The Meanings and Confusions of Weberian 'Rationality' Author(s): Arnold Eisen Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.

29, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 57-70 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/589219 Accessed: 14/12/2009 13:12
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I978 I March Volume e9 J%umber of Sociolog)o British jtournal

Arnold Eisen

of and confusions The meanings 'rationality' Weberian

A B S T RA C T

usage of the word 'rational'has been criticized Weber'subiquitous opaqueand by StevenLukes,amongothers,as being 'irredeemably shifting'.In the presentessay,however,it is seen that Weber'susage elementsof the concept'rationality' Six interdependent is consistent. to the concept's eachof whichis intendedto contribute areidentified, overallmeaningwhen any one is employedas the locus of primary rigoris thus shownto be conceptually While 'rational' significance. ous if at times needlesslyconfusing,the distinctionbetweenformal is examinedandjudged to be both theorationality and substantive the valuations biased,disguising reticallyconfusedand substantially is assessed. This inherentin the criteriaby which formalrationality confusion,Weber'spersistentusage of'rational' when 'calculable' wouldhave servedmuchbetter,and the implicitironor 'systematic' are traced to the Puritanschema on ies of Weber'spresentation, which Weberbelieved'rationalconduct'to be based, one precisely parallelto his own statement. and variegatedusageof the word 'rational'is Max Weber'spersistent to the careful reader, and the a source of perpetual consternation author's repeated caveat that 'rationalismis an historicalconcept our things'l only addresses which covers a whole world of diffierent confusionwithout at all alleviatingit. Were Weber'swarning completelytrue, he wouldobviouslynot be justifiedin usinga singleword things', and Steven Lukeshas concluded to describethose 'diffierent that he was not. Weber'susage of 'rational'and its cognates,Lukes opaque and shifting'.2Clearly, Weber has argued, is 'irredeemably and the historicaldevelopments must hold that, although diffierent, social actionswhich he labels 'rational'are integrallyrelated;that, in his words, 'ultimatelythey belong inseparablytogether'.3We thus to discoverif and how the need to know the forceof that 'ultimately' claim is legitimate. In the presentessay,I hope to showthat it is, in the followingsense. of social action, set forth of Weber'sbasic categories An examination

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Arnold Eisen

at the start of Wirtschaft undGesellschaft, and of the historicalsurvey which introduces the serieson Religionssoziologie, revealsthat the concept 'rationality' is composedof a half dozen componentelements, which reappearconsistentlyin the usages of the term throughout Weber'smonumental scholarship. Each of theseinterdependent building blocks, summarized in the followingparagraphs, is intended to contributeto the overallconceptwhen any one (or more) is used as the locus of primarymeaning,just as in the historicaloutline each applicationof the term adds its shapeto the parentidea, therebyenriching all futureapplications. What is lost in precisionthroughuse of the singletermis repaidin addedmeaningfor each application. Yet, as we shall see, the confusion which remains,especially in the related and problematic distinctionbetweenformaland substantive rationality, is considerable. This confusioncasts considerable doubt on the utility-and the value-neutrality{f Weber'sentire effort to clarify the processof rationalization which he identified.
THE USAGES SUMMARIZED

Weberusesthe conceptof rationality in the variousareasof his work in connection with or as a 'marker' for one or moreof the following six componentelements. I. Underlyingall rationality is purpose: the consciousintent of the actorto achievea given end. In the relativelyrareoccurrence of pure 'value-rational' action, only the actor's consciousend is considered, with no weighingof endsand means,but in all rationalactionthereis the denialof arbitrariness, becausethe actoractsfor a knownpurpose, and becausethis action in concertwith othersincreases(or attempts to) the extent of controlexercisedover the world, and so diminishes (or attempts to) the swayof unpredictable, i.e. chanceevents.4 Rationality has alwaysexistedto some degree;the meanschosenin pursuit of purposedetermine the degree. 2. If meansand endsare both subjectto calculation, we have zweckrational action, which embodiesthe componentelementof calculability, 'the basis of everythingelse'5not only in economicaction but in the idea of rationality itself.Becauseof this element,an actionis said to be rationalif it is maximallyefiicacious(i.e. provenby calculationand experienceto be so) for the achievement of a desiredresult.Actionis 'subjectively rational'if only believedto be most efficient,'objectively rational'if it actuallyis so, in our calculatedestimation. This sense,in Weber'sstudy of the economyand elsewhere,is the prevalentusage of the wordrational,and the key to the fourusageswhichfollow.We find that calculationis directedat certaintythroughthe computation of 'chances'in a reliable (again, provenstatistically in experienceto be so) manner. For this reason other attemptsto achieve certainty (magicand divination,for example)are 'irrational': they neitherem-

of 11;eberian 'rationality' Themeanings andconfusions

59

ploy calculation, nor are they efficient in achieving the certainty sought. moves to achieve In daily social action, an actor who consistently 'appropriate means' can rethrough the use of his ends (rationally) liably presumeto understand,and so to predict, the behaviourof anotheractorwho acts likewise,as both move througha seriesof steps both. can understand an observer dictatedby theirsharedrationality; for action possesses, of such rationallypurposeful 'The interpretation of the choice of means,the highestdegreeof verifithe understanding able certainty.With a lower degree of certainty.. . we are able to 'Chance',for Weber,is the 'incalculable'.7 understand errors.'6 relatedto purposeand calculation 3. Control is less straightforward, but diffiering in logicalstatus.It is botha meansto and a goalof rational action. Weber can speak of'rationally controlledaction', the higher rationality of controlled labour,8rational ascetic self-control,and becausein each 'rationalprophecy'(not dependenton intoxicants)9 and the unexpectedbringsa greater case a freedomfromcontingency of the world.Action, and so a greatermastery measure of predictability, therefore,is 'rational'if it is 'voluntary',i.e. freely willed, and not This usage can apply to extraneous disturbances. subjectto arbitrary unaffected by government an individual,or to freemarketcompetition monopoliesor specialprivileges.Controlis both meansto and end of calculation. of the fourtypesof socialaction,lWeberexplains In the exposition behaviourwhen it reaches that affectual action shadesinto wertrational puts it 'well on the road (such 'sublimation' the level of consciousness ...'). However, it remains affectual regardless to "rationalization" gratif it satisfies a needforrevenge,sensual of the 'levelof sublimation' bliss,or the workingoff of tensions. ification,devotion,contemplative the Weber is drawing,with what he feels is necessaryarbitrariness, line between willed action and unwilledaction of ^rhichone is conscious. The differenceis that between acting and watching acting; them is the elementof control.Similarly,aSectual what differentiates and traditionalaction shade off in the other direction (away from oriented behaviour') as they rationality,toward non-'meaningfully approach 'automaticreaction to habitual stimuli' or 'uncontrolled reactionto some exceptionalstimulus'.Again, the decisivevariableis control. 4. Perhapsthe everydayusage of logical that is, somethingwhich 'makessense'in termsof a given purpose,is coherentand efficaciousis the most obvious connectionof tllis componentto the others,and in formulating anotherindicationof Weber'sbeliefthat the sociologist, rules about action and logically deducingpredictionsfrom them, is doing no more than an ideal-typical,extremelyperceptiveactor does relationparallelsthe ends/ in everydaylife.ll The premise-conclusion by one state of affairsfollowing means relation, both characterized

60

Arnold Eisen

ineluctablyfromanother;this achievesideal embodiment in the tenets of logical thought.Second,there is internalcoherence:a set of parts are logically interrelated in our sense if they go beyond llon-contradiction to actual interdependence and mutual support,so that the presenceof each adds in some sense to the othersand to the edifice which all in commonsupport.An ideal-typeis meant to possesssuch coherence;a legal systemwhich has its own 'logic'and purports to be 'gapless' is logicalto that extent.Weberbelievesthat such 'rationality, in the senseof logicalor teleological consistency . . . has and alwayshas had power over man'.l2 Logicalcoherencein both aspectsallowsfor proof.Finally,Weberspeaksof the 'effectof the ratio, especiallyof a teleologicalreductionof practicalpostulates', and employsrationalin the senseof elaboration of implicitconsequences. Distinctness, clarity, and visibilityincreasecalculability, and are demanded in logic and the manipulation of concepts.Logicalpropositions, Weberstates,offier 'the highestdegreeof rationalunderstanding'.l3 5. There is a formalelementin logic, in that its methodholds true no matter what the empiricalcontent in a particularcase, and this universality is another component of rationality, oftenemployed in assessing the rationality of institutions. Abstractness is most obviousin law, wheregeneralrulesapply to diversesituations which they in fact help to define (an example of 'rationalization' as constructedmeaning). Bureaucracies, like juries, must act impersonally. Traditionalparticularistbondshave over time been replacedby rationaluniversalties, which demandno extrinsicattributes.Universality is importantover time as well as space: in permanentmusicalnotation,writtenconstitutions,reproducible scientificresults,or continuous tradingventures, all of them said to be rational.By contrast,meaningsso particular as to be inaccessible, or actionsaccordingto criteriaso individualthat they partakeof no sharedlogic or means/endscalculus,are irrational. Understanding is possibleat all, Weberwrites,becauseof 'accepted modesof thinking'and 'facts. . . as experiencehas accustomed us to interpretthem' in otherwords,becausethe meaningsare shared. 6. Last, rationalconnotessystematic methodicalorganizationwhich relatespartsto whole in the mannermost efficacious for the achievementof desiredresults,a usageespecially appliedto the studyof organzation, thoughwe findit as well in Weber'sdescriptions of asceticism. It can be viewed as the material analogue to the conceptualorganizationof the fourthcomponent, logic: 'an inanimatemachine,'Weber wrote,'is mind objectified'.l4 Rationalization can be an ordering, conceptualor actual.It is marked by specialization: a wholepersonbecome a part the betterto achievea desiredwhole,whetherin the factory,in science,in bureaucracy, or in a pantheonof gods. The West'smusic,then is said to be rationalbecausemathematical calculationlent certaintyand permanence to harmonicscale division, in that the tones, being calculable,could be universally reproduced.

'rationality' of Weberian andconfusions Ehemeanings Tonal material was unified in a system of mathematicalrelations governedby formalrules,and fixedin writingby a notationwhich in and permittedthe composition turn led to specializedmusic-creators a law, similarly,possesses Rational of music otherwiseimpossible.l5 and materials, all relevant integrates both systematically which logic shallin fact be relevant(as Westerntones itselfdefineswhat materials of possibletones used elsewhere).Law range a larger from are chosen set forthin abstractconcepts orderedand systematically is consciously scopeand which attemptsuniversal a structure and formalprocedures, judgment,a systemso calculablein its workings, impersonal promises to says Weberat one point, that thejudge or jury might be compared a machinewhich takesin the factsat one slot, and deliversthe verdict too, compareswith less rationalmodes from another.l6Bureaucracy, of organization'exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical of the knowledge speed, unambiguity, Precision, modesof production. reductionof files, continuity,discretion,unity, strict subordination, friction and of material and personalcosts these are raised to the rule is Wherecharismatic organizations.'l7 maximumin bureaucratic and patrimonialrule personaland unincalculableand transitory,l8 predictable,l9bureaucraticrule is both calculatingand calculable, systematic,a coherent assemblageof parts manned by specialized of personnel,ideally adapted to the dominationand administration men and the pursuitof ends throughrules appliedwithoutregardto
persons.20

andtheirbearingeachupon elements, of the component The presence chartattemptsto demthe others,shouldbe clear.The accompanying onstratethat Weber'susage of the term 'rational',far from 'shifting' within each area of his sociology,over all and 'opaque',is consistent the courseof his career.It is in this sensethat areas,and throughout 'one may ... rationalizelife from fundamentallydifferentpoints of and yet still be engagedin a view and in very differentdirections'2l single process.This is the forceof Weber'sclaim that the variousdein Westerncultureto whichhe pointsare in a meaningful velopments way one.
FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RATIONALITY

But while the meaningsof rationalityare consistentand conceptually rationalnot so the relatednotionof formalversussubstantive rigorous, he tells on theseusages.The distinction, ity whichWebersuperimposes in the use of the consistency to secure'greater us, is intendedprecisely debate whichhad beenmuddledat the time by partisan wordrational', ownusage Butas is so oftenthe casewithWeber's overnationalization.22 where idea only obfuscates of the word, the formalversussubstantive it is meant to clarify,and it standsas perhapsthe mostconfusedand We need confusingconceptin all of Weber'sworkon rationalization.
E

usagesof X ['eber's

'ratiozlal'

workin connectiollwith th (The word 'rational'appearsin Weberss

AREA I. DONIINATION source: PURPOSE CALCULABILITY CONTROL LOGICAL

andSociety Economy

In legal authority, rulesare intentionally established (p. 223)

Bureaucracy5s means-ends calculus(p. I002) Efficiency(p. 223) calIncreased culability(p. 284)

Domination throughknowledge (p. 225) Disciplinethe basisof rational warfare(p. I I 52)

Persuasio rationala (p 956)

2. LAW source:

andSociety Economy

Normsarisevia unconscious habits . becoming expecconsclous tations (p. 754)

3. ECONOMY source:

planDeliberate ning (p- 63)

andSociety Economy

Law increases with probability which actorcan calculateaction (p. 327) Law a technically rationalnzachine; predictable (p. 8 I I ) Irrational Higherrationgambling(p. I40) ality of controlledlabour
(p. I37)

'systemat analytica that they sistent,an (pp. 655-6 Legal logi

Money facilitates planning (p. 80)

Rational calculation the basis

OI eCOIlOmlC
r

activity (p. 67)

Indispensability of power of control for economic action (p. 68)

4. MUSIC source:

Rat. &9Soc.Fdn's of Music

Violin-making lacked rational foundation qualities of the instrument were unwilled (p. I IO)

Rational, arithmetic division of tonal materials (P 3)

Tone mat rationaliz musical th (P 7)

5. RELIGION sources:

Rel. China

PracticalConfucianutilitarianism(p. 24I)

Rational sobriety and discipline

(p. I6I)

Rationalit ured by sy relation b God and w

(p. 226)

Ancient udaism

Worldevents believedto be rationalin character (p. 3I4) Irrationality of worldnot org. to attain ends
(p. I23)*

Eventsand prophecy not determinedby magic or chance (p. 3I4) Masteryby calculation
((p. I39)*

Rational prophecy used no intoxicants

(p. 29I)
.

Rationaliz of need fo venge (p

SCIENCE source: Sci as Voc.

6.

Experlment

controls experience (p. I4I)*

'Logical s (proof) (p

* Qvlotations fromFrom Max Weber, ed. Gerthand Mills New York,OxfordUniversityPre

64

ArnoldEisen

only glance at the six elementswhich we have identifiedto pinpoint the sourceof the problem.A thing of process can ultimatelybe judged efficient,purposive, or systematic only relativeto some end. The standard must come from outside. Considerations of substanceare not extraneous to 'formal' ones but ratherbuilt in unavoidably. Economicformal rationality,Weber writes, represents the 'extent of quantitative calculationor accountingwhich is technicallypossible and which is actuallyapplied';it represents the extent to which provisionfor needsis, and can be, expressed in calculableterms,whether this calculationis in money or kind. Moneyyields the highestformal calculability, as it increases the facilityand extentof possible calculation. Substantiverationalityrepresentsthe degree to which provisioning is shapedundersomecriterion of values,whetherthis is 'ethical,political, utilitarian,hedonistic,feudal, egalitarian,or whatever'.Results of economicaction are assessed accordingto an extrinsicstandardof value-rationality, and not merely by the instrumental-rational standardof technically mostadequatemeans.Butwhereas thereis only one best means, there are 'an infinite number of possiblevalue-scales'. Outcomes,spirit,and instruments of economicactivitymay all be so judged, and the formalrationalityof a given systemmay be deemed less importantthan or even opposed to the achievementof one or anothersubstantive end. We see that the distinction is meantto showthe relativity of rationality; XVeber's demandfor clarityseemsto be part of his insistence that factsand valuejudgments be keptseparate. He in fact closesthisparticular sectionwith a contentious statementon that very point. 'Thereis no questionin this discussion of attemptingvalue judgmentsin this field, but only of determiningand delimitingwhat is to be called "formal".In this context the concept substantive is itself "formal"; that is, it is an abstract,genericconcept.' Formal,then in one sensemeansabstractor generic,a formor pattern into which specificcontent (substance) may be fitted. It almost meanstheoretical as opposedto actual.ThusforWeberthe substantive validityof moneyis the actualpossibility of exchanging it againstother items,while its formalvalidityis its theoretical or legal standingas an acceptedmeans of payment and (confusingly) the compulsionso to employit. Formal,nominalcontrolover the work-process is retained undersomeformsof capitalism by the worker, whileactual,substantive controlis appropriated by the owner.23 This usageis relatively uncomplicated,thoughWebermuddlesit by usingformalto meanboth 'technically possible'and 'actuallyapplied'.Both are forrnal relativeto a substantive end, but they are clearlynot the same. In its other senses,though,the word formalhas to do less with abstractionthan with an 'inside/outside' dichotomyrelatedto the issue of factsandvalues.A monetary policyorientedto substantively rational goalsis said to decline in formalrationality.Workerparticipation in

Themeanings andconfusions of Weberian 'rationcrliy'

65

management,causing substantiveintereststo take precedenceover formalfunctioning of the enterprise, reducesits formalrationality. Or, ownership of a firmby outsideinterests attempting to maximizeshortterm profitsat the expenseof the firm'slong-term viabilityis similarly likelyto impedefromal rationality.24 In all, formal rationality is equated with the continuedlong-termfunctioningat maximumefficiencyof the apparatusas presentlyconstituted(the 'inside'view), a process disrupted by personspursuing substantive goals not consistent with its statusquo operation(the 'outside'view). This is the forceof Weber's comment,in TheReligion of China, that Confucian life too was rational, but unlike Puritanismdeterminedfrom without rather than from within.25 The Puritan's God had left the worldstagefreefor whatever humanactorsmight devise;his control,in the word'sothersense,was formalratherthan substantive. The case, lastly, is similarin law. Lawmaking and lawfindingare eitherrationalor irrational:formallyirrational when normsare used which 'cannotbe controlledby the intellect',substantively irrational when decisionsare 'influencedby concretefactorsof the particular case as evaluatedupon an ethical,emotional,or political basis rather than by generalnorms',in other words,outsidethe procedureitself. Substantive rationalitymeansthat decisionsare influencedby norms 'different fromthoseobtainedthrough logicalgeneralization of abstract interpretations of meaning, whether ethical imperatives,utilitarian and other expediential rules,or politicalmaxims'.It differsfromsubstantiveirrationality in that in the latter such normsinfluenceonly particular cases,but areapplieduniversally in the substantively rational
case.26

Weber'sintentionin thus separating technicalefficiencyfrom normativemeasures is evident,but his distinction effectively obscures the relativity of even 'formal' evaluations. Only at a general level is monetarycalculationoptimallyrationalregardless of our provisioning standard:at a morespecificlevel, the particular calculationor policy used will vary in utility dependingon our specificgoals. This is even moreevidentin otherexamples. The market,the factory,the law, serve certaininterests,which thus promotetheir continuedfunctioning;in each case the questionis whethercontrolof a mechanism workingto the benefitof certaininterestswill be appropriated by other interests whosegoalsdo not coincidewith the continued,long-term functioning of the apparatus as it exists.Weberhimselfnotes that 'formal justice' must'timeand againproduceconsequences which are contraryto the substantivepostulatesof religiousethics or of political expediency', while benefiting somegroupsat the expenseof others.27 Beetham'sclaim that through this dichotomyWeber makes substantivecriticismimpossible,and leaves formalrationalityby default 'thesoleconsideration in termsof whicheconomic activityis considered in Economy and Society'28 is not quite accurate, forWeberhimselfobserves

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Eisen Arnold

and formal and substantiverationalityare often in conflict,29 that (e.g. facts certain to evade his own trap by stating that attempts withoutsupplying irrational' 'substantively are objectively exploitation) raisethe questdoes But the issue standard.30 substantive necessary the of of whetherthe distinctionas stated is not deceptive,a matter ion Marcuse's is This findings. prejudicing unavoidably procedure scientific one. strong a is case his point a to up and criticism3l [Weber's] throughout sustained not 'is writes, he ratio, of The concept for 'controlling to and fails at the decisivepoint'. The answer analysis most the definition points up the limits of formalreason,by what?' means to some end set from the outside.This end, logically efficient for human needs on is the provisioning to capitalistrationality, prior such as basisof privateenterprise(as opposedto any other basis in the the appear not to providedoes The failureof capitalism socialism). a socialisteconomyis deniedon of rationality superior the definition; is a of workerfrom meansof production groundsthat separation the Thus sense. that of formal rationalityin requirement technological becomes enterprise factof privatecapitalist historical verymaterial 'the of structure the of (inWeber'ssense of the word) a formalelement economyitself'. and of rational capitalism the fate of the modernworld,he continues, the is If industrialization This ? it controlling of is only: whatis the mostrationalmeans question is which now entersthe definitionof formalrationality, consideration, fails Weber definition. by Weber'sown a chosenend; it is substantive "technologare really and essentially necessities these to ask 'whether . . . the interests social of specific ical"or whetherthey are the disguise of instrument the of technicalreasoncan very well become perfection politas reason But, Marcusecontinues,'technical man'sliberation'.32 need not rationality Formaland substantive Historical'. is ical reason conflict. rationalforif Marcuse's to defendWeber: Hereonefeelsconstrained formal called be now ities were to work hand in hand, what would serve also would fromthe previousrationality, so different rationality, an as only not is It implications. endsand have substantive substantive neutral. never is it spirit'that 'the machineis not neutral': 'atrophied it is Formalitycan never escape substance;its formalityis relative; of level certain a at that end.It is possible some alwaysmost efficientfor this engenders, it which becauseof the confusion irony, unforgivable is not merely wantsto tell us. Formalrationality Weber what exactly is ratiollalSubstantive it has 'real'implications. formal,but substantive: But power. i.e. repercussions, ity is often merelyformal:it lacks'real' subso apparently is which at a deeper level, the formalrationality It may do so in the implications. stantivemay in fact lack substantive or socialism,it capitalism serves sensethat (X)whetherthe apparatus no one, being serves really it perhaps (X) workidentically,and so does now careerautomaton created manually a of all control, independent

Themeanings andconfusions of Weberian 'rationality'

67

ing madlyon its own power,like the demonunleashed by the sorcerer's apprentice. Conversely, one sensesthe convictionthat the only escape from this 'iron cage' lies in substantive controlapparently formalbut actuallythe only real control or rationality-possible:in the charismatic herowho mustdominatethe bureaucracy, lead the plebiscitarydemocratic state, and introducethe new god who will dethroneersatz prophecy. The answerto Marcuse's concludingquestion,'Or was there irony in Weber's conceptof reason ?'seemsclearenough,unlikethe exposition muddled,if alsodeepened, by thatveryirony.The irrationality of what passesfor reasonwas not just apparentto Weber,but a majortheme of his work. Still, one is drivento inquireinto otherpossiblemotivations for the retentionof a terminology so misleading,even given the assumption that Weberwas awareof (and perhapsenjoyed)the dialecticalturns suggested above. One possibleline of speculation is that the Weberian treatmentadhereson both its straightforward and ironic levels to a schemeoriginally developed in Puritanism; it was afterall 'on the basis of' the Puritan ideaof the callingthat 'rational conduct. . . wasborn'.33
RATIONALITY AND THE BERUFSMENSCH

We shouldnotefirstof all Weber's observation thatPuritanism affirmed the world as 'the theaterof God-willedactivityin one's worldlycalling'.34The metaphorwas significant: not only was man actorin and audienceto the dramaof divine electionunfoldingbeforehis own religiouslymandated introspection, but he was alsoactorin and audience to the drama of worldly transformation unfoldingin his religiously sanctionedeffortto controlearthlychances.This is after all \Veber's theme in TheProtestant Ethic:althoughentry to the afterworlds llad been arbitrarily allottedlong beforeby the distantinscrutable God, it was throughsuccessin his worldlycalling that a man obtainedevidence as to which of the two he was bound for. He was, further,left freeto practicethat calling,to masterhis world,becausethe authorof the play had left the stage, leavingbehindonly the outlinesof a script and the barestdirections, on the basisof which the actorswere to constructthe play. It is preciselyin this sensethat each is an actor, one who sayswordsand movesaboutknowingly, with purpose,in relation to otheractorswho do likewise. The 'stereotyping' whichresultedfrom previoussystematicreligiousworld-views was replacedby innovation in the case of Puritanism becausethe deusabsconditus had given substantive(actual)controlover the world to men, retainingonly formal (nominal)controlfor himself and even this was doubtedrepeatedly by Puritans who, observing the predominance of the arbitrary in their experienceand even in their dogma, saw preciouslittle evidencefor the claim. An important featureof the calling,then its mandatefor a

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Arnold Eisen

theatremanagedby its own actors is likewisepresentin the similar inside/outsidedistinction in rationality, that betweenformaland substantivevaluations. A secondimplication to be drawnat this point followsfromWeber's conclusionthat the Berufsmensch neither inquires about nor finds it necessaryto inquire about the meaning of his actual practice of a vocationwithin the whole world, the total framework of which is not his responsibility but his god's.35In formal rationality,too, control passesto an 'inner' mechanismundisturbed by outsideinterference, and an inner standardmeasuringefficiencywithout regardto other, transcendent criteria.In Puritanism, of course,the outsidestandard remainednormativelypotent: while the world of the religiousman becameincreasingly rationalfromhis point of view, it continuedto be irrational fromGod's.And becausePuritanism, simultaneously holding to belief in an omnipotentGod and in the meaningof a recalcitrant world far removedfrom Him, could provide'no rationalsolutionof the problemof theodicy,it concealedthe greatesttensions betweenthe worldand God, betweenthe actuallyexistentand the ideal'. Weberarguesthat the moreintensethe religiousneed for meaning, the morethe worldwas a problem. The morethe worldwassystematically organized,the sharperthe tensionsbecame,especiallyas secular institutions were systematized autonomously. And the sharper the tension, the greaterthe driveto furtherrationalization, until the original sourceof the tensionwas left far behindin an increasingly irrelevant heaven.36 Again we see that the formalmechanism, put in motionfor substantive purposes, soon achievesa self-generating momentum. It is herein Weber's view of historythat the meanings of rationalizationcometogether-and splinterapart.The worldwhichwas to have been one in its parts becamein those partsmany, each with its own rationalizedelaborationof meaning:separaterealmswhich only the specialist couldenter.Herewe perhaps findthe finalreasonforWeber's persistent usageof 'rational'on countlessoccasionswhen the relevant synonym('systematic', for example,or 'calculable')would far better have servedthe aim of clarity.The use of rationalnot only reminds us of the interlocking processes of historyand the unity of culture,not only illuminatesthe parallel processeswhich have developedmathematics,law, the sciences, the arts,eachinto a separate sphereof meaning united only by their commoninherentoppositionto the religious, but also attempts,by fiat as it were, to imposea unity of meaningon a worldmade moreunitedby this very act of comprehension.37 Weberclosesthe 'Vocation'essaywith Isaiah ('Watchman, watchman, what of the night?') and the essayon 'Objectivity in the Social Sciences' withFaust('I hastenon, his beamseternaldrinking . . . Above me Heaven unfurled,the floor of waves beneathme . . .'). Perhapsit is not going too far to suggestthat the scientific Berufsmensch would be iFaust in orderthathe mightbe Isaiah,thathe wouldmaster the world's

Themeanings andconfusions of Weberian Crationslity'

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knowledge,captureits developmentin a single overarchingtheory, tllat he might live responsibly, without the narrowness of vision to which the Berufsmensch is prone,at a time when doingso bringsone all the meaningthereis. If thisspeculation is correct,then the idea of duty in one'scalling,whichWeberbelievedCthe basis'of 'rationalconduct', doesindeed 'prowlabout'still, in our scienceas 'in our lives'. It helps us to understand how the conceptionof rationalityso far-reaching in its explanatory power and so consistently applied can contain a prejudicialmeasure of valuationwhichall Weber's efforts and declarations to the contrarycould not, or did not, sufliceto eliminate.
Arnold Eisen,B.A. B.PHIL. Danforth Sent Fellow HebrewUniversity Ofjrerusalem

Notes
I2. This and the followingquotation I. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic From Max Webern p. 324. and the Spiritof CAapitalism, tr. Talcott arefromWeber, I3. This and the quotations in the Parsonsn New York, Charles Scribner's following section are from Weber, Sons, I958, p. 78. andSociety, pp. 5-6. 2. Steven Lukes, 'Some Problems Economy I4. Ibld., p. I402. about Rationality', in Bryan Wilson I 5. Max Weber, The Rationaland (ed.), Rationality, New York, Harper & Social Foundations ofMusic, tr. and ed. Don Row, I97I, p. 207. 3. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Martindale, Johannes Riedel, and Essaysin Sociology, ed. and tr. Hans H. Gertrude Neuwirth, Southern Illinois Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York, UniversityPress, I958, pp. XXiV, 38-4I, 844, 93-7 Oxford University Press, I969, p. 293. I6. Weber, Economy and Society,pp. 4. See the opening pages of Max Weber, Economy andSociety: An Outline of 763, I395; see also pp. 655 f., 76I f., Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth 8 I I f. I7. Ibid.,p.973. and Claus \Vittich, New York, BedI8. Ibid., pp. I I I I i., especially I I 2 I. minster Press, I 968. I9. Ibid., pp. IOI2ff., especially Io2g. 5. Weber, Protestant Ethic,p. 22. 20. Ibid., pp. 956 ff., I I I I. 6. The quotations in this section are 2 I. Weber,Protestant Ethic,p. 78. from Weber, Economy andSociety, pp. 5-6. 7. Max Weber, The Methodology of the 22. This and the followingquotations and Society,pp. SocialsGiences tr. and ed. Edward A. from Weber, Economy Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, The 854. 23. Ibid., pp. I5I-3, I67Free Press, I949, p. II9. 24. Ibid., pp. I38, I407 I83. 8. Weber, Economy andSociety, pp. I37,
34o.

9. Max Weber, Ancient jtudaism, tr. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Oon Martindale New York, The E; ree Press, I 967, pp. 29I 403. I 0. Weber, Economy and Society, pp.
23-5. I I. I 78.

Weber, Methodology, pp.

I65,

I77-

25. Max Weber, TheReligion of China, tr. and ed. HansEI.Gerth,Glencoe,The Free Press,I95I, p. 247. 26. Weber, Economy and Society,pp. 656-7. 27. Ibid., pp. 8I2, 9I8 f. 28. David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Moderrz Politics,London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., I974,

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Arnold Lisen
'bestows utilitarian and social ethical blessings upon his subjects' is said to introduce 'substantive rationalization' into his realm. 3I. Herbert Marcuse, 'Industrialization and Capitalistn' in Otto Stammer (ed.), Max Weber andSociolog): Today, tr. Kathleen Morris, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, I 97I, pp I 33-52, I 84-6 32 Ibid, pp. I43, I49. 33. Weber,Protestant EtSzic, p. I 82. 3+. Weber,From Max Weber, p. 29I . 35. Weber,Economy sndSociety, p. 548. 36 Ibid, pp. 523, 572, 578-9. 37. This discussion is basedlargelyon Weber's essay 'Religious Rejections of the Worldand their Directions' in From Max Weber, pp. 323-59.

p. 274. A similarstatementon this issue is Peter Worsley's. He writes in The Trumpet ShallSound (NewYork,Schocken Books, s968) that 'Weberleaves out of his scheme,as somethingextra-scientific, the analysisof the objectivesor goals of action ... we can merely take thetn as given, for sciencecannothelp us when it comesto choosingbetweenwhat are only mattersof faith or arbitrary selection. . . we obsese that irrationalityis built into the whole scheme, for the entire provinceof the ends of action is treated as beyondthe reachof science:' (p. 267). 29. Weber, Economy and Society,pp. 8I2, 9I8 ff. 30. See ibid., pp. I40, I58, and From Max Weber, p. 298, wherethe princewho