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Information Read Me

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To Do
HUGE Get Nick White to help with the Psychoanalysis Answers More perm answers, and variations on perms You need more 2NC blocks. And a couple framing-overviews for the 2NR. Let's split up Spivak's books Jon: Reproductive Heteronormativity and Sexual Violence in the Bangladesh War of 1971 Can the Subaltern Speak

Nationalism and the Imagination Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teaching Terror A Speech After 9-11 Compile Spurlocks file in here Re: Discussion of Your Ideas and Academic Debate The Politics of Interpretation Ghostwriting
Review of Andrew Hurst, Derrida vis-a-vis Lacan, Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious Derrida vis--vis Lacan: Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis

Chris Luckett:
An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular A Note on the New International

Death of a Discipline
On the Cusp of the Personal and the Impersonal

TvB:
Resistance That Cannot be Recognized as Such Notes toward a Tribute to Jacques Derrida Learning from de Man Looking Back

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Harlem A Critique of Postcolonial Reason

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Meta-Info

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TOC
Contents
Hey Arnold K....................................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. To Do .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Meta-Info............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4 TOC ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Tips .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 10 Explanation................................................................................................................................................................................................. 11 Dedications ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 Spivak K ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14 Meta Information ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 15 Explanation................................................................................................................................................................................................. 16 Dedication .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 18 Shells................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 20 Policy ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 21 1NC ............................................................................................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Impact 2NC uncomplete .......................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Impact 2NR uncomplete .......................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Alternative 2NC ........................................................................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Alternative 2NR ........................................................................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Generic Pomo .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 30 1NC ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 31 Alternative 2NC ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Alternative 2NR ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 36 Generic Deontology ....................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Deleuze ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 44 1NC ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 45 Alternative 2NC ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 48 Alternative 2NR ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 50 Foucault............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 51 1NC ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 52 Alternative 2NC ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 55 Alternative 2NR ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 57 Capitalism ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 58 1NC ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 59 Alternative 2NC uncomplete ................................................................................................................................................................... 63 Alternative 2NR uncomplete ................................................................................................................................................................... 65 Links ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 67 Super Generic ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 68 Globalization .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 92

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Good/Bad State ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 93 Humanitarian Aid ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 98 Terrorism ................................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Military Intervention ............................................................................................................................................................................... 113 Democratization......................................................................................................................................................................................... 73 Omission ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 117 Feminism .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 86 Equality Discourse..................................................................................................................................................................................... 77 Rememoration.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 122 Social Redistribution/ Economic Restructuring .................................................................................................................................. 127 US Key ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 135 Public Intellectual .................................................................................................................................................................................... 120 Economic Collapse .................................................................................................................................................................................... 82 Human Rights .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 100 Identity Politics ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 102 Deontology State Actions ......................................................................................................................................................................... 77 Marx/Capitalism Ks ............................................................................................................................................................................... 106 Nationalism I/L ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 115 Deleuze and Guattari/Desire ................................................................................................................................................................... 73 Deleuze and Guattari/Signifier ............................................................................................................................................................... 75 Foucault/Power......................................................................................................................................................................................... 89 Western Criticism/Subject ..................................................................................................................................................................... 136 Capitalism................................................................................................................................................................................................. 136 Capitalism/Marx Specific......................................................................................................................................................................... 70 Representation ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 123 Totalizing Lens......................................................................................................................................................................................... 132 Omission ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 138 Equality Discourse.................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Deontology State Actions ........................................................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Speech Act Theory ................................................................................................................................................................................... 128 Impacts ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 141 War ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 142 Value to Life ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 150 HIV/AIDs................................................................................................................................................................................................. 151 Otherization ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 152 Structural Violence .................................................................................................................................................................................. 154 Deontology ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 155 Reproductive Heteronormativity First.................................................................................................................................................. 156 Ontology ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 158 Spurlock .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 159 Turns Case ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 160 Education .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 162 Turns Case ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 163

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No Solvency ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 164 Aesthetic Education Alternative ................................................................................................................................................................. 167 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 168 Key to Ethics............................................................................................................................................................................................. 170 Human Rights Alternative ........................................................................................................................................................................... 171 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 178 Trace Alternative........................................................................................................................................................................................... 180 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 181 Extension .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 182 AT - Deleuze............................................................................................................................................................................................. 183 Deconstruction Alternative.......................................................................................................................................................................... 184 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 185 Key to Politics........................................................................................................................................................................................... 188 AT Deleuze ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 190 Rejection Alternative .................................................................................................................................................................................... 191 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 192 Turns Case ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 198 Equivalent Comparitivism Alternative ...................................................................................................................................................... 200 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 201 Postcolonial Perspective Alternative .......................................................................................................................................................... 203 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 204 Deconstructive Psychoanalysis Alternative............................................................................................................................................... 206 1NC ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 207 2NC ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 208 2NR............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 210 Psychoanalysis First ................................................................................................................................................................................ 211 Deconstruction Psychoanalysis First ..................................................................................................................................................... 212 Alt First Criticisms Specific ................................................................................................................................................................. 213 Turns Case ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 214 Turns Case Political Action Specific ................................................................................................................................................... 216 AT Cant Solve ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 218 AT Anything Political .......................................................................................................................................................................... 219 AT Psychoanalysis Bad - Generic ....................................................................................................................................................... 221 AT No Lack/Lack is Affirmation ....................................................................................................................................................... 222 AT Psychoanalysis Bad Desire Productive ..................................................................................................................................... 223 AT Psychoanalysis Bad Schizoanalysis ........................................................................................................................................... 226 AT Psychoanalysis Bad Oedipus Bad .............................................................................................................................................. 229 AT Psychoanalysis Bad Re-entrenches Capitalism ........................................................................................................................ 232 AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Generic ...................................................................................................................................................... 234 AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Derridas Insistence ................................................................................................................................. 236 AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Textual Basis ............................................................................................................................................. 238 AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Memory Archive ...................................................................................................................................... 239 AT Psycho. Links to Derrida ............................................................................................................................................................... 241

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Deconstruction Key To Psychoanalysis ................................................................................................................................................ 243 AT Phonocentrism Bad ........................................................................................................................................................................ 244 Perm Cards ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 245 Deconstruction First ................................................................................................................................................................................ 247 Deconstruction Precedes Ontology ....................................................................................................................................................... 248 Deconstruction Precedes Epistemology................................................................................................................................................ 250 AT Reductionist .................................................................................................................................................................................... 252 Double Bind Good ................................................................................................................................................................................... 253 AT Rorty/Zizek .................................................................................................................................................................................... 255 Answers To Western Lies ............................................................................................................................................................................ 257 AT State Good ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 273 AT Subaltern Bad/PICs ................................................................................................................................................................... 274 AT Nationalism Good .......................................................................................................................................................................... 277 AT No Alternative Solvency ............................................................................................................................................................... 278 AT Globalization Good ........................................................................................................................................................................ 279 AT Perm ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 281 AT Identity Rupture Bad ..................................................................................................................................................................... 282 AT Science/Trinity ............................................................................................................................................................................... 283 AT Lash out/Reversal Psychoanalysis ........................................................................................................................................... 284 AT Subaltern is Misappropriating ...................................................................................................................................................... 285 AT Subaltern is Homogenous/Totalizing ......................................................................................................................................... 286 AT Other PICs ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 287 AT Particular K ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 288 AT Must Learn from the Oppressed .................................................................................................................................................. 289 AT Gramci ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 290 AT Doesnt Speak for India ................................................................................................................................................................. 291 AT Identity Politics Bad ....................................................................................................................................................................... 292 AT Alternative is Non-Unique ............................................................................................................................................................ 294 AT Status Quo Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................... 295 AT Capitalism ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 296 AT Subalterns are Nationalists ........................................................................................................................................................... 297 Framework .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 299 Generic ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 300 K First ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 301 Ballot Becomes the Criticism .................................................................................................................................................................. 314 Dehumanization ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 315 AT Vagueness/Theory/No Practical Application ........................................................................................................................... 316 AT Organic Intellectual ........................................................................................................................................................................ 317 AT Politics Good ................................................................................................................................................................................... 318 Class Room Pedagogy .................................................................................................................................................................................. 320 First ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 321 Solves ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 323 In Round Solvency .................................................................................................................................................................................. 324

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Contestatory Fiction ................................................................................................................................................................................ 325 AT Not Enough to Solve ...................................................................................................................................................................... 326 Representations First .................................................................................................................................................................................... 328 Deontology First............................................................................................................................................................................................ 330

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Tips
REPRODUCTIVE HETERONORMATIVITY Many judges will be confused by this phrase since you're generally not talking about sexuality. It's fine because you're using the term correctly, but for that reason you may want to be careful about using it. CRITIQUE COMES FIRST This first card is one you should read most rounds you read Spivak. CLASS ROOM PEDAGOGY This first card is another one you should read in nearly every round you read Spivak.

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Explanation
Theres a few Ks that will be in this file Be sure to talk to me and figure out which one is best for the aff and then read through the 1NC and the extensions pretty well Every link has in itself a separate spin to the K, meaning itll never be the same K. Be sure to know the argument so you dont sound dumb This K should be argued as an ethical issue, built around the question "Can the subaltern speak, and who will listen?" If you're dealing with some form of humanitarianism or Otherization aff, that's a prior question to any ethical implications the other team claims. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ZHH4ALRFHw&feature=related

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Dedications
Huge thank you to Chris Spurlock for working on this file with us and providing many a thoughts, cards etc. Hes the reason this file got started, so any win it brings us is a big thank you to him.

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Spivak K

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Meta Information

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Explanation
Heres a good run down of this K Spivak and Kiossev 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Alexander, Columbia, University of Sofia, Nationalism and the
Imagination, JCook.) A.K. Everybody is exhausted. Before expressing my deep thanks to Prof. Spivak, I will risk something quite personal. She started with an appeal that we should translate for ourselves her presentation and I did so for myself. It was a less than sophisticated translation, because I was unable to follow everything. Some stuff I really understood, other things I am still thinking about, third things remain a little bit vague for me, but at the end I experimented a kind of comic summary of your lecture. So I would summarize the lecture in this way and this is my personal risk, it has nothing to do with the lecture itself: Dear

nations this is the general message dear nations, please, you were invented as imaginary narratives. After that, unfortunately you were institutionalized and you forgot your origin, you forgot that you are imaginary. Be kind enough, go back to the imaginary. You are fictive narratives and furthermore, please, be kind enough to compare yourselves. Then you will understand that you are not equal, you are equivalent. G.S. Well done! Well done! You know what you forgot? Reproductive heteronormativity. But otherwise beautifully done! I neednt have given the lecture, it takes two minutes!

Heres the critical arguments Each link is like its own K Also, heres a good overview of Spivaks views. http://maryerint.blogspot.com/2009/04/gayatri-spivak-can-subaltern-speak1983.html
Spivak, of Indian descent, makes

a intervention in post-colonial, feminist and psychoanalytical criticism by attempting to locate (or dis-locate) the subaltern and show the subaltern cannot speak. She has a "politics of the open end" in which "deconstruction acts as a 'safeguard' against the repression or exclusion of 'alterities'...people, events, or ideas that are radical 'other' to the dominat world view." "almost from the start, she emphasized how deconstructions interest in the 'violence' of traditional hierarchical binary oppositions (between male and female, the West and the rest, etc.) afforded a passage from literary theory to radical politics." Spivak herself writes that "the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the Self's Shadow." "Spivak sees postcolonial studies as a new instance of this attempt to liberate the other and to enable that other to experience and articulate those parts of itself that fall outside what the dominant discourse has constituted as its subjecthood." The subaltern holds a subordinate position that is always in relation to but stands outside of the and ambivalent to the central locus of power. However, the subaltern itself is a heterogeneous group. Radical political movements tend to romanticize subaltern and put the responsibility upon the subaltern to liberate themselves despite their place outside the system. Spivak argues against essentialism because the subaltern cannot be easily or neatly categories. "Leftist intellectuals who romanticize the oppressed...essentialize the subaltern and thus replicate the colonialist discourses they purport to critique." "A
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person's or group's identity is relational, a function of its place in a system of differences." She does argue for a "difference feminism" "which stresses alliances among women across their differences." She
introduces the concept of "strategic essentialism": "In some instances, she argued, it was important to strategically make essentialist claims, even while one retained an awareness that those claims were, at best, crude political generalizations." Spicak turns to Frued's analysis of colonialism. "She remains

leery of any attempt to fix and celebrate the subaltern's distinctive voice by claims that the subaltern occupies the position of victim, abjected other, scapegoat, savior, and so on." Spivak notes that her analysis offers an acknowledgement of the the dangers of "interpreting and representing the other." "The subaltern is not privileged (within the dominant discourse), and does not speak in a vocabulary that will get a hearing in institutional locations of power. The subaltern enters the official and intellectual discourse only rarely and usually through mediating commentary of someone more at home in those discourses. If the problematic is understood in this way, it is hard to see how the subaltern can be capable of speaking." Spivak then tries to recover the speech of the subaltern through an analysis of an Indian woman's
suicide.

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Dedication

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Shells

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Normal 1NC

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K 1NC
First, The pursuit of modern economics and US engagement has at its root in domination and coloniality. This perpetuates total war throughout the war in the pursuit of the plan. Worse, modern coloniality cannot solve the problems of the world Its outdated and works to reproduce the nation again and again, in reproductive heteronormativity That turns case Means try or die for the K Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. 1. Modernitys

ability to provide solutions to modern problems has been increasingly compromised. In fact, it can be argued that there are no modern solutions to many of todays problems (Santos, 2002; Leff, 1998; Escobar, 2003b). This is clearly the case, for instance, with massive displacement and ecological destruction, but also developments inability to fulfill its promise of a minimum of wellbeing for the worlds people. At the basis of this modern incapacity lie both a hyper-technification of rationality and a hyper-marketization of social life what Santos (2002) refers to as the increasing incongruence of the functions of social emancipation and social regulation. The result is an oppressive globality in which manifold forms of violence increasingly take on the function of regulation of peoples and economies . This feature has become central to the neo-liberal approach of the American empire (even more so after the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq). This modernist attempt at combating the symptoms but not the cause of the social, political and ecological crises of the times results in multiple cruel little wars in which the control of territories, people and resources is at stake (Joxe, 2002). Regimes of selective inclusion and hyper-exclusion of heightened poverty for the many and skyrocketing wealth for the fewoperating through spatial-military logics, create a situation of widespread social fascism. The ever
widening territories and peoples subjected to precarious living conditions under social fascism suggest the continued validity of a certain notion of a Third World, although not reducible to strict geographical parameters. In short,

the modern crisis is a crisis in models of thought, and modern solutions, at least under neo-liberal globalization (NLG), only deepen the problems . Moving beyond or outside modernity thus becomes a sine qua non for imagining after the third world. Second, Engage in border thinking. Border thinking is the redefinition of terms and ideas within a new epistemology, intended to redefine our thought in a new path away from Occidental, coloniality Thats enough to solve the K and the aff Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

One of many plausible solutions to the Eurocentric versus fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter Mignolo, following Chicano(a) thinkers such as Gloria Anzalda (1987) and Jose David Saldvar (1997), calls critical border thinking (Mignolo 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity to retreat into a fundamentalist

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absolutism, border

epistemologies subsume/redefines the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity. What border thinking produces is a redefinition /subsumption of citizenship, democracy, human rights, humanity, and economic relations beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity.
Border thinking is not an anti-modern fundamentalism. It is a decolonial transmodern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity. But border thinking is just one expression of epistemic decolonization in this case following the Chicano colonial experience inside the US Empire. There are other decolonial notions such as diasporic thought, autonomous thought, thinking from the margins, thinking from Pachamama, etc. articulated from other colonial experiences. A

good

example of this is the Zapatista struggle in Mexico. The Zapatistas are not anti-modern fundamentalist. They do not reject democracy and retreat into some form of indigenous fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatistas accept the notion of democracy, but redefine it from a local indigenous practice and cosmology, conceptualizing it as commanding while obeying or we are all equals because we are all different. What seems to be a paradoxical slogan is really a critical decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern. This leads to the question of how to transcend the imperial monologue established by the European-centric modernity.

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2NC Impact
At the top, the impact debate: We have a few DAs to the aff: a. Problem Creation DA Occidentalism cannot solve problems any more Its created them and it continues to embrace the system of exclusion that exacerbates the epitome of the problem AND EVEN IF THEY SOLVE THIS PROBLEM NOW They are embracing the cause of these symptoms, which means they cause their impacts in the future Turns case and try or die for the alt b. Coloniality DA Occidentalism continues to create an epistemological structure that excludes all subaltern modes of thought This means no perm will solve and the system of violence that is justified by coloniality will be continued indefinitely c. Justifications DA The pursuit of economic engagement and well being continues to justify wars towards actors that threaten that plan Means perpetual war and justification of any impact Thats Escobar 04 NOW, the line on line on the impact debate

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2NC Alternative
Extend the alt border thinking Which requires us to redefinition all terms and ideas within an epistemology This new terminology forces us to rethink the way we engage in political systems and the way we talk about different epistemologies. Border thinking empirically has worked, and is adaptable to even the first world Its the rethinking of epistemological relations that breaks down the holds of coloniality Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. The corollary is the need to build narratives from the perspective of modernity/coloniality geared towards the search for a different logic (22). This

project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of border thinking. Thus, it becomes possible to think of other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality (329). These alternatives would not play on the globalization/civilization couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a mundializacin/culture relation centered on the local histories in which colonial global designs are necessarily transformed. The diversity of mundializacin is contrasted with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders --in sum, pluriversality. One may say, with Mignolo (2000: 309), that this approach is certainly a theory from/of the Third World, but not only for the Third World ..... Third World theorizing is also for the First World in the sense that critical theory is subsumed and incorporated in a new geocultural and epistemological location. AND, that solves the aff while avoiding DAs The alternative provides a better incorporation of countries into economic partnerships, allowing for us to solve your aff best AND Our alternative spills over and improves all of economics Zein-Eladin 09 [Eiman O., Franklin & Marshall College, Department of Economics, Economics, postcolonial theory and
the problem of culture: institutional analysis and hybridity, http://relooney.fatcow.com/00_New_3133.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/26/13. Postcolonial theory, on the other hand, though much criticised for neglecting the economy, has generated tremendous insights on issues of cross-cultural hegemony, that is, the creation of a political climate that elicits the subaltern (subordinated) groups consent to a dominant ideology, and the role of knowledge construction in this process (Zein- Elabdin and Charusheela, 2004).

Colonial discourse analysis (Bhabha, 1983; Said, 1979) opens up a space for comprehending the twentieth century notion of development as a discourse of power rather than a culturally neutral, scientifically knowable growth path of an economy (Escobar, 1995; Olson, 1994).2 Postcoloniality presents a promising entry point for understanding a contemporary world in which the culture of European modernity (most notably, nationstate, market system, urban agglomeration) has expanded far beyond its historical and geographical origins and has been imbricated with other cultures in deep and complex forms. This understanding could potentially allow the cultures of societies

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currently theorised in economics as less/underdeveloped to equally participate in the global construction of meaning and definitions of the terms of economic being and becoming. Perhaps the greatest promise of postcolonial insights is the possibility of imagining different economic relations and social ethics, and thereby aiding in the search for answers to the presently daunting questions of ecological sustainability and social wellbeing . Taking postcolonial theory on board calls for a more profound rethinking of the place of culture and of currently devalued cultures in economics. In particular, Homi Bhabhas (1985, 1994) idea of hybridity (deep cultural mixing) offers a fruitful analytical tool for better examining economies situated in multiple and dense cross-cultural intersections, and improves our understanding of contemporary economic phenomena at large. 2 Such hybridity is exhibited in
the contemporary economies of Africa, yet Africa is also the quintessential representative of cultural subalternity in economics, currently defined as the least developed world region and habitually associated with crisis and failure.3 Traditionally, most significant descriptions of African economies were produced by anthropologists (e.g., Bohannan and Dalton, 1962). Unfortunately, these ethnographies were rarely taken up in economics on the premise that most of the observed behaviour and institutions amounted to little more than obsolete traditions that would inevitably be supplanted by modern structures and attitudes. An important outcome of the current attention to culture in economics has been the generation of more substantive examinations of economic conditions in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Fafchamps, 2004; Schneider, 1999; Trulsson, 1997). This small literature varies in its level of detail and application of institutionalist principles, but it generally highlights the prevalence of gift giving, sharing, strong kinship obligation and other socio-economic patterns previously identified by anthropologists. The persistence of these patterns, in the midst of substantial economic change, presents a challenge to theoretical perspectives that conceptualise them as premodern or transitory. In this paper I argue that institutional

economics, with its paradigmatic emphasis on culture and long standing openness to inter-disciplinarity, is best positioned to bridge the gap between postcolonial theory and economics. In particular, the
theoretical framework of institutionalism, which underscores cultural embeddedness and an unteleological, nonethnocentric conception of social change (Mayhew, 1998), necessarily accommodates a concept of hybridity. It seems hardly coincidental that the earliest reference to postcolonial critique in economics is Paulette Olsons (1994, p. 77) effort to push the boundaries of radical institutionalism by examining . . . the postcolonial critique ofwestern humanism. Olson applied the notion of orientalism in order to heighten institutionalists attention to racist, sexist and classist biases in mainstream economics. Here, I show that

drawing on the postcolonial idea of hybridity can strengthen the institutionalist emphasis on culture, and allow more illuminating, truly substantive analysis. Space does not allow a full account of
hybridity, nor an extended exploration of its implications, but only a general outline to indicate its relevance and potential productivity for institutional economics.

***If you need more*** AND, Even if they win that we dont solve this specific instance, our form of rethinking terms spills over and solves the overall system of coloniality and Occidentalism Means we still solve AND PUT THE PERM DEBATE HERE The alternative must come before anything else, otherwise any dialogue, plan, and perm fails Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political
Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

An inter-cultural North-South dialogue cannot be achieved without a decolonization of power relations in the modern world. A horizontal dialogue as opposed to the vertical monologue of the West requires a transformation in global power structures.
We cannot assume a Habermasian consensus or an equal horizontal relationship among cultures and peoples globally divided in the two poles of the colonial difference. However,

we could start imagining alternative worlds beyond Eurocentrism and fundamentalism. Transmodernity is Latin American philosopher of liberation
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Enrique Dussels utopian project to transcend the Eurocentric version of modernity (Dussel 2001). As opposed to Habermas project that what needs to be done is to fulfill the incomplete and unfinished project of modernity, Dussels

transmodernity is the project to fulfill the 20th Century unfinished and incomplete project of decolonization Instead of a single modernity centered in Europe and imposed as a global design to the rest of the world, Dussel argues for a multiplicity of decolonial critical responses to eurocentered modernity from the subaltern cultures and epistemic location of colonized people around the world. Dussels transmodernity would be equivalent to diversality as a universal project which is a result of critical border thinking, critical diasporic thinking or critical thinking from the margins as an epistemic intervention from the diverse subalterns locations. Subaltern epistemologies could provide , following Walter Mignolos (2000) redefinition of Caribbean thinker Edouard Glissants concept, a diversality of responses to the problems of modernity leading to transmodernity. ( ) More perm answers AT// Alternative Fails ( ) Put alt extension here ( ) Their evidence assumes localized struggles remain fragmented. Our movement is much larger, and connected to other global movements that combine to show the flaws in U.S. colonialism. Our rejection opens up millions to the errors of neocolonialism WISE, 9 [Raul Delgado, Director of Doctoral Program in Migration Studies and Professor of Development Studies at
Universidad Autnoma de Zacatecas; Forced Migration and US Imperialism: The Dialectic of Migration and Development, Crit Sociol, 35: 76]

The theoretical framework outlined in this article for understanding the dialectic relationship between development and migration has four critical components. A Critical Approach to Neoliberal Globalization Contrary to the discourse regarding its inevitability (on this see Petras and Veltmeyer, 2000), we posit that the current phase of imperialist domination is historical and can and should be transformed. In this regard, it is fundamental to notice that [t]he

principal factor generating international migration is not globalization but imperialism, which pillages nations and creates conditions for the exploitation of labor in the imperial center (Petras, 2007: 512). A Critical Reconstitution of the Field of Development Studies The favoring of a singular mode of analysis based on the belief that free markets work as powerful regulatory mechanisms, efficiently assigning resources and providing patterns of economic convergence among countries and their populations, has clearly resulted in failure. New theoretical and practical alternatives are needed, and we propose a reevaluation of development as a process of social transformation through a multidimensional, multi-spatial, and properly contextualized approach, using the concept of imperialism as an alternative explanatory framework of international capitalist expansion and the growing inequalities (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2000). This integral approach requires the consideration of the strategic and structural aspects of the dynamic of uneven contemporary capitalism development, which should be examined at the global, regional, national, and local levels. For this purpose it is crucial to understand, inter alia, a) the central role played by foreign investment in the process of neoliberal restructuring of

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peripheral economies, and b) the new modalities of surplus transfer characterizing contemporary capitalism. The Construction of an Agent of Change The globalization project led by the USA has ceased to be consensual: it has only benefited capitalist elites and excluded and damaged an overwhelming number of people throughout the world. Economic, political, social, cultural and environmental changes are all needed but a transformation of this magnitude is not viable unless diverse movements, classes, and agents can establish common goals. The construction of an agent of change requires not only an alternative theory of development but also collective action and horizontal collaboration: the sharing of
experiences, the conciliation of interests and visions, and the construction of alliances inside the framework of South-South and South-North relations. A Reassessment of Migration and Development Studies The current explosion of forced migration is part of the intricate machinery of contemporary capitalism as an expression of the dominant imperialist project. In order to understand this process we need to redefine the boundaries of studies that address migration and development: expand our field of research and invert the terms of the unidirectional orthodox vision of the migration-development nexus in order to situate the complex issues of uneven development and imperialist domination at the center of an alternative dialectical framework. This entails a new way of understanding the migration phenomenon.

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2NC Link
AND, The affirmatives pursuit of modern economics and US engagement has at its root in domination and coloniality. This is a form of domination that forces all nations to adhere to the global plans of the Occidental United States, and all who refuse are shown as deviant. This perpetuates total war throughout the war in the pursuit of the plan, while supporting and embracing occidental, colonial thought Thats Escobar 04

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Generic Pomo

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1NC
First, The affirmatives genealogy enacts the same representational and epistemological violence that they hope to confront. The affirmative conflates two senses of the word representation. First, Representation as in direct proxy or political representation. And second, re-presentation as in painting a portrait. When they conflate the two senses, they create a static, unified, whole Other, from which we can learn or know the truth of the situation or experience. There is no one concrete experience of the Other from which we can base a genealogy or a politics. The affirmatives genealogy engages in this problematic representational strategy that erases their own subject position and political interest and creates violent essentialist utopian politics. This turns case. Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, A critique of postcolonial reason: toward a history of the vanishing present)
An important point is being made here: the

production of theory is also a practice; the opposition between abstract "pure" theory and concrete "applied" practice is too quick and easy.93 But Deleuze's articulation of the argument is problematic. Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as "speaking for," as in politics, and representation as "re-presentation," as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only "action," the theoretician does not represent (speak for)the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately). These two senses of representation-within state formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subjectpredication, on the other-are related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover over the discontinuity with an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects again a paradoxical subject-privileging. 94 Because "the person who speaks and acts ... is always a multiplicity," no "theorizing intellectual ... [or] party or ... union" can represent "those who act and struggle" (FD 206). Are those who act and struggle mute, as opposed to those who act.and speak (FD 206)? These immense problems are buried in the differences between the "same" words: consciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation and re-presentation. The critique of ideological subjectconstitution within state formations and systems of political economycan now be effaced, as can the active theoretical practice of the "transformation of consciousness." The banality of leftist intellectuals'
lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent. If such a critique and such a project are not to be given up, the shifting distinctions between representation within the state and political economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the other, must not be obliterated. Let us consider the play of vertreten ("represent" in the first sense) and darstellen ("re-present" in the second sense) in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where Marx touches on "class" as a descriptive and transformative concept in a manner somewhat more complex than Althusser's distinction between class instinct and class position would allow. This is important in the context of the argument from the working class both from our two philosophers and "political" third-world feminism from the metropolis.Marx's

contention here is that the descriptive definition of a class can be a differential one-its cutting off and difference from all other classes: "in so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that cut off their mode of life, their interest, and their formation from those of the other classes and place them in inimical confrontationfftindlichgegeniiberstellen], they form a class.
"95 There is no such thing as a "class instinct" at work here. In fact, the collectivity of familial existence, which might be considered the arena of "instinct," is discontinuous with, though operated by, the differential isolation of classes. In this context, one far more pertinent to the France of the 1970s than it can be to the international periphery, the formation of a class is artificial

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and economic, and the economic agency or interest is impersonal because it is systematic and heterogeneous. This agency or interest is tied to the Hegelian critique of the individual subject, for it marks the subject's empty place in that process without a subject which is history and political economy. Here the capitalist is defined as "the conscious bearer [Triiger] of the limidess movement of capital." My point is that Marx

is not working to create an undivided subject where desire and interest coincide. Class consciousness does not operate toward that goal. Both in the economic area (capitalist) and in the political (world-historical agent), Marx is obliged to construct models of a divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other. A celebrated passage like the description of capital as the Faustian
monster brings this home vividly. 96 The following passage, continuing the quotation from The EighteenthBrumaire, is also working on the structural principle of a dispersed and dislocated class subject: the (absent collective) consciousness of the small peasant proprietor class finds its "bearer" in a "representative" who appears to work in another's interest. "Representative" here does not derive from darstellen; this sharpens the contrast Foucault andDeleuze slide over, the contrast, say, between a proxy and a portrait.There is, of course, a relationship between them, one that has received political and ideological exacerbation in the European tradition at least since the poet and the sophist, the actor and the orator, have both been seen as harmful. In the guise of a post-Marxist decription of the scene of power, we

thus encounter a much older debate: between representation or rhetoric as tropology and as persuasion. Darstellen belongs to the first constellation, vertreten-with stronger suggestions of substitution- to the second. Again, they are related, but running them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essentialist, utopian politics that can, when transferred to single-issue gender rather than class, give unquestioning support tQ4-the :financialization of the globe, which ruthlessly constructs a general will in the credit-baited rural woman even as it "format"s her through UN Plans of Action so that she can be "developed." Beyond this concatenation, transparent as rhetoric in the service of "truth" has always made itself out to be, is the much-invoked oppressed subject (as Woman), speaking, acting, and knowing that gender in development is best for her. It is in the shadow of this unfortunate marionette that the history of the unheeded subaltern must unfold. Second, This representational politics and movement uncritically buy into the valuesystem that groups and systems use for the oppressive and hurtful purposes you try to stop Turns case Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12.

A deconstructive approach does not seek essences behind the historical, social and linguistic processes that produce meaning but rather investigates these genealogies. The practice of representation has to be made explicit and the problems involved in seeing language as just a means of referring to objects or things "outside it" has to be repeatedly remembered. The two senses of representation ("speaking for" and representation as staging) become relevant here. If representation as "speaking for" somebody, as being a proxy for (within the state and the political) and representation as theoretical description, as a staging of the world, as a portrayal of oneself and the other are complicit and if this complicity, when unexplicated, produces silences and hegemonies, the only way to appreciate this dynamic is to deconstruct these kinds of operations (Spivak, 1994: 70, 72). The staging of the world produces the problem of political intersectionality and structural intersections call for proxy politics. [16] The very production of categories such as "woman" is a political act and we need not see that these productive representational practices are

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"necessary" to further politics that would become possible "after" the category is produced. The politics of representation is the first thing to take seriously within critical equality discourse. Otherwise it falls into a nave identity politics where "women," "working-class," "transsexual," "lesbian," and various other categories are utilized to enable a "politics of rights" and representation for insurrectionary subjects. The insurrectionary subject needs its proxies. Although it can be argued that this might be helpful for some "groups" somewhere, I do not wish us to settle for this. In a neoliberal vein we circulate a language that "takes into account" identities such as class, ethnicity, sexuality without an epistemological (genealogical) awareness of our own academic representational practice. We uncritically buy into the very same value-system that is used by conservative regimes for oppressive purposes. We help produce the problem of political intersections. Third, The alt: Reject the affs western subjectivity and engage in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern A deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to ethics and actions is the only way of giving the subaltern a voice It puts the psychoanalyst in a position that ensures solvency, while avoiding the problems of political powers which leaves a normative system that links to the K This kills perm solvency Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.)
But the most interesting sign of disciplinary privileging is found in Julia Kristeva's "Psychoanalysis and the Polis." At

the end

or center of delirium, according to Kristeva, is that which is desired, a hollow where meaning empties out in not only the presymbolic but the preobjective, "the ab-ject." (A deconstructive critique of thus "naming" an undifferentiated telos of desire before the beginning of difference can be launched but is not to my purpose here.) The desire for knowledge involved in mainstream interpretation (which Kristeva calls "Stoic" by one of those undocumented sweeping generalizations common to a certain kind of "French" criticism) shares such a hollow enter and is thus linked with delirium. Certain kinds of fiction writers and, one presumes, analysands and social
engineers try to dominate, transform, and exterminate improper "objects" awakened in the place of the abject. The

psychoanalyst, however, wins out over both mad writer and man of politics. "Knowing that he is constantly in abjection [none of the problems of this position is discussed in Kristeva's text]12 and in neutrality, in desire and in indifference, the analyst builds a strong ethics, not normative but directed, which no transcendence guarantees" (p. 92; italics mine). This is the privileged position of synthesis within a restrained dialectic: the psychoanalyst persistently and symmetrically sublates the contradiction between interpretation and delirium. To privilege delirium (interpretation as delirium) in the description of this symmetrical synthesis is to misrepresent the dialectic presented by the essay, precisely in the interest of a politics that can represent its excluded other as an analysis that privileges interpretation. It should also be mentioned, of course, that the indivisibility and inevitability of the archaic (Christian) mother comes close to a transcendental guarantee. To know her for what she is, rather than to seek to transform her, is the psychoanalyst's professional enterprise

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Alternative 2NC
First, Extend the alternative of rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern This solves all of the K Engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to the affirmatives problems allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjection of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity, allowing us to uncover there justifications, assumptions and underlying cultural drives Only this approach allows to know the other and experience the other, giving the subaltern a voice Thats Spivak 82 AND We need to reject the utopian fantasies of the affirmatives project. Only when recognizing that it is a fantasy can we endlessly traverse and get over it. Stavrakakis 99, Ideology and Discourse Analysis Program in the Department of Government at the University of Essex,
1999 ( Yannis, Lacan and the Political, Ruteledge Press 76-78) In opposition to such a regressive attitude, Lacanian

theory promotes a return to the founding moment of modernity. Recognising the irreducible character of impossibility, the constitutivity of the real as expressed primarily in the failure of our discursive world and its continuous rearticulation through acts of identification, far from being a postmodern move, reveals the truly modern character of the Lacanian project; instead of a postmodern mysticism it leads to a reorientation of science and knowledge. Recognising the constitutivity of the real does not entail that we stop symbolising; it means that we start trying to incorporate this recognition within the symbolic itself, in fact it means that since the symbolic entails lack as such, we abstain from covering it over with fantasmatic constructsor, if one accepts that we are always trapped within the field of fantasy, that we never stop traversing it. The guiding principle in this kind of
approach is to move beyond fantasy towards a self-critical symbolic gesture recognising the contingent and transient character of every symbolic construct. This is a scientific discourse different from the reified science of standard modernity. I take my lead, in this regard, from Lacans text Science and Truth (it is the opening lecture of his 1965 -6 seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis). In this particular text, Jacques Lacan stages a critique of modern science as it has been articulated up to now, that is as a discourse constantly identifying the knowledge it produces with the truth of the real. If the constitutive, non-reducible character of the real introduces a lack into human reality, to our scientific constructions of reality for example, science usually attempts to suture and eliminate this gap. Lacan, for his part, stresses the importance of that which puts in danger this self-fulfilling nature of scientific axioms: the importance of the real, of the element which is not developing according to what we think about it. In that sense, science la Lacan entails the recognition of the structural causality of the real as the element which interrupts the smooth flow of our fantasmatic and symbolic representations of reality. Within such a context, this real, the obstacle encountered by standard science, is not bypassed discretely but introduced within the theory it can destabilise. The point here is that truth as the encounter with the real is encountered face to face (Fink, 1995a:140-1). It

is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be described as a science of the impossible, a science that does not repress the impossible real. For
Lacan, what is involved in the structuration of the discourse of science is a certain Verwerfung of the Thing which is presupposed by the ideal of absolute knowledge, an ideal which as everybody knowswas historically proved in the end to be a failure (V II: 131). In other words, we cannot be certain that definite knowledge is attainable. In fact, for Lacan, certainty is not something we should attribute to our knowledge of things. Certainty is a defining characteristic of psychosis. In Lacans view, it constit utes its elementary phenomenon, the basis of delusional belief (III:75). Opening up our symbolic resources to uncertainty is, on the other hand, the only prudent move we have left. What we can know has to be expressed within the structure of language but this structure has to incorporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which should cause unease; as Nancy has put it What will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to predict or command it. But

we can act in such a way that this world is a world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such. Invention is always without a model and without

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warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. Where certainties come apart, there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match. *same as Decon. K2 Psycho.* Third, The alternative is a prerequisite to philosophical thought It question the very basic foundation of thought and understanding Combining it with psychoanalysis is key to create a movement that truly transforms the Real, by engaging in an approach that understand our unconscious drives as well as societal influences Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 201011
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) I have already sketched out the difficulties facing a grammatological concept of the unconscious. In order to alleviate them somewhat, I will permit myself to argue the following, namely, that

Of Grammatology, a large section of the texts contained in Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy, and at least up until and including Dissemination, can be read as giving a systematic answer (which is not the same as the answer of a system) to a fundamental question, a question that Derrida gives its unary trait by repeatedly aligning it with what he considers the question of metaphysics itself. In these texts, the local question of one particular thinker, be it Husserl, Plato, Austin, Artaud, or his contemporary Foucault, is raised to the dignity of a deconstruction of metaphysics. I would argue that this is the reason why it is not wrong to consider this part of Derridas work as inaugurating, or at least co-founding, a poststructuralist program. The question of metaphysics was only interrogated anew, that is, given a genuinely novel philosophical form, with the high tide of structuralism. We are tempted to paraphrase the question as follows: how can (material) content be attributed to a synchronic system of purely differential relations; and how is one to think the passage from (virtual) differentiation to (actual) articulation? This is what led Gilles Deleuze to answer the question, what is structuralism? with a new transcendental philosophy (See Deleuze). Here it is also possible to glimpse why psychoanalysis came to play such a pivotal role for Derrida in these texts. It should be acknowledged that this is the very same question that lies at the heart of what Freud understood analysis to mean. At the same time, analysis requires an exposition of the functions of Vorstellungsreprsentanz, that is, the transformation and translation of unconscious to conscious representation, the passage from latent to manifest dream content, in short, the parameters of the dreamwork and the subjection of this transcendental problem to the absolute novelty of the talking cure, that of how it is possible that meaning, through its production and enunciation, can produce effects in the Real. Freud considered this the only possible proof of the existence of the unconscious, and attempted to give a theoretical treatment of it in the metapsychological writings. In the end, both Lacans and Derridas treatments of Freud are inquiries into the Freudian metapsychology and its place in the philosophical tradition, as well as the viability of analysis as a discourse absolutely different from the same tradition.

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Alternative 2NR
At the top The criticism solves and turns case Rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjugation of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity which underlies the affs justification and harms Thats Spivak 82 Theres three implications here: First, the only way to change the world and answer the problems of reality is the alternative We fundamentally question and change the underlying assumptions and subconscious drives that cause the affirmative impacts Only the alternative can solve Thats Wilberg 11 Second, the affs approach is steeped in symbolizing reality and fixes only the ways in which we interact with our perception of reality This is doomed to fail until it we question how we got to the point were at and begin rejecting utopian plans that rely of link chains upon link chains to some odd impact. This approaches forces us to become obsessed with our fantasy of reality Guts all solvency Thats Stavrakakis 99 Third, Even if they prove that their plan solves 100% of the plan The alternative solves it as well, with risk of the silencing of the subaltern This means risk of the criticism is a vote negative

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Race

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READ ME
So it's basically, race teams use the oppression of X group to talk about their oppression, or another groups oppression, or even identify with it, and that becomes a symbol of the entirety of racialized movments. This is Metonymy (Meh-TonAmy) The alt would be self-synecdoche (SIH-nec-dih-key), which would look at one individual's struggle and allow them to retain their identity, rally behind that person. This solves the aff, while avoiding the creation of universals and the colonization, mentally, of all encompassing symbols of the movment

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1NC
Why has critical theory failed to make overarching changes in the world? Why does writing about feminism and race never make a substantial change to the problem? The problem lies in metonymy, an ideology and identity becoming the particular for every subject that underlies the movement. The race oppressed is a singular subject that applies to every particular subject. This genealogy enacts the same representational and epistemological violence that they hope to confront. The affirmative conflates two senses of the word representation. First, Representation as in direct proxy or political representation. And second, re-presentation as in painting a portrait. When they conflate the two senses, they create a static, unified, whole Other, from which we cant learn or know the truth of the situation or experience. There is no one concrete experience of the Other from which we can base a genealogy or a politics. This framing engages in this problematic representational strategy that erases their own subject position and political interest and creates violent essentialist utopian politics. This turns case. Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, A critique of postcolonial reason: toward a history of the vanishing present)
An important point is being made here: the

production of theory is also a practice; the opposition between abstract "pure" theory and concrete "applied" practice is too quick and easy.93 But Deleuze's articulation of the argument is problematic. Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as "speaking for," as in politics, and representation as "re-presentation," as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only "action," the theoretician does not represent (speak for)the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately). These two senses of representation-within state formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subjectpredication, on the other-are related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover over the discontinuity with an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects again a paradoxical subject-privileging. 94 Because "the person who speaks and acts ... is always a multiplicity," no "theorizing intellectual ... [or] party or ... union" can represent "those who act and struggle" (FD 206). Are those who act and struggle mute, as opposed to those who act and speak (FD 206)? These immense problems are buried in the differences between the "same" words: consciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation and re-presentation. The critique of ideological subjectconstitution within state formations and systems of political economycan now be effaced, as can the active theoretical practice of the "transformation of consciousness." The banality of leftist intellectuals'
lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent. If such a critique and such a project are not to be given up, the shifting distinctions between representation within the state and political economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the other, must not be obliterated. Let us consider the play of vertreten ("represent" in the first sense) and darstellen ("re-present" in the second sense) in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where Marx touches on "class" as a descriptive and transformative concept in a manner somewhat more complex than Althusser's distinction between class instinct and class position would allow. This is important in the context of the argument from the working class both from our two philosophers and "political" third-world feminism from the metropolis.Marx's

contention here is that the descriptive definition of a class can be a differential one-its cutting off and difference from all other classes: "in so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that cut

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off their mode of life, their interest, and their formation from those of the other classes and place them in inimical confrontationfftindlichgegeniiberstellen], they form a class.
"95 There is no such thing as a "class instinct" at work here. In fact, the collectivity of familial existence, which might be considered the arena of "instinct," is discontinuous with, though operated by, the differential isolation of classes. In this context, one far more pertinent to the France of the 1970s than it can be to the international periphery, the formation of a class is artificial and economic, and the economic agency or interest is impersonal because it is systematic and heterogeneous. This agency or interest is tied to the Hegelian critique of the individual subject, for it marks the subject's empty place in that process without a subject which is history and political economy. Here the capitalist is defined as "the conscious bearer [Triiger] of the limidess movement of capital." My point is that Marx

is not working to create an undivided subject where desire and interest coincide. Class consciousness does not operate toward that goal. Both in the economic area (capitalist) and in the political (world-historical agent), Marx is obliged to construct models of a divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other. A celebrated passage like the description of capital as the Faustian
monster brings this home vividly. 96 The following passage, continuing the quotation from The EighteenthBrumaire, is also working on the structural principle of a dispersed and dislocated class subject: the (absent collective) consciousness of the small peasant proprietor class finds its "bearer" in a "representative" who appears to work in another's interest. "Representative" here does not derive from darstellen; this sharpens the contrast Foucault andDeleuze slide over, the contrast, say, between a proxy and a portrait.There is, of course, a relationship between them, one that has received political and ideological exacerbation in the European tradition at least since the poet and the sophist, the actor and the orator, have both been seen as harmful. In the guise of a post-Marxist decription of the scene of power, we

thus encounter a much older debate: between representation or rhetoric as tropology and as persuasion. Darstellen belongs to the first constellation, vertreten-with stronger suggestions of substitution- to the second. Again, they are related, but running them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essentialist, utopian politics that can, when transferred to single-issue gender rather than class, give unquestioning support tQ4-the :financialization of the globe, which ruthlessly constructs a general will in the credit-baited rural woman even as it "format"s her through UN Plans of Action so that she can be "developed." Beyond this concatenation, transparent as rhetoric in the service of "truth" has always made itself out to be, is the much-invoked oppressed subject (as Woman), speaking, acting, and knowing that gender in development is best for her. It is in the shadow of this unfortunate marionette that the history of the unheeded subaltern must unfold. Second, This representational politics and movement uncritically buy into the valuesystem that groups and systems use for the oppressive and hurtful purposes you try to stop The alternative is to deconstruct these re-presentations Turns case Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12.

A deconstructive approach does not seek essences behind the historical, social and linguistic processes that produce meaning but rather investigates these genealogies. The practice of representation has to be made explicit and the problems involved in seeing language as just a means of referring to objects or things "outside it" has to be repeatedly remembered. The two senses of representation ("speaking for" and representation as staging) become relevant here. If representation as "speaking for" somebody, as being a proxy for (within the state and the political) and representation as theoretical description, as a staging of the world, as a portrayal of oneself and the other are complicit and if this complicity, when unexplicated, produces silences and hegemonies, the only way to appreciate this dynamic is to deconstruct these kinds of
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operations (Spivak, 1994: 70, 72). The staging of the world produces the problem of political intersectionality and structural intersections call for proxy politics. [16] The very production of categories such as "woman" is a political act and we need not see that these productive representational practices are "necessary" to further politics that would become possible "after" the category is produced. The politics of representation is the first thing to take seriously within critical equality discourse. Otherwise it falls into a nave identity politics where "women," "working-class," "transsexual," "lesbian," and various other categories are utilized to enable a "politics of rights" and representation for insurrectionary subjects. The insurrectionary subject needs its proxies. Although it can be argued that this might be helpful for some "groups" somewhere, I do not wish us to settle for this. In a neoliberal vein we circulate a language that "takes into account" identities such as class, ethnicity, sexuality without an epistemological (genealogical) awareness of our own academic representational practice. We uncritically buy into the very same value-system that is used by conservative regimes for oppressive purposes. We help produce the problem of political intersections.

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2NC
The problem with identity politics is that the universal/particular. On the one hand, you look to the universal - represenatation. On the other hand, you look to the particular - ___insert aff group___. Politics, with its emphasis on difference, moves from the universal to the particular, but this maintains metonymy. Metonymy is where one takes the part for the whole. If I talk about "the throne" Im talking about British royalty. If I talk about Trayvon Martin, Im talking about racialization and oppression. That one object comes to stand for the whole. If I talk about "the (Louisville) project", I am referring to any racial liberation argument that creates liberation for all those repressed in debate. Thats Spivak 99 When one writes about difference, that difference becomes universalized for the entire group, so we talk about race struggles and racial rights in the abstract, and it comes to stand for the group and identity that race writ large. That's why "just writing about women does not solve the problem of the gendered subaltern." The women one writes about come to stand for Woman itself, as a universal. How in the hell is ___insert aff here_______. This form of violence rests on the universal-particular This removes the ability for people within any movement or group to have an identity This is the root cause of all power struggles Spivak 05 Guyatri Chakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular,
Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge

the singular, as it combats the universal-particular binary opposition, is not an If, however, we are thinking of potential agents, when s/he is not publicly empowered to put aside difference and self-synecdochise to form collectivity, the group will take difference itself as its synecdochic element. Difference slides into culture, often indistinguishable from religion. And then the institution that provides agency is reproductive heteronormativity (RHN). It is the broadest and oldest global institution. You see now why just writing about women does not solve the problem of the gendered subaltern, just as chronicling the popular is not subaltern studies. In search of the subaltern I first turned to my own class: the Bengali middle class: Bhubaneshwari Bhaduri and Mahasweta Devi. From French theory that is all I could do. But I did not remain there . In the
I have said that individual, a person, an agent; multiplicity is not multitude. middle class, according to Partha Chatterjee, Bhubaneshwari Bhaduri was metaleptically substituting effect for cause and producing an idea of national liberation by her suicide. Chatterjees argument is that

produced by, so-called, terrorist movements.23 Clytemnestralike project for a woman.

an idea of national liberation was It was a frightening, solitary, and

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Instead, Spivak thinks we need to look to singularity, where individuals can selfsynecdochalize. Bouazizi lit himself on fire in Tunisia. He became a symbol for that specific movement in Tunisia and wasnt adapted to other movements or ideas. People were able to protest and maintain their identity Egypt is not the same as Tunisia, each protestor is not the same. He wasnt making an overall claim of the subject, saying that everyone is different and oppressed in X or Y way. When the aff talks about difference, they proceed by saying "_____ are different in X way, and they are oppressed in Y way." This recreates the same form of violence and mental colonization they're trying to fight by making universals for a group. Instead, we should look to a singularity, and allow that singular human being to retain their identity. That way, we can rally behind the person without turning them into a model which everyone else must fit into. Thats Honkanen 07.

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Deleuze

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1NC
First, Deleuze confines the decentering of the subject to the subject of the West, which problematizes the non-Western other as real and knowable. Deleuze makes it impossible to confer with the subaltern in a discursive practice, which assumes that the subject is always already the subject of the West. This turns the K by issuing a new Oedipal system and guts solvency, which reinstituting an essentialist subject of the Other Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?, Jcook.)
Elsewhere, Deleuze

and Guattari have attempted an alternative definition of desire, revising the one offered by psychoanalysis: "Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is lacking in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject except by repression. Desire and its object are a unity: it is the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is machine, the object of desire also a connected machine, so that the product is lifted from the process of producing,and something detaches itself from producing to product and gives a leftover to the vagabond, nomad subject."7 This definition does not alter the specificity of the desiring subject (or leftover subject-effect) that attaches to specific instances of desire or to production of the desiring machine. Moreover, when the connection between desire and the subject is taken as irrelevant or merely reversed, the subject-effect that surreptitiously emerges is much like the generalized ideological subject of the theorist. This may be the legal subject of
socialized capital, neither labor nor management, holding a "strong" passport, using a "strong" or "hard" currency, with supposedly unquestioned access to due process. It is certainly not the desiring subject as Other.The Guattari to

failure of Deleuze and consider the relations between desire, power, and subjectivity renders them incapable of articulating a theory of interests. In this context, their indifference to ideology (a theory of
which is necessary for an understanding of interests) is striking but consistent. Foucault's commitment to "genealogical" speculation prevents him from locating, in "great names" like Marx and Freud, watersheds in some continuous stream of intellectual history.8 This commitment has created an unfortunate resistance in Foucault's work to "mere" ideological critique.

Western speculations on the ideological reproduction of social relations belong to that mainstream, and it is within this tradition that AIthusser writes: "The reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class 'in and by words' [par la paroleJ."9 When Foucault considers the pervasive heterogeneity of
power,he does not ignore the immense institutional heterogeneity that Althusser here attempts to schematize. Similarly, in speaking of alliances and systems of signs, the state and war-machines (mille plateaux), Deleuze and Guattari are opening up that very field. Foucault cannot, however, admit that a developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material production in institutionality, as well as in the "effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge" (PK, 102). Because

these philosophers seem obliged to reject all arguments naming the concept of ideology as only schematic rather than textual, they are equally obliged to produce a mechanically schematic opposition between interest and desire. Thus they align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a continuistic "unconscious" or a parasubjective "culture." The mechanical relation between desire and
interest is clear in such sentences as: "We never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it" (FD, 215). An undifferentiated desire is the agent,and power slips in to create the effects of desire: "power ...

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produces positive effects at the level of desire-and also at the level of knowledge" (PK, 59). This parasubjective matrix, crosshatched with heterogeneity, ushers in the unnamed Subject, at least for those intellectual workers influenced by the new hegemony of desire. The race for "the last instance" is now between economics and power. Because desire

is tacitly defined on an orthodox model, it is unitarily opposed to "being deceived." Ideology as

"false consciousness" (being deceived) has been called into question by Althusser. Even Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a dichotomy of deception and undeceived desire: "We must accept the scream of Reich: no, the masses were not deceived; at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime" (FD, 215).These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive contradiction-that is where they admittedly part company from the Left. In

the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power. Foucault often seems to
conflate "individual" and "subject";10 and the impact on his own metaphors is perhaps intensified in his followers. Because of the power of the word "power," Foucault admits to using the "metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates its surroundings." Such slips become the rule rather than the exception in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun of theory, the Subject of Europe. I I Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role of ideology in reproducing the social relations of production: an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject, the "object being," as Deleuze admiringly remarks, "to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be able to speak." Foucault adds that "the masses know perfectly well, clearly" -once again the thematics of being undeceived-"they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well" (FD, 206, 207).What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these pronouncements? The limits of this representationalist realism are reached with Deleuze: "Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school, in barracks, in a prison, in a police station" (FD, 212). This

foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism-the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism-to define its own arena as "concrete experience," "what actually happens." Indeed, the concrete experience that is the guarantor
of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers,and schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the intellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme. 12 Neither Deleuze nor Foucault seems aware that the

intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor. Second, The alt: Reject the affs western subjectivity and engage in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern A deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to ethics and actions is the only way of giving the subaltern a voice It puts the psychoanalyst in a position that ensures solvency, while avoiding the problems of political powers which leaves a normative system that links to the K This kills perm solvency Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.)
But the most interesting sign of disciplinary privileging is found in Julia Kristeva's "Psychoanalysis and the Polis." At

the end or center of delirium, according to Kristeva, is that which is desired, a hollow where meaning empties out in not only the presymbolic but the preobjective, "the ab-ject." (A deconstructive critique of thus "naming" an undifferentiated telos of desire before the beginning of difference can be launched but is not to my purpose here.) The desire for knowledge involved in mainstream interpretation (which Kristeva calls "Stoic" by one of those undocumented sweeping generalizations common to a certain kind of "French" criticism) shares such a hollow enter and is thus linked with delirium. Certain kinds of fiction writers and, one presumes, analysands and social
engineers try to dominate, transform, and exterminate improper "objects" awakened in the place of the abject. The

psychoanalyst, however, wins out over both mad writer and man of politics. "Knowing that he is constantly in abjection [none of the problems of this position is discussed in Kristeva's text]12 and in neutrality, in desire and in indifference, the analyst builds a strong ethics, not normative but directed, which no transcendence guarantees" (p. 92; italics mine). This is the privileged position of synthesis within a restrained dialectic: the psychoanalyst persistently
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and symmetrically sublates the contradiction between interpretation and delirium. To privilege delirium (interpretation as delirium) in the description of this symmetrical synthesis is to misrepresent the dialectic presented by the essay, precisely in the interest of a politics that can represent its excluded other as an analysis that privileges interpretation. It should also be mentioned, of course, that the indivisibility and inevitability of the archaic (Christian) mother comes close to a transcendental guarantee. To know her for what she is, rather than to seek to transform her, is the psychoanalyst's professional enterprise Third, Desire and Lack are not just productive They are equally negative Little a is that desire wants to be fulfilled i.e. negated Little b is that desire is one thing that can only be described as no other desire besides the desire it is Desire and lack are in an of themselves infinitely negative to any other desire to affirm their existence Fourth, this means our K must come first Only a deconstructive psychoanalysis can analyze all aspects of desire and lack Only the alt solves Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 201011
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) Why should we insist on this point? Let us quickly recall some elements of the Lacanian doctrine. The

signifier is absolutely negative; it is what all other signifiers are not. It is pure difference in the symbolic field, whereas the letter is of a positive order (Milner 12832). This is already the heart of the matter, the same question raised by the talking cure: how a system of negative differentiation can produce an effect in the real, that is, one which is not purely negative, La lettre radicalement est effet de [End Page 154] discours (Lacan, Sminaire XX: 36). One could say, very concisely, that the letter is that which makes a difference where there is no(-o)ne.6 From this follows that the signifier is restricted to the symbolic, whereas the letter ties it to the two other registers, the I and the R, completing its nodal structure. Also, within the framework
of The Purloined Letter, there is not simply differentiation of positions but actual transformative acts, in this case the (at least) two cases of theft. The letter is transmissible, as the signifier qua signifier cannot transmit anything. Once attuned to this question, one can even sense occasionally a lack of conviction sneaking into Derridas reading: a milieu of ideality: hence the eminence o f the transcendental whose effect is to maintain presence, to wit phon. This

is what made necessary and possible, in exchange for certain corrections, the integration of Freudian phallocentrism with a fundamentally phonocentric Saussurian semiolinguistics. The algorithmic transformation does not appear to me to undo this tie (Derrida, Post 478n56). The algorithmic transformation, of which Derrida speaks here, and which does not appear to undo the phallo/phonocentric tie, is already a consideration of later developments in Lacans work. The algorithmic transformation
does in fact not take place in the Seminar on the Purloined Letter (though there is a formalization of the odd/even game in the accompanying Suitewhich Derrida chooses not to discuss), although it is doubtless part of the nascent programmatic of the Lacanian matheme. And later, in Pour lamour de Lacan, Derrida ultimately denies that Le Facteur de la vrit aimed at one

final deconstruction of the one Lacanian discourse, and refuses to pass the judgment of phonocentrism
on Lacans idea of the matheme, his mathematical rewriting of psychoanalysis.

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Alternative 2NC
First, Extend the alternative of rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern This solves all of the K Engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to the affirmatives problems allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjection of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity, allowing us to uncover there justifications, assumptions and underlying cultural drives Only this approach allows to know the other and experience the other, giving the subaltern a voice Thats Spivak 82 *same as Decon. K2 Psycho.* Second, The alternative is a prerequisite to philosophical thought It question the very basic foundation of thought and understanding Combining it with psychoanalysis is key to create a movement that truly transforms the Real, by engaging in an approach that understand our unconscious drives as well as societal influences Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) I have already sketched out the difficulties facing a grammatological concept of the unconscious. In order to alleviate them somewhat, I will permit myself to argue the following, namely, that

Of Grammatology, a large section of the texts be read as giving a systematic answer (which is not the same as the answer of a system) to a fundamental question, a question that Derrida gives its unary trait by repeatedly aligning it with what he considers the question of metaphysics itself. In these texts, the local question of one particular thinker, be it Husserl, Plato, Austin, Artaud, or his contemporary Foucault, is raised to the dignity of a deconstruction of metaphysics. I would argue that this is the reason why it is not wrong to consider this part of Derridas work as inaugurating, or at least co-founding, a poststructuralist program. The question of metaphysics was only interrogated anew, that is, given a genuinely novel philosophical form, with the high tide of structuralism. We are tempted to paraphrase the question as follows: how can (material) content be attributed to a synchronic system of purely differential relations; and how is one to think the passage from (virtual) differentiation to (actual) articulation? This is what led Gilles Deleuze to answer the question, what is structuralism? with a new transcendental philosophy (See Deleuze). Here it is also possible to glimpse why psychoanalysis came to play such a pivotal role for Derrida in these texts. It should be acknowledged that this is the very same question that lies at the heart of what Freud understood analysis to mean. At the same time, analysis requires an exposition of the functions of Vorstellungsreprsentanz, that is, the transformation and translation of unconscious to conscious representation, the passage from latent to manifest dream content, in short, the parameters of the dreamwork and the subjection of this transcendental problem to the absolute novelty of the talking cure, that of how it is possible that meaning, through its production and enunciation, can produce effects in the Real. Freud considered this the only possible proof of the existence of
contained in Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy, and at least up until and including Dissemination, can

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the unconscious, and attempted to give a theoretical treatment of it in the metapsychological writings. In the end, both Lacans and Derridas treatments of Freud are inquiries into the Freudian metapsychology and its place in the philosophical tradition, as well as the viability of analysis as a discourse absolutely different from the same tradition.

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Alternative 2NR
At the top The criticism solves and turns case Rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjugation of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity which underlies the affs justification and harms Thats Spivak 82 Theres three implications here: First, the only way to change the world and answer the problems of reality is the alternative We fundamentally question and change the underlying assumptions and subconscious drives that cause the affirmative impacts Only the alternative can solve Thats Wilberg 11 Second, Even if they prove that their plan solves 100% of the plan The alternative solves it as well, with risk of the silencing of the subaltern This means risk of the criticism is a vote negative

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Foucault

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1NC
First, Foucault confines the decentering of the subject to the subject of the West, which problematizes the non-Western other as real and knowable. Foucault makes it impossible to confer with the subaltern in a discursive practice, which assumes that the subject is always already the subject of the West. This turns the K by issuing a new power system and guts solvency, which reinstituting an essentialist subject of the Other Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
The failure of Deleuze and Guattari to consider the relations between desire, power, and subjectivity renders them incapable of articulating a theory of interests. In this context, their indifference to ideology (a theory of which is necessary for an understanding of interests) is striking but consistent. Foucault's commitment to "genealogical" speculation prevents him from locating, in "great names" like Marx and Freud, watersheds in some continuous stream of intellectual history.8 This commitment has created an unfortunate resistance in Foucault's work to "mere" ideological critique. Western

speculations on the ideological reproduction of social relations belong to that mainstream, and it is within this tradition that AIthusser writes: "The reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class 'in and by words' [par la paroleJ."9 When Foucault considers the pervasive heterogeneity of power,he does not ignore the immense institutional heterogeneity that Althusser here attempts to schematize. Similarly, in speaking of alliances and systems of signs, the state and war-machines (mille plateaux), Deleuze and Guattari are opening up that very field. Foucault cannot, however, admit that a developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material production in institutionality, as well as in the "effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge" (PK, 102). Because these philosophers seem obliged to reject all arguments naming the concept of ideology as only schematic rather than textual, they are equally obliged to produce a mechanically schematic opposition between interest and desire. Thus they align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a continuistic "unconscious" or a parasubjective "culture."
The mechanical relation between desire and interest is clear in such sentences as: "We never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it" (FD, 215). An undifferentiated desire is the agent,and power slips in to create the effects of desire: "power ... produces positive effects at the level of desire-and also at the level of knowledge" (PK, 59). This parasubjective matrix, cross-hatched with heterogeneity, ushers in the unnamed Subject, at least for those intellectual workers influenced by the new hegemony of desire. The race for "the last instance" is now between economics and power. Because desire

is tacitly defined on an orthodox model, it is unitarily opposed to "being deceived." Ideology as "false consciousness" (being deceived) has been called into question by Althusser. Even Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a dichotomy of deception and undeceived
desire: "We must accept the scream of Reich: no, the masses were not deceived; at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime" (FD, 215).These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive contradiction-that is where they admittedly part company from the Left. In the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power.

Foucault often seems to conflate "individual" and "subject";10 and the impact on his own metaphors is perhaps intensified in his followers. Because of the power of the word "power," Foucault admits to using the "metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates its surroundings." Such slips become the rule rather than the

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exception in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun of theory,the Subject of Europe. I I Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role of ideology in
reproducing the social relations of production: an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject, the "object being," as Deleuze admiringly remarks, "to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be able to speak." Foucault adds that "the masses know perfectly well, clearly" -once again the thematics of being undeceived-"they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well" (FD, 206, 207).What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these pronouncements? The limits of this representationalist realism are reached with Deleuze: "Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school,in barracks, in a prison, in a police station" (FD, 212). This

foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism-the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism-to define its own arena as "concrete experience," "what actually happens." Indeed, the concrete experience that is the guarantor of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers,and
schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the intellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme. 12 Neither Deleuze nor Foucault seems aware that the

intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor. Second, The alt: Reject the affs western subjectivity and engage in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern A deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to ethics and actions is the only way of giving the subaltern a voice It puts the psychoanalyst in a position that ensures solvency, while avoiding the problems of political powers which leaves a normative system that links to the K This kills perm solvency Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.)
But the most interesting sign of disciplinary privileging is found in Julia Kristeva's "Psychoanalysis and the Polis." At

the end

or center of delirium, according to Kristeva, is that which is desired, a hollow where meaning empties out in not only the presymbolic but the preobjective, "the ab-ject." (A deconstructive critique of thus "naming" an undifferentiated telos of desire before the beginning of difference can be launched but is not to my purpose here.) The desire for knowledge involved in mainstream interpretation (which Kristeva calls "Stoic" by one of those undocumented sweeping generalizations common to a certain kind of "French" criticism) shares such a hollow enter and is thus linked with delirium. Certain kinds of fiction writers and, one presumes, analysands and social
engineers try to dominate, transform, and exterminate improper "objects" awakened in the place of the abject. The

psychoanalyst, however, wins out over both mad writer and man of politics. "Knowing that he is constantly in abjection [none of the problems of this position is discussed in Kristeva's text]12 and in neutrality, in desire and in indifference, the analyst builds a strong ethics, not normative but directed, which no transcendence guarantees" (p. 92; italics mine). This is the privileged position of synthesis within a restrained dialectic: the psychoanalyst persistently and symmetrically sublates the contradiction between interpretation and delirium. To privilege delirium (interpretation as delirium) in the description of this symmetrical synthesis is to misrepresent the dialectic presented by the essay, precisely in the interest of a politics that can represent its excluded other as an analysis that privileges interpretation. It should also be mentioned, of course, that the indivisibility and inevitability of the archaic (Christian) mother comes close to a transcendental guarantee. To know her for what she is, rather than to seek to transform her, is the psychoanalyst's professional enterprise

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Alternative 2NC
First, Extend the alternative of rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern This solves all of the K Engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to the affirmatives problems allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjection of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity, allowing us to uncover there justifications, assumptions and underlying cultural drives Only this approach allows to know the other and experience the other, giving the subaltern a voice Thats Spivak 82 *same as Decon. K2 Psycho.* Third, The alternative is a prerequisite to philosophical thought It question the very basic foundation of thought and understanding Combining it with psychoanalysis is key to create a movement that truly transforms the Real, by engaging in an approach that understand our unconscious drives as well as societal influences Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) I have already sketched out the difficulties facing a grammatological concept of the unconscious. In order to alleviate them somewhat, I will permit myself to argue the following, namely, that

Of Grammatology, a large section of the texts be read as giving a systematic answer (which is not the same as the answer of a system) to a fundamental question, a question that Derrida gives its unary trait by repeatedly aligning it with what he considers the question of metaphysics itself. In these texts, the local question of one particular thinker, be it Husserl, Plato, Austin, Artaud, or his contemporary Foucault, is raised to the dignity of a deconstruction of metaphysics. I would argue that this is the reason why it is not wrong to consider this part of Derridas work as inaugurating, or at least co-founding, a poststructuralist program. The question of metaphysics was only interrogated anew, that is, given a genuinely novel philosophical form, with the high tide of structuralism. We are tempted to paraphrase the question as follows: how can (material) content be attributed to a synchronic system of purely differential relations; and how is one to think the passage from (virtual) differentiation to (actual) articulation? This is what led Gilles Deleuze to answer the question, what is structuralism? with a new transcendental philosophy (See Deleuze). Here it is also possible to glimpse why psychoanalysis came to play such a pivotal role for Derrida in these texts. It should be acknowledged that this is the very same question that lies at the heart of what Freud understood analysis to mean. At the same time, analysis requires an exposition of the functions of Vorstellungsreprsentanz, that is, the transformation and translation of unconscious to conscious representation, the passage from latent to manifest dream content, in short, the parameters of the dreamwork and the subjection of this transcendental problem to the absolute novelty of the talking cure, that of how it is possible that meaning, through its production and enunciation, can produce effects in the Real. Freud considered this the only possible proof of the existence of
contained in Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy, and at least up until and including Dissemination, can

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the unconscious, and attempted to give a theoretical treatment of it in the metapsychological writings. In the end, both Lacans and Derridas treatments of Freud are inquiries into the Freudian metapsychology and its place in the philosophical tradition, as well as the viability of analysis as a discourse absolutely different from the same tradition.

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Alternative 2NR
At the top The criticism solves and turns case Rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjugation of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity which underlies the affs justification and harms Thats Spivak 82 Theres three implications here: First, the only way to change the world and answer the problems of reality is the alternative We fundamentally question and change the underlying assumptions and subconscious drives that cause the affirmative impacts Only the alternative can solve Thats Wilberg 11 Second, Even if they prove that their plan solves 100% of the plan The alternative solves it as well, with risk of the silencing of the subaltern This means risk of the criticism is a vote negative

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Capitalism

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1NC
First, Anti-capitalist movements inevitably fall into a socialization of the female body, abstracting labor This specter haunts the worker and removes their subjectivity from the world Their alternative works in a system that reproduces itself again and again in the subconscious and the continuation of their system Spivak 95 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Ghostwriting, Jcook.)
I would expand this, by

way of a Marxist theorization of reproductive engineering and population control, as the socialization of reproductive labor-power, not "the feminization of labor." (The nonexhaustive taxonomy that such a theorization has allowed me, tentatively, to
formalize in the classroom I offer here in shorthand, in the hope that Marxist-feminists active in global economic resistance will be able to reproduce the analysis. But will they be interested in Specters of Marx? At any rate, here

is the shorthand taxonomy of the coded discursive management of the new socialization of the reproductive body: (1)reproductive rights (metonymic substitution of the abstract average subject of rights for woman's
identity); (2)surrogacy (metaphoricsubstitutionof abstract average reproductive labor power as fulfilled female subject of motherhood); (3) transplant (displacement of eroticism and generalized presupposed subject of immediate affect); (4) population control (objectification of the female subject of exploitation to produce alibis for hypersize through demographic rationalization); (5) post-Fordist homeworking (classical coding of the spectrality of reason as empiricist individualism, complicated by gender ideology). It is only after a discussion of a possible taxonomy of the recoding of this socialization that I would describe the theatre of global resistance where these issues are now paramount.)' According, then, to the strictest Marxian sense, the

reproductive body of woman has now been "socialized"-computed into average abstract labor and thus released into what I call the spectrality of reason-a specter that haunts the merely empirical, dislocating it from itself. According to Marx, this is the specter that must haunt the daily life of the class conscious worker, the future socialist, so that she can dislocate him/herself into the counterintuitive average partsubject (agent) of labor, recognize that, in the everyday, es spukt. It is only then that the fetish character of labor-power as commodity can be grasped and can become the pivot that wrenches capitalism into socialism [discussed at greater length in Spivak, Outside 107 ff.]. (It wasn't Freud alone-as Glas insists-who speculated with the fetish.) Marx did indeed ignore something: that the differantial play between capital-ism and social-ism was a case of a more originary agon: between self and other; a differantiation perhaps necessary for the business of living, a differantiation that may be
described as the fort-da of the gift of time in the temporizingof l i~es .~(Fomre , the genius of Derrida is that he leads me to think this as no one else can, even if he perhaps goofs a bit by putting Marx down as a closet idealist about "empirical" actuality, although canny about the idealism of idealism [SM 2251.) That originary agon comes clearest in the coding-the figuration-- of birth and childrearing. (Once I finish this piece, I must get on with a commentary on Melanie Klein's teasing out of this coding ["Melanie Klein"].) Reproductive labor is being socialized and "freed." (The Columbia Spectator apparently ran an ad offering high prices for the unfertilized ova of students. Chickens have supplied this commodity without consent or remuneration for some time now. In Marxian terms, domesticated poultry is instrurnentum demi-vocale, domesticated human females caught in feudal patterns of loyalty (elaborately coded by psychoanalysis asdeep-structural) are insh-umenta vocale, and the students are "free lab~r . " ) 'A~s reproductive

labor is socialized and "freed," it will be unable to ignore that agon, for the commodity in question is children. If this labor were to use the fetish-character of itself as (reproductive) labor-power (as commodity) pharmakonically to bring about gender-neutral socialism in its traffic, equitable by need and capacity, from a common fund, would that be just? The issue is not simply to weigh in
the balance the painless donation of sperm for sperm banks as opposed to the possibly painful donation of eggs for the hatcheries, as television discussions invariably emphasize."

Since Specters of Marx cannot bring in women, I

will not pursue this further here.

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Second, Your criticism ignores the subaltern voice that is deeply intertwined in the division of labor This makes the subaltern silent as well as re-entrenches in the foundation of oppression that allowed capitalism to take hold Turns the criticism Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.) Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as SUbject. The theory of pluralized "subject-effects" gives an illusion of undermining SUbjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the
history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has "no geo-political determina-tions." The

much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. I will argue for this conclusion by considering a text by two
great practitioners of the critique: "Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. "3 I have chosen this friendly exchange between two activist philosophers of history because it undoes the opposition between authoritative theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, enabling one to glimpse the track of ideology. The participants in this conversation emphasize the most important contributions of French poststructuralist theory: first, that the networks of power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive-a persistent critique is needed; and second, that intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society's Other. Yet the two systematically ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual and economic history. Although one of its chief presuppositions is the critique of the sovereign subject, the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze is framed by two monolithic and anonymous subjects-in-revolution: "A Maoist" (FD, 205) and "the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). Intellectuals, however, are named and differentiated; moreover, a

Chinese Maoism is nowhere operative. Maoism here simply creates an aura of narrative specificity, which would be a harmless rhetorical banality were it not that the innocent appropriation of the proper name "Maoism" for the eccentric phenomenon of French intellectual "Maoism" and subsequent "New Philosophy" symptomatically renders "Asia" transparent.4Deleuze's reference to the workers' struggle is equally problematic; it is obviously a genuflection: "We are unable to touch [power] in any point of its application without finding ourselves confronted by this diffuse mass, so that we are necessarily led ... to the desire to blow it up completely. Every partial revolutionary attack or defense is linked in this way to the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). The apparent banality signals a disavowal. The statement ignores the international division of labor, a gesture that often marks poststructuralist political theory.5 The invocation of the workers' struggle is baleful in its very innocence; it is incapable of dealing with global capitalism: the sUbject-production of worker and unemployed within nation-state ideologies in its Center; the increasing subtraction of the working class in the Periphery from the realization of surplus value and thus from "humanistic" training in consumerism; and the large-scale presence of paracapitalist labor as well as the heterogeneous structural status of agriculture in the Periphery. Ignoring the international division of labor; rendering "Asia" (and on occasion "Africa") transparent (unless the subject is ostensibly the "Third World"); reestablishing the legal subject of socialized capital-these are problems as common to much poststructuralist as to structuralist theory. Why should such occlusions be sanctioned in precisely those intellectuals who are our best
prophets of heterogeneity and the Other? The link to the workers' struggle is located in the desire to blow up power at any point of its application. This site is apparently based on a simple valorization of any desire destructive of any power. Walter Benjamin comments on Baudelaire's comparable politics by way of quotations from Marx: Marx continues in his description of the conspirateurs de profession as follows: " ... They

have no other aim but the immediate one of overthrowing the existinggovernment, and they profoundly despise the more theoretical enlightenment of the workers as to their class interests. Thus their angernot proletarian but plebian-at the habits noirs (black coats), the more or less educated
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people who represent [vertretenjthat side of the movement and of whom they can never become entirely independent, as they cannot of the official representatives [Reprasentantenjof the party." Baudelaire's political insights do not go fundamentally beyond the insights of these
professional conspirators .... He could perhaps have made Flaubert's statement, "Of all of politics I understand only one thing: the revolt," his own.6

Third, The alt: Reject the affs western subjectivity and engage in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern A deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to ethics and actions is the only way of giving the subaltern a voice It puts the psychoanalyst in a position that ensures solvency, while avoiding the problems of political powers which leaves a normative system that links to the K This kills perm solvency Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.)
But the most interesting sign of disciplinary privileging is found in Julia Kristeva's "Psychoanalysis and the Polis." At

the end

or center of delirium, according to Kristeva, is that which is desired, a hollow where meaning empties out in not only the presymbolic but the preobjective, "the ab-ject." (A deconstructive critique of thus "naming" an undifferentiated telos of desire before the beginning of difference can be launched but is not to my purpose here.) The desire for knowledge involved in mainstream interpretation (which Kristeva calls "Stoic" by one of those undocumented sweeping generalizations common to a certain kind of "French" criticism) shares such a hollow enter and is thus linked with delirium. Certain kinds of fiction writers and, one presumes, analysands and social
engineers try to dominate, transform, and exterminate improper "objects" awakened in the place of the abject. The

psychoanalyst, however, wins out over both mad writer and man of politics. "Knowing that he is constantly in abjection [none of the problems of this position is discussed in Kristeva's text]12 and in neutrality, in desire and in indifference, the analyst builds a strong ethics, not normative but directed, which no transcendence guarantees" (p. 92; italics mine). This is the privileged position of synthesis within a restrained dialectic: the psychoanalyst persistently and symmetrically sublates the contradiction between interpretation and delirium. To privilege delirium (interpretation as delirium) in the description of this symmetrical synthesis is to misrepresent the dialectic presented by the essay, precisely in the interest of a politics that can represent its excluded other as an analysis that privileges interpretation. It should also be mentioned, of course, that the indivisibility and inevitability of the archaic (Christian) mother comes close to a transcendental guarantee. To know her for what she is, rather than to seek to transform her, is the psychoanalyst's professional enterprise Fourth, Our inclusion of the subaltern is key to solving for capitalism We must create a new system which is inclusive and listens to the voices of those who suffered at the hands of capitalism Only this creates a better, new global system Spivak 95 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Ghostwriting, Jcook.) The New International, if I understand it right, asks the international law and international human rights folks to be aware of the economic. ~ ~pOagne s 93-94 Derrida assures us that "these problems of the foreign Debt-and everything that is metonymized by this conceptwill not be treated without at least the spirit of the Marxist critique, the critique of

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the market, of the multiple logics of capital, and of that which links the State and international law to this market." This fine suggestion would gain in strength if it took into account the vicissitudes suffered by the sustained organizational opposition to legalized economic exploitation (the collusion of international law and international capital, legiferant capital-the Group of Seven today-law "carrying the subjectivity of capital," in other words), in the interest if not always in the declared name of human rights, ever since Bretton Woods (the annulment of the gold standard would have
worked in nicely with Timon of Athens), through Bandung and all the global summits, and the machinations of the GATT, and now the WTO. How, in other words,

is the New International so new? Perhaps it is, to the European left researched account would need at least to refer generally to the longstanding global struggles from below (one of the problems with Human Rights and International Law lobbies is that they are so irreproachably well-bred), which undo the opposition between economic resistance, cultural identity, and women's minded bodies, to which part of my taxonomy refers.I3 "The debt to Marx, I think, needs to be paid and settled, whereas the Third World debt ought to be simply cancelled," writes Ahmad ["Reconciling Derrida" 1061. If one attends to the struggles I am speaking of, where the specter of Marxism has been at work, molelike, although not always identified with Left parties in the impotent state, one would perhaps think of the debt to Marx as an unrepayable one with which we must speculate, to make and ask for Reparation (in the Kleinian sense) in the field of political economy [Klein 306-43].14 How much making and how much asking will depend on who "we" are. As for the
liberal; but why should the South feel any degree of confidence in the project? A "debt" increasingly incurred by the South (no longer the third world surely, Ahmad's paper was first given in Lublijana!), given the dynamics of capital and its relationship to socialism, it can never remain cancelled. What "should" happen (o tempora, o mores) is a recognition that the South supports the North in the preservation of its resource-rich lifestyle. This

at least is the sustained message of those struggles, a reworking of Marx's theme in Capital, that the worker is not a victim (no black on black there) but the agent of the wealth of societies.
Marx regularly used the phrase "agent of production" rather than "worker." Was this simply politically correct language? And, what, without infrastructural effort, would this recognition bring, to whom?

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Alternative 2NC uncomplete

First, Extend the alternative of rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern This solves all of the K Engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to the affirmatives problems allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjection of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity, allowing us to uncover there justifications, assumptions and underlying cultural drives Only this approach allows to know the other and experience the other, giving the subaltern a voice Thats Spivak 82 AND Add capitalism solvency stuff AND We need to reject the utopian fantasies of the affirmatives project. Only when recognizing that it is a fantasy can we endlessly traverse and get over it. Stavrakakis 99, Ideology and Discourse Analysis Program in the Department of Government at the University of Essex,
1999 ( Yannis, Lacan and the Political, Ruteledge Press 76-78) In opposition to such a regressive attitude, Lacanian

theory promotes a return to the founding moment of modernity. Recognising the irreducible character of impossibility, the constitutivity of the real as expressed primarily in the failure of our discursive world and its continuous rearticulation through acts of identification, far from being a postmodern move, reveals the truly modern character of the Lacanian project; instead of a postmodern mysticism it leads to a reorientation of science and knowledge. Recognising the constitutivity of the real does not entail that we stop symbolising; it means that we start trying to incorporate this recognition within the symbolic itself, in fact it means that since the symbolic entails lack as such, we abstain from covering it over with fantasmatic constructsor, if one accepts that we are always trapped within the field of fantasy, that we never stop traversing it. The guiding principle in this kind of
approach is to move beyond fantasy towards a self-critical symbolic gesture recognising the contingent and transient character of every symbolic construct. This is a scientific discourse different from the reified science of standard modernity. I take my lead, in this regard, from Lacans text Science and Truth (it is the opening lecture of his 1965 -6 seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis). In this particular text, Jacques Lacan stages a critique of modern science as it has been articulated up to now, that is as a discourse constantly identifying the knowledge it produces with the truth of the real. If the constitutive, non-reducible character of the real introduces a lack into human reality, to our scientific constructions of reality for example, science usually attempts to suture and eliminate this gap. Lacan, for his part, stresses the importance of that which puts in danger this self-fulfilling nature of scientific axioms: the importance of the real, of the element which is not developing according to what we think about it. In that sense, science la Lacan entails the recognition of the structural causality of the real as the element which interrupts the smooth flow of our fantasmatic and symbolic representations of reality. Within such a context, this real, the obstacle encountered by standard science, is not bypassed discretely but introduced within the theory it can destabilise. The point here is that truth as the encounter with the real is encountered face to face (Fink, 1995a:140-1). It

is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be described as a science of the impossible, a science that does not repress the impossible real. For
Lacan, what is involved in the structuration of the discourse of science is a certain Verwerfung of the Thing which is presupposed by the ideal of absolute knowledge, an ideal which as everybody knowswas historically proved in the end to be a failure (V II: 131). In other words, we cannot be certain that definite knowledge is attainable. In fact, for Lacan, certainty is not something we should attribute to our knowledge of things. Certainty is a defining characteristic of psychosis. In Lacans view, it constit utes its elementary phenomenon, the basis of delusional belief (III:75). Opening up our symbolic resources to uncertainty is, on the other hand, the only prudent move we have left. What we can know has to be expressed within the structure of language but this structure has to incorporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which should cause unease; as Nancy has put it What will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to predict or command

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it. But

we can act in such a way that this world is a world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such. Invention is always without a model and without warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. Where certainties come apart, there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match. *same as Decon. K2 Psycho.* Third, The alternative is a prerequisite to philosophical thought It question the very basic foundation of thought and understanding Combining it with psychoanalysis is key to create a movement that truly transforms the Real, by engaging in an approach that understand our unconscious drives as well as societal influences Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) I have already sketched out the difficulties facing a grammatological concept of the unconscious. In order to alleviate them somewhat, I will permit myself to argue the following, namely, that

Of Grammatology, a large section of the texts be read as giving a systematic answer (which is not the same as the answer of a system) to a fundamental question, a question that Derrida gives its unary trait by repeatedly aligning it with what he considers the question of metaphysics itself. In these texts, the local question of one particular thinker, be it Husserl, Plato, Austin, Artaud, or his contemporary Foucault, is raised to the dignity of a deconstruction of metaphysics. I would argue that this is the reason why it is not wrong to consider this part of Derridas work as inaugurating, or at least co-founding, a poststructuralist program. The question of metaphysics was only interrogated anew, that is, given a genuinely novel philosophical form, with the high tide of structuralism. We are tempted to paraphrase the question as follows: how can (material) content be attributed to a synchronic system of purely differential relations; and how is one to think the passage from (virtual) differentiation to (actual) articulation? This is what led Gilles Deleuze to answer the question, what is structuralism? with a new transcendental philosophy (See Deleuze). Here it is also possible to glimpse why psychoanalysis came to play such a pivotal role for Derrida in these texts. It should be acknowledged that this is the very same question that lies at the heart of what Freud understood analysis to mean. At the same time, analysis requires an exposition of the functions of Vorstellungsreprsentanz, that is, the transformation and translation of unconscious to conscious representation, the passage from latent to manifest dream content, in short, the parameters of the dreamwork and the subjection of this transcendental problem to the absolute novelty of the talking cure, that of how it is possible that meaning, through its production and enunciation, can produce effects in the Real. Freud considered this the only possible proof of the existence of the unconscious, and attempted to give a theoretical treatment of it in the metapsychological writings. In the end, both Lacans and Derridas treatments of Freud are inquiries into the Freudian metapsychology and its place in the philosophical tradition, as well as the viability of analysis as a discourse absolutely different from the same tradition.
contained in Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy, and at least up until and including Dissemination, can

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Alternative 2NR uncomplete

At the top The criticism solves and turns case Rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjugation of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity which underlies the affs justification and harms Thats Spivak 82 Theres four implications here: First, the only way to change the world and answer the problems of reality is the alternative We fundamentally question and change the underlying assumptions and subconscious drives that cause the affirmative impacts Only the alternative can solve Thats Wilberg 11 Second, the affs approach is steeped in symbolizing reality and fixes only the ways in which we interact with our perception of reality This is doomed to fail until it we question how we got to the point were at and begin rejecting utopian plans that rely of link chains upon link chains to some odd impact. This approaches forces us to become obsessed with our fantasy of reality Guts all solvency Thats Stavrakakis 99 Third, Even if they prove that their plan solves 100% of the plan The alternative solves it as well, with risk of the silencing of the subaltern This means risk of the criticism is a vote negative Fourth, add cap solvency

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Links

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Capitalism
First, Your criticism ignores the subaltern voice that is deeply intertwined in the division of labor This makes the subaltern silent as well as re-entrenches in the foundation of oppression that allowed capitalism to take hold Turns the criticism Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.) Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as SUbject. The theory of pluralized "subject-effects" gives an illusion of undermining SUbjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the
history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has "no geo-political determina-tions." The

much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. I will argue for this conclusion by considering a text by two
great practitioners of the critique: "Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. "3 I have chosen this friendly exchange between two activist philosophers of history because it undoes the opposition between authoritative theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, enabling one to glimpse the track of ideology. The participants in this conversation emphasize the most important contributions of French poststructuralist theory: first, that the networks of power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive-a persistent critique is needed; and second, that intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society's Other. Yet the two systematically ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual and economic history. Although one of its chief presuppositions is the critique of the sovereign subject, the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze is framed by two monolithic and anonymous subjects-in-revolution: "A Maoist" (FD, 205) and "the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). Intellectuals, however, are named and differentiated; moreover, a

Chinese Maoism is nowhere operative. Maoism here simply creates an aura of narrative specificity, which would be a harmless rhetorical banality were it not that the innocent appropriation of the proper name "Maoism" for the eccentric phenomenon of French intellectual "Maoism" and subsequent "New Philosophy" symptomatically renders "Asia" transparent.4Deleuze's reference to the workers' struggle is equally problematic; it is obviously a genuflection: "We are unable to touch [power] in any point of its application without finding ourselves confronted by this diffuse mass, so that we are necessarily led ... to the desire to blow it up completely. Every partial revolutionary attack or defense is linked in this way to the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). The apparent banality signals a disavowal. The statement ignores the international division of labor, a gesture that often marks poststructuralist political theory.5 The invocation of the workers' struggle is baleful in its very innocence; it is incapable of dealing with global capitalism: the sUbject-production of worker and unemployed within nation-state ideologies in its Center; the increasing subtraction of the working class in the Periphery from the realization of surplus value and thus from "humanistic" training in consumerism; and the large-scale presence of paracapitalist labor as well as the heterogeneous structural status of agriculture in the Periphery. Ignoring the international division of labor; rendering "Asia" (and on occasion "Africa") transparent (unless the subject is ostensibly the "Third World"); reestablishing the legal subject of socialized capital-these are problems as common to much poststructuralist as to structuralist theory. Why should such occlusions be sanctioned in precisely those intellectuals who are our best
prophets of heterogeneity and the Other? The link to the workers' struggle is located in the desire to blow up power at any point of its application. This site is apparently based on a simple valorization of any desire destructive of any power. Walter Benjamin comments on Baudelaire's comparable politics by way of quotations from Marx: Marx continues in his description of the conspirateurs de profession as follows: " ... They

have no other aim but the immediate one of

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overthrowing the existinggovernment, and they profoundly despise the more theoretical enlightenment of the workers as to their class interests. Thus their angernot proletarian but plebian-at the habits noirs (black coats), the more or less educated people who represent [vertretenjthat side of the movement and of whom they can never become entirely independent, as they cannot of the official representatives [Reprasentantenjof the party." Baudelaire's political insights do not go fundamentally beyond the insights of these
professional conspirators .... He could perhaps have made Flaubert's statement, "Of all of politics I understand only one thing: the revolt," his own.6

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Capitalism/Marx Specific
First, Your criticism ignores the subaltern voice that is deeply intertwined in the division of labor This makes the subaltern silent as well as re-entrenches in the foundation of oppression that allowed capitalism to take hold Turns the criticism Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.) Marx's contention here is that the descriptive definition of a class can be a differential one-its cutting off and difference from all other classes: "in so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that cut off their mode of life, their interest, and their formation from those of the other classes and place them in inimical confrontation [feindlich gagenf1berstellen], they form a class."15 There is no such thing as a "class instinct" at work here. In fact, the collectivity of familial existence, which might be considered the arena of "instinct," is discontinuous with, though operated by, the differential isolation of classes. In this context, one far more pertinent to the France of the 1970s than it can be to the international
periphery, the formation of a class is artificial and economic, and the economic agency or interest is impersonal because it is systematic and heterogeneous.

This agency or interest is tied to the Hegelian critique of the individual subject, for it marks the subject's empty place in that process without a subject which is history and political economy. Here the capitalist is defined as "the conscious bearer [Trager] of the limitless movement of capital."16 My point is that Marx is not working to create an undivided subject where desire and interest coincide. Class consciousness does not operate toward that goal. Both in the economic area (capitalist) and in the political (worldhistorical agent), Marx is obliged to construct models of a divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other. A celebrated passage like the
description of capital as the Faustian monster brings this home vividlyY The following passage, continuing the quotation from The Eighteenth Brumaire, is also working on the structural principle of a dispersed and dislocated class subject: the (absent collective) consciousness of the small peasant proprietor class finds its "bearer" in a "representative" who appears to work in another's interest. The word "representative" here is not "darstellen "; this sharpens the contrast Foucault and Deleuze slide over, the contrast, say, between a proxy and a portrait. There is, of course, a relationship between them, one that has received political and ideological exacerbation in the European tradition at least since the poet and the sophist, the actor and the orator, have both been seen as harmful.

In the guise of a post-Marxist description of the scene of power, we thus encounter a much older debate: between representation or rhetoric as tropology and as persuasion. Darstellen belongs to the first constellation, vertreten-with stronger suggestions of substitution-to the second. Again, they are related, but running them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essentialist, utopian politics. Here is Marx's passage, using "vertreten" where the English use
"represent," discussing a social "subject" whose consciousness and Vertretung (as much a substitution as a representation) are dislocated and incoherent: The

small peasant proprietors "cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. Their representative must appear simultaneously as their master, as an authority over them, as unrestricted governmental power that protects them from the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence [in the place of the class interest, since there is no unified class subject] of the small peasant proprietors therefore finds its last expression [the implication of a chain of substitutions- Vertretungen- is strong here] in the executive force [Exekutivgewalt-Iess personal in German] subordinating society to itself." Not only does such a model of social indirection-necessary gaps between the source of "influence" (in this case the small
peasant proprietors), the "representative" (Louis Napoleon), and the historical-political phenomenon (executive control)-imply a critique of the subject as individual agent but a critique even of the subjectivity of a collective agency. The necessarily dislocated

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machine of history moves because "the identity of the interests" of these proprietors "fails to produce a feeling of community, national links, or a political organization." The event of representation as Vertretung (in the constellation of rhetoric-aspersuasion) behaves like a Darstellung (or rhetoric-as-trope), taking its place in the gap between the formation of a (descriptive) class and the nonformation of a (transformative) class: "In

so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life ... they form a class. In so far as ... the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community ... they do not form a class." The complicity of Vertreten and Darstellen, their identity-indifference as the place of
practice-since this complicity is precisely what Marxists must expose, as Marx does in The Eighteenth Brumaire-can only be appreciated if they are not conflated by a sleight of word. It would be merely tendentious to argue that this textualizes Marx too much, making him inaccessible to the common "man," who, a victim of common sense, is so deeply placed in a heritage of positivism that Marx's irreducible emphasis on the work of the negative, on the necessity for defetishizing the concrete, is persistently wrested from him by the strongest adversary, "the historical tradition" in the air. 18 I have been trying to point out that the uncommon "man," the

contemporary philosopher of practice, sometimes exhibits the

same positivism.

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Colonial Representation
( ) Attempts to use the voice and literature of those being oppressed by postcolonialism merely perpetuates the system by created a homogenized representation of one, big scary colonialism, ignore the multiple faces it wears and the multiplicity of people it effects Salvatore 10 [Ricardo D., Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality:
A Historians Point of View, Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 2010, 332-348, www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

The same could be said about forms of narrating or representing the national, or the Latin-American as different from the European or the metropolitan. The impetus to examine the sub-regional, the local hybrid, and the multiplicity of voices within the national seems at times overshadowed by a fascination with the search for truer or novel representations of Nuestra Amrica. There are gestures to the subregional and to the indigenous but much less than one would expect of a critical work that is supposed to undo or challenge the homogenizing work of colonialism and nationbuilding. In the same vein, while the volume presents critical reflections on LatinAmericanism and Latin American studies, the existence of a territory called Latin America seems to have eluded the discussion of the post-colonial.

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Deleuze and Guattari/Desire

First, Deleuze confines the decentering of the subject to the subject of the West, which problematizes the non-Western other as real and knowable. Deleuze makes it impossible to confer with the subaltern in a discursive practice, which assumes that the subject is always already the subject of the West. This turns the K by issuing a new Oedipal system and guts solvency, which reinstituting an essentialist subject of the Other Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
Elsewhere, Deleuze

and Guattari have attempted an alternative definition of desire, revising the one offered by psychoanalysis: "Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is lacking in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject except by repression. Desire and its object are a unity: it is the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is machine, the object of desire also a connected machine, so that the product is lifted from the process of producing,and something detaches itself from producing to product and gives a leftover to the vagabond, nomad subject."7 This definition does not alter the specificity of the desiring subject (or leftover subject-effect) that attaches to specific instances of desire or to production of the desiring machine. Moreover, when the connection between desire and the subject is taken as irrelevant or merely reversed, the subject-effect that surreptitiously emerges is much like the generalized ideological subject of the theorist. This may be the legal subject of
socialized capital, neither labor nor management, holding a "strong" passport, using a "strong" or "hard" currency, with supposedly unquestioned access to due process. It is certainly not the desiring subject as Other.The Guattari to

failure of Deleuze and consider the relations between desire, power, and subjectivity renders them incapable of articulating a theory of interests. In this context, their indifference to ideology (a theory of
which is necessary for an understanding of interests) is striking but consistent. Foucault's commitment to "genealogical" speculation prevents him from locating, in "great names" like Marx and Freud, watersheds in some continuous stream of intellectual history.8 This commitment has created an unfortunate resistance in Foucault's work to "mere" ideological critique.

Western speculations on the ideological reproduction of social relations belong to that mainstream, and it is within this tradition that AIthusser writes: "The reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class 'in and by words' [par la paroleJ."9 When Foucault considers the pervasive heterogeneity of
power,he does not ignore the immense institutional heterogeneity that Althusser here attempts to schematize. Similarly, in speaking of alliances and systems of signs, the state and war-machines (mille plateaux), Deleuze and Guattari are opening up that very field. Foucault cannot, however, admit that a developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material production in institutionality, as well as in the "effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge" (PK, 102). Because

these philosophers seem obliged to reject all arguments naming the concept of ideology as only schematic rather than textual, they are equally obliged to produce a mechanically schematic opposition between interest and desire. Thus they align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a continuistic "unconscious" or a parasubjective "culture." The mechanical relation between desire and
interest is clear in such sentences as: "We never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it" (FD, 215). An undifferentiated desire is the agent,and power slips in to create the effects of desire: "power ...

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produces positive effects at the level of desire-and also at the level of knowledge" (PK, 59). This parasubjective matrix, crosshatched with heterogeneity, ushers in the unnamed Subject, at least for those intellectual workers influenced by the new hegemony of desire. The race for "the last instance" is now between economics and power. Because desire

is tacitly defined on an orthodox model, it is unitarily opposed to "being deceived." Ideology as

"false consciousness" (being deceived) has been called into question by Althusser. Even Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a dichotomy of deception and undeceived desire: "We must accept the scream of Reich: no, the masses were not deceived; at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime" (FD, 215).These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive contradiction-that is where they admittedly part company from the Left. In

the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power. Foucault often seems to
conflate "individual" and "subject";10 and the impact on his own metaphors is perhaps intensified in his followers. Because of the power of the word "power," Foucault admits to using the "metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates its surroundings." Such slips become the rule rather than the exception in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun of theory,the Subject of Europe. I I Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role of ideology in reproducing the social relations of production: an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject, the "object being," as Deleuze admiringly remarks, "to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be able to speak." Foucault adds that "the masses know perfectly well, clearly" -once again the thematics of being undeceived-"they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well" (FD, 206, 207).What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these pronouncements? The limits of this representationalist realism are reached with Deleuze: "Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school, in barracks, in a prison, in a police station" (FD, 212). This

foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism-the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism-to define its own arena as "concrete experience," "what actually happens." Indeed, the concrete experience that is the guarantor
of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers,and schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the intellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme. 12 Neither Deleuze nor Foucault seems aware that the

intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor.

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Deleuze and Guattari/Signifier

First, Deleuze confines the decentering of the subject to the subject of the West, which problematizes the non-Western other as real and knowable. Deleuze makes it impossible to confer with the subaltern in a discursive practice, which assumes that the subject is always already the subject of the West. This turns the K by issuing a new Oedipal system and guts solvency, which reinstituting an essentialist subject of the Other Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
The unrecognized contradiction within a position that valorizes the concrete experience of the oppressed, while being so uncritical about the historical role of the intellectual, is maintained by a verbal slippage. Thus Deleuze

makes this remarkable pronouncement: "A theory is like a box of tools. Nothing to do with the signifier" (FD, 208). Considering that the verbalism of the theoretical world and its access to any world defined against it as "practical" is irreducible, such a declaration helps only the intellectual anxious to prove that intellectual labor is just like manual labor.It is when signifiers are left to look after themselves that verbal slippages happen. The signifier "representation" is a case in point. In the same dismissive tone that severs theory's link to the signifier, Deleuze declares,"There is no more representation; there's nothing but action"-"action of theory and action of practice which relate to each other as relays and form networks" (FD, 206-7). Yet an important point is being made here: the production of theory is also a practice; the opposition between abstract "pure" theory and concrete "applied" practice is too quick and easy.13 If this is, indeed, Deleuze's argument, his articulation of it is problematic. Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as "speaking for," as in politics, and representation as "re-presentation," as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only "action," the theoretician does not represent (speak for) the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately). These two
senses of representation-within state formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subject-predication, on the other-are related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover over the discontinuity with an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects again a paradoxical subjectprivileging.14 Because

"the person who speaks and acts ... is always a multiplicity," no "theorizing intellectual ... [or] party or ... union" can represent "those who act and struggle" (FD, 206). Are those who act and struggle mute, as opposed to those who act and speak (FD, 206)? These immense problems are buried in the differences between the "same" words: consciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation and re-presentation. The critique of ideological subject-constitution within state formations and systems of political economy can now be effaced, as can the active theoretical practice of the "transformation of consciousness." The banality of leftist intellectuals' lists of selfknowing, politically canny subalterns stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent.If such a critique and such a project are not to be given up, the shifting distinctions between representation within the state and politicaleconomy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the other, must not be obliterated. Let us consider the play of vertreten ("represent" in the first sense)
and darstellen ("re-present" in the second sense) in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where Marx touches on "class" as a descriptive and transformative concept in a manner somewhat more complex than Althusser's distinction between class instinct and class position would allow.

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Democratization
First, The use of military interventions doesnt right the wrongs done It allows a justification for new violence in the name of the state guts solvency and props up reproductive heteronormativity Spivak 04 (GayatriChakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, Righting Wrongs.) (https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/engl-218-fall2010/files/Righting-Wrongs.pdf. JCook.) Accessed 8/13/12.

When the UN offers violence or the ballot as a choice it is unrealistic because based on another kind of relatedmistakeunexamined universalism the assumption that this is a real choice in all situations. It will soon lead to military intervention in the name of righting wrong, in geopolitically specific places. For democratization is not just a code name, as it so often is in practice, for the political restructuring entailed by the transformation of (efficient through inefficient to wild) state capitalisms and their colonies to tributary economies of rationalized global financialization. If it is to involve the largest sector of the electorate in the global Souththe rural population below poverty levelit requires the undoing of centuries of oppression, with a suturing education in rural subaltern normality, supplementing the violent guilt and shame trips of disaster politics.

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Deontology State Actions

First, The institutionalization of ethics for the state creates a new dominating force that kills its ethical beginnings and begins to reproduce the ethics of the state in a fashion that is reproductive and heteronormative Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9 -11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. JCook.

If this is too Eurocentric, it is because I need to question the reading of Kant that is used to justify world governance.41 There is a certain degree of self-confidence in such justifications, whereas Kants relentless honesty makes him shackle reason. In the spatial institution of pure reason, then, we must make room for the effects of grace. And, in the last section of this last critique, where he is speaking of world governance, with repeated theological references (since he is fighting the theological faculty), he insists that a global institution based on ethical commonness of being is impossible. The ethical cannot be immediately institutionalized. I learn many of my ways of reading the past
from Marx, and this is where I want to read Kant as Marx read Aristotle, with admiration but with the historical acknowledgement that he

could not imagine the value-form. Even within his brilliantly fractured model of the oneness of reason, Kant spoke of effect of grace because he could not imagine a European-style university where the theology faculty was not dominant. We have to run with the revolutionary force of the word effect, clear out of the theological into the aesthetic. Effect comes as close as Kant can get to de-transcendentalizing Grace. Grace is caught in the figure of something like a metalepsisthe effect of an effect. Since pure reasonor indeed any kind of reasoncannot know the cause, all that is inscribed is an effect.

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Discourse
First, Discourse on equality is a site for identity construction that reproduces the representation that caused your impacts while simultaneously re-entrenching the plan in a reproductive heteronormativity Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12. [17] Discourses

on equality are strategic sites that promote the iteration and repetition of gendered meanings. Equality discourses allow for the reproduction of racialized national and gendered identities. Genealogically speaking, for example, Finnish equality discourse has been a site
for identity construction for particular kind of "woman" that stands in a particular relationship both to the "man" (the Finnish man) and the nation. The

history of Finnish women (written in the 1980s and early 1990s) is a history of equality, but also of normalized heterosexuality (Honkanen, 1997). It is a history of mostly middle-class women's
struggles to be able to participate in working-life, politics and education and the life of the nation. One example of this discourse [4] is the well-known The Lady With the Bow: the Story of Finnish Woman (Manninen & Setl, 1990). The book draws the history of this "equal lady", the lady with the bow, as far back as to the stone-age, arguing that a particular rock-painting representing a figure with what can be read as breasts and a bow proves that "Finnish women always have worked together with "their" (heterosexual) men (Manninen & Setl, 1990: 9). These

representations should be genealogically analyzed and deconstructed. Otherwise they will continue to be used uncritically as part of a "politics out of history" to use Wendy Brown's formulation (Brown, 2001). These hegemonic representations, this staging of the world, these portrayals, enable the unreflexive identity politics of the equal Finnish woman and uphold the problem of political intersectionality as long as they are not deconstructed. Furthermore, this politics is backed up through history as yet another grand narrative called "the history of Finnish woman" (see
also Honkanen, 2007). [18] It seems to be the politics of this very same Woman that is advanced in recent discussions on the Finnish women's studies mailing list. This discussion was started by Pasi Malmi, a researcher on men and masculinities, who came up with the argument that certain feminist discourses oppress men (the list-archives are accessible and searchable in Finnish on the internet[5]). The discussion concerns how specific (wrong) portrayals of women affect the way in which men are seen. What I see as particularly telling in this heterocentric debate is that as long as it fails to name itself for what it is, it proceeds endlessly with its production of gendered meanings. It also proceeds as if it were engaged in a merely descriptive enterprisewith researchers attempting to describe how cultural meanings variously oppress either men or women. [19] The hegemony of the two-sex model in Finnish equality discourse also leads to a strident men's movement in Finland that claims men's equal rights. Their

politics is framed within an equality discourse and a two-sex system. Adding hetero-oriented men's studies to the academic scene also strengthens the naturalization of heteronormativity. It upholds the heterocentrist white academic hegemony by becoming the relational and complementary counter force to the uncritical "women's equality discourse." Within this kind of equality discourse women and men are unproblematically seen as relational and complementary categories.

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Discovery of America
( ) The discourse around discovering America is reaped from the occidental coloniality that created those imperial projects We should instead use the discourse of invention, because this is truly what happened Their discourse justifies and embraces the logic and epistemology of the West Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13.

America, as a concept, goes hand in hand with that of modernity, and both are the selfrepresentation of imperial projects and global designs that originated in and were implemented by European actors and institutions. The invention of America was one of the nodal points that contributed to create the conditions for imperial European expansion and a lifestyle, in Europe, that served as a model for the achievements of humanity. Thus, the discovery and conquest of America is not just one more event in some long and linear historical chain from the creation of the world to the present, leaving behind all those who were not attentive enough to jump onto the bandwagon of modernity. Rather, it was a key turning point in world history : It was the moment in which the demands of modernity as the final horizon of salvation began to require the imposition of a specific set of values that relied on the logic of coloniality for their implementation. The invention of America thesis offers, instead, a perspective from coloniality and, in consequence, reveals that the advances of modernity outside of Europe rely on a colonial matrix of power that includes the renaming of the lands appropriated and of the people inhabiting them, insofar as the diverse ethnic groups and civilizations in Tawantinsuyu and Anhuac, as well as those from Africa, were reduced to Indians and Blacks. The idea of America and of Latin America could, of course, be accounted for within the philosophical framework of European modernity, even if that account is offered by Creoles of European descent dwelling in the colonies and embracing the Spanish or Portuguese view of events. What counts, however, is that the need for telling the part of the story that was not told requires a shift in the geography of reason and of understanding. Coloniality, therefore, points toward and intends to unveil an embedded logic that enforces control, domination, and exploitation disguised in the language of salvation, progress, modernization, and being good for every one. The double register of
modernity/coloniality has, perhaps, never been as clear as it has been recently under the administration of US president George W. Bush.

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Economic Assimilation
( ) The act of assimilating a country into our economic system lays the framework for colonialitys control over these nations Forcing a nation to adapt and controlling its future, inserting the logic and market orientations of Occidentalism More so, these processes are embodied by the people of these countries, at the micro level, ensuring a more harmful cultural and social adaptation to Occidentalism Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 7/3/13. At the metaphorical level at least, I believe it is possible to find inspiration for interpreting the logic of these movements in two domains: cyberspatial practices, and theories of complexity in the biological and physical sciences. Over the past few hundred years, modernity

and capitalism have organized economic and social life largely around the logic of order, centralization, and hierarchy building (this also applies to really
existing socialisms for the most part). In recent decades, cyberspace (as the universe of digital networks, interactions and interfaces) and the sciences of complexity have made visible a different model for the organization of social life (see Escobar, 2000, 2003b further explanation of this model and additional references; Peltonen, 2003 for an application of complexity to a particular social movement in Finland). In terms of complexity in particular, ants,

swarming molds, cities, certain markets, for instance, exhibit what scientists call complex adaptive behavior. (Thousands of invisible singlecelled mold units occasionally coalesce into a swarm and create a visible large mold. Ant colonies developed over a long time span with no central pacemaker. Medieval markets linked efficiently myriad producers and consumers with prices setting themselves in a way that was understood locally.) In this type of situation, simple beginnings lead to complex entities, without the existence of a master plan or central intelligence planning it. They are bottom-up processes, where agents working at one (local) scale produce behavior and forms at higher scales (e.g., the great anti-globalization
demonstrations of the last few years). Simple rules at one level give rise to sophistication and complexity at another level through what is called emergence: the

fact that the actions of multiple agents interacting dynamically and following local rules rather than top-down commands result in visible macrobehavior or structures. Some times these systems are adaptive; they learn over time, responding more effectively to the changing needs of their environment.

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Economics General
( ) The development of economic growth is the largest drive in the domination of Latin America and colonization Only decolonialization solves this epistemic problem AND All of your evidence is based off the fundamental assumption of capital and value driving everything This calls the structural integrity of your evidence into question Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

Globalization studies, political-economy paradigms and world-system analysis, with only a few exceptions, have not derived the epistemological and theoretical implications of the epistemic critique coming from subaltern locations in the colonial divide and expressed in academia through ethnic studies and woman studies. They still continue to produce knowledge from the Western man point zero god-eye view. This has led to important problems in the way we conceptualize global capitalism and the world-system. These concepts are in need of decolonization and this can only be achieved with a decolonial epistemology that overtly assumes a decolonial geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge as points of departure to a radical critique. The following examples can illustrate this point. If we analyze the European colonial expansion from a Eurocentric point of view, what we get is a picture in which the origins of the so-called capitalist worldsystem are primarily produced by the interimperial competition among European Empires. The primary motive for this expansion was to find shorter routes to the East, which let accidentally to the socalled discovery and, eventual, Spanish and Portuguese colonization of the Americas. From this point of view, the capitalist worldsystem would be primarily an economic system that determine the behavior of the major social actors by the economic logic of making profits as manifested in the extraction of surplus value and the ceaseless accumulation of capital at a worldscale. Moreover, the concept of capitalism implied in this perspective privileges economic relations over other social relations. Accordingly, the transformation in the relations of production produces a new class structure typical of capitalism as opposed to other social systems and other forms of domination. Class analysis and economic structural transformations are privileged over other power relations.

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Economic Collapse
First, The economic narrative about "global economic collapse" used in the 1ac is designed to incentivize subalterans, specifically woman to adopt Western values and train them to others This reproduces reproductive heteronormativity in our cultural nationalism Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012

There is a difference, almost a fracture, between globality and development on the one hand, and immigration and multiculturalism on the other The located gendered subaltern, often less viciously gendered than the underclass migrant, but facing the global directly, falls through the fracture The upper-class, hybrid female is, first, "woman" for the international civil society serving today's "economic citizen"-the finance capital market in the business of development. Secondly, she is "woman" as subject of postcolonial, multiculturalist theory. And finally, she is "woman" as trainer of other women to become "woman," eligible for benevolence, for "development" coded loosely as ethical-political action. It is in the interest of the coalition between these women and metropolitan feminism that we are obliged today to forget the economic narrative. These women originally from the global South, the hybrid postmodern North are indistinguishable from the indigenous elite women of the South upon whom, by a crude and classless theory of national identity and the universalist politics of feminist solidarity that is hand-in-glove with biased cultural relativism, the donor agencies are relying more and more . Twenty-five years ago, Samir
Amin, writing about what he called "Levantine merchant princes," mentioned the difficulty of assigning a country to them. These women are their modern ideological counterparts. Their

economic counterparts, female and male, with the glass ceiling and the feudalism of heterosexist "love" worked in, are the secessionist community described by Robert Reich.

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Economy US
( ) Latin America is the colonial test kitchen where the U.S. develops neoliberal economic policy that promises individual rights, but only as long as they are economically profitable. Creating debt cycles by providing economic assistance leads to reliance, which reinforces U.S. colonial hegemony BARDER, 13 [Daniel, Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut; American
Hegemony Comes Home: The Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States May, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 38(2)]

The American-led liberal order, and its reassertion of hegemony in the 1980s, was in fact predicated upon the very need to discipline and coerce weaker states, particularly in Latin America and the Middle Eastas Ikenberry writesthrough political and economic means. The debt crises of the 1980s were part of this capacity to discipline. However, these crises,
characterized as well by the explosive development of financial securitization and the proliferation of asset bubbles, represents what Arrighi calls a signal crisis of the dominant regime of accumulation of the American postsecond world war order. 53 A

signal crisis signifies a deeper underlying systemic crisis when leading capitalist entities begin switching their economic activities away from production and trade to financial intermediation and speculation. 54 This initial move from investment in material production to
the fictitious world of financial speculation and engineering initially forestalls and enhances the capacity for wealth generation for a certain class. Nonetheless, it cannot embody a lasting resolution of the underlying contradictions. On the contrary, as Arrighi writes, it

has always been the preamble to a deepening of the crisis and to the eventual supersession of the still dominant regime of accumulation by a new one. 55 What Arrighi
calls the terminal crisis is then the end of the long century that encompasses the rise, full expansion, and demise of that regimewhat is potentially occurring today. 56 The

signal crisis of American political and economic hegemony provoked a set of policies to enhance capital accumulations beneficial to American business and state to the detriment of the global South. What Ikenberry sees as
American behavior being crudely imperial in certain contexts was in fact the way of maintaining and reinvigorating international forms of capital accumulation for the benefit of American hegemony and its allies. As I will show in the last section of this chapter,

this manifestly neo-imperial economic order was not only meant to be applicable throughout the global South; the Reagan-Thatcher counter revolution was also an internal revolution that adapted some of the experiences and practices developed in the global periphery to reinforce American hegemony at home and abroad.

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Economy World
( ) The system of capital logic on the global scale creates a hierarchy of thought and culture that led, very directly, to the colonization of the Americas and the perpetuation, today, of postcolonialism AND Their evidence is not going to call into question this form of logic It is stuck in the reductionist perspective of the abstract, not actuality Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. Without denying the importance of the endless accumulation of capital at a world scale and the existence of a particular class structure in global capitalism, I raise the following epistemic question: How would the world-system look like if we moved the locus of enunciation from the European man to an Indigenous women in the Americas, to, say, Rigoberta Mench in Guatemala or Domitila Barrios de Chungara in Bolivia? I do not pretend to speak for or represent the perspective of these indigenous women. What I attempt to do is to shift the location from which these paradigms are thinking. The

first implication of shifting our geopolitics of knowledge is that what arrived in the Americas in the late fifteenth century was not only an economic system of capital and labor for the production of commodities to be sold for a profit in the world market. This was a crucial part of, but was not the sole element in, the entangled package. What arrived in the Americas was a broader and wider entangled power structure that an economic reductionist perspective of the world-system is unable to account for . From the structural location of an indigenous woman in the Americas, what arrived was a more complex world-system than what political-economy paradigms and world-system analysis portrait. A European/capitalist/military/Christian/patriarchal/white/heterosexual/male arrived in the Americas and established simultaneously in time and space several entangled global hierarchies
that for purposes of clarity in this exposition I will list below as if they were separate from each other:

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Epistemology Claims
( ) The fact that they claim that some knowledge is better than other forms of knowledge is the very basic form of valuation that Eurocentric ideologies used to force oppression and occidental thought, by claiming that subaltern thought is not as valuable as their European thought. Their answers on this flow prove their occidental approach and the link Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

This epistemic strategy has been crucial for Western global designs. By hiding the location of the subject of enunciation, European/Euro-American colonial expansion and domination was able to construct a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus, of superior and inferior people around the world. We went from the sixteenth century characterization of people without writing to the eighteenth and nineteenth-century characterization of people without history, to the twentiethcentury characterization of people without development and more recently, to the early twenty-first-century of people without democracy. We went from the sixteenth-century rights of people (Seplveda versus de las Casas debate in the University of Salamanca in the midsixteenth century), to the eighteenthcentury rights of man (Enlightenment philosophers), and to the late twentiethcentury human rights. All of these are part of global designs articulated to the simultaneous production and reproduction of an international division of labor of core/periphery that overlaps with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans/non-Europeans.

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Equality Discourse
First, Discourse on equality is a site for identity construction that reproduces the representation that caused your impacts while simultaneously re-entrenching the plan in a reproductive heteronormativity Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12. [17] Discourses

on equality are strategic sites that promote the iteration and repetition of gendered meanings. Equality discourses allow for the reproduction of racialized national and gendered identities. Genealogically speaking, for example, Finnish equality discourse has been a site
for identity construction for particular kind of "woman" that stands in a particular relationship both to the "man" (the Finnish man) and the nation. The

history of Finnish women (written in the 1980s and early 1990s) is a history of equality, but also of normalized heterosexuality (Honkanen, 1997). It is a history of mostly middle-class women's
struggles to be able to participate in working-life, politics and education and the life of the nation. One example of this discourse [4] is the well-known The Lady With the Bow: the Story of Finnish Woman (Manninen & Setl, 1990). The book draws the history of this "equal lady", the lady with the bow, as far back as to the stone-age, arguing that a particular rock-painting representing a figure with what can be read as breasts and a bow proves that "Finnish women always have worked together with "their" (heterosexual) men (Manninen & Setl, 1990: 9). These

representations should be genealogically analyzed and deconstructed. Otherwise they will continue to be used uncritically as part of a "politics out of history" to use Wendy Brown's formulation (Brown, 2001). These hegemonic representations, this staging of the world, these portrayals, enable the unreflexive identity politics of the equal Finnish woman and uphold the problem of political intersectionality as long as they are not deconstructed. Furthermore, this politics is backed up through history as yet another grand narrative called "the history of Finnish woman" (see
also Honkanen, 2007). [18] It seems to be the politics of this very same Woman that is advanced in recent discussions on the Finnish women's studies mailing list. This discussion was started by Pasi Malmi, a researcher on men and masculinities, who came up with the argument that certain feminist discourses oppress men (the list-archives are accessible and searchable in Finnish on the internet[5]). The discussion concerns how specific (wrong) portrayals of women affect the way in which men are seen. What I see as particularly telling in this heterocentric debate is that as long as it fails to name itself for what it is, it proceeds endlessly with its production of gendered meanings. It also proceeds as if it were engaged in a merely descriptive enterprisewith researchers attempting to describe how cultural meanings variously oppress either men or women. [19] The hegemony of the two-sex model in Finnish equality discourse also leads to a strident men's movement in Finland that claims men's equal rights. Their

politics is framed within an equality discourse and a two-sex system. Adding hetero-oriented men's studies to the academic scene also strengthens the naturalization of heteronormativity. It upholds the heterocentrist white academic hegemony by becoming the relational and complementary counter force to the uncritical "women's equality discourse." Within this kind of equality discourse women and men are unproblematically seen as relational and complementary categories. First, The discourse of equality is still profoundly rooted in Judeo-Christian ethics and the affirmation of specific forms of equality are an attempt to reproduce the current code of ethics that is at the heart of your problem Only the alternative solves Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12.
So the problems concerning feminisms' others are complex ones. This article aims to discuss othering in relation to the politics of representation. I discuss various examples of feminist practices by focusing on how these practices other a substantial number of feminist issues in the dominant Finnish equality discourses. On the basis of this, I argue for the benefits of a deconstructive feminist politics both on a practical policy level and an academic theoretical level. I consider this important in order to take responsibility for the problems related to representational politics, since "

the

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power to impose on people representations of themselves, or of others on their behalf, is intrinsically oppressive" (Braidotti, 2006: 13). Theoretically my work is predominantly situated as part of European and Nordic theoretical discussions concerning equality discourse and intersectional theories. [4] Feminists have shown the problems involved in an identity politics (for a discussion see Phoenix & Pattynama, 2006) and pointed at the unavoidable complicity we have in the very power we oppose. A deconstructive politics that takes this critique seriously needs to proceed through careful deconstruction of the very discourses that it is constituted by. This enables us to see and problematize the extent to which our practices are constituted by the political climate and global situation we inescapably find ourselves in. We have to begin to deconstruct the neoliberal individualist and Judeo-Christian values that our ideals and values concerning human rights and equality usually are based on, especially in an
intellectual atmosphere where these values are considered unproblematically "secular." This not because one would want to give up all values and finally become somehow "secular," but because feminists, as knowledge producing and political agents, have always wanted to problematize our complicity in power. A deconstruction of the equality discourse hinders a reformist approach that would firmly place one inside the parameters of the particular political discourse one operates with. Deconstructing the equality discourse reveals its ethical rootedness in a Judeo-Christian value system and a liberal individual political discourse (Badiou, 2004). Equality discourses are essential systems of power that neoliberal market economies operate

This kind of contextualization and genealogical investigation helps when there is a wish to avoid indulging in another branch of moral and religious "preaching" directed against various others. Examples of this kind of "missionary work" can be found
through (Thornton, 2006: 155). [5] in the rhetoric of western and especially US based civilizing projects, directed against Islam or the moralizing preaching in the name of equality and

this moralism is promoted in the name of democracy, human rights and God (see, for instance, George W. Bush's proclamation on Human Rights Day 2004[1]). We have to ask in what ways the values that feminist critical thinkers and policymakers promote differ from the othering practices of conservative political agendas. We have to ask this because we cannot be blinded to the fact that our values might take as their departure point the very same discursive setting. [6] Although this article mainly discusses equality discourses, I still wanted to show that a deconstruction of the
human rights directed at Iran. Very often equality discourse and the two-sex model that it operates with is an undertaking that has its contexts also on this level of generality. It is important to

It is not just that equality discourses can be shown to operate through othering and exclusion, it is also possible to contextualize the unquestioned nature of the value-system that equality discourses and human rights rhetoric "spring from". Equality discourses, as such, might have exclusionary effects on a more general level. These values are also used to advance oppression and warfare which makes clear that these discourses are not in any sense "innocent" or intrinsically good. [7] Descriptive equality research that only portrays the situation internal to discourse ends up being conservative. Describing the status quo within a reformist
realize that the problem of exclusion is not just internal to feminist discourses such as equality. and consensus ridden "progressive thinking", a thinking, moreover, that does not contextualize itself may end up universalizing a western liberal value-system in problematic ways. [8] A great deal of identity-based equality politics still has to solve the problem of representation. Deconstructive anti-representationalism should be seen as a profoundly ethical move, one where the practice of deconstruction is an attitude or an ideology, if you wish, that springs from ethics. Braidotti calls this an ethical pragmatism (Braidotti, 2006: 14), and it is connected to politics as it is the site at which politics itself constituted. A productive antagonism (Butler) and the refusal to "speak for" should be seen as the poststructuralist political and ethical solution that it is. Deconstruction is much more than a method of investigation. The ethics of deconstruction lies in the practice of deconstructing representationalism. This is the main message that this article aims to communicate. [9] Within a constructivist epistemology I ask what equality discourses leave unsaid, what is marginalized in them and what power mechanisms are embedded in them. I do this by deconstructing some of the language that equality discourses circulate. I deconstruct the theme of sexual difference. The subaltern is to me a tool that I have used to discuss ways in which equality discourse speaks its own politics through various Others I use it as a concept to open up political intersectionality.

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Feminism
First, The attempt to save women in the world constitutes a mindset of the masculine, west saviors to the subaltern women This reconstitutes the reproductive heteronormative drive within the US, but also reinforces the need for the other to reproduce and continue their culture in a heteronormative fashion Spivak 99 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?, Jcook.) To mark the moment when not only a civil but a good society is born out of domestic confusion, singular events that break the letter of the law to instill its spirit are often invoked. The protection of women by men often provides such an event. If
we remember that the British boasted of their absolute equity toward and noninterference with native customj law, an invocation of this sanctioned transgression of the letter for the sake of the spirit may be read in J. M. Derrett's remark: "The very first legislation upon Hindu Law was carried through without the assent of a single Hindu." The legislation is not named here. The next sentence, where the measure is named, is equally interesting if one considers the implications of the survival of a colonially established "good" society after decolonization: "The recurrence of sati in independent India is probably an obscurantist revival which cannot long survive even in a very backward part of the country."68 Whether this observation is correct or not, what interests me is that the

protection of woman (today the "third-world woman") becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good society which must, at such in augurative moments, transgress mere legality, or equity of legal policy. In this particular case, the process also allowed the redefinition as a crime of what had been tolerated, known, or adulated as ritual. In
other words, this one item in Hindu law jumped the frontier between the private and the public domain. Although Foucault's historical narrative, focusing solely on Western Europe, sees merely a tolerance for the criminal antedating the development of criminology in the late eighteenth century (PK, 41), his theoretical description of the "episteme" is pertinent here: "The

episteme is the 'apparatus' which makes possible the separation not of the true from the false, but of what may not be characterized as scientific" (PK, 197)-ritual as opposed to crime, the one fixed by superstition, the other by legal science. The leap of suttee from
private to public has a clear and complex relationship with the changeover from a mercantile and commercial to a territorial and administrative British presence; it can be followed in correspondence among the police stations, the lower and higher courts, the courts of directors, the prince regent's court, and the like. (It is interesting to note that, from the point of view of the native "colonial subject," also emergent from the feudalism-capitalism transition, sati is a signifier with the reverse social charge: "Groups

rendered psychologically marginal by their exposure to Western impact ... had come under pressure to demonstrate, to others as well as to themselves, their ritual purity and allegiance to traditional high culture. To many of them sati became an important proof of their conformity to older norms at a time when these norms had become shaky within. "69)

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Foucault/Power
First, Foucault confines the decentering of the subject to the subject of the West, which problematizes the non-Western other as real and knowable. Foucault makes it impossible to confer with the subaltern in a discursive practice, which assumes that the subject is always already the subject of the West. This turns the K by issuing a new power system and guts solvency, which reinstituting an essentialist subject of the Other Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
The failure of Deleuze and Guattari to consider the relations between desire, power, and subjectivity renders them incapable of articulating a theory of interests. In this context, their indifference to ideology (a theory of which is necessary for an understanding of interests) is striking but consistent. Foucault's commitment to "genealogical" speculation prevents him from locating, in "great names" like Marx and Freud, watersheds in some continuous stream of intellectual history.8 This commitment has created an unfortunate resistance in Foucault's work to "mere" ideological critique. Western

speculations on the ideological reproduction of social relations belong to that mainstream, and it is within this tradition that AIthusser writes: "The reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class 'in and by words' [par la paroleJ."9 When Foucault considers the pervasive heterogeneity of power,he does not ignore the immense institutional heterogeneity that Althusser here attempts to schematize. Similarly, in speaking of alliances and systems of signs, the state and war-machines (mille plateaux), Deleuze and Guattari are opening up that very field. Foucault cannot, however, admit that a developed theory of ideology recognizes its own material production in institutionality, as well as in the "effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge" (PK, 102). Because these philosophers seem obliged to reject all arguments naming the concept of ideology as only schematic rather than textual, they are equally obliged to produce a mechanically schematic opposition between interest and desire. Thus they align themselves with bourgeois sociologists who fill the place of ideology with a continuistic "unconscious" or a parasubjective "culture."
The mechanical relation between desire and interest is clear in such sentences as: "We never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it" (FD, 215). An undifferentiated desire is the agent,and power slips in to create the effects of desire: "power ... produces positive effects at the level of desire-and also at the level of knowledge" (PK, 59). This parasubjective matrix, cross-hatched with heterogeneity, ushers in the unnamed Subject, at least for those intellectual workers influenced by the new hegemony of desire. The race for "the last instance" is now between economics and power. Because desire

is tacitly defined on an orthodox model, it is unitarily opposed to "being deceived." Ideology as "false consciousness" (being deceived) has been called into question by Althusser. Even Reich implied notions of collective will rather than a dichotomy of deception and undeceived
desire: "We must accept the scream of Reich: no, the masses were not deceived; at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime" (FD, 215).These philosophers will not entertain the thought of constitutive contradiction-that is where they admittedly part company from the Left. In the name of desire, they reintroduce the undivided subject into the discourse of power.

Foucault often seems to conflate "individual" and "subject";10 and the impact on his own metaphors is perhaps intensified in his followers. Because of the power of the word "power," Foucault admits to using the "metaphor of the point which progressively irradiates its surroundings." Such slips become the rule rather than the

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exception in less careful hands. And that radiating point, animating an effectively heliocentric discourse, fills the empty place of the agent with the historical sun of theory,the Subject of Europe. I I Foucault articulates another corollary of the disavowal of the role of ideology in
reproducing the social relations of production: an unquestioned valorization of the oppressed as subject, the "object being," as Deleuze admiringly remarks, "to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be able to speak." Foucault adds that "the masses know perfectly well, clearly" -once again the thematics of being undeceived-"they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well" (FD, 206, 207).What happens to the critique of the sovereign subject in these pronouncements? The limits of this representationalist realism are reached with Deleuze: "Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school,in barracks, in a prison, in a police station" (FD, 212). This

foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism-the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism-to define its own arena as "concrete experience," "what actually happens." Indeed, the concrete experience that is the guarantor of the political appeal of prisoners, soldiers,and
schoolchildren is disclosed through the concrete experience of the intellectual, the one who diagnoses the episteme. 12 Neither Deleuze nor Foucault seems aware that the

intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate the international division of labor.

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General (Latin America)

( ) The pursuit of the West to help Latin American nations is merely an attempt to hide the responsibility the West has for creating the conditions seen in the region. This rhetoric of underdevelopment and economic intervention into these problem regions perpetuate the growing domination of coloniality Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political
Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. Although the dependentistas struggled against these universalist/Occidentalist

forms of knowledge, they perceived this knowledge as a superstruture or an epiphenomenon of some economic infrastructure. Dependentistas never perceived this knowledge as constitutive of Latin Americas political-economy. Constructing peripheral zones such as Africa and Latin America as regions with a problem or with a backward stage of development concealed European and Euro-American responsibility in the exploitation of these continents. The construction of pathological regions in the periphery as opposed to the socalled normal development patterns of the West justified an even more intense political and economic intervention from imperial powers. By treating the Other as underdeveloped and backward, metropolitan exploitation and domination were justified in the name of the civilizing mission.

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Globalization
First, The form of globalization that the aff creates entrenches patriarchy by forcing the woman adopt the hegemonic culture with her identity This is the basis of reproductive heteronormativity Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012, PG 42-43 Keeping within the allegory of the production of the colonial subject, with something like a relationship with the implied reader of British literature, we see the orphaned brother as the full-fledged future colonial subject, mourning his sister-his personal past-but encircled by the sahib's left arm, the right implicitly pointing to a historical future. It is Shoshi, however, who supplements the picture, choosing to remain in the static culture, while sending the young unformed male into the dynamic colonial future. A gendered model, this, of the colonial reader, not quite identical with the "real" reader and therefore, in a patriarchal system of reckoning, more like a "woman." How, then, can we construct a model of the woman or man of the urban middle class, themselves woven and patched as well by the same strands, of the same stuff, reading in the exciting identity-in-difference frame of mind, the subject laid out in the pages of the story? A richly constructed, richly praised female subject who chooses to remain within the indigenous patriarchal structure; with confidence in the Magistrate as foster-father, another mark of her heroism. This is the complex of attitudes that is the condition and effect of any appropriate reading of the story. The structure survives; Madhu Kishwar will not call herself a "femi" nist" because the word is too much marked by the West, but will work for (other) women's rights.9 The Magistrate is constructed as a subject who might be privy to the thrill of this ambivalence. The possibility is lodged in this exchange: "The saheb asked, 'Where will you go.' Shoshi said, 'I will return to my husband's house, I have nothing to worry about.' The saheb smiled a little and, seeing no way out .. .'' By contrast, the neighbor Tara, who opposes husbands if they are scoundrels at the beginning of the story, and roars out her rage at the end, is displeased when Shoshi leaves her husband's house to look after her sick brother: "If you have to fight your husband why not sit at home THE BURDEN OF ENGLISH 43 do it; what's the point m leaving home? A husband, after all" 288). The Magistrate (Brit Lit) (perhaps) understands best of all that Shoshi must sacrifice herself to her own culture, but takes charge of Nilmoni (the indefinite future). A crude but recognizable model of what the "best" manage-saying "yes" and "no" to the Shoshi-function, as it were-in our Brit Lit classes.

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Good/Bad State
First, The depiction of good states and bad states friends and enemies props up state nationalism that is at the heart of reproductive heteronormativity Spivak 04, GayatriChakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9-11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. In the midst of what seemed to be a disastrous engagement with Iraq, I went back to reading Martin Luther King Jr.s Beyond Vietnam, the 1967 speech he delivered at Riverside Church in New York, a minutes walk from where I live now. Again and again in the text of the speech, I found Dr. King exhorting us to speak for those who have been designated as our enemies, because the human spirit [does not] move without great difficulty against all the apathy of conformist thought within ones own bosom and in the surrounding world. How do they judge us? King asked. When we ask why they do not leap to negotiate, these things must be remembered, he said. It was first in Hawaii that I was able to connect my efforts to imagine the suicide bomber with these exhortations. I spoke there of the fact that this resonance with Dr. Kings effort had received hostile responses from various persons and journals and this in itself was cause for alarm. I referred to the speech given in Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta on April 30, 1967, which contained these powerful words: Dont

let anybody make you think that God chose America as His divine messianic force to bea sort of policeman of the whole world. God has a way of standing before the nations with judgment, and it seems that I can hear God saying to America: You are too arrogant! If you dont change your ways, I will rise up and break the backbone of your power. I wondered
even as I repeated the apologia offered to Dr. Michael Bernetif these words applied to the curtailment of civil liberties, including intellectual freedom, the exacerbation of military permissiveness, the deformation of the polity through racial profiling, and the re- designing of the entire culture for the prevention of autoimmunity, of which I spoke in section 1.I

pointed out that we are now so used to the idea that it is the United States responsibility as the new Empire to police the world that we quibble over containment or war, war over oil as opposed to a just war, assassination as opposed to regime change. I shared with that
audience my comments, made to the then provost of Columbia University, after listening to a crazy debate on Iraq between Alan Dershkowitz and George P. Fletcher: I felt that I could not actually ask only a questionto an extent the response could not come from what the debaters had presented. It was pretty unsettling to hear It is sometimes better to do the right thing rather than the legal thing. This is of course the grounds for civil disobedience, but precisely because it is civil. We

cannot speak of states operating in this way. When it comes to state practice, it turns to vigilantism, precisely because there is no authority to disobey. I was also a bit unnerved that there were hands up
in the room for condoning the right to kill. Even one hand up for this is unnerving since we were not speaking of capital punishment, which I do oppose, but which at least can be discussed within an idea of law. It is not correct to think that, because inalienable rights have been again and again violated, they do not exist. Surely, the

difference between having torture warrants and having an individual policeman decide that torture was okay is that the latter can be punished if discovered! The problem with deciding in favor of legalized targeted
assassination is surely that if a covert targeted assassination is discovered, then, at least, in perhaps a utopian vision of the rule of law, such a thing can be retroactively punished? It was troublesome to see how a debate presumably on our right to invade Iraq turned into such a rhetorical tirade against Palestine. (Here I would want to use stronger words.) The

repetitive condemnation of Palestinians showed no ability to imagine them in a material context where Israel figured as anything other than a good figure. This is where George Fletchers idea in Romantics at war, that romanticism was simply a variety of irrationalism, may be
questionable.32 We must call the glass half full rather than half empty. Romanticism was a strike for a robust imaginationfor me, it is summarized in Shelleys remark, precisely in the context of the beginnings of capitalism, that we want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know.33 It

is the ability to imagine the other side as another human being, rather than simply an enemy to be psyched out, that is the greatest gift of romanticism. What I was saying the other day about the humanities comes in here, because this
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is the terrain where a solid grounding in the humanities allows one to think the spirit rather than the letter of the law, and not think of the imagination as mere unreason. Although I do think that Mike Davis, in his new book Dead Cities, is somewhat over the top, he certainly does
have a good deal of documented material that would not allow us to think that we are above the law because we will never be irresponsible with weapons of mass destruction.34 Not to mention Agent Orange! I grant that I am somewhat outside the grounds of the debate because historical experience makes me very uncomfortable with the pre-comprehended assumption on both sides that America should think of itself as having an imperial mandate. I admit that George Fletchers repeated assertion that there

are no good or bad states, but equal states, can be read as a questioning of this precomprehension. It troubled me then that there were student hands up in that Law School auditorium condoning murder, albeit to be carried out by the state. This too is a coercive rearrangement of desire. And such a possibility makes it necessary to call upon the robust imagination, once again, to undo the binary opposition between bad cop and good copand remember that they are both cops. The impulse to help by enforcing human rights, by giving things, giving money, commodifying literacy, ignoring genderconsciousness, has a relationship with the impulse to kill. I quote Kant: Although . . . there can still be legally good actions, [if] . . . theminds attitude is . . . corrupted at its root . . . the human being is designated as evil.35 Today, with the endorsement of the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, the backbone of the rule of law is broken.

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Hegemony
***ALSO VIOLENCE IMPMACT*** ( ) The new form of imperialism and control is economic hegemony, but the same violent, war-mongering effects take place, destroying entire nations, and subjugating all who are in the countries the US tries to economically engage Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. Before moving on, it

is important to complete this rough representation of todays global capitalist modernity by looking at the US-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Among other things, this episode has made at last two things particularly clear: first, the willingness to use unprecedented levels of violence to enforce dominance on a global scale; second, the unipolarity of the current empire. In ascension since the Thatcher-Reagan years, this unipolarity reached its climax with the post-9/11 regime, based on a new convergence of military, economic, political and religious interests in the United States. In Alain Joxes (2002) compelling vision of imperial globality, what we have been witnessing since the first Gulf War is the rise of an empire that increasingly operates through the management of asymmetrical and spatialized violence, territorial control, subcontracted massacres, and cruel little wars, all of which are aimed at imposing the neo-liberal capitalist project. At stake is a type of regulation that operates through the creation of a new horizon of global violence. This empire regulates disorder through financial and military means, pushing chaos to the extent possible to the outskirts of empire, creating a predatory peace to the benefit of a global noble caste and leaving untold poverty and suffering in its path. It is an empire that does not take responsibility for the wellbeing of those over whom it rules. As Joxe puts it: The world today is united by a new form of chaos, an imperial chaos, dominated by the imperium of the United States, though not controlled by it. We lack the words to describe this new system, while being surrounded by its images. World leadership through chaos, a doctrine that a rational European school would have difficulty imagining, necessarily leads to weakening states even in the United States through the emerging sovereignty of corporations and markets. (2002: 78, 213).

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Helping Colonials
***A lot of the framework cards extend this argument*** ( ) From the perspective of working for colonials, not from a colonial perspectives, epistemological turns solvency Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. In October 1998, there was a conference/dialogue at Duke University between the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group and the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. The dialogue initiated at this conference eventually resulted in the publication of several issues of the journal NEPANTLA. However, this conference was the last time the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group met before their split. Among the many reasons and debates that produced this split, there are two that I would like to stress. The members of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group were primarily Latinamericanist scholars in the USA. Despite

their attempt at producing a radical and alternative knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic schema of Area Studies in the United States. With a few exceptions, they produced studies about the subaltern rather than studies with and from a subaltern perspective . Like the imperial epistemology of Area Studies, theory was still located in the North while the subjects to be studied are located in the South. This colonial epistemology was crucial to
my dissatisfaction with the project. As a Latino in the United States, I was dissatisfied with the epistemic consequences of the knowledge produced by this Latinamericanist group.

They underestimated in their work ethnic/racial

perspectives coming from the region, while giving privilege predominantly to Western thinkers. This is related to my second point: they gave epistemic privilege to what they called the four horses of the apocalypse (Mallon 1994; Rodrguez 2001), that is, Foucault, Derrida, Gramsci and Guha. Among the four main thinkers they privilege, three are Eurocentric thinkers while two of them (Derrida and Foucault) form part of the poststructuralist/postmodern Western canon. Only one, Rinajit Guha, is a thinker thinking from the South. By privileging Western thinkers as their central theoretical apparatus, they betrayed their goal to produce subaltern studies.

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Homogenizing Culture
( ) The ideas of national cultures are adopted and twisted by imperial powers to assert their dominance over those cultures seen as different Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13. Culture, in other words, created

national unity: national languages, national literature, national flag and anthem, etc. were all singular manifestations of a national culture. It served to name and institute the homogeneity of the nation-state. However, insofar as the term emerged in the nineteenth century when England and France were embarking on the second wave of colonial expansion, culture also served the colonial purpose of naming and describing those alien and inferior cultures that would be under European civilization. While European civilization was divided into national cultures, most of the rest of the population of the world would be conceived as having culture but not civilization. Latin Americans had a culture, created in part in complicity with the French ideologues of Latinidad, but not a civilization, since the ancient Aztec, Inca, and Maya civilizations were already consigned to a forgotten past. Consequently, Latin Americans were considered second-class Europeans who lacked the science and sophisticated history of Europe . During the Cold War that image was still in
place and it was extended to the entire Third World.

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Humanitarian Aid
First, The usage of humanitary aid allows the US to claim it is the savior of the world This props up state nationalism that is at the heart of reproductive heteronormativity Spivak 04, GayatriChakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9-11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. In the midst of what seemed to be a disastrous engagement with Iraq, I went back to reading Martin Luther King Jr.s Beyond Vietnam, the 1967 speech he delivered at Riverside Church in New York, a minutes walk from where I live now. Again and again in the text of the speech, I found Dr. King exhorting us to speak for those who have been designated as our enemies, because the human spirit [does not] move without great difficulty against all the apathy of conformist thought within ones own bosom and in the surrounding world. How do they judge us? King asked. When we ask why they do not leap to negotiate, these things must be remembered, he said. It was first in Hawaii that I was able to connect my efforts to imagine the suicide bomber with these exhortations. I spoke there of the fact that this resonance with Dr. Kings effort had received hostile responses from various persons and journals and this in itself was cause for alarm. I referred to the speech given in Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta on April 30, 1967, which contained these powerful words: Dont

let anybody make you think that God chose America as His divine messianic force to bea sort of policeman of the whole world. God has a way of standing before the nations with judgment, and it seems that I can hear God saying to America: You are too arrogant! If you dont change your ways, I will rise up and break the backbone of your power. I wondered
even as I repeated the apologia offered to Dr. Michael Bernetif these words applied to the curtailment of civil liberties, including intellectual freedom, the exacerbation of military permissiveness, the deformation of the polity through racial profiling, and the re- designing of the entire culture for the prevention of autoimmunity, of which I spoke in section 1.I

pointed out that we are now so used to the idea that it is the United States responsibility as the new Empire to police the world that we quibble over containment or war, war over oil as opposed to a just war, assassination as opposed to regime change. I shared with that
audience my comments, made to the then provost of Columbia University, after listening to a crazy debate on Iraq between Alan Dershkowitz and George P. Fletcher: I felt that I could not actually ask only a questionto an extent the response could not come from what the debaters had presented. It was pretty unsettling to hear It is sometimes better to do the right thing rather than the legal thing. This is of course the grounds for civil disobedience, but precisely because it is civil. We

cannot speak of states operating in this way. When it comes to state practice, it turns to vigilantism, precisely because there is no authority to disobey. I was also a bit unnerved that there were hands up
in the room for condoning the right to kill. Even one hand up for this is unnerving since we were not speaking of capital punishment, which I do oppose, but which at least can be discussed within an idea of law. It is not correct to think that, because inalienable rights have been again and again violated, they do not exist. Surely, the

difference between having torture warrants and having an individual policeman decide that torture was okay is that the latter can be punished if discovered! The problem with deciding in favor of legalized targeted
assassination is surely that if a covert targeted assassination is discovered, then, at least, in perhaps a utopian vision of the rule of law, such a thing can be retroactively punished? It was troublesome to see how a debate presumably on our right to invade Iraq turned into such a rhetorical tirade against Palestine. (Here I would want to use stronger words.) The repetitive condemnation of Palestinians showed no ability to imagine them in a material context where Israel figured as anything other than a good figure. This is where George Fletchers idea in Romantics at war, that romanticism was simply a variety of irrationalism, may be questionable.32 We must call the glass half full rather than half empty. Romanticism was a strike for a robust imaginationfor me, it is summarized in Shelleys remark, precisely in the context of the beginnings of capitalism, that we want the creative faculty to imagine that which we know.33 It

is the ability to imagine the other side as another human being, rather than simply an enemy to be psyched out, that is the greatest gift of romanticism. What I was saying the other day about the humanities comes in here, because this is the terrain where a solid grounding in the humanities allows one to think the
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spirit rather than the letter of the law, and not think of the imagination as mere unreason. Although I do think that Mike Davis, in his new book Dead Cities, is somewhat over the top, he certainly does
have a good deal of documented material that would not allow us to think that we are above the law because we will never be irresponsible with weapons of mass destruction.34 Not to mention Agent Orange! I grant that I am somewhat outside the grounds of the debate because historical experience makes me very uncomfortable with the pre-comprehended assumption on both sides that America should think of itself as having an imperial mandate. I admit that George Fletchers repeated assertion that there are no good or bad states, but equal states, can be read as a questioning of this pre-comprehension. It troubled me then that there were student hands up in that Law School auditorium condoning murder, albeit to be carried out by the state. This too is a coercive rearrangement of desire. And

such a possibility makes it necessary to call upon the robust imagination, once again, to undo the binary opposition between bad cop and good copand remember that they are both cops. The impulse to help by enforcing human rights, by giving things, giving money, commodifying literacy, ignoring genderconsciousness, has a relationship with the impulse to kill. I quote Kant: Although . . . there can still be legally good actions, [if] . . . theminds attitude is . . . corrupted at its root . . . the human being is designated as evil.35 Today, with the endorsement of the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, the backbone of the rule of law is broken.

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Human Rights Generic

***Use the Military/Human Rights Link for L*** First, Human Rights are co-opted by imperialists to enforce civilizing missions, reproducing the nation in a heteronormative fashion Spivak 2003 Guyatri, Interview with Milevska, Resistance that cannot be Recognized as
Such, Journal For Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol 2, No 2, Winter 2003
This is a very important question: the use of human rights as an alibi for self-styled moral entrepreneurs, the so called minoritariansubalternists. And this is completely like crazy talk, absurd to give them an alibi for, you know even in the old imperialism, not the very old, but this imperialism of the late nineteenth century and twentieth, you have this idea of a civilizing mission, now you have this moral enterprise, and it seems to me that human rights across the board is an alibi for this kind of intervention without any social contract, any democratic procedure, I know that the democratic procedure is too idealistic to think that there is anything in it but at least there is the vague possibility of a constitution to address whereas there is nothing in this civil social forum crowd that are out of the moral outrage and out of the forms of injustice from the UN countries in the name of human rights. They go out to intervene without any kind of real preparation, without earning the right because this doing .good. is quite important and is in fact on the same spectrum as George W. Bush going out to kill people to give them human rights. And because of this social forum of folks talking about sustainability there are connections to big trans-national agencies, the IMF, the World Bank, sometimes they don.t even know what it is and sometimes knowingly they think that this is good, that development is freedom, that I think is a very scary thing, so I do believe that although it is not bad to use human rights when it is appropriate, it is much more important, that is why I began by talking about re-inventing the abstract state as the .site of constitutionality in the global South.. It is much more important to think about this apartheid of people who have human rights in their hands and people who are always visiting Europe. I would refer the reader to read a piece of mine called .Rigthing Wrongs.. It is published by Oxford University Press in a book called: Human Rights, Human Wrongs. And I have asked ObradSavic to translate it and I hope that the readers would be able to read it. There I was trying to find alternatives for human rights as a general excuse for one group without a social contract intervening in all different kinds of ways in the rest of the world and then reducing the world into domestic politics like refugees and immigrants.

Second, Their concept of human rights is nonsense under heteronormativity Spivak 2003 Guyatri, Interview with Milevska, Resistance that cannot be Recognized as
Such, Journal For Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol 2, No 2, Winter 2003
G. S.: Yes that.s it. A

way of recognition that this human rights business is nonsense. Country after country was forced to sign this agreement - they are giving the carrot in which they are completely uninterested, but at the same time holding the stick. Here I am trying to merge my voice with yours. National liberation is O.K. when it is only a means, but once it becomes an end, there is no possibility of decolonization at all. In
this case it is obvious that US is treating Macedonia with contempt.

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Independence/Democracy
( ) Independence is not so independent Economic systems of domination still exist when states of Latin America are pushed into a lesser economic position as Western powers These new independent trade partners are merely being shaped into a new subordinate position, perpetuating the oppression of coloniality Rejecting this myth is key to truly progressing and solving the oppression Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

The mythology of the decolonization of the world obscures the continuities between the colonial past and current global colonial/racial hierarchies and contributes to the invisibility of coloniality today. For the last fifty years, peripheral states that are today formally independent, following the dominant Eurocentric liberal discourses (Wallerstein, 1991a; 1995), constructed ideologies of national identity, national development, and national sovereignty that produced an illusion of independence, development, and progress. Yet their economic and political systems were shaped by their subordinate position in a capitalist worldsystem organized around a hierarchical international division of labor
1995; Lander 1998; Quijano 1998; Mignolo 2000), constitute (Wallerstein, 1979; 1984; 1995). The multiple and heterogeneous processes of the world-system, together with the predominance of Eurocentric cultures (Said, 1979; Wallerstein, 1991b;

a global coloniality between European/EuroAmerican peoples and non-European peoples. Thus, coloniality is entangled with, but is not reducible to, the
international division of labor. The global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans and non-Europeans, is an integral part of the development of the

). In these postindependence times the colonial axis between Europeans/Euro-Americans and non-Europeans is inscribed not only in relations of exploitation (between capital and labor) and relations of domination (between metropolitan and peripheral states), but in the production of subjectivities and knowledge. In sum, part of the Eurocentric myth is that we live in a so-called post-colonial era and that the world and, in particular, metropolitan centers, are in no need of decolonization. In this conventional definition, coloniality is reduced to the presence of colonial administrations. However, as the work of Peruvian sociologist Anbal Quijano (1993, 1998, 2000) has shown with his coloniality of power perspective, we still live in a colonial world and we need to break from the narrow ways of thinking about colonial relations, in order to accomplish the unfinished and incomplete twentieth-century dream of decolonization. This forces us to examine new decolonial utopian alternatives beyond
capitalist world systems international division of labor (Wallerstein, 1983; Quijano, 1993; Mignolo, 1995 Eurocentric and Thirdworldist fundamentalisms.

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Identity Politics
First, Policies that use identity politics to at aiding marginalized groups are used to change the subalteran's life in a way that suits the needs of the globalized world, reproducing the problem and reproductive heteronormativity - empirically proven Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012 The construction of the postcolonial subject was to code the failure of decolonization as multiculturalism, in metropolitan space, to race, itself rewritten as a fantasmatic national identity as its subject. So if the first was class the second is race as multiculturecultural rights. Identitarian

politics succeeds insofar as class and gender remain subsumed to this notion of a national and postnational identity. The construction, on the other hand, of the globalized subject is through the manufacturing of a gender alliance. The female subject/agent of globalization often collectively legitimatizes itself in the name of a generalized ethical agenda. This is where she crosses the capital/culture aporia on the side of capital. Yet to work for global justice as a principle is as right a decision as to work for strategy-driven globalization. But the interests of globalization from above and from below cancel each other. This too contributes to the problem of thinking ethics for the other woman. In 1998, National
Geographic showed pictures of women saluting the male fieldworkers of the Grameen Bank as they vow not to have too many children. 13 Will mainstream feminism ever think critically of this model of cultural indoctrination, even as Grameen gets more savvy? Different officers of Women's World Banking repeatedly invoke Chandra Behn, a member of the celebrated Self Employed Women's Association or SEWA, as their legitimation. At the same time, they speak of opening "the huge untapped market of poor Southern women to the international commercial sector." When SEWA was founded in the early 1960s, Ela Bhatt, the founder, had no such ambition. "The World Bank's [Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest] ... appears to be narrowly focused on microlending as an end in itself. And the means to that end, critics charge, may do more damage to 'empowerment leaders' like SEWA than good." 14 This

was the placing of the poorest women of the South upon the spectral grid of finance capital. "Pay up every week or else" is once again the instrumentalization of body and the money-form in the interest of the abstract. SEWA had made the subaltern women co-operative owners of their own bank, precisely to bypass the predations of commercial capital as they started life changes: driving by strategy, not driven by crisis management. Under the initiator Ela Bhatt's fierce left-labor Gandhianism, the free-choice culturalidentity slot was anti-Fordist, hi-religious (Muslim/Hindu) worker's pride, which lasts to this day, although one senses a certain unease now, among the working-class Hindu women, in pronouncing the "la ilaha ... "-there is no God but God-the Muslim credo.

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International Law
( ) International law developed as a way to question what to do with irrational and lesser beings This epistemological framing embodies and perpetuates racism and coloniality that strips beings of value Mignolo 09 [Walter D., Duke University, Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity,
http://m1.antville.org/static/m1/files/walter_mignolo_modernologies_eng.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/26/13.

It is not common to think of international law as related to the making of modernity. I will argue in this section that international law (more exactly legal theology) contributed in the sixteenth century to the creation a creation demanded by the discovery of America of racial differences as we sense them today. What to do, Spanish legal theologians asked themselves, with the Indians (in the Spanish imaginary) and, more concretely, with their land ? International law was founded on racial assumptions: Indians had to be conceived, if humans, as not quite rational, although ready for conversion.28 Modernity showed up its face in the epistemic assumptions and arguments of legal theology to decide and determine who was what. Simultaneously, the face of coloniality was disguised under the inferior status of the invented inferior. Here you have a clear case of coloniality as the needed and constitutive darker side of modernity. Modernity/coloniality is articulated here on the ontological and epistemic differences: Indians are, ontologically, lesser human beings and, in consequence, not fully
rational.29

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Literature
First, The link is the aff's speech act and the values that it presents - each piece of literature has an implied reader who is forced to embrace the cultural values of the writer perpetuating globalization and the eradication of subalteran cultures This is the most basic form of reproductive heteronormativity Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012, PG 36-37 What is the basic difference between teaching a second language as an instrument of communication and teaching the same language so that the student can appreciate literature? It is certainly possible to argue that in the most successful cases the difference is not easy to discern. But there is a certain difference in orientation between the language classroom and the literature classroom. In the former, the goal is an active and reflexive use of the mechanics of the language. In the latter, the goal is at least to shape the mind of the student so that it can resemble the mind of the so-called implied reader of the literary text, even when that is a historically distanced cultural fiction. The figure of an implied reader is constructed within a consolidated system of cultural representation. The appropriate culture in this context is the one supposedly indigenous to the literature under consideration. In our case, the culture of a vague space called Britain, even England, in its transaction with Europeanness (meaning, of course, Western Europe), Hellenism and Hebraism, the advent of Euramericanism, the trendiness of Commonwealth literature, and the like. "Global English" was not yet a player. Our ideal student of British literature was expected so to internalize this play of cultural selfrepresentation that she would be able to, to use the terms of the most naive kind of literary pedagogy, "relate to the text," "identify" with it. However naive these terms, they describe the subtlest kind of cultural and epistemic transformation, a kind of upward racemobility, an entry, however remote, into a geo-political rather than merely national "Indian"-ness. It is from this base that R. K. Narayan can speak of "English in India" as if it were a jolly safari arranged by some better-bred version of the India Tourist Board and, conversely, it is also upon this base that a critical study of colonial discourse can be built.2 THE BURDEN OF ENGliSH 37 It is with this in mind that many decolonized intellectuals feel that the straightforward ideal of teaching English literature in the theater o~ ~ecolonization continues the process of producing an out-of-date, Bnttsh Council-style colonial bourgeoisie in a changed global context. I am not suggesting for a moment that, given the type of student who chooses English as a field of study in the general Indian context of social opportunity (whatever that might be), this kind of ideological produ~tion is successfully achieved. The demand for a "general cultural participant" in the colonies has at any rate changed with. the .dismantling o~ actual territorial imperialism. Today, the student of Enghsh literature who 1s there because no other more potentially lucrative course of study is open to him is alienated from his work in a particular way. To make him/her the subject of an "aesthetic education" is a peculiar problem. It cannot be ignored that there is a class-argument lurking here, although it is considerably changed from my student days in the mid- to late 1950s. The reasons why a person who obviously takes no pleasure in English texts chooses English honors are too complex to explore here. At any rate, the class-value of the choice of English honors is gendered, and is different according to the hierarchy of institutions-in the metropolitan, urban, suburban, and rural centers. The same taxonomy as it operates among students of English literature as a Pass (general subject rounding out the study of the Honors subject, or part of a non-honors general bachelor's degree) and the teacher's accommodation within it as Brit Lit become less and less normative, are much more demographically and politically interesting. I have not the skills to study it, and so will turn to a more literary-critical topic and return to the "implied reader." As the years have passed, it is on the subaltern elementary level that I have confronted the immense problem of the preparation for an aesthetic education. But I was not to know it then. The implied reader is imagined, even in the most simple reading, according to rudimentary or sophisticated hypotheses about persons, places, and times. You cannot make sense of anything written or spoken without at least implicitly assuming that it was destined for you, that you are its implied reader. When this sense of the latent destiny of the texts of a literary tradition is developed along disciplinary lines, even the students (mostly women) who come to English studies in a self-consciously purposive way-all students at Miranda House would have to be included here-might still be open, under the best circumstances, to an alienating cultural indoctrination that is out of step with the historical moment. This becomes all the more dubious when the best of them become purveyors of native culture abroad.

Second, The AFFs pedagogy allows for a logic in which certain values are excluded simply on the basis of the language used in conversation excluding the subalteran Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012, PG 42-43 Gordimer is playing a whole set of variations on the topos of languages as epistemes. To begin with, the imperious gesture, of the pronominal address as imperative: "you," but even before that, and surreptitiously, the sudden incursion of Mwawate's "inside" into the novel: "Go, he willed" (emphasis added). It remains paratactic-cannot be staged as becoming syntactic in the hands of this white author woman writing about a female white protagonist, precisely because both are painfully politically correct. The sentences can

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start only after that enabling shifter, "you," (staged by the writer as) pronounced by the imperfect speaker of English. Put this on a spectrum of contemporary artists using this topos in many different ways: Toni Morrison, J. M. Coetzee, Guillermo G6mez-Peiia, Jamelie Hassan.32 In the hands of a radical creole writer like Gordimer, the implied black reader of a white text cannot be in a subject-position, not even a compromised one like Shoshi's. The text belongs to the native speaker. But the rhetorical conduct of the text undermines and complicates this a lot. The desire of the radical native speaker is in that sentence: "She understood although she knew no word." How fragile the logic of that sentence is; there are no guarantees. It is as if the white magistrate in "the elder sister" should enunciate the desire for understanding Shoshi's ambivalence, which the writer as classed male colonial subject articulates by way of the representation of his slight smile. And in Gordimer's text there is the strong suggestion that rather than understand the "burden" of Mwawate's words, the peculiar situation of being addressed by him in his tongue produces in her an understanding of a narrative of, precisely, the infelicity of their communication. His measure was elsewhere. "He spoke i~ English what belonged in English." Just as Mwawate's subject-space is syntactically inaccessible in the rhetoric of the novel, so is the dubious assertion of "understanding" unmoored from the passage that tells you what she understood. And, in addition, the man speaking his mother tongue-the other tongue from English-is deliberately distanced by a metonym with nature: Mwawate flickering, adjacent to the moon and the parachute silk clouds. Put this on a spectrum with the neat divisive locatives of nature and mind in Binodini's selfstaging!

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Marx/Capitalism Ks
First, Anti-capitalist movements inevitably fall into a socialization of the female body, abstracting labor This specter haunts the worker and removes their subjectivity from the world Their alternative works in a system that reproduces itself again and again in the subconscious and the continuation of their system Spivak 95 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Ghostwriting, Jcook.)
I would expand this, by

way of a Marxist theorization of reproductive engineering and population control, as the socialization of reproductive labor-power, not "the feminization of labor." (The nonexhaustive taxonomy that such a theorization has allowed me, tentatively, to
formalize in the classroom I offer here in shorthand, in the hope that Marxist-feminists active in global economic resistance will be able to reproduce the analysis. But will they be interested in Specters of Marx? At any rate, here

is the shorthand taxonomy of the coded discursive management of the new socialization of the reproductive body: (1)reproductive rights (metonymic substitution of the abstract average subject of rights for woman's
identity); (2)surrogacy (metaphoricsubstitutionof abstract average reproductive labor power as fulfilled female subject of motherhood); (3) transplant (displacement of eroticism and generalized presupposed subject of immediate affect); (4) population control (objectification of the female subject of exploitation to produce alibis for hypersize through demographic rationalization); (5) post-Fordist homeworking (classical coding of the spectrality of reason as empiricist individualism, complicated by gender ideology). It is only after a discussion of a possible taxonomy of the recoding of this socialization that I would describe the theatre of global resistance where these issues are now paramount.)' According, then, to the strictest Marxian sense, the

reproductive body of woman has now been "socialized"-computed into average abstract labor and thus released into what I call the spectrality of reason-a specter that haunts the merely empirical, dislocating it from itself. According to Marx, this is the specter that must haunt the daily life of the class conscious worker, the future socialist, so that she can dislocate him/herself into the counterintuitive average partsubject (agent) of labor, recognize that, in the everyday, es spukt. It is only then that the fetish character of labor-power as commodity can be grasped and can become the pivot that wrenches capitalism into socialism [discussed at greater length in Spivak, Outside 107 ff.]. (It wasn't Freud alone-as Glas insists-who speculated with the fetish.) Marx did indeed ignore something: that the differantial play between capital-ism and social-ism was a case of a more originary agon: between self and other; a differantiation perhaps necessary for the business of living, a differantiation that may be
described as the fort-da of the gift of time in the temporizingof l i~es .~(Fomre , the genius of Derrida is that he leads me to think this as no one else can, even if he perhaps goofs a bit by putting Marx down as a closet idealist about "empirical" actuality, although canny about the idealism of idealism [SM 2251.) That originary agon comes clearest in the coding-the figuration-- of birth and childrearing. (Once I finish this piece, I must get on with a commentary on Melanie Klein's teasing out of this coding ["Melanie Klein"].) Reproductive labor is being socialized and "freed." (The Columbia Spectator apparently ran an ad offering high prices for the unfertilized ova of students. Chickens have supplied this commodity without consent or remuneration for some time now. In Marxian terms, domesticated poultry is instrurnentum demi-vocale, domesticated human females caught in feudal patterns of loyalty (elaborately coded by psychoanalysis asdeep-structural) are insh-umenta vocale, and the students are "free lab~r . " ) 'A~s reproductive

labor is socialized and "freed," it will be unable to ignore that agon, for the commodity in question is children. If this labor were to use the fetish-character of itself as (reproductive) labor-power (as commodity) pharmakonically to bring about gender-neutral socialism in its traffic, equitable by need and capacity, from a common fund, would that be just? The issue is not simply to weigh in
the balance the painless donation of sperm for sperm banks as opposed to the possibly painful donation of eggs for the hatcheries, as television discussions invariably emphasize."

Since Specters of Marx cannot bring in women, I

will not pursue this further here.

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Mexican Borders
( ) Borders are a microcosm for US-Mexico relationship One of Eurocentric, Occidental coloniality towards the lesser Mexico
Olivia Wood, 9-13-2010, Year 3 Single Honours American and Canadian Studies, An Investigation into Exploitation of the Mexican Female Body along the U.S.-Mexico Border, http://www.womenontheborder.org/documents/OliviaWooddissertation.pdf, p. 53-59, CP Effect on Womens Bodies: Rape as a weapon of War261 Falcn

and others have likened border militarization to low-intensity-conflict (LIC) military doctrine, which involves using non-military bodies adopting military tactics, targeted at civilian populations,262 and is typically accompanied with a lack of government accountability.263 One effect has been to justify the use of violence when apprehending or detaining immigrants as a necessary tactic of war. 264 Furthermore, Falcn suggests that the execution of LIC doctrine can create a climate conducive to rape.265 This is because, inspired by a discourse and policy that constructs Mexican migrants as a threat to national security, the Border Patrol espouses an us versus them philosophy
particularly become 266

that infuses their encounters

with migrants

with hostility.
a nation

Moreover,

this contributes to the construction of a racialized enemy (the immigrant) that has associated with womens bodies, which symbolize (Mexico). 267 Thus, although men too frequently encounter violence with border personnel, womens bodies in particular represent conflict between the U.S. and Mexico. Rape powerfully symbolizes their unequal colonial relationship , as male bodies (American) are used to conquer (physically and symbolically) sexualized and racialized female bodies (Mexican).
Falcn concludes therefore that rape

is a weapon of war: a hegemonic tool employed by the

U.S. to wield power and control over Mexico. 268 This practice is systematic, as cases are not random or isolated, but often planned and institutionally supported. 269A final factor contributing to Border Patrol rape is the climate of hyper-masculinity within the organization fostered by militarization. This is due to the overwhelming male dominance of INS personnel and the masculinized nature of military doctrine and practice traditionally.270 Violence takes on a gendered dimension when male officers target the weakest, most exploitable group (women). By raping women, men demonstrate the power of the nation through physical domination, while simultaneously reaffirming their masculinity, gratifying their sexual desires by abusing Mexican womens bodies. Thus patriarchy, hyper-masculinity, nativism, and colonialism have all helped induce an environment conducive to rape at the Mexican border. Case Studies Below I provide two examples of Border Patrol rape to show
how the U.S.s politics of immigration affects the lives of real women traversing the border. Juanita Gmez: On 3 September 1993, twenty-two-year-old Juanita

Gmez and her female cousin, Ana, crossed through a hole in the fence between Nogales, Sonora, and Nogales, Arizona.271 After meeting two male friends at a McDonalds on the U.S. side, the group was apprehended by Border Patrol agent, Larry Dean Selders. The officer detained the two women in his vehicle, where he asked them if they had papers, which they did not.272 He then threatened to take them to the station for processing and deportation to Mexico if they would
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not have sex with him.273 The women declined Selders proposition, following which he allegedly instructed Ana to get out of the truck, and . . . drove away with Juanita, subsequently raping her.274 Afterwards, Juanita went to the Mexican Consulate, where Ana had already reported her kidnapping. Both women identified Selders in a photo lineup; however, the detectives did not believe either of the womens statements.275 They also assert that one detective inquired if they were prostitutes and threatened them with imprisonment.276 Juanita
recalls: They treated me as if I were guilty of something, not a victim.277 Human Rights Watch reports that from the begin ning, the handling and investigation of the case indicated incompetence and bias.278 Important

evidence was lost, such as Selders clothes, as police incompetence meant he was not picked up for questioning until after 6 P.M., more than three hours after Juanita reported her rape.279
Also, police reportedly seized the wrong Border Patrol vehicle, and held it for a week and a half before they realized their mistake, thereby ensuring that all meaningful evidence was destroyed.280 Selders remained employed with the agency until he negotiate d a no-contest plea of the lowest class of felony available, sentenced to only one year in prison, and paroled after six months.281 The case remained under review by federal prosecutors however and Selders later pleaded guilty to charges of civil rights violations.282 His sentence

was only fourteen months imprisonment and he received credit for time served (awaiting trial).283 Maria: Maria was stopped by Border Patrol officer, Luis Esteves in Calexico, California, on 16 December 1989.284 Esteves asked to see her papers and then invited her on a date that evening, which she cautiously accepted. Maria reports that shortly after picking her up that evening, Esteves lured her to his home so he could change his clothes, soon after which he told her she had to have sex with him.285 Fearful for her life as Esteves had positioned a gun on each side of the bed, Maria complied.286 She later
recounted that Esteves forced an object into her vagina, placed his hands into various parts of her body, orally copulated h er and forced her to have intercourse with him.287 However Maria did not show up to the preliminary hearing and consequently the charges were dropped.288 Esteves

resumed active duty as an agent289 until he was arrested in 1992 after allegedly raping another woman, found guilty on three counts of felonious sexual misconduct, and sentenced to twenty-four years in prison.290 However he appealed and was acquitted on all charged in
December 1994.291 Esteves actually had a history of violence against women, with past domestic violence allegations and a reputation of problematic behavior toward women early in his career.292 Falcn asserts that the INS is partially to blame f or allowing Esteves to commit multiple acts of violence against women by failing to conduct a thorough background check bef ore hiring him.293 Conclusion The

case studies illustrate many elements of Border Patrol rape. First, they highlight the systematic nature of abuses, as both demonstrated an element of planning. Juanita, for example, claimed Selders had seen the girls crossing through the fence initially, but waited until later to apprehend them.294 Second, they reveal that rape is institutionally supported: in Juanitas case as police incompetence and indifference both hindered the investigation and undermined the integrity of her story. The disturbingly short sentences served by both men, and the fact they continued working as agents until their convictions, also raises alarming questions regarding the conduct of justice. Furthermore, all three
reports which I have consulted denounce the INS for inadequate prevention and redress of abuses against border-crossers. Particular issues of concern are: the substandard complaints system for reporting abuses;295 poor training of new officers;296 lack of an independent review staff;297 an environment of intimidation, discouraging victims from coming forward;298 and

a code of silence within the agency, deterring officers from testifying against one another.299 Third, both men exploited their power as law-enforcement officers and the womens converse vulnerability as (potentially) undocumented migrants (although Maria did have papers), in Juanitas case, threatening her with deportation. This shows the discourse of U.S. imperialism in practice; the American male in power exploiting the Mexican womans inferior legal status through the sexual degradation of her body. Lastly, it is also interesting that a detective in Juanitas case invoked the morality (prostitution) discourse; used as a tool of power both within maquiladoras to objectify women, and in the official
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rhetoric surrounding the murders in Ciudad Jurez to justify the crimes. This shows that U.S. personnel have also been influenced by the discourse, which propagates a degraded moral image of Mexican women in the border, and justifies the violence and sexual oppression they face. It is clear, therefore, that the INS and Border Patrol are in need of serious reform to address the corruption and impunity that continues to permit violence against women and abuses against people of Latin origin in general at the border.
Despite taking some steps towards reform in response to pressure from human rights organizations, for example forming a Citizens Advisory Panel,300 many of the suggested initiatives have not been implemented and the abuses continue.301 Thus it is doubtful that the Border Patrol is living up to the standards it has proclaimed: professionalism, honor, integrity, [and] re spect for human life.302

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Military/ Military Bases

( ) The US use of military basis and military expansion is merely the driving force of modern coloniality, attempting to assert dominance over the colonial world, in the form of the aff Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13.

Some would say (mainly before the 9/11 attacks on the US) that the US was not an imperial country because it has no colonies like those of Spain or England. This opinion, however, confuses colonialism with having colonies in the sense of maintaining the physical presence of institutions, administrators, and armies in the colonized country or region. And it confuses also colonialism with coloniality. Coloniality is the logic of domination in the modern/ colonial world, beyond the fact that the imperial/colonial country was once Spain, then England and now the US. Modern technology, alongside political and economic restructuring in the second half of the twentieth century, has made it unnecessary to colonize in the old, more obvious, manner. Still, the US does in fact maintain military bases in strategic parts of the world (e.g., the Middle East and South America). Likewise, the occupation of Iraq and consequent pressure by the US for the appointment of a government favorable to imperialist power reflects a clear method of colonialism today. After 9/11, liberal voices in the US began to recognize that imperialism was necessary; but, being liberals, they called it reluctant The Americas, Christian Expansion, and Racism or light imperialism. No matter what it is called, imperialism implies colonialism in some form, as it is difficult to imagine any empire without colonies, even if colonies take different shapes at different points in history.4

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Military Intervention/Human Rights LA

( ) Today, the West imposes influence and control on Latin American nations through military intervention and the idea of influencing countries for the pursuit of human rights while denying the humanity of the people we seek to help. This reifies coloniality throughout the places we attempt to influence Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. The imposition of Christianity in order to convert the so-called savages and barbarians in the 16th century, followed by the imposition of white mans burden and civilizing mission in the 18th and 19th century, the imposition of the developmentalist project in the 20th century and, more recently, the

imperial project of military interventions under the rhetoric of democracy and human rights in the 21st century, have all been imposed by militarism and violence under the rhetoric of modernity of saving the other from its own barbarianisms. Two responses to the Eurocentric colonial imposition are third world nationalisms and fundamentalisms. Nationalism provides Eurocentric solutions to an Eurocentric global problem. It reproduces an internal coloniality of power within each nation-state and reifies the nation-state as the privileged location of social change (Grosfoguel 1996). Struggles above and below the nation-state are not considered in nationalist political strategies. Moreover, nationalist responses to global capitalism reinforce the nationstate as the political institutional form per excellence of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system. In this sense, nationalism is complicit with Eurocentric thinking and political structures. On the other hand, Third World fundamentalisms of different kinds respond with the rhetoric of an essentialist pure outside space or absolute exteriority to modernity. They are anti-modern modern forces that reproduce the binary oppositions of Eurocentric thinking. If Eurocentric thinking claims democracy to be a
Western natural attribute, Third World fundamentalisms accept this Eurocentric premise and claim that democracy has nothing to do with the non-West. Thus, it is an inherent European attribute imposed by the West. Both deny the fact that many of the elements that we call today to be part of modernity such as democracy were form in a global relation between the West and the non-West. Europeans

took a lot of its utopian thinking from the nonWestern historical systems they encounter in the colonies and appropriated them as part of Eurocentered modernity. Third World fundamentalisms respond to the imposition of Eurocentered
modernity as a global/imperial design with an anti-modern modernity that is as Eurocentric, hierarchical, authoritarian and antidemocratic as the former.

( ) The use of military interventions doesnt right the wrongs done It allows a justification for new violence in the name of the state guts solvency Spivak 04 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, Righting Wrongs.) (https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/engl-218-fall2010/files/Righting-Wrongs.pdf. JCook.) Accessed 8/13/12.

When the UN offers violence or the ballot as a choice it is unrealistic because based on another kind of relatedmistakeunexamined universalism the assumption that this is a real choice in all situations. It will soon lead to military intervention in the name of righting wrong, in geopolitically specific places. For democratization is

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not just a code name, as it so often is in practice, for the political restructuring entailed by the transformation of (efficient through inefficient to wild) state capitalisms and their colonies to tributary economies of rationalized global financialization. If it is to involve the largest sector of the electorate in the global Souththe rural population below poverty levelit requires the undoing of centuries of oppression, with a suturing education in rural subaltern normality, supplementing the violent guilt and shame trips of disaster politics.

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Military Intervention Generic

First, The use of military interventions doesnt right the wrongs done It allows a justification for new violence in the name of the state guts solvency and props up reproductive heteronormativity Spivak 04 (GayatriChakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, Righting Wrongs.) (https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/engl-218-fall2010/files/Righting-Wrongs.pdf. JCook.) Accessed 8/13/12.

When the UN offers violence or the ballot as a choice it is unrealistic because based on another kind of relatedmistakeunexamined universalism the assumption that this is a real choice in all situations. It will soon lead to military intervention in the name of righting wrong, in geopolitically specific places. For democratization is not just a code name, as it so often is in practice, for the political restructuring entailed by the transformation of (efficient through inefficient to wild) state capitalisms and their colonies to tributary economies of rationalized global financialization. If it is to involve the largest sector of the electorate in the global Souththe rural population below poverty levelit requires the undoing of centuries of oppression, with a suturing education in rural subaltern normality, supplementing the violent guilt and shame trips of disaster politics.

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NAFTA/ TFAA/ ALCA

( ) As Argentina proves, integration into new, Western led economic plans like __the aff__ act counterproductively on these countries involved. They lead to military action, violence, fascism, dehumanization and the worst effects of coloniality Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 7/3/13. 2. It

is clear by now that the Argentinean crisis was caused not by insufficient integration into the global economy but rather because of an excess of it. Even dutifully following the neo-liberal advise of the IMF or homegrown economists did not save this important country from a profound crisis. Why cant we dare to imagine the unaimaginable, that Argentina could have a better chance by stepping somewhat outside and beyond imperial globality, rather than staying fully within it? Can partial
delinking selective delinking and selective reengagementoffer an alternative path, perhaps at the level of world regions (e.g, Southern Cone), or network of world regions? This means that it would be possible to rethink the proposal of delinking introduced by Samir Amin in the 1970s to fit the new conditions.10 Needless to say, everything

seems to militate against this possibility. The proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA, as it is known in Latin America and FTAA as it is known in North America) is being pushed forward with considerable force by the United States and most Latin American leaders. And of course any country or region that dares to attempt a path of autonomy is bound to incur the ire of empire, risking military action. This is why opposition against ALCA is today indelibly linked to opposition against militarism by most activist organizations. These are just two examples of the kind of macro thinking that while not radical, could create better conditions for the struggle against imperial globality and global coloniality. If approached from this vantage point, they are likely to contribute to advance the idea that other worlds are possible. The social movements of the past decade are, in effect, a sign that this struggle is already under way. Imagining after the Third World could become a more integral part of the imaginary of these movements; this would involve, as we saw, imagining beyond modernity and the regimes of economy, war, coloniality, exploitation of people and nature, and social fascism it has brought about in its imperial global incarnation.

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Nationalism I/L
First, Nationalism uses reproductive heteronormativity as a source of legitimacy Its in every pore of reproducing the nation as its main goal Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.)
As I was growing up, then, I realized that nationalism

was related to reproductive heteronormativity as source of legitimacy. As I moved to the United States and became active around the world, I realized that the alibi for transnational agencies backed explicitly by exceptionalist nationalism( s) was nationalism in the developing world. Gender was an alibi here even for military intervention in the name of humanitarian intervention. I believe with Eric Hobsbawm that there is no nation before nationalism although I do not locate nationalism as he does in the late 18th century (Hobsbawm, 1990). When and how does the love of mother tongue, the love of my little corner of ground become the nation thing? I say nation thing rather than nationalism because something like nations, collectivities bound by birth, that allowed in strangers gingerly, have been in existence long before nationalism came around. State formations change, but the nation thing moves through historical displacements and I think Hannah Arendt was altogether perceptive in suggesting that the putting together of nationalism with the abstract structure of the state was an experiment or a happening that has a limited history and a limited future. We are living, as Habermas says, in postnational situations. Well see.

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Natural Resources
( ) The use and development of Latin America for the use of cheap labor and resources is the embodiment of subjugation through new means, a coloniality based perspective that works to maintain modern imperalism Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13.

You can still see the same projects today in the appropriation of areas of natural resources (e.g., in the Amazon or oil-rich Iraq). Land cannot be reproduced. You can reproduce seeds and other products of land; but land itself is limited, which is another reason why the appropriation of land is one of the prime targets of capital accumulation today. The idea of Latin America is that of a large mass of land with a wealth of natural resources and plenty of cheap labor. That, of course, is the disguised idea. What the rhetoric of modernity touted by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Washington consensus would say is that Latin America is just waiting for its turn to develop. You could also follow the exploitation of labor from the Americas to the Industrial Revolution to the movement of factories from the US to developing nations in order to reduce costs. As for financial control, just compare the number and
size of banks, for example, in New York, London, or Frankfurt, on the one hand, versus the ones in Bolivia, Morocco, or India, on the other.

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Omission
First, tag Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
Pierre Macherey provides the following formula for the interpretation of ideology: 'What

is important in a work is what it does not say. This is not the same as The careless notation 'what it refuses to say,' although that would in itself be interesting: a method might be built on it, with the task of measuring silences, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged. But rather this, what the work cannot say is important, because there the elaboration of the utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence."47 Macherey's ideas can be developed in directions he
would be unlikely to follow. Even as he writes, ostensibly, of the literariness of the literature of European provenance, he

articulates a method applicable to the social text of imperialism, somewhat against the grain of his own argument. Although the notion "what it refuses to say" might be careless for a literary work, something like a collective ideological refusal can be diagnosed for the codifying legal practice of imperialism. This would open the field for a political economic and multidisciplinary ideological reinscription of the terrain. Because this is a "worlding of the world" on a second level of abstraction, a concept of refusal becomes plausible here. The archival,
historiographic, disciplinary-critical, and, inevitably, interventionist work involved here is indeed a task of "measuring silences."

This can be a description of "investigating, identifying, and measuring ... the deviation" from an ideal that is irreducibly differential. . When we come to the concomitant question of the consciousness of the subaltern the notion of what the work cannot say becomes important. In the semioses of the social text, elaborations of insurgency stand in the place of "the utterance." The sender-"the peasant"-is marked only as a
pointer to an irretrievable consciousness. As for the receiver, we must ask who is "the real receiver" of an "insurgency?" The histonan, transforming "insurgency" into "text for knowledge," is only one "receiver" of any collectively intended social act.

With no possibility of nostalgia for that lost origin, the historian must suspend (as far as possible) the clamor of his or her own consciousness (or consciousness-effect, as operated by dI~cIphn~ry training), so that the elaboration of the insurgency, packaged with an insurgent-consciousness, does not freeze into an object of investigation, or, worse yet, a model for imitation. "The subject" implied by the texts of insurgency can only serve as a counterpossibility for the narrative sanctions granted to the colonial subject in the dominant groups. The postcolonial intellectuals learn that their privilege is their loss. In this they are a paradigm of the intellectuals. It is well known that the notion of the feminine (rather than the
subaltern of imperialism) has been used in a similar way within deconstructive criticism and within certain varieties of feminist criticism.48 In the former case, a figure of "woman" is at issue, one whos~ minir:n~l predication as indeterminate is already available to the phallocentnc tradItl<:m. Subaltern

historiography raises questions of method that would prevent It from using such a ruse. For the "figure" of woman, the relationship betweer: woman and silence can be plotted by women themselves; race and class dIfferences are subsumed under that charge. Subaltern historiography must confront the impossibility of such gestures. The narrow epistemi.c violence o.f imperialism gives us an imperfect allegory of the general VIOlence that IS the possibility of an episteme.49 Within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced. The
question is not of female participation in insurgency, or the ground rules of the sexual division of.labor, for both of which there is "evidence." It is, rather, that, both as object of colonialist historiography and as subject. of insurg~ncy, the ideological co.nstruction of gender keeps the male dommant. If,

in the context of colonial production, the

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subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow.

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Problem Regions
( ) The pursuit of the West to help Latin American nations is merely an attempt to hide the responsibility the West has for creating the conditions seen in the region. This rhetoric of underdevelopment and economic intervention into these problem regions perpetuate the growing domination of coloniality Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political
Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. Although the dependentistas struggled against these universalist/Occidentalist

forms of knowledge, they perceived this knowledge as a superstruture or an epiphenomenon of some economic infrastructure. Dependentistas never perceived this knowledge as constitutive of Latin Americas political-economy. Constructing peripheral zones such as Africa and Latin America as regions with a problem or with a backward stage of development concealed European and Euro-American responsibility in the exploitation of these continents. The construction of pathological regions in the periphery as opposed to the socalled normal development patterns of the West justified an even more intense political and economic intervention from imperial powers. By treating the Other as underdeveloped and backward, metropolitan exploitation and domination were justified in the name of the civilizing mission.

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Public Intellectual
First, The claim that specific people have a key role in any movement to stop oppression, or that this is the only way reproduces the nation again and again around the world, solving every problem and crisis This institutes a reproductive heteronormativity on all politics Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9-11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. JCook.

The stereotype of the public intellectual, from Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek International to Christopher Hitchens, the freelance British gadfly, would offer statements describing US policy, coming out promptly in response to every crisis. This is undoubtedly worthy, often requiring personal courage, but it is not a response. It enhances the charisma of the intellectual and produces in the reader a feeling of being in the thick of things. This type of cognitive mapping, heavily dependent upon the fieldwork of frontline investigative journalists and humble gatherers of statistics, legitimates by reversal the idea that knowledge is an end in itself, or that there is a straight line from knowing to doing politics as human rights or street theater. But to respond means to resonate with the other, contemplate the possibility of complicitywrenching consciousnessraising, which is based on knowing things, however superficially, from its complacency. Response pre-figures change. Reading Aristotle and Shelley, students typically ask, What is the difference between prediction and pre-figuration?
The difference is, negatively, in the intending subjects apparent lack of precision, in the figure; positively, it is the figures immense range in time and space. The figure disrupts confidence in consciousness-raising. That

is the risk of a response that hopes to resonate through figuration. When we confine our idea of the political to cognitive control alone, this does not just avoid the risk of response, it closes off response altogether. We end up talking to ourselves, or to our clones abroad. Predictably, on Left and Right, you lose support when you stop us-andthem-ing, when you take away the unself-critical convenience of doing good or punishing.

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Regulations
( ) Regulations are the crux of colonial modernity pushing forward against change to the economic systems of control This destroys solvency for modern problems, by using the system that creates these problems The only way to solve the aff and coloniality is to move away from this system Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. Boaventura de Sousa Santos has forcefully made the argument that we

are moving beyond the paradigm of modernity in two senses: epistemologically, and sociopolitically. Epistemologically, this move entails a transition from the dominance of modern science to a plural landscape of knowledge forms. Socially, the transition is between global capitalism and emergent forms of which we only have glimpses in todays social movements and events such as the World Social Forum. The crux of this transition, in Santos rigorous conceptualization, is an untenable tension between modernitys core functions of social regulation and social emancipation., in turn related to the growing imbalance between expectations and experience. Intended to
guarantee order in society, social regulation is the set of norms, institutions and practices through which expectations are stabilized; it is based on the principles of state, market, and community. Social emancipation challenges the order created by regulation in the name of a different ordering; to this end, it has recourse to aesthetic, cognitive-scientific, and ethical rationalities. These two tendencies have become increasingly contradictory, resulting in ever more noticeable excesses and deficits, particularly with neo-liberal globalization. The management of these contradictions chiefly at the hands of science and lawis itself in crisis.

The result has been the hyper-scientificization of emancipation (all claims to a better society have to be filtered through the rationality of science), and the hypermarketization of regulation (modern regulation is ceded to the market; to be free is to accept market regulation), and, indeed, a collapse of emancipation into regulation.
Hence the need for a paradigmatic transition that enables us to think anew about the problematic of regulation and social emancipation, with the ultimate goal of de-Westernizing social emancipation (Santos, 2002: 1-20). To this end, a new approach to social theory, oppositional postmodernism, is called for (2002: 13, 14): The conditions that brought about the crisis of modernity have not yet become the conditions to overcome the crisis beyond modernity. Hence the complexity of our transitional period portrayed by oppositional postmodern theory:

we are facing modern problems for which there are

no modern solutions.

The search for a postmodern solution is what I call oppositional postmodernism . What is

necessary is to start from the disjunction between the modernity of the problems and the postmodernity of the possible solutions, and to turn such disjunction into the urge to ground theories and practices capable of reinventing social emancipation out of the wrecked emancipatory promises of modernity.2 Santos thus points at an other paradigm, distinct from modernity, even if still not fully visible, that make imagining beyond modernity plausible. His reading of modernity builds on various readings of capitalism, distinguishing between those that posit an end to capitalism, even if in the very long run (e.g. Wallersteins analysis of Kondratieff cycles, 2000), and which thus advocate for transformative practices; and those that conceive of the future as so many metamorphoses of capitalism, and who favor adaptive strategies within capitalism (e.g., Castells, 1996; see Santos, 2002: 165-193). For this latter group, one

may say that globalization is the last stage of capitalist modernity; for the former, globalization is the beginning of something new. As we shall see shortly, the Latin American modernity/coloniality perspective would suggest that transformative practices are taking place now , and need to be socially amplified.

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Rememoration
First, The reproductive drive of nations becomes embedded in our subconciousness, in our cultural lives, and drive us to further this reproductive heteronormativity Their claims of remembering the horror we all faced in the past is a rememoration project that attempts to embed the nation in our cultural memories Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.)
The nationalism I have been describing operates

in the public sphere. But the subaltern affect where it finds its mobilizing is private, though this possibility of the private is not derived from a sense of the public, an underived private, which is very difficult for Europe to think. Women, men and queers are not necessarily divided along the public-private line everywhere. I have already let slip that nationalism is a recoding of this underived private as the antonym of the public sphere. When you begin to think nationalism this underived private has been recoded, reterritorialized as the antonym of the public. Then it is as if it is the opposite of the public. This shift is historical, of course, but it is also
logical. The subaltern folks I am talking about are in our present, but kept pre-modern. I will not rehearse here the mostly Hegelian historical story of the emergence of the public sphere. In whatever nationalist colors it is dressed, whether chronological or logical, the

impulse to nationalism is we must control the workings of our own public sphere. The reclaiming of the past is in that interest. Sometimes nationalism leads to the
resolve to control others public spheres, although this is not a necessary outcome. With this comes the necessary though often unacknowledged sense of being unique and, alas, better its a quick shift because born this way. Every diasporic feels a pull of somewhere else while located here. If we consider the model of exogamous marriage with reference to that sentence, we might have to revise the entire city/country model implicit in Metropolis, and think that the women in gendering have always shared this characteristic with what we, today, have learnt to call "Diaspora", even when it doesn't have much of a resemblance with what happened so long ago in Alexandria. And yet, metonymized as nothing but the birth-canal, woman is the most primitive instrument of nationalism. I have here offered a reading of nationalism that allows us to see why, although

nationalism is the condition and effect of the public sphere, nationalisms are not able to work with the founding logic of the public sphere: that all reason is one. It is secured by the private conviction of special birth and hops right from the underived private comfort which is no more than a thereness in ones corner. If nationalism secures itself by an appeal to the most private, democracy in its most convenient and ascertainable form is secured by the most trivially public universal each equals one. That flimsy arithmetic, unprotected by rational choice, can also be manipulated by nationalism. I am not convinced that the story of human movement to a greater control of the public sphere is necessarily a
story of progress. The religion/science debate makes this assumption, forgetting that the imagination, forgetting that literature and the arts, belong neither to reason, nor to unreason. That literature and the arts can support an advanced nationalism is no secret.

They join them in the task of a massive rememoration project, saying we all suffered this way, you remember, this is what happened, you remember, so that history is turned into cultural memory. Literature can then join in the task of a massive counterrememoration project suggesting that we have all passed through the same glorious past, the same grand national liberation battles, the same religious tolerance or whatever. I am going to suggest by the end of this
because sometimes I am misunderstood that the literary imagination can impact on de-transcendentalized nationalism. That is not what I am discussing here. I am supporting the clich that imagination feeds nationalism, and going forward toward the literary imagination and teaching the humanities, through the teaching of the humanities to prepare the readerly imagination to receive the literary and thus go beyond the self-identity of nationalism toward the complex textuality of the international. I will come to that later.

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Representation
First, The affirmatives genealogy enacts the same representational and epistemological violence that they hope to confront. The affirmative conflates two senses of the word representation. First, Representation as in direct proxy or political representation. And second, re-presentation as in painting a portrait. When they conflate the two senses, they create a static, unified, whole Other, from which we can learn or know the truth of the situation or experience. There is no one concrete experience of the Other from which we can base a genealogy or a politics. The affirmatives genealogy engages in this problematic representational strategy that erases their own subject position and political interest and creates violent essentialist utopian politics. This turns case. Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, A critique of postcolonial reason: toward a history of the vanishing present)
An important point is being made here: the

production of theory is also a practice; the opposition between abstract "pure" theory and concrete "applied" practice is too quick and easy.93 But Deleuze's articulation of the argument is problematic. Two senses of representation are being run together: representation as "speaking for," as in politics, and representation as "re-presentation," as in art or philosophy. Since theory is also only "action," the theoretician does not represent (speak for)the oppressed group. Indeed, the subject is not seen as a representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately). These two senses of representation-within state formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subjectpredication, on the other-are related but irreducibly discontinuous. To cover over the discontinuity with an analogy that is presented as a proof reflects again a paradoxical subject-privileging. 94 Because "the person who speaks and acts ... is always a multiplicity," no "theorizing intellectual ... [or] party or ... union" can represent "those who act and struggle" (FD 206). Are those who act and struggle mute, as opposed to those who act.and speak (FD 206)? These immense problems are buried in the differences between the "same" words: consciousness and conscience (both conscience in French), representation and re-presentation. The critique of ideological subjectconstitution within state formations and systems of political economycan now be effaced, as can the active theoretical practice of the "transformation of consciousness." The banality of leftist intellectuals'
lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent. If such a critique and such a project are not to be given up, the shifting distinctions between representation within the state and political economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the other, must not be obliterated. Let us consider the play of vertreten ("represent" in the first sense) and darstellen ("re-present" in the second sense) in a famous passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where Marx touches on "class" as a descriptive and transformative concept in a manner somewhat more complex than Althusser's distinction between class instinct and class position would allow. This is important in the context of the argument from the working class both from our two philosophers and "political" third-world feminism from the metropolis.Marx's

contention here is that the descriptive definition of a class can be a differential one-its cutting off and difference from all other classes: "in so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that cut off their mode of life, their interest, and their formation from those of the other classes and place them in inimical confrontationfftindlichgegeniiberstellen], they form a class.
"95 There is no such thing as a "class instinct" at work here. In fact, the collectivity of familial existence, which might be considered the arena of "instinct," is discontinuous with, though operated by, the differential isolation of classes. In this context, one far more pertinent to the France of the 1970s than it can be to the international periphery, the formation of a class is artificial

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and economic, and the economic agency or interest is impersonal because it is systematic and heterogeneous. This agency or interest is tied to the Hegelian critique of the individual subject, for it marks the subject's empty place in that process without a subject which is history and political economy. Here the capitalist is defined as "the conscious bearer [Triiger] of the limidess movement of capital." My point is that Marx

is not working to create an undivided subject where desire and interest coincide. Class consciousness does not operate toward that goal. Both in the economic area (capitalist) and in the political (world-historical agent), Marx is obliged to construct models of a divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other. A celebrated passage like the description of capital as the Faustian
monster brings this home vividly. 96 The following passage, continuing the quotation from The EighteenthBrumaire, is also working on the structural principle of a dispersed and dislocated class subject: the (absent collective) consciousness of the small peasant proprietor class finds its "bearer" in a "representative" who appears to work in another's interest. "Representative" here does not derive from darstellen; this sharpens the contrast Foucault andDeleuze slide over, the contrast, say, between a proxy and a portrait.There is, of course, a relationship between them, one that has received political and ideological exacerbation in the European tradition at least since the poet and the sophist, the actor and the orator, have both been seen as harmful. In the guise of a post-Marxist decription of the scene of power, we

thus encounter a much older debate: between representation or rhetoric as tropology and as persuasion. Darstellen belongs to the first constellation, vertreten-with stronger suggestions of substitution- to the second. Again, they are related, but running them together, especially in order to say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and know for themselves, leads to an essentialist, utopian politics that can, when transferred to single-issue gender rather than class, give unquestioning support tQ4-the :financialization of the globe, which ruthlessly constructs a general will in the credit-baited rural woman even as it "format"s her through UN Plans of Action so that she can be "developed." Beyond this concatenation, transparent as rhetoric in the service of "truth" has always made itself out to be, is the much-invoked oppressed subject (as Woman), speaking, acting, and knowing that gender in development is best for her. It is in the shadow of this unfortunate marionette that the history of the unheeded subaltern must unfold. Second, This representational politics and movement uncritically buy into the valuesystem that groups and systems use for the oppressive and hurtful purposes you try to stop Turns case Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12.

A deconstructive approach does not seek essences behind the historical, social and linguistic processes that produce meaning but rather investigates these genealogies. The practice of representation has to be made explicit and the problems involved in seeing language as just a means of referring to objects or things "outside it" has to be repeatedly remembered. The two senses of representation ("speaking for" and representation as staging) become relevant here. If representation as "speaking for" somebody, as being a proxy for (within the state and the political) and representation as theoretical description, as a staging of the world, as a portrayal of oneself and the other are complicit and if this complicity, when unexplicated, produces silences and hegemonies, the only way to appreciate this dynamic is to deconstruct these kinds of operations (Spivak, 1994: 70, 72). The staging of the world produces the problem of political intersectionality and structural intersections call for proxy politics. [16] The very production of categories such as "woman" is a political act and we need not see that these productive representational practices are

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"necessary" to further politics that would become possible "after" the category is produced. The politics of representation is the first thing to take seriously within critical equality discourse. Otherwise it falls into a nave identity politics where "women," "working-class," "transsexual," "lesbian," and various other categories are utilized to enable a "politics of rights" and representation for insurrectionary subjects. The insurrectionary subject needs its proxies. Although it can be argued that this might be helpful for some "groups" somewhere, I do not wish us to settle for this. In a neoliberal vein we circulate a language that "takes into account" identities such as class, ethnicity, sexuality without an epistemological (genealogical) awareness of our own academic representational practice. We uncritically buy into the very same value-system that is used by conservative regimes for oppressive purposes. We help produce the problem of political intersections.

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Resources/Markets
***Markets*** ( ) Control of coloniality has shifted from direct imperial control to indirect macroeconomics, such as markets, creating new systems of control that replicate the same problems and violence ***Resources*** ( ) Control of coloniality has shifted from direct imperial control to indirect macroeconomics, such as markets, creating new systems of control that replicate the same problems and violence The pursuit of resources is the lifeblood of this system Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13.

The new empire thus operates not so much through conquest, but through the imposition of norms (free-markets, US-style democracy and cultural notions of consumption, and so forth). The former Third World is, above all, the theatre of a multiplicity of cruel little wars which, rather than barbaric throwbacks, are linked to the current global logic. From Colombia and Central America to Algeria, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East these wars take place within states or regions, without threatening empire but fostering conditions favorable to it.
For much of the former Third World (and of course to the Third World within the core) is reserved the World-chaos (107), freemarket slavery, and selective genocide. In some cases, this amounts to a

sort of paleo-microcolonialism within regions (157), in others to balkanization, in yet others to brutal internal wars and massive displacement to free up entire regions for transnational capital (particularly in the case of oil, but also diamonds, timber, water, genetic resources, and agricultural lands). Often times these cruel little wars are fueled by Mafia networks, and intended for macro-economic globalization. It is clear that this new Global Empire (the New World Order of the American imperial monarchy, p. 171) articulates the peaceful expansion of the free-market economy with omnipresent violence in a novel regime of economic and military globality in other words, the global economy comes to be supported by a global organization of violence and vice versa (200). On the subjective side, what increasingly one finds in the Souths (including the South within the North) are diced identities and the transformation of cultures of solidarity into cultures of destruction.

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Social Redistribution/ Economic Restructuring

First, Economic restructuring and social redistribution inherently lie at nationalism heart, making the new economic system as the ultimate state priority. The philanthropia of the state comes down to all the people, subjugating them and making the reproduction of the nation a top priority, retrenching us in reproductive heteronormativity and gutting solvency by only working for the nations good, ignoring other possible, more effective options Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.) Economic re-structuring, as we know, removes barriers between national and international capital so that the same system of exchange can be established globally. Put so simply, there need not be anything wrong with it. Indeed, this was the fond hope of that long-lost mirage, international socialism. But the individual states are themselves in such a predicament that their situation should be transparent. Mere nationalism, ignoring that economic growth is not automatic redistributive justice, can lead us astray here. Theatrical or philanthropic wholesale counter- or alter-globalism, whatever that might be, the demonstrations at Seattle or Genoa, are not guarantees of redistributive justice either. It has long been my view, especially as a feminist, that even liberationist nationalisms should treat a seamless identity as something thrust upon them by the opposition. In this context, Edward W. Saids rejection of the two-state solution in Palestine is
exemplary. Even before the advent of economic re-structuring, anyone working in the areas I spoke of could have told you that constitutional sanctions do not mean much there. But now, with

state priorities increasingly altered, redistributive justice through constitutionality is less and less easy if not impossible. Philanthropy is now coming top-down from the international civil society; the state is being de facto (and sometimes de jure) un-constitutional, because it is asked to be managerial and take free market imperatives; Human Rights Watch notices it and then the philanthropic
institutions intervene. We in the South cannot usually engage constitutionally to achieve much how can Habermas (1992) speak about constitutional patriotism, sitting in Germany, in a post-national world? It

is unmindful of the current status of globality. As for patriotism, even more than nationalism, it is an affect that the abstract structure of a functioning state harnesses largely for defense: Dulce et decorum est pro patria
mori. I am back humming that childhood song from Mebar Patan, composed in gallant yet ideologically tarnished national liberationism: take up arms! It

is this effortful task, of keeping the civic structure of the state clear of nationalism and patriotism, altering the redistributive priorities of the state, creating regional alliances, rather than going the extra-state or non-government route alone, that the new
comparative literature, with its alliances with the social sciences, can work at ceaselessly. I think feminist teachers of the humanities have a special role here. For

behind this rearrangement of desires the desire to win in the name of a nation is the work of de-transcendentalizing the ruse of analogizing from the most private sense of unquestioning comfort to the most ferocious loyalty to named land, a ruse that uses and utilizes the axioms of reproductive heteronormativity. Emmanuel Levinas for example offers us the ruse as the establishment of a norm
the feminine establishing home as home leading to the masculine exchange of language which inexorably led, for Levinas, to a politics of a most aggressive nation-statism, anchored in a myth of identitarianism long predating the historical narrative of the rise of nations (Levinas, 1969: 154-156).

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Speech Act Theory

First, Tag Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.)
Cavell writes: "For me it

is evident that the reign of repressive philosophical systematizingdepended upon the suppression of the human voice. It is as the recovery of this voice (as from an illness) that ordinary language philosophy is . . . to be understood" (p. 173). errida admires this project and relates it to Nietzsche's attention to the force of language rather than its signification alone. What Derrida critiques is what Cavell seems to be showing here: the tendency common to most radical philosophies, including speech-act theory, to perceive their task as the restoration of voice. The systematic philosophies, on the
sometimes called metaphysics, sometimes called logical analysis-has other hand, although their aura seems to be altogether mediated and therefore akin to the common understanding (here Cavell's) of writing, develop systems which depend

upon phonocentrism as their final reference. Thus the commonsense perception-that systematic philosophies suppress and radical philosophies restore voice-depends upon varieties of phonocentric assumptions. "Writing" in this view becomes the name for that which must be excluded so that the interiority of a system can be defined and guarded. "The essential predicate of [the] specific difference" between writing and the field of voice is seen in such a reading as "the absence of the sender [and] of the receiver (destznateur), from the mark that he abandon^."^ The place of such an understanding of writing within a self-professed project of the restoration of speech should be clear. Writing as the name of that which must be excluded as the other in order to conserve the identity of the same can be related to Macherey's other formulation: "What is important in the work is what it does not say. This is
not the same as the careless notation 'what it refuses to say,' although that would in itself be interesting. . . . But rather than this, what the work cannot say is important because there the elaboration of the journey is acted out, in a sort of journey to silence."It is not surprising that, within a definition of writing as a deliberate withholding of voice, the one sense of "turn"- in Thoreau's "You only need sit still long enough in some attractive spot in the ~voods that all its inhabitants may exhibit themselves to you by turns"-that Cavell does not (cannot?) mention is "trope," the irreducible turn of figuration that is the condition of (im)- possibility of any redemption of voice. It

is in terms of saving the freely choosing subject whose concept insinuates itself into the most radical commun(al)ist politics of collectivity that Said uses bcriture as a code word suggesting (I cannot be sure, since the word hangs unexplained on the borders of his essay) linguistic reductionism at a second remove. The thumbnail explanation of bcr~turea s the excluded other that I have given above would have helped his general argument: "A principle of silent exclusion operates within and at the boundaries of discourse; this has now become so internalized that fields, disciplines, and their discourses have taken on the status of immutable durability" (p. 16).

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Terrorism
( ) The fear of terrorism is the newest move in coloniality No one, except those people working in the interest of the US are good, and everyone is a ambiguously drawn terrorist Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. Some partial conclusions: Coloniality

incorporates colonialism and imperialism but goes beyond them; this is why coloniality did not end with the end of colonialism (formal independence of nation states), but was re-articulated in terms of the post-World War II imaginary of three worlds (which in turn replaced the previous articulations in terms of Occidentalism and Orientalism). Similarly, the end of the Third World entails a rearticulation of the coloniality of power and knowledge. As we have seen, this rearticulation takes the form of both imperial globality (new global link between economic and military power) and global coloniality (the emergent classificatory orders and forms of alterization that are replacing the Cold War order). The new
coloniality regime is still difficult to discern. Race, class and ethnicity will continue to be important, but new, or newly prominent, areas of articulation come into existence, such as religion (and gender linked to it, especially in the case of Islamic societies, as we saw for the war on Afghanistan). However, the

single most prominent vehicle of coloniality today seems to be the ambiguously drawn figure of the terrorist. Linked most forcefully to the
Middle East, and thus to the immediate US oil and strategic interests in the region (vis vis the European Union and Russia, on the one hand, and China and India in particular on the other, as the most formidable potential challengers), the

imaginary of the terrorist can have a wide field of application (it has already been applied to Basque militants and Colombian guerrillas, for instance). Indeed, after 9/11, we are all potential terrorists, unless you are American, White, conservative Christian, and Republican in actually or epistemically (that is, in mindset). ( ) The category terrorist means that there's an every present threat of terrorism, so there's a constant need for counter-terrorism, and war and peace become indistinguishable This blurring of peace and war is the epitome of how Western states continue their control over life, a coloniality of modernity This turns the root of their impacts Spivak 04 [Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9-11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 7/3/13, JCook.] I have been trying to open up that abstractionterrorto figure out some possibilities. During these efforts, it has seemed increasingly clear to me that terror

is the name loosely assigned to the flip side of social movementsextra-state collective actionwhen such movements use physical violence. (When a state is named a terrorist state, the intent implicit in the naming is to withold state status from it, so that, technically, it enters the category of extra-state collective action.)20 Terror is, of course, also the name of an affect. In the policy-making arena, terror as social movement and terror as affect come together to provide a plausible field for group psychological speculation. The social movement is declared to have psychological identity. In other words, making terror both civil and

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natural provides a rationale for exercising psychological diagnostics, the most malign ingredient of racism. I have neither the training nor the taste for such exercises. But I must still say that in the case of terrorsliding imperceptibly into terrorismas social movement, the word is perhaps no more than an antonymfor war, which names legitimate violence, but also, paradoxically, for peace. And here we could wander in the labyrinth where war and peace become interchangeable terms, although the status of war as agent and peace as object never wavers. We have come to acceptthe oxymoron: peacekeeping forces. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees and Save
the Children-UK, in a report of February 2002, asked peacekeeping missions to stop trafficking in women and girl children. Feminists agitate against the sexually rapacious behavior of peacekeeping personnel. 21 The scandal of rape within the US Army is now well known. At the same time, Barbara Crossette offers the conventional wisdom, in an article entitled How to Put a Nation Back Together Again, that fastermoving armies are necessary.22 Here is the usual division between the various spheres of discourse, but they work within the same cultural imaginary, this time almost global: Conquering armies violate women. Where terror is an affect, the line between agent and object wavers. On the one hand,

the terrorists terrorize a community, fill their everyday with terror. But there is also a sense in which the terrorist is taken to be numbed to terror, does not feel the terror of terror, and has become unlike the rest of us by virtue of this transformation. When the soldier is not afraid to die, s/he is brave. When the terrorist is not afraid to die, s/he is a coward. The soldier kills, or is supposed to kill, designated persons. The terrorist kills, or may kill, just persons. In the space between terrorism as a social movement and terror as affect, we can declare victory. Although civil liberties, including intellectual freedom, are curtailed, and military permissiveness exacerbated, although racial profiling deforms the polity and the entire culture redesigns itself for prevention, and although, starting on September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council adopts
wide-ranging antiterrorism measures, we can still transfer the register to affect and say, We are not terrorized, we have won. And the old topos of intervening for the sake of women continues to be deployed. It is to save Afghan women from terror that we must keep the peace by force of arms. I

want to distinguish the suicide bomber, the kamikaze pilot, from these received binaries. ( ) Actions taken in response to terrorism are at the heart of all reproductive heteronormative drives Spivak 04 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9 -11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. JCook.)

The war on the Taliban, repeatedly declared on media by representatives of the United States government from the president on down, was only a war in the general sense. Not having been declared by act of Congress, it could not assume that proper name. And even as such it was not a response to war. The detainees at Guantanamo Bay, as we have been repeatedly reminded by Right and Left, are not prisoners of war and cannot be treated according to the Geneva Convention (itself unenforceable) because, as Donald Rumsfeld says, among other things, they did not fight in uniform.2 The US is fighting an abstract enemy: terrorism. Definitions in Government handbooks, or UN documents, explain little. The war is part of an alibi every imperialism has given itself, a civilizing mission carried to the extreme, as it always must be. It is a war on terrorism reduced at home to due process, to a criminal case: US v. Zacarias Moussaoui, aka
Shaqil, aka Abu Khalid al Sahrawi, with the nineteen dead hijackers named as unindicted co-conspirators in the indictment. This is where I can begin: a war zoomed down to a lawsuit and zoomed up to face an abstraction. Even

on the most

general level, this binary opposition will no longer stand. For the sake of constructing a response,

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however, a binary is useful. To repeat, then, down to a case, up to an abstraction. I cannot speak intelligently about the law, about cases. I am not responsible in it. I turn to the abstraction: terror-ism.

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Totalizing Lens
First, tag Spivak 99 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
I have dwelt so long on this passage in Marx because it spells out the inner dynamics of Vertretung, or representation in the political context. Representation

in the economic context is Darstellung, the philosophical concept of representation as staging or, indeed, signification, which relates to the divided subject in an indirect way. The most obvious passage is well known: "In the exchange relationship
[Austauschverhaltnisj of commodities their exchange-value appeared to us totally independent of their use-value. But if we subtract their use-value from the product of labour, we obtain their value, as it was just determined [bestimmtj. The common element which represents itself [sich darstelltj in the exchange relation, or the exchange value of the commodity, is thus its value."21 According to Marx, under capitalism, value, as produced in necessary and surplus labor, is computed as the representation/sign of objectified labor (which is rigorously distinguished from human activity). Conversely, in

the absence of a theory of exploitation as the extraction (production), appropriation, and realization of (surplus) value as representation of labor power, capitalist exploitation must be seen as a variety of domination (the mechanics of power as such). "The thrust of
Marxism," Deleuze suggests, "was to determine the problem [that power is more diffuse than the structure of exploitation and state formation] essentially in terms of interests (power is held by a ruling class defined by its interests)" (FD, 214).

One

cannot object to this minimalist summary of Marx's project, just as one cannot ignore that, in parts
of the Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari build their case on a brilliant if "poetic" grasp of Marx's theory of the money form. Yet

we might consolidate our critique in the following way: the relationship between global capitalism (exploitation in economics) and nation-state alliances (domination in geopolitics) is so macrological that it cannot account for the micrological texture of power. To move toward such an accounting one must move toward theories of ideology-of subject formations that micrologically and often erratically operate the interests that congeal the macrologies. Such theories cannot afford to overlook the category of representation in its two senses. They must note how the staging of the world in representation-its scene of writing, its Darstellung-dissimulates the choice of and need for "heroes," paternal proxies, agents of power Vertretung. My view is that radical practice should attend to this double session of representations rather than reintroduce the individual subject through totalizing concepts of power and desire. It is also my view that, in keeping the area of class practice on a second level of abstraction, Marx was in effect keeping open the (Kantian and) Hegelian critique of the individual subject as agent.22 This view does not oblige me to ignore that, by implicitly defining the family and the mother tongue as the ground level where culture and convention seem nature's own way of organizing "her" own subversion, Marx himself rehearses an ancient subterfuge.23 In the context of poststructuralist claims to critical practice, this seems more recuperable than the clandestine
restoration of Subjective essentialism.

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Trade
( ) The development of export economies of trade coincide with the most recent form of modernity in Latin America, a form of Eurocentric control that continues and intensifies current postcolonial trends Salvatore 10 [Ricardo D., Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality:
A Historians Point of View, Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 2010, 332-348, www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

The notion of modernity as understood in Coloniality at Large reflects a similar ambivalence as the concept of coloniality. Its temporality is opaque and its very nature remains imprecisely defined. Historians could agree with the effect of colonialism in Spanish and Portuguese America, but not necessarily with the view that the persistence of colonial forms and structures prevented the adoption of European modernity. One could argue that late 19th and early 20th century modernity continued and probably intensified the marginalization and objectification of indigenous peoples in Latin America. But few would want to defend the similarity between 16th century Spanish colonialism and the period of export economies, railroads, banks, and
modernist novels. In other words, historians are likely to resist the homogenization into a single polarity (modernity/coloniality) of different types or waves of modernity. The modernity that the ABC nations (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) evoked at the time of their first centenary was neither the first modernity of the sixteenth century, nor the second modernity of the Enlightenment. It

was already a completely altered configuration that we might call a third modernity,
the product of the second wave of technological innovations, influenced by currents of thought such as evolutionism, positivism, and literary modernism. This was a civilizational project in which progress was endowed with transformative potency greater than that granted by Enlightenment thinkers or Romantic writers. On

the economic terrain this type of modernity coincided with the emergence of export-economies in the region, a process that generated an intense integration into the world economy in terms of flows of capital, labor, and technology. It is not clear to me to what extent the concept of
modernity/coloniality reflects appropriately this moment of rapid transformations that some Latin American republics experienced ca.1880 and 1930.

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Universal Knowledge/Prescriptions
( ) The view of knowledge as separate and detached from the person is a symptom of Western ideology and thought. This is illogical to detach the subject from the view of knowledge they hold, epistemologically indicting the entirety of their aff AND It detaches the view of people as having personhood, perpetuating the view of subaltern groups as lesser and false Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. Ren Descartes, the founder of Modern Western Philosophy, inaugurates a

new moment in the history of Western thought. He replaces God, as the foundation of knowledge in the Theopolitics of knowledge of the European Middle Ages, with (Western) Man as the foundation of knowledge in European Modern times. All the attributes of God are now extrapolated to (Western) Man. Universal Truth beyond time and space privileges access to the laws of the Universe, and the capacity to produce scientific knowledge and theory is now placed in the mind of Western Man. The Cartesian Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) is the foundation of modern Western sciences. By producing a dualism between mind and body and between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim nonsituated, universal, God eyed view knowledge. This is what the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro Gmez called the point zero perspective of Eurocentric philosophies (Castro-Gmez 2003). The point zero is the point of view that hides and conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of view, that is, the point of view that represents itself as being without a point of view. It is this god-eye view that always hides its local and particular perspective under an abstract universalism. Western philosophy privileges ego politics of knowledge over the geopolitics of knowledge and the body-politics of knowledge. Historically, this has allowed Western man (the gendered term is intentionally used here) to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal consciousness, and to dismiss non-Western knowledge as particularistic and, thus, unable to achieve universality.

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US Key
First, The calls for the US to solve every problem reproduces the nation again and again around the world, solving every problem and crisis This institutes a reproductive heteronormativity on all politics Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9 -11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. JCook.

The stereotype of the public intellectual, from Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek International to Christopher Hitchens, the freelance British gadfly, would offer statements describing US policy, coming out promptly in response to every crisis. This is undoubtedly worthy, often requiring personal courage, but it is not a response. It enhances the charisma of the intellectual and produces in the reader a feeling of being in the thick of things. This type of cognitive mapping, heavily dependent upon the fieldwork of frontline investigative journalists and humble gatherers of statistics, legitimates by reversal the idea that knowledge is an end in itself, or that there is a straight line from knowing to doing politics as human rights or street theater. But to respond means to resonate with the other, contemplate the possibility of complicitywrenching consciousnessraising, which is based on knowing things, however superficially, from its complacency. Response pre-figures change. Reading Aristotle and Shelley, students typically ask, What is the difference between prediction and pre-figuration?
The difference is, negatively, in the intending subjects apparent lack of precision, in the figure; positively, it is the figures immense range in time and space. The figure disrupts confidence in consciousness-raising. That

is the risk of a response that hopes to resonate through figuration. When we confine our idea of the political to cognitive control alone, this does not just avoid the risk of response, it closes off response altogether. We end up talking to ourselves, or to our clones abroad. Predictably, on Left and Right, you lose support when you stop us-andthem-ing, when you take away the unself-critical convenience of doing good or punishing.

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Western Criticism/Subject
First, Their criticism confines the decentering of the subject to the subject of the West, which problematizes the non-Western other as real and knowable. It makes it impossible to confer with the subaltern in a discursive practice, which assumes that the subject is always already the subject of the West. This turns the K by issuing a new ____their bad thing___ and guts solvency, which reinstituting an essentialist subject of the Other Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.) Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as SUbject. The theory of pluralized "subject-effects" gives an illusion of undermining SUbjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the
history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has "no geo-political determina-tions." The

much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. I will argue for this conclusion by considering a text by two
great practitioners of the critique: "Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. "3 I have chosen this friendly exchange between two activist philosophers of history because it undoes the opposition between authoritative theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, enabling one to glimpse the track of ideology. The participants in this conversation emphasize the most important contributions of French poststructuralist theory: first, that the networks of power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive-a persistent critique is needed; and second, that intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society's Other. Yet the two systematically ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual and economic history. Although one of its chief presuppositions is the critique of the sovereign subject, the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze is framed by two monolithic and anonymous subjects-in-revolution: "A Maoist" (FD, 205) and "the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). Intellectuals, however, are named and differentiated; moreover, a

Chinese Maoism is nowhere operative. Maoism here simply creates an aura of narrative specificity, which would be a harmless rhetorical banality were it not that the innocent appropriation of the proper name "Maoism" for the eccentric phenomenon of French intellectual "Maoism" and subsequent "New Philosophy" symptomatically renders "Asia" transparent.4Deleuze's reference to the workers' struggle is equally problematic; it is obviously a genuflection: "We are unable to touch [power] in any point of its application without finding ourselves confronted by this diffuse mass, so that we are necessarily led ... to the desire to blow it up completely. Every partial revolutionary attack or defense is linked in this way to the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). The apparent banality signals a disavowal. The statement ignores the international division of labor, a gesture that often marks poststructuralist political theory.5 The invocation of the workers' struggle is baleful in its very innocence; it is incapable of dealing with global capitalism: the sUbject-production of worker and unemployed within nation-state ideologies in its Center; the increasing subtraction of the working class in the Periphery from the realization of surplus value and thus from "humanistic" training in consumerism; and the large-scale presence of paracapitalist labor as well as the heterogeneous structural status of agriculture in the Periphery. Ignoring the international division of labor; rendering "Asia" (and on occasion "Africa") transparent (unless the subject is ostensibly the "Third World"); reestablishing the legal subject of socialized capital-these are problems as common to much poststructuralist as to structuralist theory. Why should such occlusions be sanctioned in precisely those intellectuals who are our best

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prophets of heterogeneity and the Other? The link to the workers' struggle is located in the desire to blow up power at any point of its application. This site is apparently based on a simple valorization of any desire destructive of any power. Walter Benjamin comments on Baudelaire's comparable politics by way of quotations from Marx: Marx continues in his description of the conspirateurs de profession as follows: " ... They

have no other aim but the immediate one of overthrowing the existinggovernment, and they profoundly despise the more theoretical enlightenment of the workers as to their class interests. Thus their angernot proletarian but plebian-at the habits noirs (black coats), the more or less educated people who represent [vertretenjthat side of the movement and of whom they can never become entirely independent, as they cannot of the official representatives [Reprasentantenjof the party." Baudelaire's political insights do not go fundamentally beyond the insights of these
professional conspirators .... He could perhaps have made Flaubert's statement, "Of all of politics I understand only one thing: the revolt," his own.6

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Omission
First, tag Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
Pierre Macherey provides the following formula for the interpretation of ideology: 'What

is important in a work is what it does not say. This is not the same as The careless notation 'what it refuses to say,' although that would in itself be interesting: a method might be built on it, with the task of measuring silences, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged. But rather this, what the work cannot say is important, because there the elaboration of the utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence."47 Macherey's ideas can be developed in directions he
would be unlikely to follow. Even as he writes, ostensibly, of the literariness of the literature of European provenance, he

articulates a method applicable to the social text of imperialism, somewhat against the grain of his own argument. Although the notion "what it refuses to say" might be careless for a literary work, something like a collective ideological refusal can be diagnosed for the codifying legal practice of imperialism. This would open the field for a political economic and multidisciplinary ideological reinscription of the terrain. Because this is a "worlding of the world" on a second level of abstraction, a concept of refusal becomes plausible here. The archival,
historiographic, disciplinary-critical, and, inevitably, interventionist work involved here is indeed a task of "measuring silences."

This can be a description of "investigating, identifying, and measuring ... the deviation" from an ideal that is irreducibly differential. . When we come to the concomitant question of the consciousness of the subaltern the notion of what the work cannot say becomes important. In the semioses of the social text, elaborations of insurgency stand in the place of "the utterance." The sender-"the peasant"-is marked only as a
pointer to an irretrievable consciousness. As for the receiver, we must ask who is "the real receiver" of an "insurgency?" The histonan, transforming "insurgency" into "text for knowledge," is only one "receiver" of any collectively intended social act.

With no possibility of nostalgia for that lost origin, the historian must suspend (as far as possible) the clamor of his or her own consciousness (or consciousness-effect, as operated by dI~cIphn~ry training), so that the elaboration of the insurgency, packaged with an insurgent-consciousness, does not freeze into an object of investigation, or, worse yet, a model for imitation. "The subject" implied by the texts of insurgency can only serve as a counterpossibility for the narrative sanctions granted to the colonial subject in the dominant groups. The postcolonial intellectuals learn that their privilege is their loss. In this they are a paradigm of the intellectuals. It is well known that the notion of the feminine (rather than the
subaltern of imperialism) has been used in a similar way within deconstructive criticism and within certain varieties of feminist criticism.48 In the former case, a figure of "woman" is at issue, one whos~ minir:n~l predication as indeterminate is already available to the phallocentnc tradItl<:m. Subaltern

historiography raises questions of method that would prevent It from using such a ruse. For the "figure" of woman, the relationship betweer: woman and silence can be plotted by women themselves; race and class dIfferences are subsumed under that charge. Subaltern historiography must confront the impossibility of such gestures. The narrow epistemi.c violence o.f imperialism gives us an imperfect allegory of the general VIOlence that IS the possibility of an episteme.49 Within the effaced itinerary of the subaltern subject, the track of sexual difference is doubly effaced. The
question is not of female participation in insurgency, or the ground rules of the sexual division of.labor, for both of which there is "evidence." It is, rather, that, both as object of colonialist historiography and as subject. of insurg~ncy, the ideological co.nstruction of gender keeps the male dommant. If,

in the context of colonial production, the

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subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow.

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Impacts

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Fascism
( ) The result of coloniality, especially when applied to economics of developing nations, is the development of financial fascism A system that subjugates entire nations in the process of globalization Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13.

One of the main consequences, for Santos, of the collapse of emancipation into regulation is the structural predominance of exclusion over inclusion. Either because of the
exclusion of many of those formerly included, or because those who in the past were candidates for inclusion are now prevented from being so, the problematic of exclusion has become terribly accentuated, with ever growing numbers of people thrown into a veritable state of nature. The

size of the excluded class varies of course with the centrality of the country in the world system, but it is particularly staggering in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The result is a new type of social fascism as a social and civilizational regime (p. 453). This regime, paradoxically, coexists with democratic societies, hence its novelty. This fascism may operate in various modes: in terms of spatial exclusion; territories struggled over by armed actors; the fascism of insecurity; and of course the deadly financial fascism, which at times dictates the marginalization of entire regions and countries that do not fulfill the conditions needed for capital , according to the IMF and its
faithful management consultants (pp. 447-458). To the former Third World corresponds the highest levels of social fascism of these kinds. This

is, in sum, the world that is being created by globalization from above, or hegemonic globalization.

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Racism/Domination
( ) Coloniality exists as a matrix of different dominating factors Race, politics, and world economics This multiplicity of different systems creates the world order that labels people as inferior and superior, often based on race This is the controlling impact in the debate Race controls every system in the world Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

It is not an accident that the conceptualization of the world-system from decolonial perspectives of the South will question its traditional conceptualizations produced by thinkers from the North. Following Peruvian Sociologist Anbal Quijano (1991; 1998; 2000), we could conceptualize the present world-system as a historical-structural heterogeneous totality with a specific power matrix that he calls a colonial power matrix (patrn de poder colonial). This matrix affects all dimensions of social existence such as sexuality, authority, subjectivity and labor (Quijano 2000). The sixteenth century initiates a new global colonial power matrix that by the late nineteenth century came to cover the whole planet. Taking a step further from Quijano, I conceptualize the coloniality of power as an entanglement or, to use U.S. Third World Feminist concept, intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989; Fregoso 2003) of multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies (heterarchies) of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation where the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European/non-European divide transversally reconfigures all of the other global power structures . What is new in the coloniality of power perspective is how the idea of race and racism becomes the organizing principle that structures all of the multiple hierarchies of the world-system (Quijano 1993). For example, the different forms of labor that are articulated to capitalist accumulation at a world-scale are assigned according to this racial hierarchy; coercive (or cheap) labor is done by non-European people in the periphery and free wage labor in the core. The global gender hierarchy is also affected by race: contrary to pre-European patriarchies where all women
were inferior to all men, in the new colonial power matrix some women (of European origin) have a higher status and access to resources than some men (of non-European origin). The

idea of race organizes the worlds population into a hierarchical order of superior and inferior people that becomes an organizing principle of the international division of labor and of the global patriarchal system. Contrary to the
Eurocentric perspective, race, gender, sexuality, spirituality, and epistemology are not additive elements to the economic and political structures of the capitalist world-system, but an integral, entangled and constitutive part of the broad entangled package called the European

modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system (Grosfoguel 2002). European Judeo-Christian patriarchy and European notions of sexuality, epistemology and spirituality were globalized and exported to the rest of the world through the colonial expansion as the hegemonic criteria to racialize, classify and pathologize the rest of the worlds population in a hierarchy of superior and inferior races. This conceptualization has enormous
implications that I can only briefly mention here: 1) The old Eurocentric idea that societies develop at the level of the nation-state in terms of a linear evolution of modes of production from pre-capitalist to capitalist is overcome. We are all encompassed within a capitalist world-system that articulates different forms of labor according to the racial classification of the worlds population (Quijano 2000; Grosfoguel 2002). 2) The old Marxist paradigm of infrastructure and superstructure is replaced by a historicalheterogeneous structure (Quijano 2000), or a heterarchy (Kontopoulos 1993), that is, an entangled articulation of multiple hierarchies, in which subjectivity and the social imaginary is not derivative but constitutive of the structures of the world-system

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(Grosfoguel 2002). In this conceptualization, race

and racism are not superstructural or instrumental to an overarching logic of capitalist accumulation; they are constitutive of capitalist accumulation at a world-scale. The colonial power matrix is an organizing principle involving exploitation and domination exercized in multiple dimensions of social life, from economic, sexual, or gender relations, to political organizations, structures of knowledge, state institutions, and households (Quijano 2000). ( ) Racism is the direct result of colonliality Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13.

The complex articulation and disarticulation of diverse histories for the benefit of one, the history of the discoverers, conquerors, and colonizers, left to posterity a linear and homogeneous concept of history that also produced the idea of America. But in order for one history to be seen as primary, a system of classification to marginalize certain knowledges, languages, and beings needs to be in place. Thus, colonization and the justification for the appropriation of land and the exploitation of labor in the process of the invention of America required the simultaneous ideological construction of racism. The emergence of the Indians in the European consciousness, the simultaneous expulsion of the Moors and Jews from the Iberian peninsula in the late fifteenth century, and the redefinition of the African Blacks in slavery prompted a specific classification and ranking of humanity. The presumptuous model of ideal humanity on which it was based was not established by God as a natural order, but according to the perception of Christian, White, and European males. The geo- and body politics of knowledge were hidden and sublimated into an abstract universal coming from God or from the transcendental ego. Consequently, the geo-politics and body politics of knowledges that unfolded from the borders of imperial experiences in the colonies (that is, imperial/colonial experiences) offer not only a new and distinct epistemology (i.e., border
epistemology), but also a perspective from which to analyze the limits of the regional universalizing of understanding based on both theology and egology (i.e., theo- and ego-politics of knowledge). The

overall classification and ranking of the world do not just reveal a reality out there, in the world, that they reflect, like in a mirror. They also hide the fact that such classification and ranking are valid only from a given perspective or locus of
enunciation the geohistorical and bio-graphical experience of the knowing subject of the philosophical principles of theology,

the historical experiences of Western Christians, and the way of looking at the world as a male.

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Violence
***ALSO HEGE LINK*** ( ) The new form of imperialism and control is economic, but the same violent, warmongering effects take place, destroying entire nations, and subjugating all who are in the countries the US tries to economically engage Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. Before moving on, it

is important to complete this rough representation of todays global capitalist modernity by looking at the US-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Among other things, this episode has made at last two things particularly clear: first, the willingness to use unprecedented levels of violence to enforce dominance on a global scale; second, the unipolarity of the current empire. In ascension since the Thatcher-Reagan years, this unipolarity reached its climax with the post-9/11 regime, based on a new convergence of military, economic, political and religious interests in the United States. In Alain Joxes (2002) compelling vision of imperial globality, what we have been witnessing since the first Gulf War is the rise of an empire that increasingly operates through the management of asymmetrical and spatialized violence, territorial control, subcontracted massacres, and cruel little wars, all of which are aimed at imposing the neo-liberal capitalist project. At stake is a type of regulation that operates through the creation of a new horizon of global violence. This empire regulates disorder through financial and military means, pushing chaos to the extent possible to the outskirts of empire, creating a predatory peace to the benefit of a global noble caste and leaving untold poverty and suffering in its path. It is an empire that does not take responsibility for the wellbeing of those over whom it rules. As Joxe puts it: The world today is united by a new form of chaos, an imperial chaos, dominated by the imperium of the United States, though not controlled by it. We lack the words to describe this new system, while being surrounded by its images. World leadership through chaos, a doctrine that a rational European school would have difficulty imagining, necessarily leads to weakening states even in the United States through the emerging sovereignty of corporations and markets. (2002: 78, 213). ( ) This homogenizing view of both Western logic and the barbaric Latin America defends a old, out-of-date view of people and cultures that only leads to violence in its defense Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13. There is one proviso: at this point in time, the

colonial difference must be kept in view, because Creoles in the Americas of European descent (either Latin or Anglo), as well as Creoles of European descent around the world, may still see civilization and barbarism as ontological categories, and therefore they may have trouble accepting Indian (or Islamic, for that matter) civilizational processes and histories when entering into dialogue. There are no civilizations outside of Europe or, if there are, like those of Islam, China or Japan (to follow Huntingtons classification: see chapter 1), they remain in the past and have had to be brought into the present

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of Western civilization. That is the colonial difference that should be kept in mind. The future can no longer be thought of as the defense of Western civilization, constantly waiting for the barbarians. As barbarians are ubiquitous (they could be in the plains or in the mountains as well as in global cities), so are the civilized. There is no safe place to defend and, even worse, believing that there is a safe place that must be defended is (and has been ) the direct road to killing. Dialogue, properly speaking, cannot take place until there are no more places to be defended and the power differential, consequently, can be redressed.
Dialogue today is a utopia, as we are witnessing in Iraq, and it should be reconceived as utopistic: a double movement composed of a critical take on the past in order to imagine and construct future possible worlds. The decolonial shift is of the essence if we would stop seeing modernity as a goal rather than seeing it as a European construction of history in Europes own interests. Dialogue can only take place once modernity is decolonized and dispossessed of its mythical march toward the future. I am not defending despotism of any kind, Oriental or Occidental. I am just saying that dialogue

can only take place when the monologue of one civilization (Western) is no longer

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2NC Violence
( ) Occidental thought perpetuates global struggles throughout the world and play out in vastly violent ends This is the root cause of your impacts Turns case Ikenberry 04 [G. John, Theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and
International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Review of Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies by Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit for Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59557/g-john-ikenberry/occidentalism-the-west-in-the-eyes-of-its-enemies, JCook.] Accessed 6/26/13. In this grandly illuminating study of two centuries of anti-Western ideas, Buruma and Margalit contend that the

hostility of Islamic jihadists toward the United States is but the most recent manifestation of a longrunning, worldwide reaction to the rise of Western modernity. They call the cluster of prejudices and unflattering images of the West conjured by its enemies "Occidentalism," a phenomenon that originated within the West itself in the late eighteenth century and only later spread
to the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. German romantics, reacting to the Enlightenment and the rise of capitalism, expressed it in their rejection of

a coldly rational Europe -- a "machine civilization," manifest in imperialism, urbanism, and cosmopolitanism. From there, similar themes appear in Occidentalism's other variants: the sinfulness and rootlessness of urban life; the corruption of the human spirit in a materialistic, market-driven society; the loss of organic community; the glory of heroic self-sacrifice in overcoming the timidity of bourgeois life. Western liberalism is a threat -- to religious fundamentalists, priest-kings, and radical collectivists alike -because it deflates the pretensions of their own brand of heroic utopianism. Ultimately, the picture that emerges is not of a clash of civilizations but of deeply rooted tensions that ebb and flow within and across civilizations, religions, and cultures. What the West can do about Occidentalism, however, is less
clear. The anti-Western impulses in nineteenth-century Europe and interwar Japan were only transitional, overwhelmed by the forces of socioeconomic advancement. Whether the Occidentalism of present-day Islamic radicals will also come to accommodate modernity is the great question of our time. Buruma and Margalit do not venture an answer, but their evocative study shows that,

whatever happens in the end, it will play out as a long and violent historical drama.

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War
First, This reproductive Heteronormativity ends in the countless justification of wars As nations reproduce themselves in masculine ways, war is fought amongst the protection of the female, and the protection of the nations reproductive abilities This makes war inevitable by re-entrenching in the heterosexism that produces the justifications for wars in the first place Only the alternatives break away from this system of reproductive heteronormativity solves the impact. Global Feminisms 402 08 (Amy T., Writes on the war in Iraq and particularly its impact on women, The Gender of
War, December 15, 2008.) (http://globalfeminisms.wordpress.com/2008/12/15/the-gender-of-war/. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12.

War is an act of violence, domination, of taking away someones power by asserting and reifying your own. War is a clash of brawn and phallic guns. In our gendered society, war is without a doubt coded masculine. Think about a warrior. Is this warrior a man or a woman? Now think about a soldier. Man or woman? The traditionally maleness of warriors is one way that war becomes gendered. History books and story books alike paint a picture always of a male warrior, generally very physically impressive, so angered that someone or something is threatening what is his that he will resort to violent means to protect it. The anatomical maleness of the typical warrior isnt enough to render war masculine, though gender is socially constructed, so its the masculine-coded attributes of these warriors that really
masculinizes war. The strength, ability to protect, sense of ownership over others and willingness to use violent means that typify the warrior are also many of the traits that help to construct masculinity.

The military is further masculinized

because of its heteronormativity; Dont Ask Dont Tell in the United States means that out homosexuals are not
even allowed to serve. Homosexual soldiers challenge the hetero-masculine sphere of the soldier and problematize the undeniably homosocial atmosphere created by the presence of so many men in the same space with very few women allowed inside. War

is also coded masculine because of the feminization of what warriors protect; in our heterosexist world that which is protected and therefore less dominant cannot remain masculine, and masculinity and femininity are viewed in binary opposition and therefore complementary. In legend the Trojan War was fought over a woman. Land is feminized, as in Mother Earth
and calling countries the motherland and she.[1] Womens relation to war becomes about how they are in need of the protect ion the military can provide them.[2] Wars

begin to protect and save women, because patriarchy wants everyone to believe that women dont have the agency to protect or save themselves. This feminization of that over which war is fought is simultaneously the result of and the reason behind war being coded as masculine. Masculinization of war attempts to reduce women to property, beings without agency to quite literally call their own shots. Oftentimes womens rights become a kind of capital over which men fight. When war is fought in order to save women,
then questions of which group affords more rights to women becomes an issue not of commitment to gender equality but rather in who can claim higher moral ground. Patriarchy and the systems of oppression with which it intersects are happy to perform concern for the well-being of the very groups they oppress when doing so will reify their own power and glory. Gayatri Spivak

has termed the intersection of patriarchy and white supremacy as a phenomenon of white mensaving brown women from brown men.[3] The world of binary oppositions also engages in essentialism; that is, linking an anatomical reality to a socially constructed set of behaviors. Masculinity and maleness, though not the same thing, are nevertheless inextricably linked by essentialism. From this essentialism and binary

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opposition comes a sense that men, and therefore masculine beings, must counteract and compensate for the feminine and female behaviors that are unreachable for masculinized male bodies. Zillah Eisenstein bluntly summarizes this theory: while women birth, men kill.[4] Because women have reproductive power, men compensate for this inability by claiming power over death: deciding who gets to die when and on whose terms. War is even gendered in its defeat. Groups are emasculated in defeat, like the US after its failure in Vietnam.[5] When
war becomes about masculine posturing[6] and facing up to a bully,[7] then admitting defeat means admitting a lack of masculine potency and strength. Starhawk write that [s]oldiers can be coerced into dying for killing when their fear of being called womanlike or cowardly overrides their reluctance to face death or to inflict injury on others.[8] War, violence and killing become a way to prove manliness and masculinity. Add in the phallic images of much of modern weaponry and war becomes a battle of who has a bigger penis, who is the bigger and more masculine man. The US occupation of Iraq is definitely gendered masculine and easily matches the dominant narrative of masculinized war. The US government used the well-being of women to justify their invasion. Even though the war is really about imperialism, Western dominance, and capitalist greed, the US claimed that it wanted to liberate the Muslim women of course remembering to represent these women as an Orientalist monolith. Eisenstein describes that The

West is often described as embracing gender equality, while Muslim countries are depicted as non-democratic and patriarchal.[9] Here womens rights are commodified, used as capital to justify violence, aggression, blatant Othering racism and religious prejudice. This discourse continues to construct women as objects to protect and save rather than
recognizing their agency and status as full human beings. The US war of aggression on Iraq was also a clash of masculinities, leaving femininity on the sidelines as only something to protect. Laura Sjoberg explains how this hypermasculinization intersected with racism as US forces feminized and Othered Iraqi forces: The story of conflict was not told only in terms of American manliness, but in terms of the victory of American manliness over the mistaken and inferior masculinities of the Iraqi opponent. American masculinity was winning over Iraqi masculinity and terrorist masculinity, both of which were inferior. [10] For

US troops, not only were the motherland and the brown women to which Gayatri Spivak refers at risk, but also at risk was the very concept of what masculinity looks like in America. Of course the only way to solve the dilemma was to violently and aggressively show those mistaken Iraqis who really had more power, who was really tougher and manlier. The masculinity of war cannot be countered by femininity alone but by deconstructing our rigid essentialist gender roles. When men
dont have to prove their maleness through masculinity, violence and domination will cease to hold such importance in our lives.

We must construct strength as coming from something different than just physique, power and intimidation over others. Reimagining our concepts of gender will help us to envision a world free from war.

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Value to Life
Not very good First, Reproductive heteronormativity destroys the spirit of human life It controls our actions and our basic unconscious, removing any true freedom Spivak August 2012 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Re: Discussion of Your Ideas and Academic Debate,
http://emailswithdebateauthors.blogspot.com/2012/08/conversation-with-gayatri-spivak.html, JCook.) Accessed 8/26/12.

I think you are absolutely right in questioning "best-ness." (Only yesterday I sid to an Indian group -- my family -- "nationalist competition kills the human spirit.") That said, allow me to make a gentle criticism. I always tell my students, "theory is not there for application. Theorizing is a practice. Read theory for its own sake so that it's internalized and your reading practice is changed. Do not make things into
illustrations of theory." So, see if you can get behind my thinking, as if you're thinking them rather than following them and see what happens. Also, I always have two ways of looking at things: short term & long term. As Adrienne Rich so powerfully says: "Learn

from your own history" (1979 Smith College Commencement Address). Does increasing speed in travel actually decrease gasolene consumption? What does history teach us? And does lessened gasolene consumption lead to a juster world automatically with no training for epistemological performance? Would infrastructural change help subaltern groups be heard?

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HIV/AIDs
First, Reproductive heteronormativity leads nations like the US to pull funding from HIV and AIDs programs Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.)
In August, 2003, at the public hearing of crimes against women in Bangladesh, the jury had suggested (I was part of the jury) that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, or SAARC, be requested to put in place trans-state jurisdiction so that perpetrators could be apprehended with greater ease, and survivor-friendly laws could support trafficked women, often living with HIV/AIDS, across state lines. Such

feminist work would not only supplement the rich cultural mulch of the testifying women themselves, re-coding their lives through sex-work collectives working to monitor and advise, it would also, by supporting the sex-work awareness of these women, provide an active criticism of the reproductive heteronormativity that is making the United States withdraw aid from the most successful HIV/AIDS programs as in Brazil or Guatemala because they will not simply criminalize prostitution6. There the multilingual and regional comparative work would be immensely productive.

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Otherization
If youre going to read this as an impact read framework with it the only way youll win an outweighs and theres some pretty good policy failure stuff with it Reproductive Heteronormativity forces the postcolonial to become the other Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012 13 Of course,

changes in the mode of production of value do not bring about matching changes in the constitution of the subject. But one is often surprised to notice how neatly the ruses change in the arena that engages in coding subject-production: cultural politics. And the universities, the journals, the institutes, the exhibitions, the publish- . ers' series are rather overtly involved here. Keeping the banal predictability of the cultural apparatus in transnational society firmly in mind, it can be said that the shift into transnationalism brought a softer and more benevolent third worldism into the Euramerican academy. This was indeed a ricorso from the basically conservative social scientific approach that matched the initial dismantling of the old empires. It is in this newer context that the postcolonial diasporic can have the role of an ideologue. This "person" (although we are only naming a subject-position here), belonging to a basically collaborative elite, can be uneasy for different kinds of reasons with being made the object of unquestioning benevolence as an inhabitant of the new third world. (S)he is more at home in producing and simulating the effect of an older world constituted by the legitimizing narratives of cultural and ethnic specificity and continuity, all feeding an almost seamless national identity-a species of" retrospective hallucination." 14 This produces a comfortable "other" for transnational postmodernity, "ground-level activity," "emergent discourses." The radical critic can turn her attention on this hyperreal third world to find, in the name of an alternative history, an arrested space that reproaches postmodernity. In fact, most postcolonial areas have a classspecific access to the society of information-command telematics inscribed by microelectronic transnationalism. And indeed, the discourse of cultural specificity and difference, packaged for transnational consumption along the lines sketched above, is often deployed by this specific class. What is dissimulated by this broadstroke picture is the tremendous complexity of postcolonial space, especially womanspace.15

Second, This use women and feminism as a way to universalize identity - creates an international civil society that makes the rural poor the other Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012 In 1985, we had not yet fully acknowledged our access to a postmodern electronic capitalism in the field of gender ideology.

International feminist politics was still in the condition of modernizing. The condition and effect of constructing other women was "women in development." In the globalizing postmodern, she is embedded in the more abstract frame of "Gender and development," which is the current slogan of the agencies inaugurating our "modernity" that I mention above. Modernization was international. Postmodernization is global. The boundaries of nation-states are now increasingly
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inconvenient, yet must be reckoned with, because the limits and openings of a particular civil society are state-fixed. The globalization of capital requires a poststate system. The use of women in its establishment is the universalization of feminism of which the United Nations is increasingly becoming the instrument. In this re-territorialization the collaborative international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly being called an international civil society, precisely to efface the role of the state as agent of social redistribution. Saskia Sassen has located a new "economic citizenship" of power and legitimation in the finance capital markets.6 Thus, elite, upwardly mobile, generally academic women of the new diasporas join hands with similar women in the so-called developing world to celebrate a new global public or private "culture" often in the name of the underclass or the rural poor as "other." (I now call this phenomenon, going far beyond feminism, "feudality without feudalism."}

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Structural Violence
Reproductive Heteronormativity tasks women with the job of maintaining culture making them become the self and the other. This causes structural violence because the man vents his aggression on them because the woman becomes a symbol of the global Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012

This much at least is clear: to imagine or figure the other as another self, you need to engage the moving edge of culture as it leaves its traces in idiom. To reduce it to language-to semiotic systems that are organized as language-was a structuralist dream. But at least, whatever the subject-position of the structuralist investigator, there was rigor in the enterprise. Its tempo was different from the impatience of a universalist feminism re-coding global capital. From existing evidence, it is clear that individual-rights or universalist feminists infiltrate the gendering of the rural South to recast it hastily into the individual rights model. They simply take for granted that colonized cultures are inevitably patriarchal. I will not enter into historical speculation. I will take shelter in
a figure-the figure or topos, that in postcoloniality the past as the unburied dead calls us. This past has not been appropriately mourned, not been given the rites of the dead, as the other system brought in by colonialism imposed itself. There was no continuous shedding of a past into an unmarked modernity. I am not necessarily suggesting that there can be such continuity. It is just that when a sense of that continuity is absent, in different ways, in an entire culture, there are immense problems in the practice of freedom in a modernity not marked by a locational adjective. In later chapters, I will speak of Khaled Ziadeh and Farhad Mazhar to speak of these predicaments of infelicitous or unmourned modernities. In

the field of political culture, to engage in a strategy-driven globalization, to step into a modernity not forever marked by the West and contrasted to a tradition necessarily defined as static, it is to the past as the call of the unburied dead that the postcolonial must strain to gain access. (In the intervening years, I have realized, as I have plunged more and more into the specific task of the uncoercive
rearrangement of desires at two ends of the spectrum-represented here as a double bind-that strategy-driven globalization is the old goal of international socialism recoded into the global; and that it still needs supplementation by a persistently repeated, diversified, aesthetic education for all. But I get ahead of myself.)

Men and women are both in this situation of attending to the past so that it can be understood as another access to contemporaneity, but not equally For, first, across the classes, it is women who are generally asked to hold the marks of a necessarily stagnating traditional culture. And unable to confront the real source of domination, it is upon the domesticated woman, in the private sphere, that the underclass man, frustrated by globality, vents his frustration. And, finally, family law, a strictly codified-rather than dynamically flexible-version of precolonial laws, allowed to flourish by colonizing powers to keep indigenous patriarchy satisfied still functions across the immigrant-feminized labor export divide :sn"""~' Thus it is possible to argue that unequal gendering is exacerbated under colonialism,
subsequently in underclass migrancy, and thrust into a bewildering simulacrum of freedom in the underbelly of globalization. To undo this is not a matter of a quick-fix gender training, bringing the international feminist into the fragility of the family.

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Deontology
Tag me Spivak 2005 GuyatriChakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge
As you can see, however, in what I am writing today, the problems that emerged out of Can the Subaltern Speak?, _/ the problem of subject-ship and agency, and the call to build infrastructure in the colloquial, not the Marxist sense, so that agency would emerge _/, have not left me. At that stage already, I saw agency as institutional validation, whereas subject formation exceeded the borders of the intending subject, to put it brutally briefly. And I saw reproductive heteronormativity as the broadest global institution. Now, in addition, I see agency as the play of self-synecdochising in a metonym. To restore rights to the people without laying the groundwork for this (political) will can be well-intentioned but only that, and only at best. In general, the leaders of collectivities _/ good or bad _/ have the right to the metonym/synecdoche complex. That the rank and file do not, sometimes gets overlooked. That I believe is the difference between good and bad movements. My foray into teacher -training for the subaltern is because they also are citizens, the name for hegemony. In order to work for them, I set aside my differences _/ Columbia Professor, dollar income, classed caste-birth, and all that comes with it.

I synecdochise myself as nothing but a citizen of India, which is where my students, their parents and relatives, and I, can form a collectivity, in search of agency. On the other hand, they are not, mentally or materially (the two bleed into each other), free to put aside their differences. The effort is to build infrastructure so that they can, when necessary, when the public sphere calls for it, synecdochise themselves without identitarian exploitation(sometimes well-meaning but equally destructive), from above. The solution, as I see it, is not to celebrate or deny difference, but find out what specific case of inequality brings about the use of difference and who can deny it on occasion. The solution is also not to create a politics of recognition where this problematic is altogether ignored.25 The solution cannot come to us from the international civil society, self-selected moral entrepreneurs who distribute philanthropy without democracy.26 I believe the existing debates about contingency and universality have not taken into account.27 Here is another example, from the other end of the spectrum. Donald Pease the Americanist has suggested that, in the wake of 9/11, with civil liberties constrained by the Patriot Act and the general atmosphere of suspicion and fear, the will of the citizen of the United States has become separated from the state.28 This too is a kind of subalternity because the part is no longer part of the whole, and therefore the power to self-synecdochise has been taken away. Bruce Ackerman had suggested some years ago that, We the
people in the United States polity are not engaged on an ordinary day. It is only when there are transformative Supreme Cour t decisions and popular mandates that they act.29 And now Donald Pease was suggesting that even that has been changed. He, however, was not able to see that RHN kicks in here as well.

Although the citizen is subalternised inside the nation-state _/ the United States _/, outside in the world, agency is reclaimed, again and again, and across the political spectrum, generally in the name of gender. Gender is the alibi for much US interference abroad. That has as little persuasiveness for the thinking of subalternity as a position without identity as does genderoppression in the name of cultural difference. People will play into both these extremes.If we grasp subalternity as a position without identity we will think of building infrastructure for agency. Ethical sameness cannot be compromised. The point is to have access to the situation, the metonym, through a self-synecdoche that can be withdrawn when necessary rather than confused with identity.

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Reproductive Heteronormativity First

First, Tag me better Spivak and Mookherjee 12 (Gayatri and Nayanika. Reproductive Heteronormativity and Sexual Violence in the
Bangladesh War of 1971, Social Text 111.Vol. 30, No. 2. Summer 2012.) GayatriChakravortySpivak has been working with an organization in Bangladesh which focuses on ecological farming and the struggle against forced contraception (in particular, the dumping of Depo-Provera and other pharmaceuticals). She has also been part of this organizations educational program for women and teacher training course in rural Bangladesh. In her own work she has written critically about the various interventionist and savior paradigms of transnational organizations in Bangladesh, which she has referred to as an enabling violation of that of the production of the subject.1 In this context she has been critical of gender training the label given by international organizations to processes that seemingly empower women and give them a voice. Spivak first went to Bangladesh while she was accompanying her mother, SivaniChakravorty, on a visit to one of these rehabilitation centers, and took photographs of the women and the rehabilitation program in Dhaka in January 1973 (see page 121 and fig. 1). The

following discussion highlights the personal, political, and intellectual context within which Spivak undertook this visit to Bangladesh, along with a deconstructive reading of sexual violence during wars, which she refers to as the tacit globalization of reproductive heteronormativity. This discussion was interspersed with
looking through numerous photo albums with Spivak, searching for and talking through photographs of women.gayatrichakravortyspivak I dont quite know where to begin in this introduction, Nayanika. Derrida has this idea of destinerrance that a thing always errs away from its destination, and I feel that pulling these pictures up from 71/72 has been almost an allegory of that. These pictures were not records of anything for me I should say here I am not a photographer. I am completely excited by and committed to the unverifiable. On the other hand, in the deepest possible way I am dedicated to entering the protocols of their episteme, attempting to inhabit the often-metaphoricalsyncategoremes that link their presuppositions, as one enters the text one reads, which is a very different thing. As you will see, these pictures are poor pictures. They were taken because we were there. My mother and I were involved in working for the establishment of Bangladesh as a state. We did publicity we talked to the women a lot but not to interview, but to energize, to understand, to explain. I dont know whether you have heard me say this since you saw me at Cambridge, that reproductive

heteronormativity the para-reasonable assumption that producing children by male-female coupling gives meaning to any life is the oldest, biggest sustaining institution in the world, a tacit globalizer. And war and rape belong there. Now you will see the picture of one
young woman who was completely unhinged, never spoke a word at all I felt she was completely unhinged which is also a Derridean thing out of joint. The out of place (atopos), following Socrates, is assigned a certain gentle wisdom.

Nietzsche assigns to postreproductive women a certain cynical wisdom. Antigone, voluble, honorary male, is, says Lacan, beyond Ate. All these narratives were useless to describe her. I never followed up on these pictures this is not my work, it was a literary or disciplinary disinclination to turn her into my object of investigation.This is something that happened on the way. This is almost for me like a primal scene of activism I did not even think so till you and I began talking about this. I am
reading Frederick Douglass, and there is again and again what could be a primal scene; as a slave he was denied the so-called normal access to reproductive heteronormativity. So these are images of bare-chested women being whipped until they bleed uncontrollably, and I was realizing we need these kinds of scenes that are originary and not rationalized into what we later do.nayanikamookherjee I wanted to ask you about what you said about these images as being of the epistemic originary.My

analogy for the originary is a stick-shift car: every time you start the car you take the clutch out it is somewhere which remains lodged as the first necessary move, so it is not origin. I feel as if what happened unselfconsciously as I faced these women was a reference to, or a representation of, the originary in the field of my work for reading the world. I didnt try it with these women; I wasnt ready. I feel that silent unreading of the scene of violation was originary to all this. It was, as it were, a lesson not to read too soon. want to come back to the point of images. There is a certain kind of standardization of images that has happened in terms of wartime experiences to the extent that people

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feel bored about it the citational point about the enemy. Yes and through this the feeling is that once dealt with they need not be brought up again. I am glad you brought this up. I am talking about this entire construct which contained my approach to it and I had no plan. And we hadnt gone to do this. What I am
talking about is preimagistic. I do not follow Freud, but Freud is very canny he says that the dream in its work has to start with words but it slowly undoes the words worthiness. Freud is talking about the fact that in the dream the significance-quality of the image is undone, the meaning making of the image gets undone in order that the

dreamer can dream the very last thing the dream does, the dream work does, making a representation. It conceals all this work by producing a dream narrative. It is this dream narrative that I am talking about. I want to show you the pictures first. It is interesting to me that they are mixed in with other
pictures let me get a bigger table for the photographs. I want to show you the picture of the woman who was completely muted. I believe this is she. I have forgotten her name there are two pictures which are nearly the same. These are awful pictures these are some of the women, and this is of that woman who was always quiet. The photographs are of January 73. I dont know if these pictures mean anything to you. The settings of these images are similar to images other Bangladeshi social workers have. Maybe you could tell me how you went with your mother to Bangladesh what triggered it off. That is interesting indeed. I was of that immediately postcolonial generation that went to Presidency College in Calcutta in 1957. I was always engaged with whatever was going on that was not new. I came to the US in 1961, and I would say that the first couple of years I was slightly detached from what was on the ground. Although during that time James Brown and Malcolm X debated at Cornell, Schwerner and his associates went down south and were killed in Mississippi. There was a lot of stuff going on. But since I am not someone who would want to join for joining, I wasnt cluing in. And then came the Vietnam War and I was a bit more senior, right? 65 I became an assistant prof, and I found myself completely sucked into the antiVietnam War movement. And one of the things that kept not just me but most of the international students on the left separate from it a little was our conviction that people with whom we were struggling SDS, DSOC, NAM [Students for a Democratic Society, Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, and New American Movement] they seemed more interested in reclaiming America than entering the protocol of the episteme of the Vietcong: how Marx is transformed in Asia the atopos in Socrates that was not the story. Because student activists tend to cluster and I was becoming quite visible and I was clearly a Bengali into this came the Bangladeshi activists abroad, who were working very hard. This was in Iowa the Midwest was a solid base of the antiVietnam War movement. And so it was there that the Bangladeshis and I found each other. I remember the guy calledSayadAlam the day that Bangladesh was proclaimed and there was a huge celebration at our house, March 71. And so I was in contact with my mother in Calcutta Mother had often said to me that the best days of her life were spent in Dhaka. My fathers name was Pares Chandra Chakravorty, and my mothers name was SivaniChakravorty. So what happened was my father was asked by the British government to give false evidence in a rape trial in 1941 in Dhaka, and in a second he destroyed his career by refusing. Of course, Mother remembered the entire narrative vividly. After that my father left Dhaka. My mothers grandmother Barahini Debi was given in widow remarriage. Her father was a friend of IswarchandraVidyasagar, the great nineteenth-century Bengali reformer. Brahmins in my fathers village had therefore felt that my fathers father had lost his Brahminical standing by giving his son into such a rule-breaking household. So he tore his sacred thread and vowed never to come back to the village again. My mother had never seen my fathers birthplace. All

of these stories have to do with the cultural policing of reproductive heteronormativity. A widow remarried is akin to a rape victim, a transgressor. So now, coming to talk to you, I realize this inventory without traces, Gramscis great formula for the
historiography of the subaltern. I get my political passion from both my parents, and the entire narrative was in my mothers mind. As this drama was being played in Iowa by me thirty years later, my mother said we should go to Bangladesh and she started to make contacts. So in 71 Mother and I together went to Bangladesh, and this was just about the end well, the bridges were still down. So my chronology is not accurate this was not being undertaken for any academic transcoding. It was an emotional thing mother and daughter going back to where mother had been happiest. Going back to where no one in the family had been after 1940. It was extremely exciting and Mothers MA was in Bengali literature and she could speak all of the dialects. As we are going north I understand my mother tongue less and less. My Bengali is not bad, but she was becoming the interpreter and she was talking to them, whereas I could not talk and I could not understand either. So it was very much a womens emotional journey. Into this because she had clearly worked in the womens sector, and while I had worked in the general new-nation sector like the anti Vietnam War movement I began to discover that through her I met lots of groups of upper-middle-class nationalist women. The PunorbashonKendras (rehabilitation centers) that you mentioned approached Mother, and I went along. That is how it happened. I was twenty-nine. I hadnt begun any of my activist work of the mid-80s that was much later. And so I was very much my mothers assistant.

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Ontology
Aff is responsible for their representations and forces a flawed ontology - the act of reading forces one to construct a self in opposition to their own [also can be used as a perm card if its something to the effect of all other instances or do both since it focuses on the role of the affs literature] Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012, PG 58 Writing and reading in such general senses mark two different positions in relation to the uneven many-strandedness of "being." Writing is a position where the absence of the weaver from the web is structurally necessary. Reading is a position where I (or a group of us with whom I share an identificatory label) make this anonymous web my own, even as I find in it a guarantee of my existence as me, one of us. Between the two positions, there are displacements and consolidations, a disjunction in order to conjugate a representative self. (Even solitude is framed in a representation of absent others.) In the arena of cultural politics, whose disciplinary condition and effect are history, anthropology, and cultural studies, this disjunction/conjunction is often ignored. The socius, it is claimed, is not woven in the predication of writing, not text-ile. It is further claimed that, when we push ourselves, or the objects of our study, forward as agents of an alternative history, our own emergence into the court of claims is not dependent upon the transformation and displacement of writing into something readable. By that reasoning, we simply discover or uncover the socius and secure the basis of cultural or ethnic power through the claim to knowledge. By that reasoning, power is collective, institutional, political validation. I do not advise giving up this practical notion of power. If, however, we "remake history" only through this limited notion of power as collective validation, we might allow ourselves to become instruments of the crisismanagement of the old institutions, the old politics. We forget at our peril that we get out of joint with the pretext, the writing of our desire for validation, which one can only grasp by being "nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength some are endowed with; it is the name that one lends to a complex strategical situation in a particular society," so that one can read that writing. 3

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Spurlock
First, We challenge the binary of the universal particular these divisions rest upon reproductive Heteronormativity Spivak 05 Guyatri Chakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the subaltern and the popular,
Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge I have said that the

singular, as it combats the universal-particular binary opposition, is not an individual, a person, an agent; multiplicity is not multitude. If, however, we are thinking of potential agents, when s/he is not publicly empowered to put aside difference and self-synecdochise to form collectivity, the group will take difference itself as its synecdochic element. Difference slides into culture, often indistinguishable from religion. And then the institution that provides agency is reproductive heteronormativity (RHN). It is the broadest and oldest global institution. You see now why just writing about women does not solve the problem of the gendered subaltern, just as chronicling the popular is not subaltern studies. In search of the subaltern I first turned to my own class: the Bengali middle class: Bhubaneshwari Bhaduri and Mahasweta Devi. From French theory that is all I could do. But I did not remain there. In the
middle class, according to Partha Chatterjee, Bhubaneshwari Bhaduri was metaleptically substituting effect for cause and producing an idea of national liberation by her suicide. Chatterjees argument is that an

idea of national liberation was produced by, so-called, terrorist movements.23 It was a frightening, solitary, and Clytemnestralike project for a woman.

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Turns Case
First, Ethical Interruptions of the systematic norm are the only way to make lasting change to prevent the inevitable violence that the case focuses on AND Only the alternative alone can solve The openness to the other runs counter to state action and combinatory acts GayatriChakravorty Spivak 08, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9-11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. Yet, being a citizen of the world who aspires to live and prosper under the rule of law, I will risk a word. When we

believe that to punish the per-petrators as criminals would be smarter than, or even more correct than, military intervention, we are not necessarily moving toward a lasting peace. Unless we are trained into imagining the other, a necessary, impossible, and interminable task, nothing we do through politico-legal calculation will last, even with the chanciness of the future anterior: something will have been when we plan a something will be. Before the requirement of the emergence of a specific sort of public spherecorollary to imperial systems and the movement of peoples, when different kinds of people came to live togethersuch training was part of general cultural instruction.3 After, it has become the especial burden of an institutionalized faculty of the humanities. I squash an entire history here. Kants enlightened subject is a scholar.4 In Critique of
Power Benjamin writes, what stands outside of the law as the educative power in its perfected form, is one of the forms of appearance of divine power.5 I happen to be a Europeanist, but I have no doubt at all thathistorically

marked intuitions about the importance of the educative moment is to be found in every cultural system. What seems important today, in the face of this unprecedented attack on the temple of Empire, is not only an unmediated intervention by way of the calculations of the public sphere war or lawbut training (the exercise of the educative power) into a preparation for the eruption of the ethical. I understand the ethical, and this is a derivative position, to be an interruption of the epistemological, which is the attempt to construct the other as object of knowledge. Epistemological constructions belong to the domain of the law, which seeks to know the other, in his or her case, as completely as possible, in order to punish or acquit rationally, reason being defined by the limits set by the law itself. The ethical interrupts this imperfectly, to listen to the other as if it were a self, neither to punish nor to acquit. Second, Only by imagining and investigating our cultural imaginations allows us to solve the root cause of the problem Any other solution re-entrenches the problem, turning case Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9-11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. I am also not suggesting that political analyses and resistances and, on another level, aid and human rights, are unnecessary. I am suggesting that if

in the imagination we do not make the attempt to figure the other as

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imaginative actant, political (and military) solutions will not remove the binary which led to the problem in the first place. Hence cultural instruction in the exercise of the imagination. Even within this suggestion, I am not describing all the acts of September 11, 2001, as sublime in the Kantian sense. It is an imaginative exercise in experiencing the impossiblestepping into the space of the other without which political solutions come drearily undone into the continuation of violence. To paraphrase Devi: there are many to offer political analyses and solutions, but no one to light the fire. Cultural instructions through the imagination in time of war is seen, at best, as aestheticization and, at worst, as treason. But that too is situational.

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Education
First, Epistemic violence is rooted in the subjugation of many modes of knowledge and education We must attack this idea of supreme thought in any form to develop a true way of learning that is freed of all educational colonialism Spivak 99 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.) The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, farflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subject-ivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, m the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century.28 But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as "subjugated knowledge," "a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (PK, 82). .This is not to describe the way things really were" or to privilege. The narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history.29 It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. To elaborate on this let us consider briefly the underpinnings of the British
codification of Hiddu Law.

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Turns Case
Theory is useless in practical and specific applications and is not value-neutral guts solvency and turns case Spivak 03 (Gayatri, Winter 2003, Resistance That Cannot be Recognised as Such: Interview with
GayatriChakravortySpivak, Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol. II, No. 2 , TvB)

So I will learn as much fromwhat I callpost-imperial scholarin this kind conjuncturewith a financialised goal, and what I began with, you know, the group of seven, especially Europe-America in competition, Europe talking about its
past empires as it corrects United States as a future empire, if you look at the Frankfurter AllemaineZeitung for 31st May you will see that there is a whole bunch of European intellectuals who are talking about Europe in this way.I

say to do thisthing, this imperial competition, in the context of the post-imperialworld, with the financialisation of the globe, sometimes called globalization, itis a very different scenario, but what else is new? Who expects to be able to have theories that are as contingent as the way things are? Theory will never be like that.One must know how to use theory and I thinkour way of doingpostcolonial theory can be very useful if one is notwaiting for the theory that exactly matches your situation because that would be useless. And in this
context I would like to say whatever you think of Althusser and we have lots of criticism about Althusser, that his essay Contradiction and Overdetermination says this so clearly and for so many years ago,

this business ofnotthinking,you know hewas speakingfrom

the bosom of theFrenchcommunist party, it was a courageous thing to say. Not thinking that the theory is going to be pure, to find a field for pure application.We know thisas a schemeis finebut like most schemes it is too schematic. Thats why I saidyou cant use theory for a specific situation.That is one of the best examples.So dont askme to produce a theory that would be good for you, no theories are generally good: when you are norming them you have to internalize them so that it changes.

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No Solvency
First, The Other as a subject cannot be accessed in the ivory towers of Deleuze and Foucault The contexts of the individual is need, the subaltern cannot speak They cannot break down the conditions they are in You affirmative ignores this fact Guts solvency The alternative is a prerequisite to your affirmative Spivak 99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
These authorities are the very best of the sources for the nonspecialist French intellectual's entry into the civilization of the Other. I

am, however, not referring to intellectuals and scholars of postcolonial production, like Shastri, when I say that the Other as Subject is inaccessible to Foucault and Deleuze. I am thinking of the general nonspecialist, nonacademic population across the class spectrum, for whom the episteme operates its silent programming function. Without considering the map of exploitation, on what grid of "oppression" would they place this motley crew? Let us now move to consider I the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak?
[Spivak continues later in the essay] "The

task of research" projected here is "to investigate, identify and measure the specific nature and degree of the deviation of [the] elements [constituting item 3] from the ideal and situate it historically." "Investigate, identify, and measure the specific": a program could hardly be more essentialist and taxonomic. Yet a curious methodological imperative is at work. I have argued that, in the Foucault-Deleuze conversation, a postrepresentationalist vocabulary hides an essentialist agenda. In subaltern studies, because of the violence of imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary inscription, a project understood in essentialist terms must traffic in a radical textual practice of differences. The object of the group's investigation, in the case not even of the people as such but of the floating buffer zone of the regional elite-subaltern, is a deviation from an ideal-the people or subaltern- which is itself defined as a difference from the elite. It is toward this structure that the research is oriented, a predicament rather different from the self-diagnosed transparency of the first-world radical intellectual. What taxonomy can fix such a space? Whether or not they themselves
perceive it-in fact Guha sees his definition of "the people" within the master-slave dialectic-their text articulates the difficult task of rewriting its own conditions of impossibility as the conditions of its possibility. "At

the regional and local levels [the dominant indigenous groups] ... if belonging to social strata hierarchically inferior to those of the dominant all-Indian groups acted in the interests of the latter and not in conformity to interests corresponding truly to their own social being." When these writers speak, in their essentializing language, of a gap between interest and action in the
intermediate group, their conclusions are closer to Marx than to the self-conscious naivete of Deleuze's pronouncement on the

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issue. Guha, like Marx, speaks of interest in terms of the social rather than the libidinal being. The

Name-of-theFather imagery in The Eighteenth Brumaire can help to emphasize that, on the level of class or group action, "true correspondence to own being" is as artificial or social as the patronymic.

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Aesthetic Education Alternative

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Solves
The aff uses a flawed epistemology that suggests that problems can be solved through embracing a certain set of assumptions - Only embracing the ideas of aesthetic education can allow for effective problem solving and scholarship literature is the key place to start an embrace of alternative methods of thought because it is loaded with the assumptions of the writer and is designed to evoke certain feelings and passions in the reader Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012, PG 5-7 In his essay Bateson spelled out the training of the imagination in terms of a mise-en-abyme, an indefinite series of mutual reflections: INTRODUCTION - --- ~------speaking of "dilemma[s] ... not confined to the contexts of schizophrenia" (EM, p. 258), he distinguishes between "people and ... robots in the fact of learning ... from passing on from solution to solution, always selecting another solution which is preferable to that which preceded it" (EM, p. 240). He "enlarge[s] the scope of what is to be included within the concept of learning" by way of "hierarchic series [that] will then consist of message, metamessage, meta-meta message and so on" (EM, pp. 247-248). This "training," the bulwark of an aesthetic education, habitually fails with religion and nationalism: "Up in the dim region where art, magic, and religion meet and overlap, human beings have evolved the 'metaphor that is meant,' the flag which men will die to save, and the sacrament that is felt to be more than 'an outward and visible sign, given unto us' " (EM, p. 183 ); it is interesting that Freud mentions the same two items-"Throne and Altar"-in "Fetishism," as the monitors of fetishistic illogic.16 Play training, an aesthetic education, habitually fails with flag and sacrament, throne and altar. Bateson described habit altogether unsentimentally. A practitioner's line connects him here to the Wordsworth of the Lyrical Ballads, interested in undoing the bad episterna/affective consequences of nascent capitalism, and to Gramsci looking to produce the subaltern intellectual out of "the man [sic] of the masses" in a place and time where clan politics were not unknown.17 Here is Bateson: In the field of mental process, we are very familiar with this sort of economics [of trial and error adaptability], and in fact a major and necessary saving is achieved by the familiar process of habit formation. We may, in the first instance, solve a given problem by taking them out of the range of stochastic operation and handing over the solutions to a deeper and less flexible mechanism, which we call "habit." (EM, p. 257) The passage above was written in 1959. Ten years later, at a symposium on the double bind, Bateson generalizes habit. Here the practitioner/ philosopher's connection is with the Freud who attempted to go beyond the pleasure principle to a more general "organic compulsion to repeat [that] lie[s] in the phenomena of heredity and the facts of embryology" (SE 18, p. 37). Here, again, is Bateson: By superposing and interconnecting many feedback loops, we (and all other biological systems) not only so~ve particular problems but also form habits which we apply to the solution of classes of problems. We act as though a whole class of problems could be solved in terms of assumptions or premises, fewer in number than the members of the class of problems. In other words, we (organisms) learn to learn .... [The] rigidity [of habits] follows as a necessary corollary of their status in the hierarchy of adaptation. The very economy of trial and error which is achieved by habit formation is only possible because habits are comparatively "hard programmed." ... The economy consists precisely in not re-examining or rediscovering the premises of habit every time the habit is used. We may say that these premises are partly "unconscious", or-if you please-a habit of not examining them is developed. (EM, p. 274) The aesthetic short-circuits the task of shaking up this habit of not examining them, perhaps. I said to begin with that in the earlier stages we could find in British Romanticism our models. But as long as we take the literary as substantive source of good thinking alone, we will fail in the task of the aesthetic education we are proposing: at all cost to enter another's text. Otherwise, we will notice that William Wordsworth's project is deeply class-marked, and that he does not judge habit. He is clear about being superior to others in being a poet, unusually gifted with a too-strong imagination, capable of organizing other people's habits. I will quote at length to show his lack of interest in working with the subaltern, although he certainly acknowledges the power of their "real" language. His chief interest is in changing the taste of the readers of poetry; his confidence in "the poet's" (the trace of the author?) gifts is elaborately expressed in these passages, again even as the (unselfconscious?) power of the "real" language of "men" is recognized: For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings; and, as by contemplating the relation of these general representatives to each other, we discover what is really important to men, so, by the repetition and continuance of this act, our feelings will be connected with important subjects, till at length, if we be originally possessed of much sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced, that, by obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits, we shall describe objects, and utter sentiments, of such a nature, and in such connexion with each other, that the understanding of the Reader must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, and his affections strengthened and purified. (LB, p. 126) [The poet] is a man speaking to men: a man, it is true, endued with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him; delighting to contemplate similar volitions and passions as manifested in the goings-on of the Universe, and habitually impelled to create them where he does not find them. To these qualities he has added a disposition to be affected more than other men by absent things as if they were present; an ability of conjuring up in himself passions, which are indeed far from being the same as those produced by real events, yet (especially in those parts of the general sympathy which are pleasing and delightful) do more nearly INTRODUCTION 7 resemble the passions produced by real

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events, than any thing which, from the motions of their own minds merely, other men are accustomed to feel in themselves; whence, and from practice, he has acquired a greater readiness and power in expressing what he thinks and feels, and especially those thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or from the structure of his own mind, arise in him without immediate external excitement .... (LB, p. 138) But, whatever portion of this faculty we may suppose even the greatest Poet to possess, there cannot be a doubt but that the language which it will suggest to him, must, in liveliness and truth, fall far short of that which is uttered by men in real life, under the actual pressure of those passions, certain shadows of which the Poet thus produces, or feels to be produced, in himself. However exalted a notion we would wish to cherish of the character of a Poet, it is obvious, that, while he describes and imitates passions, his situation is altogether slavish and mechanical, compared with the freedom and power of real and substantial action and suffering. So that it will be the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings near to those of the persons whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time perhaps, to let himself slip into an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings with theirs; modifying only the language which is thus suggested to him, by a consideration that he describes for a particular purpose, that of giving pleasure .... (LB, pp. 138-139) But it may be said by those who do not object to the general spirit of these remarks, that, as it is impossible for the Poet to produce upon all occasions language as exquisitely fitted for the passion as that which the real passion itself suggests, it is proper that he should consider himself as in the situation of a translator, who deems himself justified when he substitutes excellences of another kind for those which are unattainable by him; and endeavours occasionally to surpass his original, in order to make some amends for the general inferiority to which he feels that he must submit. (LB, p. 139) Thus he may be a "man speaking to men." For him, however, Marx's third thesis on Feuerbach would have held no appeal: that since the knowledge gap between teacher and taught cannot be circumvented, not to let this develop into a power gap is a constant task that will keep society always in the state of upheaval that is necessary for liberation. (The English translation of upheaval-Umwiilzung-is usually "revolution" rather than "upheaval," thus destroying Marx's important warning: the educators must be educated.) 18 The deeply individualistic theory of the Romantic creative imagination in Wordsworth must remain anti-systemic. 19 By contrast, Gramsci's entire energies are devoted to producing the subaltern intellectual, by instrumentalizing the "new intellectual":

Second, The only way to solve this reproductive heteronormative drive that nationalism produces is to embrace a comparative approach to nations that is equivalent when looking at one another This is best done through literature and the humanities, which allow us to find empathy in the other ways of life and to learn to acknowledge that other things can occupy the unique place of the example of my first language This side steps all of your offense and solves Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.) Nationalism is the product of a collective imagination constructed through rememoration. It is the comparativist imagination that undoes that possessive spell. The imagination must be trained to take pleasure in such strenuous play. Yet social priorities today are not such that higher education in the humanities can prosper, certainly not in India as it is rising to take its place as a competitor in a developed world, and certainly not in the United States. The humanities are progressively trivialized and/or self-trivialized into belles-lettristic or quantitative work. If I have learned anything in my forty-five years of full-time teaching, it is the tragedy of the trivialization of the humanities, a kind of cultural death. So unless the polity values the teaching of literature in this way rather than just literary history and content and a fake scientism, the imagination will not be nourished.

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Key to Ethics
Affirming a correct view of pedagogy is the only way in which ethical decisions can be made and epistemology is critical to the process because education forms the habits that affect decision making Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012, PG 8-10 In an important comment on Marx, Gramsci distinguishes between the psychological, the moral (our word would perhaps be "ethical"), and the epistemological. Our task is to "ab-use" this, not to excuse its seeming INTRODUCTION 9 systemic confidence (belied by much of the hesitation of what Gramsci wrote in prison), nor to accuse it of that very thing, but to see in the addition of the epistemological a way of reading Gramsci with "history in the reading": 24 The proposition contained in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy to the effect that men acquire consciousness of structural conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered as an affirmation of epistemological and not simply psychological and moral value. From this, it follows that the theoretical-practical principle of hegemony has also epistemological significance, and it is here that Ilyich [Lenin]'s greatest theoretical contribution to the philosophy of praxis [i.e., Marxism] should be sought. In these terms one could say that Ilyich advanced philosophy as philosophy in so far as he advanced political doctrine and practice. The realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact. In Crocean terms: when one succeeds in introducing a new morality in conformity with a new conception of the world, one finishes by introducing the conception as well; in other words, one determines a reform of the whole of philosophy. 25 The relationship between education and the habit of the ethical is as the relationship without relationship between responsibility and the gift that we must imagine in order to account for responsibility-an unrestricted transcendental deduction, if you like.26 Training for the habit of the ethical can only be worked at through attending to the systemic task of epistemological engagement. We "learn to learn" (Bateson's more general phrase) how to teach from the historico-cultural text within which a certain group of students might be placed. Thus Gramsci invokes the active relationship which exists between [the intellectual] and the cultural environment he is proposing to modify. The environment reacts back on the philosopher and imposes on him a continual process of self-criticism. It is his "teacher." ... For the relationship between master and disciple in the general sense referred to above is only realised, where this political condition exists, and only then do we get the "historical" realisation of a new type of philosopher, whom we could call a "democratic philosopher" in the sense that he is a philosopher convinced that his personality is not limited to himself as a physical individual but is an active social relationship of modification of the cultural environmentP An aesthetic education teaches the humanities in such a way that all subjects are "contaminated." I have repeated that I have not much hope for this in the current context. Let me at least quote Gramsci's hope: The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, ... but in active participation in practical life, ... superior to the abstract mathematical spirit; from technique-as-work one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history, without which one remains "specialised" and does not become "directive" (specialised and political).28 I will come later to Gramsci's "techno-scientific" lesson, "superior to the abstract mathematical spirit." For now, let us remember that the prison notebooks, being notes to oneself for future work, are necessarily in an open form that requires careful acquaintance with the protocols of the text. I would like to propose that the training of the imagination that can teach the subject to play-an aesthetic education-can also teach it to discover (theoretically or practically) the premises of the habit that obliges us to transcendentalize religion and nation (as Bateson and Freud both point out). If, however, this is only a "rearrangement of desire" or the substitution of one habit for another through pedagogical sleight-ofhand, there will be no ability to recover that discovery for a continuity of epistemological effort. We must learn to do violence to the epistemoepistemological difference and remember that this is what education "is" and thus keep up the work of displacing belief onto the terrain of th'e imagination, attempt to access the epistemic. The displacement of belief onto the terrain of the imagination can be a description of reading in its most robust sense. It is also the irreducible element of an aesthetic education. In the context of the beginning of the twenty-first century, to learn to de-transcendentalize religion and (the birth of a) nation into the imaginative sphere is an invaluable gift. But this particular function of reading is important in a general and continuing way as well. Elsewhere I have argued that this type of education, with careful consideration of social context, can be part of education from the elementary level, where it is even more formal rather than substantive. In this book, that argument flashes up here and there, but the general terrain of the book is tertiary and postgraduate education, the reproduction of citizens and teachers. This is where we use the legacy of the Enlightenment, relocate the transcendental from belief, with a view to its double bind, producing a simpler solution: privatize belief, rationalize the transcendent. This particular solution, offered as liberal education as such, suits capitalism better. We saw briefly how Bateson takes the double bind out of the limited context or narrow sense of a mental "disease." Indeed, it may have become, for him, a general description of all doing, all thinking as doing, all self-conscious living, upstream from capitalism, a question of degrees. Contradictory instructions come to us at all times. We learn to listen to INTRODUCTION 11 them and remain in the game. When and as we decide, we know therefore that we have broken the double bind into a single bind, as it were, and we also know that change will have to be undertaken soon, or, things will change: task or event. Knowing this, the typical emotion that accompanies decisions-ethical, political, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, and indeed decisions of the daily grind-is a spectrum of regret and remorse to at least unease, otherwise self-congratulation followed by denial or bewilderment. This is different from the unexamined hope which animates much globalist and alter-globalist enterprise today, in the United States as in the global elite.

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Border Thinking Alternative

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2NC Solves
( ) Border thinking empirically has worked, and is adaptable to even the first world Its rethinking of epistemological relations breaks down the holds of coloniality Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. The corollary is the need to build narratives from the perspective of modernity/coloniality geared towards the search for a different logic (22). This

project has to do with the rearticulation of global designs from local histories; with the articulation between subaltern and hegemonic knowledge from the perspective of the subaltern; and with the remapping of colonial difference towards a worldly culture such as in the Zapatista project, that remaps Marxism, thirdworldism, and indigenism, without being either of them, in an excellent example of border thinking. Thus, it becomes possible to think of other local histories producing either alternative totalities or an alternative to totality (329). These alternatives would not play on the globalization/civilization couplet inherent to modernity/coloniality; they would rather build on a mundializacin/culture relation centered on the local histories in which colonial global designs are necessarily transformed. The diversity of mundializacin is contrasted with the homogeneity of globalization, aiming at multiple and diverse social orders --in sum, pluriversality. One may say, with Mignolo (2000: 309), that this approach is certainly a theory from/of the Third World, but not only for the Third World ..... Third World theorizing is also for the First World in the sense that critical theory is subsumed and incorporated in a new geocultural and epistemological location. ( ) Only border thinking opens the dialogue of politics, so that the subaltern can be included and so that coloniality cannot have social, cultural, economic and epistemological control Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13.

Critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism as a regulative principle demands yielding generously (convivially said Vitoria; friendly said Kant) toward diversity as a universal and cosmopolitan project in which everyone participates instead of being participated. Such a regulative principle shall replace and displace the abstract universal cosmopolitan ideals (Christian, liberal, socialist, neoliberal) that had helped (and continue to help) to hold together the modern/colonial world system and to preserve the managerial role of the North Atlantic. And here is when the local histories and global designs come into the picture. While cosmopolitanism was thought out and projected from particular local histories (that became the local history of the modern world system) positioned to devise and enact global designs, other local histories in the planet had to deal with those global designs that were, at the same time, abstract universals (Christian, liberal, or socialist). For that reason, cosmopolitanism today has to become border thinking, critical and dialogic, from the perspective of those local histories that had to deal all along with global designs. Diversality should be the relentless practice of critical and dialogical cosmopolitanism rather than a blueprint of a future and ideal society

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projected from a single point of view (that of the abstract universal) that will return us (again!) to the Greek paradigm and to European legacies (Z izek 1998).

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2NC Zapatistas
( ) The Zapatistas prove that border thinking can be applied to politics We need to rethink how we engage in the government, so we can work to change coloniality, but under our definition and terms Mignolo 00 [Walter D., Argentine semiotician (cole des Hautes tudes) and professor at Duke University, The Many Faces
of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism, Public Culture 12(3): 721748, Copyright 2000 by Duke University Press, JCook.] Accessed 7/3/13.

The Zapatistas have used the word democracy, although it has different meaning for them than it has for the Mexican government. Democracy for the Zapatistas is not conceptualized in terms of European political philosophy but in terms of Maya social organization based on reciprocity, communal (instead of individual) values, the value of wisdom rather than epistemology, and so forth. The Mexican government doesnt possess the correct interpretation of democracy, under which the Other will be included. But, for that matter, neither do the Zapatistas have the right interpretation. However, the Zapatistas have no choice but to use the word that political hegemony imposed, although using the word doesnt mean bending to its mono-logic interpretation. Once democracy is singled out by the Zapatistas, it becomes a connector through which liberal concepts of democracy and indigenous concepts of reciprocity and community social organization for the common good must come to terms. Border thinking is what I am naming the political and ethical move from the Zapatistas perspective, by displacing the concept of democracy . Border thinking is not a
possibility, at this point, from the perspective of the Mexican government, although it is a need from subaltern positions. In this line of argument, a

new abstract universal (such as Vitorias, or Kants, which replaced Vitorias, or the ideologies of transnationalism, which replaced Kants abstract universal) is no longer either possible or desirable.

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Solves Economy
( ) The alternative provides a better incorporation of countries into economic partnerships, allowing for us to solve your aff best AND Our alternative spills over and improves all of economics Zein-Eladin 09 [Eiman O., Franklin & Marshall College, Department of Economics, Economics, postcolonial theory and
the problem of culture: institutional analysis and hybridity, http://relooney.fatcow.com/00_New_3133.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/26/13. Postcolonial theory, on the other hand, though much criticised for neglecting the economy, has generated tremendous insights on issues of cross-cultural hegemony, that is, the creation of a political climate that elicits the subaltern (subordinated) groups consent to a dominant ideology, and the role of knowledge construction in this process (Zein- Elabdin and Charusheela, 2004).

Colonial discourse analysis (Bhabha, 1983; Said, 1979) opens up a space for comprehending the twentieth century notion of development as a discourse of power rather than a culturally neutral, scientifically knowable growth path of an economy (Escobar, 1995; Olson, 1994).2 Postcoloniality presents a promising entry point for understanding a contemporary world in which the culture of European modernity (most notably, nationstate, market system, urban agglomeration) has expanded far beyond its historical and geographical origins and has been imbricated with other cultures in deep and complex forms. This understanding could potentially allow the cultures of societies currently theorised in economics as less/underdeveloped to equally participate in the global construction of meaning and definitions of the terms of economic being and becoming. Perhaps the greatest promise of postcolonial insights is the possibility of imagining different economic relations and social ethics, and thereby aiding in the search for answers to the presently daunting questions of ecological sustainability and social wellbeing . Taking postcolonial theory on board calls for a more profound rethinking of the place of culture and of currently devalued cultures in economics. In particular, Homi Bhabhas (1985, 1994) idea of hybridity (deep cultural mixing) offers a fruitful analytical tool for better examining economies situated in multiple and dense cross-cultural intersections, and improves our understanding of contemporary economic phenomena at large. 2 Such hybridity is exhibited in
the contemporary economies of Africa, yet Africa is also the quintessential representative of cultural subalternity in economics, currently defined as the least developed world region and habitually associated with crisis and failure.3 Traditionally, most significant descriptions of African economies were produced by anthropologists (e.g., Bohannan and Dalton, 1962). Unfortunately, these ethnographies were rarely taken up in economics on the premise that most of the observed behaviour and institutions amounted to little more than obsolete traditions that would inevitably be supplanted by modern structures and attitudes. An important outcome of the current attention to culture in economics has been the generation of more substantive examinations of economic conditions in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Fafchamps, 2004; Schneider, 1999; Trulsson, 1997). This small literature varies in its level of detail and application of institutionalist principles, but it generally highlights the prevalence of gift giving, sharing, strong kinship obligation and other socio-economic patterns previously identified by anthropologists. The persistence of these patterns, in the midst of substantial economic change, presents a challenge to theoretical perspectives that conceptualise them as premodern or transitory. In this paper I argue that institutional

economics, with its paradigmatic emphasis on culture and long standing openness to inter-disciplinarity, is best positioned to bridge the gap between postcolonial theory and economics. In particular, the
theoretical framework of institutionalism, which underscores cultural embeddedness and an unteleological, nonethnocentric conception of social change (Mayhew, 1998), necessarily accommodates a concept of hybridity. It seems hardly coincidental that the earliest reference to postcolonial critique in economics is Paulette Olsons (1994, p. 77) effort to push the boundaries of radical institutionalism by examining . . . the postcolonial critique ofwestern humanism. Olson applied the notion of orientalism in order to heighten institutionalists attention to racist, sexist and classist biases in mainstream economics. Here, I show that

drawing on the postcolonial idea of hybridity can strengthen the institutionalist

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emphasis on culture, and allow more illuminating, truly substantive analysis. Space does not allow a full account of
hybridity, nor an extended exploration of its implications, but only a general outline to indicate its relevance and potential productivity for institutional economics.

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Human Rights Alternative

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Solves
Alternative text: The United States federal government should engage in a process of harnessing responsibility for accountability, check up on other directedness without persistent training and feudalism. We reserve the right to clarify. This solves human rights, 1AC and gender oppression It also avoids Social Darwinism, Essentialism, and the exacerbation of 1AC harms through the affirmatives inevitable propagation of colonial education Spivak 04 (Gayatri. Summer 2004, Righting Wrongs, The South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 103, Number 2/3, Spring/Summer
2004, pp. 523-581, TvB)

The idea of human rights, in other words, may carry within itself the agenda of a kind of social Darwinism the fittest must shoulder the burden of righting the wrongs of the unfitand the possibility of an alibi.Only a kind of Social Darwinism, of course. Just as the white mans burden, undertaking to civilize and develop, was only a kind of oppression. It would be silly to footnote the scholarshipthat has been written to showthat the latter may have been an alibi for economic, military, and political intervention. It is on that model that I am
using the concept-metaphor of the alibi in these introductory paragraphs. Having arrived here, the usual thing is to complain about the Eurocentrism of human rights. I have no such intention. I am of course troubled by the

use of human rights as an alibi for

interventions of various sorts. But its so-called European provenance is for me in the same category as the enabling violation of the
production of the colonial subject.3 One cannot write off the righting of wrongs. The enablement must be used even as the violation is renegotiated.Colonialism

was committed to the education of a certain class. It was interested in the seemingly permanent operation of an altered normality. Paradoxically, human rights and development
work today cannot claim this self-empowerment that high colonialism could. Yet, some of the best products of high colonialism,

descendants of the colonial middle class, become human rights advocatesin the countries of the South. I will explain through an analogy. Doctors without FrontiersI find this translation more accurate than the received Doctors without Bordersdispense healing all over the world, traveling to solve health problems as they arise. They cannotbe
involved in the repetitive work of primary health care, which requires changes in the habit of what seems normal living: permanent operation of an altered normality. This group cannot learn

all the local languages, dialects, and idioms of the places where they provide help. They use local interpreters. It is as if, in the field of class formation through education, colonialism, and the attendant territorial imperialism had combined these two imperatives clinic and primary health careby training the interpreters themselves into imperfect yet creative imitations of the doctors. The class thus formedboth(pseudo)doctor and interpreter, as it werewas the colonial subject. The end of the Second World War inaugurated the postcolonial dispensation. We must question the assumption that, if the sense of doing for the other is not produced on call from a sense of the self as sovereign, packaged with the sense of being fittest, the alternative assumption, romantic or expedient, of an essence of
subalternity as the source of such a sense, denies the depradations of history. Paulo Freire, in his celebrated Pedagogy of the Oppressed, written during the era of guerilla warfare in Latin America, warns us against subalternist essentialism, by reminding us that, during

the

initial stages of the struggle, the oppressed. . . tend themselves to become oppressors. 64 In addition, in the faceof UN Human Rights policy-making, we must be on guard against subalternist essentialism, both positive and negative. If the self-permission for continuing to right wrongs is premised implicitly on the formerthey will never be able to help themselvesthe latter nourishes false hopes that willas surely be dashed and lead to the same result: an unwilling conclusion that they must always be propped up. Indeed, in the present state of the world, or perhaps always and everywhere, simply harnessing responsibility for accountability in the South, checking up on other directedness, as

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it were, without the persistent

training, of no guarantees, were produce and consolidate what can only be called feudalism, where a benevolent despot like Lee Kuan Yew can claim collectivity rather than individualism when expedient. In the present state of the world, it also reproduces and consolidates gender oppression, thus lending plausibility to the instant right speak of the gender lobby of the international civil society and
Bretton Woods.

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Trace Alternative

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Reproductive heteronormativity codes and scripts genealogical realities through the natural machine of translation, programming the mind and inducing irreversible violence the alternative is to rearrange reproductive heteronormativity into a field of traces in its deepest generality separating agency and subjectship. Spivak 05 (Gayatri, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of the Center for
Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University,Notes toward a Tribute to Jacques Derrida, November 2005, TVB) In every possible sense, translation is necessary but impossible. Melanie Klein, the Viennese psychoanalyst whom the Bloomsbury Group killed with kindness, suggested that the work of translation is an incessant shuttle that is a life.10 The

human infantgrabs on to some one thing and then things. This grabbing [begreifen] of an outside indistinguishable from an inside constitutes an inside, going back and forth and codingeverything into a sign-system by the thing(s) grasped. One can call this crude coding atranslation. In this never ending weaving, violence translates into conscience and vice versa. From birth to death, this natural machine, programming the mind perhaps as genetic instructions program the body (where does body stop and mind begin?), is partly metapsychological and therefore outside the grasp of the mind. Thusnature passes and repasses into culture, in a work or shuttling site of violence: the violent production of the precarious subject of reparation and responsibility. To plot this weave, the readerin my estimation, Klein was more a reader than an analyst in the strict
Freudian sensetranslating the incessant translating shuttle into that which is read, must have the most intimate knowledge of the rules of representation and permissible narratives that make up the substance of a culture, and must also become responsible and accountable to the writing/translating presupposed original.When so-called ethnophilosophies describe the embedded ethicocultural subject being formed prior to the terrain of rational decision making, they are dismissed as fatalistic. But

the insight that the constitution of the subject in responsibility is a certain kind of translation of a genealogical scripting, which is not under the control of the deliberative consciousness, is not something that just comes from Melanie Klein. What is interesting about Melanie Klein is that she does indeed want to touch responsibilitybased ethical systems rather than just rights-based ethical systems and therefore she looks at the violent translation that constitutes the subject in responsibility. It is in this sense that the human infant, on the cusp of the natural and the cultural, is in translation, except the word translation loses its dictionary sense right there. Here, the body itself is a scriptor perhaps one should say a ceaseless inscribing instrument. (Translation as Culture) These self-quotations give an indication of some of the ways in which the agency in feminism emerged for me, rearranging reproductive heteronormativity into a field of traces in its deepest generality, via Klein, working with children for a democracy to come, literalizing Derrida. It is the part of Derrida that makes me know the limits of such regulative work. It is in the unnameable name of the event that I have proposed the methodological convenience of the separation of agency and subjectship: regulation and the trace.

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Extension
First, Write the alt extension here Second, The sign system of reproductive Heteronormativity must be destroyed Only the trace solves at the most basic level Spivak 05 (Gayatri, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of the Center for
Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University,Notes toward a Tribute to Jacques Derrida, November 2005, TVB)

What, then, is a trace? It is or is not, or, more important, is in the possibility of always not being, the material suggestion that something else was there before, something other than it, of course. Unlike a sign, which carries a systemic assurance of meaning,a trace carries no guarantees. Animal spoor on the forest floor (in German, trace is Spur) may mean the animal was there, that its a decoy, that I am mistaken or hallucinating, and so on. When I am around, you know I had a mother, but that is all.There is no guarantee who that mother was, except that she was a Mme Derrida. I am my mothers trace. The Fathers name is written within the patronymic sign system.

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AT - Deleuze
First, Deleuze and Deconstuctionist argue the same basic principle The lack and absence is a presence and a force in itself This solves all of their offense Hofmeyr 08 (Benda, Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, Pretoria South Africa, 0002. Department of
Philosophical Anthropology Faculty of Philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen, Review of Andrea Hurst, Derrida Vis--vis Lacan. Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis., JCook) In his criticism, Derrida

claims that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter harbours a closet essentialism, i.e. it represents a fundamental idealisation (akin to one of Husserls eidetic structures) that supports a covert metaphysics of presence. According to deconstructive interpretation, as we know, the entire history of Western philosophy and its language and traditions has emphasised the desire for immediate access to meaning, and thus built a metaphysics or ontotheology around the privileging of presence over absence. Hurst quite easily unravels the axial argument1 of Derridas criticism by arguing, as we have
seen above, that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter does not evoke the Real as a thing-in-itself but rather in its unspeakable singularity. However one may divide the traumatic event up into units of understanding through analysis, the event remains excessive, inherently resistant to analytical, interpretative division. Derridas

insistence upon the ineluctable divisibility of the letter refers to the fact that the original/originary, according to him, is not a substance but the scission and division of diffrance. Herein he is
therefore not as his criticism would suggest in fundamental disagreement with Lacan, for they seem to be saying the same thing, albeit in different ways about the Real. For the Real, according to Lacan, is a matter not of presence or absence but of splitting. The

indivisibility of the letter therefore is not an insistence upon presence (or absence for that matter), but upon splitting like a quantum particle split between both being and not being at its destination. In other words, Lacan promotes neither lack (absence) nor phallus
(fullness) as transcendental signifieds. Rather, he insists upon the quasi-transcendental function of the Real, which is neither the absence nor the fullness of being, but, as Hurst claims, a fundamental splitting akin to diffrance (cf. p. 378).

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Deconstruction Alternative

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First, Only breaking down the foundation of movements, ideology and discourse allows us to create a more subjective political and philosophical movement that allows the subaltern to speak All alternatives are coopted by the system they fight to oppose Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12. So the problems concerning feminisms' others are complex ones. This article aims to discuss othering in relation to the politics of representation. I discuss various examples of feminist practices by focusing on how these practices other a substantial number of feminist issues in the dominant Finnish equality discourses. On the basis of this, I argue for the benefits of a deconstructive feminist politicsboth on a practical policy level and an academic theoretical level. I consider this important in order to take responsibility for the problems related to representational politics, since "the

power to impose on people representations of themselves, or of others on their behalf, is intrinsically oppressive" (Braidotti, 2006: 13).
Theoretically my work is predominantly situated as part of European and Nordic theoretical discussions concerning equality discourse and intersectional theories. [4] Feminists

have shown the problems involved in an identity politics (for a discussion see Phoenix & Pattynama, 2006) and pointed at the unavoidable complicity we have in the very power we oppose. A deconstructive politics that takes this critique seriously needs to proceed through careful deconstruction of the very discourses that it is constituted by. This enables us to see and problematize the extent to which our practices are constituted by the political climate and global situation we inescapably find ourselves in. We have to begin to deconstruct the neoliberal individualist and Judeo-Christian values that our ideals and values concerning human rights and equality usually are based on, especially in an intellectual atmosphere where these
values are considered unproblematically "secular." This not because one would want to give up all values and finally become somehow "secular," but because feminists, as knowledge producing and political agents, have always wanted to problematize our complicity in power. A

deconstruction of the equality discourse hinders a reformist approach that would firmly place one inside the parameters of the particular political discourse one operates with. Deconstructing the equality discourse reveals its ethical rootedness in a Judeo-Christian value system and a liberal individual political discourse (Badiou, 2004). Equality discourses are essential systems of power that neoliberal market economies operate through (Thornton, 2006: 155). [5] This kind of contextualization and genealogical investigation helps when there is a wish to avoid indulging in another branch of moral and religious "preaching" directed against various others.
Examples of this kind of "missionary work" can be found in the rhetoric of western and especially US based civilizing projects, directed against Islam or the moralizing preaching in the name of equality and human rights directed at Iran. Very often this

moralism is promoted in the name of democracy, human rights and God (see, for instance, George W. Bush's proclamation on Human Rights Day 2004[1]). We have to ask in what ways the values that feminist critical thinkers and policymakers promote differ from the othering practices of conservative political agendas. We have to ask this because we cannot be blinded to the fact that our values might take as their departure point the very same discursive setting. [6] Although this article mainly discusses equality discourses, I still wanted to show that a deconstruction of the
equality discourse and the two-sex model that it operates with is an undertaking that has its contexts also on this level of generality. It is important to realize that the problem of exclusion is not just internal to feminist discourses such as equality. It

is not just that equality discourses can be shown to operate through othering and exclusion, it is also possible to contextualize the unquestioned nature of the value-system that

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equality discourses and human rights rhetoric "spring from". Equality discourses, as such, might have exclusionary effects on a more general level. These values are also used to advance oppression and warfare which makes clear that these discourses are not in any sense "innocent" or intrinsically good. [7] Descriptive equality research that only portrays the situation internal to discourse ends up being conservative. Describing the status
quo within a reformist and consensus ridden "progressive thinking", a thinking, moreover, that does not contextualize itself may end up universalizing a western liberal value-system in problematic ways. [8] A great deal of identity-based equality politics still has to solve the problem of representation. Deconstructive

anti-representationalism should be seen

as a profoundly ethical move, one where the practice of deconstruction is an attitude or an ideology, if you wish, that springs from ethics. Braidotti calls this an ethical pragmatism (Braidotti, 2006: 14), and it is connected to politics as it is the site at which politics itself constituted. A productive antagonism (Butler) and the refusal to "speak for" should be seen as the poststructuralist political and ethical solution that it is. Deconstruction is much more than a method of investigation. The ethics of deconstruction lies in the practice of deconstructing representationalism. This is the main message that this article aims to communicate. [9] Within a constructivist epistemology I ask what equality discourses leave unsaid, what is marginalized in them and what power mechanisms are embedded in them. I do this by deconstructing some of the language that equality discourses circulate. I deconstruct the theme of sexual difference. The subaltern is to me a tool that I have used to discuss ways in which equality discourse speaks its own politics through various Others I use it as a concept to open up political intersectionality. Second, Deconstructive actions solve; an escape route out of painful existence and imminent extinction Erdem 10 (Cengiz, Ph.D. degree in Cultural and Critical Theory from The University of East Anglia. He currently teaches
Literature, Philosophy, Critical Theory, and Social Psychology at The American University in Kyrenia, Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, and the Critique of Contemporary Culture, 12/23/10, http://cengizerdem.wordpress.com/2010/12/23/deconstruction-psychoanalysis-and-the-critique-of-contemporary-culture/ TVB)

Let us imagine a subject who finds himself in a certain situation which appears to have no escape route; a situation which nails him to a painful existence and brings him closer to extinction with every move he makes. What he needs is Bions theory of creative process and the emergence of new thought from within the dominant projection-introjection mechanism. In his Theory of Thinking Bion says that dismantling is as important in creative process as integration, that is, introjection and splitting are as necessary as projective identification and unification.Bion pays special attention to the process of introjection and projective identification and recreates Kleins paranoid-schizoid positionas a way of showing that it has two forms; one is healthy and the other is pathological. For Klein it was only with the
attainment of the depressive position that the formless experience was given a form, the thoughts were invested with symbolic meanings. Bion sees introjection and projective identification as the two separate but contiguous halves and the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions as the complementary parts of one another in the creative process. Now,

if, following Bion, we think about Kleins introjection and projective identification in the context of Derridas technique of deconstructive reading, we see that deconstruction is a mobile and dynamic mode of critique which moves between fragmentation and integration of the meaning of a text. Although deconstruction, as practised by Derrida himself, adapts itself to the internal dynamics of the text as the object of critique, it still lacks the affirmative and immanent fluidity which is necessaryto open up holes, or passages, through which a

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new truth in touch with the requirements of the present situation can slip. This is because Derridas practice of deconstruction is still a negating activity and a transcendence oriented practice, which remains within the confines of the antagonistic relationship between the life drive and the death drive. To become affirmative, deconstructive practice needs to produce and incorporate its own difference from itself, that is, it has to become immanent to itself and the text it interprets. As a mode of thinking, deconstruction attempts to erase the gap between the life
drive and the death drive, but always fails, and this failure eternally confines deconstructive practice to the domain of antagonism between the life drive and the death drive.

And if we keep in mind that deconstruction as a mode of thinking has become the dominant way of being creative we can understand why a critique of deconstruction is a critique of contemporary culture.

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Key to Politics
First, Only a deconstructionist method can fully access politics, making frames such as policy makers be called into question and not isolated on their own This involvement of intersectionality is key to both a new, progressive politics Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12. [10] I argue that the

concept of the subaltern helps to clarify both structural and political intersectionality (as presented by Verloo, 2006). By using the subaltern as a tool in the analysis of political rhetoric, the simultaneity of politics and theories about politics become visible. Kimberl Crenshaw (1989) uses political intersectionality to indicate how inequalities and their intersections are
relevant to political strategies: "Crucial questions in analysing political intersectionality are: How and where does feminism marginalize ethnic minorities or disabled women? How and where do measures on sexual equality or on racism marginalize women? How and where do gender equality policies marginalize lesbians" (Verloo, 2006: 213)? [11] By

focusing on political intersections we can refer to the exclusions that an identity-based equality politics produces, for instance a "queer" identity not being addressed by the politics of equality. Structural intersectionality occurs when inequalities and their intersections are directly relevant to the experiences of people in society (Verloo, 2006: 213). I
suggest the concept of subaltern as an analytical tool that reminds us of the coexistence of these two levels of intersectionality. I suggest deconstruction

as a political strategy that feminists must insist upon in order to overcome the problems of humanism, liberalism and individualism. [12] Maintaining an opposition between
theory and politics, "applied" practice can safeguard the researcher from ethical responsibility and reflexivity in relation to her own practice of representation and her complicity in a particular discursive set of meanings. She might claim her theory to be just thata reflection on politics without being itself a politics. In these cases the researcher can ascribe various meanings to equality that are exclusionary without acknowledging the role of her own practice. This is why we need a genealogical awareness of our academic representational practices. An

assumed division between politics and theory strangely implies that politics should not be advanced through theory. It implies that there is a possibility to become a neutral "expert" that supplies policymakers with theoretically informed bulleted lists of best practices for easy consumption. It again assumes that equality and human rights are unproblematically universal values and that academic knowledge produced within these discourses is necessary for the "improvement" of policies. Since when have critical thinkers become public servants for the establishment? [13] Within a deconstructive epistemology, it is not enough to for instance name oneself as "white middle class heterosexual" and portray "others" as lesbian in relation to one's own position (or indeed to portray others as "policymakers" representing politics and oneself as "knowledge producer" representing theory). Deconstruction proceeds from the assumption that one is advancing a politics. Without this awareness we produce subjects of equality and do not acknowledge that our own practice is a politics in itself. [14] According to Mieke Verloo (2006) the simultaneity of structural and political intersectionality is mostly overlooked in policy-making (Verloo, 2006: 214). By using the two-sex model as a lens I will show what I understand as such instances of overlooking within an uncritical equality research. A deconstructive approach to gender is needed when we want to pay attention to political intersections. Uncritical equality discourses operate within the hegemonic two-sex model that, I will show, might appropriate "the lesbian," "ethnicities," and various subaltern "groups" through the practice of representation. These meanings are appropriated and constructed as part of the hegemonic struggle. I think that a

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deconstructive approach manages to reveal how feminist practices that want to take heterogeneity and the Other into account can end up appropriating the Other if and when the complicity between representation as speaking for (Vertreten[2]) and representation as the staging of the world (Darstellen[3]) is forgotten (Spivak, 1994: 74). How could
feminists be constructive about the paradox they face: Being produced by the very discursive power that we resist? How could we be reflexive about the seductiveness of resistance - a resistance that calls us to become instruments of discursive power? Where

do we find an opening for an ethical representational politics, a politics that we all strive for?

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AT Deleuze
First, Deleuze and Deconstuctionist argue the same basic principle The lack and absence is a presence and a force in itself This solves all of their offense Hofmeyr 08 (Benda, Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, Pretoria South Africa, 0002. Department of
Philosophical Anthropology Faculty of Philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen, Review of Andrea Hurst, Derrida Vis--vis Lacan. Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis., JCook) In his criticism, Derrida

claims that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter harbours a closet essentialism, i.e. it represents a fundamental idealisation (akin to one of Husserls eidetic structures) that supports a covert metaphysics of presence. According to deconstructive interpretation, as we know, the entire history of Western philosophy and its language and traditions has emphasised the desire for immediate access to meaning, and thus built a metaphysics or ontotheology around the privileging of presence over absence. Hurst quite easily unravels the axial argument1 of Derridas criticism by arguing, as we have
seen above, that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter does not evoke the Real as a thing-in-itself but rather in its unspeakable singularity. However one may divide the traumatic event up into units of understanding through analysis, the event remains excessive, inherently resistant to analytical, interpretative division. Derridas

insistence upon the ineluctable divisibility of the letter refers to the fact that the original/originary, according to him, is not a substance but the scission and division of diffrance. Herein he is
therefore not as his criticism would suggest in fundamental disagreement with Lacan, for they seem to be saying the same thing, albeit in different ways about the Real. For the Real, according to Lacan, is a matter not of presence or absence but of splitting. The

indivisibility of the letter therefore is not an insistence upon presence (or absence for that matter), but upon splitting like a quantum particle split between both being and not being at its destination. In other words, Lacan promotes neither lack (absence) nor phallus
(fullness) as transcendental signifieds. Rather, he insists upon the quasi-transcendental function of the Real, which is neither the absence nor the fullness of being, but, as Hurst claims, a fundamental splitting akin to diffrance (cf. p. 378).

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Rejection Alternative

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Resistance
( ) Text: Reject and resist occidental, coloniality in all instances. Only ardent resistance has the chance of breaking away from the coloniality of today Nothing else will do Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13.

After the Third World signals both the end of an era and way of thinking and the birth of new challenges, dreams, and real possibilities; both observations, however, can be hotly
contested. On the one hand, what has really ended? Assuming that the historical horizon that has finally come to a close is that of anti-colonial nationalist struggles in the Third World, how about the other, perhaps less intractable, aspects of the spirit of Bandung and Third Worldism? For instance, how about the tremendous international solidarity that it elicited among exploited peoples? How about its passionate call for justice, or its eloquent demand for a new international economic order? And is the centrality of the political on which that spirit was based also a thing of the past? Are all of these features ineluctably left behind by the steamroller of modern capitalist history? I believe the articles in this special issue of Third World Quarterly demonstrate they are not, even if they are in dire need of rearticulation. To begin with, many of the conditions that gave rise to Third Worldism have by no means disappeared. Today

the world is confronted with a capitalist systema global empire led by the United States--that seems more inhumane than ever; the power of this empire makes the ardent clamoring for justice of the Bandung leaders appear to us today as timid. Even more, the inhumanity of the US led empire continues to be most patently visible in what until recently was called the Third World. So it can be argued that the need for international solidarity is greater than ever before , albeit in new ways, not to speak about the indubitable necessity of resisting a now global market-determined economy that commands, in more irrefutable tone than in the past, that the world has to be organized for exploitation and that nothing else will do.

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2NC Resistance
( ) Resistance isnt just doing nothing Its the act of imagining a new world as an alternative to the current realm we are resisting This alone creates the epistemological and cultural framework to solve Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 7/3/13.

Other worlds are possible: Social movements, place-based politics, and global coloniality World and knowledges otherwise brings to the fore the double aspect of the effort at stake: to build on the politics of the colonial difference, particularly at the level of knowledge and culture, and to imagine and construct actual different worlds. As the slogan of the Porto Alegre World Social Forum puts it, another world is possible. At stake in thinking beyond the Third World is the ability to imagine both other worlds and worlds otherwise --that is, worlds that are more just and sustainable and, at the same time, worlds that are defined through principles other than those of eurocentric modernity. To do this, at least two considerations are crucial: what are the sites where ideas for these alternative and dissenting imaginations will come from? Second, how are the dissenting imaginations to be set into motion? I suggest that one possible, and perhaps privileged, way in which these two questions can be answered in by focusing on the politics of difference enacted by many contemporary social movements, particularly those that more directly and simultaneously engage with imperial globality and global colonialty.

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Resistance AT// Do Nothing Bad

( ) Resistance isnt doing nothing Its the active engagement and imagination of a new world, shaped by our resistance away from Occidenalism and coloniality Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13.

3. This analysis suggests the need to move from the sociology of absences of subaltern knowledges to a politics of emergence of social movements; this requires examining contemporary social movements from the perspective of colonial difference. At their best, todays movements, particularly anti-globalization and global justice movements, enact a novel logic of the social, based on self-organizing meshworks and largely nonhierarchical structures. They tend to show emergent properties and complex adaptive behaviour that movements of the past, with their penchant for centralization and hierarchy, were never able to manifest. This logic is partly strengthened by the selforganizing dynamics of the new information and communication technologies (ICTs), resulting in what could be called subaltern intelligent communities. Situated on the oppositional side of the modern/colonial border zones, these communities enact practices of social, economic and ecological difference that are useful for thinking about alternative local and regional worlds , and so for imagining after the Third World.

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AT// Doing Anything

( ) Border thinking is a critical redefinition of thought and the world, but also an active imagination of a new world Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13.

transmodernity signals this possibility of a non-eurocentric dialogue with alterity, one that fully enables the negation of the negation to which the subaltern others have been subjected . Mignolos notions of border thinking and pluritopic hermeneutics are important in this regard. They point at the need for a kind of thinking that moves along the diversity of historical processes (Mignolo, 2001: 9), and that engages the colonialism of Western epistemology (from the left and from the right) from the perspective of epistemic forces that have been turned into subaltern (traditional, folkloric, religious, emotional, etc.) forms of knowledge (2001: 11). While Mignolo acknowledges the continued importance of the monotopic critique of
Dussels notion of modernity by Western critical discourse (critique from a single, unified space), he suggests that this has to be put into dialogue

a possibility of thinking from different spaces which finally breaks away from eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective (on the application of the notion of diatopic hermeneutics to incommensurable cultural traditions, see also Santos, 2002: 268-274). Let it be clear, however, that border thinking entails both displacement and departure (Mignolo, 2000: 308), double critique (critique of both the West and other traditions from which the critique is launched), and the positive affirmation of an alternative ordering of the real.
with critique(s) arising from the colonial difference. The result is a pluritopic hermeneutics,

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Solves
First, tag Spivak 99 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?, Jcook.)
The reduction of Marx to a benevolent but dated figure most often serves the interest of launching a new theory of interpretation. In the Foucault-Deleuze conversation, the issue seems to be that there is no representation, no signifier (Is it to be presumed that the signifier has already been dispatched? There is, then, no sign-structure operating experience, and thus might one lay semiotics to rest?); theory

is a relay of practice (thus laying problems of theoretical practice to rest) and the oppressed can know and speak for themselves. This reintroduces the constitutive subject on at least two levels: the Subject of desire and power as an irreducible methodological presupposition; and the self-proximate, if not self-identical, subject of the oppressed. Further, the intellectuals, who are neither of these S/ subjects, become transparent in the relay race, for they merely report on the nonrepresented subject and analyze (without analyzing) the workings of (the unnamed Subject irreducibly presupposed by) power and desire. The produced "transparency" marks the place of "interest"; it is maintained by vehement de negation: "Now this role of referee, judge, and universal witness is one which I absolutely refuse to adopt." One responsibility of the critic might be to read and write so that the impossibility of such interested individualistic refusals of the institutional privileges of power bestowed on the subject is taken seriously. The refusal of the sign-system blocks the way to a developed theory of ideology. Here, too, the peculiar tone of de negation is heard. To Jacques-Alain Miller's suggestion that "the institution is itself discursive," Foucault
responds, "Yes, if you like, but it doesn't much matter for my notion of the apparatus to be able to say that this is discursive and that isn't ... given that my problem isn't a linguistic one" (PK, 198). Why this conflation of language and discourse from the master of discourse analysis? . E?ward W. Said's critique of power in Foucault as a captivating and mystlfying ca!egory that allows him "to obliterate the role of classes, the role ofeconom1cs, the role of insurgency and rebellion," is most pertinent here.24 I add to Said's analysis the notion of the surreptitious subject of power and desire marked by the transparency of the intellectual. Curiously enough, Paul Bove faults Said for emphasizing the importance of the intellectual, whereas "Foucault's project essentially is a challenge to the leading role of both hegemonic and oppositional intellectuals."25 I have suggested that this

"challenge" is deceptive precisely because it ignores what Said emphasizes-the critic's institutional responsibility. . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegatlOns, belongs to the exploiters' side of the international division of l~bor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical is
caught within the debate of the production of that Other supporting 0; critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is aiso that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the t~xtual i~gr~~ients with which su~h a subject could cathect, could occupy (mvest?) 1tS. 1tl~era!"y-not only by 1deological and scientific production, but also by the mstltutlOn of the law. However reductionistic an economic analysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire overdetermined enterprise was in the interest of a dynamic economic situation requirin~ that interests, motives (desires), and power (of knowledge) be ruthlessly d1slocated. To

invoke that dislocation now as a radical discovery that should make us diagnose the economic (conditions of existence th~t separate out "classes" descriptively) as a piece of dated analytic machinery may well be to continue the work of that dislocation and unwittingly to help m securing a new balance of hegemonic relations. "26 I shall return ~o th1S a~g~~ent shortly. In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit m the persistent constitution of Other as the Self's shadow a possibility of political practice for the intellectual would be to put the economics "under erasure," to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes

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the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. 27

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Turns Case
First, We need to reject the utopian fantasies of the affirmatives project. Only when recognizing that it is a fantasy can we endlessly traverse and get over it. Stavrakakis 99, Ideology and Discourse Analysis Program in the Department of Government at the University of Essex,
1999 ( Yannis, Lacan and the Political, Ruteledge Press 76-78) In opposition to such a regressive attitude, Lacanian

theory promotes a return to the founding moment of modernity. Recognising the irreducible character of impossibility, the constitutivity of the real as expressed primarily in the failure of our discursive world and its continuous rearticulation through acts of identification, far from being a postmodern move, reveals the truly modern character of the Lacanian project; instead of a postmodern mysticism it leads to a reorientation of science and knowledge. Recognising the constitutivity of the real does not entail that we stop symbolising; it means that we start trying to incorporate this recognition within the symbolic itself, in fact it means that since the symbolic entails lack as such, we abstain from covering it over with fantasmatic constructsor, if one accepts that we are always trapped within the field of fantasy, that we never stop traversing it. The guiding principle in this kind of
approach is to move beyond fantasy towards a self-critical symbolic gesture recognising the contingent and transient character of every symbolic construct. This is a scientific discourse different from the reified science of standard modernity. I take my lead, in this regard, from Lacans text Science and Truth (it is the opening lecture of his 1965 -6 seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis). In this particular text, Jacques Lacan stages a critique of modern science as it has been articulated up to now, that is as a discourse constantly identifying the knowledge it produces with the truth of the real. If the constitutive, non-reducible character of the real introduces a lack into human reality, to our scientific constructions of reality for example, science usually attempts to suture and eliminate this gap. Lacan, for his part, stresses the importance of that which puts in danger this self-fulfilling nature of scientific axioms: the importance of the real, of the element which is not developing according to what we think about it. In that sense, science la Lacan entails the recognition of the structural causality of the real as the element which interrupts the smooth flow of our fantasmatic and symbolic representations of reality. Within such a context, this real, the obstacle encountered by standard science, is not bypassed discretely but introduced within the theory it can destabilise. The point here is that truth as the encounter with the real is encountered face to face (Fink, 1995a:140-1). It

is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be described as a science of the impossible, a science that does not repress the impossible real. For
Lacan, what is involved in the structuration of the discourse of science is a certain Verwerfung of the Thing which is presupposed by the ideal of absolute knowledge, an ideal which as everybody knowswas historically proved in the end to be a failure (V II: 131). In other words, we cannot be certain that definite knowledge is attainable. In fact, for Lacan, certainty is not something we should attribute to our knowledge of things. Certainty is a defining characteristic of psychosis. In Lacans view, it constit utes its elementary phenomenon, the basis of delusional belief (III:75). Opening up our symbolic resources to uncertainty is, on the other hand, the only prudent move we have left. What we can know has to be expressed within the structure of language but this structure has to incorporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which should cause unease; as Nancy has put it What will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to predict or command it. But

we can act in such a way that this world is a world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such. Invention is always without a model and without warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. Where certainties come apart, there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match. Second, Upon rejecting ideology, the act is possible because even ideology demands submission. We only to recognize ideology lacks through rejecting it. McGowan 04, teaches critical theory and film in the English Department at the U Vermont 2004 (Todd Lacan and
Contemporary Film, Ed. McGowan and Kunkle, pg 155-69

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This is the fundamental impasse of all mastery: not only does it need those it controls and subjects to sustain its own position of mastery, but it cannot escape being obsessed with the secret jouissance of these subjects. Hence, in addition to leaving open the space for resistance, symbolic authority actually encourages its own subversion. Through its depiction of the desire of symbolic authority, Dark City reveals one of the ways that psychoanalytic critique and psychoanalytically informed inquiry serve political action. Often, the strongest barrier to overcome in the political act is the belief that symbolic authority is without fissure, that there is no opening in which the act can occur. By showing the Strangers' desperate
search for the jouissance of the subject, the film shatters this belief. Rather than embodying an invariable mastery that thwarts all challenges to it, the Strangers betray the inconsistency of mastery, it's lack. And because even symbolic authority lacks, we need not succumb to its demands.12 Symbolic

authority's lack creates the space at which we can oppose it, and taking up this opposition is what it means to act politically. But the primary barrier to such an act is our investment in the fantasy that fills in symbolic authority's lack.Because symbolic authority is lacking or split, ideological control is not absolute. This means that it needs a fantasmatic support in order to entice subjects to buy into it. If ideology simply demands submission, subjects will be reluctant to buy into it. But fantasy fills in this lacuna, offering a reward (an image of the ultimate jouissance) that ideology offers in exchange for submission. Hence, far from subverting ideological control, fantasy perpetuates it and follows from it. The
Strangers provide the inhabitants of the city with fantasies-images of an experience beyond ideological control-and these fantasies assist in rendering the people docile. In the case of Murdoch, we see clearly how ideological control depends on a fundamental fantasy.

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Equivalent Comparitivism Alternative

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Solves
First, The only way to solve this reproductive heteronormative drive that nationalism produces is to embrace a comparative approach to nations that is equivalent To learn to acknowledge that other things can occupy the unique place of the example of my first language This side steps all of your offense and solves Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.)
If nationalism secures itself by an appeal to the most private, democracy in its most convenient and ascertainable form is secured by the most trivially public universal each equals one. That flimsy arithmetic, unprotected by rational choice, can also be manipulated by nationalism. I am not convinced that the story of human movement to a greater control of the public sphere is necessarily a story of progress. The religion/science debate makes this assumption, forgetting that the imagination, forgetting that literature and the arts, belong neither to reason, nor to unreason. That literature and the arts can support an advanced nationalism is no secret. They join them in the task of a massive rememoration project, saying we all suffered this way, you remember, this is what happened, you remember, so that history is turned into cultural memory. Literature can then join in the task of a massive counterrememoration project suggesting that we have all passed through the same glorious past, the same grand national liberation battles, the same religious tolerance or whatever. I am going to suggest by the end of this because sometimes I am misunderstood that the literary imagination can impact on de-transcendentalized nationalism. That is not what I am discussing here. I

am supporting the clich that imagination feeds nationalism, and going forward toward the literary imagination and teaching the humanities, through the teaching of the humanities to prepare the readerly imagination to receive the literary and thus go beyond the self-identity of nationalism toward the complex textuality of the international. I will come to that later. I want now to share with you a lesson learned from the oral-formulaic. If the
main thing about narrative is sequence, the main thing about the oralformulaic is equivalence. Equivalence here does not mean value in the sense of commensurate. That was the Marxist definition in the economic sphere. I am speaking of value in a more colloquial sense. The oral-formulaic is equivalence. We learn from narrative by working at the
sequence. We learn in the oral by mastering equivalence. Some years ago Roman Jakobson offered equivalence as the poetic function. In typical modernist fashion he thought equivalence lifted the burden of meaning. My experience with the oral-formulaic presentation of Sabar women, these groups that I used to train teachers for until the local landlord took the schools away from me and handed them to the corporate sector even that is gone now has convinced me that it is the inventiveness in equivalence that makes something happen beyond the tonal and verbal monotony that turns off many literate sympathizers. The Sabar women are members of a tiny and unrepresentative group among Indias eighty-two million Aboriginals. They still practice the oralformulaic, although they will soon forget this centuries-old skill. The hold upon orality is gender-divided here. The mens access to the outside world is wretched, working day labor for the Hindu villages, and since they dont themselves know that there are twenty-four hours in the day, they are cheated constantly. That is why I used to have these schools, to give the subaltern a chance at hegemony. The mens access to the outside world is nonetheless more open. When the men sing, the archived yet inventive memory of the oral-formulaic approaches rote. The men, and this is a very important distinction, inhabit enforced illiteracy rather than an orality at home with itself and with the great genealogical memories. The women, because of the peculiar situation of gender, were still practicing the oral-formulaic. The pre-colonial name for the area where I worked is Mnbhum. It is not the name now. In the adjoining state of Jharkhand there is Singbhum, not the name on the map now. Pre-colonial names. To the south there is Birbhum, etc. Imagine the frisson of delight that passed through me the first time I heard these women weave a verse that began: Mnbhur Mn rj, King Mn of Mnbhm, using the precolonial name of this place that nobody uses. Then they even brought up another pre-colonial name There were other folkloric details that sped through my mind. The next line was even more delightful: Kolkatar rajar pathorer dalan be the king of Kolkata has a stone mansion. Kolkata was in the place of what I am calling inventive equivalence. They were going to Kolkata, a little group for a fair, so they were honoring the king of Kolkata. They were preparing these songs. Kolkata is my hometown and I was thinking as I sang with the women in that remote room with no furniture, no doors and windows, no plumbing, no electricity obviously. In that remote room with no furniture but a 6-foot by 9- foot sheet of polythene in some way associated with chemical fertilizer I thought, who would the King of Kolkata be? Kolkata is a colonial city and unlike older Indian cities had never had a Nobab; and indeed, unlike Bardhaman, Krishnanagar, Srihatta (Sylhet), Jashor, or Mymensingh, it had never had a Hindu Raja either. But the women were singing The king of Kolkata has a stone mansion, where Kolkata occupied the place of a shifter, and who was I to contradict it? I translate the fiction of Mahasweta Devi and, as I was saying this afternoon, she is a wonderful writer, she writes about these tribals, but she is somewhat feudal. And the more I work with these tribals I also think that her image of the tribals is somewhat romanticized. That is ok, I keep translating her stuff because it is interesting material, but she also and this I didnt like much, she doesnt do it any more, she is too old now she used to organize these tribal fairs in Kolkata where people came to look at them and buy handicraft, etc. So the women were going there, and that is why they were preparing. The building where this tribal fair actually took place in Kolkata is called

It would be better to keep it Kolkata, I said, inwardly noting with wonderment that although they knew that Kolkata was a city with zoos and parks and streets and the Information Center only a building, and although they knew no king had power over them, the concept of sovereignty, which would put a space in apposition to archaic Manbhum or Barabhum, applied to both equally. Here,
tathhokendra Information Center. What is the name of that place, one of the women asked me. Tathhokendra, I said. They produced the line: Tathhokendrer rajar patharer dalan b the King of the Information Center has a stone mansion.

then, is a thinking without nation, space-names as shifters, in a mythic geography because of the power of the formulaic. In

internationality the nation-state has such equivalence, now rationally determined. In globalization, no, because there the medium of value is capital. This is the sort of intuition that
Lyotard and before him McLuhan had claimed for postmodernity, jumping the printed book in between. Their politics ignored the texture of subalternity, and equated it with internationality with no gap. Lyotard tried, in The Differend, to undo it, but most readers did not make the connection. Without the benefit of post-modern argumentation such geographical intuitions are defined as pre-modern, by Hobsbawm as prepolitical. This group is not tied to counterglobalization. They are too subaltern to attack the indigenous knowledge or population control people and their avoidance of chemical fertilizers or pesticides (now destroyed) was then too recent and not connected to large-scale agriculture. If, however, they had been connected to counter-globalization then they would accede to a nationalist moment, because the activist workers would speak nation to them. This is a nationalist moment in affective collectivity with no historical base, ultimately productive of neither nationalism nor counter-globalization, but rather of obedience disguised as self-help. Indeed one year I had added a line to their singing of locaters names of their village (the Hindus deny them entry there), their district and so on West Bengal is my state, India is my nation. The next day a group of women larger than the group that went to Kolkata and I walked to the central village of the area. One of the protocols of these two-and-a-half-hour walks was that we sang at the top of our voices. I longed for a camera person. (I am joking, I have never wanted anybody there). I longed for a camera person as these aboriginal women and I walked in the sparsely forested plains of Manbhum, the women and I screaming India is my country bharat henak desh be again and again and again the moment of access to nationalism Gayatri Spivak travelling with the subaltern would then be caught on camera. Except that it wasnt access to nationalism of course. The oral-formulaic can appropriate material of all sorts into its machine, robbing the content of its epistemic charge if it does not fit the inventiveness of the occasion and this is what Jakobson thought was the poetic that takes away the meaning and is only equivalence. Indeed West Bengal or Paschim Banga the name

And the lines are only sung when Shukhoda wants to show me that she loves me still. (I havent seen her for three years now; moved my schools away from the landowners grasp). I am not asking us to
of the state has long been changed into Paschim Mangal, a meaningless phrase with a Sanskrit-like aura.

imitate the oral-formulaic.

I am suggesting that the principle of inventive equivalence should be at the core of the comparativist impulse. It is not all that a fullyelaborated comparativism does. But the principle would destroy the hierarchical functioning of current comparative literature which measures in terms of a standard at whose heart are Western European nationalisms. Standing in the airport of Paris I have been turned off by the accent of upstate New York and
turned to my mother and said in Bengali You cant listen to this. But she chided me, also in Bengali, Dear, it is a mother tongue. That sense, that the language learned first through the infantile mechanism is every language, not just ones own, is

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equivalence. You

cannot be an enemy of English. People say easily English is globalization. It is destroying cultural specificity. Here is equivalence. It is not equalization, it is not a removal of difference, it is not cutting the unfamiliar down to the familiar. It is perhaps learning to acknowledge that other things can occupy the unique place of the example of my first language. This is hard. Its not an easy intuition to develop, yet this need not take away the comfort in ones food, ones language, ones corner of the world. Although even this the nomad can give up. Remember Edward Said quoting Hugo of St. Victor: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The human being can give up even the facticity of language, but comparativism need not. What a comparativism based on equivalence attempts to undermine is the possessiveness, the exclusiveness, the isolationist expansionism of mere nationalism.

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Postcolonial Perspective Alternative

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Solves
First, The Alt is to embrace the perspective of the diasporic postcolonial - only through doing so can class analysis be completed and stories from colonialism shattered Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012 It seems obvious to some of us that

the disenfranchised female in decolonized space, being doubly displaced by it, is the proper carrier of a critique of pure class-analysis. Separated from the mainstream of feminism, this figure, the figure of the gendered subaltern, is singular and alone.9 Insofar as such a figure can be represented among us, in the room where this piece was first given as a talk, it is, first, as an object of knowledge, further, as a native-informant style subject of oral histories who is patronizingly considered incapable of strategy toward us, and finally, as imagined subject/object, in the real field of literature. There is, however, a rather insidious fourth way. It is to obliterate the differences between this figure and the indigenous elite woman abroad, and claim the subjectship of an as-yet-unreadable alternative history that is only written in the general sense I invoke above. (This has now become altogether more material in globalization and alter-globalization.) This fourth person is a "diasporic postcolonial," or a cosmopolitan postcolonial who is the typical participant in international civil society. Who or what is she? (The central character of Mahasweta Devi's "The Hunt," altogether different from the two figures
described above, my chief literary example of remaking history in this piece, negotiates a space that can not only historically but philosophically, be accessible to her.) We

all know that the world was divided into three on the model of the three estates in the mid-1940s when neocolonialism began.l0 We also know that, during the immediately preceding period of monopoly capitalist territorial conquest and settlement, a class of functionary-intelligentsia was often produced who acted as buffers between the foreign rulers and the ruled.11 These are the "colonial subjects," formed with varying degrees of success, generally, though not invariably, out of the indigenous elite, At decolonization, this is the "class" (as I indicate
above, class formation in colonies is not exactly like class-formation in the metropolitan that becomes the "national bourgeoisie," with a hand in the carving out of "national identities" by methods that cannot break formally with the system of representation that offered them an episteme in the previous dispensation: a "national" buffer between the ruler and the ruled. A good deal of this repetition of the colonial episteme in the presumed rupture of postcoloniality will come into play in Mahasweta's story. For the moment let us hold onto the fact that de-colonization does quite seriously represent a rupture for the colonized. It is counterintuitive to point at its repetitive negotiations. But it

is precisely these counterintuitive imaginings that must be grasped when history is said to be remade, and a rupture is too easily declared because of the intuition of freedom that a merely political independence brings for a certain class. Such graspings will allow us to perceive that neocolonialism is a displaced repetition of many of the old lines laid down by colonialism. They will also allow us to realize that the stories (or histories) of the postcolonial world are not necessarily the same as the stories coming from "internal colonization," the way the metropolitan countries discriminate against disenfranchised groups in their midst.12 And the contemporaneity of globalization has dated these instruments of analysis. The diasporic postcolonial can take

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advantage (most often unknowingly, I hasten to add) of the tendency to conflate the three in the metropolis. Thus this frequently (though not invariably) innocent informant, identified and welcomed as the agent of an
alternative history, may indeed be the site of a chiasmus, the crossing of a double contradiction: the system of production of the national bourgeoisie at home, and, abroad, the tendency to represent neocolonialism by the semiotic of "internal colonization."

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Deconstructive Psychoanalysis Alternative

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1NC
The alt: Reject the affs western subjectivity and engage in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern A deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to ethics and actions is the only way of giving the subaltern a voice It puts the psychoanalyst in a position that ensures solvency, while avoiding the problems of political powers which leaves a normative system that links to the K This kills perm solvency Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.)
But the most interesting sign of disciplinary privileging is found in Julia Kristeva's "Psychoanalysis and the Polis." At

the end

or center of delirium, according to Kristeva, is that which is desired, a hollow where meaning empties out in not only the presymbolic but the preobjective, "the ab-ject." (A deconstructive critique of thus "naming" an undifferentiated telos of desire before the beginning of difference can be launched but is not to my purpose here.) The desire for knowledge involved in mainstream interpretation (which Kristeva calls "Stoic" by one of those undocumented sweeping generalizations common to a certain kind of "French" criticism) shares such a hollow enter and is thus linked with delirium. Certain kinds of fiction writers and, one presumes, analysands and social
engineers try to dominate, transform, and exterminate improper "objects" awakened in the place of the abject. The

psychoanalyst, however, wins out over both mad writer and man of politics. "Knowing that he is constantly in abjection [none of the problems of this position is discussed in Kristeva's text]12 and in neutrality, in desire and in indifference, the analyst builds a strong ethics, not normative but directed, which no transcendence guarantees" (p. 92; italics mine). This is the privileged position of synthesis within a restrained dialectic: the psychoanalyst persistently and symmetrically sublates the contradiction between interpretation and delirium. To privilege delirium (interpretation as delirium) in the description of this symmetrical synthesis is to misrepresent the dialectic presented by the essay, precisely in the interest of a politics that can represent its excluded other as an analysis that privileges interpretation. It should also be mentioned, of course, that the indivisibility and inevitability of the archaic (Christian) mother comes close to a transcendental guarantee. To know her for what she is, rather than to seek to transform her, is the psychoanalyst's professional enterprise.

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2NC
First, Extend the alternative of rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern This solves all of the K Engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytic approach to the affirmatives problems allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjection of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity, allowing us to uncover there justifications, assumptions and underlying cultural drives Only this approach allows to know the other and experience the other, giving the subaltern a voice Thats Spivak 82 AND We need to reject the utopian fantasies of the affirmatives project. Only when recognizing that it is a fantasy can we endlessly traverse and get over it. Stavrakakis 99, Ideology and Discourse Analysis Program in the Department of Government at the University of Essex,
1999 ( Yannis, Lacan and the Political, Ruteledge Press 76-78) In opposition to such a regressive attitude, Lacanian

theory promotes a return to the founding moment of modernity. Recognising the irreducible character of impossibility, the constitutivity of the real as expressed primarily in the failure of our discursive world and its continuous rearticulation through acts of identification, far from being a postmodern move, reveals the truly modern character of the Lacanian project; instead of a postmodern mysticism it leads to a reorientation of science and knowledge. Recognising the constitutivity of the real does not entail that we stop symbolising; it means that we start trying to incorporate this recognition within the symbolic itself, in fact it means that since the symbolic entails lack as such, we abstain from covering it over with fantasmatic constructsor, if one accepts that we are always trapped within the field of fantasy, that we never stop traversing it. The guiding principle in this kind of
approach is to move beyond fantasy towards a self-critical symbolic gesture recognising the contingent and transient character of every symbolic construct. This is a scientific discourse different from the reified science of standard modernity. I take my lead, in this regard, from Lacans text Science and Truth (it is the opening lecture of his 1965 -6 seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis). In this particular text, Jacques Lacan stages a critique of modern science as it has been articulated up to now, that is as a discourse constantly identifying the knowledge it produces with the truth of the real. If the constitutive, non-reducible character of the real introduces a lack into human reality, to our scientific constructions of reality for example, science usually attempts to suture and eliminate this gap. Lacan, for his part, stresses the importance of that which puts in danger this self-fulfilling nature of scientific axioms: the importance of the real, of the element which is not developing according to what we think about it. In that sense, science la Lacan entails the recognition of the structural causality of the real as the element which interrupts the smooth flow of our fantasmatic and symbolic representations of reality. Within such a context, this real, the obstacle encountered by standard science, is not bypassed discretely but introduced within the theory it can destabilise. The point here is that truth as the encounter with the real is encountered face to face (Fink, 1995a:140-1). It

is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be described as a science of the impossible, a science that does not repress the impossible real. For
Lacan, what is involved in the structuration of the discourse of science is a certain Verwerfung of the Thing which is presupposed by the ideal of absolute knowledge, an ideal which as everybody knowswas historically proved in the end to be a failure (V II: 131). In other words, we cannot be certain that definite knowledge is attainable. In fact, for Lacan, certainty is not something we should attribute to our knowledge of things. Certainty is a defining characteristic of psychosis. In Lacans view, it co nstitutes its elementary phenomenon, the basis of delusional belief (III:75). Opening up our symbolic resources to uncertainty is, on the other hand, the only prudent move we have left. What we can know has to be expressed within the structure of language but this structure has to incorporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which should cause unease; as Nancy has put it What will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to predict or command it. But

we can act in such a way that this world is a world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such. Invention is always without a model and without

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warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. Where certainties come apart, there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match. *same as Decon. K2 Psycho.* Third, The alternative is a prerequisite to philosophical thought It question the very basic foundation of thought and understanding Combining it with psychoanalysis is key to create a movement that truly transforms the Real, by engaging in an approach that understand our unconscious drives as well as societal influences Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 201011
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) I have already sketched out the difficulties facing a grammatological concept of the unconscious. In order to alleviate them somewhat, I will permit myself to argue the following, namely, that

Of Grammatology, a large section of the texts contained in Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy, and at least up until and including Dissemination, can be read as giving a systematic answer (which is not the same as the answer of a system) to a fundamental question, a question that Derrida gives its unary trait by repeatedly aligning it with what he considers the question of metaphysics itself. In these texts, the local question of one particular thinker, be it Husserl, Plato, Austin, Artaud, or his contemporary Foucault, is raised to the dignity of a deconstruction of metaphysics. I would argue that this is the reason why it is not wrong to consider this part of Derridas work as inaugurating, or at least co-founding, a poststructuralist program. The question of metaphysics was only interrogated anew, that is, given a genuinely novel philosophical form, with the high tide of structuralism. We are tempted to paraphrase the question as follows: how can (material) content be attributed to a synchronic system of purely differential relations; and how is one to think the passage from (virtual) differentiation to (actual) articulation? This is what led Gilles Deleuze to answer the question, what is structuralism? with a new transcendental philosophy (See Deleuze). Here it is also possible to glimpse why psychoanalysis came to play such a pivotal role for Derrida in these texts. It should be acknowledged that this is the very same question that lies at the heart of what Freud understood analysis to mean. At the same time, analysis requires an exposition of the functions of Vorstellungsreprsentanz, that is, the transformation and translation of unconscious to conscious representation, the passage from latent to manifest dream content, in short, the parameters of the dreamwork and the subjection of this transcendental problem to the absolute novelty of the talking cure, that of how it is possible that meaning, through its production and enunciation, can produce effects in the Real. Freud considered this the only possible proof of the existence of the unconscious, and attempted to give a theoretical treatment of it in the metapsychological writings. In the end, both Lacans and Derridas treatments of Freud are inquiries into the Freudian metapsychology and its place in the philosophical tradition, as well as the viability of analysis as a discourse absolutely different from the same tradition.

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2NR
At the top The criticism solves and turns case Rejecting the affs western subjectivity and engaging in a deconstructive psychoanalytical approach to the world and the subaltern allows us to find a real political solution while avoiding the subjugation of the subaltern by deconstructive the dominant paradigm of western subjectivity which underlies the affs justification and harms Thats Spivak 82 Theres three implications here: First, the only way to change the world and answer the problems of reality is the alternative We fundamentally question and change the underlying assumptions and subconscious drives that cause the affirmative impacts Only the alternative can solve Thats Wilberg 11 Second, the affs approach is steeped in symbolizing reality and fixes only the ways in which we interact with our perception of reality This is doomed to fail until it we question how we got to the point were at and begin rejecting utopian plans that rely of link chains upon link chains to some odd impact. This approaches forces us to become obsessed with our fantasy of reality Guts all solvency Thats Stavrakakis 99 Third, Even if they prove that their plan solves 100% of the plan The alternative solves it as well, with risk of the silencing of the subaltern This means risk of the criticism is a vote negative

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Psychoanalysis First
The psychoanalytic method comes first it interrogates the unconscious schemes that imprison our symbolic reality, allowing revolutionary social change Barratt '93 [Barnaby, Practicing Analyst, Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse, Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1993, 20-1//uwyo-ajl]

This insistence on the priority of method is necessarily an insistence that we revolutionize our notion of what method might be. It announces a shift to a notion of method that neither results from some propositional or conceptual scheme nor results in some elaboration or reformation of such a scheme. As we shall find out, psychoanalytic method is a work of interrogation against propositional imperatives that is, against the very structuring of our lives by conceptual or categorical systems as if to expose, by a critical passage of free-associative thinking and speaking, the very ground and horizon of experiencing and understanding as the fundamental devices of our own imprisonments. This is a postmodern notion of method, and my intent in this book is to show
how it works and plays (dissolving the traditional dichotomy of work and play into a distinctively postmodern mode of work-play). To grasp psychoanalytic method as such a work-play requires our readiness to relinquish presuppositions about "psychoanalysis" as a series of theoretical frameworks or a metahermeneutic in the modern sense - that is, as a series of maps on which to base psychotherapeutic maneuvers in the service of individual adjustment. We need to investigate anew the semiotics of freeassociative movement, for its directionality and the "cure" it comprises. Such an investigation can be inspired and supplemented by rereading Freud's great texts on method. These are the writings that either precede or are inserted between those writings expressing his commitment to various theoretical and technical systematizations, a commitment that seems to accelerate after 1914. They include, for example, the 1898 paper on forgetfulness, te 1899 essay on "screen" memories, the 1900 book on dream interpretation, and parts of the 190! work on the psychopathology of everyday life. Perhaps Freud himself would not have been averse to this emphasis. In 1923 he gave method priority over theory and treatment. And it is surely not without significance that in 1935, at the end of his life, he judged 1912 to have been the zenith of his psychoanalytic career. Moreover, as early as 1915- before the formulation of the structural-functional model, before object-relations, before self psychology and all such frame-works - he had already declared

that psychoanalysis opens us to a "critical new direction in the world and in science"
(1916-17, p. 15).

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Deconstruction Psychoanalysis First

First, Our criticism must come first Deconstruction calls into question the very basic portion of our knowledge It must come before anything else Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 201011
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.)

A grammatological concept of the unconscious begins to take shape by way of a displacement of the point of contact between Lacan and Derrida from these questions regarding the letter to the concept of writing. Two elements show themselves as favourable to the displacement I am suggesting. The first is the assertion of Derridas in Pour lamour de Lacan that one can discern a heightened sensibility towards, and even an overturning of, phonocentrism in Lacans later work, notable in the seminar Encore. While stopping short of calling this a complete turn, this development is, according to Derrida, performed trs grammato-logiquement (very grammatologically) (Pour lamour 79). In short, both Lacan and Derrida realizeand this not entirely independent of each othera rewriting of writing. If we recall the extraordinary third, and now perhaps the most dated, chapter of Of Grammatology, titled Grammatology as a Positive Science , Derrida invokes a generalized grammatology in the place of Saussures own projection of a generalized semiology, all the while acknowledging and inscribing in the idea of this science to come a certain impossibility a priori. This impossibility originates in the ex-centric position writing is shown to take up vis--vis sciencegrammatology will not be a science among other sciences. As Derrida puts it himself, elle risque en effet dbranler aussi le concept de la science (Derrida, De la grammatologie 109). In a slight approximation we could say that Derridas science of grammatology receives its problematic structure from a [End Page 156] generic re-writing of the origin of writing, whereas Lacans idea, though no less generic, finds its support in writings incompleteness.

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Alt First Criticisms Specific

*Same as key to solvency* First, Derridas deconstruction is a prerequisite to philosophical thought It question the very basic foundation of thought and understanding Combining it with psychoanalysis is key to create a movement that truly transforms the Real Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) I have already sketched out the difficulties facing a grammatological concept of the unconscious. In order to alleviate them somewhat, I will permit myself to argue the following, namely, that

Of Grammatology, a large section of the texts contained in Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy, and at least up until and including Dissemination, can be read as giving a systematic answer (which is not the same as the answer of a system) to a fundamental question, a question that Derrida gives its unary trait by repeatedly aligning it with what he considers the question of metaphysics itself. In these texts, the local question of one particular thinker, be it Husserl, Plato, Austin, Artaud, or his contemporary Foucault, is raised to the dignity of a deconstruction of metaphysics. I would argue that this is the reason why it is not wrong to consider this part of Derridas work as inaugurating, or at least co-founding, a poststructuralist program. The question of metaphysics was only interrogated anew, that is, given a genuinely novel philosophical form, with the high tide of structuralism. We are tempted to paraphrase the question as follows: how can (material) content be attributed to a synchronic system of purely differential relations; and how is one to think the passage from (virtual) differentiation to (actual) articulation? This is what led Gilles Deleuze to answer the question, what is structuralism? with a new transcendental philosophy (See Deleuze). Here it is also possible to glimpse why psychoanalysis came to play such a pivotal role for Derrida in these texts. It should be acknowledged that this is the very same question that lies at the heart of what Freud understood analysis to mean. At the same time, analysis requires an exposition of the functions of Vorstellungsreprsentanz, that is, the transformation and translation of unconscious to conscious representation, the passage from latent to manifest dream content, in short, the parameters of the dreamwork and the subjection of this transcendental problem to the absolute novelty of the talking cure, that of how it is possible that meaning, through its production and enunciation, can produce effects in the Real. Freud considered this the only possible proof of the existence of the unconscious, and attempted to give a theoretical treatment of it in the metapsychological writings. In the end, both Lacans and Derridas treatments of Freud are inquiries into the Freudian metapsychology and its place in the philosophical tradition, as well as the viability of analysis as a discourse absolutely different from the same tradition.

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Turns Case
First, We need to reject the utopian fantasies of the affirmatives project. Only when recognizing that it is a fantasy can we endlessly traverse and get over it. Stavrakakis 99, Ideology and Discourse Analysis Program in the Department of Government at the University of Essex,
1999 ( Yannis, Lacan and the Political, Ruteledge Press 76-78) In opposition to such a regressive attitude, Lacanian

theory promotes a return to the founding moment of modernity. Recognising the irreducible character of impossibility, the constitutivity of the real as expressed primarily in the failure of our discursive world and its continuous rearticulation through acts of identification, far from being a postmodern move, reveals the truly modern character of the Lacanian project; instead of a postmodern mysticism it leads to a reorientation of science and knowledge. Recognising the constitutivity of the real does not entail that we stop symbolising; it means that we start trying to incorporate this recognition within the symbolic itself, in fact it means that since the symbolic entails lack as such, we abstain from covering it over with fantasmatic constructsor, if one accepts that we are always trapped within the field of fantasy, that we never stop traversing it. The guiding principle in this kind of
approach is to move beyond fantasy towards a self-critical symbolic gesture recognising the contingent and transient character of every symbolic construct. This is a scientific discourse different from the reified science of standard modernity. I take my lead, in this regard, from Lacans text Science and Truth (it is the opening lecture of his 1965 -6 seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis). In this particular text, Jacques Lacan stages a critique of modern science as it has been articulated up to now, that is as a discourse constantly identifying the knowledge it produces with the truth of the real. If the constitutive, non-reducible character of the real introduces a lack into human reality, to our scientific constructions of reality for example, science usually attempts to suture and eliminate this gap. Lacan, for his part, stresses the importance of that which puts in danger this self-fulfilling nature of scientific axioms: the importance of the real, of the element which is not developing according to what we think about it. In that sense, science la Lacan entails the recognition of the structural causality of the real as the element which interrupts the smooth flow of our fantasmatic and symbolic representations of reality. Within such a context, this real, the obstacle encountered by standard science, is not bypassed discretely but introduced within the theory it can destabilise. The point here is that truth as the encounter with the real is encountered face to face (Fink, 1995a:140-1). It

is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be described as a science of the impossible, a science that does not repress the impossible real. For
Lacan, what is involved in the structuration of the discourse of science is a certain Verwerfung of the Thing which is presupposed by the ideal of absolute knowledge, an ideal which as everybody knowswas historically proved in the end to be a failure (VII: 131). In other words, we cannot be certain that definite knowledge is attainable. In fact, for Lacan, certainty is not something we should attribute to our knowledge of things. Certainty is a defining characteristic of psychosis. In Lacans view, it constitutes its elementary phenomenon, the basis of delusional belief (III:75). Opening up our symbolic resources to uncertainty is, on the other hand, the only prudent move we have left. What we can know has to be expressed within the structure of language but this structure has to incorporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which should cause unease; as Nancy has put it What will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to predict or command it. But

we can act in such a way that this world is a world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such. Invention is always without a model and without warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. Where certainties come apart, there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match. Second, Upon rejecting ideology, the act is possible because even ideology demands submission. We only to recognize ideology lacks through rejecting it. McGowan 04, teaches critical theory and film in the English Department at the U Vermont 2004 (Todd Lacan and
Contemporary Film, Ed. McGowan and Kunkle, pg 155-69

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This is the fundamental impasse of all mastery: not only does it need those it controls and subjects to sustain its own position of mastery, but it cannot escape being obsessed with the secret jouissance of these subjects. Hence, in addition to leaving open the space for resistance, symbolic authority actually encourages its own subversion. Through its depiction of the desire of symbolic authority, Dark City reveals one of the ways that psychoanalytic critique and psychoanalytically informed inquiry serve political action. Often, the strongest barrier to overcome in the political act is the belief that symbolic authority is without fissure, that there is no opening in which the act can occur. By showing the Strangers' desperate
search for the jouissance of the subject, the film shatters this belief. Rather than embodying an invariable mastery that thwarts all challenges to it, the Strangers betray the inconsistency of mastery, it's lack. And because even symbolic authority lacks, we need not succumb to its demands.12 Symbolic

authority's lack creates the space at which we can oppose it, and taking up this opposition is what it means to act politically. But the primary barrier to such an act is our investment in the fantasy that fills in symbolic authority's lack.Because symbolic authority is lacking or split, ideological control is not absolute. This means that it needs a fantasmatic support in order to entice subjects to buy into it. If ideology simply demands submission, subjects will be reluctant to buy into it. But fantasy fills in this lacuna, offering a reward (an image of the ultimate jouissance) that ideology offers in exchange for submission. Hence, far from subverting ideological control, fantasy perpetuates it and follows from it. The
Strangers provide the inhabitants of the city with fantasies-images of an experience beyond ideological control-and these fantasies assist in rendering the people docile. In the case of Murdoch, we see clearly how ideological control depends on a fundamental fantasy.

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Turns Case Political Action Specific

*same as AT Anything Political* Our Alternative is the Proper Form of Political ThinkingThe Affirmative is a Fundamental Avoidance of Thought and Merely Recreates the Conditions of the Problem Butler and Stephens 6 Rex Scott, Lecturers at U of Queensland, Play Fuckin Loud: Zizek vs. the Left, The Symptom,
Issue 7, Spring 2006 (http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html) Here, we might say, in a nutshell is everything Zizek writes against. And it is just at this point that the true distinctions because they are the hardest, the most unpopular, the most difficult need to be made. It is just at this moment that Zizek breaks with a well-wishing Left in the name of a proper Hegelio-Marxist critique. To begin with, Zizek absolutely takes a distance from the classical model of the philosopher giving meaning to events, providing a solution to problems the philosopher as Big Other bringing about narrative and conceptual closure. (Ironically, in another post from her website, Dean even admits that one of the

Giving meaning, providing solutions, bringing about closure: this is what French politicians from the Centre-Left like Dominique de Villepin (who criticised the French State) to the Right like Nicolas Sarkozy (who blamed the rioters) rushed to do in the days immediately following the riots. It is what innumerable media critics and commentators, both in France and
things at stake in Zizeks work is the doing away with the Big Other like this.) abroad, scrambled to do in order that there was no empty air time in which actually to think. How flimsy, how pathetic, how desperate they all sounded, when we know that, within the current configuration of the French State within capitalism, there can be no solution.2 (The

same point might even be made of the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina: for all of the criticisms made of the Bush Government for acting too slowly in response to the crisis, this is again to assume that the problem was only natural, that everything could be made right by the timely intervention of the State, when in fact it is the State itself that is the problem.) In both cases, there is no solution, and therefore no meaning, no closure to events. And it is just this that Zizek is trying to think in his essay
admittedly, with great difficulty, against the best wishes of his supporters More than this, Zizek is accused in Deans essay not only of not providing the meaning of the French riots to us, but also to the rioters themselves. In the most traditional conception of philosophy, he is expected to speak for others, bears a responsibility for articulating the violence. But the real point he re is that, if these riots are to constitute a real event, they must provide their own meaning. And it is the failure of the rioters to do this, to make of what happened an event, that Zizek indicates by the simple mathemic repetition of his previous work (mostly passages of Ticklish Subject) in response to them.3 The riots do not provide an occasion for new thought; they merely play out an existing impasse. But, again, it

is just this this lack of any wider meaning, the present inability of the rioters, of all of us, to formulate an authentic utopian moment, to make of what happened a universal that Zizek attempts to think in his refusal to clutch at solutions, to suggest possible alternatives, to issue philosophical nostrums from some higher place, not mired in the situation. Perhaps the only true equivalent to Zizeks authentic
ethical stance here, his refusal to offer placebos, his taking of the time to think, strangely enough, was the response of French President Jacques Chirac, who several days after the riots and he too was criticised for his delay put forward an equally mathemic decree: The French State will not concede to the rioters. We sense behind his words here, as with Zizek, a frank admission that the riots did not constitute an authentic event, that the only true crisis (for Capital) will be that of Capital itself So what, then, is Zizek attempting to do in Some Politically Incorrect Reflections? What is the role for philosophy he propose s there? What does he mean by saying that the philosophers task is not to propose solutions, but to reframe the problem itself? If we can begin by answering these questions in a slightly programmatic way, the

role of philosophy is to provide space for us and the protestors to think. It is to enable us to reflect upon the fact that the rioters are able to propose no solution, and to make of this problem the beginning of a solution itself. It is the rush to judgement, the proposing of solutions without seeing the prior problem, that Zizek is seeking to avoid.4 And it is this time of thinking
that we call his patience, and that is variously theorised in his work as separation, uncoupling aggressive passivity and Bartlebys I prefer not to. It

is to stop before acting and to ask why all of the available

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alternatives are insufficient, merely different versions of the same thing. (In the full-length
version of the essay, posted on Lacan.com, Zizek makes a crucial distinction between two different responses to capitalism and the separation it enforces between truth and meaning: on the one hand, there are conservative [but we would also say pseudo -Leftist] reactions to re-enframe capital within some field of meaning; and, on the other, there is the attempt to raise the question of the real of capitalism with regard to its truth-beyond-meaning (what, basically, Marx did). It is absolutely this distinction that is at stake in Zizeks attempt to tear the events of the French riots away from their various commentators, both Left and Right, in thinking their truth-outside-meaning.) And

this is why, finally we see it again in this misunderstanding between Zizek and his blogger we can say that philosophical thinking as such is always political, is not to do nothing. This is why we can say that thinking, truly thinking and here we are reminded of Dylans insistence
that all of his songs are protest songs, even when they do not take up the topical issues of the day is that rarest of events, and constitutes the only real resistance to what must be called the complicity of the well -meaning Left, which in its desire for immediate results is indistinguishable from its hated rival (the narcissism of small differences), neo-liberalism.

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AT Cant Solve
Status quo hegemony remains dominant because people give into its forced choice refusing its ideological coordinates allows one to rupture hegemony in an act of radical freedom This solves AND We turned case Try or die for the negative Zizek 1 [Slavoj, Still gives a shit, On Belief (Thinking in Action), New York City: Routledge, 2001, 120-2//uwyo-ajl]
Let us take the situation in the Eastern European countries around 1990, when

Really Existing Socialism was falling apart: all of a sudden, people were thrown into a situation of the "freedom of political choice" - however, were they REALLY at any point asked the fundamental question of what kind of new
order they actually wanted? Is it not that they found themselves in the exact situation of the subject-victim of a Beauvois experiment? They

were first told that they were entering the promised land of political freedom; then, soon afterwards, they were informed that this freedom involved wild privatization, the dismantling of the system of social security, etc. etc. - they still have the freedom to choose, so if they want,
they can step out; but, no, our heroic Eastern Europeans didn't want to disappoint their Western mentors, they stoically persisted in the choice they never made, con-vincing themselves that they should behave as mature subjects who are aware that freedom has its price . . This is why the notion of the psychological subject endowed with natural propensities, who has to realize its true Self and its potentials, and who is, consequently, ultimately responsible for his failure or success, is the key ingredient of liberal freedom. And here one should risk reintroducing the Leninist opposition of "formal" and "actual" freedom: in

an act of actual freedom, one dares precisely to BREAK the seductive power of symbolic efficiency. Therein resides the moment of truth of Lenin's acerbic retort to his Menshevik critics: the truly free choice is a choice in which I do not merely choose between two or more options WITHIN a pregiven set of coordinates, but I choose to change this set of coordinates itself. The catch of the "transition" from Really Existing Socialism to capitalism was that people never had the chance to choose the ad quem of this transition - all of a sudden, they were (almost literally)
"thrown" into a new situation in which they were presented with a new set of given choices (pure liberalism, nationalist conservatism . . . ). What this means is that the

"actual freedom" as the act of consciously changing this set occurs only when, in the situation of a forced choice, one ACTS AS IF THE CHOICE IS NOT FORCED and "chooses the impossible." This is what Lenin's obsessive
tirades against "formal" freedom are about, therein resides their "rational kernel" which is worth saving today: when he emphasizes that there is no "pure" democracy, that we should always ask who does a freedom under consideration serve, which is its role in the class struggle, his point

is precisely to maintain the possibility of the TRUE radical choice. freedom is the freedom of choice WITHIN the coordinates of the existing power relations, while "actual" freedom designates the site of an intervention which undermines these very coordinates. In short, Lenin's point is not to limit freedom of choice, but to maintain the fundamental Choice - when Lenin
This is what the distinction between "formal" and "actual" freedom ultimately amounts to: "formal" asks about the role of a freedom within the class struggle, what he is asking is precisely: "Does this freedom contribute to or constrain the fundamental revolutionary Choice?"

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AT Anything Political
*same as Turns Case Political Action Specific* Our Alternative is the Proper Form of Political ThinkingThe Affirmative is a Fundamental Avoidance of Thought and Merely Recreates the Conditions of the Problem Butler and Stephens 6 Rex Scott, Lecturers at U of Queensland, Play Fuckin Loud: Zizek vs. the Left, The Symptom,
Issue 7, Spring 2006 (http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/butler.html) Here, we might say, in a nutshell is everything Zizek writes against. And it is just at this point that the true distinctions because they are the hardest, the most unpopular, the most difficult need to be made. It is just at this moment that Zizek breaks with a well-wishing Left in the name of a proper Hegelio-Marxist critique. To begin with, Zizek absolutely takes a distance from the classical model of the philosopher giving meaning to events, providing a solution to problems the philosopher as Big Other bringing about narrative and conceptual closure. (Ironically, in another post from her website, Dean even admits that one of the

Giving meaning, providing solutions, bringing about closure: this is what French politicians from the Centre-Left like Dominique de Villepin (who criticised the French State) to the Right like Nicolas Sarkozy (who blamed the rioters) rushed to do in the days immediately following the riots. It is what innumerable media critics and commentators, both in France and
things at stake in Zizeks work is the doing away with the Big Other like this.) abroad, scrambled to do in order that there was no empty air time in which actually to think. How flimsy, how pathetic, how desperate they all sounded, when we know that, within the current configuration of the French State within capitalism, there can be no solution.2 (The

same point might even be made of the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina: for all of the criticisms made of the Bush Government for acting too slowly in response to the crisis, this is again to assume that the problem was only natural, that everything could be made right by the timely intervention of the State, when in fact it is the State itself that is the problem.) In both cases, there is no solution, and therefore no meaning, no closure to events. And it is just this that Zizek is trying to think in his essay
admittedly, with great difficulty, against the best wishes of his supporters More than this, Zizek is accused in Deans essay not only of not providing the meaning of the French riots to us, but also to the rioters themselves. In the most traditional conception of philosophy, he is expected to speak for others, bears a responsibility for articulating the violence. But the real point here is that, if these riots are to constitute a real event, they must provide their own meaning. And it is the failure of the rioters to do this, to make of what happened an event, that Zizek indicates by the simple mathemic repetition of his previous work (mostly passages of Ticklish Subject) in response to them.3 The riots do not provide an occasion for new thought; they merely play out an existing impasse. But, again, it

is just this this lack of any wider meaning, the present inability of the rioters, of all of us, to formulate an authentic utopian moment, to make of what happened a universal that Zizek attempts to think in his refusal to clutch at solutions, to suggest possible alternatives, to issue philosophical nostrums from some higher place, not mired in the situation. Perhaps the only true equivalent to Zizeks authentic
ethical stance here, his refusal to offer placebos, his taking of the time to think, strangely enough, was the response of French President Jacques Chirac, who several days after the riots and he too was criticised for his delay put forward an equally mathemic decree: The French State will not concede to the rioters. We sense behind his words here, as with Zizek, a frank admission that the riots did not constitute an authentic event, that the only true crisis (for Capital) will be that of Capit al itself So what, then, is Zizek attempting to do in Some Politically Incorrect Reflections? What is the role for philosophy he proposes there? What does he mean by saying that the philosophers task is not to propose solutions, but to reframe the problem itself? If we can begin by answering these questions in a slightly programmatic way, the

role of philosophy is to provide space for us and the protestors to think. It is to enable us to reflect upon the fact that the rioters are able to propose no solution, and to make of this problem the beginning of a solution itself. It is the rush to judgement, the proposing of solutions without seeing the prior problem, that Zizek is seeking to avoid.4 And it is this time of thinking
that we call his patience, and that is variously theorised in his work as separation, uncoupling aggressive passivity and Bartlebys I prefer not to. It

is to stop before acting and to ask why all of the available

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alternatives are insufficient, merely different versions of the same thing. (In the full-length
version of the essay, posted on Lacan.com, Zizek makes a crucial distinction between two different responses to capitalism and the separation it enforces between truth and meaning: on the one hand, there are conservative [but we would also say pseudo -Leftist] reactions to re-enframe capital within some field of meaning; and, on the other, there is the attempt to raise the question of the real of capitalism with regard to its truth-beyond-meaning (what, basically, Marx did). It is absolutely this distinction that is at stake in Zizeks attempt to tear the events of the French riots away from their various commentators, both Left and Right, in thinking their truth-outside-meaning.) And

this is why, finally we see it again in this misunderstanding between Zizek and his blogger we can say that philosophical thinking as such is always political, is not to do nothing. This is why we can say that thinking, truly thinking and here we are reminded of Dylans insistence
that all of his songs are protest songs, even when they do not take up the topical issues of the day is that rarest of events, and constitutes the only real resistance to what must be called the complicity of the well-meaning Left, which in its desire for immediate results is indistinguishable from its hated rival (the narcissism of small differences), neo-liberalism.

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AT Psychoanalysis Bad - Generic

First, Even if they win every argument here, you still vote negative make them prove why this specific application of psychoanalysis is bad. Second, Our alternative is a deconstructive psychoanalysis Theyre very different things Not only do we use psychoanalysis, but we deconstruct the subject and the process and knowledge production Solves offense Third, Their distrust is predicated off of ideology ideology necessitates the rejection of all other forms of viewing things if we win a link, it means you reject all their arguments against us. Fourth, Psychoanalysis is crucial for liberation the Impossibility that structures subjectivity is the condition of hegemonic struggle's possibility Zizek 2000 [Slavoj, Rather Prolific Author, Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please! Contingency, Hegemony,
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, New York City: Verso, 2000, 110-1//uwyo-ajl] Take the case of sexual difference itself: Lacan's claim that sexual difference is 'real-impossible' is strictly synonymous with his claim that 'there is no such thing as a sexual relationship'. For Lacan, sexual difference is not a firm set of 'static' symbolic oppositions and inclusions/exclusions (heterosexual normativity which relegates homo-sexuality and other 'perversions' to some secondary role), but the

name of a deadlock, of a trauma, of an open question, of something that resists every attempt at its symbolization. Every translation of sexual difference into a set of symbolic opposition(s) is doomed to fail, and it is this very 'impossibility' that opens up the terrain of the hegemonic struggle for what 'sexual difference' will mean. What is barred is not what is excluded under the present hegemonic regime. The political struggle for hegemony whose outcome is contingent, and the `non-historical' bar or impossibility are thus strictly correlative: there is a struggle for hegemony precisely because some preceding `bar' of impossibility sustains the void at stake in the hegemonic struggle. So Lacan is the very
opposite of Kantian formalism (if by this we understand die imposition of some formal frame that serves as the a priori of its contingent content): Lacan

forces us to make thematic the exclusion of some traumatic `content' that is constitutive of the empty universal form. There is historical space only in so far as this space is sustained by some more radical exclusion (or as Lacan would have put it, forclusion). So one should distinguish between two levels: the hegemonic struggle for which particular content will hegemonize the empty universal notion; and the more fundamental impossibility that renders the Universal empty and thus a terrain for hegemonic struggle.

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AT No Lack/Lack is Affirmation
First, Desire and Lack are not just productive They are equally negative Little a is that desire wants to be fulfilled i.e. negated Little b is that desire is one thing that can only be described as no other desire besides the desire it is Desire and lack are in an of themselves infinitely negative to any other desire to affirm their existence Second, this means our K must come first Only a deconstructive psychoanalysis can analyze all aspects of desire and lack Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) Why should we insist on this point? Let us quickly recall some elements of the Lacanian doctrine. The

signifier is absolutely negative; it is what all other signifiers are not. It is pure difference in the symbolic field, whereas the letter is of a positive order (Milner 12832). This is already the heart of the matter, the same question raised by the talking cure: how a system of negative differentiation can produce an effect in the real, that is, one which is not purely negative, La lettre radicalement est effet de [End Page 154] discours (Lacan, Sminaire XX: 36). One could say, very concisely, that the letter is that which makes a difference where there is no(-o)ne.6 From this follows that the signifier is restricted to the symbolic, whereas the letter ties it to the two other registers, the I and the R, completing its nodal structure. Also, within the framework
of The Purloined Letter, there is not simply differentiation of positions but actual transformative acts, in this case the (at least) two cases of theft. The letter is transmissible, as the signifier qua signifier cannot transmit anything. Once attuned to this question, one can even sense occasionally a lack of conviction sneaking into Derridas reading: a milieu of ideality: hence the eminence o f the transcendental whose effect is to maintain presence, to wit phon. This

is what made necessary and possible, in exchange for certain corrections, the integration of Freudian phallocentrism with a fundamentally phonocentric Saussurian semiolinguistics. The algorithmic transformation does not appear to me to undo this tie (Derrida, Post 478n56). The algorithmic transformation, of which Derrida speaks here, and which does not appear to undo the phallo/phonocentric tie, is already a consideration of later developments in Lacans work. The algorithmic transformation
does in fact not take place in the Seminar on the Purloined Letter (though there is a formalization of the odd/even game in the accompanying Suitewhich Derrida chooses not to discuss), although it is doubtless part of the nascent programmatic of the Lacanian matheme. And later, in Pour lamour de Lacan, Derrida ultimately denies that Le Facteur de la vrit aimed at one

final deconstruction of the one Lacanian discourse, and refuses to pass the judgment of phonocentrism
on Lacans idea of the matheme, his mathematical rewriting of psychoanalysis.

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AT Psychoanalysis Bad Desire Productive

First, Theyre wrong, desire lacks because of the failure of language to accord with the world. Its chaotic and unstable nature prevents attempts to tie it to the symbolic reality, resulting in contradictory feelings and a gap between actual objects and the impossible object cause that people desire, meaning that no matter what contingent object or policy you achieve, therell always be somethings thats not quite it. Second, Our alternative is a deconstructive psychoanalysis Theyre very different things Not only do we use psychoanalysis, but we deconstruct the subject and the process and knowledge production Solves offense Deconstuctionist argue the same basic principle The lack and absence is a presence and a force in itself This solves all of their offense Hofmeyr 08 (Benda, Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, Pretoria South Africa, 0002. Department of
Philosophical Anthropology Faculty of Philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen, Review of Andrea Hurst, Derrida Vis--vis Lacan. Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis., JCook) In his criticism, Derrida

claims that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter harbours a closet essentialism, i.e. it represents a fundamental idealisation (akin to one of Husserls eidetic structures) that supports a covert metaphysics of presence. According to deconstructive interpretation, as we know, the entire history of Western philosophy and its language and traditions has emphasised the desire for immediate access to meaning, and thus built a metaphysics or ontotheology around the privileging of presence over absence. Hurst quite easily unravels the axial argument1 of Derridas criticism by arguing, as we have
seen above, that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter does not evoke the Real as a thing-in-itself but rather in its unspeakable singularity. However one may divide the traumatic event up into units of understanding through analysis, the event remains excessive, inherently resistant to analytical, interpretative division. Derridas

insistence upon the ineluctable divisibility of the letter refers to the fact that the original/originary, according to him, is not a substance but the scission and division of diffrance. Herein he is
therefore not as his criticism would suggest in fundamental disagreement with Lacan, for they seem to be saying the same thing, albeit in different ways about the Real. For

the Real, according to Lacan, is a matter not of presence or absence but of splitting. The indivisibility of the letter therefore is not an insistence upon presence (or absence for that matter), but upon splitting like a quantum particle split between both being and not being at its destination. In other words, Lacan promotes neither lack (absence) nor phallus (fullness) as transcendental signifieds. Rather, he insists upon the quasi-transcendental function of the Real, which is neither the absence nor the fullness of being, but, as Hurst claims, a fundamental splitting akin to diffrance (cf. p. 378). Third, Turn - this argument destroys all hope of progressive social change. If desire is productive, then ideology directly constructs subjectivity, meaning there's no way to resist hegemony, dooming us to even more fascism. Only lack in the social allows for subjective freedom

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Fourth, Even if people get what they really desire, thats not responsive. Desire lacks because of its internal contradictions, meaning that every time you get what you desire, itll fail to bring satisfaction because the object cause that you desire retroactively morphs into something else because of the way that its split from within. Fifth, Historical examples of disappointment demonstrate how desire lacks. There have been a variety of political movements that sought to abolish the alienation of lavor, inequality and so on, like Nazi aGerman and the October Revolution. The failure of these movements to live up to there expectations and the subsequent totalitarian nightmares show how a movements political actions can fail to live up to its expectations. Sixth, Everyday objects necessarily fails to fulfill the actual cause of one's desire the conflation of the two can only take place through illusion Zizek '93 [Slavoj, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993, 323//uwyo-ajl] At first sight, Rendell seems to provide here an elementary lesson on the Freudian notion of the drive: its object is ultimately indifferent and arbitrary-even in the case of the "natural" and "authentic" relationship of a mother to her child, the object- child proves interchangeable. But the accent of Rendell's story offers a different lesson: if

an object is to take its place in a libidinal space, its arbitrary character must remain concealed. The subject cannot say to herself, "Since the object is arbitrary, I can choose whatever I want as the object of my drive." The object must appear to be found, to offer itself as support and point of reference for the drive's circular move- ment. In Rendell's novel, the mother only
accepts the other child when she can say to herself "I really cannot do anything, if I refuse him now, things will get even more complicated, the child is practically imposed on me." We can say, in fact, that The Tree of Hands works in a way opposite to that of Brechtian drama: instead of making a familiar situation strange, the novel demonstrates the way we are prepared, step by step, to accept as familiar a bizarre and morbid situation. This procedure is far more subversive than the usual Brechtian one. Herein Consists, also, the fundamental lesson of Lacan: while

it is true that any object can occupy the empty place of the Thing, it can do so only by means of the illusion that it was always already there, i.e., that it was not placed there by us but found there as an "answer of the real. "Although any object can function as the object-cause of desire-insofar as the power of fascination it exerts is not its immediate property but results from the place it occupies in the structure-we must, by structural necessity, fall prey to the illusion that the power of fascination belongs to the object as such. This structural necessity enables us to
approach from a new perspective the classic Pascalian-Marxian description of the logic of "fetishistic inversion" in inter-personal relationships. The subjects think they treat a certain person as a king because he is already in himself a king, while in reality

this person is king only insofar as the subjects treat him as one. The basic reversal of Pascal and
Marx lies, of course, in their defining the king's charisma not as an immediate property of the person-king but as a "reflexive determination" of the comportment of his subjects, or-to use the terms of speech act theory-a performative effect of their symbolic ritual. But the crucial point is that it

is a positive, necessary condition for this performative effect to take place that the king's charisma be experienced precisely as an immediate property of the person-king. The moment the subjects take cognizance of the fact that the king's charisma is a performative effect, the effect itself is aborted. In other words, if we
attempt to "subtract" the fetishistic inversion and witness the performative effect directly, the performative power will be dissipated. But why, we may ask, can the performative effect take place only on condition that it is overlooked? Why does the disclosure of the performative mechanism necessarily ruin its effect? Why, to paraphrase Hamlet, is the king (also) a thing? Why must the symbolic mechanism be hooked onto a "thing," some piece of the real? The Lacanian answer is, of course: because the

symbolic

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field is in itself always already barred, crippled, porous, structured around some extimate kernel, some
impossibility. The function of the "little piece of the real" is precisely to fill out the place of this void that gapes in the very heart of the symbolic.

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AT Psychoanalysis Bad Schizoanalysis

First, This argument is more totalizing than ours and links even worse to their Oedipal arugments. The positing of multiple becomings creates a proliferation of new egos, each of which still endures an oedipalized relationship to the external world, reinscribing a concrete subject, failing to acknowledge the fundamentally external nature of the subject and its function as a void. Second, Our alternative is a deconstructive psychoanalysis Theyre very different things Not only do we use psychoanalysis, but we deconstruct the subject and the process and knowledge production Solves offense Deconstuctionist argue the same basic principle The lack and absence is a presence and a force in itself This solves all of their offense Hofmeyr 08 (Benda, Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, Pretoria South Africa, 0002. Department of
Philosophical Anthropology Faculty of Philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen, Review of Andrea Hurst, Derrida Vis--vis Lacan. Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis., JCook) In his criticism, Derrida

claims that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter harbours a closet essentialism, i.e. it represents a fundamental idealisation (akin to one of Husserls eidetic structures) that supports a covert metaphysics of presence. According to deconstructive interpretation, as we know, the entire history of Western philosophy and its language and traditions has emphasised the desire for immediate access to meaning, and thus built a metaphysics or ontotheology around the privileging of presence over absence. Hurst quite easily unravels the axial argument1 of Derridas criticism by arguing, as we have
seen above, that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter does not evoke the Real as a thing-in-itself but rather in its unspeakable singularity. However one may divide the traumatic event up into units of understanding through analysis, the event remains excessive, inherently resistant to analytical, interpretative division. Derridas

insistence upon the ineluctable divisibility of the letter refers to the fact that the original/originary, according to him, is not a substance but the scission and division of diffrance. Herein he is
therefore not as his criticism would suggest in fundamental disagreement with Lacan, for they seem to be saying the same thing, albeit in different ways about the Real. For

the Real, according to Lacan, is a matter not of presence or absence but of splitting. The indivisibility of the letter therefore is not an insistence upon presence (or absence for that matter), but upon splitting like a quantum particle split between both being and not being at its destination. In other words, Lacan promotes neither lack (absence) nor phallus (fullness) as transcendental signifieds. Rather, he insists upon the quasi-transcendental function of the Real, which is neither the absence nor the fullness of being, but, as Hurst claims, a fundamental splitting akin to diffrance (cf. p. 378). Third, Even if there are multiple selves, those selves are still out of joint in the world and find themselves in a space in which there's no consistently grounded big other, meaning that our argument still applies.

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Fourth, Far from liberating the subject, assertion of hybridity ignores the way that deterritorialization is traumatic to marginaled peoples and feeds the stability of capital Zizek '99 [Slavoj, Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Studies, Ljubliana and Badass, The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre
of political ontology, New York: Verso, 1999, 220-1//uwyo-ajl]

Does this mean that the solution lies in acknowledging the 'hybrid' character of each identity? It is easy to praise the hybridity of the postmodern migrant subject, no longer attached to specific ethnic roots, floating freely between different.cultural circles. Unfortunately, two totally different sociopolitical levels are condensed here: on the one hand the cosmopolitan upperand upper-middle-class academic, always with the proper visas enabling him to cross borders without any problem in order to carry out his (financial, academic. . .) business, and thus able to 'enjoy the difference'; on the other hand the poor (im)migrant worker driven from his home by poverty or (ethnic, religious) violence, for whom the celebrated 'hybridity' designates a very tangible traumatic experience of never being able to settle down properly and legalize his status, the subject for whom such simple tasks as
crossing a border or reuniting with his family can be an experience full of anxiety, and demanding great effort. For this second subject, being uprooted from his traditional way of life is a traumatic shock which destabilizes his entire existence - to tell him that he should enjoy the hybridity and the lack of fixed identity of his daily life, the fact that his existence is migrant, never identical-to-itself, and so on, involves

the same cynicism as that at work in the (popularized version of) Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of the schizo-subject whose rhizomatic pulverized existence explodes the paranoiac 'proto-Fascist' protec-tive shield of fixed identity: what is, for the concerned subject, an experience of the utmost suffering and despair, the stigma of exclusion, of being unable to participate in the affairs of his community, is from the point of view of the external and well, 'normal', and fully adapted postmodern theoretician - celebrated as the ultimate assertion of the subversive desiring machine. . . . Fifth, Shifting identification reinforces the ideological regime by making it more bearable Zizek 2000 [Slavoj, Rather Prolific Author, Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please! Contingency, Hegemony,
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, New York City: Verso, 2000, 102-4//uwyo-ajl]

the exclusionary logic is always redoubled in itself: not only is the subordinated Other (homosexuals, non-white races...) excluded/repressed, but hegemonic universality itself also relies on a disavowed 'obscene' particular content of its own (say, the exercise of power that legitimizes itself as legal, tolerant, Christian. . . relies on a set of publicly disavowed obscene rituals of violent humiliation of the subordinated 26). More generally, we are dealing here with what one is tempted to call the ideological practice of disidentification. That is to say, one should turn around the standard notion of ideology as providing a firm identification
to its subjects, constraining them to their 'social roles': what if, on a different - but no less irrevocable and structurally necessary level,

ideology is effective precisely by constructing a space of false disidentification, of false dis-tance towards the actual co-ordinates of those subjects' social existence?27 Is not this logic of disidentification discernible from the most elementary case of 'I am not only an American (husband, worker, democrat, gay. . .), but, beneath all these roles and masks, a human being, a complex unique personality' (where the very dis-tance towards the symbolic feature that determines my social place guarantees the

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efficiency of this determination), up to the more complex case of cyberspace playing with one's multiple
identities? The mystification operative in the perverse 'just playing' of cyber-space is therefore double: not only are the games we are playing in it more serious than we tend to assume (is it not that, in the guise of a fiction, of 'it's just a game', a subject can articulate and stage features of his symbolic identity - sadistic, 'perverse', and so on - which he would never be able to admit in his 'real' intersubjective contacts?), but the opposite also holds, that is,

the much-celebrated playing with multiple, shifting personas (freely constructed identities) tends to obfuscate (and thus falsely liberate us from) the constraints of social space in which our existence is trapped. Let me evoke another example: why did Christa Wolf's The Quest for Christa T exert such a tremendous impact on the
GDR public in the 1960s? Because it is precisely a novel about the failure - or, at least, the vac-illation - of ideological interpellation, about the failure of fully recognizing oneself in one's socio-ideological identity: Then her name was called: 'Christa T.!' - she stood up and went and did what was expected of her; was there anyone to whom she could say that hearing her name called gave her much to think about: Is it really me who's meant? Or is it only my name that's being used? Counted in with other names, industriously added up in front of the equals sign? And might just as well have been absent, would anyone have noticed?'2B Is

not this gesture of 'Am I that name?', this probing into one's symbolic 'identification so well expressed by Johannes R. Becher's quote which Wolf put at the very beginning of the novel: 'This coming-to-oneself - what is it?', hysterical provocation at its purest? And my point is that such a self-probing attitude, far from effectively threatening the predominant ideological regime, is what ultimately makes it 'livable' - this is why her West German detractors were in a way paradoxically right when, after the fall of the Wall, they claimed that Christa Wolf, by expressing the subjective complexities, inner doubts and oscillations of the GDR subject, actually provided a realistic literary equivalent of the ideal GDR subject, and was as such much more successful in her task of securing political conformity than the open naive propagandist fiction depicting ideal subjects sacrificing themselves for the Communist Cause.29

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AT Psychoanalysis Bad Oedipus Bad

First, No link We don't invoke Oedipus in the familial way that they're criticizing. They need a specific criticism of that usage. Second, Our alternative is a deconstructive psychoanalysis Theyre very different things Not only do we use psychoanalysis, but we deconstruct the subject and the process and knowledge production Solves offense Deconstuctionist argue the same basic principle The lack and absence is a presence and a force in itself This solves all of their offense Hofmeyr 08 (Benda, Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, Pretoria South Africa, 0002. Department of
Philosophical Anthropology Faculty of Philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen, Review of Andrea Hurst, Derrida Vis--vis Lacan. Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis., JCook) In his criticism, Derrida

claims that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter harbours a closet essentialism, i.e. it represents a fundamental idealisation (akin to one of Husserls eidetic structures) that supports a covert metaphysics of presence. According to deconstructive interpretation, as we know, the entire history of Western philosophy and its language and traditions has emphasised the desire for immediate access to meaning, and thus built a metaphysics or ontotheology around the privileging of presence over absence. Hurst quite easily unravels the axial argument1 of Derridas criticism by arguing, as we have
seen above, that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter does not evoke the Real as a thing-in-itself but rather in its unspeakable singularity. However one may divide the traumatic event up into units of understanding through analysis, the event remains excessive, inherently resistant to analytical, interpretative division. Derridas

insistence upon the ineluctable divisibility of the letter refers to the fact that the original/originary, according to him, is not a substance but the scission and division of diffrance. Herein he is
therefore not as his criticism would suggest in fundamental disagreement with Lacan, for they seem to be saying the same thing, albeit in different ways about the Real. For

the Real, according to Lacan, is a matter not of presence or absence but of splitting. The indivisibility of the letter therefore is not an insistence upon presence (or absence for that matter), but upon splitting like a quantum particle split between both being and not being at its destination. In other words, Lacan promotes neither lack (absence) nor phallus (fullness) as transcendental signifieds. Rather, he insists upon the quasi-transcendental function of the Real, which is neither the absence nor the fullness of being, but, as Hurst claims, a fundamental splitting akin to diffrance (cf. p. 378). Third, It's not responsive The subject is oedipalized in that language fails to fix reality and that the social is incomplete. No matter what symbolic construction you develop, it'll miss something, meaning some form of oedipalization is inevitable Fourth, Turn Our conception of the subject is necessary for resistance. If desire doesn't lack, then the subject is determinately produced by ideology and there's no room for freedom in that failure. Only the subject as a split in reality allows for resistance to fascism.

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Fifth, The paternal law doesn't repress desire The father, itself, is a fantasy to paper over that gap Only our model allows for lack in the other and deterritorialization Zizek '93 [Slavoj, , Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993, 245//uwyo-ajl] Why is this redoubling necessary? In the Oedipus myth, the prohibition of enjoyment still functions, ultimately, as an external impediment, leaving the possibility open that without this obstacle, we would be able to enjoy fully. But enjoyment

is already, in itself, impossible. One of the commonplaces of Lacanian theory is that access to enjoyment is denied to the speaking being, as such. The figure of the father saves us from this deadlock by bestowing on the immanent impossibility the form of a symbolic interdiction. The myth of the primal father in Totem and Taboo complements-or, more precisely, supplements-the Oedipus
myth by embodying this impossible enjoyment in the obscene figure of the Father-of-Enjoyment, i.e., in the very figure who assumes the role of the agent of prohibition. The

illusion is that there was at least one subject (the primal father possessing all women) who was able to enjoy fully; as such, the figure of the Father-ofEnjoyment is nothing but a neurotic fantasy that overlooks the fact that the father has been dead from the beginning, i.e., that he never was alive, except insofar as he did not know that he was already dead. The lesson to be drawn from this is that reducing the pressure of the superego is definitely not to be accomplished by replacing its supposedly "irrational," "counterproductive," "rigid" pressure with rationally accepted renunciations, laws, and rules. The point is rather to acknowledge that part of enjoyment is lost from the very beginning, that it is immanently impossible, and not concentrated "somewhere else," in the place from which the agent of prohibition speaks. At the same time, this allows us to locate the weak point of the Deleuzian polemic against Lacan's "oedipalism."6 What Deleuze and Guattari fail to take into account is that the most powerful anti-Oedipus is Oedipus itself the Oedipal father-father reigning as his Name, as the agent of symbolic law-is necessarily redoubled in itself, it can exert its authority only by relying on the superego figure of the Father-of-Enjoyment. It is precisely this dependence of the
Oedipal father-the agency of symbolic law guaranteeing order and reconCiliationon the perverse figure of the Father-Of-Enjoyment that explains why Lacan prefers to write perversion as pre-version, i.e., the version of the father. Far

from acting only as symbolic agent, restraining pre-oedipal, "polymorphous perversity," subjugating it to the genital law, the "version of," or turn toward, the father is the most radical perversion of all. Sixth, Deleuzian anti-oedipalism is a false transgression that maintains current power configurations through perversion Zizek '99 [Slavoj, Ljubliana and Badass, The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre of political ontology, New York: Verso, 1999,
250-1//uwyo-ajl] And to give this opposition a philosophical twist one is tempted to claim that his

fidelity to the truth of hysteria against the pervert's false transgression is what led Lacan, in the last years of his teaching, to claim pathetically: 'I rebel against philosophy [Je m'insurge contre la philosophie].' Apropos of this general
claim, the Leninist question should be asked immediately: which (singular) philosophy was, for him, a stand-in for philosophy 'as such'? Following a suggestion by Francois Regnault (who draws attention to the fact that Lacan made this statement in 1975, in the wake of the publication of Anti-Oedipus), one could argue that the

philosophy actually under fire, far from standing for some traditional Hegelian metaphysics, is none other than that of Gilles Deleuze, a philosopher of globalized perversion if there ever was one. That is to say, is not Deleuze's critique of 'Oedipal' psychoanalysis an exemplary case of the perverse reaction to hysteria? Against the hysterical subject who maintains an ambiguous attitude towards symbolic authority (like the psychoanalyst who
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acknowledges the pathological consequences of 'repression', but none the less claims that 'repression' is the condition of cultural progress, since outside symbolic authority there is only the psychotic void), the

pervert bravely goes to the limit in undermining the very foundations of symbolic authority and fully endorsing the multiple productivity of pre-symbolic libidinal flux . . . for Lacan, of course, this 'antiOedipal' radicalization of psychoanalysis is the very model of the trap to be avoided at any cost: the model of false subversive radicalization that fits the existing power constellation perfectly. In other words, for Lacan, the philosopher's 'radicality', his fearless questioning of all presuppositions, is the mode of the false transgressive radicality.

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AT Psychoanalysis Bad Re-entrenches Capitalism

First, Our alternative is a deconstructive psychoanalysis Theyre very different things Not only do we use psychoanalysis, but we deconstruct the subject and the process and knowledge production Solves offense Deconstuctionist argue the same basic principle The lack and absence is a presence and a force in itself This solves all of their offense Hofmeyr 08 (Benda, Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, Pretoria South Africa, 0002. Department of
Philosophical Anthropology Faculty of Philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen, Review of Andrea Hurst, Derrida Vis--vis Lacan. Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis., JCook) In his criticism, Derrida

claims that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter harbours a closet essentialism, i.e. it represents a fundamental idealisation (akin to one of Husserls eidetic structures) that supports a covert metaphysics of presence. According to deconstructive interpretation, as we know, the entire history of Western philosophy and its language and traditions has emphasised the desire for immediate access to meaning, and thus built a metaphysics or ontotheology around the privileging of presence over absence. Hurst quite easily unravels the axial argument1 of Derridas criticism by arguing, as we have
seen above, that Lacans insistence upon the indivisibility of the letter does not evoke the Real as a thing-in-itself but rather in its unspeakable singularity. However one may divide the traumatic event up into units of understanding through analysis, the event remains excessive, inherently resistant to analytical, interpretative division. Derridas

insistence upon the ineluctable divisibility of the letter refers to the fact that the original/originary, according to him, is not a substance but the scission and division of diffrance. Herein he is
therefore not as his criticism would suggest in fundamental disagreement with Lacan, for they seem to be saying the same thing, albeit in different ways about the Real. For

the Real, according to Lacan, is a matter not of presence or absence but of splitting. The indivisibility of the letter therefore is not an insistence upon presence (or absence for that matter), but upon splitting like a quantum particle split between both being and not being at its destination. In other words, Lacan promotes neither lack (absence) nor phallus (fullness) as transcendental signifieds. Rather, he insists upon the quasi-transcendental function of the Real, which is neither the absence nor the fullness of being, but, as Hurst claims, a fundamental splitting akin to diffrance (cf. p. 378). Second, Psychoanalysis is necessary to overcome capitalism Capital functions by repressing the real of markets beneath the symbolic reality of individual decisionmaking Zizek 2000 [Slavoj, Professor at the European Graduate School, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why the Christian Legacy is Worth
Fighting For?, New York: Verso, 2000, 15-6//uwyo-ajl] Here we encounter the Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: 'reality'

is the social reality of the actual people involved in interaction, and in the productive process; while the Real is the inexorable 'abstract' spectral logic of Capital which determines what goes on in social reality. This gap is palpable in the way the modern economic situation of a country is considered to be good and stable by international financial experts, even when the great majority of its people have a lower standard of living than they did before reality doesn't matter, what matters is the situation of Capital....And, again, is this not truer than

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ever today? Do

not phenomena usually described as those of 'virtual capitalism' (the futures trade and similar abstract financial speculations) indicate the reign of 'real abstraction' at its purest, much more radical than it was in Marx's time? In short, the highest form of ideology lies not in getting caught up in ideological spectrality, forgetting about its foundations in real people and their relations, but precisely in overlooking this Real of spectrality, and pretending to address directly 'real people with their worries'. Visitors to the London Stock Exchange are given a free leaflet which explains to them that the stock market is not about some mysterious fluctuations, but about real people and their products this is ideology at its purest. Third, Psychoanalysis is key capital functions according the logic of the real, replacing social reality with an ideological abstraction that's even more real Zizek '99 [Slavoj, Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Studies, Ljubliana and Badass, The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre
of political ontology, New York: Verso, 1999, 276//uwyo-ajl] In socioeconomic terms, one is tempted to claim that Capital itself is describes the mad self-enhancing circulation of Capital, whose

the Real of our age. That is to say, when Marx solipsistic path of self-fecundation reaches its apogee in today's meta-reflexive speculations on futures, it is far too simplistic to
claim that the spectre of this self-engendering monster which pursues its path regardless of any human or environmental concern is an ideological abstraction, and one should never forget that behind this abstraction there are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources Capital's circulation is based, and on which it feeds like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this

'abstraction' is not only in our (financial speculator's) misperception of social reality - it is 'real in the precise sense of determining the structure of the material social processes themselves: the fate of whole strata of populations, and sometimes of whole countries, can be decided by the 'solipsistic' speculative dance of Capital, which-pursues its goal of profitability in a benign indifference to how its movement will affect social reality. Here we encounter the Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: 'reality' is the social reality of the actual people involved in interaction and in the productive processes, while the Real is the inexorable 'abstract' spectral Logic of Capital which determines what goes on in social reality.

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AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Generic

*same as solvency extension* First, Deconstructionalist philosophies are deeply intertwined with psychoanalytic philosophies Both believe in the same basis of the impossible real as well as the split of presence and absence both being effectual in their works Combining the similarities answers all of the offense This combination is key to solvency Hofmeyr 08 (Benda, Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria, Pretoria South Africa, 0002. Department of
Philosophical Anthropology Faculty of Philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen, Review of Andrea Hurst, Derrida Vis--vis Lacan. Interweaving Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis., JCook)

Derridas persistent resistance against psychoanalysis seems all the more curious in light of this almost effortless invalidation of his Lacan-critique, the gist of which is employed by
Hurst to argue in favour of an accord between their respective discourses on the basis of a shared poststructural logic: the plural logic of the aporia. According to Hurst, the

style of thinking underpinning Lacanian psychoanalytic theory precisely matches the plural logic of the aporia by which Derrida describes his own quasi-transcendental thinking (p. 8, my emphasis). Opposing the
mutual antagonism between these thinkers, Hurst compares what the Lacanians say about Lacan with what the Derrideans say about Derrida and curiously argues in favour of a deep theoretical accord, a mirroring symmetry or, precise match (ibid.), precisely in the name of the poststructural postulation of diffrance or splitting. She justifies this rather paradoxical enterprise of eliminating differences in the name of difference, by insisting that it would help clarify the field in which both operate (ibid.) and provide a key to a more productive interchange between deconstruction and Lacanian pscychoanalysis (p. 11). The overall task of the study is therefore to demonstrate that both

Derrida and Lacan carefully insist not only upon Kants transcendental turn but also on a second paradigm shift (reflected in Lacans thinking of the impossible Real and Derridas equivalent thinking of diffrance) whereby transcendental thinking, which concerns itself with the conditions that make what is given in experience possible, becomes quasi-transcendental. Quasi-transcendental thinking ... does not step beyond the transcendental paradigm but remains parasitic upon it even as it ruins it, by adding that economic conditions of possibility [of closure or totality] are simultaneously the very aneconomic conditions [of openness or infinity] that also make the given, strictly speaking, impossible (p. 8). Both deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis, then, embody the logic of such an aporetic (im)possibility from which there is no escape, neither by way of return to an ancient beginning nor by way of projection into a future ideal. Lacans formulation of the Real as rupture, for example, is characterised by an opposition between paranoiac universalism and hysterical nominalism, which precisely matches Derridas distinction between the economic and aneconomic aporias the choice between two equally unsatisfactory choices. Lacan cites the muggers choice as example: your money or your life. This, of course, turns out to be no real choice at all, but rather a Hegelian lose/lose scenario: in choosing one the other is lost, but since they are interdependent, opting for one would be to lose the original choice (for life, as Hurst shrewdly remarks, is the necessary condition for having money, and, these days, money is the necessary condition for having a life). For Lacan, the task of analysis is to guide the analysand beyond this lose/lose double bind the aporias of paranoiac universalism and hysterical nominalism to a third stance, the possibility of a win/win scenario: the revolutionarys choice between freedom or death. Ch Guevara risked all for the sake of freedom, whereas Socrates chose death rather than forsaking freedom. By choosing for decisive action,
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both retained eternal freedom. This freedom for, then, is the only possible freedom, the paradoxical freedom
attained through the refusal to submit to the constrictions of the either/or choice given by a binary determination of options, what Foucault dubbed the Enlightenment blackmail, and the willingness therefore to face head on the double bind of the aporia of aporias, i.e. all

the ethical, political and conceptual paradoxes and dilemmas that can neither be overcome nor evaded but must be worked through interminably (pp. 10-11).

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AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Derridas Insistence

First, Deconstruction being applied to psychoanalysis allows the theories to move beyond the pleasure principle, into every area of life Derrida is already deeply linked with psychoanalysis through theories of negation and repression Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.)

there is Derridas insistence, to be found in its most explicit form already in Freud and the Scene of Writing, that despite appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy (196). This is despite appearances, since deconstruction does indeed advance and insist not only on a concept of repression, namely the thesis of a repression of writing, but also, through the articulation of the logic of the trace, which, analogous to the Freudian Urverdrngung (primary/original repression), is refused the status of a concept but whose very structure [] makes possible, as the movement of temporalization and pure auto-affection, something that can be called repression in general, the original synthesis of original repression and secondary repression, repression itself (Freud 230).1 Here, the question of the relationship between deconstruction and psychoanalysis already finds itself organized around the thinking of temporality that Derrida considers inaugurated with Freud, and that crystallizes in the notion of the compulsion to repeat (Wiederholungszwang). Providing a new, or indeed a first, philosophical interpretation of this Freudian concept dominates all of Derridas engagement with psychoanalysis and explains the central role played by a limited number of Freuds texts, above all Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
We shall begin by addressing some major obstacles to the interpretation I am putting forward. There are at least three: First,

Second, This is irrelevant because there is now text on the combination It doesnt matter if Derrida talked and agreed with Lacan, because they obviously didnt Third, Its just personal antagonism No theoretical opposition Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) On the other hand, it

is Derrida himself who gives his readers apparent license to pass over Lacan's texts in silence. Judging by Derrida's explanation in the 1971 interview "Positions" of the almost total absence of references to Lacan in his work up to that point, the reasons are complex, having to do with personal antagonisms, striking differences in intellectual temperament, and, least of all (in my view), clear theoretical differences.19 First, Derrida accuses Lacan of an aggressive response to his own work that takes the form of "kettle logic," or the accumulation of incompatible assertions. In his words: "1. Devaluation and rejection: 'it is worthless' or 'I do not agree.' 2. Valuation and reappropriation: 'moreover it is mine and I have always said so.'"20 The justice of the accusation is questionable, and despite the avowedly "minor importance" Derrida attaches to it, there is no doubt that it contributes to the antagonistic tone of subsequent

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interchanges.21 In this odd game of getting even, as Barbara Johnson puts it, "the priority of aggression is doubled by the
aggressiveness of priority."22

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AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Textual Basis

First, Derrida may have attacked Lacan, but many concepts are shared between the two Especially true in their later, more adapted and fixed writings and thoughts Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 201011
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.)

The second obstacle concerns the difficulties concerning the textual basis for the encounter between Derrida and Lacan. These difficulties are not simply of a philological nature. On the one hand, there is Le facteur de la vrit, first published in 1975, often traded as Derridas canonical deconstruction of Lacan. This
text, a reading of Lacans 1956 Seminar on Poes Purloined Letter that concludes the highly complex textual assemblage of The Post Card,

inscribes Lacan into the pre-established framework of the earlier reading of Freud, and results in the well-known neologistic denunciation of phallogocentrism. Then there are the discussions of Lacans notion of the symbolic in the 1971 interview
with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpette, later published in Positions. Also, some clear references to Lacanian concepts, though not by way of the proper name, can be discerned in Dissemination. All of these texts, we [End Page 148] should recall, deal with Lacans thought as presented in crits, published in 1966. In Facteur de la vrit in particular, the apparent privilege Lacan himself accorded to the seminar on Poe serves to legitimate the pars pro toto approach. Still,

the reader can discern a certain unease with this self-restrictive approach in the barrage of footnotes towards the end of Facteur de la vrit, where the references to other texts by Lacan suddenly multiply. Finally, as a decidedly odd text in this set, there is the much more recent intervention at a Lacan symposium in 1991, entitled Pour lamour de Lacan, subsequently republished in
Resistances.2 On the other hand, there is only one reference to Derrida in the entirety of Lacans work, published and unpublished: a rather malicious remark (je le crois en analyse) made in Seminar XIX, Ou pire. This remark soon found the ears of Derrid a, despite being promptly left out in the institutionally sanctioned summary later published in the journal of the cole freudienne, Scilicet 5.

Second, This is irrelevant because there is now text on the combination It doesnt matter if Derrida talked and agreed with Lacan, because they obviously didnt

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AT Decon. =/= Psycho. Memory Archive

First, tag Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) The third obstacle is arguably the most important, but it is also much less straightforward. It

originates in the development of the question of the archive as an explicit development of Derridas earlier reading of the Freudian topic of the psyche in Freud and the Scene of Writing. In Archive Fever, Derrida seeks to show that what Freud presented as a topic of retention and an account of memory is not contained and exhausted by this function, but, in what is essentially a rupture, organizes an entire topology of interiority and exteriority. It does so not only as a condition for psychic activity, but as the institution of the hypomnemic apparatus that does not dissolve itself into either the mnme or the anmnesis. According to Derrida, what the Freudian topic of the psyche is supposed to achieve is already the mark of the institution as such: Ce Bloc magique , ce modle extrieur, donc archival, de lappareil
psychique denregistrement et de mmorisation nintgre pas seulement les concepts inauguraux de la psychanalyse, depuis lEsquisse jusquaux articles de la Mtapsychologie, en passant par la Traumdeutung, en particulier tous ceux qui concernent par exemple le refoulement, la censure, lenregistrement (Niederschrift) dans les deux systmes ICS et PCS, les trois points de vue topique, dynamique et conomique. En tenant compte de la multiplicit des lieux dans lappareil psychique, il intgre aussi, audedans de la psukh mme, la ncessit dun certain dehors, de certaines frontires entre du dedans et du dehors. Et avec ce dehors domestique, cest--dire aussi avec lhypothse dun support, dune surface ou dun espace internes sans lesquels il ny a ni consignation, enregistrement ou impression, ni rpression, censure ou refoulement, il accueille lide dune archive psychique distincte de la mmoire spontane, dune hupmnsis distincte de la mnme de lanmnsis : linstitution, en somme, dune prothse du dedans. Nous disons institution (on pourrait dire rection ) pour marquer, ds le seuil originaire de cette prothse, une rupture tout aussi originaire avec la nature. La thorie de la psychanalyse devient alors une thorie de larch ive et non seulement une thorie de la mmoire. (Derrida, Mal 3738) [End Page 149] The

entire complex of archivization, preservation, and transmission, which in Freud and the Scene of Writing was treated almost exclusively under the sway of the conceptual apparatus of Of Grammatology, is now being analyzed primarily from that beyond of the pleasure principle that only gains prominence in the later texts of the Freudian corpus, such as Moses and Monotheism. What these later interventions have in view, as already announced by the discussion of lifedeath (la vie la mort) in Spculer Sur Freud (Derrida, Post 259) is a certainimpossibleaffirmation of the death-drive, which can only take the shape of a double bind, rather than the earlier deconstruction of the scene of original inscription viz. repression. This third obstacle begins to gain shape when we couple this with the exigency both theoretical and ethicalof resistance, put forward by Derrida in the essay by the same name. Here, the trope of resistance is applied by Derrida as much in the name of as against psychoanalysis. The text activates the Lacanian trope of resistance to the resisters rsistance aux rsistants (Lacan, La Chose 418)not just an abused notion of the discourse of the analyst (one recalls here Freuds acknowledgment of the heads I win, tails you lose problem at the heart of the concept of resistance). Derrida speaks in the name of another resistance, one that repeats the structural argument of Archive Fever. This time, however, it is applied more widely to the contemporary question of what to do with analysis, and specifically to the love of, and for, Lacan: I consider it an act of cultural resistance to pay homage publicly to thought, discourse, writing, which is difficult and does not lend itself easily to normalization by media, academe, or publishing, is refractory to the restoration presently in progress, and to philosophical

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or theoretical neoconformism in general [] which levels everything around us, in the attempt to make us forget what the Lacan era was, along with the future and promise of his thought, thus erasing the name of Lacan (Derrida, Pour lamour 64, emph. mine).
Can one deny that the actuality of the exigency of resistance persists and imposes itself, perhaps even more so than twenty years ago, when these phrases were uttered? This is not a historicist, or even an historical, argument. It is not a question of history, but a question of dusk. As is demonstrated by the publication of Benot Peeterss biography of Derrida3 (meticulously researched, w ritten by someone with the necessary credentials, sanctioned by a good pressall the characteristics listed by Derrida himself), we are witnessing, at the end of deconstructions long march through the (American) institutions, a crepuscular taking -shape of the period of thought that sailed under the flag of post-structuralism. The proper names persist, of course, but the mere preservation of the name is no guarantee against forgetting; it is perfectly compatible with the continued groundswell of the conformism and restoration [End Page 150] Derrida wished to resist with his declara tion of love of Lacan. To remain for a moment within the Hegelian imagery of dusk: dusk is not the equivalent of a moment within history. Dusk, as it is famously presented in the preface to Hegels Principles of the Philosophy of Right, is not historical, but the time of the incongruence of history and thinking. It is ultimately impossible to determine whether the present is the dusk at which Minerva takes flight or the melancholic descent into the night in which all cows are black, that is, of true in-difference.4 Part

of the task, then, is to put the archival question to deconstruction itself, to allow it to appear historically if only in order to raise its proper problematic of transmission. Unsurprisingly, this question had begun insisting from the earliest texts Derrida produced, as this passage from Diffrance demonstrates: I wish to underline that the efficacity of the
thematic of diffrance may very well, indeed must, one day be superseded, lending itself if not to its own replacement, at least to enmeshing itself in a chain that in truth it never will have governed (7). This, however, is not to be confused with an echo of Freuds expectation and desire that his name be erased and forgotten in order to give life to psychoanalysis as a scientific discourse. It has even less to do with a vulgar and quasi-historical notion of overcoming deconstruction. If

resistance here does call for a certain supersession of the efficacity of the thematic of difference, acknowledging and entering into the dusk of deconstruction does not mean consigning it to the enclosed space of an epoch, reverting to pre- or non-deconstructive modes of, just to
name two phenomena among many, classical-philological hermeneutics and decidedly feverless, anti-inflammatory archival work (a return to a literature speaking for itself ) or what I would not hesitate to call certain new philosophical ontologies o f resentment. The real

exigency is twofold: on the one hand, resistance to the transformation of deconstruction into a dispositif, that is, it reasserts the incompatibility of Derridas work with the repressive framework Lacan formalized as the Discourse of the University. (It is worth keeping in mind that, in his theory of discourses, Lacan sees the repressive discourse not as the
discourse of the master, but as the discourse of the university, a discourse that precludes both the position of resistance, be it hysterical or analytical, and that of the master.) On the other hand, then, as Catherine Malabou has argued recently, it

is necessary to assume a responsibility of invention, which is in fact a responsibility for changing difference. The first step of this invention can only be accomplished by refuser de rpter ou de pasticher un geste qui ne peut plus produire de difference [refusing to repeat or pastiche a gesture which no longer produces difference] (Malabou 79). This is the field of intervention where a reconsideration of the relation between the works of Derrida and Lacan has become necessary, and from which a grammatological concept of the unconscious can be constructed. [End Page 151]

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AT Psycho. Links to Derrida

First, Despite Derridas assumption, Lacan and psychoanalysis remove themselves from the metaphysics of presence by discussing reality, the Real and challenging the point in which the Lack is positive and negative Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) Moreover, Derrida

argues that Lacan 's supposedly casual rhetoric leaves him naively trapped within the so-called metaphysics of presence. While he might wax lyrical about loving Lacan in Resistances of Psychoanalysis, he does not shift his critical stance in this later text. Instead, he speaks here of the ironic chiasmus between himself as a deconstructive "philosopher" and Lacan as a philosophizing psychoanalyst, which makes Lacan's discourse, in his words, "too much at home with the philosophers."24 Backed by Derrida's damning criticism, it is unfortunate but unsurprising that many
Derrideans on this account tend to avoid even opening Lacan's texts. Despite the fact that psychoanalysis haunts Derrida's own texts, it does not fare well in the commentaries on Derrida's work. Caputo's Deconstruction in a Nutshell, for example, seems to cover everything but psychoanalysis, and Bennington's "Derridabase" offers suggestive but extremely cursory remarks concerning Derrida's encounters with psychoanalysis. This is all the more surprising since it deals with the quintessentially psychoanalytical theme of singular subjectivity.25 Many

Derrideans, moreover, uncritically trusting Derrida's assessment, make the fundamental mistake of assuming from the start that Lacan's discourse is characterized by an essentialism that belongs within the ambit of the metaphysics of presence. Derrida argues that in the thinking of differance, one "puts into question the authority of presence, or of its simple symmetrical opposite, absence or lack. Thus one questions the limit which has always constrained us ... to formulate the meaning of Being in general as presence or absence, in the categories of being or beingness (ousia)"26 By contrast, he charges Lacan with the hypostatization of "lack," or, that is, the
formulation of the meaning of being in general as absence, which implies that his discourse does not move beyond the categories of being. Lacan

denies this charge emphatically, arguing a similar point: the thinking of the Real, he insists, "does not lend itself to ontology . . . it is neither being, nor non-being, but the unrealized."27Again, in response to the argument of The Title of the Letter, whose authors remain subject to
precisely this prejudice, Lacan insists to the contrary that "it cannot be ambiguous that I oppose to the concept of beingas it is sustained in the philosophical tradition . . . the notion that we are duped by jouissance."28 In fact, Lacan grumbles, "it is as if it were precisely upon reaching the impasse to which my discourse is designed to lead them that they considered their work done, declaring themselvesor rather declaring me, which amounts to the same thing given their conclusions confounded."29 Nevertheless, many

thinkers continue blithely to ignore Lacanian protests and typically misconstrue Lacan's claims, taking them as evidence of a closet essentialism. Caputo offers
a clear description of this prejudice in his exposition of Drucilla Cornell's treatment of Lacan's claim that "Woman does not exist/'30 Cornell, he reports, expresses disappointment in Lacan for undermining the revolutionary implications of this statement by insisting, as Caputo puts it, "that woman is essentially the truth of castration, or of the hole, essentially the place of the lack." Moreover, by contrast, a Derridean

approach is supposed to provide the corrective for Lacan's phallocentric essentialism: Derrida turns Lacan's statement around into a statement of non-essentialism. Woman does not exist if existence is given the sense of fixed identity and permanent presence. She does not exist, not out of lack or defect but excess, for the feminine disrupts the proper place, including and especially the proper place to which she is assigned by Lacan as lack.31 According to Copjec, then, the interpretative mistake many keep making is to take what Lacan calls the "hard kernel of the real" to be "some essence or quasi-transcendental a priori that manages to escape the contingent processes of history."32 This is, again, the mistake Judith Butler makes, for example, in

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her reading of Lacan's account of sexual difference, where she takes "the Real of sexual difference" to imply an a priori gender dimorphism in Lacanian discourse, conditioned by normative heterosexu-ality, which, as usual, defines woman as the negative of man.33 Again, Lacanians

deny this charge of covert phallocentrism: an admission such as Colette Soler's, for example, that Lacan indeed "affirms the phallocentrism' of the unconscious," must be placed within the context of his wholesale revaluation of values (for example, in Seminar XX), where such an affirmation can only function as a critique of the one-sided "phallic logic" that characterizes the "Symbolic Order."34

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Deconstruction Key To Psychoanalysis

*Same as key to solvency* First, Derridas deconstruction is a prerequisite to philosophical thought It question the very basic foundation of thought and understanding Combining it with psychoanalysis is key to create a movement that truly transforms the Real Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 2010 11
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.) I have already sketched out the difficulties facing a grammatological concept of the unconscious. In order to alleviate them somewhat, I will permit myself to argue the following, namely, that

Of Grammatology, a large section of the texts contained in Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy, and at least up until and including Dissemination, can be read as giving a systematic answer (which is not the same as the answer of a system) to a fundamental question, a question that Derrida gives its unary trait by repeatedly aligning it with what he considers the question of metaphysics itself. In these texts, the local question of one particular thinker, be it Husserl, Plato, Austin, Artaud, or his contemporary Foucault, is raised to the dignity of a deconstruction of metaphysics. I would argue that this is the reason why it is not wrong to consider this part of Derridas work as inaugurating, or at least co-founding, a poststructuralist program. The question of metaphysics was only interrogated anew, that is, given a genuinely novel philosophical form, with the high tide of structuralism. We are tempted to paraphrase the question as follows: how can (material) content be attributed to a synchronic system of purely differential relations; and how is one to think the passage from (virtual) differentiation to (actual) articulation? This is what led Gilles Deleuze to answer the question, what is structuralism? with a new transcendental philosophy (See Deleuze). Here it is also possible to glimpse why psychoanalysis came to play such a pivotal role for Derrida in these texts. It should be acknowledged that this is the very same question that lies at the heart of what Freud understood analysis to mean. At the same time, analysis requires an exposition of the functions of Vorstellungsreprsentanz, that is, the transformation and translation of unconscious to conscious representation, the passage from latent to manifest dream content, in short, the parameters of the dreamwork and the subjection of this transcendental problem to the absolute novelty of the talking cure, that of how it is possible that meaning, through its production and enunciation, can produce effects in the Real. Freud considered this the only possible proof of the existence of the unconscious, and attempted to give a theoretical treatment of it in the metapsychological writings. In the end, both Lacans and Derridas treatments of Freud are inquiries into the Freudian metapsychology and its place in the philosophical tradition, as well as the viability of analysis as a discourse absolutely different from the same tradition.

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AT Phonocentrism Bad
First, Our combination of Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis removes phonocentrism from our alternative Deconstruction problematizes the foundation of all thought, removing phonocentrism and creating ex-centrism Wilberg 11 (Henrik S., PhD candidate in German Literature and Critical Thought at Northwestern University and 201011
Yarrington Fellow at cole normale suprieure, Paris. His dissertation project is an investigation of the figure of infinite judgment in the transformation of language, logic, and aesthetics in early nineteenth-century German literature and philosophy, No Outside of Psychoanalysis: Towards a Grammatological Concept of the Unconscious, JCook.)

A grammatological concept of the unconscious begins to take shape by way of a displacement of the point of contact between Lacan and Derrida from these questions regarding the letter to the concept of writing. Two elements show themselves as favourable to the displacement I am suggesting. The first is the assertion of Derridas in Pour lamour de Lacan that one can discern a heightened sensibility towards, and even an overturning of, phonocentrism in Lacans later work, notable in the seminar Encore. While stopping short of calling this a complete turn, this development is, according to Derrida, performed trs grammato-logiquement (very grammatologically) (Pour lamour 79). In short, both Lacan and Derrida realizeand this not entirely independent of each othera rewriting of writing. If we recall the extraordinary third, and now perhaps the most dated, chapter of Of Grammatology, titled Grammatology as a Positive Science, Derrida invokes a generalized grammatology in the place of Saussures own projection of a generalized semiology, all the while acknowledging and inscribing in the idea of this science to come a certain impossibility a priori. This impossibility originates in the ex-centric position writing is shown to take up vis--vis sciencegrammatology will not be a science among other sciences. As Derrida puts it himself, elle risque en effet dbranler aussi le concept de la science (Derrida, De la grammatologie 109). In a slight approximation we could say that Derridas science of grammatology receives its problematic structure from a [End Page 156] generic re-writing of the origin of writing, whereas Lacans idea, though no less generic, finds its support in writings incompleteness.

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Perm Cards
Pragmatic reformist politics buy into ideology via compromise and are mutually exclusive with a more radical break from the very ideological coordinates that make that kind of decision possible Zizek 2000 [Slavoj, Rather Prolific Author, Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please! Contingency, Hegemony,
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, New York City: Verso, 2000, 123//uwyo-ajl] In the domain of politics proper, most of today's Left succumbs to ideological blackmail by the Right in accepting its basic premisses ('the era of the welfare state, with its unlimited spending, is over', etc.) ulti-mately, this is what the celebrated 'Third Way' of today's social democracy is about. In such conditions, an authentic act would be to counter the Rightist agitation apropos of some 'radical' measure ('You want the impossible; this will lead to catastrophe, to more state inter-vention . . .') not by defending ourselves by saying that this is not what we mean, that we are no longer the old Socialists, that the proposed measures will not increase the state budget, that they will even render state expenditure more 'effective' and give a boost to investment, and so on and so forth, but .by a resounding 'Yes, that is precisely' what we want!,.52 Although Clinton's presidency epitomizes the Third Way of today's (ex-) Left succumbing to Rightist ideological blackmail, his healthcare reform programme would none the less amount to a kind of act, at least in today's conditions, since it would be based on the rejection of the hegemonic notions of the need to curtail Big State expenditure and administration - in a way, it would 'do the impossible'. No wonder, then, that it failed: its failure - perhaps the only significant, albeit nega-tive, event of Clinton's presidency - bears witness to the material force of the ideological notion of 'free choice'. That is to say: although the great majority of socalled 'ordinary people' were not properly acquainted with the reform programme, the medical lobby (twice as strong as the infamous defence lobby!) succeeded in imposing on the public the fun-damental idea that with universal healthcare, free choice (in matters concerning medicine) would be somehow threatened - against this

purely fictiona reference to 'free choice', any enumeration of 'hard facts' (in Canada, healthcare is less expensive and more effective, with no less free choice, etc.) proved ineffectual. We must resist all reoccupations by their phantasmatic methodology, otherwise fantasy-formation will come back in the window and annihilate any possible alternative Stavrakakis '99 [Yannis, Teaching Fellow at the University of Essex, Lacan and the Political, New York City: Routledge,
1999, 118-9//uwyo-ajl] In fact, articulating

Lacanian theory with fantasmatic politics is equivalent to affirming the irrelevance of Lacanian theory for radical politics since this articulation presupposes the repression of all the political insights implicit in Lacan's reading and highlighted in this book. The alleged irrelevance of Lacan for radical politics is also the argument put forward
by Collier in a recent article in Radical Philosophy. Collier's argument is that since it is capitalism that shatters our wholeness and disempowers us (as if without capitalism we would be on the road to utopia; obviously, capitalism occupies the structural position of the antichrist in this sort of leftist preaching), then Lacan's theory is, in fact, normalising capitalist damage, precisely because alienation is so deep for Lacan that nothing can be done to eliminate it (`Lacan is deeply pessimistic, rejecting cure or happiness as possible goals', my emphasis).'9 Thus Lacan has nothing to offer radical politics. Something not entirely surprising since, according to Collier, psychological theory in general has no political implications whatsoever. The conclusion is predictable: `Let us go to Freud and Klein for our psychotherapy [Lacan is of course excluded] and to Marx and the environ- mental sciences for our politics, and not get our lines crossed' (Collier, 1998: 41-3). Surprisingly enough this is almost identical with Homer's conclusion: Lacanian theory is OK as an analytical tool but let us go back to Marx for our ideological seminar and our utopian catechism! It is clear that

from a Lacanian point of view it is necessary to resist all such `reoccupations' of

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traditional fantasmatic politics. At least this is the strategy that Lacan follows on similar occasions. Faced with the alienating dimension of every identification, Lacan locates the end of analysis beyond identification. Since utopian or quasi-utopian constructions function through identification it is legitimate, I think, to draw the analogies with the social field. If analysis resists the `reoccupation' of the traditional strategy of identification although it recognises its crucial, but alienating, role in the formation of subjectivity - why should psychoanalytic politics, after unmasking the crucial but alienating character of traditional, fantasmatic, identificatory politics, `reoccupy' their ground? This rationale underlying the Lacanian position is not far away from what Beardsworth articulates as a political reading of Derrida. For Beardsworth, deconstruction also refuses to implicate itself in traditional politics, in the `local sense of politics' in Beardsworth's terminology: In its
affirmative refusal to advocate a politics, deconstruction forms, firstly, an account of why all political projects fail. SInce the projection of any decision has ethical implications, deconstruction in fact generalizes what is meant by the political well beyond the

the radicality and political importance of the Lacanian critique depends on its ability to keep its distance from fantasmatic politics, from politics in the traditional sense; which is not the same as saying that psychoanalysis is apolitical: in fact, it becomes political precisely by being critical of traditional politics, exactly because, as argued in the previous chapter, the political is located beyond the utopian or quasi-utopian sedimentations of political reality.
local sense of politics, in this sense it becomes a radical `critique' of instit tions. (Beardsworth, 1996: 19) Similarly,

The permutation re-entrenches ideology their recognition of the Big Other of ideology before the act allows their revolution to be co-opted. Zizek 2, professor of philosophy and psychoanalysis at the University of Ljubljana, Eastern European OG, general badass, the
object of Judith Butlers hate, 2002 (Slavoj, Revolution at the Gates, Verso, page 8) In his 1917 writings, Lenin saves his most acerbic irony for those who engage in the endless search for some kind of guaruntee for the revolution; this guarantee assumes two main formes: either the reified notion of social Neccessity (one should not risk the revolution too early; one has to wate for the right moment, when the time is ripe with regard to the laws of historical development: it is too early for the Socialist revolution, the working classe is not yet mature) or normative (democratic) legitimacy (The majority of the population are not on our side, so the revolution would not really be democratic) as Lenin repatadly p uts it: as if, before the revolutionary agent risks the seizure of state power, it should get permission from some figure of the big Other (organize a referendum which will ascertain that the majority support the revolution). With Lenin, as with Lacan,

the point is that the revolution nesautorise que delle-meme: we should venture the revolutionary act not covered by the big Other the fear of taking power prematurely, the search for the guarantee, is the fear of the abyss of the act. That is the ultimate dimension of what Lacan incestantly denounces as opportunism, and his premises is that opportunism is a position which is in itself, inherently, false, masking a fear of accomplishing the act with the protective screen of objective facts, laws or norms, which is why the first step in combating it is to announce it clearly: What then is to be done? We must state the facts, admit the truth that there is a tendency, or an opinion, in our Central committee

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Deconstruction First
First, There is no outside text Nothing lies beyond our interpretation of it As such we must call into question the very premise of our understanding K must come first to access any claim you make Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) The misconstruction of Derrida's thinking that trumps them all, as John Caputo points out, is the argument that he has destroyed his own grounds for protest about being misunderstood, since his "anything goes" postmodernism undermines the very idea that there can be such a thing as misunderstanding.5 There are two versions of this misconstruction. The first is derived from a catchphrase that Derrida, and those who love him, have good reason to regret sorely, namely, "/Y n'y a pas de hors-texte" ("there

is no outside-text").6 Many take this phrase as confirmation of Derrida's apparently uninhibited celebration of an utterly
nominalist, relativist freeplay of differences, supposedly based on the premise that there is nothing "out there" beyond the text, which dooms us to the infinite play of texts upon texts upon texts, all of indifferently equivalent nonvalue and endlessly referring to nothing but themselves. Derrida persistently and explicitly rejects this misreading, which is the contemporary equivalent of Hegel's mistaken characterization of Kant's "transcendental turn" as a subjective idealism, and it may be subjected to the same kind of rejoinder; namely, that transcendental constitution does not create existence, but interprets or synthesizes what is given, thereby constituting a phenomenal world.7 Derrida's phrase "there is no outside-text" makes the equivalent claim.

"Something" must occur before there can be interpretation (i.e., texts), but there are no uninterpreted objects for us because it is precisely through the process of interpretation that they are first constituted as elements that belong to a phenomenal reality. In his words: I believe always in the necessity of being attentive first of all to this phenomenon of language, naming, and dating, to this repetition compulsion (at once rhetorical, magical, and poetic). To what this compulsion signifies, translates, or betrays. Not in order to isolate ourselves in language, as people in too much of a rush would like us to believe, but on the contrary, in order to try to understand what is going on precisely beyond language and what is pushing us to repeat endlessly and without knowing what we are talking about, precisely there where language and the concept come up against their limits.8

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Deconstruction Precedes Ontology

First, Ontology forgets the third-fold of phenomenology Subjective processes for recongnizing and categorizing Beings are implicated in the external objective world and constituted in themselves Only a deconstructive approach can account for the three-fold view of ontology That means deconstruction first and only we solve your K Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) The word "ontology," derived from the Greek word for "being," is

often reduced to a name for the branch of metaphysics that concerns itself with characterizing what exists via, as Simon Blackburn puts it, "apriori arguments that the world must contain certain things of one kind or another: simple things, unextended things, eternal substances, necessary beings, and so on" that "often depend on some version of the principle of sufficient reason."1 After Kant, however, the thinking of being can no longer simply characterize "what exists" as if one could determine what things would be like regardless of whether there are humans around to experience them.2 Kant saw that the path so far traveled had brought metaphysics to such a state of vacillation that any way forward had become impossible.3 Reason's very nature, characterized by what he called the "principle of unconditioned unity,"4 combined with a fundamental commitment to some form of representational relation between perceiving humans and an independently determined external world, had engendered a "two-fold, selfconflicting interest,"5 which trapped reason in metaphysical antinomies that, he argues, oldstyle metaphysicians could neither pass beyond nor turn away from. Reason has a two-fold interest in moving from universal to particular in determinative judgment and from particular to universal in reflective judgment. Ideally, for him, these movements should be reversible, but they led instead
to opposing conclusions about the nature of the world-whole, the self, and God, Pure Reason's "peculiar fate" was its inability to live up to its most fundamental principle, namely complete, systematic unity. He argues that one can avoid the gridlock of reason's antinomies and preserve Reason's "principle of unconditioned unity" only on a constitutive, rather than representational, account of the relation between "thought" and "thing" (henceforth, the transcendental relation). In this case, subjective

processes are recognized as unavoidably implicated in the constitution of the "external objective world," thus converting it from a supposedly independently determined thing-in-itself to "phenomenal reality."6 On Kant's account of the transcendental relation, then, one is obliged to take into account three rather than two terms: "phenomenal reality" as the constituted effect, and, working back to its transcendental conditions, the embrace between two irreducible poles: "the transcendental subject," described as an interpreting or synthesizing subject already equipped with certain sensory and cognitive powers, and an "object = X," described as an existing materiality not created by us, to which we respond via receptive sensory systems. After Kant, "thought" (or that aspect of it we
can call synthetic, cognitive processing) is implicated in the shaping of spatiotemporal things (now viewed as phenomena) in response to the force field of our sensory reception, which, in turn, is occasioned by an otherwise unknowable hyletic substratum. Put differently, phenomenal

reality is the effect of transcendental constitution, involving a relation between a perceiving subject and a perceived materiality, neither of which is visible as such in the phenomenal effect. Accordingly, philosophical thinking proceeds by transcendental questioning: on the basis of what does appear phenomenally, one proceeds by asking after its antecedent conditions of possibility. In so doing, one aims to

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determine, lay out, or explicate the tacit conditional structures of transcendental constitution (the synthetic process, or "intentional life") by virtue of which subjects let objects be.7

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Deconstruction Precedes Epistemology

First, Our construction of phenomenological reality and epistemology are based on apriori and posterioris that are taught at birth These initial learning function create a change on our conscious for the rest of our life Our deconstructive approach is a prerequisite to all of their epistemology because only interrogating the most basic function of our learn and unconscious allows a true view of our concept of reality Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) For Kant,

transcendental constitution involves a combination of the a priori syntheses of productive imagination and the a posteriori syntheses of meaning-giving cognition.
Although there are also important differences (for example, concerning where to draw the dividing line between unconscious and conscious processing), one finds certain parallels in Hus-serl's passive and active genesis, Heidegger's prethematic and thematic hermeneutics (understanding and interpretation), Nietzsche's distinction between "our spiritual fatum' and concept formation, and Freud's primary and secondary processes.8 Although not strictly in accordance with Freud's more technical terms, I shall here use the terms "unconscious" and "conscious" as roughly synonymous with "implicit" and "explicit." In view of these later developments, Kant's important distinction between a priori and a posteriori synthesis warrants the slight digression needed here for an elaboration. He accepts that human infants

enter the world prematurely, not only because they are physically underdeveloped but also because there is no pregiven phenomenal reality, and a sense of both "self" and "world" has to be learned.9 This is
clearly not because there is nothing around them nor because healthy infants lack the intrinsic cognitive potential necessary to constitute objects. Rather, he argues famously, the

a priori power of synthetic processing, which enables us to constitute an ever more complex field of experience, is only actualized in response to sensory encounters. In the total absence of sensation, any a priori given cognitive faculties would lie dormant and there would be no phenomena. (I should add here that, as emphasized in his
well-known "cinnabar" example, if the hyletic substratum that occasions sensation occurs as an utterly irregular chaos, no subject would be capable of constituting a coherent objective reality.) In other words, he accepts that phenomenal

reality is built up through repetition and surprise in the play of sensations, by means of which infants learn to constitute abiding habitualities and, on the basis of these, associations and expectations. By the same token, if we did not already intrinsically possess the power of recognition (for example, of sameness and difference) and anticipation, even given our full sensory capacity, no such learning at all could take place. I should qualify the meaning of intrinsic here. While
granting that subjective cognitive faculties are contingently given and remain corruptible, what remains incontrovertible for him, however, is the universal form these powers must take if an individual is to participate in a "nonde-fective" transcendental relation, whose constituted effect is the apparendy coherent experiential reality we all supposedly share. The presuppositions inscribed here will come into question in the work of other thinkers. For Kant, the

a priori powers of recognition and anticipation, together with intuition, constitute the power of "productive imagination." This faculty describes the power to bring a mass of sensations together (or synthesize them) by organizing them according to an articulated system of a priori concepts to form a spatiotemporal manifold of objects. When sensory events occur, this synthetic
process is a matter of making multiple basic judgments, which he believes one can describe theoretically as fundamental questions of quantity, quality, relation, and modality: for example, is it enduring, instantaneous, fleeting, continuous, discrete, regular, irregular, necessary, contingent, universal, particular, singular?10 Through experiential learning, then, based on the interaction between sensation and productive imagination, infants

gradually acquire a phenomenal reality (or, in Husserl's terms, a transcendental "monad"), which may be described as a continuously experienced phenomenal field capable of being apprehended at a glance. Importantly,
although we have to learn to synthesize (that is, to make the kind of basic judgment just listed, or to bring our sensations under these fundamental concepts), this

synthetic process, starting almost from birth and increasing in

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complexity as we mature, is implicit and generally unconscious. Once developed, synthetic operations for the most part work automatically to constitute the world that I now continuously "have" around me (I do not have to reconstitute the objective manifold anew each time I open my eyes). The a priori conceptualization that is the work of "productive imagination" goes on all the time and is presupposed by other mental processes.11

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AT Reductionist
First, Derridean psychoanalysis ignores reductionist readings Instead of break life down to one signifier as a point of problematic issues, it allows a chain of signifiers that displace and replace each other Only this solves reductionisms problems and engages in an ethical stance in the world Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) Even though the majority of Derrida's texts reveal a sustained engagement with psychoanalysis, his readings on topics other than language and the "purloined letter" draw little explicit attention from many Lacanian theorists, and citations more often than not take the form of typical misconstructions. For example, in

a collection thematizing Lacan's theory of discourse, there is but a single reference to Derrida, which refers to Jacques-Alain Miller's claim that in contrast to intellectuals such as Derrida, Lacan "saw patients": that is, he put his theories to work in the world outside the esoteric self-referential circle of the academic text.11 More importantly, when reference is made to Derrida, it is often to his early work on the sign, which is reduced to an endorsement of freeplaya misreading that precludes serious engagement with his later writings on ethical issues in the broadest sense of the term, which are in constant dialogue with psychoanalysis. Kaja Silverman's approach to Derrida's work provides a clear but by no means unique example of this reduction. In The Subject of Semiotics she focuses on his commitment to "the endless commutability of the signified"12 together with the "principle of deferral," which is taken to mean simply that "signification occurs along a chain in which one term displaces another before being itself displaced."13 These commitments are brought together under the notion of "freeplay."14 While Silverman's observations are not inaccurate, and Derrida does indeed insist on this an-economic interpretation of diffrance (naming it "diffrance as spacing"), she gives no voice at all, at least not in Derrida's name, to its economic counterpart, namely "diffrance as temporization."15 I shall address this complexity in chapter 3; suffice it to note here that her one-sided starting point assures a reductive interpretation of other Derridean notions. For example, her remark in The Acoustic Mirror that Derrida has "appropriated from
sexual difference" a signifier [namely "invagination"], with which he has attempted to erase the opposition between 'inner' and 'outer,' " can only sound strange to Derridean ears.16

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Double Bind Good

First, When faced with a double bind Two equally negative choices One must act despite the unsatisfaction and give themselves up to the negative consequences This ensures value to life, freedom and a world that can be truly revolutionary Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) William Angus Sinclair formalizes a dilemma as follows: "If

p then q, and if not-p then r [where both q and r, one should add, are equally unsatisfactory]; But either p or not-p; (Either q or r.)" Hence the double bind of having to choose between equally unsatisfactory alternatives.42 This is a slightly more elaborate form of what Simon Blackburn calls the simplest form of a dilemma, which is an argument of the form "If p then q [namely a particular unsatisfactory outcome], if not-p then q [that is, precisely the same unsatisfactory outcome], so in any event q"45 Clearly, here, either/or choices make no sense, for the alternatives, inclusively, either remain equally unsatisfactory or in the end amount to precisely the same unsatisfactory outcome. Derrida insists, however, that this difficulty (that is, the impossibility of a choice ever being completely satisfactory) does not obviate the necessity for actively going ahead and negotiating such choices. Lacan
similarly became increasingly concerned with developing a theoretical discourse of rupture and inconsistency, and according to Lee, he assiduously studied paradox: set theory, logical puzzles, classic Greek paradoxes, "the paradoxical Mbius surfaces of topology," and Borromean knots.44 He also demonstrates a correlative enjoyment of the mind-twisting grammatical constructions available to the play of language. For example, as Paul Verhaeghe notes, if "corporeal contingency" is inscribed in the phrase "to not stop being written," Lacan writes "necessity" as "it doesn't stop being written" and "impossibility" as "it doesn't stop not being written."45 These figures and enjoyments already indicate that his interests lie in the direction of paradox. Pressing this point further, one may argue that the so-called fundamental concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis are articulated according to a complex, paradoxical relationality that precisely matches the "plural logic of the aporia." I do not at this point wish to enter into the full complexity of Lacanian discourse; suffice it to mention here that Lacan's

formulation of the Real as "rupture" introduces the double trouble that Copjec names the "problem of the All" and characterizes as an opposition between paranoiac universalism and hysterical nominalism, which matches Derrida's distinction between the economic and aneconomic aporias.46 Notably, Lacan names the logic of their articulation the "vel of alienation" and, with a touch of black humor, offers as an example "the mugger's choice": your money or your life.47 This turns out to be no choice at all, for, as Copjec notes: "Once the choice is offered, you're done forno matter which alternative you take."48 The Hegelian lose/lose proposed here, then, is that in choosing one the other is lost; yet, because they are interdependent, this is also thereby to lose the original choice (for life is the necessary condition for having money, and, these days, money is the necessary condition for having a life). Lacan defines the task of psychoanalysis as that of leading analysands to the point where they may make the move beyond the lose/lose situation of the mugger's choice. Notably then, as Copjec demonstrates, Lacan (like Derrida, one should note) refuses the limitations of a choice between the aporias of paranoiac universalism and hysterical nominalism and prefers a third stance, which invokes the win/win formulation of "the revolutionary's choice: freedom or death."49 Counter to the commonsensical claim, namely, that the freedom that costs a life is not freedom, the revolutionary's choice issues from the insistence that life without freedom is not life.50 Here, to choose to fight for freedom, to the point of risking all for its sake, is to retain the
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eternal freedom of a Ch Guevara. On the other hand, to choose death rather than forsake one's freedom similarly leaves intact forever the freedom of a Socrates. But what is the meaning of this freedom
in Lacanian psychoanalysis? It names, first, freedom from the economic and aneconomic apo-rias of ideological automatism and paralyzing transgression for its own sake. Correlatively, this

is a freedom for decisive action. When it comes down to it, then, this "freedom for," as the only possible freedom, is the paradoxical "freedom" offered by a refusal to submit to the constrictions of the either/or choice given by a binary determination of options and the willingness in consequence to brave the double bind of the aporia of apo-rias, or, that is, all of the ethical, political, or, as broadly speaking as possible, conceptual paradoxes and dilemmas that can neither be overcome nor evaded but must be worked through interminably.

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AT Rorty/Zizek
First, Both Rorty and Zizek misread Derrida There criticism do not apply to true Derridean quasi-transcendental thinking which remains in a dialogue with other forms of throught AND Quasi-transcendental thought is never the same Side steps your offense Hurst 08 (Andrea, Fordham University Press, Dernda vis--vis Lacan : interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis,
JCook) In chapter 3, I offer a more detailed account of Derrida's quasi-transcendental thinking.

One of the main purposes of this account is to undo the ties of the interpretative straitjacket that binds his thinking into an aneconomic freeplay of differences, which sees "deconstruction" as merely the hysterical dismantling of any construction. A further purpose is to lay a basis for grasping his deconstructive readings of Freud. While I acknowledge the injustice of fingering only particular thinkers, I begin by criticizing Richard Rorty's early misreadings, which provide excellent material for an attempt to counter the one-sidedness of readings that make of Derrida's philosophical strategy a freeplay relativism. I, rather guiltily, for I love him otherwise, place Zizek in Rorty's company. To counter such misreadings, I offer an account of diffrance in accordance with the "plural logic of the aporia," aligning "differance as tempo-rization" with the economic
aporia and "differance as spacing" with the aneconomic aporia. Finally, I address the question of their "interweaving," by asking whether a Derridean account of this connection would be unambiguously antinomial or dialectical. These

alternative "logics" of articulation are addressed briefly to show that Derrida's thinking does not "fall from the sky" but remains in critical dialogue with other options in the transcendental tradition. Derrida, however, following Heidegger here, uncovers a third "logic" of interweaving, not quite consonant with either of these, which acknowledges that the conjunction between the economic and aneconomic aporias is irremediably paradoxical. This "logic," to which one could assign the nickname "quasi-transcendental," although it goes by many other nicknames too, my preference being the "plural logic of the aporia," is therefore what Derrida calls "iterable," that is, a "form" that can be repeated but also cannot avoid being different each time. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of Derrida's analysis of "the gift" as an exemplary case of how quasi-transcendental thinking highlights the aporias involved in an apparently simple act or a supposedly selfevidently meaningful social practice. I hope to have demonstrated by the end that whatever one chooses to do with Derrida, as enthusiast or detractor, it is important at least to avoid starting out with the oversimplifications already abundantly in circulation.

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Answer to Colonialitys Lies

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AT// Perm Do Both

First, The perm is incoherent. You cant continue the perpetuation of coloniality while simultaneously saying we should actively destroy coloniality Second, Its severance You cant severe out of your rhetoric and justifications in the 1AC Severance allows the aff to kick out of any link to a K or DA, making being neg impossible. Third, Still links cross apply the link analysis above. Means the alternative alone is a better option. Fourth, The perm makes no sense Combining our radical rejection of Occidental thought combined with the affs pursuit of Occidental thought hamstrings literally every effort to fight Eurocentrism in Latin American Postcolonial studies Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

This is not an essentialist, fundamentalist, anti-European critique. It is a perspective that is critical of both Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalisms, colonialism and nationalism. Border thinking, one of the epistemic perspectives to be discussed in this article, is precisely a critical response
to both hegemonic and marginal fundamentalisms. What all fundamentalisms share (including the Eurocentric one) is the premise that there is only one sole epistemic tradition from which to achieve Truth and Universality. However, my main points here are three: 1) that a

decolonial epistemic perspective requires a broader canon of thought than simply the Western canon (including the Left Western canon); 2) that a truly universal decolonial perspective cannot be based on an abstract universal (one particular that raises itself as universal global design), but would have to be the result of the critical dialogue between diverse critical epistemic/ethical/political projects towards a pluriversal as oppose to a universal world; 3) that decolonization of knowledge would require to take seriously the epistemic perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from the Global South thinking from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies. Postmodernism and
postructuralism as epistemological projects are caught within the Western canon reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a particular form of coloniality of power/knowledge.

***If you need*** ( ) The permutation creates a combination of occidental logic and teaching that replicates the cultural teaching that caused our impact in the first place No solvency for the perm Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9-11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008.

The university is in the world. And the worlds universities are, no doubt, of the European model [which], after a rich and complex medieval history, has become prevalent . . . over

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the last two centuries in states of a democratic type.39 Yet that structure does not operate everywhere with the same degree of efficiency, the same degree of informed consent or critique, with the same quality or connection with the state. As the best in the United States think more and more of world governance, in the name of sustainable development and ethical globalization, and human rightsto oppose the murderous collusion of the military and the economicin the context of world governance, thenwe must think of all of these different kinds of universities, rather than just generalize from the universities we know, as if the world were one. If we move through the spectrum, the ideas we will see circulating among students and teachers will be cultural identity, cultural difference, national sovereignty, minority
politics. More often than not, these issues shade off into varieties of religious freedom. I hasten to add that this is not invariably the case.

( ) The alternative must be done without the combination with occidental policy The combination coopts and destroys solvency Spivak 95 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Ghostwriting, Jcook.) To continue with the program (which is not a program, of course): We won't repoliticize [SM 871, we will be "an alliance without an institution" [SM 861, and we will "produce events, new effective forms of action, practice, organization, and so forth" [SM 891. In a world where nonalignment is no longer possible as a collective position, what good is such anonymous internationality? and how will it come to pass? Never mind. We don't like totalitarianism, and we are unsympathetic with the labor movement.

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AT// Permutation All Other Instances

First, The other instances they reject arent present in this round. You cannot reject something that doesnt exist. Our argument deals with the in-round interactions in which we as debaters conceptualize action through certain modes of knowledgeproduction. This type of permutation is a debate artifact which doesnt apply to our criticism. They dont even name, and no one knows, what these other instances they reject are. There is zero solvency or discursive effect to this perm. They ask you to imagine criticism in a world of fiat, we ACTUALLY criticize. Second, This is not an argument you wouldnt accept racism in one instances because you had the opportunity to reject it in other instances if we prove the aff is undesirable then you should vote negative. Third, Every instance is key this decision is between competing philosophies, not competing actions. Its like saying, We agree with nonviolence, except when we dont. Fourth, The perm is incoherent. You cant continue the perpetuation of coloniality while simultaneously saying we should actively destroy coloniality Fifth, Its severance You cant severe out of your rhetoric and justifications in the 1AC Severance allows the aff to kick out of any link to a K or DA, making being neg impossible. Sixth, Still links cross apply the link analysis above. Means the alternative alone is a better option. Seventh, The perm makes no sense Combining our radical rejection of Occidental thought combined with the affs pursuit of Occidental thought hamstrings literally every effort to fight Eurocentrism in Latin American Postcolonial studies Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

This is not an essentialist, fundamentalist, anti-European critique. It is a perspective that is critical of both Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalisms, colonialism and nationalism. Border thinking, one of the epistemic perspectives to be discussed in this article, is precisely a critical response
to both hegemonic and marginal fundamentalisms. What all fundamentalisms share (including the Eurocentric one) is the premise that there is only one sole epistemic tradition from which to achieve Truth and Universality. However, my main points here are three: 1) that a

decolonial epistemic perspective requires a broader canon of thought than simply the Western canon (including the Left Western canon); 2) that a truly universal decolonial perspective cannot be based on an abstract universal (one particular that raises itself as universal global design), but would have to be the result of the critical dialogue between diverse critical epistemic/ethical/political projects towards a pluriversal as oppose to a universal world; 3) that decolonization of
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knowledge would require to take seriously the epistemic perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from the Global South thinking from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies. Postmodernism and
postructuralism as epistemological projects are caught within the Western canon reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a particular form of coloniality of power/knowledge.

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AT// Permutation Plan then Alt

First, This makes no sense Our alt decolonializes our thought before doing the plan so that we avoid the impacts of the K and solve the aff better This is a try or die for the K Second, This is not an argument you wouldnt accept racism in one instances because you had the opportunity to reject it in other instances if we prove the aff is undesirable then you should vote negative. Third, Every instance is key this decision is between competing philosophies, not competing actions. Its like saying, We agree with nonviolence, except when we dont Fourth, Its severance You cant severe out of your justifications and rhetoric in the 1AC Severance allows the aff to kick out of any link to a K or DA, making being neg impossible. Fifth, We still gain access to our rhetoric and justification links, which are in round Only voting negative solves this

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AT// Permutation Alt then Plan

First, The permutation guts all solvency to the K We cant embrace border thinking and then embrace coloniality after that This makes the embrace disingenuous and we restitute coloniality after the alternative Second, This is not an argument you wouldnt accept racism in one instances because you had the opportunity to reject it in other instances if we prove the aff is undesirable then you should vote negative. Third, Every instance is key this decision is between competing philosophies, not competing actions. Its like saying, We agree with nonviolence, except when we dont Fourth, Its severance You cant severe out of your justifications or rhetoric in the 1AC Severance allows the aff to kick out of any link to a K or DA, making being neg impossible. Fifth, We still gain access to our justifications and rhetoric links, which are in round Only voting negative solves this

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AT// Permutation Do the Alt

First, The perm severs the entirety of the aff The alternative rejects the entirety of the affirmative plan and embraces a completely different outlook of politics Voting issue Strategy skew- not knowing whether the plan will change makes it impossible for the negative to form a cohesive strategy. Ground- the affirmative can permute to do the CP which hurts competitive equity. The negative will always lose because they can spike out of our offense. No Stable Advocacy they will spike out of parts of plan and mitigate the possibility of discussing those issues Kills education Destroys K ground- the aff could sever parts of plan to avoid K lnks. This is a voter for fairness and education. Second, Their justification and rhetoric is still in this round The only way to gain in round solvency is to fundamentally challenge and provide a counter rhetoric, which can only be accessed through the alternative, that they cant support after the 1AC

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AT// Coloniality Inevitable

( ) Coloniality isnt inevitable Your current flawed paradigm just forces you to see it as inevitable Our alternative allows us the possibility of seeing a new world emerge Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. 2. If we accept that what is at stake is the recognition that there are no modern solutions to many of todays modern problems, where are we to look for new insights? At this level, it

becomes crucial to question the widely held idea that modernity is now a universal and inescapable force, that globalization entails the radicalization of modernity, and that from now on it is modernity all the way down. One fruitful way to think past this commonly held idea is to question the interpretation of modernity as an intra-european phenomenon. This reinterpretation makes visible modernitys underside, that is, those subaltern knowledges and cultural practices worldwide that modernity itself shunned, suppressed, made invisible and disqualified. Understood as coloniality, this other side has existed side by side with modernity since the Conquest of America; it is this same coloniality of being, knowledge, and power that todays US-led empire attempts to silence and contain; the same coloniality that asserts itself at the borders of the modern/colonial world system, and from which subaltern groups attempt to reconstitute place-based imaginaries and local worlds. From this perspective, coloniality is constitutive of modernity, and the third world is part of its classificatory logic. Today, a new global articulation of coloniality is rendering the Third World obsolete, and new classifications are bound to emerge in a world no longer predicated on the existence of three worlds.

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AT// You Hate Democracy

( ) This is just racist and wrong Just because we dont support your Eurocentric thought does not mean we hate democracy In fact, our redefinition of democracy allows us to better support it and continue to move away from the Eurocentric epistemological structure that coalesces into coloniality Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

A good example of this is the Zapatista struggle in Mexico. The Zapatistas are not antimodern fundamentalist. They do not reject democracy and retreat into some form of indigenous fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatistas accept the notion of democracy, but redefine it from a local indigenous practice and cosmology, conceptualizing it as commanding while obeying or we are all equals because we are all different. What seems to be a paradoxical slogan is really a critical decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern. This leads to the question of how to transcend the imperial monologue established by the European-centric modernity.

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AT// Alt is Violent

( ) There is no way our alternative of rethinking the world is going to be violent Our ___ evidence provides empiric examples on why we dont trigger this impact ( ) There is absolutely no way to prove their impact true The framework and paradigm shift that brought about by the alternative would make every analysis of politic systems currently unthinkable Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13. On the other hand,

if the end the Third World signals something new, there is little agreement about this newness and the theoretical and political needs that it demands. For some, an entirely new paradigm is not only needed but already on the rise. Others speak of the need for a new horizon of meaning for political struggle after the ebbing of the dream of national sovereignty through popular revolution. Still others caution that since most alternative visions of the recent past from national liberation to socialism-- operated within a modernist framework, then the paradigms of the future have to carefully steer away from modern concepts. As the saying goes, easier said than done. The fact is that there are very many good analyses of, and ideas about the contemporary impasse, but they do not seem to coalesce or converge into shared proposals or neat formulations, let alone clear courses of political action that could capture the collective imagination. In this regard, our
Bandung forefathers fared much better their wide appeal being of course a problem in itself for many, given the questionable practices that sustained it. David Scott put it bluntly, and constructively, by saying that todays global situation ushers in a new problem-space to which neither Third Worldism nor the ensuing (1980s-1990s) postcolonial criticism provide good answers; what is needed, he says, is a new conceptualization of postcolonial politics that is able to imagine joining the radical political tradition of Bandung to an ethos of agonistic respect for pluralizations of subaltern difference (1999: 224; see also this issue).

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AT// We Help Colonials

( ) From the perspective of working for colonials, not from a colonial perspectives, epistemological turns solvency Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. In October 1998, there was a conference/dialogue at Duke University between the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group and the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. The dialogue initiated at this conference eventually resulted in the publication of several issues of the journal NEPANTLA. However, this conference was the last time the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group met before their split. Among the many reasons and debates that produced this split, there are two that I would like to stress. The members of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group were primarily Latinamericanist scholars in the USA. Despite

their attempt at producing a radical and alternative knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic schema of Area Studies in the United States. With a few exceptions, they produced studies about the subaltern rather than studies with and from a subaltern perspective . Like the imperial epistemology of Area Studies, theory was still located in the North while the subjects to be studied are located in the South. This colonial epistemology was crucial to
my dissatisfaction with the project. As a Latino in the United States, I was dissatisfied with the epistemic consequences of the knowledge produced by this Latinamericanist group.

They underestimated in their work ethnic/racial

perspectives coming from the region, while giving privilege predominantly to Western thinkers. This is related to my second point: they gave epistemic privilege to what they called the four horses of the apocalypse (Mallon 1994; Rodrguez 2001), that is, Foucault, Derrida, Gramsci and Guha. Among the four main thinkers they privilege, three are Eurocentric thinkers while two of them (Derrida and Foucault) form part of the poststructuralist/postmodern Western canon. Only one, Rinajit Guha, is a thinker thinking from the South. By privileging Western thinkers as their central theoretical apparatus, they betrayed their goal to produce subaltern studies.

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AT// Capitalism Good

( ) Coloniality exists as a matrix of different dominating factors Economic, political, and social We arent critiquing Capitalism Were critiquing the dominating force that accompanied the matrix of coloniality, which had economic aspects Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

To call the present world-system capitalist is, to say the least, misleading. Given the hegemonic Eurocentric common sense, the moment we use the word capitalism, people immediately think that we are talking about the economy. However, capitalism is only one of the multiple entangled constellations of colonial power matrix of what I called, at the risk of sounding ridiculous, Capitalist/Patriarchal Western-centric/Christian-centric Modern/Colonial World- System. Capitalism is an important constellation of power, but not the sole one. Given its entanglement with other power relations, destroying the capitalist aspects of the world-system would not be enough to destroy the present worldsystem . To transform this world-system it is crucial to destroy the historicalstructural heterogenous totality called
the colonial power matrix of the worldsystem with its multiple forms of power hierarchies. Above, I outlined a total of 15 global power hierarchies, but I am sure there are more that escaped my conceptualization.

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AT// Colonialism Good

( ) This is terrible Our entire 1NC is an impact turn to this logic, and this provides us with another link The idea that exploiting groups of people is good is the worst form of epistemologically bankrupting This is an in round link ( ) And theres a huge difference between what we critique Coloniality and colonialism Coloniality is the perpetuating domination after colonialist regimes have left Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

Colonial does not refer only to classical colonialism or internal colonialism, nor can it be reduced to the presence of a colonial administration. Quijano distinguishes between colonialism and coloniality. I use the word colonialism to refer to colonial situations enforced by the presence of a colonial administration such as the period of classical colonialism, and, following Quijano (1991; 1993; 1998), I use coloniality to address colonial situations in the present period in which colonial administrations have almost been eradicated from the capitalist world-system. By colonial situations I mean the cultural, political, sexual and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racial/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations. Five hundred years of European colonial expansion and domination
formed an international division of labor between Europeans and non-Europeans that is reproduced in the present so-called postcolonial phase of the capitalist worldsystem (Wallerstein, 1979; 1995). Today, the core zones of the capitalist worldeconomy overlap with predominantly White/European/Euro-American societies such as Western Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States, while peripheral zones overlap with previously colonized non-European people. Japan is the only exception that confirms the rule. Japan was never colonized nor dominated by Europeans and, similar to the West, played an active role in building its own colonial empire. China, although never fully colonized, was peripheralized through the use of colonial entrepots such as Hong Kong and Macao, and through direct military interventions.

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AT// Colonialism is Dead

( ) Colonialism was never dead It always exists, forever changing forms - From the Spanish conquests, to direct control to economic imperialism The plan is just the new embodiment of the same occidental philosophy Salvatore 10 [Ricardo D., Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality:
A Historians Point of View, Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 2010, 332-348, www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. To better evaluate the accomplishments of this volume, we need to first understand the meanings of coloniality. According to editors Moraa, Dussel and Juregui, coloniality

encompasses the transhistoric expansion of colonial domination and the perpetuation of its effects in contemporary times (2). According to this definition, coloniality refers to a historical processcolonialism, its forms of governance, its representations, and its effects on colonial subjectsas well as to a residual effect or persistence of that process in the present. The condition of coloniality, as past-in-the-present, the authors claim, can help understand contemporary concerns relating to neoliberalism, globalization, international migrations, new social movements, and the cultural hybridity that impregnates most global cities. This is clearly a big claim, one that depends crucially upon
the accuracy and clarity of the concept: coloniality.

( ) It never died It just changed how it appears to us Claims that it died exacerbate the problem Thats another independent link Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

We cannot think of decolonization in terms of conquering power over the juridicalpolitical boundaries of a state, that is, by achieving control over a single nation-state (Grosfoguel 1996). The old national liberation and socialist strategies of taking power at the level of a nation-state are not sufficient, because global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial administration (Grosfoguel 2002) or to the political/economic structures of power. One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a postcolonial world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same colonial power matrix. With juridical-political decolonization, we moved from a period of global colonialism to the current period of global coloniality.
states, non- Although colonial administrations have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent

European people are still living under crude European/Euro-American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-Europeans remain in place and
are entangled with the international division of labor and accumulation of capital at a world-scale (Quijano 2000; Grosfoguel 2002).

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Answers To Western Lies

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AT State Good
First, We must reclaim our ability to be actors in the statewe are the owners of our citizenship and subjectivity Alt is key to solve good parts of State and solve the K Spivak 04, GayatriChakravorty Spivak Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the
director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University , 2004, "On the Cusp of the Personal and the Impersonal": An Interview with GayatriChakravortySpivak. Laura E. Lyons, Cynthia Franklin. Biographical Research Center. Biography 27.1 (2004) 203-221. PM 10/8/2008. LEL: This term, intuition

of the public sphere, is one that you have been using in your

classes and talks here. Can you say a bit more about your use of this term? Within your own work you have been critical of theorists who want to import psychological concepts like the unconscious into other cultural contexts. Does this formulation of intuition run any comparable risks? GCS: Thats the problem with needing words, one has to use a word. I was using the word intuition, frankly, its a bad use, colloquially, because I didnt mean that I was going to give them instruction in the history of the public spherecome on, these are elementary schools in extremely backward areas. So what I

wanted to develop

was not connected to subjectship, what I still want to develop. I was just told by someone who wants to translate
me into French that the word agency is giving them trouble, so thank God youre at least publishing this in English. The area of subjectship is where psychoanalysis is important, but in the area of agency, which is action validated by a collectivity, institutionally validated action, we dont have that much of a problem with using colloquial language, right? On the other hand,one

of the great things about psychoanalysis is that it wanted to tap the subject in order to restore social agency, and thats of course kind of fallen by the wayside in the use of psychoanalytic vocabulary without that mission, as it were. But, anyway, to go back to my use of intuition, the word intuition there stands in for my needing to develop in the young people some kind of sense that the entire legal structure, civil structure, exists for their use. Thats the intuition of the public sphere. Its an incredibly difficult thing, because of course at the moment,these structures exist for their oppression. So thereforethe intuition will, one hopes, lead to real resistance rather than the shortcut thats often taken by filling these unprepared minds with just lessons of resistance. I mean that stuff can so backfire once some power has been Lyons and
Franklin, Interview with GayatriChakravortySpivak 213 gained, or if it hasnt been gained, it becomes a kind of litigious blackmail, dependency and so on.Now

public sphere, as I said, my idea is very simple here. Simply that the citizen is the owner of the state and the civil society.Thats the idea of the public sphere, that all redresses are not confined to the private sphere of the community, completely oppressed by everybody around them. And the reality doesnt match up to it, but one hopes that the attempt at educatingIm very depressed right now because, you know, its hard to undo centuries, millennia in this case, of oppressionbut I thought there was one student among all the eleven schools who, I was not sure, because this is very slow work, with no ascertainability, who might have been susceptible to this kind of work. I mean Ive known her now for many years. But she died last month of
encephalitis. I had really hoped that something was passing there between her and me, that she would be the one who would finally say, why are you here?, you know what I mean? But theres been a setback. When

people think that its just, you go there, you give a building, you put in teachers, theyre all sitting down, they have books in their hands, or you give them technology, that is a fools dream or a knaves ruse. So thats where this comes from.

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AT Subaltern Bad/PICs
First, The term subaltern does not conotate a specific group of people It resembles power and the subjugation to it. This term allows for a diversity that problematizes epistemology and intersectionality Key to solvency Honkanen 07 (Katriina, rhizomes.14 summer 2007, Deconstructive Intersections.)
(http://rhizomes.net/issue14/honkanen.html. JCook.) Accessed 8/21/12. [20] The subaltern

is a concept that might help to further the theoretization of the ideas of diversity and multiplicity that contemporary European and Nordic equality research is engaged in. It might also be helpful in attempts to overcome problems related to representational identity politics discussed above. The term "subaltern" means 'subordinated" or "non-hegemonic" (Morton, 2003: 48). In Latin "sub" stands for beneath or below and "alter" means the other one. I find the simultaneity of the oppressor and the oppressed in this concept valuable. "Subaltern" connotes power, dichotomy and hierarchy. The concept of the subaltern is defined by the complicity between the "sub" and the hegemonic. The concept becomes useful within a deconstructive epistemology that takes into account the two senses of representation (Vertretung and Darstellung) that Spivak puts forward in "Can the subaltern speak?" (1994: 75). Conceptualizing the subaltern within a deconstructive epistemology reveals the problems linked to political intersectionality and identity politics. [21] Deconstructing subalterity in equality research is a practice that keeps from the problems of multiculturalism, heteronormativity or class-bias. Diversity is not merely structural, something "always already there" to be used for the researchers' merely descriptive purposes (Carbin & Tornhill, 2004: 113). Within a realist epistemology the voice of the subaltern other is constantly sought, while within a deconstructive epistemology you spotlight places where exclusive practices are at work. I argue that not even the concept of
intersectionality manages to overcome the problems of multiculturalism and the continued colonialist astonishment in front of the other that it engenders (for a critique of "culturalism," see Badiou, 2004). No concept can, of course, prevent careless readings and narcissistic aggressivity, readings where the Other is simply the other of the self, but at least with careful reading, the subaltern does not allow for mere description, for portrayals only. [22] Thus, the

subaltern should not be conceptualized as "somebody"; it should not be understood as a person or a societal group. It is not a list of subjugated positions. Rather, within a deconstructive epistemology, the subaltern is a shifting place of silence and abjection constituted by the operations of the hegemonic, of power. The question we should ask is: what power constitutes the discussion on the Finnish women's studies list? What silences is it built on? As an analytical tool the concepts' strength lies in the fact that it only becomes intelligible through operations of power. The subaltern conventionally denotes a junior ranking officer. My reading of the concept underlines the lack of a coherent political identity and is informed by a deconstruction of dichotomies. Second, Subaltern is a singularity their appeal to more popular words means that they cannot solve the aff or affirm difference Spivak 2005 Guyatri Chakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge

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Singularity was a questioning of the universal-particular dyad. The singular is repeated, with a difference. That is how the human is repeatedindifference in single humans, prior to the construction of personhood or individuality. It is a powerful concept, anchored in good sense, questioning both universalism and identitarianism. Such differently repeated singularities collectively are a multiplicity. This is not an empirical collective, not, in other words, a multitude. As long as we remember these are ways of thinking, always inclined to the empirical, we can continue to work. If we reduce them to the empirical alone, turn subaltern into popular, we are merely disputatious chroniclers.

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AT Nationalism Good
First, The alternative solves back the bad parts of nationalism Were not saying that nations shouldnt exist Were saying that the reproductive drive of nations becomes embedded in our subconciousness, in our cultural lives, and drive us to further this reproductive heteronormativity The alternative accesses all of your offense Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.)
The nationalism I have been describing operates

in the public sphere. But the subaltern affect where it finds its mobilizing is private, though this possibility of the private is not derived from a sense of the public, an underived private, which is very difficult for Europe to think. Women, men and queers are not necessarily divided along the public-private line everywhere. I have already let slip that nationalism is a recoding of this underived private as the antonym of the public sphere. When you begin to think nationalism this underived private has been recoded, reterritorialized as the antonym of the public. Then it is as if it is the opposite of the public. This shift is historical, of course, but it is also
logical. The subaltern folks I am talking about are in our present, but kept pre-modern. I will not rehearse here the mostly Hegelian historical story of the emergence of the public sphere. In whatever nationalist colors it is dressed, whether chronological or logical, the

impulse to nationalism is we must control the workings of our own public sphere. The reclaiming of the past is in that interest. Sometimes nationalism leads to the
resolve to control others public spheres, although this is not a necessary outcome. With this comes the necessary though often unacknowledged sense of being unique and, alas, better its a quick shift because born this way. Every diasporic feels a pull of somewhere else while located here. If we consider the model of exogamous marriage with reference to that sentence, we might have to revise the entire city/country model implicit in Metropolis, and think that the women in gendering have always shared this characteristic with what we, today, have learnt to call "Diaspora", even when it doesn't have much of a resemblance with what happened so long ago in Alexandria. And yet, metonymized as nothing but the birth-canal, woman is the most primitive instrument of nationalism. I have here offered a reading of nationalism that allows us to see why, although

nationalism is the condition and effect of the public sphere, nationalisms are not able to work with the founding logic of the public sphere: that all reason is one. It is secured by the private conviction of special birth and hops right from the underived private comfort which is no more than a thereness in ones corner. If nationalism secures itself by an appeal to the most private, democracy in its most convenient and ascertainable form is secured by the most trivially public universal each equals one. That flimsy arithmetic, unprotected by rational choice, can also be manipulated by nationalism. I am not convinced that the story of human movement to a greater control of the public sphere is necessarily a
story of progress. The religion/science debate makes this assumption, forgetting that the imagination, forgetting that literature and the arts, belong neither to reason, nor to unreason. That literature and the arts can support an advanced nationalism is no secret.

They join them in the task of a massive rememoration project, saying we all suffered this way, you remember, this is what happened, you remember, so that history is turned into cultural memory. Literature can then join in the task of a massive counterrememoration project suggesting that we have all passed through the same glorious past, the same grand national liberation battles, the same religious tolerance or whatever. I am going to suggest by the end of this
because sometimes I am misunderstood that the literary imagination can impact on de-transcendentalized nationalism. That is not what I am discussing here. I am supporting the clich that imagination feeds nationalism, and going forward toward the literary imagination and teaching the humanities, through the teaching of the humanities to prepare the readerly imagination to receive the literary and thus go beyond the self-identity of nationalism toward the complex textuality of the international. I will come to that later.

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AT No Alternative Solvency
First, We do solve Add analysis Second, Its try or die for the alternative Add analysis on the case turn Third, The critique is answering an ethical question, which means you vote negative no matter if we can solve or not The debate should be framed around whether or not the affirmative excludes the subalterns voices. Even if were going to fail to end the silencing of the subaltern, that doesn't change the fact that we should fight for it. Third, Even if we never solve, we must question the current state of nationalism AND Our criticism can pave the way for a new imagination that leads us to unlearn the cultural, imaginary control of the nation, because nations are only the imagination Spivak 09 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Nationalism and the Imagination, JCook.)
As for me, I am altogether utopian. I look toward a re-imagined world that is a cluster in the Global South, a cluster of regions. Of course it

can only happen gradually. But as we make small structural adjustments, we should keep this goal in mind. It may produce imaginative folk who are not only going on about cultural identity (read nationalism), but turning around the adverse effects of the adjustment of economic structures. The state, as Hannah Arendt says, is an abstract structure. And you may have noticed that everything I have written turns around learning and teaching. One of the many tasks of the teacher of the humanities is to keep the abstract and reasonable civic structures of the state free of the burden of cultural nationalism. To repeat: an imagination trained in the play of language(s) may undo the truth-claims of national identity, thus unmooring the cultural nationalism that disguises the workings of the state disguises the loss of civil liberties, for example, in the name of the American nation threatened by terror. Again, may. I will never be foolish enough to claim that a humanities education alone (especially given the state of humanities education today) can save the world! Or that anything can, once and for all. Or, even, that such a phrase or idea as save the world can be meaningful. My main topic has been the de-transcendentalizing of nationalism, the task of training the singular imagination, always in the interest of taking the nation out of nationstate, if I may put it that way. It sounds bad right after liberation. When I spoke in South Africa in the first memorial lecture
after the lifting of Apartheid I spoke in this way. My message was not exactly popular. And then about ten years later, when the piece was included in an anthology, the editor said that I had been prescient to have spoken at that time of the ab-use of the enlightenment from below (Vincent, 2002). At the time it had sounded too negative. I am saying therefore again and again translate from someone who has had sixty years of independence, a little more than that 1947 to 2009 and see if it will translate, rather than simply saying we

cannot afford to think of the nation in that way now. This is where comparativism comes in. Hence a few obvious words about re-inventing the state, words that take us outside of an education only in the humanities, are not out of place here.

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AT Globalization Good
First, K is a DA to this flow Second, Even if they win that globalization helps some subalterans the intent behind it is flawed - it forces hyphonated identities and is done with the sole intent to further entrench globalization and the homogenization of culture Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012

In Eurocentric economic migration rather than in electronic globality, as we travel down in class, the denial of the cultural subjectship of the abstract rational structures of "democracy" to the felicitous Euro-U.S. agent becomes active rather than reactive; patriarchal rather than analytic; and becomes transvalued and displaced into demands for preserving the inscription and superscription of the woman's body as an image of a cultural "self" -as the other in the self. These abyssal shadow games also involve woman, but they are not necessarily European images, or Euro-U.S. images. (This has now changed, haphazardly, in France and in Holland.) It takes place within indigenous patriarchy, and, however intimately they might be related to modernity, they are consolidated in the name of tradition. (This is now more discursively convenient as the modernity/ tradition polarization is becoming less so.) And although the women themselves are ambivalent about these moves, they are often seen as mute victims and/or as Enlightenment subjects speaking up for diversity. As such, they provide an alibi for cultural absolutists who want to save them from their "culture" as well as cultural relativists who must see this as anticolonialism. An (unacknowledged) double bind. In quite another way, the representation of "Europe" or the United States in the place of the self in such situations becomes suspect. For though the women and men demanding the inscription and superscription of the woman's body as cultural icon are themselves the recently hyphenated, they are also the new Europe or the new United States. In the United States this is even more problematic since the so-called EuroAmericans are themselves hyphenated and the natives have been "othered." Even this is not the whole story. For the hyphenated European or American is, of course, gender and class divided. Since it is the woman who is most citational, put within quotation marks in order to sanction all kinds of social actions-from automobile commercials to war to globalization itself-the upwardly mobile, hybrid female European or American can negotiate the class divide, and even the race divide, in the name of the gendered cultural subject acting for a fantasmatic Europe or, as the case may be, the United States. Whereas in the underclass, disappointed in the expectation of justice under capitalism, the migrant falls back upon "culture" as the originary figuration of that founding gap between the quite-other and the other, in patriarchy, this cultural figuration is a gendering internalized by both male and female, differently. This too is part of "the problem of thinking ethics for the other woman." How can we, in the face of discrimination from above, and alas, from minorities with a longer history of

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U.S. nationalization, however unjust, persuade the migrant or refugee that a systemic figuration of the violence of the founding gap closes the (im)possibility of ethics, especially given the history of patriarchal figurations, the (im)possibility of an ethics of sexual difference?7 How can we, their academic champions, remind ourselves that the depredations of globalizationindiscriminate dam-building, patenting indigenous knowledge, pharmaceutical dumping, trade-related intellectual property measures, biopiracy, culture-fishery and the replacement of the welfare state by the managerial state-touch those who stayed in one place? That today, as Roberta Cohen of the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement tells us: "The most realistic count of internally displaced persons is ... 20 to 25 million: nine to ten million in Africa, five million in Asia, five million in Europe, and two million in the Americas. Their number now exceeds that of refugees" ?8 How can we say to Joan Tronto, when she writes: "I start from the assumptions about the need for a liberal, mcJcrau .... , pluralistic society in order for all humans to fl ourish," that such societies can flourish in one part of the world at the expense of another and within one globalized state at the expense of the disenfranchised and that capitalist globalization has exacerbated this?9 I therefore fear that the more "late twentieth century American society ... takes seriously ... the values of caring ... traditionally associated with women "the less it will want to learn, under all the garbage of domination and exploitation, these virtues shining in societies where the welfare state is now not allowed to emerge as the barriers between national and international economy are removed; and where, in the name of "gender training precisely these virtues must be impatiently undermined rather than nurtured even as the millennia! gender-compromise that they have brought about is shattered.

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AT Perm
First, The permutation creates a combination of heteronormative logic and teaching that replicates the cultural teaching that caused our impact in the first place No solvency for the perm Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9 -11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008.

The university is in the world. And the worlds universities are, no doubt, of the European model [which], after a rich and complex medieval history, has become prevalent . . . over the last two centuries in states of a democratic type.39 Yet that structure does not operate everywhere with the same degree of efficiency, the same degree of informed consent or critique, with the same quality or connection with the state. As the best in the United States think more and more of world governance, in the name of sustainable development and ethical globalization, and human rightsto oppose the murderous collusion of the military and the economicin the context of world governance, thenwe must think of all of these different kinds of universities, rather than just generalize from the universities we know, as if the world were one. If we move through the spectrum, the ideas we will see circulating among students and teachers will be cultural identity, cultural difference, national sovereignty, minority
politics. More often than not, these issues shade off into varieties of religious freedom. I hasten to add that this is not invariably the case.

Second, The alternative must be done without the combination with reproductive heteronormative nationalist policy The combination coopts and destroys solvency Spivak 95 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Ghostwriting, Jcook.) To continue with the program (which is not a program, of course): We won't repoliticize [SM 871, we will be "an alliance without an institution" [SM 861, and we will "produce events, new effective forms of action, practice, organization, and so forth" [SM 891. In a world where nonalignment is no longer possible as a collective position, what good is such anonymous internationality? and how will it come to pass? Never mind. We don't like totalitarianism, and we are unsympathetic with the labor movement.

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AT Identity Rupture Bad

First, our impacts are a DA to this argument Second, identity rupture solves war Spivak 92 Gayatri, Acting Bits/Identity Talk, Critical Inquiry Vol. 18 No 4: Identities. Summer 1992, pp. 770-803
When we mobilize that secret ontic intimate knowledge, we lose it, but I see no other way. We have never, to quote Glas, been virgin enough to be the Other. Claudine Hermann, a lawyer who has practiced both in Afghanistan and in France, gives me my closing words: We have always known how [in "culture"] "to see women through the eyes of men and, in life, to see men through the eyes of women." We have always known "how wide the gap is." We have always been "schizoid and we might add . . . hermaphrodite . "Not androgynous, but a bit of a hermaphrodite secure in the conviction that sex and gender are structurally not identical. Cultures are built violently on the enforced coercion that they are. War is its most extreme signature, and, like all signatures, patriarchal. Our lesson is to act in the fractures of identities in struggle.

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AT Science/Trinity
First, Their criticism romanticizes federal policy and renders cultural shifts irrelevant Spivak 2004 Guyatri, Harlem, Social Text 81, Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 2004
The intent to memorialize can be signified by way of the frames, in the style of medieval illuminated manuscripts. And, because nature is presumed to be without history in this time frame, a species here can presumably come back as the same from the verge of extinction. This magnifi cent raptor, runs the wall text for this one, was once on the verge of extinction due to thinning of its eggshells caused by pesticidal spraying. A ban on the use of DDT in the 1970s, coupled with Federal protection, paved the way for a successful comeback. In the 1990s it was removed from the endangered species list (fi g. 22). This romantic conviction (no hungry generations tread thee down) is dubious at best. Biologically, the gene pool is badly impoverished; ecologic ally, its relation to the environment is radically altered. Are the herds of bison raised in national parks the same as the herds the Indians hunted?31 But it is certain that there can be no hope of a successful comeback as a repetition of the same for inscribed collectivities, forever vanishing. A seamless culturalism cannot be as effective as federal protection and a ban on DDT.

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AT Lash out/Reversal Psychoanalysis

About your impact . . . we dont do that. Spivak 2004 Guyatri, Harlem, Social Text 81, Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 2004 Where does originary hybridity begin? What, indeed, is it to be a NewYorker? We must push back on the trace of race in identity rather than insist on exclusive culture in order to ask that question. This is not to forget that the other side oppresses in the name of race, but its opposite: not to legitimize it by reversal.

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AT Subaltern is Misappropriating
First, Subaltern have no examples Spivak 2005 GuyatriChakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge
So far I have spoken of the old subaltern, withdrawn from lines of social mobility, in terms of an educational enterprise that in a supplementary way tries to release the possibility of self-abstraction, self-synecdoche. Merely trying to release the possibility _/ it will not happen in the classroom tomorrow. By infrastructure, I had earlier meant the effort to establish, implement and monitor structures that allow subaltern resistance to be located and heard. In the interim years, through the electronic circuits of globalisation, the subaltern has become greatly permeable. Much of a pastiche of global culture is lexicalised in a fragmen tary fashion in the underclass public world. (To lexicalise is to separate a linguistic item from its appropriate grammatical system into the conventions of another grammar.) But the permeability I speak of is the exploitation of the global subaltern as source of intellectual property without the benefit of benefit-sharing,31pharmaceutical patenting and social dumping. There is no permeability in the opposite direction. That is where the permanent effort of infrastructural involvement is called for. I am not speaking of organising international conferences with exceptionalist examples of subalternity to represent collective subaltern will. The subaltern has no examples. The exemplary subaltern is hegemonised, even if (and not necessarily) in bad faith. This mus t be distinguished from the desperate and hardly perceptible effort at faking subaltern collective initiative by the leaders of counterglobalist resistances. I have called it feudality without feudalism. I do not think it is a good idea at this point to ta ke a real position against it, because I know where the desperation comes from.

Second, add subaltern bad shit

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AT Subaltern is Homogenous/Totalizing
First, Subaltern not totalizing or homogenous Vila 97 Pablo, UT El Paso, Narrative Identities: The Employment of the Mexican on the U.S.Mexican Border, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol 38, No 1, Winter 1997, pp. 147-183, Blackwell
Those feminist authors who turn feminist criticism to the deconstruction of the homogene- ous and unified images of the colonized subject argue that "while colonization and de-coloni- zation seem to urge the establishment of an identity and a homeplace, postcolonial critics instead reappropriate displacement: post-colonial criticism valorizes the hybrid rather than the unified subjectidentity figured in the dominant fiction of Western discourse; it foregrounds the multicultural rather than the unified identity of the nation-state and it insists on locally articulated criticisms of the globalization of relations of power/knowledge" (Clough 1994, p. 116). Thus, Minh-ha (1990, p. 157) points out that the question about identity is no longer who am I? but when, where, how am I?: "There

is no real me to return to, no whole self that synthesizes the woman, the woman of color and the writer; there are, instead, diverse recogni- tions of self through difference, and unfinished, contingent, arbitrary closures that make possible both politics and identity." Spivak(1988, p. 284) argues similarly that the claim for the identity of the subaltern subject favors antiessentialism, because the subaltern is not a unified subject-identity but an "identity-in-differential" in relation to the elite. Second, add misappropriating and subaltern bad shit

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AT Other PICs
First, Our Language is not fixed, it is a form of stratgegic essentialism that calls into question traditional categories of queer and feminine Marianucci 2011 Mimi, PhD and Asst. Philosophy Professor at Eastern Washington University
feminist and queer scholar, Queering up Feminism, The Scavenger, Feb. 13 2011
Despite this apparent contradiction, I have chosen the problematic label queer feminism intentionally, in full knowledge of the irony it exhibits. For one thing, I

have learned enough from poststructuralism, and especially from Derrida, to understand that, while meaning cannot be fixed permanently, it can be, indeed it must be, constantly negotiated for reference in particular contexts. This is how sexism, racism, and many other forms of oppression are able to function. Expectations and ideals are constantly revisited and revised, and this is part of what makes them so hard to achieve. Nevertheless, these expectations and ideals form the standards against which we are judged. In the response to sexism and racism, it is also necessary to recognize how the relevant meanings have been fixed relative to the oppressive contexts in which they are deployed. This is reminiscent of what GayatriSpivak referred to in 1985 as strategic essentialism. Strategic essentialism is a strategy whereby groups with toward mutual goals and interests temporarily present themselves publicly as essentially the same for the sake of expediency and presenting a united front, while simultaneously engaging in ongoing and less public disagreement and debate. Additionally, by using the term, I hope to draw attention to the problems inherent in the very notion of feminism.

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AT Particular K
First, We challenge the binary of the universal particular these divisions rest upon reproductive heteronormativity Spivak 2005 GuyatriChakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge
I have said that the singular, as it combats the universal-particular binary opposition, is not an individual, a person, an agent; multiplicity is not multitude. If, however, we are thinking of potential agents, when s/he is not publicly empowered to put aside difference and self-synecdochise to form collectivity, the group will take difference itself as its synecdochic element. Difference slides into culture, often indistinguishable from religion. And then the institution that provides agency is reproductive heteronormativity (RHN). It is the broadest and oldest global institution. You see now why just writing about women does not solve the problem of the gendered subaltern, just as chronicling the popular is not subaltern studies. In search of the subaltern I first turned to my own class: the Bengali middle class: BhubaneshwariBhaduri and Mahasweta Devi. From French theory that is all I could do. But I did not remain there. In the middle class, according to ParthaChatterjee, BhubaneshwariBhaduri was metaleptically substituting effect for cause and producing an idea of national liberation by her suicide. Chatterjees argument is that an idea of national liberation was produced by, so-called, terrorist movements.23 It was a frightening, solitary, and Clytemnestralike project for a woman.

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AT Must Learn from the Oppressed

Yep, thats what we do Spivak 2005 GuyatriChakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge
I hesitate to talk about my teacher-training efforts, because they seem so minute. But, if I am going to suggest that the task is to take Hobsbawm a step further, to make the anthropologist construct her object as a teacher for a different end, learn to learn from below, from the subaltern, rather than only study him(her), I have to make an attempt. In this audience, I can call it fieldwork. Then you can take a small example and people will not dismiss you. In this audience I can call it case studies. It is a small undertaking going on for fifteen years and it has its place in the movement of the subaltern as I am describing it. My project has become more and more not only to study the subaltern (always in the sense of cut-off from lines of social mobility) but to learn (as from figuration _/ because I am a literary person) from them in order to be able to devise a philosophy of education that will develop, for want of a better expression (since I do not write about this fieldwork, generalisablephrases do not come immediately), the habits of democratic behavior, or rituals of democratic behavior, or intuition of the public sphere.

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AT Gramci
First, We solve Gramcis criticism Spivak 2005 GuyatriChakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge

This is where the responsibilities of borrowing Gramscis word has brought me. It is the next stage of the work with a trajectory of the subaltern. Not to study the subaltern, but to learn. I am a humanities teacher, not a historian oranthropologist. Therefore, those disciplinary habits are not easily mine. I have fallen into a reading task: to learn from these collectivities enough to suture rights thinking into the torn cultural fabric of responsibility; or, to vary the concept-metaphor, activate a dormant ethical imperative. The text is text-ile. To suture here is to weave, as in invisible mending.30 The work takes me to the break up of rural welfare in China, and the transformation of indigenous knowledge in South Africa. And this brings me to the new subaltern, about whom I have written elsewhere

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AT Doesnt Speak for India

First, We wont speak for the capitalist oppressors who run the show today Spivak 95 Gayatri, Culture Alive, HeinOnline -- 5 Austl. Feminist L.J. 3 1995
And what do I say about post-colonials? I say when we first began using the word postcolonial we used it descriptively for places like India, Algeria, Bangladesh and so on, and ironically, because it was a joke. Because we all knew that post-coloniality meant this failure of decolonisation and neo colonialism. But the United States is a dangerous place. The word caught on and now people talk as if they are able to be after colonialism, when the entire world today, in the new world order as I was saying, is being written much more viciously and criminally, as the economic restructuring, the barriers between the fragile national economies of developing states are falling one by one. All of the economic constraints are orthodox. Socially distribution is going to hell. Consumerist classes are being bred. They're coming forth and representing the country. And of course I'm being told by other diasporics that I don't listen to Indians. I know I don't listen to Indians when this is the class that represents India today

Second, Spivak is speaking for herself Were merely trying to listen to her voice. Third, The way in which we read Spivak is still a crack and fissure into her experience and her thought, despite our regulation of it

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AT Identity Politics Bad

First, We are not ID politics you have entirely missed the point Libractivist 11 (Libractivist is a contributor to the Below the Belt genderblog and queer/immigrant activist, Allies must
not co-opt struggles for equality, The Scavenger, Feb. 13 2011)

It's true; I deeply believe that it is my responsibility as a person with privilege and as a decent human being to oppose any affronts to the basic humanity and dignity of any person(s). I'm a white, USian, native-born, English-speaking, (upper) middleclass, highly educated, thin, currently non-disabled, apparently cis-gendered girl-shaped person who's often read as het. I grew up within a supportive family in an urban, literate, relatively progressive milieu. So I am politicized out of a sense of fairness, not the circumstances of my life. This complicates my activism. In many of the struggles with which I am involved, I have hardly been oppressed. My knowledge of homophobia is passive, based more on life in an obnoxiously
heteronormative society than on a daily fear of gay-bashing or losing my job. I can't remember ever having been the target of intentional homophobia (biphobia, yes. But even that I could probably count on one hand). Even as a feminist, where by virtue of my perceived gender I am undeniably in a disadvantaged position, my privilege in other areas allows me a certain buffer. I can, for the most part, choose with whom I associate, for example, and I'm less bound to a particular job or setting than many others. I have to deal with objectification and casual sexism and people disbelieving my abilities or wanting to fit me into prescribed gender roles all the time. But in a lot of ways, I still have it lucky.

As a feminine, female-bodied person, as a queer person, as a gender non-conformist, I have a genuine stake in the outcomes of certain trans, queer, and feminist struggles. But I can hardly pretend that having a claim to a certain label means my interests should be allowed to dominate that struggle.The best example for me is the immigrant rights movement. I am a second-generation immigrant, and an immigrant myself, which I suppose give me some legitimacy to talk about immigrant rights. But I'm the good kind of immigrant: legal, educated, linguistically and culturally assimilated, healthy, and so on. I have to come to the struggle as an ally to the folks for whom immigration is a true hardship. It is possible that making the system work for them will mean improvements for me, but that is not my primary goal. My immigrant identity is only a source of some empathy and 101-level knowledge, not a driving factor in my understanding of the movement's goals.I want to suggest that we have to accept a blurring of the lines between allies and genuine oppressed folks.In fact, I think we need a new language that can talk about the important difference between the oppressions we face and the identities we hold. I'd argue, for example, that claiming a queer identity (however justified) does not reduce one's straight privilege, just as a pre/non-op trans man's personal identification as male does not stop him from experiencing sexism based on society's perception of his presentation.In short, anti-oppression work is not the same as identity politics, and to conflate them is to obscure the effects of intersectionality and the extremely varied experiences and struggles that we each face.

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Second, we access your criticism Policies that use identity politics to at aiding marginalized groups are used to change the subalteran's life in a way that suits the needs of the globalized world, reproducing the problem and reproductive heteronormativity - empirically proven Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012 The construction of the postcolonial subject was to code the failure of decolonization as multiculturalism, in metropolitan space, to race, itself rewritten as a fantasmatic national identity as its subject. So if the first was class the second is race as multiculturecultural rights. Identitarian

politics succeeds insofar as class and gender remain subsumed to this notion of a national and postnational identity. The construction, on the other hand, of the globalized subject is through the manufacturing of a gender alliance. The female subject/agent of globalization often collectively legitimatizes itself in the name of a generalized ethical agenda. This is where she crosses the capital/culture aporia on the side of capital. Yet to work for global justice as a principle is as right a decision as to work for strategy-driven globalization. But the interests of globalization from above and from below cancel each other. This too contributes to the problem of thinking ethics for the other woman. In 1998, National
Geographic showed pictures of women saluting the male fieldworkers of the Grameen Bank as they vow not to have too many children. 13 Will mainstream feminism ever think critically of this model of cultural indoctrination, even as Grameen gets more savvy? Different officers of Women's World Banking repeatedly invoke Chandra Behn, a member of the celebrated Self Employed Women's Association or SEWA, as their legitimation. At the same time, they speak of opening "the huge untapped market of poor Southern women to the international commercial sector." When SEWA was founded in the early 1960s, Ela Bhatt, the founder, had no such ambition. "The World Bank's [Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest] ... appears to be narrowly focused on microlending as an end in itself. And the means to that end, critics charge, may do more damage to 'empowerment leaders' like SEWA than good." 14 This

was the placing of the poorest women of the South upon the spectral grid of finance capital. "Pay up every week or else" is once again the instrumentalization of body and the money-form in the interest of the abstract. SEWA had made the subaltern women co-operative owners of their own bank, precisely to bypass the predations of commercial capital as they started life changes: driving by strategy, not driven by crisis management. Under the initiator Ela Bhatt's fierce left-labor Gandhianism, the free-choice culturalidentity slot was anti-Fordist, hi-religious (Muslim/Hindu) worker's pride, which lasts to this day, although one senses a certain unease now, among the working-class Hindu women, in pronouncing the "la ilaha ... "-there is no God but God-the Muslim credo.

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AT Alternative is Non-Unique
First, The combination of current efforts and the alternative is uniquely key to creative new types of movements that solve Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.) An awareness of solidarity with the ongoing pedagogic effort would have allowed Said to step out of the chalk circle of the three thousand critics and recognize that the task-"to use the visual faculty (which also happens to be dominated by visual media such as television, news photography, and commercial film, all of them fundamentally immediate, 'objective,' and ahistorical) to restore the nonsequential energy of lived historical memory and subjectivity as fundamental components of meaning in representation-is attempted every day by popular culture teachers on the Left (p. 25). I quote Tablozd as a metonym: "Many of our articles over the past months have
given examples of this daily subversion-women in the home mutating the 'planned' effect of TV soap operas, political activists creating pirate radio stations, the customization of cars, clothing, etc.""

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AT Status Quo Solves

First, Sure there are a few exceptions But this discourse an idea of the status quo solving because of exceptions is the type of knowledge production that causes our impact This means only the alternative causes the wide spread ideological shift and its another link to the K Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.)
The

problem cannot be solved by noticing celebrated female practitioners of the discipline, such as Hannah Arendt. The collective situation of the ideologically constitutedconstituting sexed subject in the production of and as the situational object of historical discourse is a structural problem that obviously goes beyond the recognition of worthy exceptions. This critique should not be understood as merely an accusation of personal guilt; for the shifting limits of ideology, as I have suggested earlier, are larger than the "individual consciousness." Understood as such, my desperation at the smooth
universality of Dworkin's discussion of law as interpretation will not seem merely tendentious. For it is not a questioning of the power of Dworkin's thesis; it is an acknowledgment that, interpretation,

if woman as the subject in law, or the subject of legal is allowed into the argument in terms of the differential ethico-political dimension of these relationships, then the clarity might have to be seen as narrow and gender-specific rather than universal. (I am of course not mentioning the possibility that the eruption of
Judeo- Christian sanctions within the recent debate on abortion shows how questions of sexual difference challenge the secular foundation of Western law.'"

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AT Capitalism
First, Our inclusion of the subaltern is key to solving for capitalism We must create a new system which is inclusive and listens to the voices of those who suffered at the hands of capitalism Only this creates a better, new global system Spivak 95 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Ghostwriting, Jcook.) The New International, if I understand it right, asks the international law and international human rights folks to be aware of the economic. ~ ~pOagne s 93-94 Derrida assures us that "these problems of the foreign Debt-and everything that is metonymized by this conceptwill not be treated without at least the spirit of the Marxist critique, the critique of the market, of the multiple logics of capital, and of that which links the State and international law to this market." This fine suggestion would gain in strength if it took into account the vicissitudes suffered by the sustained organizational opposition to legalized economic exploitation (the collusion of international law and international capital, legiferant capital-the Group of Seven today-law "carrying the subjectivity of capital," in other words), in the interest if not always in the declared name of human rights, ever since Bretton Woods (the annulment of the gold standard would have
worked in nicely with Timon of Athens), through Bandung and all the global summits, and the machinations of the GATT, and now the WTO. How, in other words,

is the New International so new? Perhaps it is, to the European left researched account would need at least to refer generally to the longstanding global struggles from below (one of the problems with Human Rights and International Law lobbies is that they are so irreproachably well-bred), which undo the opposition between economic resistance, cultural identity, and women's minded bodies, to which part of my taxonomy refers.I3 "The debt to Marx, I think, needs to be paid and settled, whereas the Third World debt ought to be simply cancelled," writes Ahmad ["Reconciling Derrida" 1061. If one attends to the struggles I am speaking of, where the specter of Marxism has been at work, molelike, although not always identified with Left parties in the impotent state, one would perhaps think of the debt to Marx as an unrepayable one with which we must speculate, to make and ask for Reparation (in the Kleinian sense) in the field of political economy [Klein 306-43].14 How much making and how much asking will depend on who "we" are. As for the
liberal; but why should the South feel any degree of confidence in the project? A "debt" increasingly incurred by the South (no longer the third world surely, Ahmad's paper was first given in Lublijana!), given the dynamics of capital and its relationship to socialism, it can never remain cancelled. What "should" happen (o tempora, o mores) is a recognition that the South supports the North in the preservation of its resource-rich lifestyle. This

at least is the sustained message of those struggles, a reworking of Marx's theme in Capital, that the worker is not a victim (no black on black there) but the agent of the wealth of societies.
Marx regularly used the phrase "agent of production" rather than "worker." Was this simply politically correct language? And, what, without infrastructural effort, would this recognition bring, to whom?

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AT Subalterns are Nationalists

First, The idea of a nation is foreign to the subaltern They do not find themselves in the nation, but silenced by it Spivak 95 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Ghostwriting, JCook.)
I am writing these words in Berkeley, California, and the students are agitating outside against Proposition 187, which in their view (and mine) legalizes injustice against so-called undocumented immigrants. (Another student group is publicizing Jesus's love; messianism and migrant activism-the specters of Marx? as, a generation ago, war protesters and Jesus freaks?) No liberal or radical person in North America, the EEC, Australia et cetera could therefore be against the metaphorization of Marx as a clandestine immigrant [see Walker]. Yet this privileging of the metaphorics (and axiomatics) of migrancy by well-placed migrants helps to occlude precisely the struggles of those who are forcibly displaced, or those who slowly perish in their place as a result of sustained exploitation: globality. Now we can see why the middle section of the book, speaking of international matters, is the least interesting. For Derrida's itinerary is elsewhere: the anterior is the messianic and the future is migration. The

criticism of "ontopology" ("an axiomatics linking indissociably ontological value to beingpresent [on] to one's situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general" [SM 1371Fa word that will undoubtedly be picked up by postcolonial criticism--can only see the unexamined religious nationalism of the migrant or the national. It can certainly be used to understand the often meretricious resentment of elite national intellectuals against the diasporic. But it is to me more important to point out that to see absolute migrancy as the mark of an impossible deconstruction, and to see all activity attaching to the South as ontopologocentric, denies access to the news of subaltern struggles against the financialization of the globe. The subaltern are neither "nationally rooted" nor migrant; their intra-national displacement is managed by the exigencies of international capital [SM 831. Their struggles reflect a continuity of insurgency which can only too easily be appropriated by the discourse of a come-lately New internationality in the most extravagantly publicized theoretical arenas of the world. Subalternity remains silenced there."

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AT Only About Indian

First, Yes Spivak talks about India because she's Indian. Give me a reason it doesn't apply to the context of the aff. *Wont need to read a card unless they spend a minute on this argument* Second, This is irrelevant Every impact and criticism is biased to some form of social history AND The case of India is a result of Spivaks origins, but the theories still remain true Spivak 99 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)
First, a few disclaimers: In the United States the third-worldism currently afloat in humanistic disciplines is often openly ethnic. I

was born in India and recieved my primary, secondary, and university education there, including two years of graduate work. My Indian example could thus be seen as a nostalgic investigation of the lost roots of my own identity. Yet even as I know that one cannot freely enter the thickets of "motivations: I would maintain that my chief project is to point out the positivist-idealist variety of such nostalgla. I turn to Indian material because in the absence of advanced disciplinary training, that accident of birth and education has provided me with a sense of the historical canvas a hold on some of the pertinent languages that are useful tools for a bricoleur, especially when armed with the Marxist skepticism of concrete experience as the final arbiter and a critique of disciplinary formations. Yet the Indian case cannot be taken as representative of all countries, nations, cultures,
and the like that may be invoked as the Other of Europe as Self.

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Framework

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Generic

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Theoretical

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AT Framework Policy Version

Interpretation: The affirmative has to prove their plan is a good idea. We have multiple DAs to their framework First, The aff framing ensures a reproductive heteronormative framing of all policy discussions They are excluding the discussion of subaltern politics, which is the point of the criticism This is a new link The have to beat the thesis of our K before gaining any offense on this flow Second, Reproductive heteronormative politics only work to continue the current mode of thought and reproduce the logic of the state This means we access unique education claims they cannot access Independent voter for education Third, Their form of subjectivity and politics is exclusionary to the subaltern This means we have unique fairness here because only our criticism is inclusionary to all people Independent voter for fairness Fourth, We impact turn their predictability and ground claims Debate and the aff are so stuck in their ways they dont acknowledge or realize that subaltern people are being excluded and subjugated This is a reason the criticism should be weighed first and this is another link to the K AND If we prove an impact to reproductive heteronormativity then it is arbitrary and irresponsible to ignore those impacts AND Latin America must come first when analyzing the history of coloniality It is here that the roots of domination began and the categorizing of life When addressing this topic we must analyze this area of study Salvatore 10 [Ricardo D., Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality:
A Historians Point of View, Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 2010, 332-348, www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. For the contributors of Coloniality at Large the

critique of Eurocentrism and its forms of knowledge should start not with the Enlightenment but with the Spanish conquest, for it was at that time the 16th centurythat the inception of the modern/colonial took place. If this premise is accepted, the American continent becomes the first contact zone and battleground for the deployment of ideas of civilization, evangelization, empire, and racial difference. Much before the world was ordered by the scientific categories and the rationality of 18th century European thought, the Spanish and Portuguese empires had consolidated ideas of racial difference, humanity, and patriarchy in relation to theological paradigms and the very knowledge produced by the Conquest and Colonization. To start the criticism of Eurocentrism with Conrad and Kipling, or even with the cultural activities of the East India Company, seems to miss the origin of modernity by two or three centuries.

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AND Predictable They should be able to defend the assumptions their plan makes AND Ground They still can weigh their advantages against us AND Education We challenge the affirmatives most basic assumptions This is key to any education claims they make, because if their education is flawed, then their impacts to education are flawed AND There is no such thing as objective knowledge as Western thought would lead you to believe Everything we know, or appear to deduce is always based upon our epistemological location This location determines what we know or learn and is the basis of every action in life Above all else we must question these fundamental locations That means they have to beat the thesis of our K before they gain any offense on this flow Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

The first point to discuss is the contribution of racial/ethnic and feminist subaltern perspectives to epistemological questions. The hegemonic Eurocentric paradigms that have informed western philosophy and sciences in the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system (Grosfoguel 2005; 2006b) for the last 500 hundred years assume a universalistic, neutral, objective point of view. Chicana and black feminist scholars (Moraga and
Anzalda 1983; Collins 1990) as well as Third World scholars inside and outside the United States (Dussel 1977) reminded us that

we always speak from a particular location in the power structures. Nobody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical, and racial hierarchies of the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system. As feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988) states, our knowledges are always situated. Black feminist scholars called this perspective afro-centric
epistemology (Collins 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while Latin American Philosopher of Liberation Enrique Dussel called it geopolitics of knowledge (Dussel 1977) and, following Fanon (1967) and Anzalda (1987), I will use the term bodypolitics of knowledge. This

is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. In Western philosophy and sciences the subject that speaks is always hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis . The ego-politics of knowledge of Western philosophy has always privilege the myth of a non-situated Ego. Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth about a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks . It is important here to distinguish the epistemic location from the social location. The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern
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epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial worldsystem consists in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemically like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved.
What I am claiming is that all I am not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge.

knowledges are epistemically located in the dominant or the subaltern side of the power relations and that this is related to the geo- and bodypolitics of knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge is a Western myth.

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K First LA
( ) Only analyzing the ontological and epistemological implications of our thoughts of Latin America will allow us to see what caused our impacts and how to solve those problems today Means the K must come first Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13.

The narrative and argument of this book, then, will not be about an entity called Latin America, but on how the idea of Latin America came about. One of the main goals is to uncouple the name of the subcontinent from the cartographic image we all have of it. It is an excavation of the imperial/colonial foundation of the idea of Latin America that will help us unravel the geo-politics of knowledge from the perspective of coloniality, the untold and unrecognized historical counterpart of modernity. By perspective of coloniality in this case, I mean
that the center of observation will be grounded in the colonial history that shaped the idea of the Americas. I refer to the process as an excavation rather than an archeology because it is impossible to simply uncover coloniality, insofar as it shapes and is shaped by the processes of modernity. After all, the

Americas exist today only as a consequence of European colonial expansion and the narrative of that expansion from the European perspective, the perspective of modernity. ( ) The K must be weighed first Your impacts and actions are dependent on an ideology and subjectivity which constitutes international actions This basis is what we call into question Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.) It is difficult to speak of a politics of interpretation without a working notion of ideology as larger than the concepts of individual consciousness and will. At its broadest
implications this notion of ideology would undo the oppositions between determinism and free will and between conscious choice and unconscious reflex. Ideology

in action is what a group takes to be natural and selfevident, that of which the group, as a group, must deny any historical sedimentation. It is both the condition and the effect of the constitution of the subject (of ideology) as freely willing and consciously choosing in a world that is seen as background. In turn, the subject(s) of ideology are the conditions and effects of the self-identity of the group as a group. It is impossible, of course, to mark off a group as an entity without sharing complicity with its ideological definition. A persistent critique of ideology is thus forever incomplete. In the shifting spectrum between subject-constitution and group constitution are the ideological apparatuses that share the condition/ effect oscillation. ( ) Their framing of ideology and theory constitutes only an ojective lens that does not include subjectivity and objectivity Only the combination of both lens allows for dehumanization to stop, opening up to a more pragmatic theory that truly solves Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.) A critical view of the subject of ideology would call the clarity of these distinctions into question and thus ask the critic to address a less simplified view of the world. It would

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deconstitute and situate (not reject) the "we" who experiences the productivity of alternative investigative postures, the "legitima[cy]" and "power" of the "acceptable standpoints." Such a view does not allow for a personal-subjective category to be set up over against an intellectual-interpretive category either, since it would see complicity between the constitution of subjectivity and the desire for objective identity. These problematic distinctions are necessary for Toulmin's argument because it cannot accommodate the concept of ideology. The neier fortuitous choice of normative metaphors sometimes seems to suggest this necessity: "There is more temptation to present all [author's italics] interpretations in the human sciences as being essentially political in character than there is in the physical sciences. Still, it is a temptation that we ought to resist" (p. 102; italics mine). This resistance wins a space for us where it is possible to overlook the tremendous ideological overdetermination of the relationship between the "pure" and "applied" sciences, as well as their relationship with private- and public-sector technology and the inscription of the whole into the social and material relations of production. All is reduced to the classical split between subject and object-"two-way interactions between the observer and the system being observed" (p. 106). If the clarity of the theory is dependent upon so stringent a reduction, it loses persuasive value when applied to the sociopolitical scene. A statement like the following, concluded from the subject-object premises I quote above, remains merely theoretical, normed into ethical decoration: "That being so, there is, a fortiori, no longer any reason to assume that studying human beings from a scientific point of view necessarily involves dehumanizing them" (p. 106).

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Epistemology Key
( ) Current epistemology of postcolonialism is based within the Eurocentric view of resistance to Eurocentrism It does not come from and work with the subaltern perspective when criticizing Eurocentrism This epistemologically removes our ability to fight the system that were using Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global C oloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

Among the many reasons for the split of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, one of them was between those who read subalternity as a postmodern critique (which represents a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism) and those who read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of Eurocentrism from subalternized and silenced knowledges) [Mignolo 2000: 183-186; 213-214]. For those of us that took side with the decolonial critique, the dialogue with the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group made evident the need to epistemologically transcend, that is, decolonize the Western canon and epistemology. The South Asian Subaltern Studies Groups main project is a critique to Western European colonial historiography about India and to Indian nationalist Eurocentric historiography of India. But by using a Western epistemology and privileging Gramsci and Foucault, constrained and limited the radicalism of their critique to Eurocentrism . Although they represent different epistemic projects, the
South Asian Subaltern School privilege of Western epistemic canon overlapped with the sector of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group that sided with postmodernism. However, with all its limits, South Asian Subaltern Studies Group represents an important contribution to the critique of Eurocentrism. It forms part of an intellectual movement known as postcolonial critique (a critique of modernity from the Global South) as opposed to the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group postmodern critique (a critique of modernity from the Global North) [Mignolo 2000]. These

debates made clear to us (those who took side with the decolonial critique described above), the need to decolonize not only Subaltern Studies but also Postcolonial Studies (Grosfoguel 2006a; 2006b).

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Discourse Key
( ) What terms are we using? Who is using them and what are they describing? These questions all have implications in the narratives being used that define our epistemology on any issue. To question coloniality, we must first question the narratives used around it Mignolo 05 [Walter D., Duke University, The Idea of Latin America, https://cdn.anonfiles.com/1349073241953.pdf,
JCook.] Accessed 7/11/13.

Discovery and invention are not just different interpretations of the same event; they belong to two different paradigms. The line that distinguishes the two paradigms is the line of the shift in the geo-politics of knowledge; changing the terms and not only the The Americas, Christian Expansion, and Racism content of the conversation. The first presupposes the triumphant European and imperial perspective on world history, an achievement that was described as modernity, while the second reflects the critical perspective of those who have been placed behind, who are expected to follow the ascending progress of a history to which they have the feeling of not belonging. Colonization of being is nothing else than producing the idea that certain people do not belong to history that they are non-beings. Thus, lurking beneath the European story of discovery are the histories, experiences, and silenced conceptual narratives of those who were disqualified as human beings, as historical actors, and as capable of thinking and understanding. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the wretched of the earth (as Frantz Fanon labeled colonized beings) were Indians and African slaves. That is why missionaries and men of letters appointed themselves to write the histories they thought Incas and Aztecs did not have , and to write the grammar of Kechua/Kichua and Nahuatl with Latin as the model. Africans were simply left out
of the picture of conversion and taken as pure labor force.

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Alternative Solves Epistemology

( ) Our decolonial tactic of epistemology works to include the knowledge of the subaltern groups This inclusion actively works to transform thought in the world system and allow for the end of coloniality and its epistemological controls Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

The ascribed superiority of European knowledge in many areas of life was an important aspect of the coloniality of power in the modern/colonial world-system. Subaltern knowledges were excluded, omitted, silenced, and/or ignored. This is not a call for a fundamentalist or an essentialist rescue mission for authenticity. The point here is to put the colonial difference (Mignolo, 2000) at the center of the process of knowledge production. Subaltern knowledges are those knowledges at the intersection of the traditional and the modern. They are hybrid, transcultural forms of knowledge, not merely in the traditional sense of syncretism or mestizaje, but in Aim Cesaires sense of the miraculous arms or what I have called subversive complicity (Grosfoguel, 1996) against the system. These are forms of resistance that resignify and transform dominant forms of knowledge from the point of view of the non-Eurocentric rationality of subaltern subjectivities thinking
from border epistemologies. They constitute what Walter Mignolo (2000) calls a critic of modernity from the geo-political experiences and memories of coloniality. According to Mignolo (2000), this is a new space that deserves further explorations both as a new critical dimension to modernity/coloniality and, at the same time, as a space from where new utopias can be devised. This has important implications for knowledge production. Are we going to produce a new knowledge that repeats or reproduces the universalistic, Eurocentric, gods eye view? To say that the unit of analysis is the world-system, not the nation-state, is not equivalent to a neutral gods-eye view of the world. I believe that world-system analysis needs to decolonize its epistemology by taking seriously the subaltern side of the colonial difference: the side of the periphery, the workers, women, gays/lesbians, racialized/colonial subjects, homosexuals/lesbians and antisystemic movements in the process of knowledge production. This means that although world-system takes the world as a unit of analysis, it is thinking from a particular perspective in the world. Still, worldsystem analysis has not found a way to incorporate subaltern knowledges in processes of knowledge production. Without

this there can be no decolonization of knowledge and no utopistics beyond Eurocentrism. The complicity of the social sciences with the coloniality of power in knowledge production and imperial global designs makes a call for new institutional and non-institutional locations from which the subaltern can speak and be heard.

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Alternative Solves World Politics

( ) Our alternative shifts world-systems of thought, decolonializing vast paradigms of global politics Grosfuguel 11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13. However, what I have said about the

Latin American Subaltern Studies Group applies to the paradigms of political-economy. In this article, I propose that an epistemic perspective from racial/ethnic subaltern locations has a lot to contribute to a radical decolonial critical theory beyond the way traditional political-economy paradigms conceptualize capitalism as a global or world-system. The idea here is to decolonize politicaleconomy paradigms as well as world-system analysis and to propose an alternative decolonial conceptualization of the world-system. The first part is an epistemic discussion
about the implications of the epistemological critique of feminist and subalternized racial/ethnic intellectuals to western epistemology. The second part is the implications of these critiques to the way we conceptualize the global or world system. The third part, is a discussion of global coloniality today. The fourth part is a

critique to both world-system analysis and postcolonial/cultural studies using coloniality of power as a response to the culture versus economy dilemma. Finally, the fifth, sixth, seventh and last part, is a discussion of
decolonial thinking, transmodernity and socialization of power as decolonial alternatives to the present world-system.

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Alternative Solves Politics

( ) Our alternative creates a new form of political resistance which adapts to modern politics and changes them from the inside out Empiric social and political movements prove that this form of politics works and is successful in actually creating change Escobar 04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory
and political ecology, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti -Globalization Social Movements, http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf, JCook.] Acccessed 7/3/13. The goal of many (not all) of the anti-globalization struggles can be seen as the defense of particular, place-based historical conceptions of the world and practices of worldmaking more precisely, as a defense of particularly constructions of place, including the reorganizations of place that might be deemed necessary according to the power struggles within place. These struggles are place based, yet transnationalized (Harcourt & Escobar, 2002; Escobar, 2001). The

politics of place is an emergent form of politics, a novel political imaginary in that it asserts a logic of difference and possibility that builds on the multiplicity of actors and actions operating at the level of everyday life. In this view, places are the site of live cultures, economies and environments rather than nodes in a global and all embracing capitalist system. In Gibson-Grahams conceptualization, this politics of place often favored by women, environmentalist, and those struggling for alternative forms of livelihood-- is a lucid response to the type of politics of empire that is also common on the Left and that requires that empire be confronted at the same level of totality and that, as such, devalues all forms of localized action, reducing it to accommodation or reformism. As Gibson-Graham does not cease to remind us, places always fail to be fully capitalist, and herein lie their potential to become something other (2003: 15). Or, in the language of the MC project, there is an exteriority to imperial globality a result of both global coloniality and place-based cultural dynamics that are irreducible to the terms of capitalist modernity. As I have analyzed elsewhere (e.g., Escobar, 2001), the struggle of the social movements of black communities of the Colombian Pacific illustrates the politics of place in the context of imperial globality. This movement,
which emerged in the early 1990s as a result of the deepening of the neo-liberal model and in the wake of the new 1991 Constitution that granted cultural and territorial rights to ethnic minorities such as the black communities of the Pacific, was

from the very outset conceived as a struggle for the defense of cultural difference and the territories. The movement has since emphasized four rights: to their identity (hence, the right to be different), to
their territory (as the space for exercising identity), to a measure of local autonomy, and to their own vision of development. In the encounter with State agents, experts, NGOs, international biodiversity networks, etc., the

movement has developed a unique political ecology framework that articulates the life project of the river communities embedded in placebased notions of territory, production systems, and the environment-- with the political vision of the social movement, incarnated in a view of the Pacific as a region-territory of ethnic groups. In this way, the
movement can legitimately be interpreted in terms of the defense of practices of cultural, economic, and ecological difference. Emerging from the exteriority of the modern/colonial world system within which blacks of marginal regions have always been among the most excluded and forgotten this

group of activists can also be seen as practicing a kind of border thinking from which they engage with both their communities, on the one hand, and the agents of modernity, on the other. In connecting with other continental or global movements (e.g, Afro-Latin American and anti-globalization movements), the also become part of the transnational movement meshworks analyzed in this section.

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K First Spivak
First, The K must be weighed first Your impacts and actions are dependent on an ideology and subjectivity which constitutes international actions This basis is what we call into question Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.) It is difficult to speak of a politics of interpretation without a working notion of ideology as larger than the concepts of individual consciousness and will. At its broadest
implications this notion of ideology would undo the oppositions between determinism and free will and between conscious choice and unconscious reflex. Ideology

in action is what a group takes to be natural and selfevident, that of which the group, as a group, must deny any historical sedimentation. It is both the condition and the effect of the constitution of the subject (of ideology) as freely willing and consciously choosing in a world that is seen as background. In turn, the subject(s) of ideology are the conditions and effects of the self-identity of the group as a group. It is impossible, of course, to mark off a group as an entity without sharing complicity with its ideological definition. A persistent critique of ideology is thus forever incomplete. In the shifting spectrum between subject-constitution and group constitution are the ideological apparatuses that share the condition/ effect oscillation. Second, Their framing of ideology and theory constitutes only an ojective lens that does not include subjectivity and objectivity Only the combination of both lens allows for dehumanization to stop, opening up to a more pragmatic theory that truly solves Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.) A critical view of the subject of ideology would call the clarity of these distinctions into question and thus ask the critic to address a less simplified view of the world. It would deconstitute and situate (not reject) the "we" who experiences the productivity of alternative investigative postures, the "legitima[cy]" and "power" of the "acceptable standpoints." Such a view does not allow for a personal-subjective category to be set up over against an intellectual-interpretive category either, since it would see complicity between the constitution of subjectivity and the desire for objective identity. These problematic distinctions are necessary for Toulmin's argument because it cannot accommodate the concept of ideology. The neier fortuitous choice of normative metaphors sometimes seems to suggest this necessity: "There is more temptation to present all [author's italics] interpretations in the human sciences as being essentially political in character than there is in the physical sciences. Still, it is a temptation that we ought to resist" (p. 102; italics mine). This resistance wins a space for us where it is possible to overlook the tremendous ideological overdetermination of the relationship between the "pure" and "applied" sciences, as well as their relationship with private- and public-sector technology and the inscription of the whole into the social and material relations of production. All is reduced to the classical split between subject and object-"two-way interactions between the observer and the system being observed" (p. 106). If the clarity
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of the theory is dependent upon so stringent a reduction, it loses persuasive value when applied to the sociopolitical scene. A statement like the following, concluded from the subject-object premises I quote above, remains merely theoretical, normed into ethical decoration: "That being so, there is, a fortiori, no longer any reason to assume that studying human beings from a scientific point of view necessarily involves dehumanizing them" (p. 106). Third, Criticisms of framing are inevitable Means no framing bad offense arguments Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.) One cannot of course "choose" to step out of ideology. The most responsible "choice" seems to be to know it as best one can, recognize it as best one can, and, through one's necessarily inadequate interpretation, to work to change it, to acknowledge the challenge of: "Men make their own history, but they do not choose the script" (italics
mine).3 In fact, I would agree with Edward Said that the ideological system that one might loosely name as contemporary USA expects its poets to seem to choose to ignore it and thus allows its businessmen to declare: "Solid business practices transcend ideology if you are willing to work for it."4

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Ballot Becomes the Criticism

First, Use your ballot to affirm our criticism This proves the internalization of the theories, which is truly key to solving It shows a way of affirming a new way of thinking Spivak August 2012 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Re: Discussion of Your Ideas and Academic Debate,
http://emailswithdebateauthors.blogspot.com/2012/08/conversation-with-gayatri-spivak.html, JCook.) Accessed 8/26/12.

I think you are absolutely right in questioning "best-ness." (Only yesterday I sid to an Indian group -- my family -- "nationalist competition kills the human spirit.") That said, allow me to make a gentle criticism. I always tell my students, "theory is not there for application. Theorizing is a practice. Read theory for its own sake so that it's internalized and your reading practice is changed. Do not make things into illustrations of theory." So, see if you can get behind my thinking, as if you're thinking them rather than following them and see what happens. Also, I always have two ways of looking at things: short term & long term. As Adrienne Rich so powerfully says: "Learn from your own history" (1979 Smith College Commencement Address). Does increasing speed in travel actually decrease gasolene consumption? What does history teach us? And does lessened gasolene consumption lead to a juster world automatically with no training for epistemological performance? Would infrastructural change help subaltern groups be heard?

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Dehumanization
*same as second K first card* First, Their framing of ideology and theory constitutes only an ojective lens that does not include subjectivity and objectivity Only the combination of both lens allows for dehumanization to stop, opening up to a more pragmatic theory that truly solves Spivak 82 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, The Politics of Interpretations, JCook.) A critical view of the subject of ideology would call the clarity of these distinctions into question and thus ask the critic to address a less simplified view of the world. It would deconstitute and situate (not reject) the "we" who experiences the productivity of alternative investigative postures, the "legitima[cy]" and "power" of the "acceptable standpoints." Such a view does not allow for a personal-subjective category to be set up over against an intellectual-interpretive category either, since it would see complicity between the constitution of subjectivity and the desire for objective identity. These problematic distinctions are necessary for Toulmin's argument because it cannot accommodate the concept of ideology. The neier fortuitous choice of normative metaphors sometimes seems to suggest this necessity: "There is more temptation to present all [author's italics] interpretations in the human sciences as being essentially political in character than there is in the physical sciences. Still, it is a temptation that we ought to resist" (p. 102; italics mine). This resistance wins a space for us where it is possible to overlook the tremendous ideological overdetermination of the relationship between the "pure" and "applied" sciences, as well as their relationship with private- and public-sector technology and the inscription of the whole into the social and material relations of production. All is reduced to the classical split between subject and object-"two-way interactions between the observer and the system being observed" (p. 106). If the clarity of the theory is dependent upon so stringent a reduction, it loses persuasive value when applied to the sociopolitical scene. A statement like the following, concluded from the subject-object premises I quote above, remains merely theoretical, normed into ethical decoration: "That being so, there is, a fortiori, no longer any reason to assume that studying human beings from a scientific point of view necessarily involves dehumanizing them" (p. 106).

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AT Vagueness/Theory/No Practical Application

First, Tag me Spivak 2003 Guyatri, Interview with Milevska, Resistance that cannot be Recognized as
Such, Journal For Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol 2, No 2, Winter 2003
G. S.: Yes, I think that is quite true, to comment on the first part of the question. Now, let.stalk about Lenin and Stalin. I have a footnote about this in my book. When Stalin was talking to the remnants of Hapsburg and Russian empire, especially the Hapsburg.s, he was actually talking about a kind of very long imperial tradition which was multiethnic and very different from what Lenin was talking about which was a single nation, postcapitalist colonies like the British colonies, the French colonies. The Ottomans, the Hapsburg.s, and the Russians are very different models of empires so when that breaks and it breaks in the postcolonial context as it was established in the middle of the last century, then the patterns would not be the same, and therefore I would say it is clear in the case of using anything the people who use this must be creative, I think there is a lot to be learnt from the work that some of us did. But if it is imitative, and again it is true of using anything, it will fail because whenever one uses theories like that, one makes the theory part of ones practice, by open sympathy and then as one read one.s own surroundings, the theory gets normalised by what one is reading. So I will learn as much from what I call post-imperial scholar in this kind conjuncture with a financialised goal, and what I began with, you know, the group of seven, especially Europe-America in competition, Europe talking about it.s past empires as it corrects United States as a future empire, if you look at the Frankfurter AllemaineZeitung for 31st May you will see that there is a whole bunch of European intellectuals who are talking about Europe in this way. I say to do this thing, this imperial competition, in the context of the post-imperial world, with the financialisation of the globe, sometimes called globalization, it is a very different scenario, but what else is new? Who

expects to be able to have theories that are as contingent as the way things are. Theory will never be like that. One must know how to use theory and I think our way of doing postcolonial theory can be very useful if one is not waiting for the theory that exactly matches your situation because that would be useless. And in this context I would like to say whatever you think of
Althusser and we have lots of criticism about Althusser, that his essay .Contradiction and Overdetermination. says this so clearly and for so many years ago, this business of .not thinking., you know he was speaking from the bosom of the French communist party, it was a courageous thing to say. .Not thinking.that the theory is going to be pure, to find a field for pure application .

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AT Organic Intellectual
First, Our version of the organic intellectual solves better comparative evidence Spivak 2005 GuyatriChakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge

Gramsci, the thinker of subalternity as an amendment of mere capital logic, had, in his figuration of the organic intellectual, given us an idea of expanding the horizon of historiography as an activity. In an extended consideration, I would question the figure of the organic, but that would not lead to a disagreement with Gramscis general point. This is not the place to launch an analysis of Gramscis notion of subalternity. Suffice it to say that Gramscis subaltern is not as impervious as the one I have been discussing. There are at least two reasons for this. First, Gramscis thought-world was mono-gendered. And, subalternity as position without identity computed differently in a world where the role of the Communist party as envisaged by Gramsci in his jail cell was significantly different from anything that either ourselves or the early subalternists could imagine. One insight, however, is still useful: The intellectuals
are the dominant groups deputies exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.15 I add here Raymond Williamss dynamic sense of the dominant as defined by its ceaseless appropriation of the emergent, as it divides itself into mere alternative and actively oppositional. 16 Hobsbawms and the early subalternists limiting of the subaltern within the historiographical may be seen as such an appropriation. By contrast, it was the intention of saving the singular oppositional that the example of BhubaneswariBhaduri taught me so long ago. That

message in her body led outside

disciplinary limits.

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AT Politics Good
First, We are the prerequisite without it domination of the subaltern is guaranteed. We must first lay the foundation for the affs politics to work Spivak 2005 GuyatriChakravorty, Columbia University, Scattered speculations on the
subaltern and the popular, Postcolonial Studies Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 475-486, 2005 Routledge
By now it should be clear that insertion into the public sphere means for me the effort to create the possibility of metony mising oneself for making oneself a synecdoche, a part of a whole, so that one can claim the idea of the state belonging to one. The particular collectivity claimed here is citizenship: the state can be seen as being in the citizens service through access t o this collectivity. This abstract agential self-perception is a non-dependent intuition of the public sphere, not as ma-baap but as a claimable right. This is hopelessly idealistic, especially in the context of a repressive state, in the current era of globalisation where the state is more and more reconfigured as not the agent of redistribution, but the agent of repression; and the model is not accountability, but management. The idea of relating to the state in a country as multi-lingual and multi-cultural, as many-leveled as India _/and to a degree such differences exist everywhere _/, unless you want to go through nationalism/ fascism, you must be able to metonymise/synecdochise yourself, understand the part by which you are connected to that abstract whole so that you can claim it. It is not even the right to metonymise oneself, it is the possibility. This kind of work can only be a supplement to much more quickfix, problem-solving work. But if it isnt there then subalternisation remains in place and accounts of popular practice as political society remain constative.

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Class Room Pedagogy

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First
First, Only through an embrace of tensions that exist between cultural narratives can the subalteran speak - failure to include oppressed voices leads to serial policy failure - a reform of classroom pedagogy is the critical starting point for inclusion of alternative narratives Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012 This system of cultural representation and self-representation is the U.S, semiotic field of citizenship and ethnicity. The

cultural fantasies of origin of the prominent "ethnic groups" in the United States (including the English and the French) and their imprint on the countries of their origin are well known. (Israel, Ireland, Poland, and Cuba are four other ecXa.tulJ'l"'")22 All of these groups (excluding the English) had a history of ,vall"'""" of oppression on the soil that lent an urgency to the fantasies. In the Indian case, export-import has been speeded up for reasons that I have tried to sketch. Now, if one returns to the melancholy story of the years of Independence, whose shadow fell on my childhood, then one begins to see that the c;ultural, communal (religious), and class heterogeneity native to the sub. continent has been asserting itself in spite of the unifying hopes on assorted sides, based on those assorted concept-metaphors: nationalism, secularism, internationalism, culturalism. Any extended discussion of remaking history in decolonization must take into account the dangerous fragility and tenacity of these conceptmetaphors. Briefly, it seems possible to say that an alternative and perhaps equally fragile mode of resistance to them can only come through a strategic acceptance of the centrifugal potential of the plurality and heterogeneity native to the subcontinent. Yet heterogeneity is an elusive and ambivalent resource (except in metropolitan "parliamentary" or academic space), as the recent past in India, and indeed on the globe, have shown. Its direct manipulation for electoral or diplomatic results constitutes devastation. (Manipulation in commercial interest can lead to a dynamic "public culture.") It is only in situations like this that institutionally placed cultural workers have the obligation to speak predictively. These scrupulous interventions are in fact our only contribution to the project of remaking history or sustaining ever-shifting voices with an alternative edge. In a sense our task is to make people ready to listen, and that is not determined by argument. Indirect and maddeningly slow, forever running the risk of demagogy and coercion mingled with the credulous vanity and class interests of teacher and student, it is still only institutionalized education in the human sciences that is a long-term and collective method for making people want to listen. As far as I can see, remaking (the discipline of) history has its only chance on this unglamorous and often tedious register. 23 Therefore I propose the persistent establishment and re-establishment, the repeated consolidating in undoing, of a strategy of education and classroom pedagogy attending to provisional resolutions of oppositions as between secular and nonsecular, national and subaltern, national and international, cultural and socio-political by teasing out their complicity. 24 Such a strategy of strategies must speak "from within" the

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emancipatory master narratives even while taking a distance from them. It must resolutely
hold back from offering phantasmic, hegemonic, nativist counternarratives that implicitly honor the historical withholding of the "permission to narrate." The new culturalist alibi, working within a basically elitist culture industry, insisting on the continuity of a native tradition untouched by a Westernization whose failures it can help to cover, legitimizes the very thing it claims to combat.

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Solves
First, We must use the classroom to undo the cultural teaching that caused our impacts to occur Every small step is necessary Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9 -11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. JCook.

In order to sustain such a world, assuming its establishment, it is the skills we teach in the humanities that we need. I am speaking, of course, of the skills of reading, of catching the generic difference between registers of language, with the hope of a setting to work to meet the world in which we live, in order to read Martin Luther King Jr.s example of one who so loved his enemies that he died for them as a narrative, singular and unverifiable. It should be clear from my description of the situation of religion that secularism which I will define in a momentis a persistent critique; a persistent setting to work to recognize language as system rather than ground for belief. If we are to keep working for such a world, we must partially (only partially) undo the lesson of the last few European centuries and massively redo the program of disenfranchised histories. It sounds pretty scary put this way. But if we think of it as a collective enterprise that we undertake in the classroom, it need not work that way.

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In Round Solvency
First, Our discourse and discussion in this round leads to us internalizing these theories, which is truly key to solving It shows a way of affirming a new way of thinking Spivak August 2012 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Re: Discussion of Your Ideas and Academic Debate,
http://emailswithdebateauthors.blogspot.com/2012/08/conversation-with-gayatri-spivak.html, JCook.) Accessed 8/26/12.

I think you are absolutely right in questioning "best-ness." (Only yesterday I sid to an Indian group -- my family -- "nationalist competition kills the human spirit.") That said, allow me to make a gentle criticism. I always tell my students, "theory is not there for application. Theorizing is a practice. Read theory for its own sake so that it's internalized and your reading practice is changed. Do not make things into illustrations of theory." So, see if you can get behind my thinking, as if you're thinking them rather than following them and see what happens.

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Contestatory Fiction
Our 1ac should not be taken as Truth rather as supplement Spivak 2001 Guyatri Chakravorty, Moving Devi, Cultural Critique, No. 47, Winter 2001, pp. 120-163, JSTOR, U of Minnesota Press
Hedged in by this framing, then, I give witness to the great goddesses, Durga and Kali. You will work out my negotiations. " 'I'

is only a convenient term for somebody who has no real being. Lies will flow from my lips, but there may perhaps be some truth mixed up with them; it is for you to seek out this truth and to decide whether any part of it is worth keeping. If not, you will of course throw the whole of it into the wastepaper basket and forget all about it."25

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AT Not Enough to Solve

*Same as solves card* First, We must use the classroom to undo the cultural teaching that caused our impacts to occur Every small step is necessary Spivak 04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of
the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 Terror: A Speech After 9 -11 Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities LibrariesProject Muse 10/8/2008. JCook.

In order to sustain such a world, assuming its establishment, it is the skills we teach in the humanities that we need. I am speaking, of course, of the skills of reading, of catching the generic difference between registers of language, with the hope of a setting to work to meet the world in which we live, in order to read Martin Luther King Jr.s example of one who so loved his enemies that he died for them as a narrative, singular and unverifiable. It should be clear from my description of the situation of religion that secularism which I will define in a momentis a persistent critique; a persistent setting to work to recognize language as system rather than ground for belief. If we are to keep working for such a world, we must partially (only partially) undo the lesson of the last few European centuries and massively redo the program of disenfranchised histories. It sounds pretty scary put this way. But if we think of it as a collective enterprise that we undertake in the classroom, it need not work that way.

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Ontology/Epistemology First
First, The separation between the language used and the cultural values behind it lead to cultural class separation necessarily fragmenting culture This is a link to the criticism AND means you have to disprove the thesis of our criticism before gaining this offense Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012 By contrast, literary activity is usually prolific in the mother tongue of the writer of IndoAnglian prose or poetry. The writer of Indo-Anglian literature might represent this dynamic base of regional public culture as if it were no more than a medium of private exchange or a rather quaint simulacrum of the genuine public sphere. This artificial separation of public and private is, strictly speaking, a cultural classseparation. The relationship between the writer of "vernacular" and Indo-Anglian literatures is a site of class-cultural struggle. This struggle is not reflected in personal confrontations. Indeed, the spheres of Indo-Anglian writing and vernacular writing are usually not in serious contact. By "class-cultural struggle" is meant a struggle in the production of cultural or culturalpolitical identity. If literature is a vehicle of cultural self-representation, the "Indian cultural identity" projected by Indo-Anglian fiction and, more obliquely, poetry can give little more than a hint of the seriousness and contemporaneity of the many "Indias" fragmentarily represented in the many Indian literatures.

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Deontology First
First, Closing the gap between law and justice is the only way to acknowledge the role of the historical and political in culture which is the only way that true ethics can be formed Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012

To begin with, some presuppositions. Radical alterity-the wholly other-must be thought and must be thought through imaging. To be born human is to be born angled toward an other and others. To account for this the human being presupposes the quite-other. This is the bottom line of being-human as being-in-the-ethicalrelation. By definition, we cannot-no self can-reach the quite-other. Thus the ethical situation can only be figured in the ethical experience of the impossible. This is the founding gap in all act or talk, most especially in acts or talk that we understand to be closest to the ethical-the historical and the political. We will not leave the historical and the political behind. We must somehow attempt to supplement the gap. To try to supplement the gap that founds the historical-political is a persistent critique. I believe it is in that spirit that Susan Bazilli, editor of Putting Women on the Agenda, writes: "In the present South African climate we are faced with the task of determining the future of law and its relationship to women. To do so we must always be cognizant of narrowing the gap between law and justice."2 Second, The alternatives radical alterity creates a double bind in that it forces us to think of people as other and self - only through accepting this double bind are we forced to make ethical choices Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University
and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012

Radical alterity, if one can say it, appears to require an imaging that is the figuration of the ethical as the impossible. If ethics are grasped as a problem of relation rather than a problem of knowledge, it is not enough to build efficient databases, converting the "gift," if there is any, to the "given" (datum), upon which calculating "aid" can be based. It is necessary to imagine this woman as an other as well as a self. This is, strictly speaking, impossible. Imagination is structurally unverifiable. Thus, the image of the other as self produced by imagination supplementing knowledge or its absence is a figure that marks the impossibility of fully realizing the ethical. It is in view of this experience of the figure (of that which is not logically possible) that we launch our calculations of the political and the legal. The gift of time grasped as our unanticipatable present, as a moment of living as well as dying, of being hailed by the other as well as the distancing of that call, is launched then as reparation, as

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responsibility, as accountability. This is an account of the double bind of the ethical as spelled out in the thinking of Melanie Klein, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and Luce Irigaray.10 When

one decides to speak of double binds and aporias, one is haunted by the ghost of the undecidable in every decision. 11 One cannot be mindful of a haunting, even if it fills the mind. Let me then describe a narrower sense in which I am using the word. When we find ourselves in the subject position of two determinate decisions, both right (or both wrong), one of which cancels the other, we are in an aporia which by definition cannot be crossed, or a double bind. Yet, it is not possible to remain in an aporia or a double bind. It is not a logical or philosophical problem like a contradiction, a dilemma, a paradox, an antinomy. It can only be described as an experience. It discloses itself in being crossed. For, as we know every day, even by supposedly not deciding, one of those two right or wrong decisions gets taken, and the aporia or double bind remains. Again, it must be insisted that this is the condition of possibility of deciding. In the aporia or the double bind, to decide is the burden

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