2002 Children Concept of Addition

Educational Psychology, Vol. 22, No.
5, 2002
Young Children’s Understanding of Addition

Concepts
KATHERINE H. CANOBI, ROBERT A. REEVE &

PHILIPPA E. PATTISON, The University of Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT Children’s knowledge of concrete versions of additive composition, commutativity

and associativity was investigated in two studies. In Study 1, 24 four- to ve-year-olds and
25 ve- to six-year-olds judged the equivalence of conceptually related addition problems
presented using groups of objects. In Study 2, 45 ve- to six-year-olds judged related problems
and solved addition problems. Both studies indicated that concrete versions of principles were
salient to most children although associativity was more dif cult than commutativity and there
were considerable individual differences in children’s understanding. Study 1 results indicated
that schoolchildren were more accurate at recognising additive composition than preschoolers
and Study 2 results suggested that commutativity knowledge was related to using advanced
counting strategies for solving addition problems. Overall, the research supports the claim that
examining early knowledge of addition principles provides important insights into children’s
emerging part–whole knowledge and mathematical development.
Introduction
The aim of the research was to explore children’s knowledge of concrete versions of
addition principles in order better to understand the emergence and development of
part–whole knowledge. Recognising the ways in which a whole is composed of different
parts is fundamental to number sense and underlies many relationships between
addition problems. For example, parts added in different orders still equal the whole,
therefore a 1 b 5 b 1 a (commutativity). Principles such as additive composition, com-
mutativity and associativity are fundamental properties of addition and exploring the
sequence in which children learn about them is likely to shed light on the development
of part–whole knowledge. However, despite the prominence of such principles in key
theories of mathematical development (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Piaget, 1952;
Resnick, 1992), surprisingly little is known about how children learn about them. For
example, some principles (such as associativity) are more complex than others (such as
ISSN 0144-3410 print; ISSN 1469-046X online/02/050513-20 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/0144341022000023608
514 K. H. Canobi et al.
commutativity) and may be acquired later but few studies have addressed the develop-
mental sequence in children’s part–whole knowledge. The lack of research into addition
principles is especially problematic given the evidence that individual differences in
children’s knowledge of the principles are systematically related to their skill in solving
school addition problems (Canobi, in press; Canobi, Reeve, & Pattison, 1998). Re-
search into children’s knowledge of different principles is needed in order to understand
the emergence and development of conceptual understanding in addition.
Because the addition principles vary in complexity, they provide a useful framework
for investigating different forms of part–whole knowledge. Additive composition is the
principle that larger sets are made up of smaller sets. Commutativity is the principle
that problems containing the same sets in a different order have the same answer,
a 1 b 5 b 1 a. Associativity is the principle that problems in which sets are decomposed,
and recombined in different orders, have the same answer, (a 1 b) 1 c 5 a 1 (b 1 c).
It seems likely that knowledge of addition principles emerges through noticing
regularities in the ways in which physical objects can be combined. For example, the
process of combining sets is commutative in the sense that the order in which groups
of objects are combined is irrelevant to the total number of objects in the combined set.
An appreciation of principle-based regularities in interactions with sets of objects is
viewed as important to conceptual development (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Piaget,
1952; Resnick, 1992). For instance, Resnick (1986, 1992, 1994) argues that concep-
tual development occurs as children map new forms of understanding onto an initially
“protoquantitative” part–whole schema. Speci cally, children may initially understand
commutativity and associativity in terms of how physical objects can be joined together
and a crucial development occurs when counting knowledge is combined with the
part–whole schema so that children can reason using equations such as 2 apples 1 3
apples 5 3 apples 1 2 apples. Resnick argues that, at a later stage, children begin to
reason with numbers independently of their referential context (2 1 3 5 3 1 2) before
understanding the principles as abstract rules (a 1 b 5 b 1 a). The claim that children
rst learn about addition principles in the context of physical objects (Gelman &
Gallistel, 1978; Resnick, 1992) has important theoretical and educational implications
and further research is needed to specify changes in children’s understanding of
concrete versions of part–whole concepts.
Because the addition principles are likely to be important to children’s conceptual
understanding, it is of interest to explore the sequence or sequences in which children
learn about them. However, not all researchers suggest a separation of addition
principles in children’s representations. For example, Resnick (1992, 1994) claims that
associativity and commutativity are not distinct in children’s understanding, citing a
longitudinal study of Pitt, a seven-year-old who regarded commutativity and associativ-
ity as self-evident permissions rooted in additive composition. However, although Pitt
may have come to recognise the interdependency of the principles, it is possible that he
came to appreciate the principles at different stages. Moreover, there is some evidence
that commutativity may be acquired before associativity (Canobi et al., 1998; Close &
Murtagh, 1986; Langford, 1981). For example, Close and Murtagh (1986) found that
children correctly solved more written problems designed to re ect commutativity than
associativity, but this difference may have been associated with the computational
rather than conceptual demands involved in solving three-addend problems. Canobi et
al. (1998) measured conceptual knowledge separately from problem solving and found
that children were more successful at recognising and explaining the relationship
between commuted problems than those depicting aspects of additive composition and
Children’s Understanding of Addition Concepts 515
associativity. However, the ndings of both studies pertain to symbolically presented

problems (2 1 3 5 3 1 2) and it is unclear how the results apply to children’s reasoning
about physical objects. Langford (1981) investigated concrete versions of the principles
in a longitudinal study in which children’s responses to an interviewer’s descriptions of
actions on covered boxes of beans suggested that knowledge of commutativity precedes
associativity. However, in this study, children needed to remember the interviewer’s
descriptions in order to respond correctly and associativity items involved more sets
(and longer descriptions) than commutativity items. Therefore, further research into
the comparative dif culty of recognising various addition principles in the context of
physical objects is needed. Such research should control for possible confounding
factors such as a reliance on verbal instructions and the potential use of computation
procedures on tasks designed to measure conceptual understanding.
A further interpretive dif culty with previous research is that it is unclear why
children nd associativity [(a 1 b) 1 c 5 a 1 (b 1 c)] comparatively dif cult. For exam-
ple, Langford’s (1981) associativity task was the same as his commutativity task, except
that it involved three boxes of beans instead of two. Presented symbolically, Langford’s
associativity task may have been more closely analogous to the equation
a 1 b 1 c 5 b 1 c 1 a than to the equation (a 1 b) 1 c 5 a 1 (b 1 c). However, in order to
assess associativity understanding, it is necessary to assess knowledge of decomposing
and recombining sets. For instance, Resnick and Omanson (1987) reported an example
of associativity knowledge among school children who solved problems such as 23 1 8
by decomposing 23 into 20 1 3 then recon guring the problem into (20 1 8) 1 3
(Resnick, 1992). In this example, children decomposed one addend and then recom-
bined the resulting numbers in a new order. This re ects aspects of the principle not
assessed by Langford. Canobi et al. (1998) examined problem relationships of the form
(a 1 b) 1 c 5 a 1 b 1 c and a 1 b 1 c 5 a 1 (b 1 c), thereby assessing aspects of associa-
tivity related to additive composition but not the complete principle. Therefore, the role
of knowledge about three rather than two sets as well as the composition and ordering
of sets in part–whole development is unclear.
Children’s responses to these mathematical principles may allow the identi cation of
pro les of part–whole knowledge. In support, Canobi et al. (1998) found that a key
aspect of individual differences in conceptual knowledge was a tendency for children to
1. understand both commutativity and associativity type relations

2. understand only commutativity type relations or
3. understand neither form of relation
Identifying the mathematical relationships that children understand is consistent with

calls for investigations of knowledge pro les across mathematical tasks (Bisanz &
Lefevre, 1992; Sophian, 1997) and claims that greater attention should be paid to
individual differences in children’s mathematics (Dowker 1998, Pellegrino & Goldman,
1989; Siegler, 1987, 1996; Widaman & Little, 1992).
In addition to helping explain individual differences in children’s addition, examining
children’s emerging knowledge of addition principles has the potential to shed light on
the connections children make between informal knowledge and school mathematics.
In particular, it may be useful to compare the addition concepts of children who have
not yet entered school with those who have begun to learn school mathematics. A study
by Canobi et al. (1998) suggests that the accuracy of 6- to 8-year-olds’ explanations of
problem relationships based on additive composition, commutativity and associativity
is related to their problem solving skills; in particular, children with advanced

patterns of principle knowledge are faster, more accurate and more exible at solving
school addition problems than other children. Conceptually advanced children are
more likely to report retrieving problem answers from memory, as well as using
decomposition (derived fact) and advanced counting strategies to solve problems
(Canobi et al., 1998).
Although these ndings suggest that older children’s problem solving is related to
principle-type knowledge in the context of symbolic problems, less is known about
younger children’s knowledge of concrete versions of the principles and their early
counting and problem solving skills. Indeed, a study by Sophian, Harley, and Martin
(1995) suggests that children as young as three have some appreciation of principles
in physical contexts even when they cannot enumerate the sets to be compared.
Sophian and colleagues argue that this research supports claims by Resnick (1992,
1994) that for very young children, understanding of part–whole relations is indepen-
dent of mental representations underlying quanti cation and counting. Moreover,
based on a study of ve- to six-year-olds, Baroody and Gannon (1984) argue that
children’s use of the min strategy (counting on from the larger addend) does not
necessarily re ect knowledge of commutativity. These two studies suggest that chil-
dren’s early counting and problem solving skills may not be related to their knowledge
of addition principles.
Nonetheless, other studies suggest that conceptual knowledge underlies children’s
use of advanced counting procedures to solve addition problems (Cowan & Renton,
1996; Fuson, 1982, 1988; Martins-Mourao & Cowan, 1998; Siegler & Crowley, 1994).
For example, some researchers suggest that children’s use of order-indifferent counting
strategies such as min re ect a functional understanding of commutativity (Canobi et
al., 1998; Cowan & Renton, 1996; Groen & Resnick, 1977). Similarly, based on
children’s rearrangement of quantities in word problems and construction of amounts
with different coins as compared with their counting on, Martins-Mourao & Cowan
(1998) argue that counting on may be a consequence of understanding additive
composition. Moreover, conceptual understanding of what constitutes a legitimate
addition strategy precedes children’s ability to count on from the larger addend instead
of counting all addends starting from one (Siegler & Crowley, 1994). Counting on is
a more ef cient strategy because children start their nal count of the two addends
from one of the addends instead of starting their nal count from zero (therefore to
solve 3 1 2, children count, “three, four, ve”). Also, Fuson argues that counting on
re ects a signi cant conceptual advance as it involves representing an addend using a
cardinal number in the nal count (Fuson, 1982, 1988). However, although separate
studies suggest that forms of conceptual understanding may be related to using
particular counting procedures when solving addition problems, this work has tended
to focus on isolated aspects of the relationship between conceptual knowledge and
problem solving skill in older children. Research into relations between children’s
part–whole concepts and early problem solving is needed.
In the present research, children judged the equivalence of pairs of addition problems
presented using physical objects. Problem pairs varied in the order in which groups of
objects were combined as well as the composition and number of groups. In order to
examine knowledge related to different principles, children judged the equivalence of:
1. two- and three-addend commuted problems such as a 1 b5 b 1 a and

a1 b1 c5 a1 c1 b
2. two- and three-addend problems in which sets were decomposed or combined, for
example, (a 1 b) 5 a 1 b and (a 1 b) 1 c 5 a 1 b 1 c
3. problem pairs analogous to associativity: (a 1 b) 1 c 5 a 1 (b 1 c)
Parentheses in equations were represented by groups presented in combination (groups

were presented in a single container not separate containers). A large set of an
unspeci ed numerosity was used, in order to prevent children from using computa-
tional procedures such as mental calculation, counting or subitising. An interviewer
moved uncovered groups of objects so children did not need to remember verbal
descriptions.
The claim that commutativity knowledge precedes associativity knowledge (Canobi
et al., 1998; Close & Murtagh, 1986; Langford, 1981) was explored by addressing three
issues. The rst was whether this nding would be supported for concrete versions of
the principles. The second was whether there are differences between children’s
responses to problem pairs designed to re ect additive composition and commutativity
and between their responses to problem pairs designed to re ect additive composition
and associativity. Exploring this issue would provide insight into whether children’s
dif culties in understanding associativity are due to a weakness in understanding
additive composition, and whether early forms of additive composition understanding
precede commutativity knowledge, as might be expected on the basis of Resnick’s
theory (1986, 1992). The third issue was the involvement of three rather than two sets
in associativity. If the relative dif culty of associativity is only due to the need to
consider three sets, children should nd it more dif cult to judge additive composition
and commutativity problems involving three rather than two groups. Examining these
issues was expected to provide insight into the relationships between knowledge of
different principles, and what aspects of the complex associativity principle are dif cult
for children (the presence of three sets and/or the decomposition of sets and/or
recombination of sets). More generally, examining these issues was expected to provide
insight into the development of children’s part–whole knowledge in the context of
physical objects.
In addition to exploring the relative dif culty of part–whole concepts, the research
was designed to compare the understanding of children who have just entered school
to that of younger children. Examining age group differences was expected to provide
insight into how conceptual understanding develops after children enter school. How-
ever, focussing on age group differences alone could lead to an inaccurate picture of
development because important individual differences among children of the same age
could be overlooked. Therefore, in addition to comparing the performance of age
groups, a cluster analysis exploring different pro les of performance was conducted.
The relationship between children’s conceptual judgements and problem solving
with the aid of counters was also examined. Given previous research indicating that
sophisticated counting strategies have conceptual underpinnings (Canobi et al., 1998;
Cowan & Renton, 1996; Fuson, 1982, 1988; Martins-Mourao & Cowan, 1998; Siegler
& Crowley, 1994), part–whole knowledge was expected to be related to using order-
indifferent counting strategies and counting on strategies. Moreover, based on research
into older children’s problem solving and judgements of symbolic problems (Canobi et
al., 1998), it was hypothesised that children’s patterns of conceptual judgements would
be related to their problem solving accuracy.
The relative dif culty of concrete versions of addition principles and individual
differences in conceptual knowledge were explored in two studies. Study 1 involved
preschool and school children, enabling an exploration of age group differences. In

Study 2 schoolchildren solved school addition problems as well as making conceptual
judgements, enabling an examination of relations between conceptual knowledge and
problem solving.
Study 1: Method
Participants
Participants attended a primary (elementary) school or kindergarten in multicultural,
lower-to-middle socioeconomic status suburbs in a large Australian city. There were 49
participants: 11 boys and 13 girls in kindergarten (preschool) whose mean ages were 5
years 2 months (SD 5 3 months) and 5 years 2 months (SD 5 5 months) respectively,
and 10 boys and 15 girls in preparatory (reception) grade whose mean ages were 5 years
11 months (SD 5 4 months) and 6 years 2 months (SD 5 4 months) respectively. The
parents of the children gave written consent to their participation.
Materials and Procedure

An addition principles judgement task was administered in order to explore the
children’s understanding of concrete versions of additive composition, commutativity
and associativity. The task involved making judgements about the equivalence of pairs
of addition problems presented using groups of objects. Similar to the procedure
adopted by Sophian et al. (1995), children made judgements about the equivalence of
conceptually related and unrelated pairs of problems in the context of deciding whether
two toys had been given the same number of objects.
A female experimenter interviewed children individually in two 15–25 minute
videotaped sessions because pilot work revealed that some of the younger children
found it dif cult to concentrate throughout one long session. At the start of the rst
session, the interviewer invited children to play a game in which two toy bears received
some smarties (sweets similar to M&Ms), asking them to judge whether the bears had
the same number of smarties. The interviewer told children that they did not have to
count the smarties. She showed them two 5cm x 3.5 cm blue boxes, saying, “Look,
these boxes are the same. They both have three blue smarties in them.” She then
repeated the procedure with two green boxes, each containing four green smarties. The
interviewer also showed children two red boxes, each containing 16 red smarties piled
on top of each other so that they could not be counted. In order to prevent children
from calculating mentally, the interviewer did not mention the numerosity of the red
smarties but said that the two red boxes contained the same number of red smarties.
Children were not allowed to touch the displays.
Children sat facing two toy bears. Each toy had three empty containers in front of it.
In order to familiarise children with the task and to check that they remembered that
matching boxes contained equal numbers of smarties, the interviewer administered
practice trials at the start of the sessions, in which she poured a single box of smarties
into a container in front of each toy. As she distributed the smarties, the interviewer
described her actions (“Bill gets a box of red smarties and Kate gets a box of red
smarties.”). After distributing the smarties, she asked, “Do Bill and Kate have the same
number of smarties?” She then informed children whether their judgement was correct,
describing the display (“Yes! Bill’s got a box of red smarties and Kate’s got a box of red
smarties. So they do have the same number of smarties.”) After children responded
correctly to three consecutive randomly ordered practice trials, including one involving
the same number of smarties and one involving a different number of smarties, the
interviewer administered the test trials.
The test trials were similar to the practice trials except that the interviewer gave two
or three groups of smarties to each toy, in effect presenting children with a pair of
addition problems. Table I shows that in order to measure children’s knowledge of
addition principles in a concrete context, some pairs of problems were conceptually
related. In order to assess commutativity knowledge, trials involved judging the equiv-
alence of two problems, each comprising two groups of smarties in separate containers,
but with the groups presented in a different order. In order to assess knowledge about
additive composition, trials involved judging the equivalence of a problem in which two
groups were combined (in a single container) and one in which the equivalent groups
were presented in separate containers. Three-group order and composition trials were
exactly the same as these two-group trials, except that they involved three groups of
smarties instead of two. The purpose of testing commutativity and additive composition
knowledge in the context of three groups of objects was to examine whether the
involvement of three sets increases the dif culty of principle judgements.
Order of composition trials involved changing the order in which two out of three
groups were combined in a single container. As well as examining commutativity
knowledge, the trials were designed to test whether responses to composition trials were
associated with comparing sets presented in combination with sets presented separately
(additive composition knowledge) or with judging any trials involving sets presented in
combination. Recomposition trials involved problems containing three groups in which
different pairs of groups were combined. They were designed to address associativity
knowledge. In one problem, the rst two sets were combined (in a single container) while
the third set was presented separately. In the other problem, the rst set was presented
in a single container while the other two sets were combined. Children judged three
examples of each of the six types of trials described in Table I.
All test trials included the group of 16 red smarties in order to measure conceptual
knowledge independently of mental calculation or counting. The interviewer distributed
smarties from left to right in such a way that all groups remained visible to children, so
that they did not need to rely on their memory of her actions or words to judge the
equivalence of two problems. For example, in order to test commutativity knowledge,
the rst toy received a box of reds in its rst container and then four greens in its next
container and the second toy received four greens in its rst container and a box of reds
in its next container. As she distributed the smarties, the interviewer described her
actions (“Bill gets a box of reds, then he gets four greens. Kate gets four greens, then
she gets a box of reds.”). Once the smarties were distributed, the interviewer asked, “Do
Bill and Kate have the same number of smarties?” After children judged whether the
“addition problems” in each test display were equal, the interviewer asked them to justify
their responses (“Why do you think that?”), but gave no feedback.
Children also made nine judgements about identity trials in which problems were
exactly the same (for example., “Bill gets three blues then he gets a box of reds. Kate
gets three blues then she gets a box of reds.”) and nine judgements about inequality trials
in which the problems were unrelated (for example “Bill gets a box of reds and three
blues. Kate gets three blues and four greens.”). These trials were employed because
judging unequal problems as equal or judging identical problems as unequal would
constitute evidence for response bias. Each child was presented with the test
TABLE I. Examples of trials involving conceptually related problems
Trial type Equationa Interviewer’s description
2-group order r1 3 Bill gets a box of reds (pours into container) then he gets
three blues (pours into second container). Kate gets
31 r three blues (pours into container) then she gets a box of
reds (pours into second container).
3-group order r1 31 4 Bill gets a box of reds (pours into container) then he gets
three blues (pours into second container) then he gets
r1 41 3 four greens (pours into second container). Kate gets a box
of reds (pours into container) then she gets four greens,
(pours into second container) then she gets three blues
(pours into third container)
Order-of- r1 (3 1 4) Bill gets a box of reds (pours into container) then he gets
composition three blues and four greens (pours into second
r1 (4 1 3) container). Kate gets a box of reds (pours into
container) then she gets four greens and three blues
(pours into second container).
2-group (r 1 3) Bill gets a box of reds and three blues (pours into
composition container). Kate gets a box of reds (pours into
r1 3 container) then she gets three blues (pours into second
container).
3-group (r 1 3) 1 4 Bill gets a box of reds and three blues (pours into
composition container) then he gets four greens (pours into second
r1 31 4 container). Kate gets a box of reds (pours into
container) then she gets three blues (pours into second
container) then she gets four greens (pours into third
container).
Recomposition (r 1 3) 1 4 Bill gets a box of reds and three blues (pours into into
container) then he gets four greens (pours into second
r1 (3 1 4) container). Kate gets a box of reds (pours into
container) then she gets three blues and four greens
(pours into second container).
a
‘r’ refers to 16 red smarties, ‘3’ refers to three blue smarties, ‘4’ refers to four green smarties,
and parentheses refer to combined groups
trials, which included a mix of order, composition, identity and inequality trials, in one
of two random sequences. Each sequence of test trials was split into two sessions of 18
test trials, in which children were asked to judge and to justify their judgements, and
for which the order was counterbalanced.
Children’s judgements were coded as correct if they stated that problems containing
the same groups of smarties were equal and problems containing different groups of
smarties were not. Children’s justi cations were coded according to whether they made
reference to the experimental manipulation (such as noting that groups of smarties were
combined for one toy but placed in separate containers for the other toy) and the
numerosities (colours) of the groups in each problem (for example noting that problems
contained the same groups).
Study 1: Results and discussion

The purpose of Study 1 was to explore the relative dif culty of judging different
addition principles in the context of physical objects and to examine age-related
TABLE II. Means (and standard deviations) judgement

scores in Study 1 as a function of Age Group
Trial Age 4–5 Age 5–6
Two-group order 70 (31) 85 (31)

Three-group order 74 (30) 84 (33)
Two-group composition 58 (38) 85 (29)
Three-group composition 57 (37) 85 (31)
Recomposition 54 (39) 74 (38)
n 23 25
Note: Judgement scores are the percentage accuracy of

children’s judgements of conceptually related problems
adjusted for their incorrect judgements of nine in-
equality problems. There were three judgements of
each type of trial.
changes in children’s part–whole knowledge. Initially, children’s judgements of identity

and inequality trials were examined in order to detect evidence of response bias. One
child judged all problem pairs as unequal and was not included in further analyses.
Other children’s judgements were fairly accurate for identity (mean 5 95%, SD 5 11)
and inequality trials (mean 5 87%, SD 5 22), suggesting a good understanding of the
task. In order to adjust for a possible positive response bias and control for chance
responding, each child’s percentage of false positive judgements (that inequality prob-
lems were equal) was subtracted from his/her percentage of correct positive judgements
(that conceptually related problems were equal). During the testing, children did not
appear to notice the experimental manipulation in order of composition trials. This was
probably because order of composition trials were the only trials in which the nal
display in the two problems was identical. Only two children failed to judge every order
of composition trial correctly so these trials were not analysed further.
The comparative dif culty of concrete versions of additive composition, commutativ-
ity and associativity principles was examined by comparing two-group order, two-group
composition and recomposition judgements. Repeated Wilcoxon tests were employed
because this is a relatively powerful non-parametric approach to repeated measures
designs and is appropriate when planned pair-wise comparisons are of interest, pro-
vided a conservative alpha level is adopted (Marascuilo & McSweeney, 1977), therefore
an alpha level of .01 was used. Table II shows that the accuracy of composition
judgements did not differ from recomposition or order judgements (z 5 2 1.99,
P 5 0.05, and z 5 2 1.81, P 5 0.07, respectively), although the latter may be mainly
due to the older children’s similar performance on order and composition trials as the
younger children had considerably lower mean scores for composition than order trials.
As expected, order judgements were more accurate than recomposition judgements
(z 5 2 3.06, P 5 0.002). This supports previous research indicating that commutativity
precedes associativity understanding (Canobi et al., 1998; Close & Murtagh, 1986;
Langford, 1981). However, group number had no effect on order or composition
judgements (z 5 2 0.71, P 5 0.48 and z 5 2 0.49, P 5 0.96 respectively), suggesting
that the comparative dif culty of associativity is not due to the need to consider three
sets.
Mann-Whitney U tests were employed to examine differences in the part–whole
knowledge of the four- to ve-year-old preschoolers and the ve- to six-year-old
TABLE III. Means (and standard deviations) of the

percentages of different justi cation types for correct
judgements in Study 1
Trial Age 4–5 Age 5–6
Two-group order
Same groups 83 (28) 89 (25)
Different order 12 (31) 3 (9)
Three-group order
Same groups 86 (21) 79 (30)
Different order 4 (21) 7 (16)
Two-group composition
Same groups 85 (25) 83 (33)
Different combination 2 (7) 0
Three-group composition
Same groups 88 (27) 91 (24)
Different combination 0 2 (7)
Recomposition
Same groups 72 (38) 93 (24)
Different combination 0 0
n 23 25
Note: There were three judgements and justi cations

given for each type of trial.
school children. Because no differences were found in the accuracy of children’s

judgements of two- and three-group trials, these scores were combined, a Bonferroni-
type adjustment was made to the alpha level of the three tests and a level of 0.017 was
adopted. Table II shows that children in both age groups tended to make extremely
accurate commutativity (order) judgements and less accurate judgements of concrete
versions of associativity (recomposition trials) and there were no age related improve-
ments in order or recomposition judgements (z 5 2 1.96, P 5 0.05 and z 5 2 1.95,
P 5 0.05, respectively). However, the accuracy of children’s judgements of composition
trials suggests that the older children’s concrete understanding of additive composition
is superior to that of younger children (z 5 2 2.65, P 5 0.008).
Justi cations for correct judgements are summarised in Table III. Justi cations for
incorrect judgements showed no discernable pattern. Table III shows that for both
order and composition trials, children who made correct judgements tended to focus on
whether the same groups of objects were present in both problems, rather than on
differences between problems. Speci cally, most children justi ed their correct judge-
ments of order and composition trials by describing the sets that were present in both
additions (for example, “Bill has greens and reds and Kate has the greens and reds
too.”) or simply stating that the same sets were present (for example, “Bill and Kate
have the same smarties.”). Such justi cations on recomposition trials appeared more
common among older children. Few children made reference to the experimental
manipulation that led to differences between the problems when explaining their
correct judgements. That is, few children stated that groups had been distributed in
different orders or combined in different ways. Thus, correct judgements appear to
re ect an ability to concentrate on the equivalence of groups of objects in pairs of
problems, despite differences in the ways these groups were combined.
Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that concrete versions of the addition
principles are quite salient even to preschoolers but as children enter school they
develop in their understanding that groups of objects can be thought of as being made
up of combinations of smaller groups. The results also suggest that understanding
associativity in the context of physical objects is more dif cult than understanding
commutativity and that this is due to differences in the conceptual reasoning involved
(understanding how sets can be decomposed and recombined) not merely to differ-
ences in the number of sets.
Study 2: Method
Participants
Participants attended preparatory grade in two primary schools in multicultural, lower-
to-middle socioeconomic status suburbs in a large Australian city. There were 45
participants: 21 boys and 24 girls whose mean ages were 6 years (SD 5 4 months) and
6 years 1 month (SD 5 3 months) respectively. The parents of the children gave written
consent to their participation. Preschool children were not included because they were
generally unable to solve addition problems.
Materials and procedure

The materials and procedure for Study 2 were the same as those for Study 1, except
that in one of the judgement task sessions, children in Study 2 also completed a
ten-minute problem solving task. (Task order was counterbalanced.) The addition
problem solving task was designed to examine the ways in which children use counters
to solve a set of addition problems in order to provide a basis for exploring the
relationship between emerging conceptual knowledge and problem solving abilities.
Fourteen single-digit addition problems were presented on separate 30 cm by 21 cm
sheets in the format a 1 b 5 ?. The interviewer uncovered problems one after the other,
and read them out aloud. Problems were constructed by randomly selecting two
addends between one and ten. No number appeared twice in one problem. The
position of the larger addend was counterbalanced. Half of the children solved the
problems in one random sequence and half in a different random sequence.
The interviewer drew children’s attention to counters placed on the table in front of
them by saying “you can use these counters if you want.” The interviewer also told
them that “it doesn’t matter how you work the problems out” so they would not regard
any problem solving strategies as unacceptable (Siegler, 1987). As children solved each
problem, the interviewer noted whether they used a covert or overt strategy. Children
were not asked to describe their solution procedures because piloting revealed that they
found this quite dif cult and the focus of the study was on their overt strategies with
counters. Overt procedures were coded according to whether children counted verbally,
used their ngers or used counters. Based on the range of strategies that children used
in pilot work, counting procedures were coded according to whether children:
· counted out each addend before conducting a nal count (for 3 1 2 counting,
“one, two, three,” (pause) “one, two,” then, “one, two, three, four, ve.”)
· used counters/ ngers as tags without counting out each addend initially (for 3 1 2
counting, “one, two, three,” then counting on, “four, ve.”)
· started their nal count from an addend rather than zero (for 3 1 2 counting on
“three, four, ve.”)
· represented addends using ngers/ counters without overtly undertaking a nal

count (for 3 1 2 counting “one, two, three,” (pause) “one, two,” then, “there are
ve altogether.”). This recognition strategy is similar to the “ ngers” strategy
identi ed by Siegler and Robinson (1982) and Siegler and Shrager (1984).
The order in which children counted the addends was also recorded.
Study 2: Results and discussion

The analyses addressed three main issues. First, the relative dif culty of judging
concrete versions of addition principles was explored. Second, the relation between
emerging conceptual understanding and early problem solving was addressed by
exploring relations between children’s judgements of principles and aspects of their
problem solving such as accuracy and the use of advanced counting strategies involving
counting on and order-indifference. Third, the nature of individual differences in
children’s knowledge about addition principles in both studies was explored using a
cluster analysis.
As in Study 1, children were accurate at judging identity trials (mean 5 98%,
SD 5 5%) and inequality trials (mean 5 96%, SD 5 8%) and correct conceptual judge-
ments were adjusted for false positives. As for Study 1 an alpha level of 0.01 was
adopted for the repeated Wilcoxon tests. Similarly to Study 1, Table IV shows that for
Study 2 although the accuracy of composition judgements did not differ from recompo-
sition or order judgements (z 5 -1.06, P 5 0.29 and z 5 2 2.36, P 5 0.02, ns, respect-
ively), children’s two-group order judgements were more accurate than their
recomposition judgements (z 5 2 2.81, P 5 0.005). Accuracy level did not differ be-
tween two-group and three-group judgements (z 5 2 1.67, P 5 0.10 for order trials and
z 5 2 1.59, P 5 0.11 for composition trials). Therefore, like Study 1, the results of
Study 2 suggest that concrete versions of associativity are more dif cult than commuta-
tivity because associativity involves decomposing and recombining sets—not because it
involves three rather than two sets. Table IV shows that, similar to Study 1, children’s
order and composition justi cations for correct judgements indicate that success in the
judgement task involved concentrating on the equivalence of groups of objects in pairs
of problems, despite differences in the ways these groups were combined.
In order to explore relations between children’s emerging conceptual knowledge and
TABLE IV. Means (and standard deviations) of judgement scores and the percentage frequency of
different types of justi cations for correct judgements in Study 2
Justi cations for correct judgements
Trial Judgement scores Same groups Different order/composition
Two-group order 79 (33) 87 (27) 16 (33)

Three-group order 76 (35) 91 (23) 13 (28)
Two-group composition 68 (41) 86 (30) 10 (29)
Three-group composition 72 (40) 90 (24) 7 (21)
Recomposition 66 (42) 88 (25) 2 (11)
Note: Judgement scores are percentage accuracy of judgements of three trials of conceptually related
problems for each trial type, adjusted for incorrect judgements of nine inequality problems made by
the 45 children in Study 2.
TABLE V. Means (and standard deviations) of the frequency and

accuracy of children’s problem solving strategies
Strategy % usea % strategy usersb % correct
Covert 32 (36) 69 67 (38)

Advanced count 5 (10) 33 75 (41)
Recognition 8 (10) 60 79 (37)
Count-all 48 (35) 76 77 (24)
Other 6 (18) 29 46 (48)
a
Overall frequency of reported procedure use among the 45 children in
Study 2
b
Percentage of children who reported using a procedure to solve at least
one problem out of 14 and on whom accuracy scores are based
problem solving skills, their responses to the addition problem solving task were
analysed. Children’s problem solving accuracy ranged from 0–100% (mean 5 64,
SD 5 32). However, unexpectedly, there was no relationship between the accuracy of
children’s problem solving and their conceptual judgements (Spearman’s rho values
were .12 for order, .05 for composition and 2 .04 for recomposition). This contrasts
with the strong and systematic relationship between problem solving accuracy and
knowledge of addition concepts found in older children (Canobi et al., 1998). The
distribution of children’s problem solving procedures is presented in Table V, together
with accuracy for different procedures. (Because strategies involving ngers were
extremely infrequent, they were grouped together with those involving counters.) As
expected from earlier studies (Canobi et al., 1998; Siegler, 1987), children often used
more than one problem solving strategy across the set of problems. Indeed, based on
the categories listed in Table V, only 16% of children used a single strategy to solve all
problems, while 27% used two, 40% used three, and 17% used more than three
strategies.
Table V indicates that the most common problem solving procedure was counting
all, in which children counted counters or ngers for each addend, and then counted
the total number of counters in the combined set. This procedure, though laborious,
was quite accurate. Children used recognition and other counting strategies much less
often. More advanced counting procedures involved either counting both addends
separately then initiating the nal count starting from the total number in one of these
addends (counting on), or using the counters as tags, counting one addend and then
counting on in a single count. Because these two advanced counting strategies were
relatively infrequent but similar, they were grouped together. The two strategies were
judged as similar because they both involve using counters to simultaneously represent
the separate addends and the combined set in an addition problem and this reduces the
number of counts required to solve the problem. Mann-Whitney tests were used to
explore whether children who used advanced counting strategies differed in their
conceptual knowledge from those who did not, a Bonferroni-type adjustment to the
alpha level was made and a level of 0.017 was used. In support of research indicating
that advanced counting strategies have conceptual underpinnings (Fuson, 1982, 1988;
Martins-Mourao & Cowan, 1998; Siegler & Crowley, 1994), Table VI shows that
children who used advanced counting procedures (involving using counters to simul-
taneously represent the parts and the whole) made more accurate order judgements
TABLE VI. Means (and standard deviations) of children’s judgment scores as a function
of their use of advanced counting problem-solving strategies
Advanced counting strategies Order Composition Recomposition n
Absent 55 (41) 52 (43) 59 (43) 30

Present 85 (24) 68 (40) 79 (38) 15
Note: Judgement scores are percentage accuracy of children’s judgements of three trials
of conceptually related problems for each trial type, adjusted for their incorrect judgements
of nine inequality problems.
than other children (z 5 2 2.39, P 5 0.017). However, this difference did not extend to
composition (z 5 2 1.03, P 5 0.30) or recomposition judgements (z 5 2 1.80,
P 5 0.07). This nding suggests that commutativity knowledge is related to under-
standing that counters can be used to signify both the addends and the total simul-
taneously. The result supports previous ndings that children who use advanced
counting strategies such as min (counting on from the larger addend) tend to have a
good understanding of commutativity (Canobi et al., 1998; Cowan & Renton, 1996).
Table V shows that some children used a recognition strategy in which they counted
out each set, and then named the total number of items in the combined set without
overtly undertaking a nal count. Children using this strategy may have arrived at the
nal number of counters or ngers through covert counting, subitising or a kinaesthetic
strategy. Table V also shows that covert problem solving procedures were quite
common. However, the accuracy of covert procedures was quite low, suggesting that
they may have involved guessing or inaccurate covert counting and should not be
accepted as evidence of retrieval of answers from memory (as is sometimes assumed in
older children). The use of counters appears to have assisted children who used the
relatively unsophisticated counting all strategy to achieve accuracy rates as high as those
achieved by children who used more sophisticated counting strategies. In contrast,
Canobi et al. (1998) found counting all to be the least accurate strategy among older
children. This difference may imply that mean accuracy levels are not as useful an index
of problem solving skill in research involving young children with access to counters as
in studies of older children who do not have access to counters.
A measure of order-indifference was calculated as the percentage of problems for
which an overt counting strategy was used with addends counted in a different order
from that in which they appeared. In keeping with previous research (Canobi et al.,
1998), the measure was computed using the seven problems for which the larger
addend was presented second as there is no apparent ef ciency associated with
order-indifferent counting strategies when the larger addend is presented rst. Unfortu-
nately, such strategies were used on a very small percentage of problems (mean 5 4,
SD 5 10), making it dif cult to test whether they were related to conceptual measures.
Most children were very rigid, always operating on problem addends in the order in
which they were presented. Moreover, of the nine children who used order-indifferent
strategies, six only used these strategies once, which may only suggest occasional
inattention rather than genuine exibility in treatment of addend order. However, given
the debate over whether commutativity knowledge precedes the use of order-indifferent
counting strategies (Baroody & Gannon, 1984; Cowan & Renton, 1996), it is of interest
to note that, with a single exception, all children who used an order-indifferent strategy
judged the majority of commuted addition problems correctly.
Combined Analysis of Studies 1 and 2

In order to explore individual differences in conceptual understanding, a cluster
analysis was conducted on the judgement scores of children in both studies. (The same
judgement task was used in Studies 1 and 2.) Children in both studies were included
in a single analysis in order to increase the likelihood of identifying small subgroups
with distinctive patterns of conceptual knowledge. Children’s patterns of judgements
were identi ed using Ward’s clustering algorithm (SPSS, 1999). The clustering algor-
ithm was applied to children’s judgement scores for two- and three-group order and
composition trials and recomposition trials. A ve-cluster solution, which accounted for
88% of the total variation in children’s judgement scores, was selected. The six-cluster
solution comprised small groups and accounted for 90% of the variance and the
four-cluster solution accounted for 85% of the variance. Table VII shows that the
patterns of judgements associated with the clusters were distinct and partially ordered.
Children in Cluster 1 displayed the most sophisticated pattern of performance, per-
forming close to ceiling level. It is noteworthy that the majority of school children ( ve-
to six-year-olds) and about a third of the preschool children (four- to ve-year-olds)
were in the Cluster 1. This indicates that for many children in the sample, but
particularly for school children, the addition principles presented in the context of the
physical objects were very salient. Children in Clusters 2 and 3 had similar pro les
except that Cluster 3 children were much less accurate overall. They had similar
judgement scores on composition and order trials but were less accurate at judging
recomposition trials, supporting earlier ndings that associativity judgements are less
accurate than commutativity judgements. Cluster 4 children judged order trials accu-
rately but judged composition and recomposition trials inaccurately. Children in this
subgroup appear to have some concrete version of commutativity, but not additive
composition—a relatively uncommon pattern of results that was not re ected in the
Wilcoxon tests for differences in the order and composition scores in each study.
Children in Cluster 5 performed close to oor level, making mainly incorrect judge-
ments.
The cluster analysis supports the results of the Wilcoxon tests by indicating that
many children judged order trials more accurately than recomposition trials. The
presence of such children supports previous ndings that concrete versions of the
associativity principle are relatively dif cult for young children to understand (Lang-
ford, 1981). In addition, the cluster analysis indicates that a small group of children
may understand relations between groups of objects based on commutativity but not
additive composition. Another interesting nding is the tendency for older children to
TABLE VII. Means (and standard deviations) of judgement scores as a function of cluster membership
Number of children
Trial type Age

Two-group Three-group Two-group Three-group
Cluster order order composition composition Recomposition 4–5 5–6
1 98 (4) 95 (10) 96 (9) 98 (4) 97 (6) 7 43

2 82 (19) 87 (13) 82 (19) 80 (20) 62 (17) 6 9
3 40 (25) 34 (16) 37 (25) 48 (18) 12 (16) 6 6
4 79 (29) 92 (12) 3 (8) 3 (8) 14 (24) 4 4
5 8 (15) 0 (0) 4 (12) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 8
respond to the principles in an all or nothing manner. Table VII shows that the vast
majority of ve- to six-year-olds were in Clusters 1, 4 and 5, indicating a consistent
acceptance or rejection of any given principle. In contrast, the majority of four- to
ve-year-olds were in Clusters 2 and 3, indicating less consistent judgements for at least
some principles.
General Discussion
The purpose of the research was to use the mathematical properties of whole number
addition to explore children’s conceptual knowledge of how groups of objects can be
combined. The results are consistent with arguments that young children develop an
understanding of additive composition, commutativity and associativity in the context
of physical objects (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Resnick, 1992). In addition, the results
support the usefulness of exploring different patterns in children’s conceptual knowl-
edge. Indeed, analyses of children’s patterns of judgements and of the comparative
dif culty of different principles suggest a developmental progression in part–whole
understanding. One group of children appears to have a concrete knowledge that sets
can be combined in different orders without understanding that sets presented in
combination are equal to the same sets presented separately. This suggests that some
children might acquire a primitive form of commutativity before understanding that
groups of objects are additively composed of smaller groups. The results also support
claims that commutativity knowledge precedes associativity knowledge, and indicate
that it is the conceptual relations involved in concrete versions of associativity rather
than the mere presence of three sets that makes the principle more dif cult. Consistent
with previous ndings, the results also suggest that although children’s understanding
of concrete versions of additive composition improves after they enter school, many
preschoolers understand that problems are equal when the same groups of objects are
combined in different orders or are decomposed and recombined (Cowan & Renton,
1996; Sophian et al., 1995). Finally, while the systematic relationship between problem
solving and conceptual knowledge found among older children by Canobi et al. (1998)
was not present, the emergence of advanced counting strategies was related to commu-
tativity knowledge.
Although the majority of children who participated in the study had a surprisingly
good understanding of the addition principles presented in a concrete context, different
patterns of partial knowledge were identi ed. The results support previous research
involving symbolic problems, which indicates that some children who understand
commutativity have dif culties with associativity (Canobi et al., 1998). The results also
indicate that some children in the present research had a concrete understanding of
commutativity but not additive composition although the reverse pattern was not
found.
The cluster solution suggests that some children acquire some understanding that
parts combined in different orders are equivalent before they fully appreciate the ways
in which the parts can be combined to form a whole (although this nding was not
apparent in the separate analyses of judgement scores for each study). The
identi cation of such a conceptual pro le appears inconsistent with Resnick’s (1992,
1994) claim that additive composition knowledge is fundamental to children’s under-
standing of other principles. Moreover, failing to understand that a combination of two
groups of objects is equal to those groups of objects presented separately indicates a
failure to understand addition in a fundamental sense. Therefore, it may seem surpris-
ing that some children seem to have acquired an early version of commutativity without
such a basic addition understanding. Nonetheless, Baroody and Ginsburg (1986) have
argued that even children who have a very primitive notion of addition may have some
understanding of the role of order in adding physical objects. They claim that on the
basis of their computational experience, children learn that it does not matter whether
you start with one set of blocks and add another set, or start with the second set and
add the rst set: the result is still the same. Baroody and Ginsburg argued that this
computation-based knowledge does not necessarily imply that children understand that
addition is a binary operation involving the union of two sets. Indeed, it is possible that
an understanding the order-irrelevance counting principle (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978)
helps at least some children appreciate of the role of order in combining groups of
objects. Knowledge that the objects can be counted in any order to arrive at the total
may lead to recognition that two groups of objects combined in different orders have
the same total.
The present investigation into children’s knowledge of the ways in which physical
objects can be combined supports the suggestion that commutativity knowledge pre-
cedes associativity knowledge (Canobi et al., 1998; Close & Murtagh, 1986; Langford,
1981). The current research suggests that differences in children’s performance on
commutativity and associativity items are not restricted to symbolic problems and
cannot be explained by appealing to non-conceptual factors such the involvement of
more dif cult computational, memorial or verbal demands. Interestingly, the presence
of three rather than two groups in order and composition trials did not affect the
accuracy of children’s judgements. This suggests that the mere presence of three sets is
not responsible for children’s dif culties in understanding concrete versions of associa-
tivity; instead, these dif culties arise due to the conceptual demands involved in
understanding that sets can be decomposed and recombined in different ways.
Although some age group differences in conceptual understanding were found, the
present results also support previous research indicating that many preschool children
understand that problems are equal when the same groups of objects are combined in
different orders or are decomposed and recombined (Cowan & Renton, 1996; Sophian
et al., 1995). The accuracy with which even preschoolers judged the principles suggests
that young children have a rich knowledge of regularities in the ways in which groups
of objects can be joined together and pulled apart. These ndings are in keeping with
theoretical accounts suggesting that children’s understanding of part–whole concepts
crucial to school arithmetic emerges in the context of the physical world (Resnick,
1992, 1994). Moreover, the ndings suggest that using the formal principles as a
framework allows the identi cation of important developmental changes in children’s
knowledge. For example, the results suggest that one important conceptual gain that
many children make after entering school is a greater appreciation that larger groups of
objects are additively composed of smaller groups.
The current research into children in their rst year of school did not reveal the
strong systematic relationship between conceptual knowledge and problem solving
found in children who had been attending school for more than a year (Canobi, in
press; Canobi et al., 1998). The nding that conceptual judgements were not related
to problem solving accuracy is in keeping with research suggesting that people often
nd it dif cult to coordinate their knowledge of formal and informal mathematics
(Nunes, Schliemann, & Carraher, 1993) and supports Resnick’s (1992, 1994) claim
that a protoquantitative part–whole schema emerges separately from knowledge related
to counting and quanti cation. It may be the case that many children in the sample had
not reached the stage in their mathematical development in which protoquantitative

part–whole knowledge and quanti cation knowledge become integrated.
Nonetheless, there was some indication that the forms of part–whole knowledge
explored in the current study interact with problem solving skills. In support of previous
research indicating that conceptual understanding precedes children’s use of counting
on procedures (Fuson, 1982, 1988; Martins-Mourao & Cowan, 1998; Siegler &
Crowley, 1994), the results suggest that children who used advanced counting strate-
gies to solve addition problems had a greater understanding of concrete versions of
commutativity than those who did not. Although it is dif cult to explain why the
children who used advanced counting strategies did not also have a better under-
standing of additive composition and associativity than their less skilled counterparts,
the results do suggest that some forms of principle understanding are related to an
ability to use counters to simultaneously represent the parts as well as the whole in
problem solving. Considered alongside the other ndings, this result implies that, for
the most developmentally advanced children in the sample, there may have been an
interaction between knowledge of part–whole relations and counting and problem
solving skills. However, the majority of children in the sample did not appear to make
connections between their relatively strong understanding of part–whole concepts in
the context of the physical world and school addition problems.
The results have important theoretical and educational implications. They suggest
that addition principles presented in the context of physical objects are quite salient to
young children and that many children have a surprisingly advanced concrete knowl-
edge of such principles even before they enter school. It seems likely that such children
would bene t from instruction in which explicit links are made between this emerging
understanding and the problem solving skills that they are taught in school. Indeed, the
present study indicates that the few children who employ strategies involving a more
ef cient use of counters to solve addition problems have a relatively good under-
standing of commutativity-type relations in the physical world. Further research exam-
ining the kinds of experiences that facilitate the emergence of knowledge about
mathematical properties such as commutativity is likely to prove very useful. In
particular, it may be helpful to explore interventions designed to help children to
recognise patterns in the ways in which objects can be combined, progress from
concrete to more abstract versions of the principles, and apply part–whole knowledge
to school-based mathematical problems. Differences in the accuracy of children’s
judgements of trials related to commutativity, additive composition, and associativity
suggest that examining children’s knowledge of different mathematical principles will
provide insight into changes in their domain knowledge over time. Therefore, longitudi-
nal research tracking the emergence of these forms of conceptual understanding is also
likely to prove informative.
In conclusion, the present study supports the claim that the mathematical properties
of whole number addition provide a useful framework for exploring children’s concep-
tual development (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Langford, 1981; Resnick, 1992). The
results suggest that many preschoolers know about relationships based on addition
principles in the context of combining sets of objects, and that they are particularly
adept in recognising the consequences of combining groups of objects in different
orders. Moreover, at least for the current sample, a key change in children’s knowledge
after they enter school is a greater recognition that large groups of objects can be
thought of as being made up of combinations of smaller groups. In addition, an analysis
of individual differences suggests that some children recognise the equivalence of
problems in which groups of objects are combined in different orders but not problems
in which groups of objects are decomposed and recombined in different ways. These
results support claims that the addition principles represent fundamental properties of
the addition operation and that young children learn about these properties through
their experiences with physical objects. The ndings also indicate that exploring
concrete versions of part–whole concepts based on formal addition principles provides
important information about children’s conceptual development in early mathematics.
Correspondence: Katherine H. Canobi, Department of Psychology, University of

Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 3010 (e-mail: khc@unimelb.edu.au).
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Educational Psychology, Vol. 22, No.

Young Children’s Understanding of Addition

KATHERINE H. CANOBI, ROBERT A. REEVE &

ABSTRACT Children’s knowledge of concrete versions of additive composition, commutativity

associativity. However, the  ndings of both studies pertain to symbolically presented

1. understand both commutativity and associativity type relations

Identifying the mathematical relationships that children understand is consistent with

is related to their problem solving skills; in particular, children with advanced

1. two- and three-addend commuted problems such as a 1 b5 b 1 a and

Parentheses in equations were represented by groups presented in combination (groups

preschool and school children, enabling an exploration of age group differences. In

Materials and Procedure

TABLE I. Examples of trials involving conceptually related problems

Trial type Equationa Interviewer’s description

Study 1: Results and discussion

TABLE II. Means (and standard deviations) judgement

Trial Age 4–5 Age 5–6

Two-group order 70 (31) 85 (31)

Note: Judgement scores are the percentage accuracy of

changes in children’s part–whole knowledge. Initially, children’s judgements of identity

TABLE III. Means (and standard deviations) of the

Trial Age 4–5 Age 5–6

Note: There were three judgements and justi cations

school children. Because no differences were found in the accuracy of children’s

Materials and procedure

· represented addends using  ngers/ counters without overtly undertaking a  nal

Study 2: Results and discussion

Justi cations for correct judgements

Trial Judgement scores Same groups Different order/composition

Two-group order 79 (33) 87 (27) 16 (33)

TABLE V. Means (and standard deviations) of the frequency and

Strategy % usea % strategy usersb % correct

Covert 32 (36) 69 67 (38)

Advanced counting strategies Order Composition Recomposition n

Absent 55 (41) 52 (43) 59 (43) 30

Combined Analysis of Studies 1 and 2

Trial type Age

1 98 (4) 95 (10) 96 (9) 98 (4) 97 (6) 7 43

not reached the stage in their mathematical development in which protoquantitative

Correspondence: Katherine H. Canobi, Department of Psychology, University of

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associativity. However, the ndings of both studies pertain to symbolically presented

Note: There were three judgements and justi cations

· represented addends using ngers/ counters without overtly undertaking a nal

Justi cations for correct judgements