions to accept
“subpar” equipment offered with “L1” pric-
ing. Equipment procured by the military for
non-critical applications gets deployed into
tactical environments because they are con-
sidered “rugged enough” with claimed com-
pliance to various “mil-specs”.
As the military tactics become increas-
ingly dependent upon the computers and
displays for mission success, requirements for
reliable equipment evolve from “desired” to
“mission critical.” Equipment failure, on the
battlefield, can have disastrous consequences;
from mission failures to the potential of put-
ting lives in danger.
Ultra-Rugged Computing
- Designed to Survive the
Battlefield
For over 20 years, DRS Tactical Systems has
maintained undisputed leadership in the
development, manufacture and deployment
of a class of “ultra-rugged” computer and
display systems. A diverse portfolio of prod-
ucts allows DRS to offer unique solutions to
satisfy various mission-critical operational
requirements to include vehicle mountedsys-
tems, tablet computers for commanders and
handheld devices for dismounted soldiers.
Deployed by the US Army’s Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and
the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) programs,
DRS delivered over 60,000 RVS-330 vehicle
computing systems with another 25,000 in
production. Deployed by the UK Army, DRS
delivered over 13,000 Scorpion notebook
and tablet computing, processing units and
Mission Critical
“Ultra Rugged”
Computing
Operational commonality, training and
logistical considerations dictate that the
military must deploy systems that will
work in any place and under any extreme
environmental conditions. Battlefield
computers face unique challenges and
require unique solutions. They must deliver
the operational performance required to
support the battlefield command, control and
communications needs. Any time. Anywhere.
JAY SHAH
command display systems for their BOWMAN
program. Deployed by the US Army and
the US Air Force, DRS delivered over 5000
Military Rugged Tablets (MRT) with another
20,000 in production for various fire control
and forward observer programs.
These systems are not just electronic
sub-assemblies enclosed in heavy metal
enclosures with circular interface connec-
tors to make them appear “rugged”. These
are designed completely from inside out to
counter the environmental elements in harsh
tactical environments.
Traditional cooling methods such as fans
from the sealed enclosures are eliminated to
prevent intrusion of sand, dust, moisture and
other foreign material. Cooling is performed
by special provisions inside the systems to
draw heat to the enclosure surfaces with “fins”
that enable efficient dissipation of the heat.
Provisions such as solid state hard disk drives
are made to enable operations on the move
in high vibration environments of tracked
vehicles. Optical treatments are done to the dis-
plays to enable operation in all light conditions;
from bright sunlight to night vision equipment
compatible. Most important, with complete
ownership of the product designs, DRS is able
to improve product capabilities with evolving
technologies for changing customer mission
requirements so that soldiers have the latest
RVS-330
Military
Rugged Tablet
and greatest technology in the field.
With production levels in 500-750 sys-
tems per week, DRS enjoys specially forged
and maintained relationships with all of
its key suppliers, ensuring timely deliveries
of components as well as commitments for
longer term product support, always insisted
upon by its military customers.
The growing market for rugged computers
is characterized by a degree of confusion about
the meaning of the term rugged. Users must
carefully define the requirements taking into
account the specific environment in which the
computer will be deployed. Evaluation and
selection should be based on demonstrated
compliance to the requirements, not mere
claims of compliance. After all, if you had
a choice between good-enough rugged
and ultra-rugged, what would you rather
take to the battle? SP
*The author is the Principal Systems Engineer in DRS Tactical Systems, Inc.,
Melbourne, Florida. USA
Contact Information:
DRS Tactical Systems, Inc.
1110 West Hibiscus Boulevard, Melbourne,
FL 32901. USA
Tel: +1.321.727.3672
Email: sales@drs-ts.com
www.drs-ts.com
Scorpion
Laptop
2/2009 SP’S LAND FORCES 13
 S t rateg y

Limited War: Concept & Co-Relation

India’s political elite need to take a close look at the very high levels of conventional military
force usage implicit in the Chinese doctrines for Limited War
MAJOR GENERAL (RETD) G.D. BAKSHI

Limited Wars in the Second 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, India had gradu- power. However, it restricted their employ- to Pakistan’s asymmetric war. This has
Nuclear Age ated to the phase of operational art. It had ment to its own side of the LC. By the time seriously eroded the credibility of India’s
employed a total of 12 divisions and its divi- of Operation Parakram and post Mumbai, deterrence. India therefore, urgently needs

B
sional, corps and field army commanders the employment of military force for com- to enunciate and practice a credible, declara-
ernard Brodei and William acquired valuable hands on experience which bat had come down to zero. In Operation tory doctrine of Limited War under condi-
Kaufmann were the chief theorists was to stand them in good stead later. Parakram, India had mobilised its entire tions of nuclear symmetry.
of Limited War in the First Nuclear • 1971 Quasi–Total War Capability: It was armed forces but the “all or nothing”, format
Age that spawned the Cold War only with the 1971 war for the liberation of of this coercive deployment sharply raised Cold Start Doctrine or Cold Feet
in Europe. In his seminal book, A Fire in the Bangladesh, that India acquired the capabil- the stakes for the decision makers. It thereby Syndrome?
East: The Rise of Asian Military Power in the ity and displayed the will to use military force paralysed the military response that could The cold start doctrine was enunciated post
Second Nuclear Age, Paul Bracken writes that in a decisive manner. 1971 was a quasi–total well have been initiated at the lower levels Operation Parakram to overcome the per-
the Second Nuclear Age began with India’s war that led, for the first time after the Second of the escalation ladder. Such a response ceived lacunae observed in that confronta-
peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974. Asia
today has five nuclear powers: Russia, China,
India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea is a
de facto nuclear power and Iran is well on
its way to becoming one. What would be the
nature of Limited Wars that may be fought
in Asia in the backdrop of five and more
nuclear armed powers? Would the Limited
War theories of the Cold War era in Europe
hold true for Asia?
A study of Chinese writings on Limited
War indicates that China’s concept of
Limited War envisages restraint only at
the nuclear level. Its use of conventional
military force in such Limited Wars (Local
Wars under conditions of informatisation)
remains exceedingly high. Thus, China had
used over a million troops in the Korean
War. In the Sino Vietnam War of 1979, it
had thrown in 25 Infantry divisions. In any
hypothetical conflict over Taiwan, China is
likely to employ over 3,00,000 troops, its
entire air and naval might and could end
up firing more than 1,000 conventional
tipped missiles to deny access to the US
Carrier Battle Groups. The Chinese concept
of Limited or Local Wars, even under con-
ditions of nuclear symmetry is, therefore,
characterised by very high levels of the use
of conventional military force.

Limited Wars in South Asia

The Indian political elite, on the other hand,

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

seem to have come to the unfortunate con-
clusion that post nuclearisation the use of
conventional military force is no longer a
viable option. Deterrence is primarily a mind
game. It is here that India’s non-use of con-
ventional military force—post Operation
Parakram and post Mumbai 26/11—has
seriously eroded the credibility of Indian
deterrence.
Empirical Analysis: India’s
Plummeting Force Usage Profile
The above is not a value judgement but stems
from a quantitative analysis of India’s force
usage profile. India’s use of military force
since independence has always been limited
due simply to the limitations in force availabil-
ity. The histogram below indicates the number
of divisions that India has deployed for com-
bat in the various wars since independence.
WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET
World War, to the creation of a new nation
state with the force of arms. A total of 19 divi-
sions along with India’s entire might of naval
and air power were employed in a classic tri-
service campaign. Indian political and military
leaders had displayed the vision and manage-
rial skills required for waging a quasi–total
war that led to a historic military victory.
• Post 1987 Scenario: Post the covert
nuclearisation of the sub-continent, there
was a distinct downtrend in force usage.
Nevertheless, India still employed up to four
divisions-plus in Sri Lanka in a classic power
tion. Henry Kissinger writes, “a deterrent
There is an urgent need which one is afraid to implement when
to examine air power challenged ceases to be a deterrent”. This
was primarily a land power centric doctrine.
and naval power centric The use of land power generates a great
doctrines of Limited War deal of the fog of war. It cannot easily be
calibrated in a very precise manner. There
which enable initiation of is an urgent need to examine air power and
hostilities at much lower naval power centric doctrines of Limited
War which enable initiation of hostilities
rungs of the escalation at much lower rungs of the escalation lad-
ladder der. These must provide credible and usable
options that put the onus of further escala-

projection role. Unfortunately, it was a wrong tion squarely on the aggressor.

India’s Force Usage Profile
• Tactical Phase: The initial phase of
Indian military history (from 1947-1962),
was the tactical phase. The force levels avail-
able and the military competence of Indian
commanders of that era constrained / limited
force usage to the tactical level alone. In both
1947-48 conflict with Pakistan and the 1962
war with China, the force usage was confined
to just three divisions each.
• Phase of Operational Art: With the
war in the wrong strategic direction. It locked
up India’s strategic reserves in the south
while Pakistan gained strategic depth in
Afghanistan unhindered.
• Post 1998 Scenario: Post the overt
nuclearisation of South Asia, the crippling
constraints on India’s usage of conventional
military force became painfully evident. In
response to Pakistan’s intrusions in Kargil,
India carried out partial mobilisation and
employed two divisions along with air
would have been far more feasible, just and
proportionate. It would have transferred the
onus of escalation entirely on to Pakistan.
Post the nuclearisation of South Asia, the
Indian political elite seem to have concluded
that use of conventional military force is no
longer a viable response to sub-conventional
provocations. This has led to a sharp and
visible decline in India’s force usage profile
to virtually zero. It has condemned India
in perpetuity to a purely defensive response
India’s political elite need to take a close
look at the very high levels of conventional
military force usage implicit in the Chinese
doctrines for Limited War. We have mir-
rored our nuclear doctrine on the Chinese
minimalist model based on “no first use”.
We equally need to closely examine the
Chinese views on Limited Conventional
war. There are very significant lessons there
that become sharply relevant in the post-
Mumbai context. SP

14 SP’S LAND FORCE S 2/ 2 0 09


News i n B r i e f
‘SAILING ACROSS THE DESERT
AND SEAS’ EXPEDITION
CONCLUDES
The Bombay Sapper units under the
Southern Command undertook a ‘Sailing
across the Desert and Seas’ expedition from
Munabao to Vigakot. The expedition com-
prising two groups, commenced simultane-
ously on 21 Feb 09 - one from Munabao
which was flagged off by Lt Gen AM Verma,
General Officer Commanding (GOC), Desert
Corps while the other which sailed from
Mumbai was flagged off by and Lt Gen USP
Sinha, Commandant, College of Military
Engineering (CME). The 09 officers and 02
other ranks that sailed out from Mumbai on
‘Seabird’ class boats reached Koteshwar in
Kori Creek on 01 Mar 09 covering 950 Kms
after a halt at Porbander.
■ machine and no casualties, the officer said.
US Army to Use More Electronic
Warfare
The U.S. Army’s new Training and Doctrine
Command leader Gen. Martin Dempsey is
focusing on how to bring elements of the ser-
vice’s new Electronic Warfare doctrine to the
fight in Afghanistan. EW efforts have already
proven vital to Army efforts to precisely locate
and target enemy fighters, he said. Dempsey
is focusing on EW integration as it applies to
the unique challenges of the current war in
Afghanistan. “What we are trying to become
is more versatile. We are trying to integrate
things like electronics, signal intelligence and
full motion video. You would want a platform
able to integrate those things,” said Dempsey.
Along these lines, the Army is bringing more
electronic capability to Afghanistan in order
to help units navigate the countries varied,
rigorous terrain. In Afghanistan, soldiers are
conducting missions in both desert areas and
high-altitude, mountainous regions, Dempsey
said. For instance, the Army has begun fielding
a high-altitude counter-IED unit Task Force
Odin in Afghanistan; more UAVs such as the
Army’s Sky Warrior are planned for later this
year. The EW manual specifies key areas of
electronic attack, including both offensive and
defensive activities. “Defensive electronic attack
protects friendly personnel and equipment or
platforms. Offensive electronic attack denies,
disrupts or destroys enemy capabilities,” the
EW manual states. Looking toward the future,
Army leaders expect to see EW as a fast evolv-
ing area of focus likely to take on new shapes
in years to come. “It is probably not wise to
think of an end state in terms of collecting
intelligence over time,” Dempsey said.
■ date, the Hermes 450s have flown more than
Russia, China to Hold Joint
Military Exercises
Russia and China will conduct joint military
exercises this summer on Chinese territory,
Interfax news agency reported on March 18,
citing a source in the Russian defense ministry.
“Consultations between the two countries’
defense ministries will begin shortly, in which
the forces and resources involved in the exer-
cises are to be determined, as well as the the-
matic focus of the joint maneuvers,” he said.
Counter-terrorism will be one element of the
war games, said the source. He did not specify
the timing of the exercises, but Interfax report-
ed that they would take place in summer 2009
on Chinese territory. “These will be bilateral
Russian-Chinese exercises and not maneu-
vers under the auspices of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO),” the source
said, referring to a six-nation regional group
led by Moscow and Beijing. Russia and China
have stepped up their military cooperation in
recent years, holding regular joint exercises
since 2005, although analysts say the SCO has
yet to become a full-fledged military alliance.
During the Cold War, Moscow and Beijing had
a tense relationship as rivals for the leadership
of the Communist world.
■ General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on Monday
Bomb Damages NATO
Equipment in Pakistan
A man in Pakistan on March 18 hurled a
grenade at a NATO supply truck carrying
machinery destined for Afghanistan, damag-
ing the equipment, police said. The attacker
threw the hand grenade as trucks loaded
with supplies waited for customs clearance
near the Chaman border crossing in south-
western Baluchistan province, local police
officer Gul Mohammad said.
“Soon after the grenade blast, people saw
a man fleeing the area, and (he) disappeared
in the rush,” he said, quoting witnesses. The
truck was carrying a machine for drilling
wells. The blast caused “minor damage” to the
The crossing was briefly closed to trucks after
the attack, for which nobody has claimed
responsibility. NATO and US-led forces in land-
locked Afghanistan are hugely dependent on
Pakistan for supplies and equipment, about 80
percent of which is transported through the
troubled country. Baluchistan has been rocked
by a four-year insurgency waged by tribal
rebels fighting for political autonomy and a
greater share of profits from the region’s natu-
ral resources. The province has also been hit
by attacks blamed on Taliban militants.
■ 17,000 additional troops on top of the 38,000
U.K. To Extend UAV-by-the-
Hour Deal
Britain’s Ministry of Defence is to extend a
UAV-by-the-hour deal with Thales UK that
provides the military in Afghanistan with key
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition
and reconnaissance capabilities. Company
officials attending an engineering and science
event here March 11 confirmed that they
are close to completing arrangements for the
ISTAR deal to run through to the in-service
date of the British Army’s Watchkeeper UAV
system scheduled for 2011. Thales has been
providing the service for British forces since
mid-2007 to help plug a gap in British ISTAR
capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Under an
urgent operational requirement deal with the
MoD, Thales provides the Elbit Hermes 450
tactical UAV, contractor logistics support and
program management services. It also trains
the military in the use and maintenance of
the system. The UAV-by-the-hour service has
drawn considerable attention from Canada,
France and other NATO nations that need
similarly rapid hikes in ISTAR capabilities. To
18,000 hours for the British in the two opera-
tional theaters, a Thales UK spokeswomen said.
The original two-year deal was expected to be
worth around 60 million pounds ($83 million),
much of that going to UAV provider Elbit.
■
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief
Jayant Baranwal
Editor
Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor
US Wants Afghanistan Exit
Strategy Assistant Editor
Arundhati Das
The United States met Nato allies on Monday
23 March to outline its policy review for Senior Technical Group Editor
Afghanistan after President Barack Obama Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand
said it would contain an exit strategy and Contributing Editor
greater emphasis on economic development. Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia
“What we can’t do is think that just a military
Sub-Editor
approach in Afghanistan is going to be able to Bipasha Roy
solve our problems,” he said in an interview
with CBS TV’s 60 minutes. So what we’re Contributors
looking for is a comprehensive strategy. And India
General (Retd) V.P. Malik
there’s got to be an exit strategy ... There’s Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi
got to be a sense that this is not perpetual Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra
drift.” The interview gave a taste of what Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar
to expect in the results of a comprehensive Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney
policy review on Afghanistan and Pakistan Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta
expected soon. Officials have already said Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol
Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal
the review would include more coordination
Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra
with other stakeholders than practised by the Rohit Sharma
Bush administration. In Brussels, US Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Europe
Andrew Brookes (UK)
Richard Holbrooke met Nato Secretary-
USA & Canada
before briefing the 26 alliance ambassadors. Lon Nordeen (USA)
Anil R. Pustam (West Indies)
■ South Africa
Helmoed R. Heitman
Taliban Dialogue Chairman & Managing Director
Some analysts say Washington is going to have Jayant Baranwal
to engage in dialogue with Taliban elements, a
Admin & Coordination
point Obama and Vice President Joe Biden have Bharti Sharma
conceded recently. However, in Afghanistan
itself other experts have suggested that idea is Design
Associate Art Director: Ratan Sonal
a non-starter. And Taliban-led insurgents such Layout Designs: Rajkumar Sharma,
as the Haqqani network, which has admitted Vimlesh Kumar Yadav
carrying out some of the most deadly attacks
Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on
on civilians and foreign troops in Afghanistan, behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All
dismiss the dialogue proposals as a trick to rights reserved. No part of this publication
weaken and divide militants. In an interview may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
with Reuters on Monday Sirajuddin Haqqani system, or transmitted in any form or by any
said all Taliban were the same and no parts of means, photocopying, recording, electronic,
or otherwise without the prior written
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permission of the publishers.
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