Christiana Bagusat/William J. F. Keenan/Nadja Lobner/Clemens Sedmak (eds.

): Decent Work and Unemployment, WienBerlinMns ter: Lit Verlag, 2010: xxyy.

REcOGnITIOn AnD WOrk1 Gottfried Schweiger

Introduction In this paper I will explore the concept of recognition and its meaning and importance in the sphere of work. Recognition I suggest that Decent Work can be understood as work which fulfills the workers demand for recognition and protects them from disrespect. On the one side, this junction stregthens the critical potential of the concept of recognition and gives it more substance, on the other side, it allows to further develop and deepen the concept of Decent Work. The Concept of Recognition The Hegelian concept of recognition (Siep 1979; Wildt 1982; Williams 1997) was prominently exploited by Axel Honneth (1995) to develop an empirically grounded social theory, which allows to assess existing societies. Honneth reformulates Hegels approach using G.H. Meads social psychology2 and distinguishes three forms of recognition (personal relationships, legal relations, and solidarity), which are required to successfully develop and sustain selfconfidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Table 1 on the next page).
1. This work was supported by a Fellowship of the City of Salzburg. 2. It shall be noted that Honneth has since abandoned Meads social psychology as a method of materialzing the Hegelian model because it is doubtful whether dialogical re cog nition as a process and a concept can be properly understood in terms of the second-person perspective-taking. In a reply to critics, Honneth concedes: I have come to doubt whether [Meads] views can actually be understood as contributions to a theory of recognition: in essence, what Mead calls recognition reduces to the act of reciprocal perspective-taking, without the character of the others action being of any crucial significance; the psychological mechanism by which shared meanings and norms emerge seems to Mead generally to develop independently of the reactive behaviour of the two participants, so that it also becomes impossible to distinguish actions according to their respective normative character. (Honneth 2002: 502)

2 Gottfried Schweiger Mode of recognition Dimension of personality Forms of recognition Practical relation-toself Forms of disrespect emotional support needs and emotions primary relationships (love, friendship) basic self-confidence abuse and rape cognitive respect moral responsibility legal relations (rights) self-respect denials of rights, exclusion social esteem traits and abilities community of values (solidarity) self-esteem denigration, insult

Table 1: The structure of relations of recognition; source: Honneth (1995: 129)

The first and most basic form is relations within the family, friendships, and erotic relationships, which rely on strong emotions and thus is not a matter of choice and only possible within a small group of people. To develop confidence in one-self as a distinct human being, children need to be continually recognized in strong emotional relationships which enables them to overcome their originally indistinct symbiotic relationships to primary others. The second form is legal relations in the form of civil and economic rights, which are granted to every person qua person without recognition of their respective achievments or character. This is the recognition of an individuals ability to take autonomous moral judgements and actions. Indivdiuals gain self-respect as they know themselves as equal members of society, which can make their own decisions, live their own way of life, and are responsible for it. The third and last form of recognition is described as solidarity, which means, in modern societies, that individuals receive recognition for their way of life, traits, achievements and abilities. So, for Honneth, individuals not only need care, love, emotional relationships and legal rights, but also have to feel as part of a certain community of values and shared goals. These different forms of mutual recognition are equally important and the intersubjective conditions for the constitution of subjectivity and identity and in the end enable individual self-realization and a good, ethical life. Self-realization, which relies on different forms of recognition, can so be seen as the final goal of Honneths theory, and struggles for recognition are ultimately struggles for self-realization (Hardimon 1997). Taken together, the three forms of recognition -love, rights, and esteem constitute the social conditions under which human subjects can develop a positive attitude towards themselves. For it is only due to the cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of self-respect, and of selfesteem provided, one after another, by the experience of those three

Recognition and Work

forms of recognition that a person can come to see himself or herself, unconditionally, as both an autonomous and an individuated being and to identify with his or her goals and desires. (Honneth 1995: 169) Otherwise, if recognition is denied or insufficiently granted, individuals suffer from certain forms of disrespect, like physical abuse, discrimination, social exclusion, denigration of their way of life or a lack of dignity. The possibilites for self-realization are not sufficiently given. Social conflicts are then likely to arise, which can be understood as struggles for recognition, as different groups (eg. women, ethnic or religious minorities, workers) claim and fight for recognition for themselves. Such claims carry critique and anticipate social change. This finally leads to social progress and the gradual expansion of rights to different groups, abolishing previous forms of discriminations and exclusions. For Honneth, social conflicts rest on justified moral claims and not (only) on (material) interests, and his theory can thus be labeled as a monistic approach. Honneths theory has been widely discussed and provoked criticism (van den Brink/Owen 2007), especially on the topic of economic injustice, which is of particular interest here. Nancy Fraser (Fraser/Honneth 2003) and Chris topher Zurn (2003; 2005) argued against the reduction of economic (distributive) injustice to recognitive injustice3, as this would mean to distort social reality. In general, then, Honneth, vastly exaggerates the role of recognition in capitalist society. Focused exclusively on value-regulated interaction, he takes valid insights about the ubiquity and irreducibility of culture and inflates them beyon all recognition. He goes from the true premise that markets are always cuturally embedded to the false conclusion that their behaviour is wholly governed by the dynamics of recognition. [] Instead of passing beyond economism to arrive at a richer theory that encompasses both distribution and recognition, he has traded one truncated paradigm for another, a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. (Fraser in: Fraser /Honneth 2003: 216)
3. Honneth argues: The rules organizing the distribution of material goods derive from the degree of social esteem enjoyed by social groups, in accordance with institutionalized hierarchies of value, or a normative order. [] Conflicts over distribution [] are always symbolic struggles over the legitimacy of the sociocultural dispositive that determines the value of activities, attributes, and contributions []. In short, it is a struggle over the cultural definition of what it is that renders an activity socially necessary and valuable. (Honneth 2001: 54)

4 Gottfried Schweiger

This does not mean to seperate recognition and redistribution completly, and to deny any junctions between them. On the contrary, for Fraser and Zurn, critical theory should be bivalent, and respect the independency of economic and cultural processes as both have different roots, and that the injusties they produce need different solutions. Rather then Honneths sole focus on the psychological experience of disrespect, the analysis of objective social and economic relations, can be used to critisze and evaluta claims for recognition. The critical theory of recognition needs to be paired with a critical theory of political economy. Misrecognition is rooted primarily in cultural patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication, while maldistribution is rooted primarily in the political-economic structures of society. Misrecognition occurs when oppressive, exclusionary, disrespectful and/ or denigrating cultural patterns of value are institutionally-anchored in such a way as to deny some the ability to participate in social relations on a par with others. Maldistribution occurs when economic mechanisms and structures deny some the material resources and opportunities they need in order to participate in social relations on a par with others. (Zurn 2005: 99) An (at least) bivalent social theory would seem to promise better action guidance given the (at least) bivalent character of the multiple variables involved in distributive injustices. An overly-general appeal to the theory of recognition may both be empirically accurate and satisfy the left-Hegelian desideratum of linking everyday practice to theory, but it will not be able to link that theory back to practical struggles for justice, precisely because of its generality. (Zurn 2005:117) As convincing as this critique is, I support the reply of Jean Philippe Deranty (2009), who emphasis that a critical theory can also be based on the effects of injustice and not only on the causes. Using the work of Emmanuel Renault (2004; 2006; 2007) Deranty argues that the suffering of workers under capitalistic production can be uncovered in recognitive terms and that in fact normative evaluations are based on this perspective, rather than the purely economic. In economic terms normative evalutions cant be formulated, and what is unjust in capitalism, can be seen, if someone looks at its effects rather than its causes. And for this the theory of recognition is of incalcuable value. This doesnt mean to reject political economy, but to take a different perspective on capitalistic economy and society. For sure, Marx Capital is intriguing but so is Engels The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844.

Recognition and Work

Recognition and Work This change of perspective is also the (implicit) starting point for Stephan Voswinkel and others within the German sociology of work, who exploit Honneths approach. They argue for a recognitive perspective on work not because it can explain all the underlying (economic) causes but because it places the worker and his or her experiences, needs and wishes in the center (Holtgrewe/Voswinkel/Wagner 2001a). Fore sure, this is also done by many other studies in the psychology and sociology of work. But what is especially interesting in this approach is that it aims to reformulate labour relations in recognitive terms, and is then not only concerned with forms of disrespect but also elevates which forms of recognition are actually demanded by and given to workers for and at work (Holtgrewe/Voswinkel/Wagner 2001b; Voswinkel 2005). Such studies provide the empirical substance of recognition, and therefore for any critical theory of society. Given the importance of the formation of work as employment in modern capitalistic societies4, as well for the individual as for the welfare regime, I will focus on this form of work and leave out informal work as well as unemployment. Folowing Senghaas-Knobloch (1999) employment fulfills three different functions in modern capitalistic welfare societies. First it is the main source for income for most individuals, although de-commodification reduced the individuals reliance on the market (and their labour) for their well-being (Esping-Andersen 1990). Second, most welfare regimes and their institutions (social protection, health insurance, pension system) are based on the taxation of employment rather than profit, and employment is often the main way of inclusion into this institutions. Third, employment is of high relevance for the status of citizenship and social inclusion, it endows the individual dignity, respect, status and reputation. With reference to Honneth, Voswinkel (2005) has now distinguished three levels and within these levels different modes of recognition of and at work. He particulary emphasis the importance of Honneths third mode of recognition, social esteem, which is that ones contributions are valued by the other members of a certain community, whereas the first form, love, is left out. With some omissions and own additions they are shown in Table 2 (on the following page). As can be seen in this table, Voswinkel splits social esteem into two dif fer ent but linked modes: admiration (Bewunderung) and appreciation (Wr digung). As Voswinkel puts it, if social esteem is given for ones con tri butions and use of abilities towards shared goals, then this mode of recog4. From an anthropological point of view work in general is indeed of high importance for every society and for every human being.

6 Gottfried Schweiger recognition community of values (social esteem) admiration prominence, reputation, prestige (wealth, position, power, education) Organizabonus payment, tional level employee of the month, careers, status symbols Inter-personal praise, devotion level Societal level appreciation payment, rights at work, social security (health and unemployment insurance, pension) rules of seniority, payment, partizipation, anniversaries gratitude, commitment legal relations (cognitive respect) civil rights, guaranteed minimum social security equal treatment

politeness, respect, regard

Table 2: Levels and modes of recognition, source: Voswinkel (2005)

nition is solidary as well as distinctive. If one individual contributes more, it receives more recognition; if it contributes less, it is still recognized as membership, but is given less recognition. Appreciation is given for normal contribution, for being part of a certain community or organization. It is based on membership. Whereas, admiration is given for exceptional contributions, for sucess and performance. It recognizes distinction and individuality within the realms of the communitiy. And, this distinction is especially important in the world of work, where performance or achievement is highly regarded (Drge/ Marrs/Menz 2008; see also Honneth in Fraser/Honneth 2003: 140141). Appreciation means the valuation of work in the context of social affiliation as traditional institutions like unions and works councils give by recognizing the pure membership as a worker. Admiration in contrast marks the recognition that is given for extraordinary achievements, success or originality. (Nierling 2007: 59) Now, Voswinkel distinguishes different forms of appreciation and admiration and legal relations regarding work: First, there is the societal level on which recognition is recevied or denied. Employment is generally more recognised than informal work or unemployment, and different jobs and professions receive quite different levels and forms of recognition. Whereas reputation or prestige are connected to power and achievement, and thus are forms of admiration, the inclusion into the welfare system through work and payment, if it is regulated through laws or collective bargaining agreements, are granted for just having a distinct occupation or being member of an union,

Recognition and Work

and thus are forms of appreciation. Civil rights in general as well as a distinct form of minimum social security (something Voswinkel doesnt consider) are granted to every citizen. The second level is the organizational, on which recognition is given in forms of payment (if it is regulated between the employee and the employer directly), bonus payments, career and education opportunities, symbols of status as office size or a company car, anniversaries etc. Here also one can distinguish forms of admiration and forms of appreciation. Voswinkel sees rules of equal treatment and participation as forms of respect and not social esteem. Finally, on the inter-personal level, individuals give and receive recognition from their colleagues, superiors or clients as well as in any other personal interaction. This can be politeness, respect or praise, commendation and gratitude. As can also be seen in the table, those forms of recognition for and at work that are institutionalized as rights, are in fact still forms of social esteem and not forms of cognitive respect. For sure, forms of recognition for and at work are intertwined with forms of cognitive respect (as well as love) as workers are always also persons, but to work is a distinct trait, which sperates them from all the non-workers in a society. [] a significant part of the social esteem guaranteed to individuals via corporatively stratified principles of honour made its way into the newly formed legal relations, where it attained universal currency in the concept of human dignity. In modem catalogues of human rights, all human beings are guaranteed equal legal protection for their standing in society, even though it remains unclear even today what practical legal consequences this should actually have. But legal relations cannot integrate all dimensions of social esteem as is already clear simply from the fact that, in accordance with its overall function, social esteem can only apply to those traits and abilities with regard to which members of society differ from one another. (Honneth 1995: 125) Although, one has not to exploit Marx theory too heavily, the community of work is still formed by two sperated communities with quite different goals and values: the workers and the employers. And, the ongoing conflicts between those two groups can be conceptualized as struggles for recognition (Voswinkel 2001). On the one hand, firms are not primarily concerned with the self-realisation of their workers, but with the strenghening of their performance, on the other hand workers demand recognition (Schweiger 2009a; 2009b). For sure, the provided list is far from complete, but it gives insights into actual given or demanded forms of recognition of and especially at work. It

8 Gottfried Schweiger

provides insights, on what the struggle for recognition in labour relations from the societal level to the office and shop floor is about. And it could be paired with a similar list of forms of disrespect, actually Voswinkels (2005) extensive study on service work as well as Ursula Holtgrewes (2001) on work in call centers, reveal the experience of disrespect or denied recognition and the workers coping strategies. But what this turn to the experience of recognition or disrespect (as is the main concern of Renault and Deranty in his defense of Honneths approach) lacks, is an attempt to value the so found forms of recognition or disrespect, and show how they are not contigent but can be valued from a normative concept. The pure psychological experience of disrespect, doesnt mean that what is experienced really is injust. Also vice versa the experience of recognition doesnt mean that this recognition is justified. Given the complexity of how needs, wishes and so also the experience of disrespect and harm are shaped and alienated by capitalistic production, such a bottom-up approach is for a critical theory not enough. Even though subjective experiences have to be integrated into any critical social theory. As Herbert Marcuse put this serious problem: In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own. (Marcuse 1964: 23) I view this problem as connected with another crucial question for critical theory in general, namely how internal critique is possible. Anti Kauppinen (2002) dinstigushes in his discussion of Honneths approach two basic forms of internal critique, whereas the first, simple internal critique, exploits already proclaimed norms and standards and the second, reconstructive internal critique, which is Honneths approach, has first to make implicit norms and standards explicit to use them. The problem of alienation and false consciousness in capitalistic society, which doesnt mean that alienation is complete, now challenges internal critique as explicit as well as implicit standards and norms could be or actually are themeselves skewed. An answer to this challenge would be, as Honneth suggests, to combine reconstructive internal critique that uncovers explicit and implicit standards and norms, which then have to be criticized by and tied back to external non-contingent standards. And these normative standards are outlined in his formal concept of a good, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) (Honneth 1995: 171179). Namely that intersubjectivity, in the form mutual recognition, is necessary for the formation of

Recognition and Work

subjectivity and identity, and the basis of self-realization. If self-realization is what ethical life is all about, then reconstructive internal critique has to detect and reconstruct what makes it possible within a given society. Kauppinen then is right in emphasing that this is only possible with a combination of internal and external critique, as Honneths strong notion of self-realization relies on external, so to speak a priori standards. Every theory of recognition that aims to not just describe different claims and forms of subjective experiences, has then to develop such a formal concept of ethical life. And only those forms and experiences of disrespect and harm, that are incompatibale with such a concept are then to be taken into acccount and can be used as a grounding and benchmark for critique, as are the forms of recognition that can be integrated or support such a concept. If the idea of a struggle for recognition is to be viewed as a critical framework for interpreting the processes by which societies develop, there needs to be, by way of completing the model, a theoretical justification for the normative point of view from which these processes can be guided. A formal conception of ethical life encompasses the qualitative conditions for self-realization that, insofar as they form general prerequisites for the personal integrity of subjects, can be abstracted from the plurality of all particular forms of life. (Honneth 1995: 171 and 175) Decent Work As examined recognition of and at work comes in different forms. What Voswinkel misses is the attempt to value these forms and show how they are not contigent but derive from a normative concept. I suggest that this is exactly for what the concept of Decent Work can be used and what it implicitly already does. It provides a normative concept which can be used as a benchmark for different forms of recognition. Decent Work is so to be understood as a formal but normative concept, similar to Honneths formal concept of ethical life. This is clear, when you look at the very broad definition of Decent Work given by Juan Samovia in 1999 and its further development by the ILO in the last ten years. The primary goal of the ILO today is to promote opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. (ILO 1999: 3)

10 Gottfried Schweiger

The decent work paradigm is in principle applicable to all working people in all societies. The objectives of decent work are valid across the full spectrum of institutional and developmental diversity. Working people in all societies desire freedom of association and oppose discrimination, forced labour and child employment in hazardous and harmful situations. They wish to participate through social dialogue in decision-making affecting their work and lives, both at the level of the enterprise and the nation and at regional and global levels. Likewise, all people and all societies desire work in conditions of dignity and safety and with adequate remuneration. Finally, a modicum of social and economic security in work and life is a universal aspiration. (Ghai 2006: 4) This concept is a way of condensing the different dimensions of work into one notion the dimensions of employment and its quality, rights at work, representation and voice, gender equality, social protection, and also environmental issues connected with work and labour. It includes the contribution of work both to production and income on the one hand, and to social integration and self-fulfilment on the other. Further it consists of four components: (1) rights at work, (2) employment, (3) social protection, and (4) social dialogue (Ghai 2002; 2006) All these components can be seen as forms of recognition, more precise as forms of appreciation rather than admiration. They protect and strengthen the basic justified forms of recognition of and at work. As the ILO states they derive not only from contingent described demands but from basic anthropological and moral principles as human dignity. It has to be said that this conncetion or even deduction has not been researched so far. This means that the Concept of Decent Work is justified only by its broad acceptance, even though I believe that a philosophical examination could tie it closer to moral principles and show its anthropological and normative roots. Rights at work constitute the legal framework for all other components and are to be granted to every worker reardless of their abilities or success. The employment dimension is closely connected with fair payment and opportunities to control work regarding speed or content, and possibly also to opportunites for selfrealization in work. Social security reflects the societal dimension of work and ist close connection to the modern welfare regime, which also provides security for the familiy of workes as well as it protects the workers even if he or she loses his jobs (in the form of unemployment beenfits,) or is unable to work due to illness (medical insurance and statutory sick pay). Pensions reflect the previous contributions of workers even though they stopped working. Social Dialogue then provides a form of participation and inclusion of the workers regarding their work and aims to balance the

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11

unequal distribution of power between employers and workers, eg. the right of unions to negatiote. As these components of Decent Work given by the ILO are designed for the national or even international level, they cannot reflect particular conditions and forms of recognition on the shopfloor as described by the above mentioned studies from Voswinkel or others. This leaves a wide range of possible realizations of Decent Work within the given framework and transfers the need to design and promote Decent Work to a level which cannot be covered by the ILO itself or even national law. Decent Work is a staring point which provides general conditions, basic forms of recogntion, which have then to be thickend in every particual working situation. As Honneths formal concept of ethical life the concept of Decet Work is abstracted from particular working situations and conditions and it does not allow to deduce every different form of recognition of and at work. But, this is not to be seen as a shortcoming of the concept but rather as an necessary openness. Decent Work has a clearly processual character in which its basic conditions are expanded through the integration of evermore forms of recognition. Given the antagonistic structure of working relations this process takes the form of various struggles for recognition (Schweiger 2009b). References Anker, Richard/Chernyshev, Igor/Egger, Philippe/Mehran, Fahrad/Ritter, Joseph (2003), Measuring Decent Work with Statistical Indicators, Statistical De vel op ment and Analysis Group, Working Paper No. 2, Geneva: ILO. van den Brink, Bert/Owen, David (eds.) (2007), Recognition and Power. Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory, Cambridge. Deranty, Jean-Philippe (2007), Repressed Materiality: Retrieving the Materialism in Axel Honneths Theory of Recognition, in: Deranty, JeanPhilippe/Petherbridge, Danielle/Rundell, John/Sinnerbrink, Robert (eds.) (2007), Recognition, Work, Politics. New Directions in French Critical Theory, LeidenBoston, 137164. Deranty, Jean-Philippe (2009), Kritik der politischen konomie und die gegenwrtige Kritische Theorie. Eine Verteidigung von Honneths Anerkennungstheorie, in: Schmidt am Busch, Hans-Christoph (ed.) (2009), Anerkennung, Berlin, 269300. Ebbinghaus, Bernhard/Visser, Jelle (2000), Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945, LondonNew York. Esping-Andersen, Gesta (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton/NJ.

12 Gottfried Schweiger

Fineman, Stephen (ed.) (1987), Unemployment. Personal and Social Consequences, London. Fraser, Nancy/Honneth, Axel (2003), Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, New York. Ghai, Dharam (2002), Decent Work. Concepts, Models and Indicators, Geneva: ILO. Ghai, Dharam (ed.) (2006), Decent Work. Objectives and Strategies, Geneva: ILO. Gottschall, Karin/Vo, Gnter G. (eds.) (2003), Entgrenzung von Arbeit und Leben. Zum Wandel der Beziehung von Erwerbsttigkeit und Privatsphre im Alltag, Mnchen. Grint, Keith (2005), The Sociology of Work, 3rd edition, Cambridge. Hardimon, Michael O. (1997), Review of The Struggle for Recognition, in: Journal of Philosophy 94:1 (1997), 4654. Holtgrewe, Ursula (2001): Flexible Menschen in flexiblen Organisationen. Bedingungen und Mglichkeiten kreativen und innovativen Handels, Berlin. Holtgrewe Ursula/Voswinkel, Stephan/Wagner, Gabriele (2001a), Fur eine Anerkennungssoziologie der Arbeit: Einleitende berlegungen, in: Holtgrewe/Voswinkel/Wagner (eds.) (2001b), 926. Holtgrewe, Ursula/Voswinkel, Stephan/Wagner, Gabriele (eds.) (2001b), Anerkennung und Arbeit, Konstanz. Honneth, Axel (1995), The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Cambridge. Honneth, Axel (2001), Recognition or Redistribution. Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society, in: Theory, Culture, Society 18:23 (2001), 4355. Honneth, Axel (2002), Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions, in: Inquiry 45:4 (2002), 499519. International Labour Organization (ILO) (1999), Decent Work. Report of the Director General, Geneva. Kauppinen, Antti (2002), Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique, in: Inquiry 45:4 (2002), 479498. Marcuse, Herbert (1964), One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, Boston. Nierling, Linda (2007), The Recognition of Work. In: Enterprise and Work Innovation Studies, 3 (2007), 5565. Renault, Emmanuel (2004), Lexprience de linjustice, Paris. Renault, Emmanuel (2006), Radical Democracy and an Abolitionist Concept of Justice. A Critique of Habermas Theory of Justice, in: Sinnerbrink, Robert/Deranty, Jean-Philippe/Smith, Nicholas H./Schmiedgen, Peter (eds.) (2006), Critique Today, LeidenBoston, 137152.

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Renault, Emmanuel (2007), Biopolitics and Social Pathologies, in: Deranty, Jean-Philippe/Petherbridge, Danielle/Rundell, John/Sinnerbrink, Robert (eds.) (2007), Recognition, Work, Politics. New Directions in French Critical Theory, LeidenBoston, 183201. Rubery, Jill/Grimshaw, D. (2003), The Organization of Employment, London. Schweiger, Gottfried (2009a), Arbeit im Strukturwandel, In: Bhler, Tho mas/ Neumaier, Otto/Schweiger, Gottfried/Sedmak, Clemens (2009), Menschenwrdiges Arbeiten. Eine Herausforderung fr Gesellschaft, Politik und Wissenschaft, Wiesbaden, 3972. Schweiger, Gottfried (2009b), The Tragedy of Work. Reflections from an Hegelian Perspective, In: Hamilton, Christopher/Neumaier, Otto/Sedmak, Clemens (eds.) (2009), Facing Tragedies, WienMnster, 215231. Sennett, Richard (1998), The Corrosion of Character. The Personal Consequences Of Work In the New Capitalism, New York. Siep, Ludwg (1979), Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Un tersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes. Freiburg/Br. Mnchen. Voswinkel, Stephan (2001), Anerkennung und Reputation. Die Dramaturgie industrieller Beziehungen. Mit einer Fallstudie zum Bndnis fr Arbeit, Konstanz. Voswinkel, Stephan (2005), Welche Kundenorientierung? Anerkennung in der Dienstleistungsarbeit, Berlin. Wildt, Andreas (1982), Autonomie und Anerkennung. Hegels Moralittskritik im Lichte seiner Fichte-Rezeption, Stuttgart. Williams, Robert (1997), Hegels Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley. Zurn, Christopher F. (2005), Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneths Critical Social Theory, in: European Journal of Philosophy 13:1 (2005), 89126. Zurn, Christopher F. (2003), Identity or Status? Struggles over Recognition in Fraser, Honneth, and Taylor, in: Constellations 10:4 (2003), 519527.