Sie sind auf Seite 1von 51

Oceania Publications, University of Sydney

Morality and the Concept of the Person among the Gahuku-Gama Author(s): K. E. Read Source: Oceania, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Jun., 1955), pp. 233-282 Published by: Wiley on behalf of Oceania Publications, University of Sydney Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40328996 . Accessed: 24/02/2014 12:40
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and Oceania Publications, University of Sydney are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Oceania.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

DEVOTED TO THE STUDY A JOURNAL OF OF AUSTRALIA, THE NATIVE PEOPLES NEW OF THE PACIFIC GUINEA, AND THE ISLANDS
VOLUME XXV. No. 4

OCEANIA
JUNE 1955 MORALITYAND THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA By K. E. Read

Introduction an is to ethics, beingan attempt paper primarily essayin comparative of ethical Western the traditional with categories Europeanculture compare a peopleof the EasternHighlands of New Guinea.1 thoseof the Gahuku-Gama, than with as concerned I am more for, I understand it, interpretation description, rather than with of value value the as matters with deals ethics judgments theory to understand in order record.2In other oranthropological the ofhistorical words, it to is restrict culture to in a moral life inadequate investigation the particular of the or to an examination reasons of moral elucidation rules, empirical whythey Gahuku-Gama also of the are to the The moral areobeyed. important judgments a a ethical manifest thatthey extent orientation, particular specific ontological which becompared andcontrasted ofmanandofhuman relationships may conception ofourownculture. ethical with thetraditional emphasis " " ethics willbe indicated as traditionalin Western WhatI regard European to the normative of the in due course. I do notintend, however, argue validity thatthemoral it is ofno material of concern behaviour involved. Further, criteria of no awareness the shows concerned. Western practical categories Europeans many if it is agreed thatquiteapartfrom of willbe served any questions Mypurpose a culture distinctive and Western or falsity, truth ultimate possesses European ethics. traditional
1My field was carried out during workamongthe Gahuku-Gama 2, whenI was a 1950-195 the Aust alian NationalUniversity. Fellowof the ResearchSchoolof PacificStudies, Research " is contained on the Gahuku-Gama information Somepreliminary mypapers Nama Cult of " in and Cultures of the No. Central Vol. the Central XXIII, 1, 1952, Oceania, HighHighlands," Vol. 10, No. 1, 1954. lands," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, and Mr. JamesMcAuley, both to Dr. PhyllisKaberry I wouldliketo express mygratitude have readthepresent ofwhom paperand have givenme valuableassistance. " and the " 21 use thetermvalue in the ethicalsenseof the " right good."

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

234

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

The comparisonof different fromseveral moral systemsmay be undertaken of the forms of behaviour witha simplelisting pointsof view. We may be content or we may adopt a socio-functional whichare considered rightand wrong, type of to different social structures in whichmoralvalues are examinedin relation enquiry - not neglected formsof social organization.3A thirdpossibility in and different in morerecent thepast,though somewhat unfashionable years couldbe theattempt to analyse and to comparethe categoriesof thoughtwhichconstitute a people's of theirmoral life,the mode or orientation of ethics,the conceptualframework moral systems. This is the kind of enquirywhich I intendto pursue. different I am awarethatit involves mein a number oftheoretical and methodological problems ofsuchan approachhas beenthesubjectofcontroversy.Thus, and thatthevalidity or philosophical of native behaviourhas been the intellectualistic interpretation criticized who conceiveof theirdiscipline as a consistently by thoseanthropologists positivenaturalscienceon the model of modernphysics. I do not intendto enter this argument. The conflicting pointsof view have been summarized recently by are an adequate statement of my Bidneyand I need onlystate that his conclusions own position.4 This means that althoughthe Gahuku-Gama do not explain their value judgments oftheconcepts in terms whichI shallemploy, their moralbehaviour and their beliefs a specific nevertheless ethicaloutlook; theyare theexpression imply of a particular ethicalpattern whichis amenableto logicaland systematic explanation. My task, then,will be to discoverand to make explicitthese fundamental and to comparethemwiththe traditional ontological postulates ontological assumptionsof WesternEuropean ethics. If a label is required, my paper may be called an essay in meta-anthropology, to elucidate, sinceI attempt and logical by inference certainpre-cultural whichunderlie a particular, deduction, suppositions empirically observed,patternof behaviour. rather in orderto avoid any chargeofsociological thandetermnie (I say underlie " singularism." Sorokin(Social and CulturalDynamics)has expoundedthe thesis that the philosophical of a culture(its " pre-suppositions perspective ") determine its empirical manifestations and institutions. I believethat thereis a demonstrable betweenthe philosophy of a cultureand the patternof its empirical relationship " but I do notbelievethatany " singularistic willproveto be more traits, hypothesis in this instancethan in others.) successful - forthereis no space to argue the matter - that thereis this I am assuming metacultural should which,in any given instance,the anthropologist perspective
3Cf.thegeneral treatment ofmorality Firthin his Elements by Raymond ofSocialOrganization,I95i> PP- 183-214. 4Cf.David Bidney, Theoretical Firth 1953, Anthropology, pp. 150-182. Raymond apparently excludesmy particular interest from the purview of " anthropological enquiry. He states,for in that the is not concerned with example, studying morality anthropologist directly questions - the abstract, of ethics examination of the bases of rightand wrong in general philosophical " the on which such notions are fcAinded (and) assumptions (Elements of Social Organization, of thispointof view by L. P. Mairin An African op. cit.,pp. 183-184). Cf. also a statement in the Twentieth and G. Parrinder's People Century, 1934,pp. 256-257, replyin WestAfrican London,1951, p. 11. Placide Tempelsmakes the same pointin La Philosophie Psychology, EditionsAfricaines, Bantoue, 1949,pp. 23 f.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

235

data. The immediate aim of the studyside by side withhis analysesof empirical but they are directedtowardsa common two kinds of enquirymay be different, end, and only an uncriticalacceptanceof positivistic dogmas would exclude the formerfromthe field of anthropology. Metaculturalreality is not something which we cannot" know" in muchthesamewaythatwe " know" anything mystical nature. Similarly, metacultural are subject to the of a non-material hypotheses and verification which apply to the empirical. Perhaps of correction conditions but thisis not an adequate reasonfordenying to verify, them theyare moredifficult significance. with an ethical problem,certainquestions But while my paper is concerned of are excludedfrom some moral theinvestithe attention which philosophers engage or of of as the the mannerin : for such, theory good obligation example, gation or espoused,and the processeswhereby moral perwhichvalues are apprehended plexities are resolved. This is not because the Gahuku-Gamahave no moral facedwithsituations which timeto time, necessitate clearly problems. Theyare,from I think that their a choicefromamonga numberof alternatives, though possible are morelimitedthan in our own culture. choicesas well as the probableconflicts it is assumed thevaluesespousedand recognized But granting by theGahuku-Gama, takes place in accordancewith universal of moral perplexities that the resolution to admitting wouldbe tantamount otherwise biopsychological principles.5To affirm " moralman " is " moralman " is that the whereas differences, assumption primary ofcertain moraland theworldover,endowedwithidentical capacitiesand consisting in intellectualendowmentdo not, therefore, intellectualminima. Differences accountforthe ethicalpatternof Gahuku-Gama culture, thoughit is obvious that thanourselves. The point less sophisticated the New Guineanativeis intellectually I suggest, lies in the Gahuku-Gama of departure, conceptof the person,usingthis themeof my paper. termin its ethicalsense. This is the principal Anthropology, Ethics and Cultural Relativism materialwhichhas been published the amountof anthropological Considering at to findthat primitive it ethics first, surprising years is, duringthe past thirty It a is also to discoverthat have receivedsuch little attention. disappointment ethicsare wheretherehas been an attemptto deal withthe mattersystematically, the investigator or equated withreligion, confused apparently considering generally that once he has describedthe religiousbeliefsand sanctionsof a people he has " GodfreyWilson, in his paper An African disposed of their morality. Thus " of rightconductwhichhave,a superas those forms defines morality Morality," " naturalsanction (Africa,Vol. IX, 1937, pp. 75 ff.). Religionmay or may not to assumethat theyare invariably withmorals. It is a misconception be concerned thoseforms to exclude as non-moral of the of and a misunderstanding linked, subject sanctions. by supernatural rightconductwhichare not supported
5 1 use the terms " espoused " and " recognized " values as denned by Eliseo Vivas in The Moral Life and the Ethical Life, 1950, pp. 217-218.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

236

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

Nor is it only in the analysesof particular culturesthat we come across this - or, forthatmatter, of value of ethics withfewexceptions, no mention neglectfor, sense is to be foundin thegrowing in the generic body ofworkson general theory. in anthrotrends The reasonforthislies,at least in part,in a reaction againstearlier historical and evolutionary against the intellectualistic, pologyand, in particular, in theorieswhich formedthe climate of anthropological opinion the nineteenth the when On other hand, began to lose ground evolutionary hypotheses century. we mighthave expecteda revivalin underthe attack of socio-functional doctrines, and systematic to treatthe subjectwiththe same meticulous ethicsand an attempt of of that whole in terms for demanded other which was integrated aspects scrutiny whichsocietyand culturewere now conceived. theoriesof morality were concerned to discredit evolutionary (Functionalists " in " Ethics in Marett views the Rudimentary Hasting'sEncycloexpressed by (e.g., on empirical Vol. and the new fieldand with Ethics, emphasis 5), pcediaof Religion theirpoint to lighta vast body of materialwhichdemonstrated worktheybrought In particular,these that primitivemoralityhad been grosslyover-simplified. did not live at a pre-moral studiesshowedthat the primitive stage ofsocial developwith No one played a more custom. mentin whichhe conformed automatically and in Crime Custom vitalrolein thisthanMalinowski London, Savage Society, (e.g., are to on Malinowski this context. comments Macbeath's But appropriate 1926). " has described in detail (the social organization that Malinowski Thus he remarks of the TrobriandIslanders),theireconomicsystem,theirmarriagearrangements, and mostoftheir moreimportant beliefs and practices institutheir magico-religious to almost the of their life which he has tions. Curiously onlyaspect enough, givenno which he is to makes few references their and explicit morality." separateattention in Living, 1952, p. 109).) (A. Macbeath, Experiments culture is not so surprising, The comparative neglectof this aspect of primitive that the claim advanced realize we when however, century principal by twentieth natural status as its a tied to the was science,irrevocably positive anthropology and rigorously ofmodern eschewing subjectivity. The principal physics metnoaology to a or empiricist the no doubt adhered of positivist philosophical day spokesmen as the unverifiable of and tendedto regardmoraljudgments expression standpoint states of emotion ; but even if this werenot the case, it was feltthat the natural than its could have no more to do with valuescienceof anthropology judgments elder sisters, biologyand physics. Ethical questionsmay not have been excluded fromconsideration, but if theywere admitted, positivist anthropology completely it from had no way of dealingwith them adequately,and its dogmas prohibited asking the assistanceof philosophy.6
0 Videthe moreexhaustive ofanthropological in the ofthe development exposition thought centuries whichis givenby Bidneyin his paper " The Conceptof and twentieth nineteenth Value in Modern Today,ed. A. L. Kroeber, 1953,pp. 682-699). Anthropology" {Anthropology Cf. also RaymondFirth," The Studyof Values by Social Anthropologists," Man, Vol. LIII, pp. 146-153-

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

237

There can be no argumentconcerning the benefitwhich anthropology has gained fromthis scientific emphasis. Empiricalobservation, methodological rigor and objectivity are qualities to be fostered and praised unstintingly ; but while to be achievedin thesedirections, muchhas been gainedand muchremains we may thereis not a debit side to the ledger. If, as some contend,the also ask whether " " naturalscienceof and an unquestioning adherence anthropology is a misnomer of the modelhas resulted to the tenetsand methodology in a narrowoutlook,and of the natureof the materialinvolved,then in a seriousmisunderstanding possibly we mustattempt to see where thisis likelyto have had mostnoticeable effect. It may justifiably be said that modernanthropology has been unable to offer approach to the problemof value. A further any satisfactory question,then,is it is precluded so because whether from thattheexclusive insist doing anthropologists is of natural science for a full of treatment theirparticular methodology adequate humanistic which or material. Certainly is to grapple unable any discipline unwilling withthe questionof values would seem to be incapable of makingany significant ofthemostpressing ofourcontemporary to thesolution socialproblems. contribution - where not in a Theselimitations be the of analysis may apparent particular society - or in investigations values may be taken as " given" and treateddescriptively concerned witha singleaspect of social life; but it is difficult to see how any comsocio-cultural could of be undertaken withoutgivingthe parativeanalysis change for mattercarefulattention. When Professor Radcliffe-Brown, example,remarks that what is significant in the colonialworldto-dayis the new relationships which have arisenbetweenEuropeans and the indigenous and between the inhabitants, he is not an obvious truth but inhabitants themselves, indigenous only stating to be the major fieldforstudy. We may what he considers indicating incidentally that no structural accountof the add, however, analysiscan give us a satisfactory for these have theirgenesisin the discovery of new values and involved, processes in the structural be ideals, and whateveris significant problemmust ultimately to level. referred this does not attemptto underRadcliffe-Brown Admittedly, of values. He acknowledges estimatethe significance that " the study of social to the studyof interests structure leads immediately or values as the determinants ofsocialrelations," and he adds thathe himself has made a studyofritesand myths thispointof view.7 But Radcliffe-Brown's from of values is essentially conception and its demerits are those of any theorywhichconceivesof values as simplistic with interests. synonymous The problemof the operativefunction of values and evaluationis, of course, the questionof theirobjectivevalidity; but the two are not unconfrom different nected,as indeedwe have seen timeand timeagain in our own generation. Most - unless they are preparedto abdicate the plane of fieldworkers must also admit reason that on occasion the existence of objective standards can hardly be in placingthe problem of objectivity outside therefore, questioned. I see no virtue,
7A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On Social Structure," Journalof the Royal Anthropological Vol. LXX, p. 9. Institute,

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

238

iMORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

the scope of social anthropology the methodology and simultaneously denigrating of those disciplines whichhave attemptedto deal with it. It seems to me more and I as wellas moreexpressive ofa faith in science, to acceptthechallenge, fruitful, hismaterial believethatiftheanthropologist his reluctance and examines overcomes from to contribute. thispointofview,hewillfind thathe has something ofimportance There are, in fact,encouraging that some anthropologists signs contemporary of the past and to reare preparedto question the tightpositivistic framework : workNadel remarks examinethenatureoftheir theoretical discipline. In a recent " It is often claimedthat science, of any kind,mustaim at the ' objective' analysis ' of' facts' and hencebar all valuejudgments, thatis,all statements ofwhatis ' better ' ' ' ' or worse/ right or wrong/ in a humanor moralsense. Rash and crudejudgmentsof thiskindmustobviously be avoided ; equallyit is possibleto avoid them. Yet in a more subtlesense value judgments must enterinto everysocial enquiry, entailed in its in this sense I hold that *pure/value free nature. And being very is an illusion."8 Bidney also argues that " ontologicalpostulatss anthropology constitutean indispensableelementin every one of the sciences" and that in with the problemof anthropology theyenterinto any theorywhichis concerned is culturalrealityand the natureof man.9 His own approachto these problems freedom humanistic and personalistic, for human and intelligence stressing, example, and the role of personsin determining theirculturaldestiny. On this point,his who considersthat anthropology positionis similarto that of Evans-Pritchard, is a humanistic that it and who asserts studiessocietiesas moralsystems discipline " Social ratherthan naturalsystems(E. E. Evans-Pritchard, : Past Anthropology and Present," Man, Vol. L, 1950, pp. 118-124). view that culture" is a level of reality Bidneyis also opposedto the positivist which itself aloneand is, as it were,a causa sui, a processwhichis conceived through which mouldstheexperience ofsociety."10 ofa manas a member His particular plea is that anthropology should show its respectfor human reason and science by coin the study of normative ideals, and he argues operatingwith other disciplines " , the attitudeof viewingeach culture convincingly against serial ethnocentrism from its own perspective and sole virtueof the only,as if that werethe primary I am in completeagreement withthis point of view. objectiveanthropologist."11 is a normative and I findit impossibleto conceiveof a Anthropology *' naturalscienceof " discipline, freeof society ifby that we mean a studywhichis completely any value content. Such a scienceof societydoes not exist; nor is it desirable thatit should. Normative are impliedin the natureof our materialand judgments " " ouraims,and evenin thoseanalyses strive after which mostcarefully objectivity 8 S. F. Nadel, The Foundations London,1951,pp. 53 f. of Social Anthropology, 9 Theoretical p. 164. Anthropology, 10 Op. cit.,p. 177. 11" The Concept of Value in Modern that Anthropology," op. cit.,p. 698. It is significant received hisinitialtraining in philosophy, and thatin his handling ofthesequestions the Bidney and rational ofthatdiscipline throws intosharprelief thecrudity ofso manyof logical approach most cherished positiveanthropology's arguments.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

239

they cannot be excluded. Instead of notably some studies of social structureas beyondthe reachof science,anthropology would ontological problems dismissing of its schema. be betteradvised to place them in the forefront is a naturalsciencelike I shouldadd that I rejectthe view that anthropology on this point seems to me to be wasted words, physics. Much of the argument when those who adhereto the oppositepoint of view admit that the particularly " " naturalscienceof to discovergenerallaws of the anthropology will be unlikely as modernphysics. There is, in fact,something and predictability same precision in the materialof the anthropologist, and unpredictable for imprecise inherently are relativelyfreeto choose what their men, both individuallyand collectively, - the fact that knowledge in man will be. This qualityof self-consciousness future - determines that process of the social processin questionbecomesa factoraltering whichis primarily historical and normative. thenatureof the discipline, ofvalueshas,however, call therequiredness Whatwe might longbeenrecognized " " Marett with ethics, rudimentary postulatedtwo Dealing by anthropologists. the The and to he termed the which of first, syntelic. according synomic stages society of culture and is characterized the fact level to the Marett, primitive by corresponds the bond of society,whereasthe otheris characterized that customforms by the ends and by the existenceof ideals. The primitive rationalselectionof preferred froma stage of societyis thus regardedas a regionof habit resulting (synomic) selectionof ethical standards. The higher, subconscious syntelicstage of society in which ethical standardsare selected consciously is a regionof reflexion by a rational intelligence. Marett,in other words, consideredthat the behaviour of and thatethicalideals,moralsanctions and non-rational manwas non-moral primitive level of culture.12 made theirappearanceonlyat the higher or quasi-moral sanctions whicha long in evolutionary inherent It was just thisinterpretation, anthropology, to correct. Whateverdifferences wereconcerned fieldworkers line of distinguished in recognizing on other ofopinion dividedtheseworkers matters, theywereunanimous ofethicalideals,ofideas ofright therequiredness ofmoralsanctions, theimportance choicebetween to securea rational which factors and thecomplex andwrong operated of a systematic this the But at in primitive alternatives development point society. a prefor them two was inhibited ethics of factors, principal by study comparative and the naturalistic science natural of the with emphasis methodology occupation in contemporary moralitygave philosophyitself. Custom theoriesof primitive of moralvalues while the and of cultural doctrine to the relativism, requiredness place it was no longerconsidered receivedfullrecognition or, indeed,possible, legitimate ethical systemsof different and comparison to proceedto a logical interpretation from this " discovery resulted To aver that littlemorethan a changein terminology " is an obviousover-simplification culture of the ethical in primitive ; yet as faras is partiallytrue,for,whereascustomhad the statement is concerned ethicaltheory was had now succeededand the ethicalproblem once been king,culturalrelativism it as cultural resolved conditioning. by explaining away
12R. R. Maret," Rudimentary Ethics," op. cit.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

240

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

The relativistic as long pointof view was expressedsuccinctly by Levy-Bruhl on " La Moraleet la Sciencedes Moeurs/'he held thatmorals ago as 1903. Writing conductin any society, are simply theruleswhichdetermine and thattheytherefore vary fromsocietyto society. The moralis what is regardedas moralby a given social group at a given stage of development, and, whateverpracticesthismay are moralforthe peopleconcerned. Westermarck devoteda include,such practices the same idea and if we allow fora fewminor great deal of space to expressing which is expounded by many it is his doctrineof ethical relativity corrections, us that sociologistsand anthropologists.Thus, La Piere informs contemporary " its conceptsofmorality, and its ethical everypeoplehas its standardsof conduct, ; and these have been subjected to sociologicalexamination. Under principles value ofanyethicalor moralprincipal ... is found suchexamination, thefunctional to be relativeto the social context." He concludes, that thereare " no therefore, fixedpointsof reference forthe studyof social or forany otherkindof phenomena. All the sciences, to sociology, deal in relatives rather thanabsolutes."13 from physics this is also the view of the anthropologists Expressed more systematically, Slotkin and Herskovits. Adopting the standpointof Spinoza, the former, for at a theory of value whichis utilitarian, subjectiveand relativisticexample,arrives " whichhelp the organism to Slotkintellsus, " that has characteristics Anything/1 and therefore has value. Obviously, achievesatiationis useful have no then,things to thingsby the inherent use or value, but ratherthese qualities are attributed organismthat can use them in its adjustments." Some motives,however,are moreimportant than others. Thus, you could live foronlya minuteor so without for that as sorre but severalweeks withoutfood. It follows, therefore, breathing motives, their relative value depends on the relative things satisfy different of the motiveconcerned in each instance. Finally," sincethingsdiffer importance in theirvalue, everyone has a set of values,and in so far as thingsvary in their fordifferent importance people, theirsets of values are different."Wheresociety as a wholeis concerned, thesebasic assumptions lead to the view that each group attributes value to the thingsit finds usefulin its adjustments, and since different theirvalue systems are therefore different.14 groupsfinddifferent thingsare useful, Slotkin'spoint of view deservesmore than a passingmention. His approach is utilitarian and subjective. Value attachesto what is desiredor sought,and the which things help the organismto achieve satiation are what are sought. The of the because it is good good is thusdenied; we do not seek something objectivity or right it or but- following is we it. In equating because seek Spinoza good right relativevalue with the relativeimportance of the motiveswhicha thingsatisfies, Slotkin has perpetrated a gross over-simplification. We may, for example, cite Linton's account of the values whichthe Comancheattached to the dog as com13RichardT. La Piere,Sociology, New York, 1946,pp. 167-168. 14J. S. Slotkin, Social 1950,pp. 3, 50-71. Slotkinconcludes Anthropology, by sayingthat " in therelative ofa group's a shift in itsvaluesystem." changes importance produce adjustments - thatit is It couldbe as easilymaintained and in someinstances it is quiteeasilydemonstrated thediscovery ofnewvalueswhich in theadjustments of a group. produce changes

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

241

Slotkin's ofMan, pp. 428-429). Further, paredwiththehorse(R. Linton,The Study ofvaluesdiffers forevery individual assertion thatthehierarchy apparently precludes the possibilityof there being any objective hierarchywhich all individuals withintheir own value systems. could recognizeand even actively incorporate an objectivehierarchy, ofascertaining orstating But in spiteofthedifficulty precisely in termsof it. Indeed, we normally admitthat it exists and we make judgments oftheUniversity wouldseemto be recognized somesuchhierarchy by thosestudents of Texas whose value ratingsSlotkinquotes (p. 51). I suggest,too, that certain " One to Slotkin, valuesare recognized important by all cultures. Finally,according effect of evaluationis that it gives a purposeor meaningto life. Animalsact in orderto satisfy theirmotives. But man has a complexbrain whichhe sometimes ' with this question: ' Why live ? Purpose and value are uses to perplexhimself in things and arenotinherent attributed to things ; therefore, organisms by adjusting or life has intrinsic human universe in the purpose value . . . including any nothing what on or However, you thinkof yourfellow depending fortunately unfortunately, rational. In this case they invariably men, human beings are not particularly put the cart beforethe horse. Instead of lookingat theiractions as attemptsto of thesemotives, the worthwhileness theirmotivesand thenexamining they satisfy to reachgoals whichare ends in themselves. This oftheiractionsas attempts think " - not even human life is a productof evaluation (pp. 60-62). Nothing,then of a in the resides value motives for the or intrinsic value, thing objective possesses thesemotives; value,and theprocesses and has no reality which it satisfies apartfrom forself-delusion, mechanism of evaluation,are thus littlemore than an irrational not onlyhis own motivesbut also the himself man concealsfrom a meanswhereby of Saint Simon,Comte tradition ofexistence. In the positivist fundamental futility Slotkinwouldprobablycontendthat the way out of of Durkheim, and the followers of our of the worthwhileness thisimpasseis to be foundin the rationalexamination whichwould assist us to this end. motives. But he fails to indicateany criteria could whathe has said no suchcriteria Indeed,he seemsunawareofthefactthatfrom " of " worthwhileness of some kind of the for to exist, anythingimplies speak his motives the individual standard which an absolute, objective may judge against seek to realizein his behaviour. On Slotkin'sown and whichhe may consciously no such absoluteor objectivestandardcan exist. All we can however, admission, " and a littlemore" rationally is to to hope practiceour self-delusion hope do, then, that we are spared finalenlightenment. " " Herskovits' view is only slightlydifferent. Judgments,"he says, are in terms ofhis is interpreted and experience based on experience, by each individual own enculturation." Values, in otherwords,are relativeto the culturein which relative: " the criteria are therefore and moraljudgments culturally theyfunction in the culture and ofvalidity by whichwe acceptthemor rejectthemare immanent culture in which than the the other source from be derived to no sense in are any no there can be It that follows function."15 themselves values universally acceptable
15Vivas,op. cit.,p. 31. Melville Man and His Works, 1949,pp. 63 fif. J. Herskovits,

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

242

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

ethicalcriteria and thatit is therefore to make trans-cultural comparisons impossible of different ethicalsystems the superiority of one over with a view to establishing another. One mightadd that even if therewere only one cultureand one valuein the world,the relativist system positionwould be the same, that is, that values are whollyculturallydetermined. To support this claim Herskovitscites a numberof " psychological determinants," but, as Vivas has pointedout (The Moral Lifeand theEthicalLife,p. 27), " either thesemaybe interpreted valuesor as someofthe as themeansofdiscovering factors whichconstitute them; and whichof theseinterpretations is acceptableis a question for philosophers." The prestigeof Herskovits' statementof cultural relativism is evidentin the factthat it forms on Human the basis of a " Statement " whichthe to the United American Association submitted Rights Anthropological Nations in 1947 (vide AmericanAnthropologist, Vol. XLIX, pp. 539-541). There are, however,signs that its extremepositionis no longeracceptable to the more of contemporary and it has lately been subjected to thoughtful anthropologists, some trenchant criticism fromBidney (David Bidney, " The Conceptof Value in " ModernAnthropology," op. cit.,pp. 689-694,and On the Conceptof Cultureand Some CulturalFallacies," American Vol. XLVI, pp. 30-34). Anthropologist, Culturalrelativismprofesses a profound of the respectfor the complexities moral life in all social groupsat all levels of development, and it is undoubtedly correctin drawingattention to the experiential elementin value judgments ; but theadequacyofa hypothesis an irreducis notto be found in thefactthatit contains ibleelement oftruth butrather in itscomprehensiveness, thatis,to account itsability, forthe fullrange of the phenomenapresentforstudy. What culturalrelativism owesto contemporary utilitarian and pragmatic moralphilosophies is perfectly clear. Relativismis not imposedon the sociologistby the empiricaldata of his study; it is a philosophicaldecision imposed on the data. On issues of a specifically natureits protagonists must therefore to argueits merits be prepared philosophical on groundswhich the philosopher chooses. ofvalue to which relativism leads is thatwhich Vivas (op. cit.,p. 22) (The theory calls " moral vitalism." Thus : " By moral vitalismI mean the fallacioustheory thatvalue is constituted on an object through the act ofsatisfaction by,or conferred or fulfilment of a non-valuetermor factor, eitherbiologicalor psychological (more ofnames . . . Amongthenames usuallythelatter),whichis designated by a variety ' ' ' used themostcommon are perhaps' desire/' interest/ appetition/ need/ drive/ ' ' ' and impulse . . . From this biologisticor psychologists reductionism, the moralvitalistgoes on to arguethatifone value is conferred on an objectthrough the of a desiretowardsor an interest in it, it follows, of course,thattwo values presence are conferred that we seek to by two desiresthat that the moredesiresor interests the more value we shall realize.") fulfil, forthe moment, it is not Passing over the glaringinadequaciesof relativism difficult to see its ready appeal to thosewhose workbrought theminto the closest contactwith an almostbewildering varietyof ethicalsystems. To the studentof

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

243

factthat peopleshave different it is an elementary values,and that what is society, as good and right and, regarded by one groupfailsto findacceptancewithanother, moral systemsappear to function that all these different further, satisfactorily in which undertheparticular conditions theyare found. Thismay createdifficulties forthosewho hold that values are objectiveand that standardshave a normative but it is not proofto the contrary. All values are, of course,subjectivein validity, but this the obvious sense that in orderto be effective theymust be internalized, is calculated doesnotobviatethenormative relativism, however, problem. Cultural to make its strongest pragmaticinterappeal to those who adopt an exclusively of human behaviour. A majorityof current make sociologicaltheories pretation or another and it is thecreed, use ofit in one form too,ofthepre-eminently pragmatic it is 'functional" school of anthropology. Indeed, for some functionalists a dogmawhichis so firmly and uncritically held thatit defeats grounded apparently to achieveand, by stultifying whichit purports theveryaim of objectivity enquiry, of philosophy and sociology to a sterile reducesthemajor problems formula. and functionalism have performed No one would denythat culturalrelativism the experiential and pragmaticaspect of values servicein stressing an important " of different theirutilityand the " reasonableness moral and in demonstrating a of if conditions culture. But the is under the doctrine particular given systems to see how it can attemptto do any morethan this it is difficult held consistently, of thoseproblems which and, least of all, how it can be applied to the mosturgent with other in our The truth of it is that besetus is, course, relationships peoples. nor held Whatever he to neither applied consistently. may imply the contrary, are admitted so long as he continues absolutestandards to employ by the relativist is so far from ; indeed, relativism many of the basic conceptsof anthropology the objectivity whichit claims that its evaluationsmust be patently approaching to all the clear but mostobtuse.16 As Nadel has pointedout,thebasic judgments of " do not social science or values necessarily expressa purelypersonalphilosophy out ofthe history assumed."17 Theyhave grown ofhumanthought and, arbitrarily in particular, out of the social and ethicalissues whichhave exercised the mindsof Western Europeansduriugthe past seventyyears. Thus, Bidney [op, cit.,p. 688) at its first showsthatcultural was in part a reaction relativism, appearance, against theethnocentrism ofnineteenth and thatthecultural evolutionists, century pluralism it postulated" coincided withthe liberaland democratic which climateof strikingly " opinion of the day. It is true, too, that the presenttendencyto depart from extreme relativism awarenesso its failure to offer is, in part,due to a growing any let alone solutionto the particular of our own times. (See also guidance, problems Worldand its Transformations RobertRedfield,The Primitive (1953), pp. 145 ff.) The relativist in two respectsfromthose who hold opposed however, differs, - for he can hardlyfail to recognize - the value views: he fails to make explicit
18 the transvaluation of values whichis involvedin relativist doctrines. Bidney, " The E.g. Conceptof Value in Modern Anthropology," op. cit.,pp. 689-692. 17S. F. Nadel, op. cit.,p. 54.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

244

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

on which his doctrine is basedand,secondly, he constantly judgments employs which he is concerned to deny. How standards acknowledgment againwithout to accepttheissueresults thisdoublerefusal in greater thanin cases objectivity - onlythe - and criticism where are statedexplicitly is thusinvited evaluations to explain. The fact relativist knows is unwilling is thathowever and,apparently, hemay ordeny their scientific therelativist tostandards hasrecourse suspect validity, of right and wrong, of whatis appropriate or abnormal or inappropriate, normal notonly in hispersonal butalsoin hisstudies, andas a socialscientist relationships he cannomore eliminate from them thelatter thanas a human hecanexclude being from hisprivate them life. " Wilhelm fundarelativist," (" Even the staunchest Ropkehas said, knows well that are and . . . there quite mentally appropriate inappropriate relationships Theindividual who haslost hisfeeling for what isnormal . . . human (in relationships) willfind or laterin theconsulting himself sooner room ofa nerve or specialist in a a while nation of far too such individuals willendin war, hospital, composed many revolution and dissolution. Thisis thefrightful for expiation neglecting anthropo" constants which therelativist considers out ofreach logical scientifically (Civitas Humana,1948, pp. 77-78). One may add that the burdenof anthropological to thereality ofa normal of stateofsociety andto a natural order enquiries points human however difficult be to define.The relativist relationships, may they may he proceeds mere he cannot denythatthisis so, butwherever beyond description avoid its implications.) But although on sociological no less thanon philosophical we may grounds thesolipsistic of value to which relativism relativism leads, reject interpretation yet doescontain an irreducible element oftruth. Evena casualpersual oftheliterature of anthropology reveals theheterogeneity of thevalueswhich menrecognize and seekto express, and it is a simple truism thatevery a culture possesses hierarchy ofapproved ends. At thisdescriptive it is indeed to say thatvalues correct level, arerelative to theculture in which for each culture certain function, they presents values toitsmembers andseeks to secure of them institutional means, acceptance by out other valuesby negative and is indifferent to justas it also shuts conditioning and others are correct in that the yetothers. So far, Levy-Bruhl maintaining right andthegoodarethose which arerecognized as right andgoodbythemembers things ofa particular socialgroup. Andifthisconstituted theonlyproblem, it couldbe resolved the values a form which by inductively eliciting particular system, by their witheach other and withother of the examining inter-relationships aspects culture from thence to an examination oftheir and,finally, functional byproceeding and inconsistencies. we must do if this we aim at underinadequacies Indeed, has revealed standing any way of life,and functionalism, by just thisapproach, thelogical ofbehaviour which areremotely removed consistency underlying patterns from our ownexperience, has demonstrated the rashness and and, by so doing, ofso many ofourjudgments.It is,however, onething to insist that superficiality we study valuesin culture and relative to culture. It is quitea different to thing

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

245

is ofvalue, initself andonly becomes so through thatnothing thecomplex conclude theargument to itsend,needwe ofcultural Nor,to follow conditioning. processes of valueswhich menrecognize, and espouse, acknowledge agreethatthediversity to establish andattempting thenormative, andtherefore us from affirming precludes ofevaluation.18 ofstandards trans-cultural, validity to deal withtheproblems theories ofthemoral life ofrelativist The inability a simple ofvalues thefarther weproceed clear from becomes description increasingly of the philosophical issues. Yet even on the a consideration towards in culture thatthemostconfirmed relativist mustfind difficulties level,I suspect sociological Herskovits : " Each people/'he tellsus, " having in the following passagefrom so thateachgeneration in theyoung them is enculnotonlyinculcates standards, butthey seetoit thattransgressions ofitspredecessors, tothevalue-systems turated . . . Yet every culture knows therebel, which means codesarepunished ofaccepted as wellas cultural cultural thatman'sexperience change stability."19 encompasses has to say on theimportant of ofwhatrelativism If thisis a fair subject example to which we areentitled to expect an there areseveral then culture questions change ofany thatchange in thevalue-system to conclude answer. Arewe,for example, of cultural in the processes of a failure theresult ; conditioning peopleis simply find howdo people solutions to the arefully or,ifvalues explained byenculturation, cultural ? And, which newmoralproblems change characteristically accompany in the rebelelectsto espouse as Vivashas also asked,whatof the valueswhich ? Relativism is unableto tellus are culturally to thosewhich offered preference what leadsto them arediscovered, howthey neither aboutthese, becoming anything ofpublic norhow, thestamp which to others in preference approval, carry accepted ofthe intothevalue-system in spiteofopposition, incorporated maybecome they " However the : a from To concerned. questions philosopher again quote group ' ' . . . The the moralproblem be answered, appearsto transcendenculturation buthowto choose or notmensetup goalsforthemselves is notwhether problem alternatives. to themas beckoning themselves thesegoalsthatoffer from among onefrom thecorrect ofwhich to choose ofa criterion Andin theabsence bymeans the codes all who the individual those found, prevailing repudiates actually among be corrected" and adoptshis owncannot (Vivas,op. cit.,pp.28-29). must as anysociologist ; butI pass Theseareglaring agree surely inadequacies, of to mein is more concern a which to to giveattention problem in order overthem are that values relativism denies cultural thispaper. Held consistently, objective from has departed the relativist sense. Here,of course, in a normative strictly of philosophical thefield enters and by implication ofreference terms sociological
18Cf. Bidney,op. cit.,p. 692 : " The naturalscientist does not use objectiveevidenceto of moraltruth in the sphere values. Similarly, values,it is not logical truth discredit objective moralnormsare seen to rejectobjectivemoralnormssimplybecause some allegedobjective " thereis no necessary also arguesthat Ginsberg to have a purely validity/' Morris subjective " " of ethics (Morris and the relativity of morals the diversity Ginsberg, On between connexion Institute, London,1953,p. 1). ofMorals,"RoyalAnthropological theDiversity 19 Man and His Works. Herskovits,

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

246

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

ethics. He mustaccordingly which the thematter be prepared to contest on grounds chooses and by means of the rationaland logical methodswhichthe philosopher latter employs. The obviousstarting that sincethereare no universally pointis the contention or actionis betterthan the proposition that one way of thought acceptedcriteria, anotheris exceedingly is difficult to establish. What we need to know,however, with not that it is difficult but whether it is possibleto establishthe proposition reasonableobjectivity. To this,relativism a negativereply,so returns apparently let us briefly to take up a pointwhich consider what the answerinvolves. Firstly, Vivas has made, the relativist as a denial of the point of view may be interpreted metacultural ofmoraljudgments. oftruth as wellas themetacultural validity validity It may mean,in otherwords,that in factthereare no universally acceptedcriteria oftruth or moraljudgments which criteria that thereare no normative or,secondly, are universally An adequate valid and whichoughtto be accepted universally.20 the objectivity of establishing answer, then,dependsverylargelyon the possibility ofvalues and on reaching someagreement on their hierarchical relationships.These, are controversial we shall and as faras the latteris concerned matters, admittedly, - forsometimeto come - ifwe reachagreement have to be content probably onlyin that it is not beyondour powers tells us, however, generalterms. Commonsense ofrationalenquiry and criticism, even ifit werenot the case thatwe can objectively of observethe presence of certain moralconstants quite diversepatterns underlying social life. As to theobjectivity ofvalues,it mustsuffice hereto pointout thattheargument it has not been seriously which doctrines affected affirming by any ofthesubjectivist have come and gone since the timeof Locke, and further, that it is the onlyinterwhichcan satisfactorily ofmoral accountforthe distinctive characteristics pretation behaviour. There is, of course,a partial truthin the view that we approve the we desirerather thanseekwhatwe approve; but thefactthatit is applicable things to most of us formuch of the time does not invalidatethe view that values are on theseoccasions us to claimthatourbehaviour objectiveany morethanit permits is moral. Whenconfronted witha moralperplexity, valuesnormally appearto usthough with varyingdegrees of clarity with an objective character. We not our only perceivethis characterof value, but in any moralaction it determines behaviour in the moraleconomy that until ; indeed,it is such an essentialelement we have graspedit and acted upon it we cannotrightly lay claim to the status of a moral agent. If, however,the evidence of experiencefails to findacceptance, it can be demonstrated that the basic assumptions of relativism lead us into a maze of logical impossibilities.A doctrine, forexample,whichdeniesthe metacultural and moraljudgments, has a right to our consideration validityoftruth onlyifit can show that nothing is normatively trueunlessit is universally accepted. If, on the otherhand,the relativist intendsus to understand that truthand moraljudgments are only valid intra-culturally, he must, as a first task, establishthis proposition
20Vivas, op. cit., p. 36.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

247

his proposition metaand objectively. He would have to substantiate universally " which transcendsall intra-cultural of a determinations its in way culturally, and this,of course,wouldbe self-contradictory."21 truth, mustbe leftto rest. The outcome,as faras my object in Here the argument is unacceptable ifit is considered seemsto be thatrelativism thispaperis concerned, to which the moral from life. We may morethana starting as anything point study the of culture selective role admitthat it containsa modicumof truth, recognizing a particularsystem. We may agree, the values which constitute in determining of the manner to our understanding is able to contribute too, that learning theory from to in whichvalues persistand are transmitted generation generation. But to of are not susceptibleto the and the that product conditioning processes imply is to abandon the plane of reasonand to denythe onlymeanswe rationalcriticism who do not conform to our accepted of our own culture members have of criticizing and has to say can detractfromthe legitimacy standards. Nothingthe relativist at of criteria which aim the normative of pursuing the necessity discovery enquiries of one ethical systemwith another. As a forthe moral life and the comparison thetask ofsystemfinal point,it is equallyclearthatwe need not be dissuadedfrom view that forwe do not have to accept the defeatist atizationand interpretation, to objectiveanalysis. are not susceptible and judgments moralactivities Western European Ethics and the Concept of the Person of that it is one thingto argue the legitimacy It mustbe admitted, however, on rationaland logical groundsand it is quite anothermatterto find comparison on the normativecriteriato be employed. Thus, it is apparent that agreement of opinion even among those who oppose objectivismthereis a wide divergence the nature of moralityand the values which constitutethe ethical. concerning on basic categories Indeed,thislack ofunanimity may verywellbe citedas a reason if not indifference. fortreating Obviously, enquirieswith diffidence philosophical in a shortpaper to attempta fullyreasonedanswerto the it would be impractical the conceptof the personas an ethical objectionswhichmay be raised concerning it is equally forthelimits whichI have set to myenquiry buthavingregard category, to argue the it. Thus, I am not concerned clear that I do not have to undertake view primacyof the person,nor to defendthe concept against the reductionistic claim to know of man's natureis revealedto us that all that we can legitimately and psychological sciences. The significant throughthe biological,physiological and in the contrary, affirms of ethics Western traditional the that is Europe point it has and free-will, claimingthat man is person,a unique centreof rationality a way of lookingat human to Westernculturea particular contributed morality, real and sufficiently and obligationswhich is sufficiently specificto relationships of otherethicalsystems. serveas a basis forthe analysisand comparison " " As the termis used by contemporary writers, personalism stands for any value and the that personality is the supreme whichmaintains of philosophy system
21Vivas, op. cit.y p. 36.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

248

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

ofreality. Growing out of the attempt to interpret theselfas a keyto themeaning ofreality interpretations experience, personalistic represent partofphenomenological of European thought fromthe Greekrhetoricians to the the main current through and downto thepresent Scholastics day. It is true,ofcourse,thatthepersonalistic and the positionis complicated has been challenged, by the factthat the viewpoint whichare clearlyincompatible. of ways of thinking termis used to covera number withtheirparticular of changing fashions in philosophy, claimsand But irrespective of the personwhichhas counter claims,it is clear that thereis one centraldoctrine on WesternEuropean culturethan any other. In short, exercisedmore influence and our moral categoriesare those of the our traditionalmoralityis Christian, Boethiusand Thomas Aquinas. of Augustine, Church, definition of the personas " an It is to Boethius that we owe the Christian individual substance of rational nature." Being individual,the person is also matter ofindividuation. forin Scholasticterminology material, suppliestheprinciple for he man alone is alone material But of the person, beings, possessesa rational man this which confers on and which constitutes him That nature. special dignity The is not nor is man his soul. considered soul,however, person; onlyas personis to the entitled term. in other to refers a psycho-physical Person, words, organism " thehuman composite." the constituents of the compositeare primematter and In Scholasticsystems, as a is defined all which lacks matter Prime hyle) pure potentiality (or positive form. all physical which characterize characteristics.It is one ofthetwointernal principles all remains the same and that is the passive which being throughout changes things, and identity in the physicalworld. Formis the intrinsic, deterbasis of continuity essence. More principleof existenceof any determinate miningand perfective or that constitutive it is sformasubstantiate, element of a substancewhich strictly, it to a definite is the sourceof its activityand whichdetermines speciesor class and it fromother substances. By being united with primematterthe differentiates or narrowed becomesindividual; it is contracted from its universal form and specific in a Matter to existence united with form us the particular. being gives composite. In thecase ofthehumancomposite theforma substantiate is therational (theperson), soul. More specifically, the soul is a formasubsistens or immateriate, one which can exist and act separatelyfrommatterand is thus to be distinguished froma or non-subsistens which cannot exist or be active from matter. materiate, forma apart But thoughit is an immaterial the soul is not a completesubstance, forit is form, created to be united with a body to completeits own species. It is thus to be froma formaseparatawhich is a completesubstance,a pure spirit distinguished whichis not destinedto be unitedwithmatterand whichcannotcor municateits thesoul is thedifferentiating, constitutive element beingto matter. In otherwords, which determines human to their (substantial form) beings particularspecies. Unitedwithmatter(the body forwhichit is created),it is made individualand it constitutes the person, substanceof rationalnature. i.e., an individual

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

249

language,this view claims that man is something Expressedin more familiar of inter-related morethan a collection powersand aptitudesof the body. It holds, factor whichcannotbe thathe is also constituted in short, psychic by a substantival an reduction. He is but for accounted we know or organism, by nothing explained his organicnaturecan fullyexplain him as he actually or can discoverconcerning exists,forman is also spirit,the possessorof a rationalsoul. Spiritdistinguishes and thoughnot personit constitutes man person. The otherorganisms, himfrom knowhimbut as a composite not to man as we can positively term therefore, refers, or psychic whole,as organicmatterinformed by spirit. has several ethicalconsequences. of as man This conception important person are said to be of the marks and selfIn the first freedom, spirit objectivity place, with these man endowed and the consciousness, being qualities possesses abilityto whichconfront him. He is not, as some fromthe alternatives choose rationally of his psycho-physical nature,but rathera creature regardhim,the mereresultant true from able to and to of reasonand freewill, false,rightfrom distinguish wrong, this when conflicts even with his immediate the follow good, pursue ideals and is to seek desires. Indeed, one of the moraldutieshe thus intelectuallyperceives and if he failsto do so he denieshis naturalstatus and conthe good objectively, i 1 a social medium, and while stitution. It follows, too, thatwhileman is immersed he is, as person, and realize to on thatmedium express he depends himself, essentially the personstands, the criticof thatmedium. Endowedwiththe qualitiesof spirit, it creates and which institutions the to seek to someextent,above uses, committed of the social forms it as independent and conceiving in which the good objectively it may or may not be embodied. From this,thereresultsan attitudeof mind whichis somewhatobscureand to expressconcisely. For lack of a bettertermwe may call it a d fficult therefore an awarenessof the selfas a spiritualentity, sense of individuality, as pronounced the social mediumin whichit is involved. This and apart from distinct something an alterego,is radically ofindividuality, it,ofa higher self, or,ifwe prefer conception at the psycho-physical level. Self-consciousmereself-consciousness from different or regardforthe idioness in the lattersense may involve a pronounced feeling " however, givingriseto that whichis syncratic me/1the lowerselfor ego, without, of person.22 At the lower,idiosyncratic of the consciousness level of distinctive ofthevariousroles theindividual awareness, solelyin terms may,in fact,see himself he tendsto view the otherindividuals with whichhis status ordainsand, likewise, as figures in a social pattern. He does not whomhe comes in contact primarily withouta profound nor is he necessarily lack individuality, of the feeling thereby itselfproportionately withhis insistence on self; indeed,the lattermay manifest the rightsand obligationswhich are associated with status. But this outlook, to the consciousness are entirely with its moral consequences, of foreign together that the individualis person. Thus, it is the essence of personalconsciousness
22Cf. Christian to lose the selfin orderto realizeone's on the necessity mystical teaching truenature.
B

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

250

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

from his social status. He embodies, more than we are able to infer immeasurably and absolutevalue whichis not, in any sense, as it were,an intrinsic, irrefragable in a social pattern he or conferred on himby his position determined and, therefore, in that pattern. Indeed, recognition of can never be regardedsimplyas a figure and others as individual entities us to viewbothourselves theperson standing compels and institutions, and it requires and above theworldofsocialrelationships apartfrom and the conductit asks ofus, to assess thisworld,its obligations us, too, constantly whichare objectively outsideit. Such standards, againsta standardor standards " from the world. Theyare said to be here, are not " remote now, however, present, else. just as much as anything This bringsus to anotherpoint of great importance. Stated in the simplest is the beliefthat the personis ordained of Christian the foundation terms, morality directlyto God, its absolute end. The spiritualcomponentof man's nature is in all ofus, and whileit confers His likeness on man God's own and unique creation, of his it is also themeasure and to others. Thus, an absoluteworth dutyto hims3lf man cannotdo less thanuse his rationalpowers to be trueto his personal existence, in pursuitof the end forwhichtheyweregivenhim. This end is to knowand seek the good, and since the natureof the good is not temporalbut eternal,the social it onlyindirectly and imperfectly.At thesame menlive can embody worldin which as men,to seekthegood in theworldin whichwe live,realizing, we are obliged, time, wherethe worldsays it is, fornothing that it is not necessarily is good or however, what societyvalues is good only because societyvalues it, but rather worthy simply order. Our task as persons, to the extentthatit accordswitha universal therefore, it onlythat whichis not is not to accept the social worldas it is but to seek within aliento our spiritual forward the nature,and it is herethat Christian teaching brings of a certainminimum of attitudes, of conceptof a naturalmoral order,consisting and of institutions which embodythe transcendent obligationsand relationships value of the personand which defineman's temporalduty. The resultmay be oftheground ofmoralobligation. Nothing, as an externalization described in other words,is moralsimplybecause societyclaimsit of us, forthe groundof our moral external bothto ourselves is objectively and to the system of social rights obligation the mediumin whichwe live. It follows, and duties whichconstitute therefore, that the basis on whichwe recognize a moraldutycannotbe adequatelyexpressed, . muchless explained,in termsof the requiredness of a social pattern, foralthough we have relationships whichare morallyas well as sociallybinding, and although thereare somewhichare moral,thisqualitybelongsto them amongour institutions than any of onlyderivatively. In short,the moraldutiesof the personare greater the dutieswhichthe individualpossessesas a member of society. Elementswithin societymay embodya moralduty,but thereis nevera simpleequivalencebetween and moral obligation. Social requiredness There is one finalpoint. The most widespreadconceptof Christian ethicsis in a belief thatit consists in thebrotherhood ofman. It wouldbe a mistake, however, to interpret our traditional teachingsimplyas a claim forthe commonhumanity

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

251

of all mankind. It impliesmuch more than this. To the Christian, the spiritual whichin all menconstitutes thempersonalso confers on theman incomcomponent and to espouse above all others. parable value whichman is requiredto recognize to all men irrespective This worthis inalienable of ; it is also intrinsic, belonging and irrespective of what theydo or may have statusor individualaccomplishments done in the usual moral sense. Thus, the absolute value of the human personis and it priorto all othercreatedvalues. It cuts across all othermoral categories, is thereasonwhywe are enjoinedto love all men,even our enemies, for, quite apart from their whichcannotbe measured actions,theypossessa worth by the standards of society. Moreimportantly, this is the groundon whichChristian ethicsclaims is not onlyderivedfrom to be universal, forman's spiritual constitution an identical all mankind source butit also charges withidentical within a universal responsibilities moral order. Based on the absolute value of the person,Christianmoralityis metacultural. It makes no distinction betweenindividuals or groupsof essentially but assertsthat all are bound by a commondutyto themselves individuals and to* is incommensurable withanyoftheobligations whicha manmaypossess others which cannotbe narrowed or contracted, undera particular social pattern. Its judgments are derived refer to an absolute for are in the sense that from and universals they they in man's nature. and irreducible element theanalysis further thesepoints me to carry ; but keeping Space doesnotpermit in mind,I suggestthat theyprovidea usefulbasis from whichto beginmy major of the ethicallifeof the Gahuku-Gama. the comparison task,namely, The Gahuku-Gama of tribes whichI call the Gahuku-Gama are situatedin the valley The congeries of the Asaro River in the Eastern Highlandsof New Guinea. They are broadly uniform in cultureand languagebut, like the majorityof the groupsof Melanesia, have no centralized each tribe laterallythrough authority. Power is distributed there are no or of and and its component vested with persons body persons segments, At and an over-all control. the same certain critical time, culture, language political the tribesas a whole attitudesand activitiesenable us to identify relationships, them. and to distinguish themfromthose surrounding The Gahuku-Gamaare agriculturalists, cultivatingsweet potatoes as their on ridgesand whichgive a comin which are sited live villages staple crop. They of view the These settlements surrounding country. manding may contain as or as many as fifty houses arrangedin a straight line in front fewas twenty of a . the houses are clearedarea ofland (gapoor nutnuni women's Strictly speaking, apd) - and in manygroupstheruleis stillobserved - husbands for untilrecently dwellings, wives. Each villagehad one or moremen'shouses,situated did not sleepwiththeir or at some distancefromit. The social structure follows eitherin the settlement of on on a a segmentary and is based and balanced principles kinship pattern the use of forc^ betweensolitary local groupswhicheffectively controls opposition and takes the place of centralized machinery. political

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

252

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

The smallest permanent group is the four generationpatrilineage. This is not named,but its memberstend to formthe nucleusof a residential group and them fromother possess certaincriticalrightsto land whichserve to distinguish similarlyconstituted groups. For most purposes,however,the identityof the patrilineage mergesinto that of a largerpatrilinealgroup which I shall call the butit is readily sub-clan. Thisgroupalso is notnamed, by a descriptive distinguished dzuhanone)whichmay be translated as " the peopleofone root." phrase(ha'makoko to be trueblood relatives, all descended of thesub-clanconsider themselves Members a common is not a truelineage, from namedmale ancestor. The sub-clan, however, its members unit theyare conceiveof it as a genealogically structured foralthough withall thosewho belongto unable to tracetruegenealogical connections normally - because of reasonsforthis. Firstly, whileit is necessary it. Thereare a number to inheritance formembersof the true patrilineage of land rightsand property of the formembers exact relationship is less important exact genealogies, remember of the common ofcommon descentand the remembering sub-clanthanthe tradition to recall or higher, thereis a tendency ancestor. At the fourth therefore, generation betweenthe comindividualsto explain a connection the names of only sufficient of the ponenttrue patrilineages. In otherwords,thereis a continualtelescoping so that at any pointin timethe sub-clanappearsto have a framework genealogical depth of, at the most, five generations. residetogether The sub-clanis a corporate normally group. Its male members in a common to land settlement. same in the ; theyparticipate Theypossess rights their of activities and theyhave a common wide rangeof corporate unityin symbol ritual. are with the flutes which associated nama sacred the major local clan. Members namedpatrilineal ofa larger is againa segment The sub-clan but are unable from a common ancestor of the clan believethat theyare descended to be related. Kinshipterms believethemselves to name him. They nevertheless of the clan and and sub-clanare extendedto members used withinthe patrilineage clans are mostlyexogamous. They are also corporategroups. Their members as a groupin themajor ritualand to land ; theyparticipate rights possesscommon clans. Members ofother withmembers one another in disputes to support arerequired settlements of the clan may live in the same villageor in a numberof contiguous the clan's common within territory. are linked to forma named tribe. Membersof the Several local patri-clans " " one as themselves to triberefer origin, though people and claimto be ofcommon thetribeare contiguously ancestor. Clanswithin theycannotpointto any common are knownand the whole area is situated. The boundariesof the tribalterritory the name of the tribe. of the tribehave certain to Members referred by generally to grazepigs the within thisterritory, mostimportant common beingtheright rights ritual in certain is or vacant Tribal land. on any unoccupied unity expressed is there and instances and in the in some at initiation greatpig festivals, obligations is warfare and most for in-groupmarriage. Finally, a preference importantly, all disputes thetribe, excludedwithin beingcapableofamicablesettlement. Because

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

253

of internal of this " normal" expectation as the peace, the tribemay be identified effective group. largestpolitically withinsome tribesshows dualisticfeatures. The smallertribes Segmentation two local clans whichare usuallyexogamous. The two named comprise patrilineal tribes also intothree namedsub-tribes are subdivided and,withone exception, largest thesesub-tribes each comprise twonamedclanswhich, again,are usuallyexogamous. be with the clans of othersub-tribes is and of Marriage permitted, may preferred, but it is not a closedclan system. The remaining thesame tribe, tribesare without thissubdivision intomajor sub-tribal of linked segments, comprising onlya number local clans. These tribesdiffer from the simpletwo-clan tribein that theycomprise four,six and, in one doubtfulinstance,seven named clans. Clans in the multiclan tribeare normally groupedinto a numberof linkedpairs. Thus, a four-clan tribe consists of two tribemayhave usually pairsofclanswhilea six-clan exogamous threesuch pairs. The tendencytowardsa dual organization is most markedin thosetribes wherewe findthat the linkages between clans results in two exogamous clans opposingtwo otherexogamousclans. Marriagebetweenthese pairs is not, it may be preferred, and however, enjoined,thoughin particularcircumstances this is sometimes ritualduties,there preference accompanied although by reciprocal is not a clearlydefined or recognized moietydivision. There is one further which occursonly betweenpairs of tribesand grouping which a strictly therefore follows dualistic whichare linked pattern. Anytwotribes in thisway also acknowledge an inclusivename whichis a compoundformed from thenamesofthemajorassociatedgroups(e.g.,thelinkedtribes Gahukuand Gehamo . The associationis permanent the common name Gehamo-Gahukuve) acknowledge and is conceivedof as traditional. It involvesobligations of hospitality as well as collaboration in certain and it is a also for ritual, accompanied by preference in-group do notmakewaron one another marriage. Linkedtribes, finally, though theyresort to feuds. Warfare is described a word which it from by special {rovo) distinguishes In warfare the is the aim destruction of an and his feuding {Una). complete enemy meansoflivelihood, and each single tribe is opposedto other tribes whichare regarded " at war " as traditional as beingpermanently enemies withone and, consequently, another. Feuds, on the otherhand, arise out of some specific dispute. They are for redress are to be and concluded either fought only expected amicably, by payment of compensation or by ceremonial reconciliation. In otherwords,they represent offriendly disturbance and theimportance ofthelinkage relations, onlya temporary betweentribesis the fact that it providesfora larger,thoughless cohesivesociopoliticalassociation As themostcharacteristic and frequently inter-tribal warfare recurring activity, indicatesa marked culturalemphasison physical aggression. Enemy tribes,in are no morethanfifteen walk apart,and in the continually minutes manyinstances, of war each grouphas suffered fortunes an astonishing numberof vicisfluctuating situdes. The vanquishedand the dispossessed were compelledto seek refuge with theirfriends and allies, and fromtime to time during its morerecenthistory each

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

254

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

tribehas been scatteredand dispersedover a wide area. But conqueredgroups neverceased hopingforrevenge, and theyaimed to achieveit by forming alliances with theirstronger these alliances resultedin one neighbours. Not infrequently, for,except in the group suddenlyattackingthe people who had given it refuge, relationshipsbetween linked tribes, political expediencyoutweighedall other considerations. to inter-group is not confined however, ; it is the Physicalaggression, hostility and of the cultural is manifest alike in situations as warp pattern manyday-to-day well as many institutional contexts. Both men and womenare volatile,proneto at a suspectedslightor injury. They are and quick to take offence quarrelling of tension, of and an even latentanimosity, their undercurrent reputations, jealous Dominance and submission, relationships. accompanies many inter-personal coercion are and and themes, constantly recurring rivalry althoughthe people are not lackingin the gentler there is an unmistakeable tone to life. virtues, aggressive The majorityof social rewards to the and to the self-assertive, strong go physically the to the warrior and extroverted and orator who demands, proud flamboyant, and usuallyobtains,the submission of his fellows. As a result, we findthat people are markedlyaware of themselves as individuals. They possess a strongfeeling " foror awarenessof what I shall later refer to as the idiosyncratic me," and the of a social situations reveal of involvement. These statemajority highdegree ego mentsare supported a the results of test administered to a sampleof projective by men and test of women. The is one three devised by twenty-five twenty-five Professor S. F. Nadel to be used experimentally his in students New Guinea, by and whileit is not, by itself, an adequate basis forgeneralized of perassessments or cultural dominant the results corroborate remarks attitudes, sonality my concerning the aggressive bias of Gahuku-Gamacultureand the tendency to describeand to assess each situation in terms of the subject'sown involvement. But leavingthese mattersaside, it is timeto indicatethe moreimportant characteristics of GahukuGama morality. Moral Behaviour is an aspect of evaluation. All social life,as Nadel has pointedout, Morality may be said to implicateor to involve the idea of value, in that being aimfulit ideas of worth, of whatis desirable or undesirable.23Clearly, expresses preferences, the conceptof value in this genericsense coversmany forms of conduct however, whichare not equivalent; worth, or undesirability of desirability possessdifferences to different degreeas well as referring qualitiesin things. Conductwhichis moral is conduct which involves thenotions ofdutyand theideal,ofobligation and intrinsic of such qualitiesas good and bad, right desirability. It is conductjudged in terms - goodness and Tightness and wrong being here conceivedin an absolute sense; it is theabsolute nature ofthegoodwhich indeed, givesto moralvaluestheir particular all social behaviouris not investedwith a moral quality, requiredness. Although
23 and Self-Regulation," S. F. Nadel," SocialControl SocialForces, Vol. 31,No. 3, pp. 265-273.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

255

a relatively moral values tend to pervade the greaterpart of social life,forming is sought and felt by most individualsand autonomoussystemwhose influence institutions.From the sociologicalpoint of view, moral norms are, above all, foraction. Possessingrequiredness, directives they lead to conformity, ensuring, certainchoicesare normally situations made and that forexample,that in specific in certaindirections. In otherwords,moral values behaviouris thus channelled mechanisms of culture. Indeed, in small scale, are one of the principal regulative - where, whichrelyto a largeextenton self-regulation societies undifferentiated for are few sui institutions the social order there be seen generis legal example, may ofmoralvalues whichare simply on the requiredness to dependquite largely held.24 that in these societiesthereis usually a close consistency It follows betweenthe the moralsystemand the social structure. whichconstitute norms it is obviousthatmoralvaluesmustbe internalized and generally To be effective, those of who constitute the It the is group. majority acceptedby equally obvious for moral that theymust be capable of generalized are the expression, judgments of conduct in termsof generallyaccepted notions of the good. Such criticism as Firthhas said, are notable forthe ease withwhichtheytend to be judgments, : " theycost so little/'25 But we do theman injusticeif,forthis reason, uttered of states of emotion. They possess,too, we regardthemsimplyas the expression an intellectual bears on the which,thoughpresentin varyingdegrees, component as theseare conceivedby a particular natureof the good and of obligation people. of our own moraljudgments ethicof personal Thus,a majority implythe Christian and objectivenatureof the good and the transcendent and responsibility, freedom in a moral universe. the moraljudgour common obligations By way of contrast, of practicality mentsof otherpeoplesmay be couchedin terms ; theymay eschew the speculativeand abstractand they may stressthe immediateclaims of interof rightand wrongis in each case not only relationships.The assertion personal also founded. The good is not simply what but ideologically emotionally what but also think or believe to be right,and we to be feel right they people as the of a particular their moral thus ethic,as judgments expression regard may other some of human of man's relationnature, conception things, among involving, devolve on of the which him and certain to man obligations through ship presupposed of existence. conditions the Gahuku-Gama, peopledo not normally Among appeal to abstractprinciples of the moral but ratheremphasize deviation. Instead of practicalconsequences " " " " " sayingit is good or right to help others,they state quite simplythat if otherswon't help you." Indeed, in a possiblemajorityof you don't help others, of disregarding the practicalconsequences moral normsis fairly instances, readily if direct as in this particularillustration. Thus, disapparent, not as obviously to supportfellowclansmen, respectforelders,lack of regardforage mates,failure incest or breakingthe rules of clan exogamy all involve practicalpenalties,not
24Cf. S. F. Nadel, ibid. 26Raymond Firth, Elementsof Social Organization,p. 184.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

256

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

understood statedin each case but undoubtedly who by theindividuals explicitly in fact, assert thatthenorms theright concerned are right. Sociologically, must ofwhatNadelrefers be regarded as thecognitive to as an counterpart frequently a norm or activity the extent, instrumental thatis, to which is thefocal nexus, ifit is impeded ofa series centre ofactivities which byvariation.26 maybe impeded At thesametime, as saying thatGahuku-Gama thisis not quitethesamething instances theright ethics areavowedly is that course for inmost utilitarian, although or which most to can be proved the result to offer in the satisfaction, pragmatically leastdislocation, is in ittoberight He theagent alsoconceives intrinsically. varying is itself ofhisawarean aspect aware ofthepragmatic butTightness effects, degrees to certain in as it were, he attaches an irreducible valuewhich ness,being, things certain arenotmerely instrumental moral situations.In short, norms imperatives. toshow that for theGahuku-Gama anontological andI shall element, They possess try thisis boundup with doesnotallowfor a particular ofmanwhich any conception the statuswhichhe and the individual distinction between clearly recognized it byway and I shallapproach I wish to develop now, occupies. Thisis thetheme ofa description a I ofGahuku-Gama however, attempt complete morality. cannot, ofmoral account ofalltheoccasions aremade thesubject which andevents judgments andshallconfine to me to be most critical. to those which seem myself remarks on the general As an introduction a fewadditional to the subject, form of Gahuku-Gama be moralassertions appropriate. They frequently may will of " helpothers so they moral as universals on thepattern statements express " think well of will or so to those who visit food helpyou," you." you they give Butthepractical thesimple then takes directive andthemoral rider maybe omitted, " " " it is bad forbrothers to quarrel form of "it is goodto obeyyourelders ; ; " it is " " ofyour fora manto fence hiswife's right garden ; it is goodto think " " it is bad to slander sister or " it is affd herchildren clansman," ; yourfellow thatpeople do with however, goodto be friendly your age mates." We maynote, " " while notassert to loveeveryone," that it is wrong to kill,"or that it is right oftheother are conspicuously a largenumber ofChristianity universal commands forabsent. The Gahuku-Gama, for do notsay thatoneshould practice example, bearance in all circumstances their ; indeed, adultery, against against injunctions to all thesituations as applying and slander notbe accepted should lying, thieving in this. It is unusual in which is nothing theindividual himself.There mayfind as distinct a tribal with another thatwe are dealing morality simply wayofsaying Gahuku-Gama In other from theuniversal of Christian words, teaching. morality to applyto all assertions ofwhatis right or wrong, goodor bad, are notintended ofwhich outside men; they arestated from theposition ofa particular collectivity in which themoralnorm ceasesto have anymeaning.Thus,themanner people relationbehave whoareoutside andinter-personal ofinter-group thetribal system doesnot theindividual is virtually a matter ofindifference. More thanthis, ships
26S. F. Nadel, op. cit.,p. 267.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

257

: it is justifiable as beingbound to themby any moralobligation to regardhimself killthem, themand to seducetheirwomen. to steal from Thereis a moreimportant point,namely,that withinthe groupitselfthereis " of moralobligation. For, while whatmight be called a " distributive recognition are clearly theexpression ofvaluesacknowledged themoralassertions by all members is notboundto all his fellows in likedegree. As a moral ofthegroup, theindividual of other vary considerably accordingto the positioning agent his responsibilities the systemof inter-personal and inter-group within individuals relationships. Any have a moreor less relevanceor requiredness moralnormmay therefore particular involvedin a specific situation. In otherwords,it is to the individuals according of a certainnormmay be temporarily affected that the applicability not simply by characterof Gahuku-Gamamorality particularcircumstances.The distributive that his moralobligations to others lies rather in the factthat each agentrecognizes are differentially apportioned. of the group We may expressthisin an alternative way. Fromthe standpoint common moral Certain at large the Gahuku-Gamarecognize values obligations. of the group: theyare and espousedby all members are acknowledged, recognized in a secondsense,when heldin common. Obligations mayalso be said to be common individuals moral duties two or a relationship betweenany more entailsreciprocal we of the or common whichare identical complementary.Thus, may speak obligaofbrothers, and children, ofmembers tionsofhusbandand wife, age mates,ofparents as oflinkedclans and so on. But thereis a sensein whichwe cannotuse the term, an identicalmoralresponsibility that is, that everyindividualrecognizes implying, towardsall otherindividuals. The Christian ethic,on the otherhand, requiresus to regardevery individualin the same to do just this. It is our responsibility demands of us. We may argue,of course, all the same make moral moralterms ; have also been distributive. of forms Western historical the that Europeanmorality has achieved expressionin many of our most cherished The ideal, nevertheless, of personalintegrity and of individuality, and the Western institutions, conception for are of our social and as as well criticism, quite political grounds many obligation, it. The contrastis, therefore, and fundamentally significant, clearlyderivedfrom of with different concerned ethical,being conceptions man and ofhuman ontological nature of moral the with and morality obligation. The distributive relationships in the individual's differences of the Gahuku-Gama recognizes significant explicitly to otherpeople, and while these differences and responsibilities moral obligations social structure, relatedto a particular are closely too, an ethicaloutlook theyimply, to to return is ofconsiderable in itself which Thus, phrasing myoriginal importance. the Western character involveswhat is from thisdistributive of the question, point oftheperson. It is a failure an ethicalcategory to distinguish ofviewa basic failure to grant the social contextand, ethically to separatethe individualfrom speaking, that whichattachesto himas the occupant moralvalue apart from himan intrinsic status. I will be citingotherevidenceto supportthis view,but for of a particular

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

258

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

themoment we needto examine more thedistributive nature ofthemoral closely system. The morality of kinship an obviousstarting fornot onlyis provides point, the ofeachindividual's todeath, determined birth from life, pattern daily quite largely butit is also thatsubject theanthropologist on which by kinship, mayjustifiably claimto speakwithmostauthority. the treatment givento it by Disregarding earlier historical ofkinship and evolutionary thestudy schools, by anthropologists in thiscentury : somehave been primarily has takentwo principal directions concerned with a socio-functional while others havebeenmainly interested analysis in thestudy ofkinship For sometime, structure. too,thesedifferent approaches tended to keepapart, theformal static structural and essentially analysis becoming forsometheprincipal Morereasonable aim and sole end of socialanthropology. - stress, - which,indeed,appear to be gathering counsels the greater following thatthetwoare inter-dependent sui and thatstructure is nota reality however, towhich all activities It is argued, that structure contribute. rather, generis appears within thecontext ofspecific interests and activities, andthatit is from aims, only these thatit derives those who As we might itsmeaning and significance. expect, haveadopted to giveexplicit thesocio-functional havebeenmore ready approach to the moralcharacter Yet on the whole of kinship recognition relationships.27 with havetaken thisquality andhaveconcerned themselves as given they primarily . therelationship ofsocialorganization and other between analysing aspects kinship Thisis notsaidin disparagement, for in a sense we cantakethis nature for granted. forexample, relations of biological has remarked that" the transmutation Firth, intosocialrelations in terms is intelligible ofsociety for theordinary member only " andfor ofappealto customary to be theeffective ofwhat is right, notions kinship it is, it mustbe firmly in themoral order.28 Thus, organizing principle grounded in theanalysis ofeconomic orpolitical we do notneedto giveseparate organization consideration to the moralaspectof kinship The factthat such relationships. channel that theydetermine the choices made,implies behaviour, relationships thattheyare feltto be right. It is hardly ofbehaviour, social worth thatdifferent different patterns saying andobligations areenjoined an individual andhisdifferent between rights categories of kinsmen.Whatis ofmoreimportance, also is thatthesedifferences however, moraldutiesof possessa moralquality. Thus,we may speakof the reciprocal elder andyounger with the andwemaycompare theidealin thisinstance brothers, ofbehaviour kind whoareagemates. A younger between kinsmen brother, enjoined forexample, is expected to be mindful at all times ofhis elderbrother's superior status. He is required to heed to accepthiscriticism, to showthelatter respect, hiswishes and to obeyhis commands.Thereare moralduties on thesideofthe
87Meyer Fortes'TheWeb theTallensi (Oxford, exception ofKinshipAmong 1949)is a notable is "its structure.To Fortes, the essenceof the Tale kinship amongstudiesof kinship system function as theprimary of of a mechanism which the moral axioms basic society" thetype through intotheconcrete represented by theTallensiare translated giveand takeofsociallife (p. 346). 28RaymondFirth, op. cit.,p. 210.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

259

elder brother brother does not want. The too, forhe has to see that his younger latterlooks to him forassistancein obtaininga wife,forpigs withwhichto start his householdand fora fairshare of theirfather'sproperty. From the younger the moralqualityof the relationship brother's is primarily pointof view,however, of obedience and the acceptance of discipline. It contrasts, one of constraint, with the moral relationship betweenkinsmenwho are the same age. therefore, and equalityare stressed. Mutualhelp,frankness, a Here, the ideals of friendship which is in one secrets another's and in expressed sharing comradeship asking freely - all theseadd their to themoralqualityoftheage-mate and giving measure relationto take in, one by one, all the ship. The comparisoncould be carriedfurther, which a of kin man The moral recognizes. categories quality of the individual's for with his mother's brother from themoral is, example,quite different relationship ties has with his father's of the different from he those which brothers, again quality withhis wife'sparentsand her brothers, and different he recognizes his from again his husband. we could the towards sister's extend examinaFinally, responsibilities his moralrights tionto the variousgroupsof whicha man is a member, contrasting of his sub-clanwith those towardsmembers towardsmembers and responsibilities ofotherclansofthesame towards ofhis clan and thesewithhis obligations members tribe. to standwithout are sufficiently elaboration. These characteristics commonplace that our own said it be moral Indeed, could systempossessesmany comparable of a father moralobligations to his features. Thus, we mightpointto the different of of a or to his the members club an other associaof employer children, employees, tion to one another,in fact of any of the thousandand one socially recognized between two or more individuals. Closer examination suggests, relationships in our moral obligations is more apparentthan real, that the diversity however, forwe recognize that thereis- or at least that thereshouldbe- a certaincommon in all ourrelationships. Ideally,we may say thatcertain measure ofethicalcontent to be independent ofstatus. Thereareminimum which dutiesare felt responsibilities and thereare in whichthe individualfindshimself, apply to all the circumstances whichare considered actionsand attitudes wrongin all situations. of measure rights and responsibilities this common dependson the Ultimately, that is, ethical value whichwe attach to the individual. We recognize, intrinsic have a valid claim to be treatedas that all men,in virtueof this intrinsic worth, as moralagents, we are required moralequals ; theymake identicaldemandswhich, to respect. Needlessto say, moralrealityshowsvarying degreesof approximation from the ideal, but we cannot,forthat reason,denythat the ideal to or departure of the past one and a has any influence. Many,if not all, of the social reforms in whichpractice halfcenturies could be viewed as attemptsto correct conditions it. Similarly, has seemedto obscureor to departtoo farfrom manyfeelbound at whichshow a calculated or timesto criticizeand to oppose politicalmovements of the In otherwords,whileour for the moral individual. rights cynicaldisregard I suggestthat thesealso embody moralsystem features, possessessome distributive

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

260

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

certain we operate, as it common in our moralrelationships principles. Ideally, from a fixed oftheperson and his moral ethical theperspective were, perspective, That consideration. ofsocialtiesorstatus, to a certain minimum claim, regardless thisclaim doesnotalter theissue; noris it is frequently terms couched in different ifever, affected received complete materially by thefactthattheidealhas seldom, of thatall men,in virtue The essential is thatwe acknowledge expression. point ofus. their demands nature as such, moral makecertain basicand invariant It is in the absenceof any comparable of obligation tjiat the conception distributive revealed. Contrasted character ofGahuku-Gama ismost clearly morality withour ownfixed is continually thatof the Gahuku-Gama ethicalperspective, : sense to be equalsin a moral are notconceived words, changing.Men,in other their it valuedoesnotreside orpersons as individuals in themselves ; is dependent, and interon the position of inter-personal a system within rather, theyoccupy in the sensethat is distributive Moralobligation, therefore, group relationships. it is also dependent This ofindividuals. on and varies with thissocialpositioning does not meansimply or the involve charge thatcertain relationships obviously has individual a father withdifferential forexample, duties. In ourownsociety, in duties his ownchildren he is notcalleduponto assume towards which specific the parent-child respectof others. In like manner amongthe Gahuku-Gama to find notexpect involves which wewould between, relationship specific obligations a I to a fundaofhis wife's brothers. refer, however, say, man and thechildren of Gahukumental character difference the distributive between thetwosystems, ofethical measure Gamamorality thefactthatthere is no common from issuing he content situations which in whatever for themoral should serve as a guide agent finds himself. on the Statedas sharply areprimarily as possible, moral contingent obligations socialpositioning do they refer neither ofindividuals.Theyarenotderived from, to anything of himself orto thenature is intrinsic oftheagent which to thenature other from ourown human is quitedifferent as such. Thus, in a waywhich beings traditional aretheprincipal ofview, with status associated thedifferential duties point ofmoral tochange orvary constituents seen is therefore andthis according obligation, to theindividuals or groups as a continual involved. The result maybe described or contraction in ofthemoral due to thefactthattheright, narrowing judgment, is also true has basically a socialconnotation. instance, This,ofcourse, anygiven ofourselves, forourmoral to be theappropriate to whatwe consider norms refer form forhuman an independent and But Tightness is nevertheless relationships. withthe invariable whereas qualitywhichtranscends any givensocial context, it is the socialcontext the moral determines itself which Gahuku-Gama largely character of a particular a thatwe can observe action. It is not,then, simply distributive thatthis of duties at the descriptive level,but rather apportionment distributive element is theexpression ofbasicethical principles. from theWestern Evidence is notlacking to support this Thus, interpretation. arisemoral thatin the situations which pointof view,it is significant normally

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

261

or inappropriate are not phrasedin termsof what is appropriate in the judgments of men considered simplyas humanbeings. This does not mean that relationships ofbehaviour whichis becoming have no conception theGahuku-Gama or,conversely, to men as such. They say, forexample, that " men are not dogs," unbecoming to implythat thereis a certainminimum of behaviourwhich quite clearlymeaning to humanbeings.29 Indeed, any culturally is considered standardized appropriate " ofbehaviour couldbe said to possessthisparticular Tightness." Fromthe pattern minimum standardswhich can be individual'spoint of view, there are therefore said to apply to himas a humanbeing. The important pointis that thesebasic or of and are not universalized : the Gahukuconceptions Tightness wrongness generic - because, Gama do notgo on to argueor to assertthatbecausemanis a humanbeing - there him other which from animals thatis, of someinherent distinguishes quality with all other are invariablestandardswhichhe must apply in his relationships human beings. forus to be quite clear to make,but it is necessary This is a difficult distinction thereare minimum standards what it involves. From the individual'sstandpoint, to him as a man, in the sense that if his behaviourdeviates whichare appropriate he will be actingin a mannercontrary to that too far fromthe normsconcerned as theway in whichmenshouldbehave. Even at thislevel it is whichis recognized closerto the factsto say that if he acts in a particular way,his behaviour probably fora man of the Gahuku-Gama. For to that whichis appropriate willbe contrary " he may be chargedwith " unmanly conduct,identicalbehaviouron the although forexample,with stigmatized. Confronted, partof otherpeoplesis not necessarily from the Gahuku-Gama of customswhichare aberrant a description pointof view, their do not on moralquality that are not do ; pronounce wrong they they say people are curiouspossibilities, but ratheradopt the attitudethat the customsconcerned would not consider neitherintrinsically rightnor wrong,which they themselves correct. are fairly obvious. is not unusual,and its sociological This attitude implications at one,extreme, the Gahuku-Gama to illustrate, failure it in merely I have brought whichtheynevera conceptof humannatureand moralobligation, to universalize in otherwords,humannatureas such does not thelesspossess. Unlike ourselves, a standard nordoes it provide a bond between moral establish individuals, necessarily or and either all can be actions which approved disapproved. We are judged against to as a continually moral instead with what I have referred confronted changing at a of it number as The moral different were, judgmentoperates, perspective. levels. At one level,certainthingsare approvedformen as men. At otherlevels to the status of thosewho of an actionvariesaccording or wrongness the Tightness
29Sexual behaviour is rarely in even heredisapproval is a case in point,though expressed to humannature. Thus, the attitudetowards termsof a particular practicebeingcontrary but ratherthat it is unnecessary.Homois not that it is intrinsically masturbation wrong, ofit, but theywere thanimmoral. Peopledeniedanyknowledge rather too,is foolish sexuality, viewthatit wouldbe silly, as wellas themore affronted notmorally practical by theidea,taking to indulgein it. undignified,

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

262

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

: are involved. Homicide providesus with an obvious example. Stated briefly it is wrong but it is commendable foran individual ofhis owntribe, to killa member to killmembers of opposedtribes, that theyare not relatedto him. alwaysprovided other Thusa manis expected in battlethough members to avoidhismaternal kinsmen of his own clan have no such moralobligation towardstheseindividuals. Within the tribe,too, homicideis regardedwith varyingdegreesof moral reprehension, ofthesame to whether theindividuals involvedare,forexample,members according clans. Our own sub-clansof the same clan, or of different sub-clan,of different but thereis attitudetowardsparricideor fratricide may be cited as comparable, thisdifference.The Christian linkedwith is indissolubly attitudetowardshomicide theintrinsic value oftheindividual and our traditional teaching emphasizes personal that it is the takingof innocent human life as such that is wrong. With us, the thanand quite individual lifehas, in otherwords,an absolutevalue whichis greater social tie or by froma value whichis conferred sharplydistinguished by a specific it is of a particular social group. With the Gahuku-Gama, however, membership clear that the value of an individuallife is primarily dependenton these social criteria. Thus, the reactionto homicide the moralnatureof the social emphasizes bonds betweenindividualsand groupsof individualsratherthan the inviolability of human life itself. have a Considered as theybear upon the theory of primitive law, theseremarks familiar to what Nadel has called the " social range" of offences.30 ring. I refer Thus, he has pointedout that amongthe Nuba the evaluationof a crimesuch as and the sanctions to whether it occurs whichit provokes, variesaccording homicide, " withinthe clan or outsideit, in or outsidethe politicalunit." Homicidewithin the Nuba kinship in the sensethat it does offence, groupor clan is an unpunishable notprovoke forceful retaliation oftheclan or its segments.Between by themembers is exactedin the form of blood feudand revenge. The clans,however, punishment homicideis seen natureof intra-clan sociological explanationforthe unpunishable to lie in the principle of self-help on whichthe law is based. Homicidewithin the clan affects a groupwhichis so closelyknitthat although its unityhas been violated measureby retaliation. Punishment by the act, it wouldbe violatedin evengreater is therefore leftto supernatural agenciesor it is excluded altogether. There is a situation law is also and, sinceGahuku-Gama comparable amongthe Gahuku-Gama on self-help, founded the same sociological may be advancedto account explanation forthe absenceof forceful retaliation homicide within the sub-clan. But, following as Nadel has also stressed,the failureto take retaliatory action impliesa moral attitudewhereinthis particularact is regardedwith such abhorrence that it is the realmof humansanction. Indeed,Nadel prefers to speak unthinkable, beyond ofthe " sin " ofintra-clan homicide as compared ofhomicide withthecrime between clans. My own pointis thathumanlifeis givena variablevalue, depending on the socialpositioning ofdifferent individuals. It is unthinkable to killin certain contexts, in others, in others, and a matter ofindifference in others. In each case, wrong right
30S. F. Nadel, The Nuba, Oxford, 1947, PP- 5OT~54

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

263

factorratherthan the moral nature of particularsocial bonds is the important is primarily intrinsic to man as such. To sum up : morality contextual. anything of universal the fixedperspective does not operatefrom The moraljudgment obligasocial contexts, tion for the moral assessmentof behaviour varies in different values placed on different individuals that is, to the different in different according, contexts. - and to grant a conceptof moralobligation to universalize I regardthisfailure ethicalvalue to the individual as the most important an invariant characteristic in passingto homicide as a case in point,but ofthe moralsystem. I have referred it could be shownthat a specialor exceptional lest thisshouldbe thought instance, restrictive or distributive. A few the vast majorityof moral normsare similarly this position. to clarify examplesmust suffice has a moraldutyto himself holdsthat man, as person, Christian and teaching whichis contrary to his true to tellthetruth. To lie is to act in a manner to others valuewhich he embodies. To theGahuku-Gama, a denialofthetranscendant nature, on the otherhand, the value of truthis not absolute,nor is it relatedto intrinsic because " lyingmakes people humannature. The prudentindividualis truthful, and mostpeoplewishto retainthe good opinionof those ; it causes trouble," angry in with whom they are in close daily association. But there are circumstances asked me to whichdeceit is not considered wrong. Thus, men have frequently in myhouseand to take chargeoftheir cash forthem, hidetheir personal possessions kin demandany of the ceremonial if theiraffinal so that theymay plead poverty to whichthey are entitled. Nor does anyone expect an individualto payments admit his guilt if he is chargedwith some offence by a memberof anotherclan. of othergroupsif,in the event from members is the truth not expected Similarly, of gaininga greater of someclaim or quarrel,thereis the possibility advantageby as bad, but almostin the it. To lie and to be deceitful may be regarded concealing in whichtheyhave either misledothers same breathpeoplejoke about the manner or have escaped the consequencesof some of their actions. An examinationof is primarily showsthatthemoralevaluation all theseoccasions contextual, dependent, thanon the recognition of a moral social tiesrather thatis, on thenatureof specific absolute. we finda similar of property-holding, situation. Firth to themorality Turning of makinga sharpdistinction betweenborrowing and has pointedout the difficulty the fact that theft in involves communities, instancing primitive stealing many of its more than takingan articlewithouthaving obtained the priorpermission " to the abstraction of owner.31Kinshipties,he says, may give a moralumbrella " and the moralevaluationof the article,"and he concludesthat the classification theparticipants." theact dependin parton themoralevaluationofthetiesbetween This is a neat expressionof the situationamong the Gahuku-Gama. Theft,or to one's own use, is considered but kinsmen another's wrong, property converting them are permitted a large in virtueof themoralqualityof the social tiesbetween
31Raymond Firth, op. cit., p. 196.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

264

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

of freedom withone another's a man is not measure goods. Generally speaking, ifa kinsman tobe angry tohimprovided something appropriates belonging expected him what hehas done, andeveniftheowner is notnotified tells heseldom thelatter theactas theft. He is angry. He chides hiskinsman for toinform omitting regards buthedoesnotfeel oftheaction, as injured as ifithadbeena member ofanother him to whom he was notrelated. Moreover, theft is regarded clanor someone as more to whether it involves or less reprehensible members of thesameclan, according offriendly clansofthesametribe, clansofdifferent orofgroups ofdifferent tribes, social ties. In the past, forexample, without was any recognized pig stealing a rivalgroup a legitimate off considered ; andevenbetween wayofscoring friendly different clansofthesametribe, a gooddealis condoned clansorbetween " provided out. The Gahuku-Gama remark it is not found quite casuallythat everyone haveno compunction aboutkeeping ofproperty and they someitem which steals," if there is no to even doubt as the owner's come by accidentally, rightful they identity. ofspecific nature themoral socialtiesis primarily for In short, responsible defining which the appropriation of the property of another within is right or the limits for like of the virtue is not a moral absolute. truth, Respect property, wrong. to theattitude we mayturn towards Finally, adultery.Hereagainthemoral onthemoral ofthetiesbetween ofadultery evaluation evaluation depends primarily within the sub-clan and the clan is strongly the partiesconcerned.32 Adultery it creates theanger andtheenmity which for arecontrary to themoral condemned, ofthese should assist andsupport eachother.People idealthatthemembers groups thatit occurs, thata manwhohas been and though willevendeny they recognize inthis andto seekredress for theinjury, wayhascauseto show anger, wronged they resentment for whose theinformant has beenresponsible express tattling invariably into theopen. Action thematter iftheoffence hastobetaken for isbrought bringing notice husband's andhe,inturn, makes a public to thewronged issueofit ; butthe attitude is thatit would havebeenbetter for all concerned iftheoffence had general withwomenof different extreme, adultery passed unnoticed.At the opposite as hardly is regarded infact, ofmoral tribes censure. It is necessary lightly, worthy, to conceal ownaffairs andthey willquite it,butmenboasta gooddealabouttheir left thescars ontheir ofirate husbands.They proudly display thighs bythearrows to admit with ofdifferent arelessready women clansofthesametribe, but adultery theimpression thatifa mancan getawaywith heretoo onereceives it,no great to him. Moraldisapproval moral blameattaches is more thanin the pronounced it but far is less than in of cases theclan within instance, previous emphatic adultery or sub-clan. In other moralevaluation is againcontextual.Adultery is words, and not wrong that in is the of sense to universally intrinsically, beingcontrary constitution. The wrongness man'smoral oftheact depends on theevaluation of the individuals the socialtiesbetween involved.
82H. Ian Hogbin drawsattention to this fact in his paper " Social Reactionto Crime," Vol. LXVIII, pp. 226-248. The situations which Institute, Journal oftheRoyalAnthropological he describes for similar to thosewhich ariseamong theGahuku-Gama. Wogeoarein mostrespects

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

265

is felt We are brought back, then,to the groundon whicha moralobligation I have triedto show that thisground to rest. With our own traditional teaching, of status,are also persons, the person,and since all men,irrespective is ultimately The of sourceofmoralauthority, a measure bound common are obligation. by they whichbind men is seen to lie outsidethe systemof social relationships moreover, ofsociety. Moraldutyis neversimply as members with to one another synonymous social duty,forthe moral agent is requiredto look beyondthe formof particular and the differential rightswhichthey involve,and to measurethese relationships value whichhe and all othermen possess. It inherent and invariable the against of obligation is based on a will be clear by now that the Gahuku-Gama conception We will look in of forexample, human view different vain, beings. fundamentally forany comparable conceptthatmen,as men,are boundto one another by a moral the ties that link themsocially. In short, tie whichis widerthan,and subsumes, has tended to show that men are not primarily persons,in the my examination moral sense, but social individuals. The analysis,however,is not complete,for we have yet to see what ideas of man's natureare held by the Gahuku-Gamaand if any, they involve. what ethical consequences, Human Nature and the Basis of Obligation the human individualis a complexbiological,physioTo the Gahuku-Gama, logical and psychicwhole. Though their knowledgeof these several aspects of man's nature is understandably limited,they nevertheless regardthem as being man consists of a number of articulatedparts Anatomically, inter-dependent. ofcertain internal which organs having toge hermakeup hisbody. He also consists and amongstwhichthe heart,liver,stomachand visceraare the functions specific he is constituted In addition, mostimportant.33 by a psychicfactor. But though detail, into a numberof components, he can be thus analysed,with considerable is morethan the sum of thesevariousparts. the livingpersonality, the individual, and psychicaspects of his nature cannot be clearly The biological,physiological being, as it were, fused separated. They exist in the closest inter-dependence, the humanpersonality. To an extentwhichit is perhapsdifficult to form together the variouspartsof the body,limbs,eyes,nose, forus to appreciateor understand, of the hair, the internalorgans and bodily excretionsare essential constituents the wholein each of theirseveral and expressing humanpersonality, incorporating functions. It followsthat an injuryto any part of the body is also comparable of the individualsustainingthe injury. Similarly, to damage to the personality excretion is, in a ratherobscure the loss of any of the bodily substancesthrough of the whole,a loss whichis an essentialpartor element sense,the loss ofsomething of mostof the customary forms itself. This idea clearlyunderlies to the personality The common most form and of appreciation. obligation expressing ways greeting,
33 to the brain,norhave theyany condo not ascribeany importance The Gahuku-Gama To are associatedwith of its function. processes Cognitive ception " the " organ of hearing." " " " " " " is to hear (gelenove) ; "I don'tknow or I don'tunderstand is or to "think " " " know I do nothear or I have notheard (gelemuve).
c

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

266

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

" let me eat is theverbal foreach of thesesituations yourexcreta/'34 expression " " either suchas yoururine/' or variations etc.,accompanied by a yoursemen/' or or by grasping thebuttocks oftheup-turned, openhandto themouth gesture a to this as It of individual the concerned. of course, is, possible interpret genitals with it contrasted when is of conventionalized submission, particularly expression " eat is ! " one of the gravest of insults. There form theimperative myexcreta thefull is intended, butin order to understand submission no doubtthata token it is also necessary to graspthemoreobscure of thephrase relationship meaning and the individual functions of the humanorganism the physiological between alsoconveys which is then seento be a statem3nt itself. Theexpression personality of concerned. the of the a sympathetic This,I individuality person recognition one informant. to in me the what is is by following explanation given implied suggest, leavehim,fall "walks about. He excretes.His faeces "A man/'he remarked, on to him I am for see there the to (i.e., theground). sorry him,sorry ground. from thecommon different This idea is am I him I tell not,perhaps, very sorry/' of a forms of most identity sympathetic contagious magic, underlying assumption, bea mistake incontact with oneanother. It would havebeen which , between objects forwhileit is truethat this the two ideas as equivalent, to regard however, between go a objectsis feltto exist,the Gahuku-Gama relationship sympathetic of the and functions the various thanthisin regarding parts good deal further a and therefore of man's elements as inseparable human individuality, organism wemayturn to other Forcorroborative ofhispersonality. as expressive evidence, usages. customary " skin" ofcontexts toconvey informais usedina wide Theword variety (gupe) A manmaybe said to have a " good" ideasaboutothers.35 tionand to express to hismoral character.To incur in thissense theword ora" bad " skin, referring to inkind thevaluables for the return others to an obligation (as, example, " obligation as a debt on one's skin." is rendered a to contributed bride-price) having Similarly, ofgiving or theact ofmaking ofan obligation, thedischarging gifts, compensation " " the debt on one's own ofothers notonly loosens skinbut theservices returning " towhom oneis obliged. Doubtas toa person's also" makes goodtheskin ofthose ofhis character is commonly or lack ofpersonal motives, expressed by knowledge " is used,too,to thephrase I do notknow (orhavenotseen)hisskin." Theword Thusthemembers ofa particular anddifferences. similarities socio-cultural express as " oneskin," orthey thesame to themselves descent mayemploy mayrefer group " a similar culture skinis thatother to denote (i.e., their groups possess phrasing ofother members descent aresaid with us "). By wayofcontrast, onekind groups " are explained and cultural skin differences to be " another skin," by saying their thewordis usedin expressing sorrow or loss kind." Finally, is another personal ofa particular individual orabsence at thedeath and,inthelatter case,ofjoyat his
34I.e. ase roko lit. " faeces I eat." of ase rokononuve, contractions ve,or serokove, making " as well as " 35Gupe refers to " flesh epidermis."

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

267

" " return (e.g., I willnot see his skinagain," or I hold (or see) yourskin; mybelly is good "). Whileit is easy enoughto findparallelsto these usages amongstourselves, it to regardthemmerely as metaphorical wouldbe an over-simplification expressions. an outlookor ideologywhichdoes conceptof individuality, They denotea specific betweenthe physicaland psychicconstituents not recognize any sharp distinction tendto take man's naturalphysical ofman's nature. Indeed,whereaswe ourselves and whereaswe tendto thinkof him as an individualmainly forgranted, character to his temperamental qualities,the Gahuku-Gama place a muchgreater by reference on the insist individual as a psycho-physical former. on the stress regarding They - constitutes nature embodies his man's to wholeand, them, specific physical identity the diacritical of as much as him individual qualities temperament. Something be seenin themarked ofthisoutlookmaypossibly demonstrativeness which physical as in the continual mostinter-personal of arms characterizes relationships, caressing or in expressing sorrowand affection in greeting foranother. and thighs sympathy, a man of a group people, On approaching (or woman) walks slowly round the to caresshis thighs, his shoulders, at each individual his armsor his halting company, the other'swaist withhis arms,holds him calves,or he kneelsdownand encircling an older woman,a man may also lifther breasts, in a fullembrace. In greeting on thefactthattheyare no longer firm. The customary exclaiming sympathetically thesegestures is moka'ne. Its literalmeaning whichaccompanies verbalexpression to contextit indicatespleasure,sympathy, but according and affection is obscure, gratitude. embracein whichmembers This outlookalso appearsin the customary standing and also in a strongly of eithersex presstheirbodies together, developedsense of ofself-mutilation man'sphysical practice dignity. It can be seen,too,in thecommon extensive and in a fairly rangeof otherusages. Thus, to take a singleexample,a hisrelatives and age-mates. man (orwoman)whocutshishairis boundto recompense Men and women normallywear their hair in long ringletsreaching to their in European households, leave theirvillages shoulders. If theyseek employment Christian or iftheyreceive to workon coastalplantations, baptism, theyare required ofboththeyoungand the old also number to cut it short. Nowadays,an increasing that theyare sophisticated men-of -theworld. cut theirhair simplyto demonstrate his relatives and into Whena mancutshishairfor reason, any age-mates go mourning, theirbodies with clay and ashes and perhapseven cuttingoffa finger. plastering at least one pig and giving skingood " by killing them to " maketheir He is required valuables. Each timemy own hair was cut my adoptiverelativesand age-mates put on the signs of mourning. Finally,the emphasison the physicalaspect of man's natureis revealed quite and development associatedwiththe growth of clearlyin manyof the ceremonies " children. One of these, knownas agoka hukukave (lit. his nose they cut "), is the periodbefore morefrequently, at least once,and occasionally during performed to drawattention menstruation. It is designed to the first ora girl's a boy'sinitiation

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

268

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

to recognize and to recompense child'sphysical and,on thechild'sbehalf, development in its welfare. The ceremony all those who have had an interest includesa feast kinare theprincipal ofvaluablesin whichthematernal and a distribution recipients. decideswhento holdthefeast, but ifhe showsreluctance thechild'sfather Normally, who expressto himtheir or tardiness his hand may be forced by his wife'skinsfolk, desireto honourtheirsister'schild. They point out that the childis growing up, that theyare anxiousto " make its skingood," to bring the father and theyinform of foodand to paint and decoratethe child'sbody. Theirrequestcan onlybe gifts interest in the child'swelfare at the riskof beingaccused of insufficient and refused the fatheris therefore compelledto make the necessaryarrangements.At the and solemnly downthelength escorted the childis paintedand decorated ceremony, shrillcries of of the village to the assembledcompany,men and womenuttering its is shown the which father intends to make on The child gifts appreciation. " its behalfand it is told that theseare forthosewho honouryourskin,who have for your skin and make it good." affection is used fora varietyof ceremonies concerned with The termagoka hukukave For it to and refers the ceremonial conditions example, development. physical welcome givento initiateswhen,aftertheirseclusionin the men's house, theyare metin the villageby crowdsof menand womenwho breakbamboosof cookedfood I have described above may be performed several legs. The ceremony againsttheir father. It is obviouslyan occasionwhichservesthe purposeof timesby a wealthy to the rights and it also drawsattention the childin kinship obligations, instructing of maternalkin in respectof sister'schildren. At the same time,it expressesthe in the body and in the physicalaspect of man's markedinterest Gahuku-Gama's is also evident the formal nature. Apartfrom usages alreadydetailed,thisinterest desireforclose physicalcontact with otherpeople. Arms are conin a life-long children and to pressthemhard againstan adult's out to encircle reaching tinually its genitals or itsbuttocks. the are seeking ; baby's mouth, continually lips open body and Men and womensit and walk with theirarms roundone another'sshoulders, the arm on the the side forearm, side, courting pillowed boy's couple girl's by lying untilthe skin breaksand bleeds. In otherways rub theirlips and chinstogether - ways whichsoon becomeso familiar that an observer ceases to noticethem too forexample,in the with the body. It is reflected, we can see this preoccupation lavished on the skin,in the long periodswhichpeople spend de-lousing attention and decoration, in titivation each other,in theirdelightin bodily ornamentation - pig's greaseand othersubstances of unguents and in the ceremonial application interest in the to thehair,thelimbsand otherpartsofthebody. Indeed,thisfixed make to contact the continual nature and man's of attempt physical aspect physical aboutanother's attributes to holdorto caressand to pass remarks to touch, physical in inter-personal elements is one of the mostnoticeable relationships. that in additionto the body the human The Gahuku-Gama believe,however, which is the essential individualis also constituted by a psychicfactor,meni.Z6
36ist, 2nd and 3rd persons : nemenigemeni, ameni. possessive

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA 269 " self " or If we use theterm in ofhuman thewhole nature, personality. principle we maycall thispsychic thesoul,formeni element its mostcomprehensive sense, individual existence.At thesametime, is thebasisof conscious and continuous between themeni to find an exactequivalence andtheChristian weneednotexpect of lifewhich the breath-soul, the principle of the soul. Meni is rather concept it simply andat death ceasesto exist.37 animates thephysical organism, theGahuku-Gama difference between and theChristian is thusan initial There in not or include a for former does entail belief survival. the personal any concepts, to at or indeed what the meni death No oneknows, ; thelife speculates happens " to and with its the individual ceases be, departure simply departs," principle in thesenseof anyrealpersonality. What ceasesto have anyexistence, himself " if anything soul nor but a is neither rather doesremain, shade/' remains, body characteristics and which has no fixed lacksanypositive which placeof something the oblivion and certainly an almostcomplete abode. Death means, therefore, nor no an There is in of anypositive belief extinction after-world, individuality. in somedifferent form. The dead thatthe personality persists any reassurance oftheliving are beyond thereachof theworld ; thereafter they passfrom simply them no further between and there is contact human knowledge virtually personal of an age-mate A manwhohas married thewidow descendants. and their may, shadeofthe has beencausedby thedisapproving thatsomeillness believe perhaps he thenperforms a riteto " send the husband deceased and, characteristically, situation thedeadarenot deadaway." But thisis an exceptional and,in general, their in cannot revisit the interest to retain believed living. They any personal to be feared are nor and therefore neither neither descendants. punish approve They oftheGahuku-Gama belief thefundamental norplacated. Thus, religious although is itself a in thispower as belief an unnamed ancestral characterized be power, may in words. than or is inferred or felt described and more readily expressed impersonal havenoknowledge inanydogma, andtheliving statethatthey It is notformulated inwhich it operates. orthemanner ofitssource I madeinan earlier to correct certain which this statements (I take" opportunity " In Nama CultoftheCentral cit.,p. 9), I statedthat: Highlands {op. paper. " The in certain situations deadarefelt to concern themselves oftherecently spirits to punish thosewho descendants. confront their which living Theyare thought Their ofconduct norms withillnesses and other misfortunes. accepted transgress and sacrifice."Subsequent field favour mustthenbe sought by meansofprayer oftherecently deadarenotgenerally concerned work madeit clearthatthespirits on norpunish their bestow favours oftheliving. Theyneither theconduct with be regarded as arbiters of moralconduct. I have and theycannot descendants " shade" whena disapproving to one possible referred exception, may be held
" 37The wordgika (ni-gika, with a-gika),that is, neck,"is used interchangeably gi-gika, in both cases, " his soul meni. Thus, one may say ameniramanaor agika ramana,meaning, used morefrequently, thesimplest gikais possibly explanation good(it is)." Ofthetwoterms, which the breath withthe associated issues,is the organmostclosely beingthattheneck,from the seat ofthe animating breath-soul.It is, as it were, principle.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

270

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

ofa manwhohasmarried buteven hisage-mate's for theillness widow, responsible is no ruleagainst such of moraldisapproval, forthere herethere is no question andhostility between thelatent Thesituation reflects, however, jealousy marriages. age-mates.) ofpersonality intheGahuku-Gama ofthesoulto thebody Therelation concept with is nota dichotomy thus ofdualism. Whatwe arefaced involves therejection in which the partsare mutually of soul and bodybut a psycho-physical unity the is the the and,in a sense, breath-soul, Meni, principle animating dependent. " " butit from the and on the the self ; separated body body depends personality, tobe an integral itlosesall positive is conceived thebody characteristics. Similarly, is diffused whoseconsciousness the personality, it, partof the whole, throughout members.Thus, the and differentiated ofitsparticular intothelocalconsciousness Thelimbs, andpsychic ethical various ofthebodyhaveeachtheir qualities. " parts are members and excretions theskin, nose the theinternal the hair, bodily organs, of the ofthe nature ofthewhole," to and both contribute and,as such, partake they of in a and whole. Oncewe graspthis, innumerable appear figures speech usages the and concern newlight. We can,for more sympathy readily appreciate example, and self whicheven the smallest to the bodyevokes, cut or injury -mutilation, ifviewed in relation a newsignificance deliberate assumes to one'sownbody, injury to thisconcept of psycho-physical unity. are It is in thislightthatwe mustalso viewthe physical which indignities ofstripping anadulteress oncertain common offenders, heaped practice e.g.,thefairly or suspicious are and beating husbands or throwing dirt on hergenitals.Wronged of also known a wife a stickintohervagina. Thisform to punish by thrusting aremoved toexpress butthewoman's retaliation criticism, sympathisers mayevoke of the attackbut their viciousness notso much because ofthepeculiar disapproval In short, rather it is directed because thisparticular partofthe body. they against " Does hethink so little to this seeit as an unwarranted organ. particular indignity is notstraight in ofhervaginathathe doesthisto it ? " they ask. " His thought it thus ?" he treat this. The vagina holdshispenis. Whyshould in which it is easierto appreciate expressions partsofthe everyday Similarly, of or of character or describe an aspect type behaviour. bodyare usedto indicate in another is or recalcitrance wilfulness Thus,determination, expressed by usually " toindicate a state ofuncertainty, itis customary oragain saying hisnoseis strong," " conceals concerned thattheindividual his or furtiveness suspicion by remarking is nottelling thetruth nose." People willalsoclaim tobe ableto tellifa person by " hisnose; at hisnose, or they willsumup hischaracter by saying I know looking must nottouch theinjunction thata wife he is ofsuchandsucha type." Finally, to the ofhis formal herhusband's noseor hishairgives aspect physical recognition his is whole which and that indivisible to specific uniqueidentity. personality, theideasexpressed between Word for there is almost a literal word, correspondence theGahuku-Gama in which the 12 and manner St. Paul XII, ff.) by (I Corinthians for and of the understand the parts readily body. Theywould, example, regard

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

271

in verse26 : " And whether concurwiththestatements one member wholeheartedly all members suffer withit ; or one member be honoured, all (of the body) suffer, the members rejoice with it." of anydichotomy and the rejection ofsoul The essential unityofthe personality and body is also emphasizedin Christianteaching. St. Thomas, for example, maintainsthat soul and body are relatedas formto matter. Indeed, man is the thesetwogreatrealmsand in his naturehe unitesthemin ofcontactbetween centre does not mean that the soul depends mutual dependence. By this,the Christian on the body forits ultimateexistenceor that it dies in the physicaldissolution of that the relationship betweensoul and body is death. He understands, however, and that the bodyitself is therefore to or artificial, not temporary intrinsic, integral humannature,at least in so faras its powersbelongto and are finally gathered up in the life of the soul. The Gahuku-Gamaconcept of man's nature is in broad affirm that there withthispositionbut, if it is possible,theyapparently agreement betweenthe physicaland psychic is an even closerand more intimateconnection of humanpersonality. In this,theirideas are closerto those of the Old elements " " than the New Testament Testament ; theythinkof the dead as shades in Sheol " rather than as the " souls of Christian teaching. But at this point all similarity - and the New Testamentmakes it a ceases, for the Old Testamentalso affirms articleof faith that thereis one aspect of his naturethat relatesman to principal to God. Christian in other introduces God and makeshimaccessible words, teaching, and emphasizesthe theisticidea that both soul and body are of Divine creation. the fact that they are so closelyinter-related in presentexperience Furthermore, them intoexistence : theyarecomplementary thatGodhas brought together suggests on different planes,of the one entirepersonality. Thus, the Christian expressions, believesthat man's first duty in all thingsis towardsthe Divine Creator. God is and to be faithful to theDivine and his end,thereasonforhisexistence, man'sorigin bound to will for him to do man ascertain God's and what God is Source, requires. deriveshis strongsense of sin, of actionswhichare It is fromthis that Christian an offence to his true nature and therefore to the Divine Creator. In contrary iftheGahuku-Gama it is verydoubtful everexperience sin as the Christian contrast, " understandit. A man may feel shame," a temporary even embarrassment, but he certainly does not live withthe knowledge or self-pity, of sin as the remorse does. " Shame " is rendered Christian by nogozahelekave. Nogoza (nogoza, gogoza, and othersubstances, agoza)is also used forthejuice offruits e.g. muliagoza,lemon " " near present (3rd personsingular, juice. The verbhelekave tense)means to die " " with nivisekave, to desire,"or want," e.g. nenetakum or interchangeably gumu " " or nenetakumu helekave givisive(or givisekave), what do you want (desire, like) ? " " also means to be ill." Thus, givisekave, you are ill." It is Finally,nivisekave that the helekave refers to an affective state and that the use phrasenogoza apparent of nogozain this contextpoints to a physically based conceptionof feelings and emotions. Indeed, the seat of the emotions is located in the stomachand we may

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

272

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

" that the affective is conceivedof as a " disturbance infer state of embarrassment " or change" in the " juices " of the individualundergoing the experience. to A wordor two on conscience be may also appropriate thiscontext. Hogbin has suggestedthat formost of the Busama " the notion of consciencehas little " really meaning,"and that apart froma small handfulof convertswho have " " " absorbed Christianteaching, goodnessis dependenton expediency (H. Ian " in a New GuineaVillage,"Oceania, Hogbin, Shame: A Studyof Social Conformity Vol. XVII, 1947, pp. 283-287). We would not expect to findthat the Gahukua notionequivalentto the Gama- or,forthatmatter, the Busama- had formulated theistic viewsof the that Christian of is, particular concept conscience, embodying, The Concise Oxford and Dictionary, right wrong associated with Christianity. " defines conscience however, simplyas the moral sense of rightand wrong/'and that a particular unlesswe are prepared to argueand to demonstrate peoplehave no we cannot certain done in be of what should situations, generally accepted ideas exclude the operationof " conscience." sense in the Christian In any case, the Gahuku-Gama to contrition is a stranger state whichthe Christian and a stranger and cognitive to that particular affective calls the " sense of sin." In short,man is accountableonly to his fellowsand ancestral in an impersonal belief is purely secular. Thereis a general power morality to whichlies behindthe continuing not man is but order, responsible it, and though offfromit, he dependson it he cannot offend it. He can deny it or cut himself the practices forexample by destroying the sacred nama flutesand discontinuing whichhas any spiritual associated with them,but this is not a sin or an offence his shieldagainst he has that for it mean at can the worst gambled consequences, only thevagariesand uncertainties ofnature. in Gahuku-Gamamoral life. Further,the ancestralpower is not interested It is not concerned withquestionsof ethics,and none of the people's supernatural the with the Christian beliefspossess any ethical content. Contrasted viewpoint, lies whollywithinthe social mediumitself ; groundand sourceof moral obligation of the system from it is " internalized," its requiredness and deriving locatedwithin and inter-group inter-personal relationships. - to observe - I would almost say impossible I found it extremely difficult at awe or reverence one could describeas a distinctively fervour, religious anything a casualwith are treated I witnessed. Even thesacredflutes any ofthe ceremonies ness whichcontradicts as a symboland channelof access to the theirimportance ancestralpower, and though there is great excitementand evident emotionat the its stimulus of the crowd, it is the tensionand excitement particular gatherings, to the personalhuman contacts and secular ambitions impress, food, the finery, Durkheimian to show to one's best advantage. This accordswiththe well-known stated and I have already my general analysis of primitive religiousexperience, If we with Durkheim'sposition.38 There is, however,this difficulty. agreement
38"Nama Cult of the CentralHighlands,"Oceania,Vol. XXIII, No. 1, pp. 1-25.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

273

of a " sacralized" societywe could, in contradiction adopt Durkheim's conception of the statements I have made above, arguethat all moralrulestherefore possessa or supernatural a distinct sanction. Thereis nevertheless difference quasi-religious between thekindofmoralobligation to which we can pointunderthesecircumstances and thatwhichis explicitly in Christian teaching. The sourceof the one recognized internal whilethe otheris externalto the social medium. remains essentially of As with the conceptand awarenessof sin, so also the higherconsciousness - is foreign - of such immediate to the Gahukuto the Christian person significance Gama. A highlydevelopedfeelingand regardfor the " lower" psycho-physical " " self,the idiosyncratic me is clearlyevidentin a wide range of characteristic in the stanceand forexample,in the art of oratory, behaviour. It finds expression, of the speaker, his wide-flung arms,the way he beats his breast,and in the gestures to himself, references content of his speech,his boasting, his continualand vigorous with has a markedaffinity his importance and his abilities. (The styleof oratory in the Hall of thatoftheHomeric heroesand Beowulf; e.g. theboastingof Beowulf to whenhe tells of his exploitsagainstBreca.) The desireto dominate, Hrothgar and theiradulation,are to receivetheirsubmission stand out fromone's fellows, and of Gahuku-Gamainter-personal among the most pronouncedcharacteristics decorateddancer aims to be the centreof behaviour. The brilliantly inter-group references attraction. Pigs and valuablesseldomchangehandswithout exaggerated seemstireless to their donor'sindustry, his reputation and his greatness ; thewarrior with angerat a in recounting his exploitsand the average individualreadilyflares deliberateor suspectedslightor injuryto his self-esteem. illustrated is strikingly and submission ofdominance The theme by thefollowing of the the house of one a to a man After dance, performers.He may go practice. he replies his of the reason sitsdownoutsideuntilsomeone visit, whereupon enquires has " killed" him (helekave). He then of the man concerned that the performance to makehima shoutand thelatteris compelled witha stylized theperformer greets to be that can the valuables. This is of paid a dancer,the compliment highest gift else has that he it an as surpassedeveryone acknowledgment accepting performer his or emotionally disturbed unsettled have seriously and that his accomplishments themostopportunity bothgreatand small,bring visitor. But ceremonial occasions, for formally giving vent to the qualities of aggressionand self-assertion.The themas theyenter guestsis forthehoststo rushtowards way ofreceiving customary themand leap up and down,brandishing thevillage,to surround weapons,shouting out such phrasesas " now you eat pig ! I have killedmy largestpig, and crying the pig I have rearedand fed! Now look and see whereis the homeof pigs ; say " There are innumerable for otherinstances, who it is who has a name forpigs ! conseand in of an element contain or formal mostfestive competition, gatherings for boasting and display. quence, the majorityof them provide an opportunity fromtheirearliestage. is also impartedto children A sense of self-importance are alwaysa centre and kissed hand to from caressed, hand, they passed Continually of adult attention. Lovingly decorated and indulged,their infantand childish

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

274

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

and display are consciouslyencouraged and their attempts at self-expression behaviour is a never-failing source of amusementand parental pride. In the ceremonies associated with theirgrowthand development, they are greetedwith and the solemnsmall boy or girl,befeathered, praise and shouts of appreciation, a throng oiled and hungwithornaments, of leaping,shouting men, walking through as thoughit werehis just due. For accept it all, the honourand the excitement, of theirnovitiate, comes at the conclusion boys, the climax of this adult interest whentheyleave themen'shouseand are ceremonially back to thevillage. conducted and their eldershave beenbusycollecting seclusion, Duringtheir everykindoffinery decoration forthem, barkclothand making newarmand anklebands,dying plaiting theirnew clothes. All thisis placed on themin the men's house and at dawn,in a ferment of excitement, of women. Their they come outsideto the waitingthrong hair piled highin a chignon downwith wrappedin bark cloth,paintedand weighed whichare attachedto theirshoulders, plumesand the vast frames theyare greeted withtearsand shoutsand theystandmotionless whilein thesurroundand speechless an old womancriesand holdsher hands to her belly,armsreachout to ing throng touch and caress themand appraising eyes and excitedvoices considersome final for their beauty. Then, when the sun has risen,they enter the embellishment of a highlyemotionalday of village in a long processionand for the remainder dancingand feasting they are the centreof attraction. To sum up : Modestyis not a virtue; the respectedand successful are those who are mostloud in theirown praiseand mostpositivein theirexpressions of selfhe a and to be worn like Pride is banner, importance. though may be something is theunassuming and retiring loved,considered person good and shownsomeesteem, and nevera majorinfluence forunwillingness to wrangle in thelifeofthecommunity, to boast is tantamount to an admissionthat one is a nonentity. with also give this Together strongly developedsenseof self,the Gahuku-Gama full recognition of others,notingthe mannerin whichthey to the idiosyncrasies behave, theirfoiblesand theirtypical reactions. There can be characteristically littledoubtthattheyconceive somehumorous fellows as distinct oftheir personalities, otherssternand unrelenting, and to be treatedwith familiarity, some easy-going some wise,some foolish and each endowedwitha specific qualityor qualitieswhich set him offfromothers,whichmake him the individualhe is. But this sense of of person. self does not necessarily involve the higherconsciousness idiosyncratic The latteris an awareness whichgoes beyondthisexperience oftheselfand ofothers and thisrecognition me. Difficult as it is to expressconcisely, of the idiosyncratic its essentialqualitymay be described of an identicalnaturein as the consciousness all men. In otherwords,the diacritical whichconstitute of qualities temperament at the level of no meaning our " normal" knowledge of othershave no significance, of personsurmounts awarenesswhichis personalconsciousness. The consciousness of the it is independent these differences, of them and similarly, is independent " know" the In to of and social roles status. short, person pattern relationships, we must conceiveof all men in the same way ; we must be aware of a common

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

275

and we must view this common of ourselvesand others, basis in the individuality factoras essentiallyapart fromor above the social mediumin which men live. " of ourselves and othersis We may argue,of course,that our " normal knowledge but at the same timewe can denythe conceptof the persononly not of thisnature, the foundation of our conceptof naturaljustice and many at the riskof denying ideas. and mostcherished otherof our distinctive of personis the Christian sense of livingfor One resultof this consciousness and in the sight of the eternal. Regardingtemporalexistenceas a sojourn,the of his truenature. On the looksto death to open the way to a realization Christian otherhand, forthe Gahuku-Gamadeath means the virtualend of the personality. his thought, his motivesand his Beyondlifethereis no realityand, in consequence, does not come within in the his actionsare morefirmly grounded present. Eternity of the His are shallow little He has ; his knowledge past. genealogies perspective. within and he has confined to events is almost livingmemory exclusively history The unknown. of life thus like is is fewmyths or legends. His future, too, reality a space betweentwo areas of darkness. Man lives out his a lightwhichillumines of fourgenerations. withina timeperspective wholeexistence nor in theirbehaviour is thereany in theirbeliefs It is clear,then,that neither or theirfellowsin a manner evidencethat the Gahuku-Gamaregardthemselves whoare endowed witha to ourowntraditional which is comparable view,as creatures whichis distinct from the value and an individuality unique,objectiveand intrinsic in which status they occupy,the roles they play and the systemof relationships of man's natureand to a purelypsycho-physical conception theylive. Committed at the same time, the Gahuku-Gama, aware of his idiosyncratic identity, strongly in a social pattern. But as figures and othersprincipally tendsto regardhimself devoid of individual he does not regardhis fellowsas featureless entities,figures character and motivation, movingin lackingthe abilityto choose and continually man to someexternaland impersonal compulsion. This view of primitive response and it has been said that the closelyknitfabricof primitive has been fashionable character.Primitive ofpersonality and independent thedevelopment hinders society as crowdpsychology. in the lightof what is regarded conductis " best understood on each In a typicalcrowdthe public opinionexercised by the individualmembers theirown, since it does not is not properly on themselves other,and, reactively, a critical and intelligent self. . . Each man looks outwards, takinghis proceedfrom of a theexpression in theirmass (and) his conductis merely cue from his neighbours caused and receivedimpression."39In the whole historyof mankind mobbishly therehas probablynever been a society which fitsthis analysis and, certainly, it. We I knowabout the Gahuku-Gama I have said and nothing supports nothing is different from ourown ; oftheGahuku-Gama thattheintelligence cannotconclude betweenalterand the abilityto choose rationally we cannotdenyhim standards, his judgments ofreflection and regard himthefaculty natives; norcan we take from
" 39Marett, concise as a relatively Ethics,"op. cit. I cite thispapermerely Rudimentary ofa particular statement pointofview.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

276

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

we in termsof senseperception. Yet in the moresubtlesenseof Durkheim merely sociocentric. His commay, I think,concludethat his outlook is fundamentally are of his relationships lifeis lived on a relatively smallscale ; the majority munity the constitute personaland directand the bonds of kinshipand of local contiguity framework of his social system. These characteristics of simplesocietiesare suffielaboration,and while they do not cientlywell knownto stand withoutfurther human of what we regardas the fundamental precludethe existenceand expression outlook and with a socially orientated consistent qualities,they are nevertheless conceptionof one's fellowman. To the Gahuku-Gama,the palpable differences betweenpeople, the idiosyncratic variationsin theirnatures,are like a shimmer which overliestheir social identity. They are not unaware of these variations ; them; but theydo notdistinguish, as we are accustomed as clearly theydo notignore to, betweenthe individualand the status whichhe occupies. They tend,in other to categorize, ofsocial in a system to see menlargely in terms oftheir words, position rightsand obligations. Let me emphasizeagain that this particularoutlook does not reduce one's fellowmen to a featureless and uniform witha desire grey; nor is it incompatible to stand out from a the crowdand to shinein the eyes of others. It is, however, view whichpenetrates beneaththe surfacediversity of character and temperament and whichfixesthe individualin relationship to the social pattern. People may, and in factdo, move out of positionand thereby, in a somewhat paradoxicalsense, or lose forfeit their a man is the the moreoutstanding they identity. Conversely, morehe is held in, and the more pronounced his own esteemthe morecloselyhe identifies himself with his status. Individualidentity are two and social identity sides of the same coin. We ourselves are accustomed to distinguish betweenthem, and we recognize that althoughman lives and moves withina social mediumhe is an entitywho stands essentially nevertheless apart fromand above it, a view, it be which is in reflected our literature. By way of contrast, may added, extensively the outlookof the Gahuku-Gama a implies rejectionof this dualism. There is no real dichotomy betweenman and society,no essentialseparationof the individual fromthe social pattern. Of course it does not followthat idiosyncratic are unimportant. differences forexample,are expectedto be the closestof friends, the but although Age-mates, formalities of friendship are generally with all of them,it is clear that maintained menhave a greater forand feela closerbondwithsomethanothers.People affection are probably well aware ofthis,but it is onlyto an outsider, suchas theanthrovery that can their The same could be said pologist, they express personalpreferences. formostotherrelationships, but even whenwe have made everyallowanceforthe mannerin whichdifferences in temperament and charactermay modifya formal - hisposition to his status bond,thefactremains ofsocial in thesystem that, fellows, and is a basic and of constituent each man's rights obligations inseparable identity. Indeed, it is possible to conclude that for most purposesand in most situations social identity is moreimportant thanidiosyncratic individuality.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

277

to thefactthatamongtheAbelam has drawn (Dr. Phyllis Kaberry myattention to live of the Sepik River,peoplemay choose,on the basis of idiosyncratic affinity, is then and workwithmenwho are not relatedto them,and thatthe kinship system " " of a commanipulated to fittheseindividuals. I did not come acrossanything of (if,that is, we exclude a small number parablenatureamongthe Gahuku-Gama or some other in a predominantly men livingmatrilocally patrilocalcommunity, rather thanwithmembers withage-mates to associatethemselves menwhopreferred or sub-clan); but I shouldpointout that I am not denying ownpatrilineage oftheir bis to choose fromamong his fellowsor to distribute the individualall freedom " " affections.Indeed, the fact that the systemis manipulatedto fit these cases may be cited in supportof my thesis.) in determining are not without Individualidiosyncracies, however, significance as good or a man is characterized but whether the way one regardsone's fellows, of or selfish, he is, at thesame time,a member or ineffectual, bad, dominant generous an age-mate, member of kin of one's wifeor mother, one's own clan or patrilineage, knownfriend or potentialenemy. It relativeor stranger, the tribeor sub-tribe, is not free,as we are relatively free,to choose too, that the Gahuku-Gama follows, thosewithwhomhe will on the basis ofidiosyncratic from affinity amonghis fellows withthemare and his possiblerelationships others towards associate. His attitudes so thatwhilehe may feel in the social pattern, defined by his own and theirposition attractedto one age-materatherthan another,and while he may morestrongly - and to live and workwith and confidant chooseto make thisman his specialfriend him he can exercisehis preference only withina particularcategoryof people. himfrom themas potentially The natureof his ties withothersprecludes regarding bond. affective same the of capable to appreciateor understand in a general difficulty This outlook is reflected between Europeans. People, for example, were puzzled by my own friendship ofmyEuropeanneighbours. Theycouldnot fully withcertain appreciate friendship and which whichwas based solelyon a mutualregardforone another a relationship it they in order to account for and and of ideas an from interests, affinity sprang us : we were tie between social some age-mates, specific invariablypostulated " of the same tribe. clansmenor one-kind,"a phrase whichis used formembers on the European into casual enter do not Gahuku-Gama the In short, friendships It involves exists. reciprocalobligationsof pattern. A formof bond friendship and some minorkinds of economicassistancebetweenindividualsof hospitality do not use the pidjin different tribes,but, significantly enough,the Gahuku-Gama Pren is only used this to friend for term relationship. designate {pren) English tribe. same of the members are who reciprocally by age-mates, his as possible,we may say that the Gahuku-Gama Stated as concisely regards in of are viewed terms individuals. social as fellowsprimarily largely People role are not and his social individual the status,or, to put it a little differently, clearlyseparable.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

278

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

To his fellows, the social role is an intrinsic constituent of each man's identity an essential element awareness ofhim; it becomes, to their and,as such,it contributes as it were,an inseparable of his individuality. The ethicalconsequences component of this outlook have been indicatedalready: it resultsin what I have called a or contraction of the moral judgment. By this I mean two things : narrowing that themoralrulesof theGahuku-Gama are not universals in the sensethat firstly, from or referring to something whichis inherent theyare not conceivedas deriving to man's nature; man is not boundby a dutyto himself or others whichis greater than or cannotbe containedin his social relationships I mean that ; and secondly, not onlythe individual's but also his judgments moralobligations of othersare to a on the presence or absenceof a particular social bond.40 In largeextentdependent at his fellows, theGahuku-Gama sees themprimarily as peopleto whomhe is looking boundby a particular tie or social relationship. differentially to see people in termsof social ties is clearlyevidentin manyof The tendency the responses givenin projectivetests. It is also a matterof everyday experience and observation. I recall, on one occasion,accompanying a party of men to a festivalat a settlement whichwas threehours' walk fromthe villagewhereI was As we were home I noticedthat a youthof about fourteen living. returning years of age was walkingbehindone of my companions. The two of themexchangedan occasional word but did not seem to be paying much attentionto one another. the olderman called out to me excitedly, and on turning round however, Suddenly, I foundhim standingwithhis arms aroundthe boy's shoulders. He explainedto me that in the courseof some casual enquiries he had made the discovery that the was a distant maternal kinsman. he showed the Thereafter, youth very greatest solicitude forhis companion, and whenwe lefttheboy at hisownvillagehe embraced himseveraltimes. Later,he expressed at themeeting hisastonishment byremarking that he had not knownthat he had any relativesat the boy's village. " I do not " I walk other roads. But now," he added, " I willgo there go there,"he said. by if I come thisway. My maternal kinsmen willknowme and take care of me." Men are similarlyconstituted. Moreover, they possess a dignitywhich sets them above other animals. It cannot be said, however,that the Gahuku-Gama considerthis sense of human dignity to have any far-reaching moralimplications. Human beings, as such,possessintrinsic but it is in as Western value, not, teaching, an incommensurable worthwhichstands above all othervalues and whichdefines the moral duty of the individualto himself and to his fellows. Wherethe moral lifeis concerned, the value whicheach man possessesas a humanbeingis relatively
40 Radin drawsattention to a similar moralemphasis amongtheWinnebago. The Winneare enjoined to love everybody but notto love themall equally. Theywould bage,he remarks, theChristian ideal as notonlyimpossible also untrue, but" in practice, to manifest regard leading, for to theWinnebago, it is the in which, manner in yourrelations to other insincerity, according " of the tribe, members distribute this emotion is that of you worthy approbation (Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher, New York,1927,p. 73. It maybe added thatin thispassage- Radin showsa misunderstanding wherehe makesuse of the comparison as in others of basic Christian forthe Christian does notregard love as an emotion, but as an inclination teaching, of " " " - ofanother thewill,so thatone can love - willthe good whom one does not like") person

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

279

forone's moralresponsibilities and dutiesvarysubstantially insignificant, according of otherindividualswithinthe social structure. Although, to the positioning in theGahuku-Gama theclaimofall mento a common other words, recognize humanity, they do not considerthat this involvesthemin identicalmoral duties. Ethically human beings but individualsto whom one is speaking,men are not primarily moral implications, and it is therefore relatedby social ties whichcarrydifferent an be individual not bound to him to humanity grant yet possible by any moral obligations. Conclusion I have not attempted to give a completeaccountof GahukuIn thisenquiry, to the specific Gama morality. I have, forexample,made few references values aim these because been interpretation has whichare acknowledged people, by my and myexamination has been directed towardstheclarificarather thandescription, In tion of what I believeto be a morefundamental short,I have been problem. withethicsratherthan withmorals,withthe attemptto arriveat some concerned of the natureof Gahuku-Gama its principles and general morality, understanding and their its basic man characteristics, assumptions concerning bearingon moral the of aims has also been to the Not least ethicaloutlook my compare obligation. withthat of Western as of the Gahuku-Gama in the European culture, exemplified of This of that traditional different ethical teaching Christianity. implies, course, that moral diversity is not may be comparedand evaluated objectively, systems I that am some ethical authorities of who aware,however, relativity. proof agree findcause to criticize the terms withme on thispointmay nevertheless in employed of I be an initial that in held guilty may, fact, over-simplification my comparison, " " of WesternEuropean cultureor of Christianity.41 in speakingof the morality in dealingwitha small-scale, Such strictures homocarryno greatweight relatively it but is common as the such that in our Gahuku-Gama, knowledge geneousgroup ofopinion on quitefundamental moralissuesbetween are differences there ownsociety theseand other and between thevariousgroups non-Christian professing Christianity, of the community. At the same time, I suggestthat thereis a central members in thesensethatit possesseshistorical whichis traditional, coreofChristian teaching which is and withinthe widely accepted. Diversityand differences continuity, no the variations of Christian less than framework presented teaching by different - should not, in fact,be permitted to obscurea commonelement moral systems ; " " is common we mayreasonably ofthatwhich and in respect speak of the Christian of man,ofthe good and of obligation. ethic,of a Christian conception - as beingboth basic and withthe conceptof the person therefore, Beginning, I have attempted and thus to WesternEuropean teaching, to Christian traditional it certainethicalcharacteristics to elicitfrom and, in turn,to comparethese with
" On the " It is a 41Cf. Morris of Morals," Ginsberg, Diversity op. grossover' ' cit.,p. 3 :of the ' the ' the of the of Romansor the to speak Greeks, morality morality simplification ' ' ' ' or the American or of the Christian way of life,as is oftendone in studiesof Egyptians, ethics." comparative

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

28o

MORALITY AMONGTHE GAHUKU-GAMA

oftheGahuku-Gama. andoutlook theassumptions In a more comprehensive study, criteria Yet if we regard additional as mayhave beenintroduced.42 myenquiry I suggest a single ithasalsoserved with that concerned tofocus attention theme, being is notthesimple on certain factthatthe majorvariations.WhatI havein mind or approve Gahuku-Gama somethings which we condemn, but thattheir permit more fundamental ordeep-seated ethical alsoreveals thatcertain differences, system of its characteristics in moralperception differences and moral pointto genuine consciousness. I amnotreferring todifferences Onceagain, inthemoral attitude towards simply be and evaluated. In acts,though these, too,may compared objectively specific of moralperception thissense,thereare not onlydifferences between different but there in moralperception cultures within a particular may also be changes at different in culture time. would for that points Theologians agree, example, do notconstitute a closed Christian ethics in there which is no for system provision ofa deeper thedevelopment moral into the nature of acts their and conseinsight in thiscase the ethical contrast centres on a however, quences. Fundamentally, of of moral and responsibility. the Thus,from differing concept man, obligation moralstandpoint of our ownculture, manis conceived to be a uniquecentre of - as person - ofan absolute theembodiment valuewhich setshimin individuality, somemeasure overand abovetheworld in which he lives. Theground andsource ofmoralobligation not onlyin thesensethatit is a is, as it were, externalized, which confers on man his incommensurable but in the worth, spiritual principle that the moral standard is conceived to be : autonomous there is an sense, too, distinction between the and and that the which is desirable explicit good right simply ina human orsocialsense. In short, themoral duties oftheperson aregreater than of the duties which the individual as a member of His moral any possesses society. bothto himself and to others, transcend thegivensocialcontext, responsibilities, are conceived to be independent of the socialtieswhich linkhimto his fellows. To the Gahuku-Gama, on the other man is a socialindividual, a hand, primarily member ofthisor thatparticular socialgroup, whooccupies someone a particular in a system ofsocialrights and obligations. Moral devolve position responsibilities on himas such,rather thanby virtue of any qualities which are intrinsic to his nature. The moral is the individual in his various social psycho-physical agent His are not conceived as detercapacities. responsibilities beingconstitutionally norhavethey extra-social reference aredependent onthe mined, ; they anyexplicit or absence ofparticular socialbonds. Thus,it is notto human as presence beings suchthatmenaremorally butto human as members ofa particular bound, beings collectivity. Thisinvolves a further basicdifference in perception. Fromthestandpoint of Christian menare moral their valueis constant and is ethics, equals. As persons, ofstatus. Theypossess identical andarecharged with identical independent rights
42E.g. the criteria suggested by Ginsberg, op. cit.,pp. 14-15.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

281

because of this,theyare also bound to one anotherby a responsibilities.Precisely measureof obligation. But it is not so withthe Gahuku-Gama common ; indeed, is mostsharpat thispoint. Thus,theground thetwosystems between thecontrast is not conceivedto lie in humannatureas such,either, that is, in the of obligation or in the natureof othermen as men; it resides, natureof the agenthimself rather, linkthemsociallyto one another. In short, in thenatureofthetieswhich themoral judgmentdoes not operate fromany basis of universalobligation. There is no sui generis, of the moralas a category as constituting a distinct explicit recognition orderof natureand actionwhichpossessesits own intrinsic and requiredness which involvesman in a commonmeasureof responsibility.By this I do not mean that but rather that thereis no explicitseparation of expediency, is a matter of morality from the social context: the moralorderand the social orderare moralcategories not differentiated conceptually. This means that it is the evaluation which is for determining social ties whichis primarily on different the responsible placed the Tightness and therefore or wrongness natureand extentofmoralobligation, of a - if I may use such a particularaction. These qualities are variable absolutes - forthe moraljudgment is largely of a contextual in terms contradiction character. the moraldifferentia It operateswitha continually perspective, changing beingthe of a parti ular groupor as individuals variablevalue whichmenpossessas members status. who occupy a particular WhereasI have spoken of the failureof the Gahuku-Gamato distinguish an - theirfailure,that is, to grant the individualan ethical categoryof the person that men are boundto one another moralvalue and thusto recognize intrinsic by a - Ginsberg to " the rangeof personsto whom refers measureof obligation common moralrulersare held to be applicable," and he uses this as one of his criteriafor ethical evaluation (" On the Diversityof Morals/' op. cit., pp. 3-4, 12). While not equivalent,these two ideas have more in commonthan the difference in termakes it quite clear,forexample,that suggest. Ginsberg minology mightat first " in a merely his " rangeofpersons is not to be understood sense. He quantitative in moralconsciousness whichare associated also has in mindqualitativedifferences " withdiffering conceptions of the humanpersonhimself." He therefore disagrees withthose (like Boas) who assertthat therehave been no fundamental changesin moralideas,who hold that all that has happenedis that the same basic dutieshave " to larger extended beengradually remarks, hardly groups. This position, Ginsberg and especially oftheideas ofequality ofmoraluniversalism doesjusticeto thehistory value of the individualas such." and the intrinsic There is one finalpoint. One of the most noticeablecharacteristics of the with and theirunwillingness is theirunconcern to judge actions or Gahuku-Gama involved. Moral offences in whichtheyare not personally and breaches situations or as members themeitheras individuals of a particular of rulewhichdo not affect whichthemoraljudgment groupstand,as it were,outsidetherangewithin operates. Such acts may be discussed ; indeed,people are always preparedto ask questions about themand to listento thosewho are able to supplythemwithdetails. They
D

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

282

MORALITY AMONG THE GAHUKU-GAMA

but theirattitudeis one of may shake theirheads and murmur sympathetically, an evaluation, their usual rather than Pressed for condemnation. puzzlement " I don't know" to is a neutral it and is exceedingly difficult reply (gelemuve), whether the act is regarded or wrong. Persistent someascertain as right enquiries timesproducea tacit acknowledgment that " it is not rightto do this/1 but the " informant normallyadds I don't know what they think," and thus virtually evades the issue. In most cases, a judgmentone way or the otheris simplynot - havingsuffered - soon a good deal of initialfrustration made, and the investigator learns not to expect one. Nor are the Gahuku-Gamaalone among New Guinea to judge. Dr. J. B. Watson of Washington peoples in showingthis unwillingness has told me that he has also come acrossit amongthe Agarabeof the University EasternHighlands. Dr. K. O. L. Burridge oftheUniversity ofMalayahas mentioned a similar attitudeamongthe Tangu of Madand District, and I have heardit referred to by Miss Chowning, of Pennsylvania, from the University amongthe Nakanai of It doesnotfollow from thisthattheGahuku-Gama are devoidofmoralsensibility even that are but a in moral unable to fundamental difference or, less, they judge ; I involved. The to failure at attitude the neutral is, think, perception judgeor, least, towardsactionsand situations in whichthe individual is not himself involvedis, for example, consistentwith the contextualcharacterof the moral system. It is if we accept the proposition do that the Gahuku-Gama understandable, moreover, not distinguish their moralcategories withtheprecision to whichwe are accustomed. What I meanis thatwe seemto be confronted witha basic difference in conceptualizathe in that to which ideas of the and the extent, tion, is, right good are formulated in and the to which the moral is an conceived to constitute systematically, degree autonomous order. In thissense,thereis a markeddisparity between the degreeof abstraction achievedby our own traditional systemand that of the Gahuku-Gama. The latterhas no body ofexplicitprinciples, no formal code ofethics, in thesenseof a more or less coherently stated and inter-connected of moral : system concepts it has nothing to offer whichis comparable to the integrated of the concepts person, of a naturalmorallaw and a universal moralorder. Abstract ideas of the good, of the basis of rightand wrong, do not interest the Gahuku-Gama. Theirmoralrules - judgments whichrefer to specific situations are, forthe mostpart,unsystematized ratherthan to any explicitideologyof rightand wrongas such. In short,the moralindifference to whichI have referred does not implythe absenceof a moral senseor ofanything which we can recognize as an objectivestandard. But compared withourownsystem, it does indicatea difference in thedegree to which theprinciples behaviour are abstracted from the social context and relatedto a underlying right of the of and generalized concept good obligation. K. E. Read.

New Britain.

This content downloaded from 200.68.117.69 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 12:40:44 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen