EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127182. December 5, 2001]

HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA P. GAMINDE, Commissioner, and HON. RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and SECRETARY RAFAEL M. ALUNAN, III, Department of Interior and Local Government, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACOB F. MONTESA, respondents. RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For resolution is private respondents motion for reconsideration of the January 22, 2001 Decision of the Court, which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38664 and reinstated Resolution Nos. 953268 and 955201 of the Civil Service Commission. In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private respondents appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig,[1] we held that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service (CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al., decided on September 26, 1990,[2] where the nature of private respondents appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, was first contested, this Court issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private respondent. The pertinent portion thereof reads -

The holding of this Court in the Achacoso case is not applicable to petitioner Montesa. Petitioner was appointed on August 28, 1996 by virtue of Article III of the Freedom Constitution. He was extended a permanent appointment by then Minister Pimentel and subsequently confirmed as permanent by the Civil Service Commission. He is a first grade civil service eligible (RA 1080) the appropriate eligibility for the position at that time and a member of the Philippine bar. There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6) members sometime in August 1988. There was no CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given on August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a requirement at the time of the appointment of petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the position to
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which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature of his appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case considering that said issue had already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court. Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court,[3] would bar a re-litigation of the nature of private respondents appointment. Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be contoverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.[4] Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the first time in Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence.[5] In the March 17, 1992 Minute Resolution, we held that private respondent who was appointed in 1986 pursuant to the Freedom Constitution, though not a CES eligible, possessed all the requirements for the position of Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local Government, since a CES eligibility was not, at that time, a requirement for the same position. A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, clearly shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. Thus:

c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualifies in such examination.
In fact, in March 1974, the CES Board issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid down the requirements for membership in the CES, to wit:

a) Successful completion of CESDP shall constitute one of the requirements for membership in the CES. Except as otherwise provided by law, no person shall be admitted into the CES without having satisfactorily completed the program; b) Admission into CESDP shall be limited to incumbents of positions falling within the CES duly nominated by their Department Heads; c) Upon satisfactory completion of the program, the incumbent-participant shall be enrolled in the roster of CES eligibles and shall be qualified for appointment by the President to the appropriate
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rank in the CES upon recommendation of the Board. He may then be assigned to any position in the CES by the President.
The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitution. A CES eligibility was an existing and operative requirement at the time of private respondents appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither were the said law and circular inconsistent with the Freedom Constitution as to render them modified or superseded. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently acquire the needed eligibility. It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the questioned appointment was made on October 16, 1987, before the CES Board was reconstituted in 1988, and before the first CESO examination was given in 1990, as in the present case. Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of one who does not possess such eligibility shall be temporary. Evidently, a CES eligibility has always been one of the requirements for a position embraced in the CES. The Court finds no reason to make an exception in the instant controversy. Moreover, in the recent case of Secretary of Justice v. Josefina Bacal,[6] we ruled that security of tenure in the CES is acquired with respect to rank and not to position. Hence, assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other positions of the same rank or salary,[7] justify his transfer to other CES position without violating his right to security of tenure. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Buena, J., on official leave.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner. 1. The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event. 2. On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. 3. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

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4. The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter. 5. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. 6. Meling filed his Answer with the OBC. 7. Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." 8. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude. 9. As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk. 10. OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise: The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. 11. The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty. 12. As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say: Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. 13. Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 14. We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. 15. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic. Issue: whether or not Meling be disqualified in the examinations for the bar in relation to the violation of CPR for non-disclosure of his pending criminal cases Held: Yes Ratio: 1. The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him spea ks of his lack of the requisite good moral character. 2. The Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. 3. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court. 4. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic. Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union (CFSWU) and Filemon Alvarez v. Lo Bu and Court of Appeals No. L-40136, March 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 321 Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Wednesday, April 04, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century Foundry Shop where he and his family resided in the premises. After several attempts to settle a pending unfair labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all his business, including equipment and rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu, for Php20,000.

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On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18, 1973, levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale.

Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb 23, 1973, denied his motion. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration.

Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated July 17, 1993. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila covering the same properties.

Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a second motion to dismiss complaint. After the complaint was dismissed by the lower court, decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner Labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.

(2) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the court while sustaining the dignity of the profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu.

Held:

Writ of certiorari is granted and the order of Respondent CA reinstating appeal is nullified and set aside.

The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent CA being perpetually restrained from taking any further action in such appeal, except that of dismissing it.

Courts should dismiss a suit which has all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor controversy. There was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the CFI Manila. What is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance , as he himself was the petitioner in the

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certiorari proceedings before this Court. He was a prinicipal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of the petitioner labor union.

Rule that certiorari will not be granted where petitioners have plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law will not be enforced where it would result in further delay in satisfaction of judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labors just claim.

A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients cause but not at the expense of truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws. For even such case, Atty Busmente had not exculpated himself. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.

Share this legal resource:Google+0Pinterest0LinkedIn0Twitter2tumblrReddit0Facebook0 24 SCRA 402 Legal Ethics Duty to Assist in the Administration of Justice In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was awarded compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he incurred while working for Samar Mining. The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by Francisco Arnado, a regional administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar Minings lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an action for certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no authority or jurisdiction over said case because he was a mere labor lawyer who had no authority to render the award being complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas. Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v. Villanueva (L-15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional administrators of the labor department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas still filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal has merit. HELD: No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in the ho pe of draining the resources of the poorer party and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion. The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.

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