Bismarck and German Unification Summary.

Writing an essay on this topic can be difficult, as it is a big topic. Exam essays therefore have to include only the bare essentials. Introduction German Unification had been unsuccessful before the 1 !"s. 1 !1 William # became $russian %ing and follo&ing year appointed 'tto (on )ismarc* as $russian +inister,$resident. +any &ould argue that )ismarc* &as the architect of German Unification, &hich &as complete by 1 -1 after three &ars &ith .enmar*, /ustria and 0rance. 12his is due to many factors 3 of course a gro&ing desire for unification in the German states, )ismarc*s planning, but also his opportunism and 4ealpoliti*, the character of William #, the decline of /ustria as a German po&er and $russian Economic and military strength.5 But only if the question is about why Unification was achieved. If it is about whether Bismarck was an opportunist or a planner, this bit will be slightly different.

Background 3 6onstitutional 6risis of 1 !7 and )ismarc*s appointment as +inister,$resident. William #s determination to strengthen the $russian army 3 &hy8 $lanned army reforms 1dont list, *eep it simple, say , 2he planned reforms &ere to extend army training, introduce ne& &eapons, increase the standing army and create an extra 9: regiments. 6rucially, ho&ever, ;1.<m per annum &ould be needed to cover the cost of these reforms.5 6onstitutional 6risis 3 =iberal,dominated $russian parliament refuses to fully agree the budget for Williams army reforms, %ing determined to carry out the reforms. )ismarc* appointed as $russian +inister $resident 3 collects taxes to fund the cost of the army reforms &ithout the consent of parliament. !!" #$$ %& '(IS B)I!& ************

"russo+,anish -ar ./0123 0irst international crisis )ismarc* had to face, >ust three years after ta*ing office, some &ould argue, first step on the road to German Unification. ?o& the crisis developed@ 1 !A, ne& .anish *ing 1&ho &as also the .u*e of Bchles&ig and ?olstein5 agrees to a plan to annexe Bchels&ig and rule ?olstein more closely. /ngers German nationalists as all of ?olstein and southern,part of Bchles&ig German,spea*ing. 2his plan also brea*s the 1 <7 =ondon $rotocol, &hich guaranteed the independence of the t&o .uchies. 'pportunities )ismarc* sa& in $russian involvement in the crisis. Unli*ely that 0rance, 4ussia or )ritain &ould get involved because C. 2he &ar@ Dan 1 !9, $russia and /ustria signed an alliance, presented .anes &ith ultimatum to &ithdra& from .uchies, .anes did not, $russians and /ustrians invaded, .anes defeated by /ugust. 2reaty of (ienna 3 .anes gave up all claims to .uchies, future to be decided by /ustrians and $russians. 6onvention of Gastein 3 1 !<. /fter initial disagreements of future of .uchies, /ustria and $russia decided that C..

Sub-conclusion 6risis not initiated by )ismarc*, but )ismarc* exploited it to his o&n advantage C.. 'ther reasons CC. 1/rmy, Wilhelm etc. )e S"!4I&I4 about &hat the contributions of the other factors &ere to '(IS &ar5

#ustro+"russian -ar 5 /011 .Seven -eeks -ar3 )ismarc*s politics &ere anti /ustrian, even before appointment as +inister $resident. ?e &anted to remove /ustrian influence from German states and *ne& that to do so &ould probably mean &ar. Ba& potential in B,? Euestion to pic* a Euarrel &ith /ustria, but first had to ma*e sure that /ustria &ould fight alone. 0rench FeutralityG/lliance &ith #taly 'utbrea* of &ar@ #talians panic /ustrians into mobilising. /ustrians aggravate $russians by putting the Euestion of B,? in front of )und, brea*ing convention of Gastein. /ustrians as* )und to send forces against $russia 3 $russia ta*es as declaration of &ar. 2he &ar@ =asted seven &ee*s, stunning success for $russians. Forthern states that had opposed $russia defeated very Euic*ly. #talians tied up /ustrians in south, decisive battle and defeat of /ustria A Duly at %onnigratH. Why )ismarc* &anted to treat /ustria leniently. 2reaty of $rague 1significance of its terms5G 4reation of the 6orth German 4onfederation 5 Germany now unified e7cept 2 southern states 88

Sub-Conclusion )ismarc* planned for &ar 3 0rench neutralityG #talian alliance )ut not all do&n to )ismarc* 3 victory &ould not have been achieved &ithout the strength of the $russian army 3 leadership of (on +olt*e and (on 4oon. 1)e specific about &hat the role of the army &as here5 )ismarc* seemed to have done all he intended to in 1 !! as far as the unification of Germany &as concerned 3 &e have done enough for our generation. .id not plan &ar &ith 0rance. 2his occurred because of un&ise 0rench actions, &hich )ismarc* exploited.

&ranco+"russian -ar /09:+9/ ?o& 0rance &as isolated in 1 -". Why a &ar &ith 0rance &ould mean that it &as likely that the four southern states &ould unite &ith the F.G.6. ?ohenHollern candidature and its &ithdra&al by $russians at 0rench reEuest. 0rench insistence that the candidature never be rene&ed and Williams refusal. 2he Ems telegram and ho& )ismarc* altered it to provo*e the 0rench. Why the southern states >oined the F.G.6. 2he &ar@ Iuic* German mobilisation, 0rench on defensive, 0rench armies defeated, Fapoleon ### overthro&n, $aris besieged, over by Dan 1 -1. 2reaty of 0ran*furt and significance of its harsh terms. German Unification complete , formation of German Empire &hen 9 southern states >oin. $roclamation of German Empire in ?all of +irrors, $alace of (ersailles 1 Dan 1 -1.

Sub-Conclusion )ismarc* did, to an extent engineer the ?ohenHollern crisis, as he persuaded 6ortes and =eopold to accept, but this &as done to strengthen $russia. War bro*e out because of un&ise 0rench actions 3 &hich )ismarc* exploited. /gain 3 strength of $russian army crucial 1)e specific about &hy5 /lthough )ismarc* asserted later in his memoirs that he had planned &ar &ith 0rance to complete German Unification, this is extremely unli*ely.

Summary and 4onclusion 'verall factors contributing to Unification. Bummarise, but dont list. Which one or ones &asG&ere most important8 / nice Euote too please.