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Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 44(2), 99–118 Spring 2008
Published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/jhbs.20301
© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

REVISITING WITTGENSTEIN ON KÖHLER AND GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

JOHN G. BENJAFIELD

In an article in this journal, Nicholas Pastore rejected Ludwig Wittgenstein’s critique of

Wolfgang Köhler and Gestalt psychology. Pastore appears not to have appreciated
Wittgenstein’s argument that Köhler mistook conceptual questions for factual ones. A simi-
lar confusion seems to underlie at least some aspects of contemporary neuroscience. Be that
as it may, Wittgenstein has had minimal influence on the research practices of psychologists
while Köhler remains influential. This outcome would not have surprised Wittgenstein, who
predicted that scientists would not see his work as relevant to theirs. © 2008 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc.

Nicholas Pastore (1916–1998) was a deeply knowledgeable student of the psychology of

perception (Winnick, 2001). His history of the nativism-empiricism controversy in perception
(Pastore, 1971) has been cited continuously since its publication (e.g., Allik & Konstabel,
2005). Pastore (1991) published an article in this journal considering some of Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s (1889–1951) remarks on Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967) and Gestalt psychol-
ogy. Pastore’s paper was an important illustration of the way in which Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy has tended to be assimilated by those psychologists who have taken an interest in it.

PASTORE’S CRITIQUE OF WITTGENSTEIN

Pastore focused on Wittgenstein’s treatment of reversible figures such as the famous
duck-rabbit (Figure 1; Brugger, 1999; Kihlstrom, 2006), versions of the Necker cube (Figures 2
and 3) and the double cross (Figure 4). Figures such as these were used by Wittgenstein to
illustrate how seeing a figure in one way (e.g., as a duck) can change into another way of see-
ing the same figure (e.g., as a rabbit). Pastore observed that Köhler did not think that sensory
organization was determined by learning in any essential way. By contrast, we have
Wittgenstein’s (1958, p. 207) statement that “you only ‘see the duck rabbit aspects’ if you are
already conversant with the shape of those two animals.” Pastore (1991, p. 349) concluded
that Wittgenstein did not fully appreciate Köhler’s rejection of empiricism, and that
Wittgenstein’s “objections to Köhler . . . are . . . unfounded.”
Pastore did not claim that Köhler was a nativist, as indeed he should not. The Gestalt
psychologists were not nativists (Henle, 1977/1986). As Pastore (1971, p. 269) correctly
observed, the Gestalt psychologists were opposed to both nativism and empiricism as these
terms are usually understood. For them, perceptual organization is governed by the same laws
that regulate all phenomena and does not require an evolutionary explanation. “From
the standpoint of physics one feels at once inclined to conceive of the processes underlying
perception as a dynamic pattern that comes into existence in some field of the brain” (Köhler,
1930/1971a, p. 240).

JOHN G. BENJAFIELD is Professor Emeritus at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario. His research
interests have included aesthetics, the history of the English language, and personal cognition. Both his
History of Psychology (2nd ed., 2005) and Cognition (3rd ed., 2007) were published by Oxford University
Press. Send correspondence to John Benjafield, 83 Glenridge Avenue, St. Catharines, ON, L2R 4X2,
Canada, (905) 685–6039. E-mail: John.Benjafield@BrockU.Ca

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100 JOHN G. BENJAFIELD

b b

a a

(1) (2) b b
(3) (4)
a a

FIGURES. 1–4

Figures 1 (the duck-rabbit), 2 and 3 (versions of the Necker cube), and 4 (the double cross). From N. Pastore.
(1991). Wittgenstein on Köhler and Gestalt psychology. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 27, 344.

As the preceding quotation shows, Köhler believed that psychological facts have physio-
logical correlates, a notion that Pastore says “is supported by a considerable body of evidence”
(p. 343). Most neuropsychologists would surely agree, but Wittgenstein (1980a, p. 160) won-
dered, “Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regular-
ity corresponds?” By asking such a question, said Pastore (1991, p. 343), Wittgenstein had
engaged in “magical thinking.”
Generally speaking, Pastore did not think much of Wittgenstein’s remarks, observing
that Wittgenstein “does not formulate an explicit theory of seeing,” and there is “no appeal to
the empirical investigations by psychologists and physiologists” (1991, p. 344). Moreover,
“the systematic exposition of an argument is absent and the justification or intended signifi-
cance of some remark is not evident” (1991, p. 343). Finally, “Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
psychology expresses a pronounced hostility toward psychology as a science. This is evident
in his unusual ideas about physiological explanation” (1991, p. 343).
Pastore’s view of Wittgenstein was particularly striking because it came from someone
steeped in the tradition of experimental psychology and contrasted sharply with the views of
many of those whose backgrounds were in philosophy. Indeed, Pastore (1991, p. 351) appeared
to discount the objections of Wittgensteinian philosophers (e.g., Budd, 1989; Stromberg,
1980) to Köhler’s psychology because they were “philosophical.”
One purpose of the present paper is to see if there might not be more to the philosophical
critique of Köhler than Pastore allowed. In particular, recent scholarship on both Wittgenstein and
Gestalt psychology allows us to better appreciate the breadth and complexity of Wittgenstein’s
analysis. Pastore focused on the contrasting approaches to reversible figures taken by
Wittgenstein and Köhler. We will also consider their contrasting approaches to memory (Bennett
& Hacker, 2003, p. 161f; Hark, 1995; Schulte, 1992, p. 114f). These two topics are intertwined.
Finally, we will consider the possibility that Wittgenstein’s famous remark about psychology’s
barrenness may have been justified.
Wittgenstein was not hostile toward psychological science as such (e.g., Hark, 1990,
1995). Indeed, while a student at Cambridge, Wittgenstein collaborated on an experiment on
the perception of rhythm that he presented to a meeting of the British Psychological Society
in 1912 (McGuinness, 1990, p. 128). However, he did not think that Gestalt psychology in
general and Köhler’s research program in particular were going in fruitful directions.
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s attitude toward Gestalt psychology was colored by his profound pes-
simism about the drift of modern times, particularly with respect to its scientism (Monk,
1991, pp. 484–486). Wittgenstein took scientism to be “the smug and unexamined assurance
that what wants explanation is obvious, and that scientific tools are immediately applicable.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES DOI: 10.1002/jhbs