Necessary, sufficient and contributory factors generating illegal economic activity, and specifically drug-related activity, in Colombia Author(s):

Francisco E. Thoumi Source: Iberoamericana (2001-), Nueva poca, Ao 9, No. 35 (Septiembre de 2009), pp. 105-126 Published by: Iberoamericana Editorial Vervuert Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41676906 . Accessed: 26/11/2013 15:48
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Francisco E. Thoumi* Z> Necessary, sufficient and contributory activity, activity, in Colombia** factors

economic generating illegal and specifically drug-related

I. Introduction The internationl undera basic paradigm:all drugs drugcontrolregimeis formulated included in the convention schedules I, II and IV can only have medical and research uses. The policies derived fromthese conventionsforbidall recreational,ritual,experimental,or self-medicating consumptionof coca, cocaine, opium, heroin,marijuana and other The conventions allow theproduction of controlleddrugsformedical many drugs. and researchuses and criminalizeall otherproduction. Where consumptionis concerned theyare less rigid,as users of illegal drugsdo not have to be arrestedorjailed. Anti-drug policies seek to suppressboth illicitdrugsupply and demand but are formulatedwithoutclearly spelling out the reasons why thereis a demand and a supplyfor illegal drugdemand and supply it is necessaryto have clear illegal drugs.To understand answers to fundamental criminological questions such as: Why do people commit normswhile othersdo crimes?Or why some individualscontraveneformalor informal not? Policymakers, do not hesitate to formulate and however, anti-drug poliimplement cies withouthaving firstconsidered those questions. They proceed as if theiranswers were obvious or known.Yet, when asked about the reasons why the illegal drugsindustrydevelops in a location, most answers are highlyquestionable and at best partially The aim of thisessay is to show thisusing Colombia as an example. right. II. The requirements of illegal cocaine production The There is no factorwhich, once in place, will always produce an illegal activity. are there sufficient or services do not have of factors,although production illegal goods There some necessaryones withoutwhich therewould not be illegal economic activity. factorsthatincrease the probabilitythatthe illegal are also innumerablecontributing VO <N O ON o o <N in c*~) >< O s: * Francisco andonnaringeneral books andarticles on narcotrfico E. Thoumi haspublished many a at the holds a Tinker inColombia inparticular. He currently cotrfico Professorship University S Visiting 5 Studies Institute American j. (Lozano ofTexas Long ofLatin o ** Theauthor p onanearlier Fischer for comments Antanas Mockus andThomas thanks Marcela Anzola, inthis the Theauthor is fully for draft. essay. responsible opinions expressed

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will develop. There are also preventive factorsor reasons thatare the inverseof activity ones. manycontributing A. Necessaryfactors The developmentof an illegal drugsindustry requiresan illegal demand and an illeThis is trivial but basic: without an gal supply. illegal demand and an illegal supply,there would be no illegal production, or trafficking consumption. While illegal demand is necessary,the frequently made statement: "when thereis a demandtherewill be a supply" is not a sufficient conditionforthe productionof a good or service.As shown in several places (Thoumi 2003, 2005a, 2009), despitethehighillemostcountriesthatcan grow coca and poppy and refinecocaine and heroindo gal profits not.The existenceof a demand does not guaranteethatthe productor service demanded will be produced. While demand is necessary,supplydoes notdevelop unless otherconditionsare met. The question is: what are the necessary conditions for supply to develop? These are in question. Illicit drug industries require dependenton the illegal natureof the activity tasksthatare not requiredby licitactivities: theperformance of several industry-specific etc. "Sucthegrowingof illegal crops,the developmentof illegal distribution networks, of these tasks requiresspecial 'illegal skills' used to develop illegal cessfulperformance fromlaw enforceto protect theindustry social support networks business organizations, and conflict resolutionsystemswithinthe crimiand contract enforcement mentefforts, nal organizations,to have the will to break economic laws and regulations and to use violence if necessary" (Thoumi 2003: 56). In orderto develop illegal skills and undertakeillegal tasks therehave to be people willingto break some laws. Illegal economic activitiesbeyond pettycrimerequireplanning,the participationof a group and the developmentof a supportnetworkof people who are willing to break the law and who consider such behavior appropriate.A cocacocaine and poppy-heroinexport industry requires complex illegal organizationsthat can grow only in countrieswhere thereare groups whose social or informalbehavior fromthe formalrules and normsformulated rules and normsdiffer by the substantially and which trafficking. drugproduction government prohibit When the rule of law prevails, crime is limited to that committed by a few "bad apples" or individuals whose behavior is deviant in the society. Common police and can keep crime levels low. But if a significant efforts judicial systemlaw enforcement formal rules as legitimate;if many individualsare the does not of the accept society part laws is justifiedbecause theyare or appear if those comfortable laws; breaking breaking from benefit that to be capturedby particular them,thenthesocietybecomes vulgroups nerableto the developmentof illegal economic activities. behavthatdo have a gap betweenformaland informal There are,however,countries ior norms and do not have significantorganized crime problems. For the illicit drug social to develop, one of two otherconditionsis necessary.First,the informal industry normsof behavior have to allow individuals to disregardthe effectof theiractions on thatdrugsmay have on consumersand societyat other people so thatthenegativeeffects An ethnically in to not an obstacle are engaging illicit productionor trafficking. large

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divided societymay have a groupwhose social normsdiffer fromthe formalones. But if the group has strongsocial cohesion, solidarity,dignityand respect forhuman life, it in a productor service thatis perceived as damaging to its would not produce or traffic fellowhumans. If through timethe gap among normsresultsin increased illegal behavif social controlsbreak down and a strongamoral individualisticculior and impunity, of engagementin illegal activitiesincreases. Second, turedevelops, thenthe probability individualsor social groups mightfeeljustifiedproducingdrugs because theycan be a This would be the case of a groupthat country. weapon againstothergroupsor a foreign forwhat theyconsidera superiorgoal such as overtakes up arms or uses drugsto fight or liberating thecountry. the government throwing Illicit poppy and coca can grow in many countriesand regions although very few Three countriesprois highlyconcentrated. actuallydo grow themand theirproduction duce morethan90% of these two crops. One can findmanycountrieswith"weak states" and social conflictsamong various groups,countriesthatcould grow these crops but do and to linkwithinternational not.To do so it is also necessaryto develop illicitnetworks criminalones. This is why having smugglingorganizationsthathave stronglinks with the outside world and the internationaleconomy increases the probability of illegal industry growth. These necessaryconditionscan be summarizedin a nutshellas illegal demand,wide legal-informalnorm gaps, disregard for externalitiesor the will to commit crime to and links. achieve a highergoal, and the abilityto develop illegal networks There are othernecessary factorsrelatedto cocaine and heroinproductionfunctions cocaine or heroinand havingthe approsuch as havingthe chemical knowledgeto refine The labor skills needed are abuncoca or to conditions environmental poppy. grow priate dantin almost everycountry today and can easily be hired. B. Contributing factors in Colombia faccan be stimulated by many contributing Illegal drugsproductionand trafficking tors. In Colombia the followinghave been considered: the geopolitical location of the and economic crises (Arango/Child 1987 country(MacDonald 1989); unemployment and Arango 1988); the large migrationof Colombians to the United States fromthe 1960s on which facilitated the development of illegal distribution networks 1991, Thoumi 1995); the lack of statepresence in large partsof (Krauthausen/Sarmiento the country(Dombois 1990); its widespread smugglingexperience (Craig 1981), and though,requirea normsgap. One (Sarmiento 1990: 33). The last two factors, corruption such as factors that other also experience withperiods of inequality, poverty, argue may in increases and single parentfamiliescan highviolence, large populationdisplacement the developmentof the illegal drugsindustry. also trigger An authoritarian The natureof the political regime is also a relevantfactor. regime, is concerned which a than can forinstance, democracy repressivepolicies apply stronger It is questionable,however,how successfula represof humanrights. withtheprotection sive, authoritarian regime can be in the long runbecause it tends to fall preyto corrupa tion.Furthermore, regimethatgeneratesfeelingsof exclusion among some groupsmay factor to crime. also be a contributing

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To sum up, no factoris sufficient forthe developmentof illegal crops or illegal drug Some factorsare necessaryto develop coca and poppy plantingsand cocaine trafficking. and heroinproduction and exports.To do so countries musthave the fullset of necessary factors. There is also a wide spectrum of potential factors. These mighttrigcontributing of the illegal industry gerthedevelopment onlyifall thenecessaryconditionsare present. The lack of a sufficient factormakes it possible to have a societywithall the conditionsforthe developmentof the illegal industry and which has, however,not developed it. Such a society, however, would be very vulnerable and could develop the illegal The appearance of a new contributing factor,for example, could triggerit. industry. Criminal activities develop as a resultof evolutionaryprocesses, not Newtonian ones withwell definedcausality of the type "Y=f(X)" thatis "if X thenY happens". This is why some societies thathave all the necessary conditions forthe development of the do not currently have it.1 industry It should be acknowledged,however,thatthe structure of illegal drugsdevelopment an identification for the conditions forits development.The presents important problem conditions to be in the and the ones are seen as tend contributing necessary background looked as its causes. As one can see in the the and thus at triggering industry's development has case with most of the literature on this been the section, drugsin Colombia. following III. The Diverse Reasons Used to Explain Why Colombia is one of the Main Illegal Drug Producers Most authorsidentify illegal cocaine demand abroad, mainlyin the United States,as the main reason why Colombia produces cocaine. Colombia is seen as a victimof the These authorsmay be classifiedin "insatiable" demand forillegal drugsinternationally. two groups: those who develop political economy and political arguments,and those Some of the criticspresentexculpatory economic arguments. who use mainstream argumentsand argue thatdrug addiction mustbe controlledand thatColombia cannot stop because its causes are exogenous. Othersgo beyondthatand arejustificatory. production drugsas a reaction They implythatit is fineforColombia to be producingand exporting that for Colombia protake most As shown to an unfairworld. below, granted analysts domestic and sufficient the and do not look at duces illegal drugs contributory necessary, such that factors encourage production. A. The exculpatoryand justificatory political economyarguments Writerslike the very popular columnistAntonio Caballero presentColombia as a victimof American prohibitionist policies designed to generatelarge wealth in the US 1 that illness such with a terminal is diagnosed a patient toa caseinwhich Thisis similar every person finds Thepatient, cures the ifcorrected, however, ofvitamin with ithasa deficiency patient. xyzwhich, the In this case illness. the who do not this who have that there aremany develop deficiency people didnot others tohim a physician until totake the willnot refuse why explains pills xyzvitamin patient the illness. develop

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and block legal Colombian economic development.The followingquotes clearly show thisposition:"Far fromgenerating any wealthin Colombia [illegal drugs]have drowned the countryin corruptionand violence. They increase Gross National Product in the UnitedStates and destroyit in Colombia" (Caballero 1996: 139); "The war (our war) is fed by coca, the only thingwe are allowed to produce profitably"(Caballero 2004a); "the 'drug trafficking links' are taken forgranted.All Colombians have them,like we have amoebas... Even our two candidates forthe papacy, Monsignors Dario Castrillon and Alfonso Lpez Trujillo,have them.These linksare perhapsnot as strongas those of the Americans who consume and pay for all of the drugs produced in Colombia" (Caballero 2004b); "A government (of the UnitedStates) thatrealizes thatit is incapable the of makingits citizens obey those laws thatprohibitdrugconsumptionand transfers foritself' (Caballero 2006) . costs to theproducingcountriesand keeps thebenefits Orejuela Daz (1997) follows a similar line of thought.He argues thatthe pressure to aerially spray marijuana thatthe U.S. government put on the Turbay administration "It was all clear: the enemy fieldswas simplya protectionist effort the United States: by to be attackedwas not marijuana. It was Colombian marijuana,withthe aim of benefittingAmericanmarijuana.The goal was to controla marketwithretailrevenues of close to $25 billion" (29)2. These arguments promoteand reflectthe factthatmany Colombians take the illicit This is reinforced for by cultural expressionslike the"corridosprodrugindustry granted. like "No hibidos" thatcelebrate drug trafficking.3 Songs soy culpable", "El rey de los and "El "El cartel de Cali" "Corrido del cocalero", granmafioso" thatare played capos", and in low income urban neighborhoods in coca and regions poppy-growing frequently Pablo Escobar as a and role the as heroes traffickers models, police as corrupt, drug portray and the cause of thedrug on American as society dependent drugs sadlymissedbenefactor, have thecunningand because that succeed as they drugtraffickers entrepreneurs problem, as biased and the American againstColomjustice system gutsto do what otherscannot, traffickers. Colombian were commissioned bians. In the 1980s manyof thesesongs by of many (not wisdom conventional of the which are part The followingstatements, into three be can categories. grouped all) Colombians, are deserving of analysis. They marketphenomena,the second argues the greatbeneviews drugs as a strictly The first fitsof prohibitionforthe American economy and the thirdfocuses on the double standardsof Americansociety. 1) Strictly market arguments: "When there is demand, there is supply" This assertionis frequently accompanied by "There will allways be a producer."The leftimplicit.Granted,theexistenceof a sentence:"So why shouldn'tbe us?" is normally 2 3 "A government Caballero: Antonio around (of could ofcourse beturned This assertion byanAmerican itscitizens ofmaking itis incapable realizes that drug prothat prohibit obeyitslawsthat Colombia) for itself'. the benefits andkeeps countries the costs tothe transfers duction, consuming ofdrug stories andtell the inMexico that arepopular "Corridos appeared originally songs prohibidos" with associated andother andharvesters personalities traffickers, peasants guerrillas, coca-producing ofthis trade. Wald the study phenomenon. (2001)isa pioneer illegal drug

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demand tends to induce production,but producers also seek to open up new markets, introducenew products, advertize, etc. Producers are not merely passive actors who reactto active consumers.The dynamicsof the cocaine marketare particularly illustrative. In 1980 the wholesale price of cocaine in the United States was reported at around $50,000 per kilo. Today it is around $15,000 per kilo. The American Consumer Price Index increasedfrom100 in 1980 to 237 in 2005. In real termsthen,the wholesale price of cocaine at theAmerican portof entry declined at least 90%. This huge fall indicates thatthe "insatiable American market"has been saturatedfora long time and thatthe in supplyhas drivenmarket growth years.Thus, itcannot prices down over thelast thirty be argued that cocaine supply has grown as a passive response to cocaine demand. Cocaine demand and supply interact as in any othermarket;indeed, cocaine producers have soughtnew marketsoutsidethe United States and have also developed otherproductstherelike crack, and "bazuco" or "paco" in LatinAmerica. 2) Benefits of Prohibition "The lion's share of theprofits remainsin theUnitedStates" of illegal profits to the benefitof the This implies thatthereis an unjustdistribution make a lot more and that American crooks countries moneythanColombian consuming thatrisksin U.S. illegal mardismisstheargument ones. Those who argue thisimplicitly there.Furthermore, kets are high and are the reason forthe high illegal profits theydo not consider thatthose profitsare U.S. value-added, generated in American markets. in of profit distribution unfairness Curiously,those who complain about the underlying the illegal cocaine marketdo not express the same feelings about the legal coffee or remainin theU.S.". flowermarketsin which "most profits cocaine because it cannotgrow coca and keep "The United States prohibits thebusiness" This impliesthattheUnited Statesseeks to block Colombia's comparativeadvantage and fails to explain why it is thatthe United States does not prohibitimportsof other goods itcannotproduce to "keep thebusiness". If thisassertionwere truewe would have a fascinatingnew theoryof developmentthrough illegality: if, forexample, Colombia would enrichthemselvesand were to declare cigarettesillegal, trafficking organizations would develop. Besides, it is not truethatin the United States thereare no the country thereare notmany,but it can grow in PuertoRico, places wherecoca can grow.Granted, theVirginIslands and Guam. Indeed, duringWorldWar II, when cocaine was still used the famoushead of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,develmedically,HarryAnsiinger, an plantationin PuertoRico (Jordan1999). experimental oped to the U.S. economythatdepends on them" substantially "Drugs contribute thatitwould be restson severalstrong first, of thisassertion The validity assumptions: at a veryhighprice,without an illegalproduct fortheUnitedStatesto import better generai-

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at a low pricewithtaxes. Second, thatit ingany tax revenues,thanthesame legal product would be better forthecountry to have an illegal industry in whichtraffickers make money rather thanhavinga state-sanctioned manufacture and distribute cocaine. import, laboratory that traffickers have more influence on the than the Third, drug policy-making process large firms thatwould benefit fromthelegal market. thatdrugdemand is an additionto Fourth, demand,thatis thataddictsand druguserswould have saved whattheyspendon aggregate rather thanspend it on legal goods and services.In reality, of illegal drug thegrowth drugs demandgeneratesa displacement of legal to illegal demand.Besides, manyaddictsfindit their to crimeto financeit. impossibleto keep a job and/or support illegal habit,and resort Those thatargue thatthe United States needs drugsto maintaina high level of economic activityappear stuck in the era thatended withthe Great Depression when economic policies compounded economic cycles. Furthermore, duringthe last fifteen years theUnitedStates has been themain driverof theworld economy and duringthe last five thatits absorption, thatis account deficitindicating or six it has had a verylarge current what it has have exceeded investment expenditure consumptionplus plus government the U.S. needs It is then to maintain that illegal drugsto economy impossible produced. demand high. keep aggregate "The world's financialsectordepends on the huge deposits of drugtraffickers" it implies thatdrugtraffickers' This belief,shared by many,is false because, firstly, the banks' which raise increase in bank capacityto lend.To prove deposits depositsare a net cash othhave spenttheir addicts would not that users and thisitis necessaryto show drug If that bank. at a that cash is erwise.If someone spendsmoneyat a supermarket, deposited Trafreach a bank. for the cash to will take longer personbuys cocaine, chances are thatit use of Increased in local banks. rather than their centers fickers tendto depositin off-shore off-shore banks. in local banks to a shift away from deposits illegaldrugsthengenerates Second, centralbanks have mechanisms to controlloan expansion and circulating of money expansion, one would cash. If illegal drugconsumptionwere the determinant world would de-factoset have to accept thatthe traffickers monetary policy. Third,the illegal drugs industry generateslarge costs forthe banking system.Govof cash deposits,interhave createda long listof controlmeasures like reports ernments Reuter and Truman(2004: nal auditingproceduresand know-your-client requirements. 5) estimatethese costs to the United States systemand conclude thattheyare "substan- on theorderof $7 billion" per year. tial but notoverwhelming Fourth,the world illegal drug marketis very large relative to variables such as the Colombian GNP but it is not largerelativeto international moneyflows or deposits.Data on thetotalrevenuegeneratedby illegal drugsis weak and the amounttends to be overestimated 2001, Thoumi 2005b). If however,the figureof around$60 (Reuter/Greenfield billion forannual U.S. retail drug sales is accepted, one concludes thatthe size of the drugrevenuesthatenterthe financialsectorto be launderedis not verylarge.4 About 50 4

Control ofNational TheOffice unreliable. arevery (ONDCP)perionillegal Policy Drug drugs Figures ofthe late the from decline a significant hasbeen that there show These makes estimates. highs odically

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to 60 percentof the drugvalue added is generatedin the finaltwo transactions. Sellers at thatlevel tendto spend theirincome in cash in shoppingcenters, and supermarkets other - also in cash - or deposited in the bankingsystem. shops. The restis spentby traffickers It is thenunlikelythatmore than$30 billion would be available formoney laundering. Even ifone assumes (falsely) thatthiswould be a netincrease in bank deposits,theprofits generated would not be large forthefinancialsystem. thereis anotherimportant effect thathas not been quantified.The growthof Fifth, the illegal industry and of any informaleconomic activityincreases cash transactions and the demand forcash. This leads to an increase in transactionsthat do not use the financialsystem, which lowers totalbank depositsand profits. Of course, in the financialsystemthereare corrupt officialsand banks who benefit from in off-shore centers. The moneylaundering, mainly pointhowever,is thatthefinancial systemas a whole does not depend on illegal drugindustry deposits and thattheydo not increaseits overall profits. 3) The American Double Standards Argument "The United States police do not pursuetheAmericancapos" benefittheAmeriThis assertionis consistentwiththe belief thatlarge drugprofits networksin the U.S. are controlledby capos or can economy and thatdrugdistribution large"cartels" as theywere in Colombia in the 1980s. It should be noted thatthe mafias thatgrew duringalcohol prohibitionavoided the gamillegal drug business. They engaged in less riskyactivities such as prostitution, bling,and controlof garbage collectorsand stevedores'labor unions in large cities. The reaction of the U.S. governmentagainst themhas been strong.In 1970 it enacted the famous Racketeer Influencedand CorruptOrganizationAct (RICO) against organized crimewhich expanded the Federal Government'spowers to fightagainst organizations fromgambling,homicide,extortion, thatprofited counterfeiting money and documents, done by criminalorgaand other crimes substances and othercontrolled drugtrafficking numA significant and sentenced. in most indicted nizations.This resulted capos being have died in ber of them prison. in theU.S. is highlysegmentedand involves manygroups. The illegal drugsindustry of made These are mainly up nativeswho feel excluded fromtheAmerican mainstream recent or minorities.Some importers and by may deal with large quantities immigrants the old Medellin and Cali resembles is that there but inside the U.S. of cocaine nothing correctional inmates in the of In the number "cartels". the U.S. systemaccused of drugor dealer is on trafficker of a career the criminal is and related crime enormous drug average fouryears.

one in2000:"roughly in1988 and$60billion $134billion andReuter 1980s. (2005:29) report Boyum somewhat be level that the current It is of may expenditures". possible consumption percent personal for lower accounts which trend term show a long Thepoint is that declining many drug prices higher. total sales.

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State legislationshave been verystrict. Many enacted harshminimumsentencesand asset forfeiture measures. Some of these have led to expropriations of property used to storeor deal drugseven in cases when these activitiestook place withouttheknowledge of the property owners. Some states established mandatorylife sentences foranybody foundguiltyof a thirdfelony.This implies thatin some states small drug dealers convictedforthe thirdtime end up servinglongersentencesthansome assassins. The number of people indicted,jailed and imprisonedon drugcharges every year is huge. Each year thereare more than 1,600,000 drugarrests.The numberof individuals actually in jail fordrugcrimesexceeds 600,000. The numberof people on probationis similar. Some may argue thatthe large numberof arrestsis proofthatthe U.S. does not pursue capos. Even if the U.S. had large capos thatwould not mean thatgoing againstthem of the large Medellin would end the illicittrade.As provedby theColombian elimination on the size of the illicitindustry. and Cali cartels,theirdestruction did not have an effect The factthatabout 25% of young black males ages 18-25 are detained or on probathe tion is proof of harsh anti-drugpolicies. The governmentexpenditureforfighting war on drugs is huge. Most of this expenditure (80%) takes place inside the United States. There is no doubt that the U.S. does a lot domestically to fightdrugs. It may is ineffective and thatefforts should shifttoward prevention, argued thattheirstrategy not be said that the U.S. does little. and but it can treatment, rehabilitation, are discriminated "In theUnited States Colombian traffickers against.They receive very and dealers receive much lower sentences" harshsentenceswhile Americantraffickers because This is oftenaccompanied by "theAmericanplea bargaining systemis unfair for lower sentences" in return it accepts de-factopaid testimonies given as victimsof an unjustlegal system.There This beliefpresentsColombian traffickers are no rigorousstudiescomparingthesentencesof Colombians and Americansaccused of the long sentencesof In Colombia, however,the press has highlighted drugtrafficking. some Colombians but untilrecentlytherehas not been a discussion of cases of ColomTllez and Lesmes withtheAmericanauthorities. bians who have negotiatedsuccessfully have traffickers how Colombian documented have and extensively (2006) Reyes (2007) not did extradited first traffickers that the It authorities. with American appears negotiated arrested and "those More American confront the know how to important, judicial system. sentences"(Chepesiuk 2005: of lighter offers convictedkepttheirmouthsshut...ignoring on theirfamiliesin information had detailed cartels for this: the 39). There were reasons with the U.S. collaborated if risk of death at Colombia who were high justice system; they and "the organizationoperatedthrough cells, and the membersof each cell independent now requestto be extradid notknow each other"(Chepesiuk 2005: 39). Many traffickers it is so. how to do out have ditedbecause they impossibleto argue thatthe Today figured Colombians. discriminates American against judicial system "The United States prohibits drugsbecause theC.I. A. is involved in the illegal business" Many national securityagencies and subversivegroups around the world have used Whathappensis simple: thosewho are fightactivities. illegal drugsto fundsome of their

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some principles theyconsiderless imporingfora "superior"cause are willingto sacrifice and become friendly links with the underworld tant.Spies and othersecurity typesdevelop witharms and drug traffickers as partof theirwork. For themthe fightforregional or or fornationalsecurity takesprecedenceoverthefight nationalfreedom againstdrugs. There have been documented reportsof C.I. A. participation in the drug trade in Nicaragua and otherCentralAmericancountries(Scott/Marshall1991) and in theGoldAffairof Colonel Oliver North en Triangle (McCoy 1991). The (in)famous Iran-Contra these linkswere partof the overall policy of is thebest knowncase. The issue is whether theCIA orjust theresultof decisions made by local operatives.In any case, even ifthese actions were approved at a high level, theycould not have been officialagency policy buttheresponsibility of an individualor a small group. are and freedom The linksbetweendrugsand nationalsecurity fighters organizations also verycommon. While in power,the Sandinistas used drugsto obtain fundsto fight the contras (MacDonald 1989: 34, Gugliotta/Leen 1990: Ch. 16). Similar links have and theTaliban, rebel Chechnyan,Kosobeen documentedbetween the illegal industry the most extremecase was the Garca-Meza and other Chinese van, groups. Perhaps 1980 in Bolivia August 4, 1981). During the PRI Hegemony in (July 17, government were so strongthat Mexico the links between the federal police and drug traffickers some spoke of a symbioticrelationship. "The United States did not toleratealcohol prohibition, why thendo theyprohibit cocaine? This proves thattheyhave double standardsand thattheybenefitfromthe cocaine market" Assertionslike this raise the expectationthatthe U.S. could be forcedto liberalize Perfromits illegality. thecocaine marketiftheyreach a pointwheretheydo notbenefit it. to will be forced with cocaine, they legalize haps, if Colombia floods them It is truethatthe U.S. has been the world champion of prohibition,but repressive A anti-drug policies are supportedby mostcountries.Indeed, the world is prohibitionist. former USSR the of the Islamic all worldprohibitionist countries, map shows thatChina, and EasternEuropean countries, Scandinavia, all of Africaand almost all Latin America are prohibitionist.Many of these countriesare a lot more repressive than the United States. "Liberal" countrieslike the Netherlands,Switzerland,Spain, Portugal,and the between consumptionof softand U.K. are also prohibitionist. They may differentiate more liberal a not advocate hard drugs but they do production of cocaine, heroin, sentiment world The supportsthe prohibitionist amphetaminesand otherillegal drugs. will have effort liberalization control international regime.Any drug drug prohibitionist U.S. with the not to be negotiatedat the UnitedNations, just The political process thatled to alcohol prohibitionin the U.S. was very different fromthe one thatresulted in the prohibitionof cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other drugs (Musto 1999: 65-68). In contrastto alcohol, in the United States thereis a wide social consensus to prohibitcocaine, heroin, amphetamines and other drugs.5 Many 5 down. bebreaking andmight is lesswidespread about Theconsensus prohibition marijuana

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Americansassociated opium, morphineand heroinwithChinese immigrants, marijuana with Mexican migrantworkers and cocaine with black workers (Musto 1999, Falco 1994). Users of these drugs were perceived as un-American and as deviants to be continuesto be widespread across reformed or sanctioned. Supportfordrugprohibition theAmerican mainstreamas those drugsare perceived as a threatto theAmerican way of life. and developed social domesticatedalcohol, itritualizeditsconsumption, Christianity controlsystemsto limitthe negative social consequences of alcohol addiction(Escohotado 2002: chs. VIII, X and XII). This has nothappened withotherdrugsthatChristianityhas associated withthe devil. all the recommendedpolicies, "Colombia has applied the fullanti-drugs prescription, and the drugproblemhas not been solved. Besides, in the drugwar Colombia contributes the dead bodies. This is why Colombia should demand a different anti-drug abroad" strategy to implement has attempted There is no doubt thatthe Colombian government very extradition of traffields and the of coca like massive aerial spraying repressivepolicies to solve the But it is not truethatit has applied the fullanti-drugs fickers. recipe. Efforts not been prohave Alternative have been weak. developmentprograms peasantproblem from has come ones of the and most of the motedaggressively foreign existing funding laws have been enacted and a verylarge numberof drug donors.Anti-moneylaundering assets have been seized, mainly land. Expropriations,however, have been traffickers' sparse. The National Drugs Directorate thatmanages seized assets has had very few It has expropriated resourcesand has not been managed effectively. 60,000 hectaresbut to themor to their hectares returned have succeeded in havingover 1,300,000 traffickers after the has not In otherwords,the government frontmen. money".6 "gone casualties have been very high and as imporIt is truethatColombian drug-related most of the dead bodies in the war on tantpoliticiansassert,Colombia has "contributed for drugs".This assertionimplies thatit is "natural" people to kill each otherwhen there are large illegal profits.Illegal economic activitiestend to increase violence levels; the question,however, is why this increase has been so much greaterin Colombia than in There is no doubt thathomiothercountriesthatare also involved in drugtrafficking.7 cide rates like the ones sustained in Colombia in the late 1980s and 1990s are terrible, but froma social point of view it is much worse thatthe assassins are Colombian. The issues to be raised are how come in Colombia the sicarios have been accepted withinat least some social groups? Can Colombia blame theoutsideworld forthat?

6 7

Uribe Directorate National headofthe toinjury a former byPresident To addinsult appointed Drugs onextradition andrequested ofmoney accused hasbeen byPanama! hisfirst term laundering during inBolivia, from wasejected EvoMorales 2002after Inlate ofdata. Congress arethe Anecdotes singular last is intolerable; inChapare situation "the that heasserted inwhich him with interview 1hada long much how him tell and a him I could a Colombian As killed". were four hug big only give year peasants him. 1envied

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116 4) Conclusion

Francisco E.Thoumi

All the beliefs and argumentsdiscussed above are exculpatoryand justificatory of Colombians who participatein the illegal drugindustry. This may be an understandable attemptto survive and succeed in an extreme,amoral, individualistic society and an unfairworld. Some of the argumentsimplicitly assume thata large percentageof individual wealth in capitalist societies has been acquired illegally and thatthe Colombian traffickers are fighting to have the same opportunity. If banks and firstworld crooks enrichthemselvesillegallywithdrugs,why are Colombians not allowed to do thesame? In an unfairworld isn't it "natural" forthose who feel wronged to break the law? This sentiment of unfairness is generalbut it is stronger in reference to coca and poppy-growing peasants. Tovar Pinzn (1999: 70) describes coca and cocaine as having been declared "illegal". In a recent WOLA reporton aerial spraying(Walsh/Snchez-Garzoli/Salinas2008), illicitcrops are always referred to as "illicitlyused crops". For them it is clear thatcoca crops should not be illicitand coca-growingpeasants should not be expectedto respectthe law. ' B. MainstreamEconomists Explanations and ExculpatoryArguments 1) External shock explanations as economistsexplain the developmentof the illegal drugindustry Some prominent the a response to an externalshock suffered the Colombian economy: large growth by inillegalmarijuanaand cocaine demand in the UnitedStates and WesternEurope during also the 1960s and 1970s, coupled withthe recession in theAntioqueotextileindustry, caused by external factors,thatgenerateda large Antioqueo migrationto the United networks(Gaviria 2000 and States which allowed forthe development of trafficking Robinson 2008; 2007).8 the cause of the developmentof the illeThe "externalshock" explanationattributes "a set of fortuitous and to non-repeatableevents" (Gaviria 2008: 95). gal drugindustry was factoras the industry recession was a contributing The Antioqueo textileindustry which came into the amount of an unknown but significant by foreign imports, pressured was to the United States of A as contraband. significant migration Antioqueos country one of the consequences of the recession. This "external shock" theoryis very peculiar. External shocks occur when export when debtorcountriesface largeincreasprices increasesharply, pricesdecline or import es in internationalinterestrates or when countries are faced with other changes that all markets.Externalshocks affect make it difficult forthemto operate in international been would have valid it to be shock one. For the external not countries, just argument necessary to have an externalshock whose negative effectswere concentratedon one

hasbeena massive but: "Inthefirst than Gaviria Robinson place,there (2007:662) is lessexplicit of isthe result that this Itisclear, cocaine ofthe the since the1970s however, shock, economy." growth anexternal shock.

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and institutional characteristicsof countrybut which did not depend on the structural thatcountry. Curiously,Colombia neverexportedmarihuanaor cocaine while theywere legal. 2) External shock complemented by path dependencyarguments The external shock does not explain why Colombia's dominance on the cocaine has been maintained.Some argue thatmarketforcescreated a path dependence industry thattrappedthe country in illegal production and trafficking.9 Accordingto thisexplanaones to respondto the growthin cocaine demandinthe tion,Colombians were the first U.S. in the 1970s because theywere in theright time; or perhapsin the place at the right at the time. Once established distribution otherpossinetworks, wrongplace wrong they ble competitors were leftout of themarket. This path dependence explanation is also verypeculiar. Path dependence is usually theresultof highcosts faced by producersand consumersof shifting supplysources. The classic case of this is Microsoftvs. Apple. Experts agree thatApple is technologically and since, formost people, learningthe superiorbut Microsoftbecame establishedfirst one. One can also conceive of new systemis quite costly,theycontinueusing theinferior in a when a or store is located factory sub-optimalplace butthecosts of pathdependence best location are to the sufficiently high. moving Path dependence in the case of cocaine impliesthatdespitehuge illegal market profits,Colombians were able to block all othercompetitors. Curiouslythough,the ColomNew routes appear all the time, illicit bian cocaine industryis continuously shifting. as new new markets move, productshave been developed, and open up, noted, plantings has evolved come onto the scene. The Colombian drugindustry new actorscontinuously several smalland two in thelast twenty from one controlled by largeorganizations years size trafmedium and small number of one made of a er ones (drug lords), to up large of armed the subordinates large groups (warfickingorganizationsthatended up being lords) (Thoumi 2009). The latestdevelopmentssuggestthatas warlordorganizationsare eliminated, manysmallerarmedbands (ganglords)have gained controlof theproduction networks. Othersmall "baby cartels" made up of educatand some trafficking networks and are thatfollow a very low profilestrategy ed, bilingual, savvy youngertraffickers networks. very difficultto detect control a significantproportionof new trafficking share in the United States and Mexican crimColombian organizationshave lost market What one finds inal organizationshave become dominantin manypartsof thatcountry. different Colombian have is a continuously organichangingpath.The issue is then,why This would controlof cocaine productionand trafficking? zations maintainedsignificant etc. That is, to masterthe underlyrequirethe willingnessto use violence, intimidation, ing illegal skills.

UniLenDe Greift" Gaitn lecture inthe Elicer auditorium, Andrs series, Jorge Lpez'presentation October versidad Nacional de Colombia, 2,2006. Bogot,

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118 3) Financial co-responsibility

Francisco E.Thoumi

Othershave argued thatsince prohibitionist policies are imposed fromabroad and resultin large social costs in Colombia, it is only fairthatthe mainlyconsumingcountries should compensate the mainly producing countries. Fandio (2005) proposed a "retributive tax" which consumingcountries should pay producingcountriesfortheconconcept sequences of theirmistakenrepressiveanti-drug policies. The co-responsibility used is an attempt one way. It implies thatconsumershave all to make a two way street theresponsibility forthe growthof the illegal drugindustry: producersare only passive actors who should be exonerated. It also implies thatthese passive actors do not profit from theillegal industry. is notrelatedto any domesticstrucSince theindustry's growth turalor institutional characteristic, mainlyproducercountriesshould be compensated. economthatbothpolitical and mainstream To conclude thissection,it is interesting in Colombia as the ic argumentsexplain the development of the illegal drug industry resultof exogenous factorsand presentColombia as a victim.These arguments implicitand values) and cultural(beliefs, attitudes and institutional ly assume thatthe structural fromthose of othercountriesare of no characteristics of Colombia and how theydiffer Since the reasons why the illegal relevance to the development of the illegal industry. all these were argumentsdismiss the possibility developed exogenous, drugsindustry while the world's prothatColombia could be able to eliminateits illegal drugsindustry world must legalize drugs! save the No to Colombia hibitionist wonder, policies persist. IV. A neoclassical-institutionalapproach10 has necessaryand contribuAs shown above, the developmentof an illegal industry ones are exogenous (internaThe ones. There are no sufficient factors. necessary tory tional illegal demand) stressedby the analystsdiscussed above, and endogenous, those thatmake the country veryvulnerableand proneto respondto illegal marketincentives. role in prodemand plays an important There is no doubt thatillegal international on coca concentrates not Colombia but it does explain why motingillegal production not it does Cocaine is a veryeasy-to-produce and cocaine production. requirelarge drug: or specialised labor,and coca can grow all across the humidtropics. capital investments Once such a productis declared illegal valuable on theblack market. It is also extremely thenit will be in become concentrated, and trafficking across the globe, if its production a place where it is easier to carryout illegal economic activities. In otherwords, the is concentratedin Colombia because of internalfactors.Over the last cocaine industry I have exploredthispoint(Thoumi 1987, 1995, 2003 and 2006)." twenty years This approach argues that in Colombia thereis a wide gap between formalnorms behavioral norms.12 and informal Following North(1990), (laws, decrees, constitution) 10 Themodel toThoumi adheres section inthis 3). (2003:Chapter closely developed 11 Inthe efforts recent some for ofthis isnorefutation there byGavina literature academic except position Herrn with consistent is it and UNDP (1987), It has been 306-308) (2003: by supported 2008). (2006, Mockus Kalmanovitz (2003). (1994)andYunis (1989), 12 Theimportance isalsostressed rules formal ofrespecting (2008:105-109). byGavina

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it is important to separate the rules of a society(institutions) fromthe actors thatimplementand enforcethose rules,the organizations.13 Colombia has some strongorganisms: a strongcentralbank and constitutional court,armed forcesthatrespectand supportthe civil regime,some strongproducerassociations and otherorganizations(Cepeda 2004). But having strongorganisms does not mean thatthereis no large gap between formal and socially accepted norms. The Colombian problem then,is not necessarily one of weak organisms, but one of conflicting norms(institutions). This does not mean thatthe growth of the illegal drugindustry has nothad verynegative social, political and economic consequences forthecountry. Indeed, itacts as a catand social problems of Colombia (Thoumi 1987, alystthataggravates the institutional 1995, 2003) and widens the normsgap. An importantissue is whetherthe formal-informal rules gap has been greater in Colombia thanin othercountries.Gaviria (2008) assertsthatthegap betweenformaland did notdevelinformal ruleswas similaracross LatinAmerica and thatsince theindustry in the formal-informal cannot be a cause of the other rules countries, growthof op gap normsgap is the illegal industry in Colombia.14As noted above, a large formal-informal a necessarybut not a sufficient forthe developmentof the drugs industry. requirement social groups impose different Besides, norms gaps vary across societies, as different on theirmembers' behavior.A society mightbe very strictwith regardto a constraints activityand relativelylax withregardto others.Various societies and groups particular to the in a societymay have different social controlsand not all social groupsparticipate same extentin illegal activities. is very strong:all countries coca-cocaine and opium-heroin The evidence regarding or regions thathave illegal coca or poppy plantingsand thatrefinecocaine and heroin and develop strongtrafficking organizations have one or more importantunresolved have implicitnormsthatdiffer social issues. Afghanitribalregions(most of thecountry) frommany of those of the centralstate.The same occurs withinthe native and peasant coca. In many regions and in a large partof in Bolivia and Peru regarding communities Colombia the statehas notbeen able to impose therule of law, contrabandand otherillewhile manyformallaws and rules have been gal activitieshave been socially legitimate, furinformal normsvary among regions,generating de factoillegitimate.Furthermore, thernormclashes. Similar conditionsare foundin Myanmarand Laos, the othersignifiwas concentratedin the Northcant opium producers. In Pakistan the illegal industry where of the formallaws of the rest of the tribal area Frontier a west Province, many thatactivity and heroinproducer, was a main do not When opium apply. Turkey country was concentrated in the Kurdisharea. The norms gap discussed above can be framedwithinmainstreameconomics. The following model developed in Thoumi (2003) does that.The mainstream economics 13 Most toas institutions. arereferred two andboth mixes these oftheliterature on institutions concepts 14 "Around traf"Around the1970s weak toward all governments were the1970s drug (84).And drugs" moral ofthe as a way totake form ofcontraband; as a venial wasperceived (andunjusadvantage ficking inthis tobacktrack Gaviria United States" ofthe regard: appears (85).Atsome point tified) protectionism contributed itself but thebusiness the initial havehelped "Institutional weaknesses development, may between the difference doesnot the institutions" toweakening however, perceive (80).Gaviria decidedly one. a to be weak institutions factors and considers and contributing only contributingnecessary

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approach considers thatthe decision to commita crime is the resultof a comparisonof the net benefitsof the crime with the costs of the action and the expected value of the if the criminalis caught.In simplemathematical terms: punishment NB = 1- c - w - (pr pu) [1] the crime; 1 is Where:NB are the benefitsthatthe criminalobtains fromcommitting thevalue of the loot; c are the costs associated withplanningand executingthecrime;w of is thetotalvalue of wages foregoneduringtheperiodof planningand implementation the crime; pr is the individual's perceived probabilityof being convicted,and pu is the If the criminalis not caught, estimated value of the punishment given by the authorities. his or her benefitwill exceed NB by the amount(pr pu), and if the criminalis caught, his or herbenefit will be lower thanNB by [(1-pr) pu]. "The simple economics approach to crimehas provenquite useful in many contexts time in a particularlocality,as long as the as it can explain variationsin crimethrough to crimedo not change. This is the model's main social structure and social constraints but when the underliningsocial structure changes, it cannot be expected to strength, maintainits explanatorypower" (Thoumi 2003). The model cannot explain differences in crimeratesacross countries.15 Humans are selfish but theyare also social and by being part of a society theyare subject to normsthatconstrainindividual behavior.All societies have developed conThese controlshave and use of psychoactivedrugs.16 trolson theproduction, trafficking forms.17 taken and have in on the differed many society question depending social controlsintoequation (1) one gets: Introducing NB = 1- c - w - (gpr gpu) - (spr spu) [2]

and magnitudeof government to theprobability Where(gpr gpu) refers punishment is an latter control The other and (spr spu) to social punishment organisms. imposed by elsewhere As of each social of the 2003): (Thoumi society. explained capital expression "The variables 1, c, w, gpr, gpu, spr and spu vary among individuals and population or fencescan networks connectionsto distribution groups.Individualswithgood market obtain higherprices fortheirloot than others,some people have a higheropportunity cost fortheirtime than others,and expected punishments may vary depending on conindividual other and of residence specificcharacteristics." nections,race, ethnicity, place cost of thetimedevotedto crime,w varies betweenindividuals.The The opportunity value of thestate's sanctionsalso depends on thevalue of timeof each person,at least in cases where freedomis lost.

15 Thoumi this statement. tosupport several examples 3) provides (2003:Chapter norms 16 Coleman which under conditions the norms and for demand the Searle and study (1995) (1990) ina society. develop 17 See for andMamani (i wi), uei uimo (1986),Vidart (1989),Carter Siegel(1989),Morales example others. Escohotado (2002)among (1992),

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sufficient and factors Necessary, contributory

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In some cases gpu can be negativeso that-(gpr gpu) is positive.18 Social organisms are expected to sanction criminal behavior but some may actually encourage it. For instance,going to jail can be a "riteof passage" thatincreases the statusof manyyoung males. Additionally, tax evasion in some countriesfaces a very low risk of government and punishment may be a source of pride(Guisarri 1988). Taking into account these differencesin the way in which different agencies and social groupsdeal withcrimesanctions,thenetbenefits of crimebecome: ij NB = 1- c - w - X(gpr gpu) - (spr spu) [3]

Where i=l....n are the different government agencies and j=l....m are the different social organisms. theworld Humans develop beliefs,attitudes and values thatallow themto understand the socialization process particuand live in theirsocieties. These are generatedthrough lar to each society throughwhich internalizedbehaviors and constraintsare formed. so thateverypersonhas a threshold thathas to be Individualvalues generateself-control exceeded forhim or her to commit a crime. This thresholdcan be expressed as M, the minimumreturn to crime required forthe person to decide to commit a crime. Taking intoaccount social controls,equation (3) becomes: NB = 1- c - w - E(gpr gpu) - E(spr spu) - M i j [4]

In this case, an individual chooses to commit a crime when NB is positive. This models used in economics and withthe withthe bounded rationality model is consistent Economics and shows thatthe decision to commitan economic crime New Institutional of law the strength depends on the value of the loot, the costs of the criminalenterprise, and magnitude and the magnitudeof the legal penalties,the strength efforts enforcement of a prospectivecriminal. behavioral constraints of social sanctionsand the internalized It shows thatthe decision to commita crime depends on threetypes of behavioral theconstraints constraints: imposedby the law and law enforcement X(gpr gpu) reflects i the culture;and M the morals of which reflect efforts; Z(spr . spu) the social constraints j a personcomwhether in determining are important theindividual.The threeconstraints mitsa crime. These are similar to Mockus' (1994) regulatory systems:morals and cultherewill be few ture.Obviously,when the threeare strongand complementeach other,

18 Forexample, issenofdrugs with a kilogram ata U.S.airport Colombian a poor captured unemployed to access medical radio, he has a in where television, toa few tenced attention, food, roof, years jail his Thisincreases a foreign tolearn andthe exercise education language. room, material, opportunity own individual's on the would criminal tothe Thevalueofthepunishment ofliving. standard depend of cost with the ofliving standard oftheincreased ofthebenefits andevaluation physical comparison freedom lost 2003). (Thoumi

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crime levels are going to illegal activities.But when theyare weak and/or contradictory, be high.In otherwords,the structure and institutions of a societyare key determinants of levels. illegal activity V. The Colombian Problem When the state and social enforcement is easy. efforts coincide, policy enforcement law enforcement becomes But when theydiffer and counteract each other, very widely to difficult. Several studies have focused on why in Colombia it has been so difficult has been of the and social trust, generate reciprocity solidarity; why capital mostly and why bridgingsocial capiboundingtypearound familyand small groupsof friends; tal has been veryscarce;19whyColombia has a veryweak nationalidentity; why itdeveltowards in which individual a individualist culture societyis responsibility oped strongly is comof individual actions on others weak and behavior that the effects disregards very mon (Thoumi 2003, Yunis 2003, among others). The roots of the formal-informal rules conflictcan be traced back to the country's and the civil and organismsthatdeveloped in Colombia. government geography, history theterritory, to establishtherule difficult for the state to control made it Geography very for the It was also of law and to bind the country country'slow levresponsible together. els of internationaltrade and tax revenue. Colombia had many isolated regions that developed with few links to each other.Colombia's exposure to the outside world was The large foreign verylimited.It received the least numberof non-Spanishimmigrants. debt inheritedfromBolivar's campaign to free Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia prevented access to externalcapital fundsfora century. The rapid mestizaje weakened native communitiesand social behavioral controls. booms and busts,butuntilthecoffeetrade a series of primary Colombia suffered product locations which in different were in the 1920s, they products and different developed of communities. the prevented development strong Political partiesin Colombia have been atypical.In responseto theweak centralgovand thestateand ernment presencein manyregions,theymediatedbetweenthecitizenry The to and identification of became a source identity strong partyloyaltiesallowed many. died. While therehave been in which about 1950s 1940s and of the La Violencia 200,000 in Latin America, there outlier not been an rate has homicide which the periods during have been sustainedperiods of high violence. Today it mightbe argued thata large prostress syndrome.One can only portionof the population suffersfrompost-traumatic about its consequences. speculate Internalmigrationin the 1950s and 1960s was large as it was in many otherLatin role. Many Americancountries.In Colombia, however,La Violencia played a significant Colombian migrantswere uprooted, which was not the case in other countries. This destroyedmany families and substantiallyweakened the social fabric and social controls,includingthose imposed by theCatholic Church.

19 Thesocial considered (1993). byPutnam types capital

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The armedforceshave also been atypical.Untilrecently it was not theirgoal to controlthe territory, did not have the to do so and they capacity theywere not a focus for of national or feelings identity patriotism.20 Colombia is the only Latin Americancountry thatnever had a real populist government.Instead, it developed a strongclientelisticsystem(Robinson 2007) thatavoided manyof theeconomic pitfallscommonto otherLatinAmericancountries(Urrutia1991). But clientelismturnsthe state intoa bountyand undermines the rule of law and theabilof the state to enforce its norms. ity These and other factorshave generated a wide gap between formal and informal conflict.This gap is complex as informalnorms norms,hence creatingan institutional different social and varyamong groups regions.There is a modernColombia thatseeks theruleof law and strivesto achieve it.But thereare several "otherColombias" in which social normspromotelaw-breaking. The normsgap is not equal across the territory. For in there have been civic the to contraband marches instance, Guajira demanding right (Gonzlez-Plazas 2008). VI. By way of conclusion The eliminationof the illegal drugsindustry requiressubstantialsocial change. Furthe of international control has created a straitjacketthat cannot be thermore, regime in short run. will have to live withina prohibitionist world. the Colombia Thus, changed to the Current which attack factors that contribute development of the policies largely will not eliminatethe illewill at best lower the but industry's scope they illegal industry have to be continued. gal industry. They do, however, in Colombia in any of its evolving forms The permanenceof the illegal drugindustry is and will remaina huge obstacle to developing a modernsociety thatcan successfully is a much greatersource of social and compete in the world. The illegal drug industry economic problemsin Colombia thanin mainlyconsumingcountriesand in most mainly producingcountries.In otherwords,theneed forchange is more pressingin Colombia thanin the United States,Europe, Bolivia and Peru. to generatea widespread movement The question is whetherthis need is sufficient within Colombia that recognizes the need to eliminate the necessary factors forthe and commitsto it. This is very unlikely.Therefore, developmentof the illegal industry the most likely scenario is one in which Colombians will continue giving exculpatory Colombian govwill remaina featureof the country. and the illegal industry arguments donors to assist in from ernment officialswill continue requestingmore funds foreign will continue the war on drugs and some Colombian intellectuals clamoring forthe because Colombia cannot world to worldto legalize drugs,thatis, to requestthe change is not to the challenge forColombia legalize drugs but to legalchange. Unfortunately, ize Colombia.

20 Itis remarkable milithan more former a few for decades there havebeen that several guerrillas quite inCongress. tary

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124 Bibliography

Francisco E.Thoumi

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