ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR., Complainant, - versus ATTY. JOSELITO C. FRIAL, Respondent. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.

: [1] In his sworn complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on December 22, 2006, complainant Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr. charged respondent Atty. Joselito C. Frial with violating his Lawyers Oath and/or gross misconduct arising from his actuations with respect to two attached vehicles. Complainant, owner of the vehicles in question, asked that Atty. Frial be disbarred. The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo v. Ricardo Salomon et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 05-111825 before the Regional Trial Court in Manila, in which a writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favor of Lucy Lo, Atty. Frials client. The writ was used to attach two (2) cars of complainanta black 1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra. According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Los counsel. Atty. Salomon claimed that on several occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized individuals. For instance, on December 26, 2005, barangay captain Andrew Abundo saw the Nissan Sentra in front of a battery shop on Anonas St., Quezon City. On February 18, 2006, Architect Roberto S. Perez and three others saw and took video and photo shots of the same car while in the Manresa Shell station at P. Tuazon Blvd. corner 20th Avenue, Quezon City. Also sometime in June 2006, Robert M. Perez, complainants driver, saw the said car in another Shell station near Kamias Street. On December 16, 2006, Arlene Carmela M. Salomon spotted it driven by bondsman Ferdinand Liquigan allegedly with Atty. Frials consent. As Atty. Salomon further alleged, when the misuse of the car was reported, paving for Liquigans apprehension, Atty. Frial, in a letter, acknowledged having authorized Liquigan to bring the car in custodia legis to a mechanic. As to the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial deliberately withheld information as to its whereabouts. As it turned out later, the Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but the court was not immediately put on notice of this development. In his Answer, Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars thru his own undertaking, without authority and knowledge of the court. The subject vehicles, according to him, were first parked near the YMCA building in front
[2]

of the Manila City Hall where they remained for four months. He said that when he went to check on the vehicles condition sometime in December 2005, he found them to have been infested and the wirings underneath the hoods gnawed by rats. He denied personally using or allowing others the use of the cars, stating in this regard that if indeed the Nissan Sentra was spotted on Anonas St., Quezon City on December 26, 2005, it could have been the time when the car was being transferred from the YMCA. The February 18, 2006 and June 2006 sightings, so Atty. Frial claimed, possibly occurred when the Nissan Sentra was brought to the gas station to be filled up. He said that the car could not have plausibly been spotted in Project 3 on December 13, 2006, parked as it was then in front of Liquigans house for mechanical check-up. During the mandatory conference/hearing before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, the parties agreed on the following key issues to be resolved: (1) whether or not Atty. Frial used the cars for his personal benefit; and (2) whether or not Atty. Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached properties. Thereafter and after the submission by the parties of their respective position papers, the Commission submitted a Report dated October 9, 2007 which the IBP Board of Governors forthwith adopted and then transmitted to this Court. In the Report, the following were deduced from the affidavits of Andrew Abundo, Roberto Perez, Robert Perez, and Dante Batingan: (1) at no time was Atty. Frial seen driving the Sentra; (2) Abundo learned that at that time the car was spotted at the battery shop, the unnamed driver bought a new battery for the car which was not inappropriate since a battery was for the preservation of the car; (3) Atty. Frial admitted that the Nissan Sentra was seen gassed up on February 18, 2006 and in June 2006 and there was no reason to gas up the Nissan Sentra on those times unless it was being used; (4) Roberto Perez said the Nissan Sentra was used to buy goats meat; and (5) photos of the Nissan Sentra in different places obviously showed it was being used by others. In the same Report, the Commission observed that while there is perhaps no direct evidence tying up Atty. Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact remains that it was being used by other persons during the time he was supposed to have custody of it. In addition, whoever drove the Nissan Sentra on those occasions must have received the car key from Atty. Frial. When Atty. Frial took custody of the Nissan Sentra and Volvo cars, he was duty bound to keep and preserve these in the same condition he received them so as to fetch a good price should the vehicles be auctioned. As to the burnt Volvo, Atty. Frial admitted receiving it in excellent condition and that there was no court order authorizing him to remove the

car from the YMCA premises. Admitted too was the fact that he secured the release of the Volvo on the strength alone of his own written [3] undertaking; and that the car was almost totally destroyed by fire [4] onFebruary 4, 2006 at 1:45 a.m. while parked in his residence. He could not, however, explain the circumstances behind the destruction, but admitted not reporting the burning to the court or the sheriff. While the burning of the car happened before the mediation hearing, Atty. Frial, upon inquiry of Atty. Salomon, did not give information as to the whereabouts of the cars. The destruction of the Volvo in Atty. Frials residence was not an ordinary occurrence; it was an event that could have not easily escaped his attention. Accordingly, there is a strong reason to believe that Atty. Frial deliberately concealed the destruction of said vehicle from the court during the hearings in Civil Case No. 05-111828, which were the opportune times to reveal the condition of the Volvo car. On the basis of the foregoing premises, the Commission concluded that Atty. Frial committed acts clearly bearing on his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to observe the diligence required of him as custodian of the cars. The Commission thus recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. The findings and the recommendation of the Commission are welltaken. A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the attached property, thus securing the satisfaction of any judgment that [5] may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. When the objects of the attachment are destroyed, then the attached properties would necessarily be of no value and the attachment would be for naught. From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is no question that Atty. Frial is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics that states: 11. Dealing with trust property The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him. (Emphasis ours.)

A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the courts order and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of attachment the court issued. Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority. For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, we find Atty. Frial guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We must mention, at this juncture, that the victorious parties in the case are not without legal recourse in recovering the Volvos value from Atty. Frial should they desire to do so. The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and [6] member of the bar. With the view we take of the case, there is no compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial intended to pervert the administration of justice for some dishonest purpose. Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would [7] accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person. In the case of Atty. Frial, the Court finds that a years suspension from the practice of his legal profession will provide him with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct. WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Frial is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct and infidelity in the custody of properties in custodia legis. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Decision

DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. MINERVO T. LANGIT, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case On 5 May 2004, David L. Almendarez, Jr. ("complainant") filed this 1 complaint-affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Minervo T. Langit ("respondent") for acts unbecoming a lawyer. The facts are undisputed: Complainant, as attorney-in-fact of his mother Pura Lioanag Vda. de Almendarez, was the plaintiff in an ejectment case before the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2 ("trial court"). Respondent served as complainant's counsel. While the case was pending, defendant Roger Bumanlag ("Bumanlag") deposited monthly rentals for the property in dispute to the Branch Clerk of Court. On 3 February 1994, the trial court rendered a decision in the ejectment case based on a compromise agreement executed by complainant and Bumanlag. On 18 December 1995, the trial court issued an alias writ of 2 execution for the satisfaction of the decision. A court order dated 2 March 2000 granted the Omnibus Motion for Execution and Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as complainant's counsel. Respondent filed a second motion for withdrawal of deposited rentals, which the trial court also granted on 16 March 2000. Sometime in May 2003, complainant learned that respondent was able to withdraw the rentals deposited by Bumanlag. Felicidad Daroy ("Daroy"), Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court, confirmed this to complainant who received from Daroy copies of the two withdrawal slips drawn from the trial court's 3 savings account. One slip dated 10 March 2000 was for P28,000, and 4 another slip dated 19 April 2000 was for P227,000. Thus, respondent 5 received a total of P255,000, as evidenced by two receipts signed by him. The withdrawals were made through Daroy's authorized representative Antonia Macaraeg, but Daroy personally delivered the money to respondent. Respondent did not inform complainant of these transactions.

Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for the accounting and 6 return of the P255,000. Respondent failed to reply. Hence, complainant filed this case for disbarment against respondent for failing to account for complainant's funds. Complainant further accuses respondent of neglecting to pursue the implementation of the writ of execution issued in the ejectment case. On 12 May 2004, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ("IBP Director Vinluan") ordered respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint. 7 Respondent did not file an answer despite receipt of the notice. On 4 October 2004, IBP Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay ("IBP Commissioner Dulay") notified the parties to appear before him for a mandatory conference on 15 November 2004, later reset to 17 January 2005. Only complainant appeared at the conference, prompting IBP Commissioner Dulay to order the conference terminated and to declare that respondent had waived his right to participate in the proceedings. IBP Commissioner Dulay directed the parties to file their respective position papers. Complainant submitted his position paper on 22 March 2005. Again, respondent took no action. Findings and Recommendation of the IBP On 8 June 2005, IBP Commissioner Dulay submitted his Report and 8 Recommendation ("Report") with the finding that respondent failed to account for money he held in trust for complainant. The Report considered complainant's evidence "clear and convincing" enough to justify disciplinary action against respondent for violation of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be declared guilty of gross misconduct and suspended for one year, aside from being ordered to render an accounting of the money he had received. In a Resolution dated 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors approved the Report, with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to two years. The Court's Ruling We sustain the findings of the IBP.
9

Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. The Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") states: CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court's approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney's 10 fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the money. Respondent's failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter's demands gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public confidence in the 11 legal profession. More specifically, it renders respondent liable not only for violating the Code but also for contempt, as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but

proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Additionally, respondent failed to observe Canon 17 of the Code, which obligates the lawyer to take up the cause of his client with entire zeal and devotion. It seems that after respondent received the withdrawn deposits, he never contacted complainant again. He did not pursue the implementation of the writ of execution issued in the ejectment case, to the prejudice of complainant. By his inaction, respondent violated the trust and confidence reposed in him. For in agreeing to be complainant's counsel, respondent undertook to take all steps necessary to safeguard complainant's interest in the case. The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaintaffidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to 13 uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial 14 officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys. The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney. Respondent miserably failed in this regard. Instead, he demonstrated a lack of integrity, care, and devotion required by the legal profession from its members. Whenever a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, this Court has the right and duty to withdraw his privilege as officer of the Court 15 and member of the Bar. WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Minervo T. Langit GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this Decision. We ORDER respondent to RESTITUTE, within 30 days from finality of this Decision, complainant'sP255,000, with interest at 12% per annum from 30 June 2003 until fully paid. We DIRECT respondent to submit to the Court proof of payment within 15 days from payment of the full amount.
12

ANA A. CHUA and MARCELINA HSIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR., respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: By a verified complaint received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on [2] May 5, 1998, Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice. As related by complainants, the following facts gave rise to the filing of the complaint. Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now deceased husband Chua Yap Ans legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street, Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondents family, and another property containing an area of 854 sq. m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City (Melencio property), also owned by respondents family whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, respondents mother Felicisima Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, respondent convinced complainant Ana Chua and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m. Accommodating respondents request, the spouses Chua and their business partner, herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the amount ofP983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute [4] Sale antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose
[3] [1]

name again appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00. After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of the MESINA properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit of February 18, 1986, acknowledged such obligation to be his and undertook to settle it within two years. Complainants were subsequently issued on January 21, 1986 a title over the Melencio property. Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Juanito Tecson (Tecson) filed an [5] Affidavit dated February 20, 1986 before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office charging respondents mother, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment of capital gains tax. Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated. Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina. Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of [6] Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio property for P85,400.00. A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio, the owners copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecson subsequently filed before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors [7] Office an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and

difference with herein complainants and their co -respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them. Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached complainants and told them that he would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants [8] favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking dated May 2, 1990 reading: Received the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 4383 issued by the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan City registered in the name of Felicisima Mesina, widow, consisting of about 854 square meters more or less located at calle Melencio, Cabanatuan City from Mrs. Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia. I promise to and undertake to have the Deed of Sale of the abovementioned property in favor of Ana Chua and Marcelina Hsia to be signed by Mrs. Felicisima Mesina, within four (4) months from date hereof so that the above-mentioned property and title maybe transferred in the name of Ana Chua and Macelina Hsia. (Underscoring supplied) In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991. Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed on [9] August 24, 1992 a Complaint against respondent and his two siblings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Ecija in Cabanatuan City, for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property. As of the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint in 1998, the civil case against the Mesina siblings was still pending. This Court, by Resolution of July 13, 1998, file Comment on the complaint within ten days.
[11] [10]

Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent was accordingly deemed to have waived the filing of the required comment. By the same Resolution of December 2, 1998, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety days. The IBP, acting on the complaint, issued a notice of hearing on [12] September 14, 2001, copy of which was sent to respondent at his office address via registered mail, covered by Registry Receipt No. 2605 of the [13] Meralco Post Office. On the scheduled date of hearing, complainants personally appeared with their counsel. Respondent failed to show up. Given the length of time that the case remained pending from its filing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, by Order of October 12, [14] 2001, directed complainants to just file their position paper with affidavits and supporting documents in lieu of actual presentation of witnesses and to serve a copy thereof to respondent at his last known address. In compliance with the IBP Order, complainants filed on April 1, 2002 [15] their position paper, annexed to which were photocopies of: 1) a May 5, [16] 1993 Certification issued by the Metrobank Cabanatuan Branch certifying that it issued the demand drafts to the payees enumerated below, which were debited from the account of Mr. Chua Yap An under Savings Account No. 760: D/D No. Payee Amount e of Issue 214597 Planters Bank P 805,299.54 12-19-85 214760 Planters Bank 100,000.00 01-14-86 214761 Atty. Simeon Jr. 77,826.10 01-14-86;
[17]

Dat Dev. Dev. Mesina,

directed respondent to

By Resolution of December 2, 1998, this Court, noting that the copy of the Resolution of July 13, 1998 requiring respondent to comment on the complaint sent to him at his office address at S. M. Mesina Law Office, 30 Jupiter St., Paseo de Roxas, Bel-Air Subd., Makati City was returned unserved with the notation Moved, considered the Resolution of July 13, 1998 served on respondent by substituted service pursuant to Rule 13,

2) Affidavit dated February 18, 1986 of respondent acknowledging a debt of P400,000.00 to complainant Ana Alvaran Chua and promising to pay interest thereon within 2 years to commence upon the signing thereof [February 16, 1998] and, in the event no partial or full payment of the principal is made within 2 years, Ana Alvaran Chua is under no obligation to pay any lease rentals over the lot situated in Burgos Avenue, Cabanatuan City where the Oceanic Hardware Bldg. is erected; 3) Deed of Absolute [18] Sale dated January 19, 1985 and 4) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 9, [19] 1979, both executed by Felicisima M. Melencio in favor of complainant; [20] 5) TCT No. T-48114 issued by the Cabanatuan City in the name of [21] complainants on January 21, 1986; 6) Affidavit of Juanito C. Tecson dated

January 20, 1986 charging complainants et al. for Falsification of Public Documents; 7) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 executed by [22] complainants in favor of Mrs. Mesina; and 8) TCT No. T-48383issued on [23] April 4, 1986 in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio; and 9) Complaint of spouses Chua Yap An and Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia, for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property [24] against respondent and his two siblings. A copy of complainants position paper was sent on March 18, 2002 to respondent at his office address by registered mail covered by Registry [25] Receipt No. 5278. There is no showing if respondent received this mail matter. The IBP once more scheduled, by notice of December 13, 2002, a hearing of the administrative case to January 15, 2003, copy of which notice was sent to respondent at his office address by registered mail covered by [27] Registry Receipt No. 2953 issued by the Meralco Post Office. On the scheduled hearing on January 15, 2003, the IBP Investigating [28] Commissioner, by Order of even date, noted the presence of complainants, and the absence of respondent, copy of the notice of hearing to whom was returned unserved with the notation RTS -Moved. The case was thereupon deemed submitted for report and recommendation. On June 21, 2003, the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-2003[29] 342 adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, the Investigating Commissioner of the case. In her March 3, 2003 Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Maala observed as follows:
[30] [26]

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated 28 his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet 29 activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he 30 did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating. Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he 31 committed dishonesty. Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty. That the signature of Felicisima M. Melencio in the 1985 32 33 document and that in the 1979 document are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or the 1985 document or even both. A propos is this Courts following pronouncement in Nakpil v. Valdez
34

Investigation

A lawyer should not engage or participate on any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The moral character he displayed when he applied for admission at the Bar must be maintained incessantly. Otherwise, his privilege to practice the legal profession may be withdrawn from him (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility). On the basis of the uncontroverted facts and evidence presented, respondent Atty. Simeon M.Mesina has committed gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his license and law confer upon him, and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of One (1) Year. This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exerc ise in hisdealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability 35 of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. (Underscoring supplied) Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio property to complainants, consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such promise should be taken up in the civil case filed for the purpose, the issue there being one of ownership while that 37 in the case at bar is moral fitness. In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness. CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased). Both parties are from Zamboanga City. The allegations in the letter-complaint are: Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent. Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors. Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant. Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties worth millions. In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his comment on the complaint. Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is premature since there is pending
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before the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. [2] 1781 for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him involving the subject lots. On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondents motion and requiring him to submit his answer. In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited her to live with his family. His children used to call her Lola due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation. It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainants witnesses and the submission of its report and recommendation. On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows: A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5, 1974. It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the documents involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which ended up in respondents name like in the deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties.

The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and liabilities to her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay complainants accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent. It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the complainant on how he paid complainants creditors without selling her properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainants properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties. As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as complainants legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainants properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation hereof, subject to the approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors. On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years. We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, we have to modify its recommended penalty. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides: A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in [3] judgment. Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at all time s conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with [4] honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Canon 17 of the same Code states: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel. Undoubtedly, respondents conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity [5] and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the [6] fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the [7] legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within [8] its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession.

Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to protect the interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects his clients cause; he also serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued [9] possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without [10] authority to do so. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro vs. [12] Meneses III, we disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a [13] case. In Docena vs. Limson, we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and [14] misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort, an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for misappropriating his clients money. Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.
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ERLINDA R. TAROG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: We resolve a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for his failure to account for and to return the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of the civil action to recover their property from a foreclosing banking institution he was handling for them. The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R. Tarog, substituted him upon his intervening death. Antecedents In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for that purpose. Thus, they went to see Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who 1 was a brother of Atty. Miralles. They ultimately engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on account of his being well-known in the community, and being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University where their son was then studying. Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs 2 to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave to him. He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After they informed him that they had onlyP60,000.00, he required them to add some 3 more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti). To raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee of his brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that amount in the name of 4 Arnulfo. On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00. When Arnulfo said that he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the check to him instead so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court. On that representation, Arnulfo 5 handed the check to Atty. Ricafort.

After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands. The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for annulment of sale was being heard, had required the parties to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they deliveredP15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the 6 memorandum. When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning theP65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return theP65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the 7 memorandum. Yet, they did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort. In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal," that is, the amount included his acceptance fee, attorneys fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of sale until judgment, but excluding appeal. He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor, time, and trouble involved, and his professional character and social standing; that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to the contents of the complaint, which did not mention anything about any 8 consignation; and that Arnulfo, being a retired school principal, was a learned person who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted against him. Findings of the IBP Commissioner Following his investigation, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline rendered his 9 Report and Recommendation dated October 7, 2004, in which he concluded that: It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal more credible than the testimony of Atty. Ricafort, observing: Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog and his collaborating witness, we find their statements to be credible. Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount of P65,000.00 was paid to him by the complainant as acceptance fee on a package deal basis and under said deal, he will answer the filing fee, attorneys fees and other expenses incurred up to the time the judgment is rendered. He presented a transcript of stenographic notes wherein it was stated that complainant himself did not consign the money in court. The respondent admitted in his testimony that he did not have any retainer agreement nor any memorandum signed or any receipt which would prove that the amount of P65,000.00 was received as an acceptance fee for the handling of the case. Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer agreement and that he issued only receipt because the late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent "Basically you describe that thing that will happen in the litigation related to the payment of fees. But when you received that P65,000.00 did you not put anything there that you will describe the nature of legal work which you will undertake considering that you have considered thisP65,000.00 as your attorneys fees? And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not know why they were not showing the receipt. That is a big amount, Your Honor. They demanded for me the receipt of P30,000.00 how much more with that P65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of that P65,000.00 but I cannot explain the reason why During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned Commissioner also asked Atty. Ricafort why he did not answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and the proof of service of the said letter was presented by the complainant. Conveniently, Atty. Ricafort stated that he did not receive the letter and it was received by their helper who did not forward the letter to him. He also adopted the position that the complainant was demanding theP65,000.00 wherefore this case was filed. When confronted by the testimony of Mr. Vidal Miralles, the respondent Atty. Ricafort just denied the

allegation that he received the P65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also denied that Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for follow-up the reimbursement. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent if he has personal animosity with Arnuldo Tarog, Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles and if there are any reason why this case was filed against him. In his answer the respondent stated that we have been very good friends for the past ten (10) years and he said that in fact he was surprised when the complaint was filed against him and they even attached the decision of the Supreme Court for his suspension and maybe they are using this case to be able to collect from him. The main defense of the respondent is that the complainant in this case testified that the total amount to redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked whether he consigned the money to the court to redeem the property he answered in the negative. The alleged payment of P65,000.00 was made prior to the said testimony sometime in 1992. Hence, it was stated on complainants affidavit that on November 7, 1992, prior to filing said complaint I had given him the sum of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos to be deposited to the Regional Trial Court representing redemption money of the Real Estate Mortgage. The amount of P65,000.00 is very much close to the amount of the principal obligation of the complainant and it is not surprising for a non-lawyer to hold on to the belief that with the filing of the case for annulment of foreclosure his case would be strengthened by making a deposit in court hence, the motivation to produce the deposit was logical and natural insofar as the complainant is concerned. The testimony of the complainant in court that the bank needed P240,000.00 for the redemption of the property will have no bearing on the actuation of the complainant who has been required to deposit P65,000.00 by his lawyer. The Undersigned Commission has no alternative but to believe in the credibility and truthfulness of complainants 10 narration that of Mrs. Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles. Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them. On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. 11 XVI-2004-473, resolving to return the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a

clarification of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00 had been in payment of attorneys fees and other expenses. On October 11, 2005, Commissioner Reyes issued a second Report and 12 Recommendation, in which he declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount ofP65,000.00 had been part of his attorneys fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation. Action of IBP Board of Governors Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569, therefore, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda, viz: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent has taken advantage of his client [sic] vulnerability and has been dishonest with his dealings to his client, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED and Ordered to Return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration, maintaining that a retainer agreement was immaterial because he had affirmed having received the P65,000.00 and having issued a receipt for the amount; that he had not kept the receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand 15 for a receipt;" that considering that the Tarogs had produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for attorneys fees had been made at the time when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC; that the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with Arnulfos affidavit; and that he did not receive Arnulfos demand letter, which was received by
14 13

one Gemma Agnote (the name printed on the registry receipt), whom he did not at all know. Acting on Atty. Ricaforts motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from disbarment to indefinite 16 suspension, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification of Resolution No. XVII-2006-509 of the Board of Governors dated 18 November 2006, that in lieu of the Disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort, he is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law and Ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration, assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based. Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution. Ruling We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial evidence. However, we impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension, considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his having been previously administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was warned against committing a similar offense. A. Version of the complainants was more credible than version of Atty. Ricafort Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the P65,000.00 from the Tarogs. Even so, we have two versions about the transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs
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insisted that the amount was to be consigned in court for purposes of their civil case; on the other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his fees under a "package deal" arrangement. Commissioner Reyes considered the Tarogs version more credible. We hold that Commissioner Reyes appreciation of the facts was cor rect and in accord with human experience. Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the Tarogs on the need for that amount to be deposited in court for purposes of their civil case. Being non-lawyers, they had no idea about the requirement for them to consign any amount in court, due to the substantive and procedural implications of such requirement being ordinarily known only to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricaforts representations about the requirement to consign that amount in court was entirely understandable in view of their awareness of Atty. Ricaforts standing in the legal community of the place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it was not far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering their property. Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos demand letter was incredible. He already initially admitted receiving the letter through a 18 househelp. His denial came only subsequently and for the first time 19 through his motion for reconsideration dated December 30, 2006, in which he completely turned about to declare that the Gemma Agnote who had 20 received the letter was unknown to him. Expectedly, Commissioner Reyes disregarded his denial, because not only was the denial an apparently belated afterthought, it was even contradicted by his earlier admission of receipt. In any event, the fact that Gemma Agnote was even the househelp whom Atty. Ricafort had adverted to becomes very plausible under the established circumstances. Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it 21 behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt." But such explanation does not persuade us. Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was by issuing and keeping

receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was burdened with the legal duty to promptly 22 account for all the funds received from or held by him for them. And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the P65,000.00 was not intended for deposit in court, Atty. Ricafort insisted that Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the complaint in the civil action of any mention of consignation. However, the complaint that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs contradicted his insistence, specifically in its paragraph 16, which averred the plaintiffs (i.e., Tarogs) readiness and willingness to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 (inclusive of the redemption price and interest) in court, thus: 16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the plaintiffs, they are ready and willing to deposit the amount ofP69,345.00 as redemption price plus 23 reasonable accrued interests, if there are any; Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for consignation. The consignation was a notion that could have emanated only from him as their lawyer. In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty. Ricafort only P60,000.00 for the consignation, but that Atty. Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount. The excerpt of her pertinent testimony follows: Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you stated that your late husband and Mr. Vidal Miralles went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter that we already had the sum of P65,000.00 in the form of check, how did you come to know this fact? Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng P65,000.00 tapos may P60,000.00 kami sabi niya dagdagan niyo ng konti . Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo? Witness: Nandoon po ako. Comm. Reyes: Where you present when the check was given? Witness: Yes. Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay yong P65,000.00 na tseke?

Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari doon sa tseke na idiniposit? Witness: Noong una sinabi niya sa amin na ididiposit niya sa court. Comm. Reyes: Nalaman niyo ba na hindi naman pala idiniposit sa court? Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Kailan niyo nalaman? Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong interest sa bank ay 24 ibinigay niya sa amin ang sabi naming salamat. B. Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers 25 because of their fiduciary relationship. In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and 26 property of his clients that came into his possession, and he needed to be 27 always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him. Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients (a) 28 when they became due, or (b) upon demand. 1avvphi1 Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit: Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it

upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the 29 particular purposes intended. He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients 30 and in violation of the clients trust reposed in him. He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he 31 should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients. Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients 32 rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01, 33 supra, and Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that impaired public confidence in the legal profession 34 and deserved punishment. Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricaforts acts and conduct as gross misconduct, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include: xxx 3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; xxx That this offense was not the first charged and decided against Atty. Ricafort 35 aggravated his liability. In Nuez v. Ricafort, decided in 2002, the Court 36 37 found him to have violated Rules 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.03 and 38 Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to his failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell the realty in her behalf). His failure to turn over the proceeds compelled the complainant to commence in the RTC a civil action to recover the proceeds against him and his wife. The Court meted on him the penalty of indefinite suspension, and warned him against the commission of similar acts, stating:

We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respo ndents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty. There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation. All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates. By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon,

337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra). Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the 39 court, was under continuing duty to uphold. Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering that the penalty 40 for violation of Canon 16 ranges from suspension for six months, to 41 42 suspension for one year, to suspension for two years, depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyers misconduct , we rule that disbarment is the commensurate punishment for Atty. Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his handling of trust funds for his clients. WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus interest of six percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3, 2002, within twenty days from notice. This decision is effective immediately. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference. SO ORDERED.

LOURDES R. BUSIOS, complainant, RICAFORT, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:

vs. ATTY.

FRANCISCO

In a sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October 1994 but received by us on 21 November 1994, complainant Lourdes R. Busios charged respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas, Albay, with having committed the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code by misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00. Of this amount,P30,000.00 was entrusted to respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainants husband, while P2,000.00 represented the amount respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in Civil Case No. 5814, when no such bond was required. In the resolution of 18 January 1995, we required respondent to comment on the complaint. Despite his receipt of a copy of the resolution, respondent did not comply, compelling us in the resolution of 17 July 1995 to require him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure. Again respondent failed to comply. Hence in the resolution of 25 September 1996, we ordered him once more to file his comment within ten (10) days from notice, and within the same period, to pay a fine of P1,000.00 or suffer imprisonment of ten (10) days should he fail to so pay. In a Compliance and Motion dated 24 October 196, respondent transmitted the fine of P1,000.00 by way of postal money order, but asked for five (5) days from date to file his comment. As respondent still failed to so file, we then declared, in the resolution of 2 December 1996, that respondent was deemed to have waived his right to file his comment, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant for reception of complainants evidence and submission of a report and recommendation thereon. On 16 October 1997, the Bar Confidant, Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, submitted her Report and Recommendation, material portions of which read as follows: Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands charged with having misappropriated the sum of P30,000.00 intended for his clients as well as having deceived his clients into giving him the sum of P2,000.00 purportedly to be deposited as a bond in the case he was handling.

Complainant Lourdes R. Busios is one of the heirs of Pedro Rodrigo who are the defendants in Civil Case No. 1584, apparently a case involving the properties of the late Pedro Rodrigo, father of herein complainant. Respondent was the counsel of record for the defendants in the said case. On July 10, 1994, complainant representing her co-heirs, executed a special power of attorney, appointing and constituting respondent and/or Pedro Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true and lawful attorney-in-fact with the following powers: 1. To attend to and represent me, testify, or otherwise enter into compromise during the pre-trial stage or other proceedings in Civil Case No. 1584, entitled Heirs of Rosario Rodrigo-Reantaso, vs. Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo Sr., et al. now pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ligao, Albay; 2. To demand, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money that may now be deposited in said court by the defendant Oas Standard High School or hereafter be deposited by said defendant, due and owing to me or said Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo Sr., representing the rentals of said defendants for the lease of the property involved in said case; and 3. To sign, authenticate, issue and deliver any and all deeds, instruments, papers and other records necessary and pertinent to the above stated transactions. On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Br. 12 issued an order, directing the Clerk of Court to release any and all d eposits of rentals made in connection with this case (Civil Case No. 1584) to the defendants Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo through Lourdes Rodrigo Businos who were receiving the rentals from Oas Standard High School prior to the institution of this case. In a letter dated August 10, 1994, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Ligao informed herein complainant that respondent had already received the rental deposit of P25,000.00 on eve date (see Annex C to the complaint). Respondent also received from Oas Standard High School on August 17, 1994 the sum of P5,000.00 as payment for rental of school site for the month of July 1994 (See Annex D to the complaint). The said sum was entrusted to respondent with an obligation on his part to deposit the same in the account of complainants husband at PNB, Ligao Branch. Instead, however, of depositing the money, respondent converted the money to his own personal use, and despite several demands, he failed to return the same to complainant. She was thus constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and

an administrative case for disbarment against him. Thus, on November 21, 1994, complainant filed the instant administrative case against respondent. Complainant further accuses respondent for demanding and receiving P2,000.00 from her which he said will be used for the bond in Civil Case No. 1584, but said amount was never used as intended since no bond was required in the said case. Thus, respondent merely pocketed the said amount. xxx xxx Complainant, upon questioning by the undersigned, testified that: She authorized respondent to withdraw the money amounting to P35,000.00 representing the rental fee paid by Oas Standard High School from the Clerk of Court, with the instruction to deposit the same in her savings account at the PNB. After she was informed by the court that respondent had already withdrawn the money, she expected in vain to receive the money a week later in Tarlac as respondent failed to effect the deposit of the said sum in her account. She demanded from him to give her the money, but he informed her that he had already spent the same. He promised, though to pay her the said amount. (pp. 7-8, TSN, Reception of Evidence, April 18, 1997). She clarified that respondent withdrew only the sum of P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court, while the P5,000.00 was withdrawn by respondent from Oas Standard High School (TSN, p. 8). Despite several demands, both from her and her lawyer, respondent failed to make good his promise to give her the money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School (TSN, pp. 11-13). She was then constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and an administrative case against respondent sometime in November of 1994 to recover the money in question (TSN, pp. 14-16).On their third hearing of the estafa case sometime in 1995, respondent came with the money and paid complainant inside the courtroom (TSN, pp. 15, 1920). Because of this development, she did not anymore pursue the estafa case against respondent (TSN, p. 17). She has no intention, however, of withdrawing the instant complaint (TSN, p. 18). She further testified that respondent demanded from her the sum of P2,000.00 for the bond required in the civil case. (TSN, p. 18). Respondent did not give her a receipt for the said amount. (TSN, p. 19). Respondent gave back the P2,000.00 to complainant. He paid complainant a total of P60,000.00 representing the money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School, the P2,000.00 he got from xxx

complainant and attorneys fees, which he undertook to foot as a way of settlement. (TSN, p. 19). Although complainant failed to submit the original or certified true copies of the documents in support of her complaint against respondent, respondents repeated failure to comply with several resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint lends credence to the allegations of the complainant. It manifests his tacit admission thereto. We have no other alternative, therefore, but to accept the said documents at their [sic] face value. There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of having used the money of his clients without their consent. As the evidentiary value of the documents should be given more weight than the oral testimony of complainant, we place the amount illegally used by respondent at P30,000.00 and not P35,000.00 as claimed by complainant. Respondents illegal use of his clients money is made more manifest [by] his letters to complainant, all promising the latter to make good his promise to pay the money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School (See A nnex E to the complaint). It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his cllients [sic] consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Daroy vs. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304). Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8). Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their consent , and by deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as a bond which was not required, is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession. His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve him from any liability if only to impress upon him that

the relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct (Daroy vs. Legaspi, supra). Moreover, his repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court, requiring him to comment on the complaint indicate the high degree of irresponsibility of respondent. PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.Francisco Ricafort be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR. While the findings are in order, the penalty recommended is not commensurate to respondents infractions. Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which read: SEC. 25 Unlawful retention of clients funds; contempt.--When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01-- A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02-- A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03-- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Respondents transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier (A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 12-13), reiterated in Fernandez v. Grecia, (A.C. No. 3694, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 425, 434), this Court declared: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing . Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyers oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice -- a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is specially so, as here, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment

on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts. WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. This resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record; the National Office and the Albay Chapter of the Integrated bar of the Philippines; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 2144

April 10, 1989

Robinol), who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them. But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. On the same date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone. In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q16433, Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al., Defendants." with the principal prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, however, dismissed the case. To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit "2"). On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by: (1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in question in favor of herein plaintiffs after the payment of the corresponding amount paid by the defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in case of refusal or failure on their part to do so, ordering the Clerk of Court to execute the same in favor of plaintiffs and declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E) null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said certificate and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of plaintiffs-appellants, upon presentation of the deed of conveyance to be executed in favor of appellants and (2) ordering appellees jointly and severally to pay appellants the sum of P 2,000.00 as attomey's fees, plus costs." (p. 30, Report and Recommendation)

CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS AGAWAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, respondent. A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989 ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, complainant, vs. ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32) squatter families to own the land of approximately 50 square meters each on which their respective homes were built. To vindicate their rights they have aired their plight before this Court. Thwarted, too, was the benevolence shown by the original owner of the land which parted with its property at a giveaway price thinking that it was accommodating the landless squatters. The antecedent facts follow: The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel of land at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President (Exhibit "24",

To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P 68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P 2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P 2,500.00, or a total of P 75,000.00. After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all. On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit "3"). The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P 75,000.00 deposited with him (Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol. On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433 as counsel for the plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority dated 18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-A"). Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document labelled the "second consensus" (Exhibit

"E") was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor. Administrative Case No. 2144 On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P 75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. The details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them and Atty. Robinol. In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of appeals after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement as to attomey's fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court Decision, they wig give him a portion of the property subject matter of the litigation equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not receive P 70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00; that he prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he received P 70,000.00 only to save complainants from embarrassment and shame should their co-plaintiff ask for proof that they (Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have not; that the correct amount in his possession is only P 62,470.00-it would really be P 75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their shares in the amount of P 12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00; that he had the right to hold the money in his possession as guarantee for the payment of his attomey's fees of get a portion of the property that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his portion converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals 85 square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P 500.00 up per square meter); that considering that P 50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of the total value of the property, which is more than a million pesos, such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the amount of P 12,470.00, representing the difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount of P 62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot make this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has the exclusive disciplinary power over members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot pass judgment on Complainants' plea that the amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action; that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession (P 62,470.00) for

himself, but he is holding it until his attomey's fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of Complainants' adamant refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to him of his discharge; and that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity. Administrative Case No. 2180 Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel. For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were purely on a contingent basis, the truth being that the attomey's fees were payable on a cash basis of P 2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty. Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount is adjudicated as attomey's fees by the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by Atty. Robinol was the result of his insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil Case No. Q16433 was already final, as shown by the date of the agreement (Annex "2"); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan signed the agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as shown by Annex "3", which is a majority of the membership and, therefore, a valid consensus; that he agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the growing belief of the Samahan that most members of the Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no formal Motion for substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of appearance in Civil Case No. Q-1 6433 (Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex "9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution (Annexes "10' and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of his appearance as counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of the Court to the substitution as shown by its Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3"); that his professional and personal actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City, do not cause dishonor either to himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the Complaint against him should be dismissed. On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180, respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 15

December 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his compliance and recommended: 1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm. Case No. 2134, the sum of P 75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo) Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with the recommendations. Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P 2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heart lessly took advantage of them. Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.

The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit onquantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable. But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had received only the sum of P 62,470.00 and not P 75,000.00 claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not yet paid their shares to P 12,500.00. We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this score is the more credible and that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the share of P 12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the Somalian For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the Motion for Execution on 5 June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for Execution on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of that time, had not yet submitted their corresponding shares which list, however, did not include any of the five (5) officers of the Samahan. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a lifetime ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own. Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433. Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one (21) had signed the first consensus of 6 March 1980 expressing their resolve to change their lawyer. In as much as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment of their shares, only twenty five (25) of them should be considered in determining the majority. Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to make the said consensus binding. It is more than a simple majority.

Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge as counsel: On 17 March 1980 he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination of his services (Exhibit "5"). That was followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12 December 1985 and during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had stated that he had no objection to Atty. Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did enter his appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had been formally terminated. He had in no way encroached upon the professional employment of a colleague. There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we find the same absolutely without merit. ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned Administrative Case. 2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RUBY

MAE BARNACHEA, complainant, QUIOCHO, respondent. RESOLUTION

vs. ATTY.

EDWIN

T.

CALLEJO, SR., J.: On January 3, 2002, Ruby Mae Barnachea filed a verified complaint for breach of lawyer-client relations against respondent Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho. It appears that respondent had not been in the private practice of the law for quite some time. However, in September 2001, he decided to revive his legal practice with some associates. Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent for the latter to cause the transfer under her name of the title over a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 334411 previously owned by her sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. The latter sold said property to complainant under an unnotarized deed of absolute sale. Complainant drew and issued BPI Family Bank Check No. 0052304 in the amount of P11,280.00 and BPI Family Bank Check No. 0052305 in the amount of P30,000.00, both dated September 5, 2001, or the total amount of P41,280.00 for the expenses for said transfer and in payment for respondents legal services. Respondent enchased the checks. However, despite the lapse of almost two months, respondent failed to secure title over the property in favor of complainant. The latter demanded that respondent refund to her the amount ofP41,280.00 and return the documents which she earlier entrusted to him. However, respondent failed to comply with said demands. On November 1, 2001, complainant received a letter from respondent informing her that he had failed to cause the transfer of the property under her name and that he was returning the documents and title she had entrusted to him and refunding to her the amount of P41,280.00 through his personal check No. DIL 0317787. Said check was drawn against his account with the Bank of Commerce (Diliman Branch) in the amount of P41,280.00 and was postdated December 1, 2001. Respondent told complainant that he needed more time to fund the check. However, respondent failed to fund the check despite the demands of complainant. In his Answer to the complaint, respondent denied that complainant contracted his legal services. Although respondent admitted having received the two checks from complainant, he claimed that said checks were intended to cover actual and incidental expenses for transportation, communication, representation, necessary services, taxes and fees for the cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411 under the name of complainant and not for legal services. He asserted that he acted in good faith as shown

by the fact of his return of complainants documen ts with an explanatory letter and his issuance of a personal check for P41,280.00 dated December 1, 2001. He insisted that he would not compromise for such meager amount his personal standing as well as his membership in the legal profession. His failure to transfer the title of the property under the name of the complainant was caused by his difficulty in making good the claimed amount, compounded by his affliction with diabetes and the consequent loss of sight of his right eye. Respondent further alleged that he was a licensed real estate and insurance broker and had been a freelance business management consultant. At the same time he engaged in real estate brokering, pre-need products marketing for Prudential Life, and life insurance underwriting for Insular Life. In 1999, he gave up the practice of his profession as a lawyer and subsequently managed to put up a business center with fellow insurance underwriters for their common insurance underwriting practice. He further claimed that sometime in August, 2001, an insurance client introduced complainant as an insurance prospect to him. In the course of their dealing, complainant intimated to respondent her willingness to consider respondents insurance proposal provided the latter would help her facilitate the cancellation and eventual transfer to her name the property covered by TCT No. 334411 in the name of complainants sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. Respondent agreed to help complainant in the transfer of the title to her name, with the condition that no diligent study or verification of complainants documents, nor preparation of any additional document or any application or petition whatsoever, will be made by respondent. He explained to complainant that his task was merely to go through the regular process of presenting the available documents, paying the taxes and fees, and following up the processing for the cancellation and issuance of the certificate of title. In other words, respondent offered to complainant services which a non-lawyer familiar with the procedure and the related offices can perform and provide to the complainant with respect to the transfer of the title of the property in her name. Respondent asserted that in the latter part of September 2001, he discovered and became aware for the first time that the original copy of TCT No. 334411 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was destroyed in a fire in Quezon City Hall several years earlier and that complainants copy of the title needed to be reconstituted before it can be cancelled and transferred. At about the same time, the working relations of respondent in the business center with his non-lawyer associates had become difficult and strained, impelling him to sever his business relations with them and cease from to going to the business center. Consequently, telephone communications between respondent and complainant at the business center was cut. Communications became much more limited when, apart

from the fact that respondent did not have a landline at his residence, respondents mobile phone was stolen sometime in October 2001. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint. Despite several settings, respondent failed to appear and adduce evidence. On April 26, 2002, Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa submitted his report and recommendation stating in part that: 1. Respondent is not able to meet his financial obligations due to financial difficulties, and that respondent is in good faith in his failure to meet this obligation. 2. It is recommended that respondent be ORDERED TO REPAY HIS CLIENT within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision. The principal amount being P41,280.00. Failure to comply with the Order shall be considered as proof of evident bad faith, and shall be considered in the continuing evaluation of the case in view of the continued failure to repay his client. 3. Respondent should also be given a WARNING that a repetition shall be [1] dealt with more severely. The Investigating Commissioner gave credence to the claim of complainant that she engaged the legal services of respondent and paid him for his services and that respondent failed in his undertaking and refund the amount of P41,280.00 to complainant despite her demands and that respondent appeared to be evading the complainant. On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-550 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation with the additional sanction of reprimand for respondent: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification. Respondent is hereby reprimanded and ordered to return the Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P41,280.00) Pesos to [2] complainant within ninety (90) days from receipt of notice.

While the Court agrees with the Board of Governors that respondent should be meted a disciplinary sanction, it finds that the penalty of reprimand recommended by the Board of Governors is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. As found by the Investigating Commissioner, the complainant engaged the legal services of the respondent. As admitted in his letter to the complainant, respondent had just resumed his private practice of law two months before complainant contracted his services for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the registration thereof with the Register of Deeds and the transfer of the title over the property to the complainant: NOVEMBER 1, 2002 DEAR RUBY, I AM SORRY I AM RETURNING YOUR DOCUMENTS WITHOUT CHANGES. I HAD A SERIES OF MONEY PROBLEMS RIGHT AFTER YOU GAVE ME THE TWO CHECKS AND COMING WITH THE AMOUNTS WITH PERSONAL FUNDS. I WAS REVIVING MY LEGAL PRACTICE ONLY FOR TWO MONTHS WHICH WE MET AND HAD JUST SET UP THE OFFICE WITH TWO ASSOCIATES WHICH A FEW WEEKS LATER WE HAD DISAGREEMENTS AND DECIDED TO DISBAND. I WILL HAVE TO REFURBISH MY OFFICE. I AM ISSUING MY PERSONAL CHECK TO GUARANTEE THE AMOUNT I TOOK. I NEED A LITTLE TIME TO COVER THE AMOUNT. THANKS FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING. (Sgd.) EDWIN.
[3]

Respondents claim that complainant did not retain his legal services flies in the face of his letter to complainant. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and [4] unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. In this case, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking for almost two months. Worse, despite demands of complainant, he failed to refund the amount of P41,280.00 and to return to complainant the deed of

absolute sale and title over the property. Respondents claim that complainant could not contact him because he did not have any landline at his residence and that his mobile phone was stolen in October 2001, is hard to believe. He failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove that his telephone at the business center was cut or that his mobile phone had been stolen. Even then, respondent could have easily contacted the complainant at her residence or could have written her a letter informing her that the original copy of TCT No. 324411 in the custody of the Register of Deeds was burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire and that there was a need for the reconstitution of said title. Neither did respondent adduce evidence that he was a life insurance underwriter for Insular Life or that he had been sick with diabetes and had lost his sight in his right eye. Respondent simply refused to adduce evidence to prove his allegations in his Answer to the complaint. The Court is led to believe that respondents failure to cause the transfer of the title of the property under the name of complainant was due to a financial problem that beset him shortly after he received the checks from complainant. It can easily be inferred from respondents letter that he used complainants money to alleviate if not solve his financial woes. What compounded respondents unethical conduct was his drawing of a personal check and delivering the same to complainant without sufficient funds in his bank account to cover the check. Even as he promised to fund his account with the drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the check became due. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and [5] property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has [6] misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the [7] legal profession. In this case, respondent intransigeantly refused to return to the complainant the amount of P41,280.00 which he received for the expenses for the transfer to her of the title of the property and for his professional fees. His dishonest conduct was compounded by his interjection of flimsy excuses for his obstinate refusal to refund the amount to complainant.

The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of [8] a very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions [9] with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard expected of him. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Respondent Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho is found guilty of violation of Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to restitute to the complainant the full amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from notice hereof. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of said amount within ten (10) days from said payment. If Respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the aforesaid period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of three (3) months for every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have paid the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his one year suspension and the subsidiary penalty. This is without prejudice to the right of the complainant to institute the appropriate action for the collection of said amount. SO ORDERED.

DOMINGO D. RUBIAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISAIAS BATILLER, defendant-appellee. TEEHANKEE, J.: In this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court as involving purely legal questions, we affirm the dismissal order rendered by the Iloilo court of first instance after pre-trial and submittal of the pertinent documentary exhibits. Such dismissal was proper, plaintiff having no cause of action, since it was duly established in the record that the application for registration of the land in question filed by Francisco Militante, plaintiff's vendor and predecessor interest, had been dismissed by decision of 1952 of the land registration court as affirmed by final judgment in 1958 of the Court of Appeals and hence, there was no title or right to the land that could be transmitted by the purported sale to plaintiff. As late as 1964, the Iloilo court of first instance had in another case of ejectment likewise upheld by final judgment defendant's "better right to possess the land in question . having been in the actual possession thereof under a claim of title many years before Francisco Militante sold the land to the plaintiff." Furthermore, even assuming that Militante had anything to sell, the deed of sale executed in 1956 by him in favor of plaintiff at a time when plaintiff was concededly his counsel of record in the land registration case involving the very land in dispute (ultimately decided adversely against Militante by the Court of Appeals' 1958 judgment affirming the lower court's dismissal of Militante's application for registration) was properly declared inexistent and void by the lower court, as decreed by Article 1409 in relation to Article 1491 of the Civil Code. The appellate court, in its resolution of certification of 25 July 1972, gave the following backgrounder of the appeal at bar: On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot under Psu99791 located in Barrio General Luna, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot on two occasions in 1945 and in 1959. Plaintiff prayed also for

damages and attorneys fees. (pp. 1-7, Record on Appeal). In his answer with counter-claim defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question and for the alleged malicious institution of the complaint he claims he has suffered moral damages in the amount of P 2,000.00, as well as the sum of P500.00 for attorney's fees. ... On December 9, 1964, the trial court issued a pre-trial order, after a pre-trial conference between the parties and their counsel which order reads as follows.. 'When this case was called for a pre-trial conference today, the plaintiff appeared assisted by himself and Atty. Gregorio M. Rubias. The defendant also appeared, assisted by his counsel Atty. Vicente R. Acsay. A. During the pre-trial conference, the parties have agreed that the following facts are attendant in this case and that they will no longer introduced any evidence, testimonial or documentary to prove them: 1. That Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in the Barrio of General Luna, municipality of Barotac Viejo province of Iloilo, which he caused to be surveyed on July 18-31, 1934, whereby he was issued a plan Psu-99791 (Exhibit "B"). (The land claimed contained an area of 171:3561 hectares.) 2. Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for the registration of the title of the land technically described in psu-99791 (Exh. "B")opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and other oppositors . However, during the war with Japan, the record of the case was lost before it was heard, so after the war Francisco Militante petitioned this court to reconstitute the record of the case. The record was reconstituted on the Court of the First Instance of Iloilo and docketed as Land Case No. R-695, GLRO Rec. No. 54852. The Court of First Instance heard the land registration case on November 14, 1952, and after the trial this court dismissed the application for registration . The appellant, Francisco Militante, appealed from the decision of this Court to the Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-GR No. 13497R.. 3. Pending the disposal of the appeal in CA-GR No. 13497-R and more particularly on June 18, 1956, Francisco Militante sold to the plaintiff,

Domingo Rubias the land technically described in psu-99791 (Exh. "A"). The sale was duly recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province of Iloilo as Entry No. 13609 on July 11, 1960 (Exh. "A-1"). (NOTE: As per deed of sale, Exh. A, what Militante purportedly sold to plaintiff-appellant, his son-in-law, for the sum of P2,000.00 was "a parcel of untitled land having an area Of 144.9072 hectares ... surveyed under Psu 99791 ... (and) subject to the exclusions made by me, under (case) CAi3497, Land Registration Case No. R-695, G.L.R.O. No. 54852, Court of First Instance of the province of Iloilo. These exclusions referred to portions of the original area of over 171 hectares originally claimed by Militante as applicant, but which he expressly recognized during the trial to pertain to some oppositors, such as the Bureau of Public Works and Bureau of Forestry and several other individual occupants and accordingly withdrew his application over the same. This is expressly made of record in Exh. A, which is the Court of Appeals' decision of 22 September 1958 confirming the land registration court's dismissal of Militante's application for registration.) 4. On September 22,1958 the Court of appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13497-R promulgated its judgment confirming the decision of this Court in Land Case No. R-695, GLRO Rec. No. 54852 which dismissed the application for Registration filed by Francisco Militante (Exh. "I"). 5. Domingo Rubias declared the land described in Exh. 'B' for taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 8585 (Exh. "C") for 1957; Tax Dec. Nos. 9533 (Exh. "C-1") and 10019 (Exh. "C-3")for the year 1961; Tax Dec. No. 9868 (Exh. "C-2") for the year 1964, paying the land taxes under Tax Dec. No. 8585 and 9533 (Exh. "D", "D-1", "G-6"). 6. Francisco Militante immediate predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, has also declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 5172 in 1940 (Exh. "E") for 1945; under Tax Dec. No. T-86 (Exh. "E-1") for 1948; under Tax Dec. No. 7122 (Exh. "2"), and paid the land taxes for 1940 (Exhs. "G" and "G-7"), for 1945 46 (Exh. "G-1") for 1947 (Exh. "G-2"), for 1947 & 1948 (Exh. "G-3"), for 1948 (Exh. "G-4"), and for 1948 and 1949 (Exh. "G5"). 7. Tax Declaration No. 2434 in the name of Liberato Demontao for the land described therein (Exh. "F") was cancelled by Tax. Dec. No. 5172 of Francisco Militante (Exh. "E"). Liberato Demontao paid the land tax under Tax Dec. No. 2434 on Dec. 20, 1939 for the years 1938 (50%) and 1959 (Exh. "H").

8. The defendant had declared for taxation purposes Lot No. 2 of the Psu155241 under Tax Dec. Not. 8583 for 1957 and a portion of Lot No. 2, Psu155241, for 1945 under Tax Dec. No. 8584 (Exh. "2-A" Tax No. 8583 (Exh. "2") was revised by Tax Dec. No. 9498 in the name of the defendant (Exh. "2-B") and Tax Dec. No. 8584 (Exh. "2-A") was cancelled by Tax Dec. No. 9584 also in the name of the defendant (Exh. "2-C"). The defendant paid the land taxes for Lot 2, Psu-155241, on Nov. 9, 1960 for the years 1945 and 1946, for the year 1950, and for the year 1960 as shown by the certificate of the treasurer (Exh. "3"). The defendant may present to the Court other land taxes receipts for the payment of taxes for this lot. 9. The land claimed by the defendant as his own was surveyed on June 6 and 7,1956, and a planapproved by Director of Land on November 15, 1956 was issued, identified as Psu 155241 (Exh. "5"). 10. On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer case against Isaias Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of Barotac Viejo Province of Iloilo (Exh. "4") to which the defendant Isaias Batiller riled his answer on August 29, 1960 (Exh. "4-A"). The Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo after trial, decided the case on May 10, 1961 in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff (Exh. "4-B"). The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo which was docketed in this Court as Civil Case No. 5750 on June 3, 1961, to which the defendant, Isaias Batiller, on June 13, 1961 filed his answer (Exh. "4-C"). And this Court after the trial. decided the case on November 26, 1964, in favor of the defendant, Isaias Batiller and against the plaintiff (Exh. "4-D"). (NOTE: As per Exh. 4-B, which is the Iloilo court of first instance decision of 26 November 1964dismissing plaintiff's therein complaint for ejectment against defendant, the iloilo court expressly found "that plaintiff's complaint is unjustified, intended to harass the defendant " and "that the defendant, Isaias Batiller, has a better right to possess the land in question described in Psu 155241 (Exh. "3"), Isaias Batiller having been in the actual physical possession thereof under a claim of title many years before Francisco Militante sold the land to the plaintiff-hereby dismissing plaintiff's complaint and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant attorney's fees ....") B. During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will prove by competent evidence the following: 1. That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante under Exh. "A" was formerly owned and possessed by Liberato Demontao but that on September 6, 1919 the land was sold at public auction by virtue of a

judgment in a Civil Case entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs. Liberato Demontao Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo, defendants", of which Yap Pongco was the purchaser (Exh. "1-3"). The sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on August 4, 1920, under Primary Entry No. 69 (Exh. "1"), and a definite Deed of Sale was executed by Constantino A. Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on Jan. 19, 1934 in favor of Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having been registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 10, 1934 (Exh. "1-1"). 2. On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to Francisco Militante as evidenced by a notarial deed (Exh. "J") which was registered in the Registry of Deeds on May 13, 1940 (Exh. "J-1"). 3. That plaintiff suffered damages alleged in his complaint. C. Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent evidence during the trial of this case the following facts: 1. That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally owned and possessed by Felipe Batiller, grandfather of the defendant Basilio Batiller, on the death of the former in 1920, as his sole heir. Isaias Batiller succeeded his father , Basilio Batiller, in the ownership and possession of the land in the year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land remains in the possession of the defendant, his possession being actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous in the concept of an owner, exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants. 2. That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff have never been in the actual possession of the land and that they never had any title thereto. 3. That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent application of the defendant has beenapproved. 4. The damages suffered by the defendant, as alleged in his counterclaim."'
1

subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to this Court and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante. Invoking Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads: 'Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx (7) Those expressly prohibited by law. 'ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a public auction, either in person of through the mediation of another: . xxx xxx xxx (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights of in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring an assignment and shall apply tolawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.' Defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the property in dispute as the contract he (plaintiff) had with Francisco Militante was inexistent and void. (See pp. 22-31, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that defendant can not invoke Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code as Article 1422 of the same Code provides that 'The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected' (See pp. 32-35 Record on Appeal). On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order disclaiming plaintiffs complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on Appeal.) In the aforesaid order of dismissal the lower court practically agreed with defendant's contention that the contract (Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism Militante was null and void. In due season plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 50-56 Record

The appellate court further related the developments of the case, as follows: On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the

on Appeal) which was denied by the lower court on January 14, 1966 (p. 57, Record on Appeal). Hence, this appeal by plaintiff from the orders of October 18, 1965 and January 14, 1966. Plaintiff-appellant imputes to the lower court the following errors: '1. The lower court erred in holding that the contract of sale between the plaintiff-appellant and his father-in-law, Francisco Militante, Sr., now deceased, of the property covered by Plan Psu-99791, (Exh. "A") was void, not voidable because it was made when plaintiff-appellant was the counsel of the latter in the Land Registration case. '2. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant-appellee is an interested person to question the validity of the contract of sale between plaintiff-appellant and the deceased, Francisco Militante, Sr. '3. The lower court erred in entertaining the motion to dismiss of the defendant-appellee after he had already filed his answer, and after the termination of the pre-trial, when the said motion to dismiss raised a collateral question. '4. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffappellant.' The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs "assignment of errors gives rise to two (2) legal posers (1) whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law, the late Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan Psu-99791 was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute; and (2) whether or not the lower court was correct in entertaining defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss after the latter had already filed his answer and after he (defendant) and plaintiff-appellant had agreed on some matters in a pre-trial conference. Hence, its elevation of the appeal to this Court as involving pure questions of law. It is at once evident from the foregoing narration that the pre-trial conference held by the trial court at which the parties with their counsel agreed and stipulated on the material and relevant facts and submitted their respective 2 documentary exhibits as referred to in the pre-trial order, supra, practically

amounted to a fulldress trial which placed on record all the facts and exhibits necessary for adjudication of the case. The three points on which plaintiff reserved the presentation of evidence at the-trial dealing with the source of the alleged right and title of Francisco 3 Militante's predecessors, supra, actually are already made of record in thestipulated facts and admitted exhibits. The chain of Militante's alleged title and right to the land as supposedly traced back to Liberato Demontao was actually asserted by Militante (and his vendee, lawyer and son-in-law, herein plaintiff) in the land registration case and rejected by the Iloilo land registration court which dismissed Militante's application for registration of the land. Such dismissal, as already stated, was affirmed by the final 4 judgment in 1958 of the Court of Appeals. The four points on which defendant on his part reserved the presentation of evidence at the trial dealing with his and his ancestors' continuous, open, public and peaceful possession in the concept of owner of the land and the 5 Director of Lands' approval of his survey plan thereof, supra, are likewise already duly established facts of record, in the land registration case as well as in the ejectment case wherein the Iloilo court of first instance recognized the superiority of defendant's right to the land as against plaintiff. No error was therefore committed by the lower court in dismissing plaintiff's complaint upon defendant's motion after the pre-trial. 1. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof for P2,000.00 made in 1956 by his father-inlaw, Francisco Militante, in his favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming the dismissal of Militante's application for registration, the lack of any rightful claim or title of Militante to the land was conclusively and decisively judicially determined. Hence, there was no right or title to the land that could be transferred or sold by Militante's purported sale in 1956 in favor of plaintiff. Manifestly, then plaintiff's complaint against defendant, to be declared absolute owner of the land and to be restored to possession thereof with damages was bereft of any factual or legal basis.

2. No error could be attributed either to the lower court's holding that the purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil 6 Code, reproduced supra; and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived." The 1911 case of Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez relied upon by plaintiff as holding that a sale of property in litigation to the party litigant's lawyer "is not void but voidable at the election of the vendor" was correctly held by the lower court to have been superseded by the later 1929 case of Director of 8 Lands vs. Abagat. In this later case of Abagat, the Court expressly cited two antecedent cases involving the same transaction of purchase of property in litigation by the lawyer which was expressly declared invalid under Article 1459 of the Civil Code of Spain (of which Article 1491 of our Civil Code of the Philippines is the counterpart) upon challenge thereof not by the vendorclient but by the adverse parties against whom the lawyer was to enforce his rights as vendee thus acquired. These two antecedent cases thus cited in Abagat clearly superseded (without so expressly stating the previous ruling in Wolfson: The spouses, Juan Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, were the owners of twelve parcels of land. Vicenta Macaraeg died in November, 1909, leaving a large number of collateral heirs but no descendants. Litigation between the surviving husband, Juan Soriano, and the heirs of Vicenta immediately arose, and the herein appellant Sisenando Palarca acted as Soriano's lawyer. On May 2, 1918, Soriano executed a deed for the aforesaid twelve parcels of land in favor of Sisenando Palarca and on the following day, May 3, 1918, Palarca filed an application for the registration of the land in the deed. After hearing, the Court of First Instance declared that the deed was invalid by virtue of the provisions of article 1459 of the Civil Code, which prohibits lawyers and solicitors from purchasing property rights involved in any litigation in which they take part by virtue of their profession. The application for registration was consequently denied, and upon appeal by Palarca to the Supreme Court, the judgement of the lower court was affirmed by a decision promulgated November 16,1925 . (G.R. No. 24329, Palarca vs. Director of Lands, not reported.)
7

In the meantime cadastral case No. 30 of the Province of Tarlac was instituted, and on August 21, 1923, Eleuteria Macaraeg, as administratrix of the estate of Vicente Macaraeg, filed claims for the parcels in question. Buenaventura Lavitoria administrator of the estate of Juan Soriano, did likewise and so did Sisenando Palarca. In a decision dated June 21, 1927, the Court of First Instance, Judge Carballo presiding, rendered judgment in favor of Palarea and ordered the registration of the land in his name. Upon appeal to this court by the administration of the estates of Juan Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, the judgment of the court below was reversed and the land adjudicated to the two estates as conjugal property of the deceased spouses. (G.R. No. 28226, Director of Lands vs. Abagat, promulgated May 9 21, 1928, not reported.) In the very case of Abagat itself, the Court, again affirming the invalidity and nullity of the lawyer's purchase of the land in litigation from his client, ordered the issuance of a writ of possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the adverse parties without reimbursement of the price paid by him and other expenses, and ruled that "the appellant Palarca is a lawyer and is presumed to know the law. He must, therefore, from the beginning, have been well aware of the defect in his title and is, consequently, a possessor in bad faith." As already stated, Wolfson and Abagat were decided with relation to Article 1459 of the Civil Code of Spain then adopted here, until it was superseded on August 30, 1950 by the Civil Code of the Philippines whose counterpart provision is Article 1491. Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law. In Wolfson which involved the sale and assignment of a money judgment by the client to the lawyer, Wolfson, whose right to so purchase the judgment was being challenged by the judgment debtor, the Court, through Justice Moreland, then expressly reserved decision on "whether or not the judgment in question actually falls within the prohibition of the article" and held only that the sale's "voidability can not be asserted by one not a party to the 10 transaction or his representative," citing from Manresa that "(C)onsidering the question from the point of view of the civil law, the view taken by the

code, we must limit ourselves to classifying as void all acts done contrary to the express prohibition of the statute. Now then: As the code does not recognize such nullity by the mere operation of law, the nullity of the acts hereinbefore referred to must be asserted by the person having the necessary legal capacity to do so and decreed by a competent 11 court." The reason thus given by Manresa in considering such prohibited acquisitions under Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code as merely voidable at the instance and option of the vendor and not void "that the Code does not recognize such nullity de pleno derecho" is no longer true and applicable to our own Philippine Civil Code which does recognize the absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy" or which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts 12 "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Supreme Court of Spain and modern authors have likewise veered from Manresa's view of the Spanish codal provision itself. In its sentencia of 11 June 1966, the Supreme Court of Spain ruled that the prohibition of Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code is based on public policy, that violation of the prohibition contract cannot be validated by confirmation or ratification, holding that: ... la prohibicion que el articulo 1459 del C.C. establece respecto a los administradores y apoderados, la cual tiene conforme a la doctrina de esta Sala, contendia entre otras, en S. de 27-5-1959, un fundamento de orden moral lugar la violacion de esta a la nulidad de pleno derecho del acto o negocio celebrado, ... y prohibicion legal, afectante orden publico, no cabe 13 con efecto alguno la aludida retification ... The criterion of nullity of such prohibited contracts under Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) as a matter of public order and policy as applied by the Supreme Court of Spain to administrators and agents in its above cited decision should certainly apply with greater reason to judges, judicial officers, fiscals and lawyers under paragraph 5 of the codal article. Citing the same decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Gullon Ballesteros, his "Curso de Derecho Civil, (Contratos Especiales)" (Madrid, 1968) p. 18, affirms that, with respect to Article 1459, Spanish Civil Code:.

Que caracter tendra la compra que se realice por estas personas? Porsupuesto no cabe duda de que el caso (art.) 1459, 40 y 50, la nulidad 14 esabsoluta porque el motivo de la prohibicion es de orden publico. Perez Gonzales in such view, stating that "Dado el caracter prohibitivo delprecepto, la consequencia de la infraccion es la nulidad radical y ex 15 lege." Castan, quoting Manresa's own observation that. "El fundamento do esta prohibicion es clarisimo. No sa trata con este precepto tan solo de guitar la ocasion al fraude; persiguese, ademasel proposito de rodear a las personas que intervienen en la administrcionde justicia de todos los retigios que necesitan pora ejercer su ministerio librandolos de toda suspecha, que aunque fuere in fundada, redundura 16 endescredito de la institucion." arrives at the contrary and now accepted view that "Puede considerace en nuestro derecho inexistente 'o radicalmente nulo el contrato en los siguentes cases: a) ...; b) cuando el contrato se ha celebrado en violacion de una prescripcion 'o prohibicion legal, fundada sobre motivos de orden publico (hipotesis del art. 4 del 17 codigo) ..." It is noteworthy that Caltan's rationale for his conclusion that fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited 18 contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning." Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or

second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the 19 first contract." As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendantappellant. The principles governing the nullity of such prohibited contracts and judicial declaration of their nullity have been well restated by Tolentino in his treatise on our Civil Code, as follows: Parties Affected. Any person may invoke the in existence of the contract whenever juridical effects founded thereon are asserted against him. Thus, if there has been a void transfer of property, the transferor can recover it by the accion reinvindicatoria; and any prossessor may refuse to deliver it to the transferee, who cannot enforce the contract. Creditors may attach property of the debtor which has been alienated by the latter under a void contract; a mortgagee can allege the inexistence of a prior encumbrance; a debtor can assert the nullity of an assignment of credit as a defense to an action by the assignee. Action On Contract. Even when the contract is void or inexistent, an action is necessary to declare its inexistence, when it has already been fulfilled. Nobody can take the law into his own hands; hence, the intervention of the competent court is necessary to declare the absolute nullity of the contract and to decree the restitution of what has been given under it. The judgment, however, will retroact to the very day when the contract was entered into. If the void contract is still fully executory, no party need bring an action to declare its nullity; but if any party should bring an action to enforce it, the 20 other party can simply set up the nullity as a defense. ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in all instances against plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant, v. ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint filed by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), charging him for gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law. The Facts Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), a 3 British national who passed away on June 18, 2004. Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the Philippines and owned, among 4 others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc. (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased 5 husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent. cralawlibrary On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso 6 7 Bantegui (Bantegui), a major stockholder of Consulting Edge, in order to 8 discuss the settlement of Davids interest in the company. They agreed to another meeting which was, however, postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide something, respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as 9 scheduled. cralawlibrary Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, 10 assuring her that the same was legal. cralawlibrary On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office 11 and refused to give them a duplicate key. cralawlibrary Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, 12 caused the change in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door, which prevented the employees thereof from entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutors Office) a complaint for grave
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coercion against complainant and respondent. In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal records/business interests in Consulting 14 Edge. Thus, on January 17, 2005, the two entered into a Memorandum of 15 Agreement, whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which complainant paid the amount of P150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay respondent P1,000.00 for 16 every court hearing. On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutors Office issued a Resolution dated October 13, 2004, finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion. The corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of 18 course, warrants of arrest were issued against them. Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the 19 grave coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant. Failing 20 to reach respondent despite diligent efforts, complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1689. Despite a directive from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. The case was set for mandatory conference on November 22 23 24, 2006, which was reset twice, on January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence of respondent. The last notice sent to respondent, 24 however, was returned unserved for the reason moved out. In view thereof, Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the mandatory conference terminated and required the parties to submit their 25 position papers, supporting documents and affidavits. cralawlibrary The IBPs Report and Recommendation On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) issued a Report and 26 Recommendation, observing that respondent failed to safeguard complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion case. Commissioner Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor complainant as subrogee of David because complainant has yet to establish her kinship with David and, consequently, her interest in 27 Consulting Edge. Hence, the actions taken by respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the door of the company premises and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the counter legal 28 measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's cause. Commissioner Magpayo found that respondents acts evinced a lack of adequate
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preparation and mastery of the applicable laws on his part, in violation of 29 Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), warranting his 30 suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months. cralawlibrary The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and 31 rules. cralawlibrary In a Resolution dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBPs November 19, 2011 Resolution, and referred the case to the Office o f the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and 33 recommendation. cralawlibrary The OBC's Report and Recommendation On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and 34 Recommendation dated February 6, 2013, concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client and failed to safeguard the latter's 35 rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties as a lawyer. It deemed that the six-month suspension from the practice of law as suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty and, in lieu thereof, 36 recommended that respondent be suspended for three years. Likewise, it ordered respondent to return the P150,000.00 he received from complainant 37 as acceptance fee. cralawlibrary The Court's Ruling After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the OBC. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he 38 accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only 39 fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state: CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
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CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. x x x x

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. x x x x CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. xxxx Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainants cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and,second, abandoned his clients cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending. Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of her deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-handed action taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the latters interest in Consulting Edge i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free ingress and egress of the employees of the said company was highly improper. Verily, a person cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light, respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his client to use peaceful 40 and lawful methods in seeking justice, in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not only improper but also erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his client with competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same regard, he also remained unmindful of his clients trust in him in particular, her trust that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal advice in pursuing her interests thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.

With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent completely abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case against them; this notwithstanding petitioners efforts to reach him as well as his purported receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding 41 from the client or the court. Hence, considering respondents gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint despite due notice. This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of the charges 42 leveled against him. In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable for his infractions as herein discussed. That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed against respondent. Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those committed of respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. 43 Jiz, a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the IBPs directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small 44 v. Banares, the Court meted a similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant; to return the money and documents he received despite demand; to update his client on the status of her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer and attend the mandatory conference 45 before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, a lawyer who neglected complainants cause; refused to immediately account for his clients money and to return the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for information; and failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the Court observes that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not for

respondents imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to complainant, the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC. In the same light, the Court sustains the OBC's recommendation for the return of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the 46 respondent-lawyers's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not instrinsically linked to his professional engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of respondent's receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains 47 undisputed, the Court finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty Gfviolating Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher the P150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts. SO ORDERED.

MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant, vs. ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for the maintenance of an 1 untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards his client. Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court. The essential facts are as follows:
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Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case. Forthwith, a petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by respondent to forestall the execution of the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046. In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, 3 and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend). Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed as Civil Case No. 55118. Respondent demanded from the complainant one thousand pesos (P l,000.00) as attorney's fee which the latter paid that same afternoon. However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship. On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked her to be ready with two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6046). Complainant and her sister were only able to raise the amount of one thousand pesos which they immediately gave to respondent. Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister that he could not locate the judge who would issue the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where respondent ordered some food including two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the remaining balance of the two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) which he earlier demanded. Complainant gave her last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill. Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose, respondent told complainant to prepare the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with

Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment" docketed as Civil Case No. 6046 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila. Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 54117 for "reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by complainant and her sister. When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. Civil Case No. 54117 for reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on June 8, 1987 while Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court against her. On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment, complainant and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days from receipt of notice.

the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the expenses of the suit. Respondent stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint. Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some friends and relatives. On October 26,1987, the money was handed over to the respondent. On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance, Annulment of Simulated or Spurious Sale with Damages," later docketed as Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by respondent with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig, Metro Manila. At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed. Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a deposit of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987, complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for the return of the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein respondent. Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, 4 dismissed Civil Case No. 55118 for failure to state a cause of action. On January 20,1988, Civil Case No. 5521 0 was likewise dismissed for being 5 identical with Civil Case No. 55118. Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge against him are all lies, product of one's 6 imagination and only intended to harrass him.

This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. having represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost cause of complainant respondent should have carefully prepared the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently respondent was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P 10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious. When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of 7 professional ethics . The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact. Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent failed to find a replacement. He 8 did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of his client and of the fidelity, trust and confidence 9 which he owes his client. More so in this case, where by reason of his gross negligence complainant thereby suffered by losing all her cases. The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same day that he had already filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for complainant in Civil

Case No. 55118, reveals his lack of good faith as an advocate. He also failed to appear for the complainant in said case. It was all a show to get more money from her. This adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. When confronted with this evident irregularity, he lamely stated that while he did not physically appear for complainant he nevertheless prepared and drafted the pleadings. His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the property subject of the ejectment proceeding would be returned to her. In fact, it was respondent who persuaded complainant that the filing of these two cases simultaneously were the means by which this objective can be achieved. His duty was not only to prepare the pleadings but to represent complainant until the termination of the cases. This he failed to do. His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when he already knew that he could no longer physically handle the 10 same is an act of deception of his client. It shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a member of the Philippine bar. The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) was given to him as fee for his services, is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually 11 rendered. And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that respondent does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative. Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest. WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances present in this case, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law.

Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of eleven thousand pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned. SO ORDERED.

RAMONA L. VDA. DE ALISBO and NORBERTO S. ALISBO, petitioners, vs. ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR., respondent. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on January 2, 1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de Alisbo and Norberto S. Alisbo against their former counsel, Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., charging him with deceit, malpractice, and professional infidelity. The complaint was referred to this Court on February 5, 1974. After the complainants had submitted the required number of copies of their complaint, the respondent was ordered to file his answer thereto which he did on June 5, 1974. On August 20, 1974, the complainants filed a reply. On August 28, 1974, the Court referred the complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On February 2, 1990, or after sixteen (16) years, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, together with the transcripts of stenographic notes taken at the investigation and folders of exhibits submitted by the parties. The facts of the case, as found by the Solicitor General, are the following: On March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., as his counsel to commence an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been adjudicated to him under the judgment dated April 29, 1961 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 4963, because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of the judgment in his favor within the reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule, 39, Rules of Court). The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following: 1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share or claim; 2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and

3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid fifty per cent (50%) of the value of the property recovered. On April 18, 1970, respondent prepared a complaint for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 but filed it only on September 12, 1970 on five (5) months later. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 9559, entitled: "Ramon S. Alisbo, Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo vs. Carlito Sales, in his own capacity and as Judicial Administrator of the deceased Pedro Sales." The complaint was signed by respondent alone. However, no sooner had he filed the complaint than he withdrew it and filed in its stead (on the same day and in the same case) a second complaint dated August 31, 1970, with Ramon S. Alisbo as the lone plaintiff, praying for the same relief. Teotimo S. Alisbo and Pacifico S. Alisbo were excluded as plaintiffs and were impleaded as defendants instead. Attorneys Bernardo B. Pablo and Benito Jalandoon, Sr. (herein respondent) signed as counsel. On December 8, 1971, an amended complaint was filed wherein the plaintiffs were: Ramon S. Alisbo, assisted by his judicial guardian, Norberto S. Alisbo, and eight (8) others, namely: Pacifico S. Alisbo, Ramona Vda. de Alisbo and Ildefonso, Evangeline, Teotimo, Jr., Reynaldo, Elizabeth and Teresita, all surnamed Alisbo. The amended complaint was signed by Attorney Bernardo B. Pablo alone as counsel of the plaintiffs. On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 had already prescribed (Exh. 21). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Exh. 22). On October 3, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became final on May 30, 1961 yet, and, although a complaint for revival of said judgment was filed by Ramon Alisbo on September 12, 1970, before the ten-year prescriptive period expired, that complaint was null and void for Ramon Alisbo was insane, hence, incompetent and without legal capacity to sue when he instituted the action. The subsequent filing of an Amended Complaint on December 8, 1972, after the statutory limitation period had expired, was too late to save the plaintiffs right of action. Thereafter, nothing more was done by any of the parties in the case. On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. with having deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 and with having concealed from them the material fact that he had

been the former legal counsel of Carlito Sales, their adversary in the probate proceedings. The respondent filed a general denial of the charges against him. When Ramon S. Alisbo engaged the services of Attorney Jalandoon to enforce the decision in Civil Case No. 4963, that decision was already nine (9) years old, hence, it could no longer be executed by mere motion (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court). Complainants had only about a year left within which to enforce the judgment by an independent action. Ramon Alisbo was already insane or incompetent when he hired Attorney Jalandoon to file Civil Case No. 9559 for him. Attorney Jalandoon concealed from Alisbo the fact that he (Atty. Jalandoon) had been the former counsel of Carlito Sales in the probate proceedings where Alisbo and Sales had litigated over their shares of the inheritance. However, according to Attorney Jalandoon, it was only on October 6, 1972, when Civil Case No. 9559 was called for pre-trial, that he discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales. At that time, the ten-year prescriptive period for revival of the judgment in favor of Alisbo had already expired. He thereupon asked Alisbo's permission to allow him (Jalandoon) to withdraw from the case. He also informed the court about his untenable position and requested that he be allowed to retire therefrom. His request was granted. In his report to the Court, the Solicitor General made the following observations: Evident from the foregoing is the fact that in handling the case for Ramon S. Alisbo which eventually led to its dismissal, respondent committed several errors, among which are: 1. He did not verify the real status of Ramon Alisbo before filing the case. Otherwise, his lack of capacity to sue would not have been at issue. 2. He postponed the motion to revive judgment and gave way instead to a motion to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he frittered away precious time. 3. He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and impleaded them as defendants. Otherwise, the complaint would have been defective only in part.

Had not respondent committed the above mistakes, Civil Case No. 9559 in all probability would not have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. (pp. 9-10, Solicitor General's Report.) While the Solicitor General does not believe that Attorney Jalandoon's mistakes in handling Alisbo's case were deliberate or made with malice aforethought because there is no "proof of collusion or conspiracy between respondent and those who would benefit from the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 . . . and that, on the other hand, respondent stood to gain substantially (50% of the amount recovered) if he had succeeded in having the judgment revived and executed" (pp. 10-11, Solicitor General's Report), still those errors are so gross and glaring that they could not have resulted from mere negligence or lack of due care. Attorney Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know before the pre-trial that the Sales defendants had been his clients in the past, is unbelievable because: 1. Before he filed the complaint for revival of judgment, he had had several interviews with Ramon S. Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo regarding Civil Case No. 4963. 2. He must have done some research on the court records of Civil Case No. 4963, so he could not have overlooked his own participation in that case as counsel for Carlito Sales, et al. 3. To prepare the complaint for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 9559), he had to inform himself about the personal circumstances of the defendantsCarlito Sales, et al. The fact that they had been his clients could not have eluded him. In view of his former association with the Saleses, Attorney Jalandoon, as a dutiful lawyer, should have declined the employment proffered by Alisbo on the ground of conflict of interest. Had he done that soon enough, the Alisbos (herein complainants) would have had enough time to engage the services of another lawyer and they would not have lost their case through prescription of the action. The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide: 6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.) The impression we gather from the facts is that Attorney Jalandoon used his position as Alisbo's counsel precisely to favor his other client, Carlito Sales, by delaying Alisbo's action to revive the judgment in his favor and thereby deprive him of the fruits of his judgment which Attorney Jalandoon, as Sales' counsel, had vigorously opposed. Thus, although Atty. Jalandoon prepared Alisbo's complaint for revival of judgment on April 18, 1970, he delayed its filing until September 12, 1970. He postponed filing the action by asking the Court instead to resolve pending incidents in said Civil Case No. 4963. By doing that, he frittered away what little time was left before the action would prescribe. The original complaint which he filed in the names of Ramon Alisbo and his brothers was only partially defective because of Ramon's incompetence. By dropping the other plaintiffs, leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the action, respondent made the second complaint wholly defective and ineffectual to stop the running of the prescriptive period. After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on the case. While he allegedly found out about Ramon Alisbo's insanity on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the complaint to implead Alisbo's legal guardian as plaintiff on December 8, 1971 only, or almost five (5) months later. By that time the prescriptive period had run out. The surrounding circumstances leave us with no other conclusion than that Attorney Jalandoon, betrayed his client Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause with that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a lawyer is obligated to give to every case that he accepts from a client. There is more than simple negligence resulting in the extinguishment and loss of his client's right of action; there is a hint of duplicity and lack of candor in his dealings with his client, which call for the exercise of this Court's disciplinary power.

The Honorable Solicitor General who conducted the investigation of this case found respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity. Although the Solicitor General recommended the suspension of respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon Sr. from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court, after due deliberation, decided to suspend him for a period of two (2) years from the finality of this decision.

FULGENCIO A. NGAYAN, TOMASA K. NGAYAN and BELLA AURORA NGAYAN, complainants, vs. ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: This case refers to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein complainants Fulgencio A. Ngayan, Tomasa K. Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan in a letter-complaint dated November 16, 1982 against respondent lawyer for violation of sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines. It appears that respondent lawyer was formerly a counsel for complainants either as defense counsel or private prosecutor in the following cases: (a) People v. Fulgencio A. Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch Criminal Case No. 053773-CR for light threat; (b) People v. Tomasa Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch VIII, Criminal Case No. 053594-CR, for unjust vexation; (c) People v. Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch II, Criminal Case No. 053599-CR, for grave threats; (d) People v. Roberto Leonido, City Court of Manila, Branch XIV, Criminal Case No. 053649-CR, for trespass to dwelling; and People v. Nestor Campo, Branch XIV, Criminal Case No. 053650-CR, for threats; (e) Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido for grave threats and trespass; Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano, for grave defamation, Office of the City Fiscal of Manila before Assistant City Fiscal Elmer K. Calledo, I.S. No. 82-8564. (pp. 1-2, Rollo) The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: Complainants alleged that they asked respondent to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the same, Mrs. Tomasa

A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she was rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not mention that Robert Leonido was with Rowena Soriano when both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly told respondent about his omission and in front of her, respondent crossed out the paragraph she complained about and promised to make another affidavit. In the meantime, complainants filed motions to discharge the respondent as their counsel. Complainants allegedly made a follow up after discharging respondent and found that the name of Robert Leonido was not included in the charge. Since the omission was remedied by their new counsel and the case was subsequently filed in court, the adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation and attached thereto the first affidavit of complainants which was crossed out. Complainants averred that the motion was filed by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of respondent. They further said that respondent was also a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company. Complainants further alleged that the motion for reinvestigation was set for hearing before Assistant City Fiscal Milagros F. Garcia-Beza where respondent himself executed and submitted an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano controverting the affidavit of complainants notwithstanding the fact that he prepared the latter's affidavit when he was still their counsel. They further alleged that before he executed and submitted his affidavit, respondent sent a personal letter to Fiscal Beza denouncing complainants and stating that he is filing criminal and civil cases against them. Complainants charged respondent for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court, which provide: (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; (f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged; Complainants claim that paragraph (e) above was violated by respondent when the affidavit he prepared for complainants but subsequently crossedout was submitted as evidence against complainants in the motion for reinvestigation. As to paragraph (f), complainants averred that respondent

violated it when he sent a letter to the fiscal saying that his name was being adversely affected by the false affidavits of complainants and for that reason, respondent was contemplating to file a criminal and civil action for damages against them. In a resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated January 19, 1983, respondent was required to answer the complaint against him but respondent failed. Thus, on May 25, 1983, for failure of the respondent to file an answer, this Court resolved to refer this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereupon, the Solicitor General set the complaint for hearing on September 26, 1983, October 17 and 18,1983 and November 24,1983, all of which dates, respondent was duly notified. However, respondent never appeared on any date. Accordingly, the Solicitor General made findings of facts based on the aforesaid claims of complainants and said: Consistent with respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint herein filed against him, he also did not appear, despite due notice on the four occasions when the hearing of the present complaint was set at the Office of the Solicitor General. Neither has respondent shown concern or interest about the status of the complaint filed against him. The inaction of respondent to the resolutions of this Honorable Court requiring him to file his Answer to the Complaint filed against him and his subsequent failure to attend the hearings on the said complaint indicate that respondent has not obeyed the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and he has not conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients (Sec. 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Further, lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes. They should stand foremost in complying with the court's directives or instructions being themselves officers of the court (p. 75, Legal Ethics, Ruben Agpalo, 2nd Ed.). This lack of concern shown by respondent regarding the matter that involved the very foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law would show how much less he 1 would regard the interest of Ms clients. He thus recommended that the respondent lawyer be disbarred and his name dropped from attorney's roll. In this report, he averred that the conduct of respondent as above-shown constitutes unprofessional conduct and an outright violation of the provisions of Section 3 and paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the

respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof (Santos v. Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22, 1978, 84 SCRA 622). In the case at bar, complainants claim that respondent furnished the adverse parties in a certain criminal case with a copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it as evidence against complainants. This actuation constitutes betrayal of trust and confidence of his former clients in violation of paragraph (e), Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Inasmuch as respondent failed to answer the complaint filed against him and despite due notice on four occasions, he consistently did not appear on the scheduled hearing set by the Office of the Solicitor General, this claim remained uncontroverted. Besides, We tend to believe the said claim of complainants when it is taken together with their other claim that respondent's actuations from the beginning tend to show that he was partial to the adverse parties as he even tried to dissuade complainants from filing charges against Robert Leonido. This partiality could be explained by the fact that respondent is the former classmate of Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, the adverse parties' counsel and the fact that respondent is the lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company. Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients such as the fact that the crime charged in complainants' affidavit had prescribed and that he was asked to prepare an affidavit to make the offense more grave so as to prevent the offense from prescribing demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative of the first part of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Likewise, respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case against them shows not only his bias against the complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer. It was meant only to titillate the anger of complainants. Additionally, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court. But We feel that disbarment is too harsh considering the circumstances of the case. We hold that suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year should be imposed on respondent for the aforestated misconduct. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Faustino F. Tugade is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective from receipt of this resolution.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court provision covering this cases central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled case. In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in [2] Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94, a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera. The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in its Resolution dated November 19, [3] 1996. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath. In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maqueras case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maqueras acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative [4] of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. Pursuant to this Courts directive in its Resolution dated March 18, [5] 1997, the Bar Confidant sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the record of the [6] disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him.
[1]

The Court received certified copies of the record of Maqueras case [7] from the District Court of Guam on December 8, 1997. Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and recommendation [8] within sixty (60) days from the IBPs receipt of the case records. The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear [9] before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998. However, the notice was returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any [10] forwarding address. On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and [11] unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full. The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably [12] high fee for handling his clients case. In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying [13] the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period. At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged [14] to pay him. On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the [15] latter. On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his [16] name.

On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars [17] (US$320,000.00). On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) [18] conducted hearings regarding Maqueras alleged misconduct. Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of [19] Guam praying that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and [20] 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyers acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully [21] disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing. The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period of two [2] years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action by the Superior Court of [22] Guam. Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior written agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute an [23] exorbitant fee for his legal services to Castro. On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered [24] its Decision suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castros right of redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of Castros property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more

than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case that he was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business transactions between an attorney and his client in a very general sort of [25] way. On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of [26] ethics in the Philippines. However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A [27] of the Revised Rules of Court. The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states: Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office , grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied). The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras acts, namely: acquiring by assignment Castros right of redemption over the property

subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction. The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code [28] of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients property which is the subject of the [29] litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney [30] may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. The case of In re: Ruste illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the attorney acquired his clients property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held: Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latters behest, as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and [32] client, and of the rights of both. The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras acquisition of Castros right of redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption was
[31]

assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00. Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2) -year suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence repo sed in him; and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones goods standing in the legal [33] profession. It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering Maqueras suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the [34] Philippines. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or [35] suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical [36] acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that [37] an investigation may be conducted ex parte. The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maqueras current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership

dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the [39] delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction. The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution. In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.

[38]

DOLORES D. PARIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR P. PAGUINTO, respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case A lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and time to every case he accepts. A lawyer impliedly warrants that he possesses the necessary diligence, learning and skill to handle each case. He should exert his best judgment and exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of his clients cause. The Facts Sometime in October 2001, complainant Dolores Dryden Parias (Parias) engaged the services of respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto (Paguinto) to annul her marriage to Danilo Sorian o. They agreed that for the legal services, Parias would pay Paguinto an acceptance fee of P25,000, the filing fee of P2,500 and other incidental expenses. On 2 December 2001, Parias paid Paguinto P10,000 in cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee. An acknowledgment receipt [1] evidenced this payment. Parias gave Paguinto a diskette containing a narration of what happened between her and her estranged husband Danilo Soriano. Parias also furnished Paguinto with a copy of her marriage contract with Soriano. Before the end of December 2001, Parias gave Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee. Sometime between January and April 2002, Parias inquired from Paguinto on the progress of her annulment case. Paguinto informed her that the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 64 (RTC Manila, Branch 64), before Judge Ricaforte and that the hearing was scheduled on 25 April 2002. Before the hearing, Parias requested for a meeting with Paguinto but the secretary informed her that the hearing was cancelled. The secretary further informed Parias that the judge reset the succeeding hearings originally scheduled on 29 May 2002 and 26 June 2002 because the judge was sick or out of town. On the first week of July 2002, Parias went to the trial court to inquire about her case but the court personnel in RTC-Manila, Branch 64 informed her that there was no such case filed in their court. Parias asked Paguinto for the case number, date of filing, copy of the petition and the court where

the annulment case was pending. Paguinto told Parias that the records were at his office and that he was in Malolos, Bulacan attending to a case. It turned out that there was no annulment case filed in RTC-Manila, Branch 64. Paguinto promised to return the money that Parias paid as down payment. However, Paguinto returned the P10,000 only after Parias filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integ rated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) the present complaint for disbarment. In the Order dated 14 February 2003, the CBD directed Paguinto to answer the complaint. Paguinto asked for an extension of 15 days to file his Answer. The CBD granted the extension in the Order dated 19 March [3] 2003. However, Paguinto failed to file his Answer within the extended period and thus the CBD declared him in default in the Order dated 15 July [4] 2003. After the hearing, Parias submitted her Position Paper praying that the CBD declare Paguinto guilty of violation of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On 10 September 2003, Parias filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of the complaint. Parias stated that Paguinto personally explained exhaustively the reasons why he failed to comply with his obligations and she realized that the complaint arose due to a misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and miscommunication. Parias manifested that she was withdrawing the complaint, as she was no longer interested in pursuing the case. On the same date, Paguinto filed a Manifestation and [6] Motion explaining that he failed to attend the hearing on 30 July 2003 because he was in Tabuk, Kalinga attending a hearing in a criminal case for frustrated homicide. He apologized to Parias for his actuations claiming himself solely to be blamed. He further declared that he failed to timely prepare and file the petition for annulment because he spends his time mostly in Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Cavite where he practices law catering to those clients who have less in life. Commissioners Report & Recommendation The IBP designated Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Commissioner) as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the case. The Commissioner found Paguinto negligent in performing his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. The Commissioner declared that a lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention, care and time to his cases, accepting only as many cases as he can handle. Paguinto failed to comply with this duty. The Commissioner recommended the suspension of Paguinto from the practice of law for six months. The Courts Ruling
[5] [2]

We agree with the Commissioner. Parias gave Paguinto P10,000 cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee. Parias also gave Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee. Paguinto led Parias to believe that he had filed the annulment case. Paguinto informed Parias that the case was filed with the RTCManila, Branch 64, before Judge Ricaforte. However, Parias later found out that Paguinto never filed the annulment case in court. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code) provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorneyclient relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients [7] cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be [8] returned to the client on demand. Paguinto returned the money only after Parias filed this administrative case for disbarment. Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case. A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as much cases as he can [9] efficiently handle, otherwise his clients interests will suffer. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter. He must also give adequate attention to his legal work. The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge [10] and diligence to manage their cases. The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family. In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara,
[11]

to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. An attorneys duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his retainer unt il his effective release from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his clients interests may require. And failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code.
[12]

Rule 18.01 of the Code is clear. A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service that he is not qualified to render. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. He has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. Rule 18.03 of the Code also provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence shall render him liable. One last point. Parias executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of the complaint stating that she was withdrawing the administrative complaint against Paguinto after realizing that said complaint against the respondent arose due to misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and miscommunication. Paguinto, on the other hand, submitted a Manifestation and Motion apologizing to Parias for his actuations and admitting that he was solely to be blamed. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does [14] not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer, especially in this case where the lawyer admitted his misconduct. Pariass affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does not exonerate Paguinto in any way. We reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. [15] Rayos that [A] proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken solely for the public welfare. x x x The attorney is called upon to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto GUILTY of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we penalize Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto with SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision.
[13]

we ruled:

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, and his duty of entire devotion to his clients cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means

EMMA V. DE JUAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA III, respondent. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: In her Salaysay filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 29, 2002, complainant, former client of respondent, charged respondent with negligence in handling her labor case and threats against her person. The complainant alleged that respondent Atty. Oscar R. Baria III, as her counsel in NLRC NCR CA No. 022654-00/NLRC RAB IV-7-11287-99R, Emma De Juan v. Triple AAA Antique/Mr. Yappe and Mr. Godofredo Nadia, negligently failed to file motion for reconsideration of the decision [1] dated September 24, 2001 of the NLRC in her behalf. The complainant avers that she was hired by Triple AAA on or about December 15, 1998 as packer on probation status for six months in its [2] Packing Department. Based on a performance evaluation citing her irregular attendance and inefficiency, the company terminated her services [3] on June 11, 1999, after waiting for two weeks for her to report. She claims [4] that she was terminated without notice nor explanation so she filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the company for illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for holiday, th rest day, and 13 month pay. She also claimed moral and exemplary [5] damages and attorneys fees. In search of a lawyer, she asked the assistance of Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which assigned respondent to handle her labor case. Respondent represented complainant on a contingency fee agreement. On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor [6] of complainant. Triple AAA appealed to the NLRC. In a decision promulgated on September 24, 2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter [7] and declared there was no illegal dismissal. Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal. She said that she came to know of the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision when she called respondent in October 2001. When she asked the respondent what they should do, respondent answered, Paano iyan ihaehhindi ako marunong gumawa ng Motion for Reconsideration. Sometime in November 2001, her husband called respondent to ask if he did anything in connection with the NLRCs Decision and he was advised by respondents secretary that, Sabi

ni Attyhuwag na kayong magpakita sa kanya dahil galit na galit sa inyo si [8] Attorney at baka kung ano pa ang magawa niya sa inyo . The Court required respondent to comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and [9] recommendation. In his Comment, respondent explained that soon after passing the bar in 1999, he was employed as a broadcaster in DWANs radio program offering free legal services to the poor. He gave free legal services to indigent clients one of whom was complainant. As a practice, he said he forewarned his clients that he was just a new lawyer and that they should not expect too much from him because of his limited legal experience. According to respondent he tried to explain to complainant the legal remedies available to her as well as the time her case may take. It appeared to him that complainant did not fully grasp the usual delays that may be involved in her case. He recalled that when he told complainant that the Labor Arbiters decision was in her favor, she was so jubilant at the money judgment. Later however, the complainant became furious when he told her that Triple AAA Antique had appealed. Respondent filed a Motion for Writ of Execution of the Labor Arbiters Decision but this Motion was ruled premature. Respondent then filed an opposition to the appeal filed by Triple AAA but the NLRC still gave due course to the appeal. While Triple AAAs appeal was pending resolution he told complainant to call him every week so that she could be advised of any developments in her case. He generously suggested that complainant call collect to lessen her expenses. He even allowed complainant and her husband to stay in his home when they came to Manila from the province. He said he even fed them when they were inManila. In October 2001, the NLRC rendered its decision reversing the Labor Arbiter. By this time, according to respondent, he confronted complainant for lying to him about her employment with Triple AAA and told her that because of her lies there was a possibility she could lose the appeal. He advised complainant to get a more experienced lawyer for her appeal because as a new lawyer he was not confident he could handle her appeal. Thereafter, complainant no longer contacted him and at some time, he even had to ask her whereabouts from her relatives. On December 2001, respondent received calls from the staff of Raffy Tulfo, a radio commentator. In one of these calls, his wife talked to one of Tulfos employees and she was told that complainant told Tulfo that the respondent received money from Triple AAA Antique. As a result Tulfo lambasted him on his radio program. Respondent thereafter called Tulfo, explained his side, and demanded that the latter apologize on air otherwise he would file a libel case against Tulfo.

Sometime in January 2002, respondents secretary received a call from the complainants husband. When respondents secretary confronted the husband regarding the Tulfo incident, complainants husband retorted, Sabihin mo sa kanya mag ingat siya at baka may mangyari sa kanya. Shortly thereafter, respondent began receiving death threats over the phone and also noticed armed men casing his office. He reported these calls and presence of suspicious armed men to the police. Respondent surmises that complainant believed Triple AAA paid him off and he pocketed money supposedly for her. Respondent vehemently denied he did. He asks that Triple AAA be summoned to bear witness to his story. Respondent asserts that he has not committed any breach of his oath and that he has vigorously pursued his clients cause to the end. He avers that it was his clients own negligence and folly that caused her to lose her case. He asks that the complaint be dismissed. In a Resolution dated March 15, 2003, this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required complainant to reply. In her reply written in Filipino, complainant denied that she accepted money from respondent during the pendency of her labor case, except on one occasion when she borrowed P100 from respondents secretary for travel fare back to the province. She reiterated that she filed her Salaysay because of respondents failure to file a motion for reconsideration. She further insists that she does not believe that respondent did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration as he claims since she was aware that even a law student would know how to. In its Resolution dated August 30, 2003, the IBP approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The IBP Board of Governors found respondent guilty of negligence in handling the aforecited labor case and recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law for three months. The charge of grave threats was dismissed for [10] complainants failure to substantiate the same. The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainant a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC. No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and [11] confidence reposed in him. Further, among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw

his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in [12] the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects the [13] client. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his [14] lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC such that the said decision eventually had become final and executory. Respondent does not refute this. His excuse that he did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration is lame and unacceptable. After complainant had expressed an interest to file a motion for reconsideration, it was incumbent upon counsel to diligently return to his books and re-familiarize himself with the procedural rules for a motion for reconsideration. Filing a motion for reconsideration is not a complicated legal task. We are however, not unaware that respondent had been forthright and candid with his client when he warned her of his lack of experience as a new lawyer. We are also not unaware that he had advised complainant to get a new lawyer. However, his candor cannot absolve him. As already stressed by this Court: A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to not just competent service but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of law the interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for [15] disciplinary action. Again, the Court held in the case of Santos v. Lazaro, that Rule [17] 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable. Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record and whether or not he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the [18] new attorney is recorded in the case. Respondent did not comply with these obligations.
[16]

WHEREFORE, respondent lawyer Oscar R. Baria III is hereby FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of this or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, complainant, vs. Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latters money or other property coming into the formers possession should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers own; much less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. The Case and the Facts Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the [1] Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The Affidavit submitted by complainant alleges the following: Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment; After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I was required to pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which amount was paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as Annex A to form part hereof; As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the following week to make follow-up on said case. However, I was informed later by my son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because the latter was so busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action done on our case;

Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latters failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will assist me in the above-mentioned case; My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naravals office that same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their house, and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no money; Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline; xxx xxx x x x.
[2]

In an Order dated March 12, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez, directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same directive was reiterated in [3] the CBDs May 31, 2002 Order issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his receipt of the [4] Orders. Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD [5] proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order dated November 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit her position paper within ten days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution. The CBD received complainants Position Paper 2002. Report of the Investigating Commissioner In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows: Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable x x x.
[6]

on December 10,

In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will render legal services to her, and after receiving certain amount from the latter as payment for filing fee and service fee did nothing in return, has caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished. xxx xxx xxx

CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can [13] efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with [14] dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their lawyers oath. The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as filing and service fee and thereby gave her hope that her case would be acted upon. Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is [15] not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers. If they find that their clients cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the [16] incontrovertible. The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in [17] all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he failed to properly appraised her of the status of her case which she later on found to have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and the complainant have been decided against the latter and which judgment has long become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the respondent of such finality based on the documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital information and did not properly appraise the complainant. Thus, respondent violated the [7] mandate in Canon 15 x x x. IBP Board of Governors Resolution On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted Report. The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of complainants P8,000. The Courts Ruling We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondents Administrative Liability Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as [8] advocates of any person who may wish to become their client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a [9] position to carry it out effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional [10] Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients [11] cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, [12] skill and competence, regardless of importance. The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely [18] had no right to keep or use. Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their clients money and property [19] that may come into their possession. As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office -- was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had [20] reposed in him. His failure to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal [21] profession. The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal [22] processes and the courts, but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their [23] fiduciary relationship. Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this [24] Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public. Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the [25] profession. WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainants eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

RIZALINO FERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR. respondent. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for alleged patent and gross neglect in the handling of Civil Case No. 7500 which complainant Rizalino Fernandez and others had filed against the Bacolod City Water District before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Bacolod City. In his letter, dated October 16, 1996, to the Court Administrator, complainant imputed the following negligent acts to respondent which led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 7500: 1. Respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing on January 11, 1996 nor seek a postponement thereof, for which reason the trial court considered respondent to have waived further presentation of his evidence and directed him to formally offer his exhibits for admission on January 30, 1996; 2. Notwithstanding receipt of the order dated January 11, 1996, respondent failed to formally offer his exhibits on January 30, 1996, prompting the trial court to order the dismissal of the case; 3. While respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, he did not file his motion within the reglementary period, as a result of which the said motion, actually filed on May 7, 1996, was denied by the trial court on May 14, 1996 for having been filed out of time; 4. When asked for an explanation regarding the dismissal of the case, respondent informed complainant through a letter, dated July 30, 1996, that he had filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but the motion, which had been filed a long time ago, had not yet been resolved by the trial court; 5. Respondent tried to shift the blame on complainant by claiming that the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last witness. The truth was that complainants sister had already testified and there was no more witness to present; and 6. Respondent only attended one (1) hearing in the civil case. In his answer, dated September 3, 1997, respondent averred that the complaint filed against him was baseless and was purely malicious and
[2] [1]

speculative considering the fact that it was not made under oath. He alleged that complainant engaged his legal services after the first counsel had withdrawn from the case because of a misunderstanding with complainant. He stated that he had no knowledge of what had happened in the case before he handled it because complainant did not furnish him the records and stenographic notes of the previous proceedings despite his repeated requests. Respondent further claimed that he failed to formally offer the exhibits as evidence because complainant could not be reached when he was needed for conference and the latter even tried to take over the handling of the case by insisting on presenting more witnesses who nevertheless failed to appear during trial despite several postponements. The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), which [3] submitted a report, dated February 3, 2001, finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month. Thereafter, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which in its report and recommendation, dated October 15, 2001, found respondent remiss in observing the standard care, diligence and competence prescribed for members of the bar in the performance of their professional duties. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with warning that the commission of the same or similar offenses will [4] be dealt with more severely in the future. The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner was approved on June 29, 2002 by the [5] IBP Board of Governors. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, dated September 17, 2002, alleging that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because it was not verified. According to him, the complaint was a mere political ploy to discredit him because he was aspiring for a congressional seat in the 1998 elections. He denied complainants claim that he attended only one hearing. He explained that he was not able to terminate his presentation of evidence because complainant insisted on presenting as witness his sister who was residing in Manila, even though the latter repeatedly failed to appear in court despite several postponements. He claimed that complainant had told him that his intention was really to delay the case as he was using the same as his leverage in a criminal case filed or to be filed against him by the Bacolod City Water District for his alleged water tapping. When he refused to go along with the scheme, complainant allegedly threatened to change counsel. Respondent further alleged that complainants attitude is apparent from the fact that the latter caused to be disseminated several copies of the IBP Resolution recommending his (respondents) suspension and distributed them to radio

stations in Bacolod City. For these reasons, respondent sought the reversal [6] of the IBP Resolution. After review of the records of this case, the Court finds the report of the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP to be well taken. The records clearly show that respondent has been negligent in the performance of his duties as complainants counsel. His failure to file his formal offer of exhibits constitutes inexcusable negligence as it proved fatal to the cause of his client since it led to the dismissal of the case. To compound his inefficiency, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration outside the reglementary period, which was thus accordingly denied by the trial court for being filed out of time. Hence, the order issued by the trial court dismissing the case became final. Respondents acts and omission clearly constitute violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides in pertinent parts: CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

known that he could easily obtain a copy of the records and stenographic notes from the court where the case was docketed. Respondent likewise refers to the alleged obnoxious attitude of complainant in trying to manipulate the manner in which he was handling the case as the main reason for his failure to formally offer his exhibits in contravention of the order of the court. But respondent should bear in mind that while a lawyer owes utmost zeal and devotion to the interest of his client, he also has the responsibility of employing only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and he should not allow the latter [8] to dictate the procedure in handling the case. As this Court said in another case: A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his clients cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the [9] general public. As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, 1 of the Rules of Court on Disbarment [10] and Discipline of Attorneys, suffice it to say that such constitutes only a formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in [11] order that the ends of justice may be served. However, instead of suspension for six (6) months as recommended by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, we hold that the suspension of respondent Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for one (1) month, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant, would be commensurate considering that this is the first time Atty. Novero is found guilty of neglect of his clients case. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month effective upon finality hereof with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with even more severely. SO ORDERED.

Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. As this Court has held: A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be binding on his client. Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and [7] competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause. Respondents attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant is apparent. His averment that complainant failed to turn over to him the records and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his incompetence and inadequacy in handling complainants case. Considering that respondent has been practicing law for almost 15 years, he should have