[G.R. No. 155207, August 13, 2008] WILHELMINA S. OROZCO, E!I!IONER, "S. !HE #I#!H $I"ISION O# !

HE HONORA%LE CO&R! O# A EALS, HILI INE $AIL' IN(&IRER, AN$ LE!ICIA )IMENEZ MAGSANOC, RES ON$EN!S. $ECISION
NACH&RA, ).* The case before this Court raises a novel question never before decided in our jurisdiction whether a newspaper columnist is an employee of the newspaper which publishes the column. In this Petition for Review under Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure! petitioner "ilhelmina #. $ro%co assails the &ecision'() of the Court of *ppeals +C*, in C*--.R. #P .o. /01/ dated 2une ((! 3//3 and its Resolution'3) dated #eptember ((! 3//3 denyin4 her 5otion for Reconsideration. The C* reversed and set aside the &ecision '6) of the .ational 7abor Relations Commission +.7RC,! which in turn had affirmed the &ecision '4) of the 7abor *rbiter findin4 that $ro%co was an employee of private respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer +P&I, and was ille4ally dismissed as columnist of said newspaper. In 5arch (00/! P&I en4a4ed the services of petitioner to write a wee8ly column for its 7ifestyle section. #he reli4iously submitted her articles every wee8! e9cept for a si9-month stint in .ew :or8 City when she! nonetheless! sent several articles throu4h mail. #he received compensation of P3 /.// - later increased to P6//.// - for every column published. ' ) $n .ovember 1! (003! petitioner;s column appeared in the P&I for the last time. Petitioner claims that her then editor! 5s. 7ita T. 7o4arta!'<) told her that respondent 7eticia 2imene% 5a4sanoc! P&I =ditor in Chief! wanted to stop publishin4 her column for no reason at all and advised petitioner to tal8 to 5a4sanoc herself. Petitioner narrates that when she tal8ed to 5a4sanoc! the latter informed her that it was P&I Chairperson =u4enia *postol who had as8ed to stop publication of her column! but that in a telephone conversation with *postol! the latter said that 5a4sanoc informed her +*postol, that the 7ifestyle section already had many columnists.'1) $n the other hand! P&I claims that in 2une (00(! 5a4sanoc met with the 7ifestyle section editor to discuss how to improve said section. They a4reed to cut down the number of columnists by 8eepin4 only those whose columns were well-written! with re4ular feedbac8 and followin4. In their jud4ment! petitioner;s column failed to improve! continued to be superficially and poorly written! and failed to meet the hi4h standards of the newspaper. >ence! they decided to terminate petitioner;s column.'?) *44rieved by the newspaper;s action! petitioner filed a complaint for ille4al dismissal! bac8wa4es! moral and e9emplary dama4es! and other money claims before the .7RC. $n $ctober 30! (006! 7abor *rbiter *rthur *mansec rendered a &ecision in favor of petitioner! the dispositive portion of which reads@ ">=R=A$R=! jud4ment is hereby rendered! findin4 complainant to be an employee of respondent companyB orderin4 respondent company to reinstate her to her former or equivalent position! with bac8wa4es. Respondent company is also ordered to pay her (6th month pay and service incentive leave pay. $ther claims are hereby dismissed for lac8 of merit.

#$ $R&=R=&.'0) The 7abor *rbiter found that@ 'R)espondent company e9ercised full and complete control over the means and method by which complainant;s wor8 - that of a re4ular columnist - had to be accomplished. This control mi4ht not be found in an instruction! verbal or oral! 4iven to complainant definin4 the means and method she should write her column. Rather! this control is manifested and certained +sic, in respondents; admitted prero4ative to reject any article submitted by complainant for publication. Cy virtue of this power! complainant was helplessly constrained to adopt her subjects and style of writin4 to suit the editorial taste of her editor. $therwise! off to the trash can went her articles. 5oreover! this control is already manifested in column title! DAeminist ReflectionD allotted complainant. Ender this title! complainant;s writin4 was controlled and limited to a woman;s perspective on matters of feminine interests. That respondent had no control over the subject matter written by complainant is stron4ly belied by this observation. =ven the len4th of complainant;s articles were set by respondents. Inevitably! respondents would have no control over when or where complainant wrote her articles as she was a columnist who could produce an article in thirty +6, +sic, months or three +6, days! dependin4 on her mood or the amount of research required for an article but her actions were controlled by her obli4ation to produce an article a wee8. If complainant did not have to report for wor8 ei4ht +?, hours a day! si9 +<, days a wee8! it is because her tas8 was mainly mental. 7astly! the fact that her articles were +sic, published wee8ly for three +6, years show that she was respondents; re4ular employee! not a oncein-a-blue-moon contributor who was not under any pressure or obli4ation to produce re4ular articles and who wrote at his own whim and leisure. '(/) P&I appealed the &ecision to the .7RC. In a &ecision dated *u4ust 36! (004! the .7RC #econd &ivision dismissed the appeal thereby affirmin4 the 7abor *rbiter;s &ecision. The .7RC initially noted that P&I failed to perfect its appeal! under *rticle 336 of the 7abor Code! due to non-filin4 of a cash or surety bond. The .7RC said that the reason proffered by P&I for not filin4 the bond - that it was difficult or impossible to determine the amount of the bond since the 7abor *rbiter did not specify the amount of the jud4ment award - was not persuasive. It said that all P&I had to do was compute based on the amount it was payin4 petitioner! countin4 the number of wee8s from .ovember 1! (003 up to promul4ation of the 7abor *rbiter;s decision. '(() The .7RC also resolved the appeal on its merits. It found no error in the 7abor *rbiter;s findin4s of fact and law. It sustained the 7abor *rbiter;s reasonin4 that respondent P&I e9ercised control over petitioner;s wor8. P&I then filed a Petition for Review'(3) before this Court see8in4 the reversal of the .7RC &ecision. >owever! in a Resolution'(6) dated &ecember 3! (00?! this Court referred the case to the Court of *ppeals! pursuant to our rulin4 in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission.'(4) The C* rendered its assailed &ecision on 2une ((! 3//3. It set aside the .7RC &ecision and dismissed petitioner;s Complaint. It held that the .7RC misappreciated the facts and rendered a rulin4 wantin4 in substantial evidence. The C* said@

The Court does not a4ree with public respondent .7RC;s conclusion. Airst! private respondent admitted that she was and 'had) never been considered by petitioner P&I as its employee. #econd! it is not disputed that private respondent had no employment contract with petitioner P&I. In fact! her en4a4ement to contribute articles for publication was based on a verbal a4reement between her and the petitioner;s 7ifestyle #ection =ditor. 5oreover! it was evident that private respondent was not required to report to the office ei4ht +?, hours a day. Aurther! it is not disputed that she stayed in .ew :or8 for si9 +<, months without petitioner;s permission as to her leave of absence nor was she 4iven any disciplinary action for the same. These undisputed facts ne4ate private respondent;s claim that she is an employee of petitioner. 5oreover! with re4ards +sic, to the control test! the public respondent .7RC;s rulin4 that the 4uidelines 4iven by petitioner P&I for private respondent to follow! e.4. in terms of space allocation and len4th of article! is not the form of control envisioned by the 4uidelines set by the #upreme Court. The len4th of the article is obviously limited so that all the articles to be featured in the paper can be accommodated. *s to the topic of the article to be published! it is but lo4ical that private respondent should not write morbid topics such as death because she is contributin4 to the lifestyle section. $ther than said 4iven limitations! if the same could be considered limitations! the topics of the articles submitted by private respondent were all her choices. Thus! the petitioner P&I in decidin4 to publish private respondent;s articles only controls the result of the wor8 and not the means by which said articles were written. *s such! the above facts failed to measure up to the control test necessary for an employer-employee relationship to e9ist.'( ) Petitioner;s 5otion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated #eptember ((! 3//3. #he then filed the present Petition for Review. In a Resolution dated *pril 30! 3// ! the Court! without 4ivin4 due course to the petition! ordered the 7abor *rbiter to clarify the amount of the award due petitioner and! thereafter! ordered P&I to post the requisite bond. Epon compliance therewith! the petition would be 4iven due course. 7abor *rbiter *mansec clarified that the award under the &ecision amounted to P( !6 /.//. Thus! P&I posted the requisite bond on 2anuary 3 ! 3//1. '(<) "e shall initially dispose of the procedural issue raised in the Petition. Petitioner ar4ues that the C* erred in not dismissin4 outri4ht P&I;s Petition for Certiorari for P&I;s failure to post a cash or surety bond in violation of *rticle 336 of the 7abor Code. This issue was settled by this Court in its Resolution dated *pril 30! 3// . '(1) There! the Court held@ Cut while the postin4 of a cash or surety bond is jurisdictional and is a condition sine qua non to the perfection of an appeal! there is a plethora of jurisprudence reco4ni%in4 e9ceptional instances wherein the Court rela9ed the bond requirement as a condition for postin4 the appeal. 9999 In the case of Taberrah v. NLRC the Court made note of the fact that the assailed decision of the 7abor *rbiter concerned did not contain a computation of the monetary award due the employees! a circumstance which is li8ewise present in this case. In said case! the Court stated!

*s a rule! compliance with the requirements for the perfection of an appeal within the re4lamentary +sic, period is mandatory and jurisdictional. >owever! in .ational Aederation of 7abor Enions v. 7adrido as well as in several other cases! this Court rela9ed the requirement of the postin4 of an appeal bond within the re4lementary period as a condition for perfectin4 the appeal. This is in line with the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowin4 the appeal to be resolved on the merits rather than dismissin4 it based on a technicality. The jud4ment of the 7abor *rbiter in this case merely stated that petitioner was entitled to bac8wa4es! (6th month pay and service incentive leave pay without however includin4 a computation of the alle4ed amounts. 9999 In the case of NFL! v. La"ri"o III this Court postulated that Dprivate respondents cannot be e9pected to post such appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award when the amount thereof was not included in the decision of the labor arbiter.D The computation of the amount awarded to petitioner not havin4 been clearly stated in the decision of the labor arbiter! private respondents had no basis for determinin4 the amount of the bond to be posted. Thus! while the requirements for perfectin4 an appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions a4ainst needless delays and for orderly dischar4e of judicial business! the law does admit of e9ceptions when warranted by the circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolvin4 the ri4hts and obli4ations of the parties. Cut while this Court may rela9 the observance of re4lementary periods and technical rules to achieve substantial justice! it is not prepared to 4ive due course to this petition and ma8e a pronouncement on the wei4hty issue obtainin4 in this case until the law has been duly complied with and the requisite appeal bond duly paid by private respondents. '(?) Records show that P&I has complied with the Court;s directive for the postin4 of the bondB '(0) thus! that issue has been laid to rest. "e now proceed to rule on the merits of this case. The main issue we must resolve is whether petitioner is an employee of P&I! and if the answer be in the affirmative! whether she was ille4ally dismissed. "e rule for the respondents. The e9istence of an employer-employee relationship is essentially a question of fact. '3/) Aactual findin4s of quasi-judicial a4encies li8e the .7RC are 4enerally accorded respect and finality if supported by substantial evidence.'3() Considerin4! however! that the C*;s findin4s are in direct conflict with those of the 7abor *rbiter and .7RC! this Court must now ma8e its own e9amination and evaluation of the facts of this case. It is true that petitioner herself admitted that she Dwas not! and 'had) never been considered respondent;s employee because the terms of wor8s were arbitrarily decided upon by the respondent.D'33) >owever! the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be.'36)

This Court has constantly adhered to the Dfour-fold testD to determine whether there e9ists an employer-employee relationship between parties.'34) The four elements of an employment relationship are@ +a, the selection and en4a4ement of the employeeB +b, the payment of wa4esB +c, the power of dismissalB and +d, the employer;s power to control the employee;s conduct. '3 ) $f these four elements! it is the power of control which is the most crucial '3<) and most determinative factor!'31) so important! in fact! that the other elements may even be disre4arded. '3?) *s this Court has previously held@ the si4nificant factor in determinin4 the relationship of the parties is the presence or absence of supervisory authority to control the method and the details of performance of the service bein4 rendered! and the de4ree to which the principal may intervene to e9ercise such control. '30) In other words! the test is whether the employer controls or has reserved the ri4ht to control the employee! not only as to the wor8 done! but also as to the means and methods by which the same is accomplished.'6/) Petitioner ar4ues that several factors e9ist to prove that respondents e9ercised control over her and her wor8! namely@ a. *s to the Contents of her Column - The P=TITI$.=R had to insure that the contents of her column hewed closely to the objectives of its 7ifestyle #ection and the over-all principles that the newspaper projects itself to stand for. *s admitted! she wanted to write about death in relation to *ll #ouls &ay but was advised not to. *s to Time Control - The P=TITI$.=R! as a columnist! had to observe the deadlines of the newspaper for her articles to be published. These deadlines were usually that time period when the #ection =ditor has to Dclose the pa4esD of the 7ifestyle #ection where the column in located. DTo close the pa4esD means to prepare them for printin4 and publication. *s a columnist! the P=TITI$.=R;s writin4s had a definite day on which it was 4oin4 to appear. #o she submitted her articles two days before the desi4nated day on which the column would come out. This is the usual routine of newspaper wor8. &eadlines are set to fulfill the newspapers; obli4ations to the readers with re4ard to timeliness and freshness of ideas. *s to Control of #pace - The P=TITI$.=R was told to submit only two or three pa4es of article for the column! +sic, DAeminist ReflectionsD per wee8. To 4o beyond that! the 7ifestyle editor would already chop off the article and publish the rest for the ne9t wee8. This shows that PRIF*T= R=#P$.&=.T# had control over the space that the P=TITI$.=R was assi4ned to fill. *s to &iscipline - $ver time! the newspaper readers; eyes are trained or habituated to loo8 for and read the wor8s of their favorite re4ular writers and columnists. They are conditioned! based on their daily purchase of the newspaper! to loo8 for specific spaces in the newspapers for their favorite write-upsGor opinions on matters relevant and si4nificant issues aside from not bein4 late or amiss in the responsibility of timely submission of their articles.

b.

c.

d.

The P=TITI$.=R was disciplined to submit her articles on hi4hly relevant and si4nificant issues on time by the PRIF*T= R=#P$.&=.T# who have a say on whether the topics belon4 to those considered as hi4hly relevant and

si4nificant! throu4h the 7ifestyle #ection =ditor. The P=TITI$.=R had to discuss the topics first and submit the articles two days before publication date to 8eep her column in the newspaper space re4ularly as e9pected or without miss by its readers.'6() -iven this discussion by petitioner! we then as8 the question@ Is this the #orm o# $ontrol that our labor la%s $ontemplate su$h as to establish an employer&employee relationship bet%een petitioner an" respon"ent PDI' It is not. Petitioner has misconstrued the Dcontrol test!D as did the 7abor *rbiter and the .7RC. .ot all rules imposed by the hirin4 party on the hired party indicate that the latter is an employee of the former. Rules which serve as 4eneral 4uidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result are not indicative of the power of control. '63) Thus! this Court has e9plained@ It should! however! be obvious that not every form of control that the hirin4 party reserves to himself over the conduct of the party hired in relation to the services rendered may be accorded the effect of establishin4 an employeremployee relationship between them in the le4al or technical sense of the term. * line must be drawn somewhere! if the reco4ni%ed distinction between an employee and an individual contractor is not to vanish alto4ether. Realistically! it would be a rare contract of service that 4ives untrammelled freedom to the party hired and eschews any intervention whatsoever in his performance of the en4a4ement. 7o4ically! the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve as 4uidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result without dictatin4 the means or methods to be employed in attainin4 it! and those that control or fi9 the methodolo4y and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first! which aim only to promote the result! create no employer-employee relationship unli8e the second! which address both the result and the means used to achieve it. 9 9 9.'66) The main determinant therefore is whether the rules set by the employer are meant to control not just the results of the wor8 but also the means and method to be used by the hired party in order to achieve such results. Thus! in this case! we are to e9amine the factors enumerated by petitioner to see if these are merely 4uidelines or if they indeed fulfill the requirements of the control test. Petitioner believes that respondents; acts are meant to control how she e9ecutes her wor8. "e do not a4ree. * careful e9amination reveals that the factors enumerated by the petitioner are inherent conditions in runnin4 a newspaper. In other words! the so-called control as to time! space! and discipline are dictated by the very nature of the newspaper business itself. "e a4ree with the observations of the $ffice of the #olicitor -eneral that@ The Inquirer is the publisher of a newspaper of 4eneral circulation which is widely read throu4hout the country. *s such! public interest dictates that every article appearin4 in the newspaper should subscribe to the standards set by the Inquirer! with its thousands of readers in mind. It is not! therefore! unusual for the Inquirer to control what would be published in the newspaper. "hat is important is the fact that such control pertains only to the end result! i.e.! the submitted articles. The Inquirer has no control over 'petitioner) as to the

means or method used by her in the preparation of her articles. The articles are done by 'petitioner) herself without any intervention from the Inquirer. '64) Petitioner has not shown that P&I! actin4 throu4h its editors! dictated how she was to write or produce her articles each wee8. *side from the constraints presented by the space allocation of her column! there were no restraints on her creativityB petitioner was free to write her column in the manner and style she was accustomed to and to use whatever research method she deemed suitable for her purpose. The apparent limitation that she had to write only on subjects that befitted the 7ifestyle section did not translate to control! but was simply a lo4ical consequence of the fact that her column appeared in that section and therefore had to cater to the preference of the readers of that section. The perceived constraint on petitioner;s column was dictated by her own choice of her column;s perspective. The column title DAeminist ReflectionsD was of her own choosin4! as she herself admitted! since she had been 8nown as a feminist writer. '6 ) Thus! respondent P&I! as well as her readers! could reasonably e9pect her columns to spea8 from such perspective. Contrary to petitioner;s protestations! it does not appear that there was any actual restraint or limitation on the subject matter - within the 7ifestyle section - that she could write about. Respondent P&I did not dictate how she wrote or what she wrote in her column. .either did P&I;s 4uidelines dictate the 8ind of research! time! and effort she put into each column. In fact! petitioner herself said that she received Dno comments on her articles...e9cept for her to shorten them to fit into the bo9 allotted to her column.D Therefore! the control that P&I e9ercised over petitioner was only as to the finished product of her efforts! i.e.! the column itself! by way of either shortenin4 or outri4ht rejection of the column. The newspaper;s power to approve or reject publication of any specific article she wrote for her column cannot be the control contemplated in the Dcontrol test!D as it is but lo4ical that one who commissions another to do a piece of wor8 should have the ri4ht to accept or reject the product. The important factor to consider in the Dcontrol testD is still the element of control over how the wor8 itself is done! not just the end result thereof. In contrast! a re4ular reporter is not as independent in doin4 his or her wor8 for the newspaper. "e note the common practice in the newspaper business of assi4nin4 its re4ular reporters to cover specific subjects! 4eo4raphical locations! 4overnment a4encies! or areas of concern! more commonly referred to as Dbeats.D * reporter must produce stories within his or her particular beat and cannot switch to another beat without permission from the editor. In most newspapers also! a reporter must inform the editor about the story that he or she is wor8in4 on for the day. The story or article must also be submitted to the editor at a specified time. 5oreover! the editor can easily pull out a reporter from one beat and as8 him or her to cover another beat! if the need arises. This is not the case for petitioner. *lthou4h petitioner had a wee8ly deadline to meet! she was not precluded from submittin4 her column ahead of time or from submittin4 columns to be published at a later time. 5ore importantly! respondents did not dictate upon petitioner the subject matter of her columns! but only imposed the 4eneral 4uideline that the article should conform to the standards of the newspaper and the 4eneral tone of the particular section. "here a person who wor8s for another performs his job more or less at his own pleasure! in the manner he sees fit! not subject to definite hours or conditions of wor8! and is compensated accordin4 to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof! no employer-employee relationship e9ists.'6<) *side from the control test! this Court has also used the economic reality test. The economic realities prevailin4 within the activity or between the parties are e9amined! ta8in4 into consideration the totality of circumstances surroundin4 the true nature of the relationship between the parties.'61) This is especially appropriate when! as in this case! there is no written

a4reement or contract on which to base the relationship. In our jurisdiction! the benchmar8 of economic reality in analy%in4 possible employment relationships for purposes of applyin4 the 7abor Code ou4ht to be the economic dependence of the wor8er on his employer. '6?) Petitioner;s main occupation is not as a columnist for respondent but as a women;s ri4hts advocate wor8in4 in various women;s or4ani%ations.'60) 7i8ewise! she herself admits that she also contributes articles to other publications.'4/) Thus! it cannot be said that petitioner was dependent on respondent P&I for her continued employment in respondent;s line of business. '4() The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner was not respondent P&I;s employee but an independent contractor! en4a4ed to do independent wor8. There is no infle9ible rule to determine if a person is an employee or an independent contractorB thus! the characteri%ation of the relationship must be made based on the particular circumstances of each case.'43) There are several factors'46) that may be considered by the courts! but as we already said! the ri4ht to control is the dominant factor in determinin4 whether one is an employee or an independent contractor. '44) In our jurisdiction! the Court has held that an independent contractor is one who carries on a distinct and independent business and underta8es to perform the job! wor8! or service on one;s own account and under one;s own responsibility accordin4 to one;s own manner and method! free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the wor8 e9cept as to the results thereof. '4 ) $n this point! Son(a v. )*S&C*N *roa"$astin+ Corporation'4<) is enli4htenin4. In that case! the Court found! usin4 the four-fold test! that petitioner! 2ose :. #on%a! was not an employee of *C#-CC.! but an independent contractor. #on%a was hired by *C#-CC. due to his Dunique s8ills! talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees!D a circumstance that! the Court said! was indicative! thou4h not conclusive! of an independent contractual relationship. Independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique s8ills! e9pertise or talent to distin4uish them from ordinary employees. '41) The Court also found that! as to payment of wa4es! #on%a;s talent fees were the result of ne4otiations between him and *C#-CC..'4?) *s to the power of dismissal! the Court found that the terms of #on%a;s en4a4ement were dictated by the contract he entered into with *C#-CC.! and the same contract provided that either party may terminate the contract in case of breach by the other of the terms thereof.'40) >owever! the Court held that the fore4oin4 are not determinative of an employer-employee relationship. Instead! it is still the power of control that is most important. $n the power of control! the Court found that in performin4 his wor8! #on%a only needed his s8ills and talent - how he delivered his lines! appeared on television! and sounded on radio were outside *C#-CC.;s control.' /) Thus@ "e find that *C#-CC. was not involved in the actual performance that produced the finished product of #$.H*;s wor8. *C#-CC. did not instruct #$.H* how to perform his job. *C#-CC. merely reserved the ri4ht to modify the pro4ram format and airtime schedule Dfor more effective pro4rammin4.D *C#-CC.;s sole concern was the quality of the shows and their standin4 in the ratin4s. Clearly! *C#-CC. did not e9ercise control over the means and methods of performance of #$.H*;s wor8. #$.H* claims that *C#-CC.;s power not to broadcast his shows proves *C#CC.;s power over the means and methods of the performance of his wor8. *lthou4h *C#-CC. did have the option not to broadcast #$.H*;s show! *C#CC. was still obli4ated to pay #$.H*;s talent fees... Thus! even if *C#-CC. was completely dissatisfied with the means and methods of #$.H*;s performance of his wor8! or even with the quality or product of his wor8! *C#CC. could not dismiss or even discipline #$.H*. *ll that *C#-CC. could do is

not to broadcast #$.H*;s show but *C#-CC. must still pay his talent fees in full. Clearly! *C#-CC.;s ri4ht not to broadcast #$.H*;s show! burdened as it was by the obli4ation to continue payin4 in full #$.H*;s talent fees! did not amount to control over the means and methods of the performance of #$.H*;s wor8. *C#-CC. could not terminate or discipline #$.H* even if the means and methods of performance of his wor8 - how he delivered his lines and appeared on television - did not meet *C#-CC.;s approval. This proves that *C#-CC.;s control was limited only to the result of #$.H*;s wor8! whether to broadcast the final product or not. In either case! *C#-CC. must still pay #$.H*;s talent fees in full until the e9piry of the *4reement. In ,au+han et al. v. -arner et al.! the Enited #tates Circuit Court of *ppeals ruled that vaudeville performers were independent contractors althou4h the mana4ement reserved the ri4ht to delete objectionable features in their shows. #ince the mana4ement did not have control over the manner of performance of the s8ills of the artists! it could only control the result of the wor8 by deletin4 objectionable features. #$.H* further contends that *C#-CC. e9ercised control over his wor8 by supplyin4 all equipment and crew. .o doubt! *C#-CC. supplied the equipment! crew and airtime needed to broadcast the D5el I 2ayD pro4rams. >owever! the equipment! crew and airtime are not the Dtools and instrumentalitiesD #$.H* needed to perform his job. "hat #$.H* principally needed were his talent or s8ills and the costumes necessary for his appearance. =ven thou4h *C#-CC. provided #$.H* with the place of wor8 and the necessary equipment! #$.H* was still an independent contractor since *C#-CC. did not supervise and control his wor8. *C#-CC.;s sole concern was for #$.H* to display his talent durin4 the airin4 of the pro4rams. * radio broadcast specialist who wor8s under minimal supervision is an independent contractor. #$.H*;s wor8 as television and radio pro4ram host required special s8ills and talent! which #$.H* admittedly possesses. The records do not show that *C#-CC. e9ercised any supervision and control over how #$.H* utili%ed his s8ills and talent in his shows.' () The instant case presents a parallel to Son(a. Petitioner was en4a4ed as a columnist for her talent! s8ill! e9perience! and her unique viewpoint as a feminist advocate. >ow she utili%ed all these in writin4 her column was not subject to dictation by respondent. *s in Son(a! respondent P&I was not involved in the actual performance that produced the finished product. It only reserved the ri4ht to shorten petitioner;s articles based on the newspaper;s capacity to accommodate the same. This fact! we note! was not unique to petitioner;s column. It is a reality in the newspaper business that space constraints often dictate the len4th of articles and columns! even those that re4ularly appear therein. Aurthermore! respondent P&I did not supply petitioner with the tools and instrumentalities she needed to perform her wor8. Petitioner only needed her talent and s8ill to come up with a column every wee8. *s such! she had all the tools she needed to perform her wor8. Considerin4 that respondent P&I was not petitioner;s employer! it cannot be held 4uilty of ille4al dismissal. WHERE#ORE! the fore4oin4 premises considered! the Petition is $ISMISSE$. The &ecision and Resolution of the Court of *ppeals in C*--.R. #P .o. /01/ are hereby A##IRME$. SO OR$ERE$.