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Anatoly Golitsyn

New Lies For Old

The Communist strategy of deception and Disinformation

An ex-KGB officer warns how communist deception threatens survival of the West
Dodd, Mead & Company, 1984, 412 pp., $15

Editors' Foreword

Very rarely disclosures of information from behind the Iron Curtain throw new light on the
roots of communist thought and action and challenge accepted notions on the operation of
the communist system. We believe that this book does both these things. It is nothing if not
controversial. It rejects conventional views on subjects ranging fro Khrushchev's overthrow
to Tito's revisionism, from Dubchek's liberalism to Ceausecu's independence, and from the
dissident movement to the Sino-Soviet split. The author's analysis has many obvious
implications for Western policy. It will not be readily accepted by those who have for long
been committed to opposing points of view. But we believe that the debates it is likely to
provoke will lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of the threat from international
communism and, perhaps, to a firmer determination to resist it.

The author's services to the party and the KGB and the unusually long periods he spent in
study, mainly in the KGB. but also with the University of Marxism-Leninism and the
Diplomatic School, make the author uniquely qualified as a citizen of the West to write
about the subjects covered in this book.
He was born near Poltava, in the Ukraine, in 1926. He was thus brought up as a member of
the postrevolutionary generation. From 1933 onward he lived in Moscow. He joined the
communist youth movement (Komsomol) at the age of fifteen while he was a cadet in
military school. He became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in
1945 while studying at the artillery school for officers at Odessa.
In the same year he entered military counterintelligence. On graduation from the Moscow
school of military counterespionage in 1946, he joined the Soviet intelligence service. While
working in its headquarters he attended evening classes at the University of Marxism-
Leninism, from which he graduated in 1948. From 1948 to 1950 he studied in the
counterintelligence faculty of the High Intelligence School; also, between 1949 and 1952 he
completed a correspondence course with the High Diplomatic School.

In 1952 and early 1953 he was involved, with a friend, in drawing up a proposal to the
Central Committee on the reorganization of Soviet intelligence. The proposal included
suggestions on the strengthening of counterintelligence, on the wider use of the satellite
intelligence services, and on the reintroduction of the "activist style" into intelligence work.
In connection with this proposal, he attended a meeting of the Secretariat chaired by Stalin
and a meeting of the Presidium chaired by Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Bulganin.
For three months in 1952-52 the author worked as a head of section in the department of
the Soviet intelligence service responsible for counterintelligence service responsible for
counterespionage against the United States. In 1953 he was posted to Vienna, where he
served for two years under cover as a member of the apparat of the Soviet High
Commission. For the first year he worked against Russian emigres, and for the second
against British intelligence. In 1954 he was elected to be a deputy secretary of the party
organization in the KGB residency in Vienna, numbering seventy officers. On return to
Moscow he attended the KGB Institute, now the KGB Academy, as a full-time student for
four years, graduation from there with a law degree in 1959. As a student of the institute
and a s party member, he was will placed to follow the power struggle in the Soviet
leadership that was reflected in secret party letters, briefings, and conferences.
From 1959 to 1060, at a time when a new long-range policy for the bloc was being
formulated and the KGB was being reorganized to play its part in it, he served as a senior
analyst in the NATO section of the Information Department of the Soviet intelligence
service. He was then transferred to Finland, where, under cover as vice-consul in the Soviet
embassy in Helsinki, he worked on counterintelligence matters until his break with the
regime in December 1961.
By 1956 he was already beginning to be disillusioned with the Soviet system. The Hungarian
events of that year intensified his disaffection. He concluded that the only practical way to
fight the regime was from abroad and that, armed with his inside knowledge of the KGB, he
would be able to do so effectively. Having his decision, be began systematically to elicit and
commit to memory information that he thought would be relevant and valuable to the West.
The adoption of the new aggressive long-range communist policy precipitated his decision to
break with the regime. He felt that the necessity of warning the West of the new dimensions
of that threat that it was facing justified him in abandoning his country and facing the
personal sacrifices involved. His break with the regime was a deliberate and long-
premeditated political act. Immediately on his arrival in the United States, he sought to
convey a warning to the highest authorities in the U.S. government on the new political
dangers to the Western world stemming from the harnessing of all the political resources of
the communist bloc, including its intelligence and security services, to the new long-range
From 1962 onward the author devoted a large proportion of his time to the study of
communist affairs as an outside observer reading both the communist and Western press.
He began work on this book. While working on the book he continued to bring to the
attention of American and other Western authorities his views on the issues considered in it,
and in 1968 allowed American and British officials to read the manuscript as it then stood.
Although the manuscript has since been enlarged to cover the events of the last decade and
revised as the underlying communist strategy became clearer to the author, the substance
of the argument has changed little since 1968. Owing to the length of the manuscript, a
substantial part of it has been held over for publication at a later date.

With few exceptions, those Western officials who were aware of the views expressed in the
manuscript, especially on the Sino-Soviet split, rejected them. In fact, over the years it
became increasingly clear to the author that there was no reasonable hope of his analysis of
communist affairs being seriously considered in Western official circles. At the same time,
he became further convinced that events continued to confirm the validity of his analysis,
that the threat from international communism was not properly understood, and that this
threat would shortly enter a new and more dangerous phase. The author therefore decided
to publish his work with the intention of alerting a wider sector of world public opinion to the
dangers as he sees them, in the hope of stimulating a new approach to the study of
communism and of provoking a more coherent, determined and effective response to it by
those who remain interested in the preservation of free societies in the noncommunist
In order to give effect to his decision to publish, the author asked the four of us, all former
U.S. or British government officials for editorial advice and help. Three of us have known
the author and his views for twelve years or more. We can testify to his Sisphean efforts to
convince others of the validity of what he has to say. We have the highest regard for his
personal and professional integrity. The value of his services to national security has been
officially recognized by more than one government in the West. Despite the rejection of his
views by many of our former colleagues, we continue to believe that the contents of this
book are of the greatest importance and relevance to a proper understanding of
contemporary events. We were, therefore, more than willing to respond to the author's
requests for help in editing his manuscript for publication, and we commend the book for
the most serious study by all who are interested in relations between the communist and
noncommunist worlds.

The preparation of the manuscript has been undertaken by the author with the help of each
of us, acting in an individual and private capacity.
The author is a citizen of the United States of America and an Honorary Commander of the
Order of the British Empire (CBE).
Stephen De Mowbray Arthur Martin Vasia C. Gmirkin Scott Miler

Author's Note
This book is the product of nearly twenty years of my life. It presents my convictions that,
throughout that period, the West has misunderstood the nature of changes in the
communist world and has been misled and out maneuvered by communist guile. My
researches have not only strengthened by belief, but have led me to a new methodology by
which to analyze communist actions. This methodology takes into account the dialectical
character of communist strategic thinking. It is my hope theat the methodology will come to
be used by students of communist affairs throughout the Western World.

I accept sole responsibility for the contents of the book. In writing it, I have received no
assistance of any kind from any government or other organization. I submitted the text to
the appropriate US authorities, who raised no objection to its publication on grounds of
national security....

Part I
The Two Methodologies
1. 1. The Problems Facing Western Analysts
2. 2. The Patterns of Disinformation--"Weakness an Evolution"
3. 3. The Patterns of Disinformation--"Facade and Strength"
4. 4. The Patterns of Disinformation--Transitional
5. 5. The New Policy and Disinformation Strategy
6. 6. The Shelepin Report and Changes in Organization
7. 7. The New Role of Intelligence
8. 8. Sources of Information
9. 9. The Vulnerability of Western Assessments
10. 10. Communist Intelligence Successes, Western Failures and the Crisis in Western
11. 11. Western Errors
12. 12. The New Methodology
Part II
1. The Disinformation Program and its impact on the West
2. 13. The First Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Yugoslav "Dispute" from 1958 to
3. 14. The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution" of the Soviet Regime
(Part I)
4. 15. The Third Disinformation Operation: The Soviet-Albanian "Dispute" and "Split"
5. 16. The Fourth Disinformation Operation: The Sino-Soviet "Split"
6. 17. The Fifth Disinformation Operation: Romanian "Independence"
7. 18. The Sixth Disinformation Operation: The Alleged Recurrence of Power Struggles
in the Soviet, Chinese and Other Parties
8. 19. The Seventh Disinformation Operation: "Democratization" in Czechoslovakia in
9. 20. The Second Disinformation Operation: The "Evolution of the Soviet Regime (Part
II)-- The Dissident Movement
10. 21. The Eighth Disinformation Operation: "Eurocommunism"
11. 22. The role of Disinformation and Intelligence Potential in the Realization of the
Communist Strategies
12. 23. The Evidence of Overall Coordination Between the Communist Governments and
13. 24. The Impact of the Disinformation Program

Part III
1. The final phase and the Western Counter-Strategy
2. 25. The Final Phase
3. 26. Where Now?
...Traces of Chinese communist thinking about splits can be found in the Chinese press. The
analogy is drawn between growth in nature, which is based on division and germination,
and the development and strengthening of the communist movement through "favorable
The creation of two of more communist parties in one country was advocated openly. One
Chinese paper use the formula: "Unity, then split; new unity on a new basis-- such is the
dialectic of development of the communist movement." Problems of Peace and Socialism
referred disparagingly to Ai Sy-tsi, a Chinese scholar will versed in dialectics, who developed
the idea of the contradiction between the left and right leg of a person, which are mutually
interdependent and move in turn when walking. All of this suggests that the communist
leaders had learned how to forge a new form of unity among themselves through the
practical collaboration in the exploitation of fictitious schismatic difference on ideology and
tactics. (page 181)

The Golitsyn Predictions

by Mark Riebling

Even if one rejects Golitsyn's overall thesis -- viz., that Gorbachev's changes comprised a
long-term strategic deception -- one must still acknowledge that Golitsyn was the only
analyst whose crystal ball was functioning during the key period of the late 20th century.
When the Soviet Empire collapsed in 1989, the CIA was chastised for failing to foresee the
change. "For a generation, the Central Intelligence Agency told successive presidents
everything they needed to know about the Soviet Union," said Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, "except that it was about to fall apart."

Sovietologists both inside and outside CIA were indeed baffled, for their traditional method
of analysis had yielded virtually no clues as to what Gorbachev would do. When Mikhail
Gorbachev took power in February 1985, after the death of Konstantin Chernenko, analysts
like Roy Medvedev preoccupied themselves with trivial details in the Soviet press, and
gained no larger view. "The black mourning frame printed around the second page where
the deceased leader's picture was run] looked rather narrow," Medvedev observed. "It was
still, however, a millimeter broader than the frames used for the second-page
announcements of the death of senior Politburo members like Marshal Ustinov, who had
died a few months previously." There was nothing in the measurement of picture frames to
suggest liberalization in the USSR; therefore, no one suggested it.

CIA's leadership acknowledged that fell short in predicting Gorbachev's reforms, but could
provide no real excuse. "Who would have thought that just five years ago we would stand
where we are today?" Acting Director Robert Gates told Congress in late 1991. "Talk about
humbling experiences." Gates could have said: Our reporting was poor because our Moscow
network was rolled up, coincidentally or not, precisely as Gorbachev was coming into power.
Gates did not say this, however. Instead, he suggested that "We're here to help you think
through the problem rather than give you some kind of crystal ball prediction." This anti-
prediction line was echoed by the Agency's deputy director, Robert Kerr, who told Congress:
"Our business is to provide enough understanding of the issue ... to say here are some
possible outcomes.... And I think that's the role of intelligence, not to predict outcomes in
clear, neat ways. Because that's not doable."

Yet someone had predicted glasnost and perestroika, in detail, even before Gorbachev came
to power. This person's analysis of events in the communist world had even been provided
to the Agency on a regular basis.

In 1982, KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn had submitted a top-secret manuscript to CIA. In it,
he foresaw that leadership of the USSR would by 1986 "or earlier" fall to "a younger man
with a more liberal image," who would initiate "changes that would have been beyond the
imagination of Marx or the practical reach of Lenin and unthinkable to Stalin."

The coming liberalization, Golitsyn said, "would be spectacular and impressive. Formal
pronouncements might be made about a reduction in the Communist Party's role; its
monopoly would be apparently curtailed.... The KGB would be reformed. Dissidents at home
would be amnestied; those in exile abroad would be allowed to take up positions in the
government; Sakharov might be included in some capacity in the government. Political dubs
would be opened to nonmembers of the Communist Party. Leading dissidents might form
one or more alternative political Censorship would be relaxed; controversial plays, films,
and art would be published, performed, and exhibited."

Golitsyn provided an entire chapter of such predictions, containing 194 distinct auguries. Of
these, 46 were not soon falsifiable (it was too early to tell, e.g., whether Russian economic
ministries would be dissolved); another 9 predictions (e.g., of a prominent Yugoslavian role
in East-Bloc liberalization) seemed clearly wrong. Yet of Golitsyn's falsifiable predictions,
139 out of 148 were fulfilled by the end of 1993 -- an accuracy rate of nearly 94 percent.
Among events correctly foreseen: "the return to power of Dubcek and his associates" in
Czechoslovakia; the reemergence of Solidarity" and the formation of a "coalition
government" in Poland; a newly "independent" regime in Romania; "economic reforms" in
the USSR; and a Soviet repudiation of the Afghanistan invasion. -Golitsyn even envisioned
that, with the "easing of immigration controls" by East Germany, "pressure could well grow
for the solution of the German problem [by] some form of confederation between East and
West," with the result that "demolition of the Berlin Wall might even be contemplated."

Golitsyn received CIA's permission to publish his manuscript in book form, and did so in
1984. But at time his predictions were made, Sovietologists had little use for Golitsyn or his
"new methodology for the study of the communist world." John C. Campbell, reviewing
Golitsyn's book in Foreign Affairs, politely recommended that it "be taken with several
grains of salt." Other critics complained that Golitsyn's analysis "strained credulity" and was
"totally inaccurate," or became so exercised as to accuse him of being the "demented"
proponent of "cosmic theories." The University of North Carolina's James R. Kuhlman
declared that Golitsyn's new methodology would "not withstand rigorous examination.
Oxford historian R.W. Johnson dismissed Golitsyn's views as "nonsense." British journalist
Tom Mangold even went so far as to say, in 1990 -- well after Golitsyn's prescience had
become clear -- that "As a crystal-ball gazer, Golitsyn has been unimpressive." Mangold
reached this conclusion by listing six of Golitsyn's apparently incorrect predictions and
ignoring the 139 correct ones.

Golitsyn's analysis was as little appreciated within CIA as it was in the outside world.
"Unfortunate is the only term for this book," an Agency reader noted in an official 1985
review. A CIA analyst took Golitsyn to task for making "unsupported allegations without
sufficient (or sometimes any) evidence," and for this reason would be "embarrassed to
recommend the whole." Golitsyn's case, other words, was deductive: He had no "hard
evidence," no transcript of a secret meeting in which Gorbachev said the would do all these
things. Perhaps most fundamentally, as the philosopher William James once noted, "we tend
to disbelieve all facts and theories for which we have no use." Who had any use, in the end,
for Golitsyn's belief that the coming glasnost and perestroika would merely constitute the
"final phase" of a long-term KGB strategy to "dominate the world"?


by Jay Edward Epstein

Through the Looking Glass

by Edward Jay Epstein

In the midst of a blinding snow storm, a short stocky man, bundled in a heavy overcoat,
arrived at the American Embassy in Helsinki, Finland. He matter-of-factly identified himself
as a consul at the Soviet Embassy, and then asked to see Frank Friberg. The request,
coming from a Soviet stranger, immediately set off alarm bells; Friberg was the CIA station
The procedures for dealing with a potential defector were immediately put in effect. After
escorting the Russian visitor to an isolated room, the marine guard alerted the desk officer
at the embassy, who relayed the Mayday message to the CIA station. Within minutes,
Friberg rushed down to meet this Soviet "walk in". The stranger came right to the point. He
identified himself as Anatoli Golitsyn, a major in the KGB. To leave no doubt in the mind of
his CIA counterpart, he handed over a sheath of secret documents from the files of the
Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. He said he would make further information available about the
Soviet espionage apparatus if the CIA immediately arrange his safe passage to the United
States, along with that of his wife and daughter. It was an extraordinary offer. Friberg
asked the Russian if he would consider returning to the Soviet Embassy and acting as an
agent in place for the CIA. Golitsyn was adamant. He replied he would not survive if he
returned. The KGB had means of identifying CIA agents in place-- and he could disclose
them after he was safely in America. Friberg realized that he was suggesting that there was
a serious leak in the CIA. Unable to persuade him to work as a mole, he asked how much
time he had to organize his defection. Golitsyn replied that he had to be out by Christmas
day. After that, his wife and daughter would be expected back in Moscow, and Soviet
security personnel, who were being rotated over the holiday, would be back on active duty.
This gave Friberg a maximum of forty-eight hours. In Washington, the frantic search
through the CIA's central registry of records produced only a single "trace" on Golitsyn.
Peter Derebian, a KGB officer who had been stationed in Vienna before defecting in 1954,
had mentioned him to his CIA debriefers as a KGB officer who might be potentially disloyal
to the Soviet Union. Before this lead could be followed up in Vienna, Golitsyn had been
recalled to Moscow. The CIA had been given now a second chance. The Soviet Russia
division authorized his immediate evacuation from Helsinki. No matter what diplomatic
complications it would cause, it wanted to get this KGB officer in the palm of its hand, and
use him to identify, and possible approach, other potential defectors in the Soviet diplomatic
Corp. On Christmas day, a US air force courier plane landed at Helsinki's snow-covered
airport. Servicing military attaches stationed abroad, such flights are routinely exempted
from foreign customs and immigration inspection. This was, however, not a routine training
mission. While the plane waited on the runway, a car pulled up beside it. Its passengers,
who carried no luggage, quickly boarded the plane. Among them were Golitsyn, his wife and
daughter. Minutes later, the plane was airborne again, en route to West Germany. The first
round of interrogations took place at the US Army defector center outside of Frankfurt.
Golitsyn was required to write out by hand his entire career in the KGB from the day he
joined in 1948 to the day he defected-- listing all the positions he held, promotions he
received and KGB officers with whom he came in contact. Unlike most previous defectors,
who had field agents with limited knowledge about the central apparatus of the KGB,
Golitsyn claimed to have been assigned to the KGB's headquarters in Moscow and also to its
"think tank", the KGB institute, where intelligence operations were related to overall Soviet
strategy. To determine if his story was true, Golitsyn was next strapped into a stress-
analyzing machine, used by the CIA as a lie-detector , and relentlessly quizzed about
various details of his story -- a process known in the CIA as "fluttering". After each session,
counterintelligence experts also compared each bit of information he provided with what
was already known. By the end of the first week, the CIA was fully persuaded that he was a
bona fide defector who had indeed held the positions in the KGB he claimed. Arrangements
were then made to bring him and with his family to the United States. In February 1962, in
an isolated and heavy-guarded CIA compound overlooking the Choptank River in Talbot
County, Maryland, he began an extensive debriefing. To the amazement of his debriefers,
he not only revealed knowledge of a wide range of secret NATO documents -- but he
identified them by their code numbers. He explained that for convenience the KGB used the
NATO numbering system to request specific documents, which would than arrive from its
source in France in 72 hours. President John F. Kennedy, apprized of the Golitsyn
revelations, then dispatched a personal courier to Paris, with an "eyes only" letter for
President Charles De Gaulle. In it, he warned that the KGB had penetrated French
intelligence. A few weeks later, six French intelligence officers, handpicked by De Gaulle,
arrived in Washington. They carried with them specially-devised ciphers that by passed the
normal channels of French intelligence, and kept their very presence in the United States a
secret from even their own embassy. Their tape-recorded interrogation of Golitsyn, who
they code-named Martel, took 14 days, and left them in a paralyzing quandary. The French
intelligence secrets Golitsyn had provided came from the highest echelon of the French
government. When the list of those having access to them was narrowed down, suspicion
was focused on both the head of French counterintelligence and De Gaulle's personal
intelligence advisor. Golitsyn then dropped another bombshell. He told of a KGB plan he had
help draft in Moscow to use the French intelligence service to spy on missile sites in the
American Midwest. French intelligence officers would be ordered by Paris to use their
contacts to gather data -- for the benefit of Moscow. De Vosjoli initially was openly
incredulous of this allegation. It not only implied that the KGB controlled French intelligence,
but that it would blatantly use its officers to spy on the United States. His first reaction was
that Golitsyn was a "plant", dispatched by the KGB for the express purpose of disrupting
US-French relations. Several months later, however, he had to abandon this theory. He
received an order from Paris to begin organizing French spy networks in the United States.
The mission would be to ferret out secret data about American missile bases. De Vosjoli
could not believe his eyes: it was the very order that Golitsyn claimed he had seen a year
earlier in Moscow. Since he knew that France itself had no need for such information about
US bases, he queried Paris for further clarification. The answer instructed him to implement
the plan without further delay-- or questions. At this point, he realized that Golitsyn's
assertion , as implausible as it first seemed, was correct. The KGB had penetrated French
intelligence. He refused the order. In Paris, a top official, who was identified through
Golitsyn's leads as a member of a spy ring, code-named Sapphire, was thrown from a
window-- and died. When well-connected friends in Paris then informed de Vosjoli that this
was done on orders of French intelligence to protect others in the ring. He then attempted
going out of his normal reporting channels to General De Gaulle himself, but to no avail. By
November 1963, he realized his own life was in jeopardy and he sought the protection of
the CIA. Golitsyn, the source who had caused all this turmoil, was becoming throughout this
period increasingly more difficult to debrief. He was an angry, short-tempered man with no
patience for matters that he considered trivial. He prided himself on being a historian of
Soviet foreign policy. His interrogators, on the other hand, needed to test every petty detail
in his story. This led to constant friction. The Soviet Bloc Division seemed mainly concerned
in having Golitsyn identify the KGB officers working under cover as diplomats at each
embassy. He was tediously shown over one thousand snapshots of Soviet diplomats, usually
surreptitiously taken, and asked if he recognized them. Then Golitsyn refused to look at any
more photographs, shouting at his debriefers, "What good is knowing all the names in the
KGB. .. if you don't understand what they do?". He insisted that they should be debriefing
him on strategy-- not personnel. The interrogators let him finish his tirade, then, returned
to the snapshots. Their job was to identify officers of the KGB, not delineate its geopolitical
strategies. Then, when these photo sessions were over, Golitsyn was asked whether he
would be willing to go abroad and personally contact former KGB acquaintances on behalf of
the CIA. He refused, explaining "The KGB knows all your operations in advance". To prove
his point, he ticked off a number of examples of CIA attempts to recruit Soviet diplomats in
Switzerland and Austria which the KGB had had advanced warnings. The debriefers showed
little interested in this assertion; instead they implied his debriefings were coming to an
end. Golitsyn then demanded to see the President of the United States. When informed that
such an audience was impossible, he became even less cooperative, and asked permission
to go to England.. By the end of his first year, the CIA had concluded that they had
"squeezed" Golitsyn of all the information he knew. In early 1963, it arranged to send him
to England to be "resettled" under a new identity. Stephan De Mowbray handled his case
there Before his defection, Golitsyn had worked at KGB headquarters in the northern
European espionage division, which included England. He had prepared his defection by
memorizing English as well as French documents. Many of these came directly from the files
of MI-5, the British equivalent of the FBI. For example, he quoted verbatim from a secret
report on the breaking of a Soviet code by British intelligence. As it turned out, one of his
interrogators had written the report. When he rechecked the "bigot list"-- which identifies all
those with access to the report, he found that it had been circulated is to only the top
executives officers of MI5. How then could have Golitsyn seen it in Moscow? The only
answer was that one of these executives had provided the KGB with the report. The search
for that tainted executive, which would continue for over a decade, began with the setting
up of a secret unit, called innocuously "The Fluency Committee". The members included De
Mowbray and six other counterintelligence officers drawn from both MI-6 and MI-5. Their
sole job was determining who was the mole. As these investigators evaluated the clues from
Golitsyn and other sources, they gradually eliminated most of the names on the Bigot list.
There remained two prime suspects-- Sir Roger Hollis, the Director of MI-5, and his
deputy,Graham Mitchell. Both were put under surveillance. When the investigation then
rules out Mitchell, Sir Roger, the head of MI-5, remained the sole candidate. Although the
Fluency Committee had no direct evidence that Sir Roger ever was in contact with Soviet
intelligence, De Mowbray went personally to the seat of the British government at 10
Downing Street, identified himself, and asked to see the Prime Minister. To his surprise, he
received an immediate appointment. He came right to the point and told him that there was
reason to believe Sir Roger was a traitor. This initiative was not "popular" with his superiors.
Two years later, De Mowbray retired. Golitsyn's stay in England turned out to be
unexpectedly brief. During his interrogation about the KGB agents in British intelligence, he
alluded to a similar situation in the CIA. This possibility was of great concern to MI-5. It
might explain the origin of some of its own untraced leaks. Arthur Martin, one of the most
skilled interrogators in MI-5, quickly zeroed in on the CIA treatment of this charge. Had his
leads been followed? Golitsyn insisted that they had not. Instead, the interrogators from the
Soviet Russia Division persisted in asking the wrong questions. They wanted to know the
names of case officer from the KGB, not the purpose behind their activities. They confused
tactics, with strategy. He explained that the tactic was making contact with the "main
enemy", the CIA, in order to compromise and recruit agents. The strategy was not merely
to neutralize the CIA but to turn it into an instrument to serve Soviet objectives. Martin
listened attentively. He already knew, from his experience with recruits the KGB had made
in British intelligence, of the vulnerability of intelligence officers. He had also come to
believe that the CIA had placed too much faith in security procedures, such as lie detector
tests. He asked Golitsyn if he had any ideas about why his CIA interrogators had
downplayed, if not entirely avoided this issue. Golitsyn said that he knew the KGB had been
successful in recruiting at least one, and possibly more, CIA officers in the Soviet Russia
Division. He assumed from the way he was treated that the mole (or moles) was still
influential in the Division. It was clear to both Martin and De Mowbray that the CIA had
badly mishandled Golitsyn's interrogation. While they did not the entirely buy his theory of
an active mole in the Soviet Russia Division, they realized that it might have inhibited him
from openly discussing this issue with the CIA. In any case, his allegation could not be
lightly dismissed. If there was a penetration of this sensitive part of the CIA, it would affect
all the allied intelligence services. Martin decided to go directly to his friend, James
Angleton. Angleton had himself come to a similar conclusion about Golitsyn's original
debriefing. Whatever was the reason, the Soviet Bloc Division had not got the full story out
of Golitsyn. He thus went to Helms with an unprecedented request. He asked that
responsibility for this defector be re-assigned to his counterintelligence staff. Helms found
Angleton's case persuasive. He not only made the re-assignment but, as he explained to
me, he gave Angleton "carte blanche" authority to use whatever resources were needed. In
doing so, although he didn't realize it at the time, he set in motion the longest and most
incredible debriefing in the history of the CIA. In July 1963, through a leak arranged by
MI-5, a story appeared in the Daily Telegraph revealing that Golitsyn (under the purposely
misspelled name "Dolitson" was in England. It had the calculated effect of persuading
Golitsyn that his security could not be assured in England. Three weeks later, Golitsyn
arrived back in the United States. Under Angleton's tutelage, there would be no more
exhaustive grillings of him or repetitive showings of snapshots of Soviet diplomats. Angleton
told him that his interest was not the KGB's staffing, or "order of battle", as it is called; but
the "logic of Soviet penetration". As Angleton saw it, it was not a debriefing, but an
"elicitation". Golitsyn became an intellectual partner in the process where their dinners
would turn into discussion of Soviet politics that would continue into the early hours of the
morning. Golitsyn was allowed to sift through sanitized copies of Angleton's "serials",
searching for connections between these clues. To build his confidence, Angleton arranged
for Golitsyn to brief Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy on the KGB threat, and took him
on trips to Europe and Israel to speak to allied intelligence executives. Golitsyn, encouraged
by this attention, proposed organizing a new counterintelligence service which would be
independent of the CIA. Angleton took it under consideration, although it had no chance of
coming to fruition, to further drew out his ideas about the KGB. While this elicitation was
proceeding, Angleton moved to plug the putative leak in the Soviet Russia Division. Golitsyn
had insisted that it had to come from more than a single agent, and used the analogy of a
growing "cancer" that the patient refused to recognize -- or cut out. With the assistance of
the CIA's Office of Security, which has responsibility for ferreting out moles, he arranged a
series of "marked cards" for the Soviet Russia Division. These were selected bits of
information about planned CIA operations passed out, one at a time, to different units of the
Division to see which, if any, leak to the enemy. The "marked card" in the initial test
revealed that an effort would be made to recruit a particular Soviet diplomat in Canada. The
Office of Security agents, watching the diplomat from a discreet distance, then observed the
KGB putting its own survelliance on him on the day of the planned contact, realized that the
"marked card" had gotten to the KGB. This test confirmed Golitsyn's suspicion that the mole
was still active. Through a process of elimination, subsequent marked cards narrowed down
the leak to the unit directly involved with recruiting REDTOPS. Since more than one
individual was exposed to this marked information, and there was no way of knowing if
there was more than one leak in that unit, the investigation could not weed out the mole (or
moles) from the roster of suspects. Instead, beginning in 1966, the entire unit was cut off
from sensitive cases until its personnel could be reshuffled. Murphy, Bagley and a dozen
other officers were re-posted to Europe, Africa and Asia. This "prophylactic", as Angleton
called it accounted for what appeared to the uninitiate be a "purge" over the Nosenko case.
In any case, after the transfers, additional "marked cards" indicated that the penetration
had been remedied. Angleton's interest, however, went well beyond the security problem
arising from the recruitment of western case officers by the KGB. He wanted to know why
the KGB had focussed its attention on particular units of the CIA, such as the operational
side of the Soviet Russia Division. The real issue to Angleton was what purposes these
penetrations advanced. Golitsyn explained that they were a necessary part of the deception
machinery that had been out in place in 1959. Their job was to report back on how the CIA
was evaluating material it was receiving from other KGB agents. These moles attempted to
work their way into positions of access in the Soviet Russia Division or other parts of
American intelligence that intercepted soviet data. With them in place, disinformation
became a game of "show and tell" for the KGB. The dispatched defectors and other
provocateurs, who could be anyone from a Soviet diplomat to a touring scientist, " showed"
the CIA a Soviet secret, and then its moles told the KGB how the CIA had interpreted it. It
was all coordinated from Moscow like an orchestra. This system was designed by the KGB,
according to Golitsyn, to gradually convert the CIA into its own mechanism for manipulating
the American government. Angleton wanted to know more about the Soviet apparatus foe
deception. Why had the KGB moved from being a espionage to deception? Why had it been
re-organized? Golitsyn suggested that it all began with a Politburo assessment in the mid
1950s that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to prevail in a nuclear war. It followed that if
it was to win against the West, it would be by fraud rather than force. For this singular
purpose, Soviet intelligence would have to undertake the tricky job of manipulating the
information western leaders received. This sort of manipulation was not a new role for
Soviet intelligence. After all,,under the leadership of Felix Dzerzhinskii in the 1920s, it had
ran sustained disinformation campaigns, such as The Trust, against the West. Aleksandr
Shelepin, a top executive of the Communist Party, was put in charge of the KGB in 1959,
and given a mandate to return it to a mission of strategic deception. Under Shelepin, during
this reorganization, Golitsyn worked on an analysis intended to demonstrate how convention
spying could be subordinated to deception goals, without potentially compromising the
secrecy of the latter. The intrinsic problem was that KGB officers had to be in contact with
western intelligence officers either to recruit them or to pass them disinformation, and, this
presented the opportunity to defect or otherwise be compromised. In fact, scores of Soviet
intelligence officers had either defected or offered information to the CIA since the end of
the war. While some of these sources could be assumed to be dispatched defectors from the
KGB, a large number of the others turned out to be legitimate. How could the KGB sustain
deceptions-- if it was probable that some of its officers would defect or otherwise betray its
secret. Golitsyn explained that the KGB re-organization in 1958-9 was designed to avoid
this vulnerability. It effectively separated the KGB into two distinct entities. An outer and
inner KGB. The "outer" KGB was made up of personnel who, out of necessity, had to be in
contact with foreigners, and were therefore vulnerable to being compromised. It included
KGB recruiters and spotters posted to embassies and missions ,military attaches,
disinformation and propaganda agents and illegal case officers who worked abroad. Since
they had to be in touch with Westerners, if only to attempt to recruit them as spies, they
were assumed to be "doomed spies". A certain percentage would, by the law of probability
would be caught. These "doomed spies" were the equivalent of pilots sent on raids over
enemy territory. They were not only restricted from knowing any state secrets (other than
what was necessary for their mission), but they were purposefully briefed on what it was
useful for the enemy to learn if they were captured. The "inner" KGB was the real repository
of secrets. It was limited to a small number of trusted officers, under the direct supervision
of the Politburo, who planned, orchestrated, controlled and analyzed the operations. (
According to Golitsyn, all potential security risks, which included most of the officers of
Jewish descent, were transferred into the outer service in preparation for the
reorganization). A "China wall" existed between these two levels. No personnel from the
outer service would ever be transferred to the inner service, or vice versa. Nor would any
personnel in the outer service ever be exposed to strategic secrets other than what had
been prepared for them to divulge as disinformation. Angleton realized the implications of
this reorganization. If Golitsyn was correct, it meant that the CIA knew virtually nothing
about its adversary's capacity for orchestrated deception. To be sure, it had received
fragmentary clues from other sources that Soviet intelligence was undergoing shifts in its
personnel in 1959 but it had not been able fit these developments into any meaningful
pattern. Seen through the new perspective provided by Golitsyn, the KGB turned out to be a
different and much more dangerous instrument of Soviet policy. Its principle objective was
to provide information to the CIA that would cause the United States to make the wrong
decisions. Such information would appear to be credible because it would be fashioned to
dovetail that U.S. intelligence received from other sources. It meant, moreover, that very
targets the CIA was going after as recruits-- diplomats, military attaches, journalists,
dissidents and intelligence officers-- were the carriers of this disinformation. They were all in
the outer KGB. Even if they were persuaded to work in place as moles for the CIA, their
information would be of dubious value. All they would have access to, aside from trivial
details about their own espionage apparatus, was disinformation. Nor would any
microphones the CIA planted in Soviet embassies be of any use. The chatter they would
eavesdrop on would come from those excluded from the real strategic secrets of the inner
KGB. They would thus only reinforce the disinformation. The Golitsyn thesis went further
than invalidating the present tactics of the CIA and FBI. It impeached many of their past
successes-- at least since the reorganization in 1959. This reassessment would be
particularly damaging to double-agents and defectors who claimed to have access to
strategic secrets. If they could not have had such access, as Golitsyn asserted, they had to
be redefined as either frauds or dupes. In this new light, heroes became villains,and
victories became defeats. It was the equivalent for the CIA of stepping through a looking
glass. When Angleton presented the Golitsyn thesis to CIA and executives on the
operational side, it aroused fierce resistance. Neither CIA nor FBI recruiters were willing to
accept the idea that they were going after the wrong Soviet personnel. This would make
them the accomplices, albeit unwitting, of Soviet deception-planners. They also were not
receptive to a concept of the CIA that discredited valued sources, such as Oleg Penkovskiy,
on whom many of them had built their careers. There was also the practical problem that
the conclusions drawn from these sources had been forwarded over the years to the
National Security Council and the President. The inference that this CIA product was based
on KGB disinformation was not therefore not attractive to most of the executives of the CIA.
At the FBI, the Golitsyn thesis was rejected out of hand by J. Edgar Hoover. He had a very
powerful motive since FBI agents had recruited a number of Soviet diplomats at the U.N.,
such as Fedora and Tophat, as sources. They not only claimed that they had access to
secrets from the decision-making level of the Politburo, but they furnished them on demand
to the FBI. Hoover had personally passed some of this material directly to the President. He
was not about to accept an interpretation that would render this data KGB disinformation. In
1967, he ended the issue, at least within the FBI, by branding Golitsyn a Soviet-controlled
"provocateur and penetration agent" . He advanced the theory that the KGB had staged his
defection to discredit the FBI. He then refused any further cooperation with the CIA aimed
at substantiating Golitsyn's story. For example, he pointedly withdrew a FBI surveillance
team which had been watching a suspect round-the clock on behalf of the CIA. And, as the
tensions over this case increased, Hoover broke off all liaison relations with the CIA. (In
1978, after Hoover's death, the FBI acknowledged that Fedora and Tophat were KGB-
controlled disinformation agents). By 1968, American intelligence was , as Helms described
the situation, "a house divided against itself". Angleton's staff, and others executives who
accepted Golitsyn's thesis, saw the need to take precautions against a reorganized KGB.
Instead of targeting Soviet bloc embassy personnel, as it had done before, they wanted to
find new ways of penetrating the heart of Soviet intelligence. They also had to make sure
that their decisions were not being fed back to the KGB-- even if this meant disturbing
careers paths in the CIA. Those involved in the gathering of intelligence saw the situation in
very different terms. The attempt to validate the thesis of a Soviet defector had prevented
the CIA's Soviet Russia Division from going after promising Soviet recruits. It had also led to
defectors being held offshore to avoid another "Nosenko" incident. And it kept reports
officers, whose job it was to extract information from agents' reports, from extracting
valuable information from sources who had already been recruited. It had, from their point
of view, all but paralyzed normal intelligence operations. The frustration of these officers
was intensified by the secrecy surrounding the dispute. Few of them were briefed on the
Golitsyn thesis. All they knew was that their work was being called into question by
Angleton and his staff. As the years dragged on, the mysterious investigation appeared to
them as nothing more than "sick think". What neither side in the CIA could see was the
other's logic. It was like the celebrated experiment in Gestalt psychology in which one can
either see two faces or a wine cup in a picture , but not both. Similarly, the CIA could not
deal two mutually exclusive concepts of its enemy. What its operational officers and
analysts looked at as valid information, furnished by Soviet sources who risked their lives to
cooperate, counterintelligence officers saw as disinformation, provided by KGB dispatched
and controlled sources. Finally, Helms decided that Gordian knot had to be cut. He
suggested that the test of Golitsyn's thesis should be its utility. Could it be used to identify
the deceptions of the Kremlin? If not, what good was it to the CIA? Helms asked, what had
7 years of debriefing Golitsyn produced in practical terms: " an elephant or a mouse?."
Golitsyn had never claimed to have participated in any of the actual deceptions planning. He
had only seen the mechanism for executing them being put in place. When pressed by
Angleton's staff as to what these deceptions might be, Golitsyn could only extrapolate from
clues a decade old. They were, at best, unproven theories. For example, he speculated that
many of the apparent divisions in the eastern bloc, including the split between China and
the Soviet Union, had been staged to throw the West off balance. When he presented them
in 1968 to the special committee Helms had assembled, he was unable to convince its
members, especially since they directly contradicted the CIA's picture of world events. When
skeptic pressed him about his evidence, he became extremely defensive, and demanded
their evidence for disputing his theories. The meeting ended acrimoniously, with Golitsyn
shouting back at the CIA experts as they subjected him to a cross-fire of objections. Helms
concluded that whatever the value of the "vintage" information that he supplied, Golitsyn's
speculations about current KGB operations, to which he had no direct access, was worthless
to the CIA. He had failed the test. Angleton, who had survived in the CIA bureaucracy for
twenty years, understood that this meant that ~Golitsyn was to be "put on the shelf". A
patient man, he was willing to wait to see if future evidence developed. In the meantime, he
encouraged Golitsyn to set down all the details of the KGB reorganization in a manuscript.
The issue of Soviet deception was not settled until 1973. While Helms was willing to tolerate
the doubts of Angleton, the new Director William E. Colby, was not. Colby, the son of a
Jesuit missionary, whose main experience in the CIA had been in paramilitary and political
activities, rejected out of hand Angleton's complicated view of KGB strategic deception. He
saw the job of the CIA as a straight forward one of gathering intelligence for the President.
He considered "the KGB as something to be evaded" . It was not to be the "object of the
CIA's operations". Whereas Angleton had encouraged a policy of suspecting "walk in"
defectors and double-agents, he decided to encourage their recruitment. He explained: "We
spent an inordinate amount of time worried about false defectors and false agents. I'm
perfectly willing to accept if you try to go out and get ten agents you may get one or two
that will be bad. You should be able to cross check your information so that you are not led
very far down the garden path... at least you'll have eight good agents." This conceptual
change was reflected in a top secret order that went out to all CIA stations in 1973. Rather
than rejecting REDTOPS who made contact, until their bona fides could be established, it
advised: " Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates that REDTOP
services have not been seriously using sophisticated and serious walk-ins as a provocation
technique. However, fear of provocations has been more responsible for bad handling than
any other cause. We have concluded that we do ourselves a disservice if we shy away from
promising cases because of fear of provocation... We are confident that we are confident of
determining whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide information." Angleton
had lost the battle. It was only a question of time before Colby formally got rid of him.

Bombs Away
18 December 2004
J.R. Nyquist, interviewes

If you leap into a well... ...Providence is not bound to fetch you out.
Recent Interviews With Foreign Language Journalists
In recent months J.R. Nyquist has been interviewed by Brazilian and Polish writers. First,
Midia Sem Mascara's interview last October; second, an interview by Dariusz Rohnka,
author of Fatalna Fikcja [The Fatal Fiction].

Mídia Sem Mascara: The United States is currently under great tension as Nov. 2 gets
closer. In your opinion, which candidate -- John Kerry or George W. Bush -- would be the
most suitable to deal with America's enemies?
JRN: The United States is in a difficult position because the media, the system of higher
learning, the intelligence bureaucracy and most politicians do not understand the threat
America is facing. This threat involves the coordination of organized crime, drug
trafficking, traditional intelligence operations, subversion, disinformation, propaganda,
terrorism, the manipulation of raw material supplies (i.e., metals and oil), attacks on
information systems, the proliferation of WMDs to North Korea and Iran and clever
financial sabotage operations directed against hedge funds (or employing hedge funds as
a mechanism to stimulate a general financial crash). All these elements can be tied to
think tanks at the "strategic centers" of Russia and China. The alliances between leading
international crime syndicates and Russian-Chinese intelligence are generally ignored by
U.S. policy-makers. The fact is, the infiltration of the U.S. political system began decades
ago, and this has helped forestall U.S. counter-measures. The use of bribery and
blackmail by foreign intelligence services and associated mafias is an ongoing
phenomenon which cannot be fully appreciated or measured at this time. As to which
U.S. presidential candidate is best to cope with this multidimensional threat, the
melancholy answer is that neither is very well equipped -- though President Bush has
shown a certain instinctive grasp of the situation, leading him to bold offensive actions
that tend to throw the terrorists, criminals and rogue state elements off balance. Senator
John Kerry, on his side, shows a certain lack of strategic judgment in his opposition to
National Missile Defense and nuclear modernization. One good thing about Kerry is the
promise he has made to add two divisions to the United States Army. This is desperately
needed. But Kerry's problem is a problem stemming from his fuzzy-leftist tendencies; a
basic nihilism and atrophy of instinct, moral sense as well as common sense. This is
abundantly evident if we look at his voting record as a Senator, which by some
assessments is the most "left" voting record in the U.S. Senate. Bush over Kerry is the
only possible answer with regard to this question.

Mídia Sem Mascara: In your most recent article ("Talking up the Russia Threat"), you
mentioned President Putin's revival of the KGB. Sometimes, reading your articles, we are
reminded of Anatoliy Golitsyn's warnings. What is the role of Anatoliy Golitsyn on your
analysis and articles? Do you believe, given what is happening today in Russia and China,
that we can fully accept Anatoliy Golitsyn's statements as factually accurate?
JRN: Golitsyn wrote a book in 1984 titled New Lies for Old. In that book he predicted the
collapse of the communist bloc. He said this collapse would be deceptive and it would be
orchestrated from above. There can be no doubt on this point: the long-range strategy of
the communist bloc is real, and not a paranoid fiction. We know about it from defectors
like the Czech general, Jan Sejna. It wasn't only Golitsyn who warned the West. We have
heard similar statements, as well, from Vladimir Rezun and Col. Stanislav Lunev. The
communist bloc strategy is predicated on the development of deceptive changes
(perestroika) in communist bloc countries. These changes began in the late 1980s, as
foretold by Golitsyn in his 1984 book. And these changes were, as he predicted, directed
from the Kremlin according to a well-worked out plan. Without an understanding of
Soviet clandestine methods -- methods that were developed over a period of seventy
years -- it is impossible to understand the grand sweep of Russian and Chinese moves
today. This kind of strategy is alien to Western thinknig. In essence, despite the changes
that occurred in 1989-91, the old communist bloc still exists. Only the label has been
removed, and the iron hand now fits inside a velvet glove. These communist countries
are weak countries, predicated on terror, oppression and war. They can only hope to
succeed against America and the West by deceptive means, by the pretense of peace and
democratic reform. In reality, they are building their military power in secret, working
with criminal groups and terror groups through intermediaries. They seek to economically
cripple the United States, diplomatically isolate America and destroy the foundations of
American military power. All of this is made possible by a broad-based, long range
deception strategy. If they achieve their objectives the world will belong to the
communists who continue to consolidate their grip in Africa, South America, Europe and
Asia. Golitysn's predictive methodology successfully anticipated the changes in Eastern
Europe; he foretold the advent of the Russia-China alliance and the present campaign
against "American imperialism." We can ill-afford to ignore this methodology when it has
successfully anticipated so many crucial developments. Even if Golitsyn has made
mistakes, his basic approach is an invaluable tool for understanding the grand strategy of
Russia and China, and whoever ignores Golitsyn's warnings is making a potentially grave
Mídia Sem Mascara: Why does the Western intelligence community, especially the
American CIA, ignore such important and grave Communist strategies? Why do you think
the West so easily accepted the "fall of Communism" that occurred in 1989-91? Why is
the West so susceptible to deceptions like those orchestrated by Moscow?
JRN: The intelligence community in the U.S. doesn't exist in a vacuum. It exists in a
cultural milieu that is permeated by misguided liberalism and a superficial media-
generated version of reality that American consumers (including intelligence
professionals) take in as their mothers' milk. We are the creatures of our culture. Few
can escape the powerful clichés and images that are generated by television, radio and
the mainstream press. In addition, intelligence professionals have degrees from leading
universities and leading universities are centers of radical anti-Western thought. The
poison is imbibed thoughtlessly, almost without the subject realizing what is happening,
and that is because the subject is ignorant from the outset (as a student). It must be
admitted, though few are ready to admit the seriousness of the crisis, that education in
America has collapsed in terms of the teaching of history and philosophy (the two most
critical subjects for understanding politics), and the present market culture simply
promotes confused ideas through fashionable crazes. There is also another problem that
commercial culture exacerbates: People feel a profound need to belong, and thus a kind
of mob mentality takes over. If a person wants to advance his career it is necessary for
him to belong to the "in-crowd." Therefore the criteria for thinking is not truth and logic,
but group-dynamics and trendy "duckspeak." As Gustav le Bon showed in his famous
study of crowd behavior, the "psychological crowd" possesses a low critical intelligence,
and accepts the most idiotic nonsense as truth. It doesn't make the least difference if the
individual is highly intelligent, if his emotional need to belong is active he will be reduced
to idiocy. Now let's look at the specific example you mention: With regard to the "fall of
communism," the thing that fell was a word -- the word "communism." And you can see
how easily words can be dispensed with as organizations and methods are adapted to
new conditions. Yes, overtly Stalinist structures have been swept aside in favor of subtle
Bonapartist structures, in the sense of a soft-totalitarianism which aims at a greater
effectiveness. It is important to acknowledge that the malevolent essence of the
totalitarian structures remain, despite superficial appearances. The great relief felt in
West, especially among conservative elites, is perfectly understandable in this context.
The conservatives felt embattled on the Cold War issue because the liberals had begun to
reject the communist threat as a serious issue in the early 1980s (if not earlier). The
hedonist party in America long ago voiced the opinion that conservative anti-communists
were more dangerous than communists and more likely to trigger a world war. One only
has to look at the liberal propaganda against President Ronald Reagan in the mid-1980s.
In light of these attitudes, the supposed fall of communism was uncritically accepted by
the American right because the Republicans could not resist claiming a victory, because
the conservatives felt tremendous relief that the controversy over communism was finally
put to rest, and because the business community was eager to reduce defense spending
and enjoy an era of rapid growth founded on the "peace dividend." If we closely consider
the psychological mechanism behind all totalitarian deceptions (but especially the
deception under discussion), they are very powerful. And this is nothing new. The West
was fooled by Lenin's NEP in the 1920s, by Stalin's "liberal" Constitution in the 30s and
his dissolution of the Commintern in the 40s, by Khrushchev's "secret" speech
denouncing Stalin in 1956, by Brezhnev's Detente, by Gorbachev's perestroika and
Yeltsin's supposed "democracy." The deceptions of totalitarian regimes are constant, and
the lies are always believed by the West. Only with time are Western leaders
disillusioned. It must be understood, above all, that the totalitarian ruler is always re-
inventing himself. And yes, there are changes in such regimes, and sometimes these
changes bring greater freedom for a time, but the criminal nature of the regime always
remains. During moments of liberal flowering the names of the regime's enemies are
listed, and the inevitable contraction occurs. Putin is presently rounding up selected
enemies. Eventually he will initiate purges on a grand scale. This is the pattern, and we
should expect nothing else.

Mídia Sem Mascara: Why do you think the United States invaded Iraq? Is it a strategy
to get closer to China? Was it a wise move? Were the reasons presented to the public for
invading Iraq the real ones?
JRN: In games of mixed chance and skill the ultimate usefulness of a move is found in
the outcome. As it stands, we have no idea of the ultimate outcome. Here is the thing
your readers should reflect upon: The decision to invade Iraq was unique to President
Bush's character. This president has strategic instincts superior to most politicians. He
knows that aggressive action knocks an enemy off balance. The United States is at a
distinct disadvantage against totalitarian states when it refuses to use its conventional
military strength against them. This reluctance led President Ford and President Carter to
grief (especially Carter), and President Reagan was also fairly timid (despite his rhetoric).
Dictators therefore have a tendency to regard America as a "paper tiger." By acting
against Iraq the president threw all the rogue states into confusion and panic. Russia was
so frightened by the decisiveness of President Bush that Putin abandoned Saddam
Hussein by offering to overthrow him after acknowledging intelligence that Saddam was
preparing a major terror strike against the United States. President Bush did not take the
Kremlin's bait and refused to allow the Russians to replace Saddam with a more pliable
KGB puppet. President Bush boldly struck the dictator, frightening Libya into concessions
and forcing North Korea to huff and puff itself into a state of political exhaustion. Syria
and Iran have been flanked. The U.S. position, in terms of striking down the worst rogue
regimes, has been enhanced. Now the ball is in Moscow's court and we see the desperate
maneuver the Kremlin is attempting, with this sly post-Beslan mobilization and the coded
declaration of war against the United States. Sadly, the U.S. is effectively blind in terms
of intelligence collection and analysis, and nobody in the White House took Putin's code
words seriously. While it is true that a massive amount of data is collected by U.S.
satellites, the real intelligence game is played out by human agents on the ground and by
analysts. And this is where the U.S. has been completely outmaneuvered, penetrated,
spoofed, tricked and misled. There is only the dimmest awareness of a Russian/Chinese
combination threat. Furthermore, threats from smaller countries are misunderstood
because they are analyzed out of context. The former CIA director, George Tenet,
recently admitted that he initially thought Iraq had WMDs. If you read the CIA reports
and analysis going back several years this was the official conclusion. How is the
President of the United States to blame for misinformation from the CIA? To further
confuse the public's mind, the CIA (through leaks) has attempted to blame President
Bush for their mistakes! This is the real story. If you read Laurie Mylorie's account, Bush
Vs. the Beltway, the picture comes into focus. The fact is, Bush and his vice president
had a better intuitive grasp of Saddam's relationship to al Qaeda than the CIA. President
Bush strongly suspected Saddam was involved in 9/11. And I don't think Bush was
wrong. When the leading American expert on Iraq thinks the CIA was hopelessly ignorant
on Iraq, that Saddam was closely working with al Qaeda, then we must conclude that the
CIA has made a pudding. As for an imperialist economic motive for war: Business people
here in the U.S. were quite gloomy about the idea of war with Iraq in the months leading
up to the invasion. Everyone realized that Iraq's oil production would be disrupted for two
to three years, and that is real pain for America's economy. Everyone I talked to in the
investment community in early 2003 knew that there would be a negative economic
impact from the impending war, and a negative fiscal impact on the U.S. federal budget.
Only ignorant observers uncritically accept the propaganda that the U.S. invaded Iraq to
grab oil. As it happens, the U.S. was -- at the time -- far more dependent on Venezuelan
oil and the crisis in Venezuela was ripe for U.S. intervention in early 2003 -- but the
United States continues to ignore the emerging communist regime in Venezuela. If the
U.S. is motivated to take oil, then why has Hugo Chavez remained in power? Critics of
the U.S. are very selective in their world view, and prefer to ignore facts that are
inconvenient to their thesis. To understand President Bush's rhetoric in early 2003 you
have to understand the conflict within the U.S. intelligence community, and the
intellectual laziness of that community together with the undercurrent of belief within the
White House that Saddam was working with al Qaeda, plus the strategic location of Iraq
as a point where Syria and Iran could be split [and for safeguarding Saudi security].

Mídia Sem Mascara: So, in your understanding is "internationalism" an

inevitable political trend in which all countries need to grow together,
driven into each others' arms by long range weapons of mass destruction?
Am I correct?

JRN: Internationalism has many causes. It is animated, on the one hand, by the
rationalist idealism of the cosmopolitan spirit. This is a spirit entirely cut off from
tradition. It's rootless quality leads it into the error of imagining that all men are
brothers, all disputes can be negotiated peacefully, and free trade will solve humanity's
economic problems. There are also socialist internationalists, who believe in the
construction of a socialist world state. There are arms control internationalists who seek
to limit the spread of WMDs. All these cross-currents of internationalism work in various
ways, cooperating to form international bodies for the regulation of human affairs. These
bodies routinely fail to perform their function because they are rooted in abstractions that
do not motivate the people of the world, even if they animate a few bureaucrats and
intellectuals. We live in a world of nation states, and these hold the power to make war
or actualize agreements. Economic internationalism, by way of free trade, is inevitable
only so long as the present economic order lasts and continues to rationalize its
operations. When the next world war comes, when the nations fall into their next great
quarrel, the greater the interdependence of the nations, the greater the calamity.
Economics can hold countries together for many decades, but not forever. The United
Nations will disintegrate at the outset of the next world war just as the League of Nations
disintegrated at the outset of the Second World War.
Mídia Sem Mascara: Let me insist a little bit more here regarding the United
Nations and, in particular, John Birch Society conspiracy theories. Edward
Griffin, in his books The Fearful Master and The Creature of Jekyll Island,
cites a long list of Americans working as Soviet spies involved in the
creation of UN, IMF, World Bank and other organizations (Harry Dexter
White and Alger Hiss, for example). Why were the Russians so eager to
mold and control the United Nations if it is a "weak organization" as you
JRN: The Soviet Union sought to dominate the U.N., especially its military bureaucracy,
from the outset. In 1945 nobody knew how far the West's internationalists would go in
weakening British and American sovereignty. The Soviets wanted to encourage this
weakening and the surrender of U.S. power to international bodies (using agents of
influence like Hiss and White in the process). Meanwhile, the Kremlin would never
concede anything to an international body themselves. If the U.S. agreed to hand over its
nuclear arsenal to the United Nations, the Russians would merely pretend to do the
same. In this way the Russians could use internationalism to advance their own imperial
schemes. One might view the United Nations as a means to sabotage the United States.
As such, it hasn't been terribly effective since Americans refused to put their trust in the
U.N. In terms of practical advantages, the U.N. headquarters in New York has served the
communist bloc as an ideal nest for spies in the midst of America's financial capital.
Mídia Sem Mascara: Are you aware of Lev Navrozov's writings regarding
super weapons? What do you think of Navrozov's warnings? Won't this
have a big affect on the dynamics of the next world war described in your
JRN: I am aware of Lev Navrozov's work. I had dinner with Lev in New York six years
ago, and he has a remarkable sense of Moscow's dark side. Significantly, Lev writes
about super weapons in order to warn us about the decisive weapons of the next war. It
must be understood that Russia is determined to develop such weapons, while America
has become lax and confused about military-technical issues. Lev understands that the
"zone of militarism," which includes Russia and China, isn't run along consumerist lines.
The East is not like the West. Militarist states know that they will never produce the kind
of prosperity known to Western countries. But a decisive weapon can be developed in
secret, and the balance of power can be changed very quickly. The presently modified
totalitarian systems of Russia and China are unwilling to adopt Western models in full.
And why should they when a super weapon might make Western economic and political
structures "obsolete."
Mídia Sem Mascara: You recently said that "something has to be done to
wake a sleepwalking nation." So, as a geopolitical analyst and scholar,
what advice would you give to the American leaders? (intellectuals,
politicians, and businessmen) to wake America? Are the American
conservatives taking the right course of action? Is there any politician or
political party in America that we can rely on?
JRN: Perhaps I am too pessimistic in my assessment of present trends, but I don't see
America's political leaders asking the right questions. Without asking the right questions
they will never find the right answers. Certainly, I may be mistaken in my views on
Russia and China. On the other hand, the evidence is strong enough that a debate should
be taking place. Questions should be asked, and nobody in government seems to be
looking at the very serious strategic-economic-diplomatic combination developing against
the United States today. I would have greater confidence in President George W. Bush if
he publicly expressed doubts about Russian intentions and announced plans for
restricting trade with China. Such statements would be extremely effective in limiting
Russia's future moves (and China's potential for troublemaking). As it is, a naive attitude
prevails in the Bush administration. It is an attitude reminiscent of 1938. President Bush
is committed to eliminating six thousand U.S. nuclear warheads during the next few
years. The Russians have no obligation to eliminate any part of their nuclear arsenal.
Meanwhile, China is in the midst of a nuclear buildup. This is a very alarming
development, not to mention the way Russia and China use criminal groups and terrorists
as allies and proxies.

As for the American "conservatives" (so-called), I am disappointed. Narrowly focused on

"cultural" or economic issues, these writers and thinkers have entirely forgotten that
thousands of nuclear-armed missiles are aimed at the country, and they have
irresponsibly refused to discuss realistic civil defense. In fact, the conservative
intellectuals in this country, despite their lip service to "tradition," are creatures of
consumerism and market hedonism. I often suspect that these people do not know
themselves, and do not recognize the rottenness of their own milieu.
Mídia Sem Mascara: But isn't America founded on a solid Christian culture? I
mean, to ask the right questions, isn't it necessary first to bring back a
minimum Christian mindset that could properly deal with foreign threats?
After all, aren't the Russians and Chinese seeking to weaken American
through its culture, as Antonio Gramsci once advocated? In Brazil, for
instance, almost all of the Catholic leaders are Liberation Theology
followers, i.e., communists. The ruling communist party, Workers' Party
(PT), was forged by these Catholic leaders, and now Protestant leaders are
also being co-opted by the communists.
JRN: Yes, the "crisis of modernity" has everything to do with the disintegration of the
Christian faith -- Catholic and Protestant. The corruption of doctrine, the corruption of
time-honored rules and ideas, was allowed to advance decade after decade. Materialist
thinkers have yet to acknowledge the negative power of modernity's de-spiritualization.
Decade after decade secular leveling advanced. At times it seemed that we were
successfully coping, adapting and learning. But the leveling of the soul, the shrinking of
the West's soul, has already occurred. To understand the pace of change, I was born in
1958 and my generation absorbed many of the old ideals, though we did not always live
by them. Those born after 1980, however, have absorbed almost nothing of the old
ideals. The churches have failed to bring Christian thinking to today's young people.
Secular entertainment and secular schools have shoved religion aside. In light of such
profound spiritual change there is no way, no possible way, that our civilization can long
avoid a period of destructive wars and political upheavals. My work has been to envision
the specific causes of the coming destructive wars, knowing full well that the real cause
(i.e., the deeper underlying cause) is spiritual and not political. The West will be forced to
learn a bitter lesson. For the present, the leading pundits deny what is coming. They
deny history, arguing that modern man is somehow exempt from history's pattern. But
we are not exempt and we will suffer the same fate as those who, in previous history,
followed this very path. Our technology cannot save us. In fact, it only assures that our
destruction will be swifter, more efficient and thorough.

Mídia Sem Mascara: Speaking of religion, we know that Europe is under a

slow but sure Islamicization process. Do you think Europe is going to
become an Islamic continent in the future? And what about America?
Wouldn't America be the next step in this Islamic expansion? Does the
spread of Islam have something to do with Russia and China, or is it an
independent development?
JRN: Islam is penetrating Europe through immigration.
It is penetrating America as well, but today's Western politicians do not see a problem.
They see cheap labor. In other words, their thinking is driven by hedonistic calculation.
This demonstrates a lack of historical understanding, as well as basic survival instinct.
Our thinking today is also influenced by fundamental errors like atheism and materialism,
and these are reflected in catastrophic policies. If there is no God, what difference does it
make what religions are practiced within your commonwealth? If the meaning of life is
material accumulation then cheap labor is an absolute good.

I do not believe that "liberalism" will continue much longer with this program of decay
leading to the slow and final dissolution of the West (and the victory of Islam). The
mechanisms of our civilization are too delicate. The economic mechanism is nearly
compromised already, and the military mechanism -- under a regime of strategic
misconception -- is bound to invite aggression from the leading Asiatic powers. I believe
we are facing, in the not-too-distant future, a double catastrophe. This catastrophe will
save the West from slow death by the immediate prospect of quick death.
Dariusz Rohnka interview follows:
Rohnka: What was the origin of the American anti-communist in the 1980s? Was it a
common path for the young American in this time or rather a rare way of looking for the
JRN: Americans in general are anti-communist. But there has been a qualitative change
in this stance. In the 1950s Americans realized that communist spies had penetrated our
institutions, and they were alarmed by these penetrations. But the alarm gradually faded.
Communist subversion ceased being a national issue despite the fact that communist
subversion advanced from strength to strength. After the culture shifted from print media
(books, magazines and newspapers) to television, the public lost interest in communism.
By 1980 Ronald Reagan appeared as a quaint old-fashioned anti-communist. He had
been a film star, so he translated his Cold War message easily to television. And this
worked until Gorbachev won Reagan's friendship with his "glasnost" and his
"perestroika." During the Reagan years the main anti-communist youth movement was
YAF (Young Americans for Freedom). This was an insignificant group, made up of a
handful of "conservative" students. On a campus of 20,000 you might find ten to fifteen
active YAF members. As a graduate student in political science at the University of
California, I did not participate in YAF beyond attending one or two meetings, having
learned that the leading YAF organizers smoked marijuana and one of the East European
girls in the group repeated what I'd said about a left-wing professor to the professor. This
was not encouraging. All in all, anti-communism was not a normal concern (and those
concerned with it were not considered normal), and as far as I could see being anti-
communist was never an answer to anything, and was more like a noose around my
neck. But I accepted this noose. One might say I preferred to "hang with the truth." It
was, at least in my case, the result of an unpleasant discovery. Far too many professors
and graduate students were Marxists. They were not Soviet spies or agents of a foreign
power. They were simply pro-socialists who hated capitalism and thought the Soviet
Union was harmless. Some tended to believe Soviet propaganda while assuming that
everything done by the U.S. government was "evil." They generally mocked the U.S.
political system, disparaged American freedoms, despised the free market and secretly
dreamt of revolution. Their animating spirit was thwarted ambition, resentment, envy
and malice. Some communists I met were sincere idealists; but most were sour little
souls inwardly wounded by their own cosmic unimportance. In my view, Karl Marx was a
fraud and communism was a criminal enterprise from the outset. By 1987 I concluded
that America's tolerance of communism within the educational establishment indicated a
coming "time of troubles."
Rohnka: Am I wrong if I see the American anti-communist today as a strange mix of
consistent conservative attitudes and a touch of crazy conspiracy theory? I remember
well my shock at reading that the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had been masterminded
by a small circle of New York Masonic strategists. How would you comment on this
phenomenon, and what is your experience with people of such views?
JRN: The idea, on the part of conspiracists, that the Bolshevik Revolution was engineered
by Masonic conspirators in New York, is the dirty step-child of the Protocols of the Elders
of Zion. This theory is poisonous, ignorant and futile. The people in America who believe
such theories are opponents of the U.S. government. They oppose the capitalists and
unwittingly side with the communists, imagining that in doing so they are opposing THE
CONSPIRACY. In reality, the Protocols and similar conspiracy nonsense was invented by
Russian secret police officials for purposes of mass manipulation. And Russia continues to
use this sort of thing world-wide. The Arab world along with most Islamic countries are in
the grip of the Protocols, and the same can be said for our primitive anti-communists in
America -- like the John Birch Society -- who have been convinced that there is a
conspiracy "above communism" (i.e., capitalism). Grand conspiracy theory is, in fact, a
contagious intellectual illness.
Rohnka: What was the influence of Anatoliy Golitsyn on your political views, and could
you imagine Jeffrey Nyquist's analysis without New Lies for Old?
JRN: Golitsyn indirectly influenced my political views. He influenced my perception of
Soviet grand strategy, which then caused me to recognize certain weaknesses within the
capitalist West. This led me to trace Western weakness to market hedonism, de-
spiritualization and the baneful affects of television. Please note that Russia and China
are weak powers when compared with America. But wealth and power are corrosive if the
antidotes to corrosion are set aside. And I believe that's what the American people have
done. America has developed a serious weakness as well as blindness, and the Russians
are eager to take advantage of a developing situation. In fact, they have the
sophistication to manipulate the U.S. in a variety of ways. I want to add, especially, that
Golitsyn is not a god and his analysis is not 100 percent correct. There are many
mysteries with regard to the inner workings of the "former" Soviet power structures. We
do not understand how these structures work (in detail) because they are so secretive.
We do not know what the principal players actually believe (in terms of ideological
orientation). But one thing I am certain of, after watching their behavior for the past 15
years: Golitsyn is right in terms of the final tendency of Russian politics. Whatever the
"changes" in the communist world signify, there has been a consistent effort to use these
changes to detach America from Europe, to build a military alliance with China, to retool
Soviet war industries, to use criminal organizations as allies in a secret war, to sabotage
America's economic system via control of raw material inputs and the penetration of
major banks, to ultimately isolate and destabilize the United States, and to destroy any
chance of it rising from the ashes or using its nuclear arsenal. Following that, the power
structures of Moscow and Beijing plan to split the world into spheres of influence, with
lesser nations having a share in "looting rights." One might think of this process as a
grand strategic proposition that never dies or surrenders. It simply adjusts itself to new
conditions and new requirements. The inner nature of the leaders in Moscow has not
changed (whatever their ideological pretensions), and this should be obvious because
real change -- internal change -- rarely happen in this world. Whether Golitsyn's accurate
predictions are due to his own previous involvement with KGB strategists, or to psycho-
sociological intuition, he has correctly anticipated the overall direction of international
affairs. My own thinking owes a great deal to his insights.
Rohnka: Let us look at the early 1960s. The Soviet spy named Golitsyn came to
Washington. He comes over with a strategic revelation in his head, and he wants to
speak with the first man in American policy -- the President of the United States. This is a
problem, of course, because it is impossible for President Kennedy to meet with a Russian
spy. Then Golitsyn meets Angleton, the chief of CIA counter-intelligence. For about 13
years Golitsyn and Angleton work together to convince the American establishment about
the grand threat posed by Russian deception strategy. Their warning is not heeded. In
1974 Angleton is fired from the CIA, Golitsyn is pushed into the political wilderness. Don't
you think this was the turning point in American defense history? Is there any
coincidence that detente policy coincided with the government's rejection of the Golitsyn
JRN: The administration of President Nixon was a disaster in many respects. Nixon's
detente policy, his opening to China, were naturally fatal to Golitsyn's message and
Angleton's function as counter-intelligence chief. It may not be generally known in
Poland, but a Polish intelligence defector, Michael Goleniewski, claimed that Nixon's
national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, was a Soviet agent recruited by the GRU
during the occupation of Germany in 1945. There were problems with Goleniewski's
mental stability, to be sure, but the intelligence he provided had always been first rate.
In the case of Kissinger, there are known facts that tend to confirm Goleniewski's claim.
Books about Kissinger reveal that on more than one occasion, after becoming Secretary
of State, he brought people into the State Department who were found to have
communist ties. Kissinger's handling of Vietnam and the China opening are also suspect.
His arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, as well as the unilateral destruction of
America's biological weapons stockpiles cry out for explanation. These actions were
carried out on his advice. The policies later advocated by Kissinger's deputies in later
administrations (e.g., Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft and Alexander Haig) also
raise alarm bells. But more significant than the possible penetration of the U.S.
government by Soviet agent networks, we find that a kind of hedonism had begun to set
into American thinking by 1975. Unpleasant thoughts, the necessity of hard choices,
tough reforms in the intelligence community, were simply out of the question. An inner
softness was, by then, dominant. Golitsyn's analysis and Angleton's fears were dismissed
as "Cold War paranoia." Fear of Russian penetration, fear of Russian deception, was
necessarily characterized as "mental illness." Here we see an example of "the sociology of
knowledge" at work. Under certain cultural conditions, certain facts cannot be known
because they are socially unacceptable.
Rhonka: The 1980s were the years in which Solidarity took shape in Poland. Lech
Walesa was the great hero. Threats of Soviet intervention, tanks on the streets, were
very real at the time. Poland dreamed of freedom. Did you have any suspicions then that
it could be some kind of political trick?
JRN: In America I heard various things from my Polish-American friends, but people
were hopeful. I had no suspicions in the early 1980s. Americans liked the idea of a free
Poland; and for them, Walesa was a hero. Nobody paid attention when Golitsyn warned
against Solidarity in his 1984 book, New Lies for Old. He explained that the communists
had moved to take Solidarity over and use it to introduce controlled changes. I watched
the 1989 revolutions with skepticism. I looked for critical thinking from Western analysts.
But there wasn't any. Everybody accepted the 1989-91 changes uncritically. No debate
occurred. Golitsyn's name was mentioned, from time to time, as a curious footnote. Then
several anti-Golitsyn books were published, smearing his name and slandering his ideas.
Tom Mangold's Cold Warrior is one example. Mangold appeared on many talk shows. The
public was told that Golitsyn was mentally unbalanced. His accurate predictions were not
mentioned, and his reputation was destroyed.
Rohnka: Ronald Reagan personified the hope of anti-communists everywhere in the
world. How could you explain that his presidency was chosen for implementing Soviet
deception strategy? Was it the best timing or simply a coincidence?
JRN: If Moscow's strategists could trick Reagan then they could accomplish anything. Of
course, Reagan was getting old and soft. So they took aim during the last years of his
second term. After playing Cold War games, they flattered Reagan and built him up. They
made concessions. This was a very effective tactical switch. As everyone knows, the
great charm offensive worked and Reagan led the way -- along with Thatcher -- in
accepting Gorbachev as "a man we can do business with." Afterwards no conservative
dared question the changes in the communist bloc. The conservatives, in fact, were eager
to claim victory. The whole process was incredibly self-serving, and the Republicans were
shameless in their readiness to claim what they had no right to claim.
Rohnka: The false collapse of communism, the so-called "democratic revolutions" in
countries like Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Romania, etc., were judged, in spite of
the obvious facts, as real historical events by the establishments of Western Europe and
the United States. Was this typical Western naiveté, the well-crafted work of agents of
influence or a lucky outcome for Moscow?
JRN: People love to think of themselves as winners. Nothing is more flattering than the
appearance of victory. The announced changes in Poland and Czechoslovakia and
Romania brought a wave of relief. This was the political equivalent of a drug. Already the
West was divided on the issue of communism, with the left arguing that communism was
never a serious threat in the first place. Furthermore, the West by that time had become
hedonistic in its responses, as I mentioned earlier.
Rohnka: Have you an unequivocal opinion about the goals and methods of Soviet
strategy associated with the false collapse of communism? On the one hand we have
unilateral disarmament of the Western alliance and intensive Russian rearmament behind
the legend of rusting Soviet military equipment. Secondly, the convergence strategy is
still alive, which means a progressive coming together of both political systems. Don't
you think that, in the light of increasing leftist trends in the Western countries, that the
military option will not be required?
JRN: This is an excellent question because it illustrates the difference between
rationalistic thinking about history versus the empirical approach. The intention of any
power, of course, is to win an easy victory. To win without fighting, as Sun Tzu said, "is
excellence in warfare." But the process of subversion, the process of convergence, the
process of deceptive change and corruption -- in the East as well as the West -- involves
a moral and intellectual unraveling. Such a process necessarily leads to catastrophic
violence, on an epic scale. You cannot derange a man's sense of what is, you cannot
abolish the foundations of order itself, without unleashing anarchy in the soul which leads
to abuse of the economic system, rampant criminality, revolutionary intrigue and social
upheaval. The readiness to exploit such an upheaval is present in Russian and Chinese
national strategy, even though they hope to win bloodless victories. Yes, they have
managed remarkable changes within their own social systems -- the Chinese have
achieved an economic revolution as Russia has achieved a mock political revolution within
the CIS countries. But the breakdown of the global economic system, based as it is on
American dominance, means total breakdown. It means international anarchy and
dictatorial opportunism. It signifies the advent of another world war.
Rohnka: As I know you are very critical of social and political reality in the United States.
In your book, Origins of the Fourth World War, you present a tragic picture of the moral
and spiritual condition of your nation. What will be the future of America?
JRN: I believe that the dollar will continue to fall, an economic crisis will occur, the U.S.
will become politically unstable and the communists (i.e., Moscow and Beijing) will exploit
the situation strategically.
Rohnka: The Moscow putsch has a long, 15-year history. In the Soviet bloc there were
no authentic democratic reforms during this period. The communists ruled as usual in
almost every corner of this dolorous space. The West seems to have no interest in
changing this situation. The West has its own problems: terrorism, drugs and organized
crime -- with no time for secondary matters. In reality the West itself is the biggest
problem. The traditional sense of freedom disappeared in something like a dark hole.
Huge bureaucracy, unbelievable corruption, political correctness, total surveillance of its
own citizens, unimaginable fiscal stringency indicate where things are headed. It is not
freedom in the West, but slavery. A new Bolshevik face. What should be the answer of
mankind or of a single man?
JRN: I should correct a false impression that many people in Eastern Europe have about
America. Knowing how the U.S. security system works and how police and security
functions are executed (having been a security professional myself), the idea that there
is "total surveillance" of American citizens is seriously mistaken. I remember being
shocked, in 1988, when I asked a Czech waiter how he liked America. He said that it was
just like Eastern Europe, only richer. This puzzled me, so I asked what he meant. He said
that it was the same surveillance state that he'd left, only the CIA and FBI were "more
efficient." Their cleverness, he said, consisted in the fact that they were watching
everyone in such an inconspicuous way that nobody suspected they were being watched.
This is a laughable instance of "mirror imaging." It is hard for East Europeans, I think, to
realize how absolutely unsupervised Americans actually are. Our political culture insists
that police surveillance of anyone -- excepting known criminals or spies -- is itself
criminal. This view has been translated into law. It has escaped notice by many critics of
America, but civil suits were successfully filed against FBI officials in the 1970s -- and the
FBI lost in court. Before 9/11 it was illegal for the FBI to spy on American citizens unless
legally authorized by a judge (who alone can authorize wiretaps). Furthermore, the FBI is
a very small organization, incapable of watching more than a fraction of the crazies,
Nazis, communists, Islamists, etc. Please note, FBI officials were forced to pay penalties
and fines in the late 1970s because of surveillance conducted during anti-terrorist
operations (versus the communist Weather Underground). Security officials in this
country have lost their jobs over petty infractions. In 1974 the head of CIA counter-
intelligence (James Angleton) was forced to resign because he was part of a scheme to
open mail from the Soviet Union. All government officials in this country know the
penalties. They know that the ACLU and the National Lawyers Guild (the legal arm of the
Communist Party U.S.A.) are watching for violations. Security in this country was
paralyzed for two decades. The attack of 9/11 occurred under a legal regime that
safeguarded the spy, the saboteur and the criminal. We have many rights in this country,
and a policeman's lot is not a happy one. The famous gangster Al Capone could not be
prosecuted successfully for many years because he had rights that gave him the edge in
court. Only when he was found guilty of a tax violation was he put in prison. Since 9/11
more sensible measures have been put in place, allowing the police and FBI to monitor
suspects and keep files on subversive groups. For the past 20 years, before the World
Trade Center attacks, it was illegal for the FBI or CIA to maintain files on subversive
American groups based in the U.S.A. It should also be understood that the American
intelligence services are run by university-educated liberals. George Tenet was such a
man. These are people who think anti-Communism was a sick joke (and that communism
is a meaningless term anyway). There is this impression out there, due to anti-American
propaganda, that America is a right-wing country. But America is a country that has
grown soft and slovenly during five decades of prosperity. Basically, the security regime
remains lax. The people are too busy shopping and having fun. Everything here is
predicated on work and consumption.

Now I will say a word about crazy legislation and bureaucracy in the United States. While
the left is attacking the police and the intelligence services, the left simultaneously
campaigns to take guns out of the hands of citizens through legislation. Environmental
legislation deprives land-owners of their property rights. Laws for fighting drug cartels
have been misused by lazy police officials to confiscate property, and entrapment was
used in an attempt to recruit Randy Weaver to spy on Idaho Nazis -- which backfired
when Federal officials opened fire on Weaver's family. The government is not all-powerful
in this country, and Randy Weaver's acquittal could not have happened in a genuinely
totalitarian country. While it is true that left wing crazies are given teaching positions at
leading American universities, right wing crazies like Timothy McVeigh imagine that the
deranged laws passed by Green Party activists and other leftist busy-bodies prove the
existence of a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. But the multiplication of resentful, deranged
ideologues proves nothing. It is merely a symptom of a society that will not maintain its
standards, traditions and intellectual integrity. A kind of anarchy reigns, and the result is
an ideological free-for-all in which leftists can dictate certain environmental policies (like
crippling the nation's timber industry in the Northwest), while right-wingers arm
themselves for "Judgment Day" in the futile belief they are governed by ZOG (Zionist
Occupation Government). It was Timothy McVeigh who once suggested to Ted Kaczynski
(the "unabomber") that the far left and far right should come together since they had the
same enemy. This very concept was adopted by Stalin in the 1930s. It is the concept of
the Red-Brown alliance.
The problem with America is distraction, enervation, intellectual decline, fiscal
irresponsibility, lax attitudes, materialism and permissiveness. At the same time,
however, the strengths of America deserve to be listed. Europeans do not understand the
kind of freedom and initiative that still exists in the United States. Freedom forces the
average American into a kind of discipline, in terms of creative work. I believe that
freedom is essential. But licentiousness must not be permitted. Civilization also depends
on traditional values, belief in God and classical teachings. We must have balance, and
we must return to aristocratic standards of culture.