Critical Mass The Real Story of the Birth of the Atomic Bomb and the Nuclear Age by Carter

P. Hydrick Copyright (c) 1998 by Carter P. Hydrick _______________________________________ Contents Introduction Prologue Part One - he !raniu" #o"b 1 !-$%&'!$%( $ he )o #illion *ollar #et % !raniu" & he Hidden #o"b ( Oak +idge Part )o - he Plutoniu" #o"b , i"ing - Han.ord 8 /i"ple 0ath Part hree - 0artin #or"ann 9 0aiden 1oyage 12 3 Pig *igging 4or 3 Potato 11 Operation 4ireland 1$ he Pig 4inds 3 Potato 1% 5scape and /urrender 1& Occa"6s +a7or 5pilogue #ibliography ______________________________________ - ntroduction his "icro-history is suggested as the result o. ne)ly disco8ered9 8ery signi.icant e8ents that occurred during the closing )eeks o. :orld :ar )o. 3s the story o. Critical 0ass un.olds9 it ;uestions the .oundations o. the traditional history o. the "aking and use o. the .irst ato"ic bo"bs as )ell as our understanding o. the <uclear 3ge. he .acts re8eal not only i"portant ne) in.or"ation about the race to produce the bo"b= but the ne) in.or"ation helps us understand ho) the su" o. the history o. "an )as co"bined in one brie. "o"ent to create a critical "ass in hu"anity that shattered the old )orld .ore8er and ushered in the <uclear 3ge. he pre8iously secret (no) declassi.ied) unpublished "ilitary9 state9 intelligence and *epart"ent o. 5nergy docu"entation cited throughout Critical 0ass suggests that the ato"ic bo"b )as not .ully de8eloped and built by 3"erican scientists and technicians9 as the traditional and long-standing history asserts. Instead9 the e8idence sho)s that enriched uraniu" and other ato"ic bo"b co"ponents de8eloped by <a7i >er"any )ere surrendered to !nited /tates .orces during the .inal )eeks o. the )ar - probably according to prearranged surreptitious agree"ents - and )ere a 8ital part o. the "aterials used to create the bo"bs that )ere dropped on Hiroshi"a and <agasaki. he e8idence indicates that )ithout these "aterials the !nited /tates )ould ha8e .allen short o. achie8ing its nuclear )eapons ob?ecti8es. Inter)o8en into this story - in .act9 integral to it - is pro8ocati8e e8idence that connects Hitler6s behind-thescenes right-hand "an9 <a7i Party Chie. 0artin #or"ann9 to >er"any6s 8ery nearly success.ul e..ort to create an ato"ic bo"b= and to >er"any6s last-ditch e..orts to trans.er that technology to @apan. 58idence also suggests that #or"ann9 at the latest possible "o"ent9 turned against his 3sian ally and decided to hand the keys o. )orld do"inion - in the .or" o. the ato"ic bo"b - to any 3llied country that )ould treat )ith hi". hus #or"ann co8ertly negotiated a separate9 and 8ery secret9 personal peace )ith the !nited /tates that allo)ed hi" to disappear .ro" the .ront page o. history and slide silently bet)een the shado)s o. a "urky past and a phantas"al .uture. he e8ents that initiated this story ha8e each lead to astounding ne) re8elations that had the net e..ect o. continually9 and9 see"ingly unendingly9 eApanding the scope o. this book. 3s a pri8ate citi7en )ho

researched and )rote the book around the de"ands o. a .ull-ti"e ?ob and )ho9 )ith the aid o. generous .riends and .a"ily9 .inanced the research and )riting9 generating unli"ited resources to constantly eApand the book6s scope )as i"possible. *espite desires to thro) light in e8ery corner9 pro8ing the pre"ises presented in Critical 0ass has9 o. necessity9 been circu"scribed to pro8ing the .ollo)ing basic assertionsB 1. hat the 0anhattan Pro?ect )as not success.ul producing all o. the needed enriched uraniu" - isotope !$%( - in ti"e to .ul.ill its ato"ic bo"b re;uire"ents9 nor )as it success.ul creating a triggering de8ice .or the plutoniu" bo"b )ithout the help o. captured >er"an co"ponents. $. :hile not pro8ing conclusi8ely that uraniu" )as enriched in >er"any9 it )ould be de"onstrated that there )as potential in >er"any9 despite the traditional history that states other)ise9 .or the <a7i progra" to success.ully enrich !$%(. 5nrich"ent )ould ha8e been in ;uantities that could ha8e supplied the bo"bgrade uraniu" needed by the !nited /tates to co"plete its ato"ic bo"b pro?ect. 3lso9 that >er"any success.ully de8eloped a triggering "echanis" usable .or the plutoniu" bo"b. %. hat !$%( .or the uraniu" bo"b9 and in.rared .uses .or the plutoniu" bo"b9 )ere obtained by the !./. .ro" >er"any and )ere trans.erred into the possession o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect and ulti"ately used in the bo"bs dropped on @apan. 3s a "atter o. su..iciently authenticating the abo8e assertions9 I ha8e tried to obtain a "ini"u" o. t)o corroborating pieces o. e8idence to 8alidate the theories presented. In al"ost e8ery case9 as )ill be seen9 this has been acco"plished. In "any9 three or "ore proo.s are gi8en. In a .e) instances only one piece o. e8idence is eAtant= but taken on the )hole9 the accu"ulated e8idence is considerable i. not incontro8ertible. he ;uestion "ay be asked that9 )ith the hundreds i. not thousands o. books9 articles and histories that ha8e been )ritten about the "aking o. the .irst ato"ic bo"bs9 ho) can any ne) and unpublished in.or"ation be added to the chronicle. +e"arkably9 the ans)er9 in part9 is that 8ery .e) o. the )riters o. those histories e8er sa) any o. the original records o. the "ost se"inal e8ents that constituted the "akings o. the bo"bs. 3s .ar as I can tell9 I )as the .irst to re8ie) the actual uraniu" enrich"ent production records9 the shipping and recei8ing records o. "aterials sent .ro" Oak +idge to Cos 3la"os9 the "etallurgical .abrication records o. the "aking o. the bo"bs the"sel8es9 and the records and testi"ony regarding .ailure to de8elop a 8iable triggering de8ice .or the plutoniu" bo"b. O. the %8 boAes o. Oak +idge records held in the /outheast +egional 3rchi8es in 3tlanta9 >eorgia I had pulled .or re8ie)9 only .our had been opened since their declassi.ication in 19,- and 19-8. I )as the .irst to open and cull through "any o. these boAes9 and )ithin these containers I .ound "any critical docu"ents. 3nd there are boAes that re"ain9 their declassi.ication seals yet unbroken. 3pparently9 the authors described abo8e ha8e relied on personal accounts and the ad"inistrati8e9 strategic and general records harbored in the <ational 3rchi8es in :ashington .or their research. he critical daily production records o. Oak +idge and else)here ha8e been all but ignored9 though they re8eal i"portant in.or"ation not pre8iously considered in other histories9 and although they tell a di..erent story than that presently belie8ed. 58en i. those authors had read9 assi"ilated and interpreted the a8ailable records9 the discrepancies "ay ha8e been considered ano"alous and possibly )ould ha8e been ignored )hen co"pared against the o8erpo)ering reputation o. the traditional history. 0ost o. that history can be traced in the"e and content to 0anhattan Pro?ect Co""anding >eneral Ceslie >ro8es6 book on the sub?ect9 <o) It Can #e old. <o) It Can #e old presents the story o. the "aking o. the ato"ic bo"b that the !nited /tates go8ern"ent needed the )orld to hear at the ti"e. here )as9 undoubtedly9 ?usti.ication .or this guarded approach considering the eAigencies o. the era. he chronicle o. history should be corrected )hen opportunity allo)s9 ho)e8er - though it all too o.ten is not - .or the understanding and bene.it o. generations to co"e. 3nd9 .rankly9 .or the recognition o. all those )ho played a part9 as )ell as the enlighten"ent o. those )ho si"ply desire to kno) the truth. *e"ocracies especially depend on an in.or"ed citi7enry to sa.eguard the proper use o. po)er and appropriate o8ersight o. i"portant "ilitary and political policy. Certainly not all in.or"ation and actions o. a go8ern"ent at )ar or in con.lict )ith another so8ereignty can be re8ie)ed on an open basis conte"poraneously )ith the critical e8ents. #ut as ti"ely issues are resol8ed or neutrali7ed by ne) e8ents9 it is incu"bent upon that de"ocratic society to care.ully re8ie) and analy7e the e8ents and e;uitably ?udge the syste" and the people in8ol8ed. hrough this course )e ensure the nation6s best interests )ere preser8ed9 and "ake )hate8er ad?ust"ents are necessary to pro8ide a guide .or .uture like endea8ors. Other o..icial and se"i-o..icial accounts o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect and the progra"s that co"peted against it ha8e been )ritten9 the best a"ong the" being +ichard +hodes6 eAceptional Pulit7er Pri7e )inning book9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b. Critical 0ass atte"pts in no )ay to re-docu"ent the other)ise reliable historical ele"ents o. a 8ery co"pleA and detailed sub?ect9 other than to pro8ide a basic understanding use.ul to the reader6s analysis o. the scenario .or)arded )ithin these pages. Critical 0ass si"ply suggests that the data recently .ound describe so"e 8ery di..erent e8ents than are recounted in the presently accepted history.

3s noted9 "any other authors6 accounts are cited herein9 but all o. the"9 ulti"ately9 either directly or indirectly9 by de.ault or design9 ha8e been "olded by the "an )ho presided o8er the pro?ect itsel.9 >eneral >ro8es. *uring the 8ery process o. the "aking o. the ato"ic bo"bs9 through co"part"entali7ation and by "iAing a high percentage o. genuine data )ith innuendo - as )ell as ?udicious use o. the occasional untruth >ro8es )as able to create a resilient and coherent sel.-perpetuating "yth o. the birth o. the ato"ic age. 0uch o. the in.or"ation used to tell the story in Critical 0ass does co"e .ro" the )ritings o. >ro8es and other authors. *a8id Ir8ing9 #ritain6s contro8ersial but docu"entation-dependant :orld :ar II historian has recorded "uch o. the >er"an e..ort to create a bo"b in his book9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b. His account alone9 though he see"s not to reali7e it9 goes a long )ay to)ard i"peaching the accepted history that9 because >er"any .ailed to create plutoniu"9 it there.ore .ailed to build an ato"ic bo"b. here are t)o )ays to build an ato"ic bo"b9 one o. plutoniu"9 the other o. uraniu". Ir8ing brings to light a"ple in.or"ation that9 )hen considered )ith other e8idence ne)ly disco8ered and re8ealed in Critical 0ass9 suggests the >er"ans produced the "aterial .or and all but asse"bled a uraniu" bo"b. In the traditional history o. the bo"b9 >ro8es has positioned the >er"an plutoniu" e..ort as the only nuclear initiati8e >er"any e8er pursued. 3nd he has "agni.ied this "isin.or"ation9 couched in a cushion o. hal.-truths9 to i""ense proportions - large enough to hide )hat appears to be a huge >er"an uraniu" enrich"ent pro?ect behind it - and thus he has shielded the <a7i near-success .ro" the 8ie) o. the )orld. His "oti8ations .or doing so )ill be discussed in detail later. One o. "any other authors ;uoted in Critical 0ass is .or"er :orld :ar )o intelligence o..icer Cadislas 4arago9 )ho docu"ented 0artin #or"ann6s escape .ro" <a7i >er"any at the end o. the )ar and his ensuing li.e in se"i-secret eAile in /outh 3"erica in his book9 3.ter"ath. 4arago )as accused and supposedly pro8en9 )ith the help o. the CI39 o. ha8ing .orged the docu"entation he used to 8eri.y his clai"s about #or"ann. Critical 0ass re8ie)s the sub?ect o. the CI3 and its predecessor the O//9 and their in8ol8e"ent in the negotiations )ith #or"ann and e8entual surrender o. >er"an-"ade nuclear bo"b "aterials during the course o. the )ar9 later )ithin the body teAt o. this book. /u..ice it to say here that in8ol8e"ent by the CI3 in a .air perusal o. 4arago6s .indings "ust be suspect. Critical 0ass ;uotes other authors9 as )ell9 )ho ha8e independently disco8ered si"ilar but di..erent docu"entation to that 0r.4arago cites9 and )hose .indings eAonerate and rehabilitate Cadislas 4arago6s )ork. 3"ong these authors are Paul 0anning9 .or"er ?ournalist .or the <e) Dork i"es and author o. 0artin #or"ann - <a7i In 5Aile. 0anning6s credentials as a ?ournalist particularly are i"peccable9 and his reputation is unassailable. 3lthough he did not accept an o..er i""ediately a.ter the )ar to ser8e as the ci8ilian deputy o. the !nited /tates6 occupation 7one o. >er"any9 the o..er itsel. attests to the high regard in )hich he is held9 as )ell as to the potential "ilitary intelligence and other resources he had a8ailable )hen researching his book. 3nother author .ro" )hose )ritings I ha8e dra)n is :illia" /te8enson9 author o. the book 3 0an Called Intrepid9 the appro8ed biography o. another gentle"an and .riend o. /te8enson6s9 a "an by the sa"e na"e9 /ir :illia" /tephenson (unrelated9 note spellings). /ir :illia" is the "an )ho o8ersa) the co"bined intelligence e..orts o. the !nited /tates and 5ngland during :orld :ar II9 and )ho9 incidentally9 plays a "inor role in our story )ithin the co8ers o. Critical 0ass. 3uthor /te8enson6s book is titled he #or"ann #rotherhood. 0any other authors are ;uoted9 as )ell9 to highlight and 8alidate the conclusions presented in Critical 0ass. #ut the de.initi8e body o. e8idence is the actual docu"ents cited in this book that dispassionately record the nu"bers and )eights and dates and ti"es and places and people that constitute the real e8ents that occurred. he silent archi8es9 in so"e cases long untouched9 contain the re"aining .e) pieces o. the picture that had been painted o8er )ith duplicitous details and .raudulent .acts. 5Aposing those lost data to the light o. day is "uch like the art curator )ho takes a blacklight to a painting to ascertain its origin. !nder scrutiny o. light tuned only to see the original9 the pri"ary picture is eAposed underneath as )ell as any re8isions that "ay later ha8e been "ade. /o it is )ith the certi.ieds cited in Critical 0ass. he light o. day9 Eal)ays a great disin.ectantE as the saying goes9 re8eals through ne)ly-disclosed docu"entation the true story o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect during the birth o. its ato"ic o..spring - )ith all its .la)s9 .oibles and unholy alliances as )ell as its ulti"ate9 although so"eho) t)isted9 success. 3nd e8en )ith those .la)s and .oibles it is9 at once9 a story o. genius and perse8erance as )ell as a lesson in "an6s o)n struggle to gro) "orally and spiritually at the sa"e pace that he has gro)n intellectually and technologically. 4or9 as social beings )ho "ust share this earth9 )e are all interdependent upon one another. :hen one such as Hitler rises to po)er9 the only de.ense against the bully )ho insists on blood9 )hen all reason has .ailed9 is to be "ore the aggressor9 or sub"it and perish. /uch course de8ol8es to a le8el o. beha8ior di..erentiated .ro" the instigator6s only by the "oral i"perati8e o. one6s right to sur8i8e. he sad .act is )e can rise as a race only to the le8el o. our least enlightened. !ntil that ti"e9 the )eight

o. our hu"an .railties and .la)s )ill at irregular inter8als co"press to critical "ass and ignite a ne) eAplosion o. pain and su..ering until )e learn once and .or all that our cu"ulati8e "orality "ust "eet or eAceed our united intellects.

Part !ne " The #ranium Bomb Cha$ter !ne " #"%&'(#%&) E he "ost i"portant and secret ite" o. cargo9 the uraniu" oAide9 )hich I belie8e )as radioacti8e9 )as loaded into one o. the 8ertical steel tubes Fo. >er"an !-boat !-$%&G.... )o @apanese o..icers... F)ereG... painting a description in black characters on the bro)n paper )rapping.... Once the inscription !$%( (the scienti.ic designation .or enriched uraniu"9 the type re;uired to "ake a bo"b - author6s note) had been painted on the )rapping o. a package9 it )ould then be carried o8er...and sto)ed in one o. the siA 8ertical "ine sha.ts.E FiG :ol.gang Hirsch.eld Chie. +adio Operator o. !-$%& ECieut Co"dr Harl # +eese !/<+9 Cieut (@>) 5d)ard P 0c*er"ott !/<+ and 0a?or @ohn 5 1ance C5 !/3 )ill report to co""andant 0ay %2th :ednesday in connection )ith cargo !-$%&.E FiiG !/ <a8y secret trans"ission I$9$2&( .ro" Co""ander <a8al Operations to Ports"outh <a8al Dard9 %2 0ay 19&( EI ?ust got a ship"ent in o. captured "aterial.... I ha8e ?ust talked to 1ance and they are taking it o.. the ship.... I ha8e about 82 cases o. ! po)der in cases. He (1ance) is handling all o. that no).Eiii elephone transcript bet)een 0anhattan Pro?ect security o..icers 0a?or /"ith and 0a?or raynor9 1& @une919&(. he traditional history o. the ato"ic bo"b accepts as an uni"portant .ootnote the arri8al o. !-$%& on !nited /tates shores9 and ad"its the !-boat carried uraniu" oAide along )ith its load o. po)er.ul passengers and )ar-"aking "aterials. he accepted history also ackno)ledges these passengers )ere )hisked a)ay to :ashington .or interrogation and the cargo )as ;uickly co""andeered .or use else)here. he traditional history e8en concedes that t)o @apanese o..icers )ere onboard !-$%& and that they co""itted a .or" o. uncon8entional /a"urai suicide rather than be captured by their ene"ies. he traditional history denies9 ho)e8er9 that the uraniu" on board !-$%& )as enriched and there.ore easily usable in an ato"ic bo"b. he accepted history asserts there is no e8idence that the uraniu" stocks o. !$%& )ere trans.erred into the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 although recent suggestions ha8e hinted that this "ay ha8e occurred. 3nd the traditional history asserts that the bo"b co"ponents on board !-$%& arri8ed too late to be included in the ato"ic bo"bs that )ere dropped on @apan. he docu"entation indicates ;uite di..erently on all accounts. #e.ore !-$%& had landed at Ports"outh - be.ore it e8en le.t 5urope - !nited /tates and #ritish intelligence kne) !-$%& )as on a "ission to @apan and that it carried i"portant passengers and cargo.i8 3 portion o. the cargo9 especially9 )as o. a singular nature. 3ccording to !-$%&6s chie. radio operator9 :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 )ho )itnessed the loading o. the !-boatB he "ost i"portant and secret ite" o. cargo9 the uraniu" oAide9 )hich I belie8e )as highly radioacti8e9 )as loaded into one o. the 8ertical steel tubes one "orning in 4ebruary9 19&(. )o @apanese o..icers )ere to tra8el aboard !-$%& on the 8oyage to okyoB 3ir 4orce Colonel >en7o /hosi9 an aeronautical engineer9 and <a8y Captain Hideo o"onaga9 a sub"arine architect )ho9 it )ill be recalled9 had arri8ed in 4rance aboard !-182 about eighteen "onths pre8iously )ith a .ortune in gold .or the @apanese 5"bassy in #erlin. I sa) these t)o o..icers seated on a crate on the .orecasting engaged in painting a description in black characters on the bro)n paper )rapping gu""ed around each o. a nu"ber o. containers o. uni.or" si7e. 3t the ti"e I didn6t see ho) "any containers there )ere9 but the Coading 0ani.est sho)ed ten. 5ach case )as a cube9 possibly steel and lead9 nine inches along each side and enor"ously hea8y. Once the inscription !$%( had been painted on the )rapping o. a package9 it )ould then be carried o8er to the knot o. cre)"en under the super8ision o. /ub-Ct P.a.. and the boats)ain9 Peter /cholch9 and sto)ed in one o. the siA 8ertical "inesha.ts.8 Hirsch.eld6s straight.or)ard account o. the uraniu" being Ehighly radioacti8eE - he later )itnessed the storage tubes being tested )ith >eiger counters8i - and labeled E!$%(E pro8ides pro.oundly i"portant in.or"ation about this cargo. !$%( is the scienti.ic designation o. enriched uraniu" - the type o. uraniu" re;uired to .uel an ato"ic bo"b. :hile the uraniu" re"ained a secret .ro" all but the highest le8els )ithin the !nited /tates until a.ter the surrender o. !-$%&9 a captured >er"an !C +3 encoder'decoder had allo)ed the :estern 3llies to intercept and decode >er"an and @apanese radio trans"issions. /o"e o. these captured signals had already identi.ied the !-boat as being on a special "ission to @apan and e8en identi.ied >eneral Hessler and "uch o. his cortege as likely to be onboard9 but the curious uraniu" )as ne8er "entioned. he strictest secrecy )as "aintained9 nonetheless9 around the !-boat. 3s early as 1% 0ay9 the day be.ore !-$%& )as actually boarded by the /utton6s pri7e cre)9 orders had

already been dispatched that co""anded special handling o. the passengers and cre) o. !-$%& )hen it )as surrenderedB Press representati8es "ay be per"itted to inter8ie) o..icers and "en o. >er"an sub"arines that surrender. his "essage applies only to sub"arines that surrender. It does not apply to other prisoners o. )ar. It does not apply to prisoners o. the !-$%&. Prisoners o. the !-$%& "ust not be inter8ie)ed by press representati8es.8ii )o days later9 )hile the /utton )as slo)ly stea"ing to)ard Ports"outh )ith !-$%& at her side9 "ore orders )ere recei8ed. E*ocu"ents and personnel o. !-$%& are "ost i"portant and any and all doubt.ul personnel should be sent here9E8iii the co""ander o. na8al operations in :ashington9 *.C. ordered. he sa"e day9 the co""ander in chie. o. the <a8y instructed9 E0aintain prisoners !-$%& inco""unicado and send the" under <a8y depart"ent representati8e to :ashington .or interrogation.EiA he e..ort to keep !$%& under )raps )as only partially success.ul. +eporters had been allo)ed to inter8ie) prisoners .ro" pre8ious !-boats9 and9 in .act9 )ere allo)ed to inter8ie) captured cre)s .ro" succeeding !-boats9 as )ell. :hen the press disco8ered !-$%& )as going to be o.. li"its9 a cry and hue )ent up that took t)o days to settle. 4ollo)ing eAtended negotiations9 a co"pro"ise )as struck bet)een the <a8y brass and the press core.A he reporters )ere allo)ed to take photographs o. the people dise"barking the boat )hen it landed9 but no talking to the prisoners )as per"itted.Ai :hen they landed at the pier9 the prisoners )alked silently through the ga)king cro)d and cli"bed into buses9 to be dri8en out o. the spotlight and .ar .ro" the glaring eyes o. history. On $% 0ay9 the cargo "ani.est o. !-$%& )as translatedAii by the o..ice o. <a8al Intelligence9 ;uickly triggering a series o. e8ents. On the second page o. the "ani.est9 hal.)ay do)n the page9 )as the entry E12 cases9 (,2 kilogra"s9 uraniu" oAide.E :hoe8er .irst read the entry and understood the .rightening capabilities and potential purpose o. uraniu" "ust ha8e been stunned by the entry. Certainly ;uestions )ere asked. :as this the .irst ship"ent o. uraniu" to @apan or had others already slipped byJ *id the @apanese ha8e the capacity to use itJ Could they build a bo"bJ :hate8er the ans)ers9 )ithin .our days personnel .ro" the O..ice o. <a8al Intelligence had brought !$%&6s second )atch o..icer9 Harl P.a.. - )ho had not been brought to :ashington )ith the original batch o. high-le8el prisoners9 but )ho had o8erseen loading o. the !-boat in >er"any - to :ashington and interrogated hi". hey ;uickly radioed Ports"outhB P.a.. prepared "ani.est list and kno)s kind docu"ents and cargo in each tube. P.a.. states...uraniu" oAide loaded in gold cylinders and as long as cylinders not opened can be handled like crude < . hese containers should not be opened as substance )ill beco"e sensiti8e and dangerous.Aiii he identi.ication that the uraniu" )as sto)ed in gold-lined cylinders and that it )ould beco"e Esensiti8e and dangerousE )hen unpacked pro8ides clear substantiation o. radio o..icer Hirsch.eld6s assertion that the uraniu" )as labeled )ith the title !$%(. !raniu" that has had its proportion o. the isotope !$%( increased co"pared to the "ore co""on isotope o. uraniu"9 !$%89 is kno)n as enriched uraniu". :hen that enrich"ent beco"es -2 percent or abo8e9 it is bo"b-grade uraniu". he process o. enriching uraniu" during the )ar )as highly technical and 8ery eApensi8e - it still is. !pon .irst reading that the uraniu" on board !-$%& )as stored in gold-lined cylinders9 this author tracked do)n Clarence Carsen9 .or"er director o. the leading uraniu" enrich"ent process at Oak +idge9 ennessee9 )here the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s uraniu" enrich"ent .acilities )ere housed. In a telephone con8ersation9 I asked 0r. Carsen )hat9 i. anything9 )ould be the purpose o. shipping uraniu" in gold-lined containers.Ai8 0r. Carsen re"e"bered that the Oak +idge progra" used gold trays )hen )orking )ith enriched uraniu". He eAplained that9 because uraniu" enrich"ent )as a 8ery costly process9 enriched uraniu" needed to be protected ?ealously9 but because it is 8ery corrosi8e9 it is easily in8aded by any but the "ost stable "aterials9 and )ould then beco"e conta"inated. o pre8ent the loss to conta"ination o. the in8aluable enriched uraniu"9 gold )as used. >old is one o. the "ost stable substances on earth. :hile eApensi8e9 0r. Carsen eAplained9 the cost o. gold )as a drop in the bucket co"pared to the 8alue o. enriched uraniu". :ould ra) uraniu"9 rather than enriched uraniu"9 be stored in gold containers9 I askedJ <ot likely9 0r. Carsen responded. he 8alue o. ra) uraniu" is9 and )as at the ti"e9 inconse;uential co"pared to the cost o. gold. 3ssu"ing the >er"ans in8ested roughly the sa"e a"ount o. "oney as the 0anhattan Pro?ect to enrich their uraniu"9 )hich it appears they did9A8 the cost o. the !$%( on board the sub"arine )as so"e)here in the neighborhood o. K1229222 an ounce= by .ar the "ost eApensi8e substance on earth. he .act that the enriched uraniu" had the capacity to deli8er )orld do"inance to the .irst country that processed and used it "ade it priceless. 3 long 8oyage )ith the !$%( sto)ed in anything but gold could ha8e cost the >er"an'@apanese ato"ic bo"b progra" dearly. In addition to the gold-lined shipping containers corroborating Hirsch.eld6s identi.ication o. the uraniu" as !$%(9 the description o. the uraniu"6s characteristics )hen its container )as opened also tends to support the conclusion the uraniu" )as

enriched. !raniu" o. all kinds is not only corrosi8e9 but it is toAic i. s)allo)ed. In its ra) state9 ho)e8er9 )hich is 99.% percent !$%89 the substance poses little threat to "an as long as he does not eat it. he stock o. ra) uraniu" that e8entually )as processed by the 0anhattan Pro?ect originally had been stored in steel dru"s and )as sitting in the open at a /taten Island storage .acility.A8i 0uch o. the >er"an ra) uraniu" disco8ered in salt "ines at the end o. the )ar also )as stored in steel dru"s9 "any o. the" broken open. he "aterial )as loaded into hea8y paper sacks and carried .ro" the storage area by apparently unprotected >.I.s.A8ii /ince then9 "ore precautions ha8e been taken in handling ra) uraniu"9 but at the ti"e9 caution )as "ini"al and ra) uraniu" )as considered to be relati8ely sa.e.A8iii 4or the <a8y to note the uraniu" )ould beco"e Esensiti8e and dangerousE and should be Ehandled like crude < E )hen it )as unpacked tends to indicate that the uraniu" enclosed )as9 in .act9 enriched uraniu". !raniu" enriched signi.icantly in !$%( is radioacti8e and there.ore should be handled )ith appropriate caution9 as the co""uni;uL described. #y 1, @une 19&(9 a second cargo "ani.est had been prepared .or !-$%&9 this ti"e by the !nited /tates <a8y. #ut the uraniu" )as not on the list. It )as not e8en "arked as shipped out or ha8ing once been on hand. It )as ne8er "entioned. It )as gone - as i. it ne8er eAisted. :here did the uraniu" goJ 5le8en days a.ter !-$%& )as escorted into Ports"outh9 and .our days a.ter P.a.. identi.ied its location on the !-boat9 a tea" )as selected to o8ersee the o..loading o. !-$%&. Ports"outh recei8ed the .ollo)ing "essageB Cieut. Co"dr. Harl # +eese !/<+9 Cieut (@>) 5d)ard P 0c*er"ott !/<+ and 0a?or @ohn 5 1ance C5 !/3 FCorps o. o. 5ngineers9 !nited /tates 3r"y (the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s parent organi7ation) - author6s noteG )ill report to co""andant 0ay %2th :ednesday in connection )ith cargo !-$%&. It is conte"plated that ship"ent )ill be "ade by ship to ordnance in8estigation laboratory <31PO:43C Indian Head 0aryland i. this is .easible.AiA he order9 dispatched by the chie. o. na8al operations9 is re8ealing i. not outright startling .or the selection o. one "e"ber o. its three-"an tea". Including 0a?or 1ance o. the 3r"y Corps o. 5ngineers in )hat )as other)ise an all <a8y operation see"s a telling selection. he "ilitary ser8ices o. the !nited /tates9 as in "ost other countries9 )ere highly co"petiti8e )ith one another. rue9 !-$%&6s cargo included a "iAed bag o. aeronautics9 rocketry and ar"or-piercing technology that the 3r"y could use9 too9 but the <a8y had progra"s .or all o. these "aterials and surely )ould ha8e done its o)n analysis .irst and then possibly shared the in.or"ation )ith its ser8ice brothers. /o"eone9 so"e)here at a 8ery high le8el9 appears to ha8e seen that the 3r"y )as brought into the sca8enging operation that had beco"e !-$%&= not ?ust any 3r"y group9 but the group that o8ersees the 0anhattan Pro?ect - the Corps o. 5ngineers. 0a?or @ohn 5. 1ance )as not only .ro" the Corps o. 5ngineers9 the 3r"y depart"ent under )hich the 0anhattan Pro?ect operated9 but9 i. a telephone transcript taken .ro" 0anhattan Pro?ect archi8es re.ers to the sa"e E1anceE as the 0a?or assigned to o..load !-$%& - as it appears to - then he )as part o. 3"erica6s super-secret ato"ic bo"b pro?ect9 as )ell. he transcript is o. a con8ersation bet)een 0anhattan Pro?ect intelligence o..icers /"ith and raynor and )as recorded t)o )eeks a.ter E0a?or 1anceE )as assigned to the tea" responsible .or unloading the "aterial captured on !-$%&. /"ithB I ?ust got a ship"ent in o. captured "aterial and there )ere %9 dru"s and -2 )ooden barrels and all o. that is li;uid. :hat I need is a test to see )hat the concentration is and a set o. reco""endations as to disposal. I ha8e ?ust talked to 1ance and they are taking it o.. the ship and putting it in the -%rd /treet :arehouse. In addition to that I ha8e about 82 cases o. ! po)der in cases. He (1ance) is handling all o. that no). Can you do the testing and ho) ;uickly can it be doneJ 3ll )e kno) is that it ranges .ro" 12 to 8( percent and )e )ant to kno) )hich and )hat. raynorB Can you gi8e "e )hat )as in those casesJ /"ithB ! po)der. 1ance )ill take care o. the testing o. that. raynorB he other stu.. is so"ething elseJ /"ithB he other is )ater.AA !-$%&6s cargo "ani.est re8eals that9 besides its uraniu"9 a"ong its cargo )as 12 EbalesE o. dru"s and (2 EbalesE o. barrels. he barrels are noted in the "ani.est to ha8e contained ben7yl cellulose9 a 8ery stable substanceAAi that "ay ha8e been used as a biological shield .ro" radiation or as a coolant or "oderator in a li;uid reactor.AAii he "ani.est lists the dru"s as containing Econ.idential "aterial.E 3s surprising as it "ay see"9 this secret substance "ay ha8e been the E)aterE that 0a?or /"ith noted in his discussion )ith 0a?or raynor. :hy )ould 0a?or /"ith )ant the )ater testedJ 3nd )hat did he "ean )hen he said that its concentration ranged E.ro" 12 to 8( percent and )e )ant to kno) )hich and )hatEJ he leaders o. the >er"an pro?ect to breed plutoniu" had decided to use hea8y )ater9 or deuteriu" oAide9 as the "oderator .or a plutoniu"-breeding li;uid reactor. he procedure o. creating hea8y )ater results in regular )ater "olecules picking up an additional hydrogen ato". he percentage o. )ater "olecules )ith

the eAtra hydrogen represents the le8el o. concentration o. the hea8y )ater. hus 0a?or /"ith6s see"ingly o8er7ealous concern about )ater and his ;uestion about concentration is predictable i. /"ith suspected the "aterial )as intended .or a nuclear reactor. 3nd using hea8y )ater as a "a?or ele"ent o. their plutoniu" breeding reactor pro?ect9 it is easy to see )hy the >er"ans labeled the dru"s Econ.idential "aterial.E he e8idence indicates that !-$%& - i. the captured cargo being tested by E1anceE )as .ro" !-$%&9 )hich see"s 8ery probable gi8en all considerations - carried co"ponents .or "aking not only a uraniu" bo"b9 but a plutoniu" bo"b9 also. 4urther corroborating the connection o. the barrels and dru"s as those that )ere taken .ro" !-$%& is a hand)ritten note .ound in the /outheast national archi8es held at 5ast Point9 >eorgia.AAiii *ated 1, @une9 19&(9 t)o days a.ter /"ith6s and raynor6s telephone con8ersation9 the note described ho) 129 barrels and dru"s - the eAact total gi8en in the /"ith' raynor transcript - )ere to be tested )ith geiger counters to deter"ine i. they )ere radioacti8e. he note also included instructions that an Eintelligence agent cross out any "arkings on dru"s and bbls. Fsic. - abbre8iation .or barrels - authors noteG and nu"ber the" serially .ro" 1 to 129 and "ake note o. )hat )as crossed out.E he note goes on to say that this reco""endation )as gi8en to and appro8ed by Ct.Colonel Parsons9 >eneral >ro8es6 right-hand "an on the "ilitary side o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect. 3nd lastly9 the )riter o. the note had called 0a?or /"ith9 apparently to report back to hi"9 leading one to belie8e the note6s author "ay ha8e been 0a?or raynor. :as the captured cargo discussed by /"ith and raynor .ro" !-$%&J he presence o. a 0r. E1anceE )ho )as in charge o. E! po)der9E al"ost certainly deter"ines that such )as the case. he docu"ents under consideration and the con8ersation they detail are .ro" 0anhattan Pro?ect .iles and are about "en )ho )orked .or the 0anhattan Pro?ect. !sing the letter E!E as an abbre8iation .or uraniu" )as )idespread throughout the 0anhattan Pro?ect. hat there could ha8e been another E1anceE )ho )as )orking )ith uraniu" po)der - especially EcapturedE uraniu" po)der - see"s unlikely e8en .or coincidence. 3nd the .act that the contents o. the barrels listed on the !-boat "ani.est )ere identi.ied as containing a substance likely to be used in a nuclear reactor9 ben7yl cellulose9 and that the barrels in the /"ith' raynor transcript and the untitled note - as )ell as the dru"s - )ere tested .or radioacti8ity by geiger counter9 certainly links the EcapturedE "aterials to no other source than !-$%&. he ne)-.ound e8idence taken en "ass de"onstrates that9 despite the traditional history9 the uraniu" captured .ro" !-$%& )as enriched uraniu" that )as co""andeered into the 0anhattan Pro?ect "ore than a "onth be.ore the .inal uraniu" slugs )ere asse"bled .or the uraniu" bo"b. he Oak +idge records o. its chie. uraniu" enrich"ent e..ort - the "agnetic isotope separators kno)n as calutrons - sho) that a )eek a.ter /"ith6s and raynor6s 1& @une con8ersation9 the enriched uraniu" output at Oak +idge nearly doubled - a.ter siA "onths o. steady output. FAAi8G 5d)ard Ha""el9 a "etallurgist )ho )orked )ith 5ric @ette at the Chicago 0et Cab9 )here the enriched uraniu" )as .abricated into the bo"b slugs9 corroborated this report o. late-arri8ing enriched uraniu". 0r. Ha""el told the author that 8ery little enriched uraniu" )as recei8ed at the laboratory until ?ust t)o or three )eeks - certainly less than a "onth - be.ore the bo"b )as dropped.FAA8G he 0anhattan Pro?ect had been in desperate need o. enriched uraniu" to .uel its lingering uraniu" bo"b progra". <o) it is al"ost conclusi8ely pro8en that !-$%& pro8ided the enriched uraniu" needed9 as )ell as co"ponents .or a plutoniu" breeder reactor. <otesB i :ol.gang Hirsch.eld and >eo..rey #rooks9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. 3 !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. 1989199 ii !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-boat !-$%& .ile9 !/ <a8y secret dispatch I$9$2&(9 %2 0ay 19&( iii !/ 3rchi8es /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia9 telephone transcript titled elephone Con8ersation #et)een 0a?or /"ith9 :CO and 0a?or raynor9 1& @une9 19&( i8 !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 eAtract o. intercepted trans"ission sent .ro" Chie. Inspector in >er"any to #ureau o. 0ilitary Operations and 0ilitary 3..airs9 I1,(9 1( 3pril9 19&(9 declassi.ied I <<*9-(2219 <3+3 date 9'1('98 :ol.gang Hirsch.eld and >eo..rey #rooks9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. 3 !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. 1989199 8i :ol.gang Hirsch.eld and >eo..rey #rooks9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. 3 !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 3ppendiA 8ii !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-boat !-$%& .ile9 con.idential dispatch I1%1(299 1% 0ay 19&( 8iii !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-boat !-$%& .ile9 secret dispatch I1(1-1,9 1( 0ay9 19&( iA !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-boat !-$%& .ile9 secret dispatch I1(19&$9 1( 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*-&(28( A !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-boat !-$%& .ile9 Cog o. Public +elations +estricted9 by Co""ander <.+. Collier9 1- 0ay9 19&(= transcript9 elephone Con8ersation #et)een Capt. 1.*. Herbster9 !/< (+et.)9 and Co""odore Hurt79 !./.<. 5./.4.9 18 0ay9 19&(= second telephone con8ersation transcript Captain Herbster and Co""odore Hurt79 18 0ay9

19&( Ai !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-boat !-$%& .ile9 Cog o. Public +elations +estricted9 by Co""ander <.+. Collier9 1- 0ay9 19&(= transcript9 elephone Con8ersation #et)een Capt. 1.*. Herbster9 !/< (+et.)9 and Co""odore Hurt79 !./.<. 5./.4.9 18 0ay9 19&(= second telephone con8ersation transcript Captain Herbster and Co""odore Hurt79 18 0ay9 19&( Aii !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 0ani.est o. Cargo 4or okio On #oard !-$%&9 translated .ro" >er"an9 $% 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*92%21(9 <3+3 *ate 1$'11'9% Aiii !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 secret dispatch I$,$1(19 $- 0ay9 19&( Ai8 Personal telephone con8ersation bet)een the author and Clarence Carsen9 *irector o. D-1$ calutrons operations at Oak +idge9 no date recorded A8 @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p 11,= Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p.1(%= co"pare to Chapter 4our9 page 8$ A8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &$A8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9p p. ,289 ,29 A8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &,1 AiA !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-boat !-$%& .ile9 !/ <a8y secret dispatch I$9$2&(9 %2 0ay 19&( AA !/ 3rchi8es /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia9 telephone transcript titled elephone Con8ersation #et)een 0a?or /"ith9 :CO and 0a?or raynor9 1& @une9 19&( AAi Personal telephone con8ersation bet)een the author and *r. /usan 4rost9 Ph*9 3ssociate Pro.essor o. #ioche"istry and 0olecular #iology9 College o. 0edicine9 !ni8ersity o. 4lorida9 %2 3ugust 19999 also *r. :ent)orth9 !ni8ersity o. Houston AAii Interscience Publishers9 Concise 5ncyclopedia o. <uclear 5nergy9 p. ,88 AAiii !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >39 untitled hand)ritten note dated ,'1,'&( AAi8 !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >39 #eta OAide rans.er +eport= see also chart on page MM AA8 Personal telephone con8ersation bet)een the author and 5d)ard Ha""el9 0anhattan Pro?ect "etallurgist9 1& 0ay9 199,

Cha$ter T*o " The T*o Billion +ollar Bet E3 study o. the ship"ent o. (bo"b-grade uraniu") .or the past three "onths sho)s the .ollo)ing...B 3t the present rate )e )ill ha8e 12 kilos about 4ebruary - and 1( kilos about 0ay 1.EAA8i 4ro" a "e"o )ritten by chie. Cos 3la"os "etallurgist 5ric @ette9 *ece"ber $89 19&&. he uraniu" bo"b re;uired (2 kilos by @uly $&. #y "id-0ay o. 19&(9 as !-$%& )as being escorted in to Ports"outh9 al"ost t)o billion dollars had been spent on the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 "aking it the greatest )ager e8er to that point in ti"e. he "an )ho thre) the dice9 and )as about to lose it all9 )as #rigadier >eneral Ceslie +ichard >ro8es. In the course o. ?ust three years9 using taApayers6 "oney unbekno)nst to the"9 >ro8es had built a secret industry that outstripped any other enterprise on earth. He had purchased 8ast tracts o. land in :ashington state9 ennessee9 <e) 0eAico and else)here9 engul.ing hundreds o. thousands9 i. not "illions9 o. acres. On these reser8ations he built huge .actories that contained the "ost ad8anced technology on the .ace o. the earth. He "ade "ulti-"illion dollar deals )ith "any o. the globe6s top co"panies - co"panies like *uPont9 :estinghouse9 and +aytheon. o support these contracts and ne)ly constructed .acilities9 he built )hole to)ns9 co"plete )ith roads9 schools9 postal ser8ices9 banks9 unions and e8erything else necessary to "aintain a co""unity. 3nd he "anned these "unicipalities )ith hundreds o. thousands o. )orkers and their .a"ilies9 including "any o. the greatest intellects ali8e. <o .e)er than 1% o. the physicists and che"ists in8ol8ed in the 0anhattan Pro?ect either had already )on9 or later )ould go on to )in9 the <obel Pri7e. 3ll o. this had been asse"bled and .ocused on one task - to "ake an ato"ic bo"b. <o) the e..ort see"ed to be eAploding in his .ace. he construction o. an ato"ic bo"b re;uires t)o thingsB enough .issile "aterial to achie8e critical "ass and eAplode9 and a trigger to start the eAplosion. *espite the i""ense in8est"ent9 progress )as re"arkably slo) on both re;uire"ents. Contrary to presently accepted history9 by "id-0ay o. 19&(9 neither re;uire"ent had been obtained. 3ccording to recently unco8ered in.or"ation .ro" conte"poraneous 0anhattan Pro?ect docu"ents - enriched uraniu" production charts and "e"os on "etallurgical progress and other ne8erbe.ore-re8ealed sources9 including .irst-hand in.or"ation re8ealed to the author during inter8ie)s )ith 0anhattan Pro?ect personnel - the ob?ecti8es still had not been achie8ed. 3nd >ro8es had a third re;uire"ent that )as about to "ake the other t)o points "oot. i"e )as a .actor9 and it )as running out. >er"any9 the chie. ri8al in the ato"ic bo"b race according to intelligence reports9AA8ii - not)ithstanding its no)-surrendered status - planned to pro8ide its 3sian ally9 @apan9 )ith an ato"ic bo"bAA8iii to use in the Paci.ic. !-$%& had not been the only !-boat scheduled to 8oyage to @apan.AAiA 3t least one other 8essel9 possibly "ore9 apparently also carried in its belly enriched uraniu" intended .or okyo. 3pparently9 the race .or the ato"ic bo"b )as "uch closer than "ost )ould ha8e supposed - possibly e8en closer than >ro8es thought. 3.ter all9 the >eneral had spy Paul +osbaud9 code na"ed >ri..in9 keeping hi" in.or"ed o. >er"an progress and possibly e8en o. ship"ents to the Island <ation. here see"s to ha8e been no such counterpart in @apan to ser8e >ro8es as a conduit. I. uraniu" had been sent to @apan9 as appears probable9 >ro8es "ost likely kne) through +osbaud9 but )hat )as happening to it in he Cand o. the +ising /un he could only guess. >ro8es )as not pressured by this threat only9 he also had to )orry about the .act that9 should the 3llies6 )ar e..ort sur8i8e the >er"an'@apanese conspiracy9 in @uly9 ru"an9 Churchill and /talin )ere scheduled to "eet in Pottsda" to partition the re"nants o. 5urope that the hird +eich had le.t behind. he result )ould go a long )ay to)ard deciding the balance o. po)er in the post-:orld :ar )o 5ra.AAA 3dditionally9 /talin had already declared his intent to go to )ar )ith @apan in "id-3ugust.AAAi he !nited /tates and #ritain could then eApect to share the 3sia'Paci.ic region9 as )ell as 5urope9 )ith +ussia= lea8ing the Co""unist #ear )ith a "uch greater share o. the globe than it had earned or that either de"ocracy cared to relin;uish. 3 de"onstration o. the po)er o. 6the bo"b6 to end the )ar )ith @apan - displaying to the rest o. the )orld that the !nited /tates possessed this a).ul )eapon - )ould establish 3"erica as the "ilitary leader o. all nations= and )ould certainly i"pact these negotiations and the resulting socio-political co"pleAion o. the "odern age. #ut here stood >ro8es9 as yet unsuccess.ul9 )ith the sands o. ti"e slipping through his hands. *espite "assi8e9 so"eti"es reckless9 al)ays all-out spending= despite playing all the odds9 e8en those )ith the sli""est chance o. )inning= despite asse"bling the greatest braintrust e8er brought together in the !nited /tates= and e8en despite >ro8es6 o)n eApansi8e eAperience and un;uestioned sel.-con.idence9 the ga"ble appeared to be a bust. 3l"ost K$ billion to produce ?ust o8er 122 pounds o. .issile "aterial .or the uraniu" bo"b and about %2 pounds .or the plutoniu" bo"b9 and a )ay to detonate the"9 had not been enough to "eet the deadline. he cost9 had the e..ort been success.ul9 e;ualed al"ost K1229222 per ounce o. enriched uraniu" - in 19&(

dollars. :hile the great e..ort had been success.ul enriching uraniu" and reducing it to its eAplosi8e "etallic .or"9 it appears that o8er one-hal. o. the hard-earned "aterial ne8er )ould see a uraniu" bo"b= it )as secretly being used to .uel the huge plutoniu"-breeding reactors at Han.ord9 :ashington. he reactors9 .ueled by the enriched uraniu"9 )ould produce se8eral orders o. "agnitude "ore eAplosi8e plutoniu" than the enriched uraniu" they consu"ed= pro"ising ;uicker9 easier9 less eApensi8e bo"bs9 and "any "ore plutoniu" bo"bs than the single uraniu" bo"b that could ha8e been produced )ith the a"ount o. enriched uraniu" consu"ed in the reactors. he end result .or the uraniu" enrich"ent e..ort )as that less than hal. o. the enriched uraniu" "etal re;uired .or a nuclear de8ice )as a8ailable by "id-0ay9 according to calculations based on data gi8en in a "e"o )ritten by top 0anhattan Pro?ect "etallurgist9 5ric @etteAAAii and )ith )hich later in.or"ation agrees9 as do @ette6s resulting predictions. 58en doubling that rate o. output9 the progra" )ould .all .ar short o. the a"ount re;uired .or a bo"b to ha8e been dropped in early 3ugust. 3nd yet the bo"b dropped on Hiroshi"a is kno)n to ha8e been a uraniu" bo"b. @ette6s calculations correspond al"ost precisely )ith and are 8alidated by in.or"ation supplied in +ichard +hodes6 book he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 in )hich +hodes sets the a"ount o. enriched uraniu" "etal a8ailable .or a uraniu" bo"b by 3pril 19&( as Ea near critical asse"bly.EAAAiii 3ccording to +hodes6 calculations9 )hich are based on in.or"ation recorded at the ti"e by @a"es #ryant Conant9 one o. the scienti.ic ad8isors on the 0anhattan Pro?ect and president o. Har8ard9 &$ kilogra"s9 or 9$.& pounds9 o. enriched uraniu" is e;ual to $.8 critical "asses.AAAi8 One critical "ass there.ore9 the a"ount barely a8ailable in "id-3pril )ith only three "onths o. production ti"e le.t9 is eAactly 1( kilogra"s9 or %% pounds9 the a"ount @ette predicted )ould be a8ailable by 1 0ay. In theory9 one critical "ass )as all that )as needed to "ake a bo"b= but in reality9 due to ine..iciencies caused by i"purities still "iAed throughout the enriched uraniu"9 the bo"b actually re;uired o8er three critical "asses in order to achie8e the le8el o. eAplosion desired. +obert /erber9 )ho )rote he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 gi8es the total .igure .or the uraniu" bo"b at Eabout (2 kilogra"s9EAAA8 o8er three ti"es critical "ass. he point is9 in "id-3pril9 a.ter al"ost a year o. processing enriched "aterial9 because o. the de"and to use enriched uraniu" to produce the "uch "ore practical and po)er.ul plutoniu" bo"b9 the uraniu" progra" had barely one-third the processed uraniu" re;uired to "ake a uraniu" bo"b. he uraniu" bo"b option )ould ha8e been inconse;uential )ith a 8alid plutoniu" bo"b but it )as later disco8ered that the plutoniu" bo"b could not be detonated e..iciently enough to create a success.ul eAplosion. <o)9 )ith enriched uraniu" stocks depleted by plutoniu" de"and and the plutoniu" bo"b9 in turn9 undetonatable9 the entire enor"ous enterprise appeared destined .or de.eat. Det e8en no)9 both >ro8es and his superiors kne) that the ga"ble had been a strategic i"perati8e. o sit on the sidelines o. international in.luence9 )hen 3"erica )as ?ust co"ing into its o)n= to allo) .ascist9 co""unist or i"perialistic go8ern"ents to control the destinies o. the countries o. the )orld - especially those o. .ree nations - )as i""oral and inconcei8able. he )ager )as essential no "atter ho) s"all the chance o. success. 4or the opportunity e8en to sit at the table and bet9 kno)ing that the stake )as )orld do"inion9 +oose8elt had anted-up K$ billion9 and )ith .orekno)ledge so"e say9 had allo)ed Pearl Harbor to be bo"bed. hus the !nited /tates entered the )ar .or a chance to play the nuclear ga"e. <o) the deck al"ost had been played out and9 as is so o.ten the case in )ar and politics9 it appeared there )ould be no clear )inner9 only 8arying degrees o. losers. 58en >ro8es9 .ro" the 8ery beginning )hen he took o8er the 0anhattan Pro?ect .ro" Colonel @.C. 0arshall in /epte"ber o. 19&$9 AAA8i despite all his later e..orts9 had gi8en the i"probable sche"e a s"all chance o. success.AAA8ii 0arshall had been the 0anhattan9 <e) Dork district engineer .or the 3r"y Corps o. 5ngineers. He )as assigned to the pro?ect shortly a.ter +oose8elt recei8ed the .a"ous letter in late 19%99AAA8iii )ritten by 3lbert 5instein at the behest o. t)o reno)ned Hungarian physicists9 5ugene :igner and Ceo /7ilard9 that eAplained the destructi8e realities o. nuclear energy and that the >er"ans )ere )orking .e8erishly on its unleashing. he letter )as deli8ered personally to the president by econo"ist and +oose8elt con.idant 3leAander /achs9 )ho read it to the president aloud in the o8al o..ice. +oose8elt9 by his o)n nati8e genius9 see"s ;uickly to ha8e understood the .ull i"plications o. the de8elop"ent. #e.ore /achs le.t the :hite House that day9 the President had established a co""ittee .or pursuing nuclear energy. #ut despite +oose8elt6s ;uick re.leAes9 the )ork "o8ed slo)ly. +esponding to a report by aid 1anne8ar #ush t)o years later9 in the early /pring o. 19&$9 +oose8elt - )ho see"ed to understand the urgency o. the ato"ic initiati8e better than "ost o. his nuclear ad8isors - )rote e"phatically9 E he )hole thing should be pushed not only in regard to de8elop"ent9 but also )ith due regard to ti"e. his is 8ery "uch o. the essence.EAAAiA he President see"s to ha8e been the only one )ho understood the .ull gra8ity o. the circu"stances. :hen @a"es #. Conant reported in "id-19&$ that >er"any "ight be ahead in the ar"s race by as "uch as a yearAl - and despite traditional history there is e8idence this )as so - i"petus )as .inally gi8en to the

progra"9 but it still took until /epte"ber o. that year to recruit >ro8es. he colonel )ho had a decade earlier o8erseen the construction o. the great sy"bol o. !nited /tates "ilitary "ight - he Pentagon - had been "ade a brigadier general responsible .or the de8elop"ent o. the )eapon ulti"ately destined to guarantee that po)er. >ro8es6 response to learning that the pro?ect .or )hich he )as being recruited could single-handedly )in the )ar speaks 8olu"es about the si7e o. his ego and the eAtent to )hich his eAperience building the Pentagon and handling a K12 billion budget as the nu"ber t)o "an in the Corps o. 5ngineers had alienated hi" .ro" .eelings o. "ere hu"an di"ensions. He said si"plyB EOh.EAli he one thing +oose8elt didn6t need to )orry about )ith >ro8es )as )asted ti"e. he general )ent to )ork i""ediately9 criss-crossing the country to .a"iliari7e hi"sel. )ith the theory and processes and all o. the research and de8elop"ent progra"s presently in progress. :hat he .ound )as discouraging. 4irst9 uraniu"9 at least at the ti"e9 )as rare and relati8ely eApensi8e. 5Aperts in the !nited /tates kne) o. only a .e) light deposits o. the 8ery hea8y ele"ent but )ere doing little to "ine it. !p to that point9 there had not been a lot o. use .or uraniu" eAcept in cera"ic gla7es. o get )hat it needed9 the 0anhattan Pro?ect )ould ha8e to go outside o. the so8ereign borders o. the !nited /tates9 or so it see"ed. In a ;uirk o. circu"stance9 o8er 19222 tons o. ra) uraniu" ore had been sent to <e) Dork and )as sitting in open steel dru"s in a )arehouse on /taten Island.Alii he uraniu" had co"e .ro" )hat >ro8es later identi.ied9 )rongly9 as the richest uraniu" reser8es in the )orld - those o. the #elgian Congo - by )ay o. #elgiu" and the #russels-based co"pany that o)ned the "ines9 !nion 0iniNre. !nion 0iniNre had pro8ided rare-earth "inerals .or radiation studies per.or"ed by the .a"ous 4rench Curie .a"ily. >ro8es6 "isstate"ent that the #elgian Congo held the richest uraniu" reser8es is the lead-o.. in a long litany o. hidden or hal.-truths9 shaded assertions and outright lies later e"ployed to paint a public picture decidedly di..erent than those e8ents that actually transpired. he details o. this deception )ill be outlined later. /i"ply put9 the "ischaracteri7ation is a single brushstroke - a"ong a "ultitude - that "akes up part o. a larger picture created a.ter-the-.act to hide the e8idence that the hird +eich already had in its possession .ar "ore ra) uraniu" than it )ould e8er need .or its purposes= and that it also held )ithin its hands total control o. the largest and "ost high-grade uraniu" ore deposit in the )orld9 that at @oachi"sthal9 C7echoslo8akia. he president o. !nion 0iniNre9 0. 5dgar /engier9 ha8ing been approached pre8iously by agents o. the >er"an go8ern"ent to buy the 8aluable "ineral stocks9 care.ully a8oided closing a deal )ith the >er"an e"issaries. /engier kne) o. uraniu"6s ulti"ate possibilities. hrough his dealings )ith the Curies he had been in8ited by 4rederic @oliot-Curie in 19%9 to help build an ato"ic bo"b in the /ahara desert9 according to >eneral >ro8e6s book9 <o) It Can #e old.Aliii /uch a .ascinating re8elation .ro" >ro8es de"ands a ;uestionB #uild an ato"ic bo"b .or )ho"J Certainly @oliot-Curie )as not planning it .or personal )orld do"inion. He "ust ha8e kno)n such a pro?ect could only be acco"plished at enor"ous cost and e..ort i. it )ere possible at all. >i8en later accusations regarding @oliot-Curie that sho) e8ery indication o. ha8ing been true9 and despite his reported "e"bership in the 4rench resistance9 it is possible that he planned on consorting )ith the >er"ans. 3t any rate9 /engier appears to ha8e declined that o..er9 as he presently did the agents6 bid .or the bulk uraniu" stores. Instead9 right under the >er"ans6 noses9 he had shipped the uraniu" to the !nited /tates .or sa.e keeping. Once ha8ing "ade such a prudent and noble "o8e at the potential cost o. the loss o. great pro.it .or hi"sel. and his co"pany9 not to "ention the threat to his physical sa.ety that de.ying the <a7is could "ean9 he tried to "ake a deal )ith the !nited /tates to co8er his lost in8est"ent. #ut the old 0anhattan Pro?ect regi"e9 .or )hate8er reason9 had not responded. >ro8es9 on the other hand9 no) snapped it up. O8er t)el8e hundred tons o. uraniu" "ight be enough to har8est the 112 pounds o. !$%( needed to "ake a bo"b. #ut ra) uraniu" ore is only the basest .or" o. uraniu". 4ro" the ore9 .ull o. a 8ariety o. polluting ele"ents and "inerals9 pure uraniu" "ust be re.ined= a considerable process in and o. itsel.. hen the real challenge beginsB !raniu" ato"s9 like "ost ele"ents9 eAist in 8arious 8ersions called isotopes. hese di..erent 8ersions o. the ato" contain the sa"e nu"bers o. protons and electrons9 )hich de.ine the ele"ent and create its characteristics9 but ha8e a di..erent nu"ber o. neutrons9 )hich9 )hile not changing the ele"ent6s characteristics9 alter the ato"6s structure and )eight. he 8ast "a?ority o. uraniu" is the isotope identi.ied as !$%8 (! .or uraniu"9 $%8 .or this particular isotope6s ato"ic )eight)9 )hich constitutes 99.% percent o. all o. the uraniu" on earth. he re"aining lessthan-one percent is "ostly !$%( - the .issile .or" o. uraniu". !nlike the "ore balanced lattice-)ork o. the !$%8 nucleus9 the unbalanced structure o. a !$%( nucleus is unstable. :hen the nucleus is struck )ith enough .orce by a passing neutron or other sub-ato"ic particle9 the nucleus )ill .racture and di8ide9 lea8ing t)o sub-uranic ele"ents behind9 )hile at the sa"e ti"e releasing additional neutrons along )ith a portion o. the energy that had kept the uraniu" nucleus bound together. his nuclear energy is by .ar the strongest .orce kno)n to "an and9 although because o. each ato"6s "inuscule "easure"ents the energy released see"s like an in.initesi"al .orce9 actually9 the po)er discharged is proportionally enor"ous.

o appreciate the truly di"inuti8e si7e o. an ato"9 ?ournalist Chap"an Pincher has gi8en the .ollo)ing scale against )hich the "inuteness o. ato"s can be "easured. 5n8ision a straight pin "agni.ied so large that its head lay in Condon9 5ngland and its point ter"inates in the country o. #angladesh9 on the .ar side o. India - a distance co8ering approAi"ately one-third the circu".erence o. the earth. he ato"s o. such a needle )ould be the si7e o. gol. balls.Ali8 Det according to real-)orld eAa"ples cited in +ichard +hodes6 book9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 the strength o. the nuclear .orce in a single ato" contains enough energy to "ake a grain o. sand ?u"p9 a "ass hundreds o. thousands i. not "illions o. ti"es greater than that o. an ato". +hodes adds that there is enough po)er in one cubic "eter o. uraniu" to li.t one "illion "illion kilogra"s (or $.$ "illion "illion pounds) $- "iles into the air. Put another )ay9 one pound o. uraniu" can produce nine "illion kilo)att hours9 .or )hich <e) Dork City )ould pay about K1.$ "illion. 3l"ost as soon as the .irst ato" )as split9 physicists the )orld o8er reali7ed that i. these great .orces could be syste"atically released and controlled in large ;uantities o. ato"s9 an enor"ous source o. energy )ould be "ade a8ailable. On the heels o. this reali7ation ca"e the re8elation that i. this energy could all be released in an instant9 a super po)er.ul eAplosion )ould occur9 the likes o. )hich had not been eAperienced on earth. Calculations and eAperi"ents soon pro8ed that in properly prepared uraniu"9 .or each neutron that split a nucleus9 o. the "any neutrons that )ould be released an a8erage o. t)o-and-a-hal. )ould hit and split other nuclei9 )hich )ould split yet t)o "ore each9 and so on - creating a chain reaction that theoretically could sustain itsel. until the nuclear .uel ran out. his kno)ledge9 along )ith the .act that <a7i >er"any )as the .irst to unco8er these cos"ic secrets9 is )hat caused 5instein9 /7ilard and eller to )rite their .a"ous letter o. )arning to +oose8elt. he great challenge o. this task .or all )arring .actions )as in accu"ulating enough uraniu" that )as predo"inantly pure !$%(9 and )hose ato"s )ere closely enough positioned together9 so that released neutrons could reach the surrounding !$%( ato"s and create a chain reaction. his "eant that a "ethod had to be .ound to 8irtually pluck !$%( ato"s one at a ti"e .ro" the a8erage o. 1&2 !$%8 ato"s surrounding each one o. the"9 and gather the" together in a single body. >i8en the acutely "inute9 super-sub"icroscopic "edia to be "eddled )ith and the o8er)hel"ing ratio o. !$%8 to !$%(9 the prospects )ere surely daunting. :hen >ro8es had been gi8en the assign"ent to o8ersee this *raconian task in the .all o. 19&$9 ho)e8er9 he had nonetheless been told by his superior that the pro?ect )as )ell in hand. He )as stunned to .ind upon his re8ie) that so little had in .act been acco"plished. 4or starters9 al"ost no one in the !nited /tates had been able to technically de8ise ho) to separate !$%( .ro" ra) uraniu". hus .ar e8erything )as theory - )ith one s"all eAception. <obel Caureate *r.5rnest Ca)rence at the !ni8ersity o. Cali.ornia in #erkeley )as ?ust in the process o. de8eloping an electro-"agnetic "ass separator that9 using "a""oth-si7ed "agnets and hundreds o. thousands o. 8olts to po)er the"9 could separate !$%( .ro" !$%8 to at least a no"inal degree o. enrich"ent. >ro8es presu"ably )as encouraged )hen he heard about the breakthrough. ra8eling to #erkeley9 the >eneral entered Ca)rence6s laboratory and )as brought to )here he could see the enriched uraniu" product - he )as led to a "icroscope. !ndoubtedly du"b.ounded and disappointed9 >ro8es bent o8er the lens to see a spec o. uraniu" that "easured -( "icrogra"s o. only %2 percent enriched uraniu".Al8 4or co"parison9 a di"e )eighs $9(229222 "icrogra"s. He kne) by this ti"e that the a"ount needed .or a bo"b )as still a "atter o. theory but that esti"ates ranged any)here .ro" .i8e pounds to ,22 pounds (0anhattan Pro?ect scientists )ould ulti"ately conclude the bo"b )ould need to be about 112 pounds) o. .ro" 82 to 92 percent enriched "aterial. Co"pared against the "eager o..ering he )as staring at through the "icroscope lens9 the re;uire"ent to produce any and all a"ounts o. "aterial bet)een those .e) "icrogra"s and the roughly calculated critical ;uantities "ade the chances o. achie8ing bulk production a"ounts in a usable ti"e .ra"e so astrono"ical as to be "eaningless. *espite >ro8es6 disappoint"ent9 the perennially opti"istic Ca)rence assured the >eneral that )hat he had seen represented great strides9 and that .ro" this .eeble .oundation he could build a de8ice capable o. separating uraniu" in "ass production ;uantities - tens o. gra"s at a ti"e. >ro8es )as nonplused. hey )ere still talking in .ractions o. ounces. #ut Ca)rence6s process )as the best chance he had - .or e8eryone else so .ar9 any kind o. serious isotope separation had been i"possible.Al8i :hile in #erkeley9 the ne)-.or"ed cradle o. 3"erican nuclear research9 the >eneral also took the ti"e to 8isit se8eral other researchers9 eAperi"enters and theoreticians9 and this pro8ed to be .ortuitous. He "et @. +obert Oppenhei"er9 the "an >ro8es )ould e8entually choose to direct the laboratory that )ould de8elop the !nited /tates ato"ic bo"b. +obert /erber9 a close .riend and co-)orker o. Oppenhei"er6s9 in his pre.ace to the post-)ar publication o. he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 )hich he )rote at Oppenhei"er6s re;uest to orient ne)ly arri8ing 0anhattan Pro?ect personnel into the progra"9 described >ro8es6 ego-e"anating entrance the .irst ti"e they "et.Al8ii 3pparently >ro8es had no "ore than entered the roo"9 )hen he re"o8ed his ?acket and handed it to a colonel he had Ein to)9E and curtly ordered the high-ranking o..icer to .ind a laundry and

get his tunic cleaned. Oppenhei"er9 on the other hand9 )as ;uite a di..erent personality. He )as young9 ascetic9 )ealthy9 and see"ingly .rail9 although later e8ents )ould pro8e hi" to be a glutton .or physical9 psychological9 e"otional and intellectual abuse. Oppy9 as he )as a..ectionately kno)n by .riends9 )as scienti.ically and clinically critical )hile at the sa"e ti"e e"bracing 4ar 5astern "etaphysical "ysticis". he paradoA "ade hi" an astonishing choice .or pro?ect director. he greater hal. o. the astonish"ent )as that Oppy )as a theoretician9 not an eAperi"entalist. he ne) laboratory )as9 o. necessity9 going to be nothing i. not o8er)hel"ingly eAperi"ental. Oppenhei"er6s lack o. eAperi"ental eAperience caused "any )ho co8eted the position9 or )ho other)ise had )hat appeared to be legiti"ate concerns9 to cry .oul. >ro8es )ould ha8e none o. it. He had ;uietly grasped Oppenhei"er6s uni;ue genius9 his brilliantly ;uick analytical and intuiti8e .acility and a talent .or eAciting people about the )ork9 and )as not about to let hi" go. :hat concerned >ro8es "ore )as the .uture lab director6s le.tist connections. <ot that >ro8es .elt they )ere "uch o. a hindrance to Oppy6s doing the ?ob9 but security checks had to be per.or"ed and they soon re8ealed that not only had Oppenhei"er once been a registered "e"ber o. the 3"erican Co""unist Party9 but his )i.e9 brother and eA-.iancL9 as )ell9 )ere presently "e"bers or had been "e"bers at one ti"e. he endless pursuit by "ilitary security to recti.y this apparent security breach kept >ro8es al"ost continually in a position o. ha8ing to protect his chie. deputy. His )illingness to do so is surely a strong endorse"ent o. >ro8es6 belie. and con.idence not only in Oppenhei"er but in his o)n eAtraordinary ability as a ?udge o. people. he results Oppenhei"er brought .orth stand as an undeniable testa"ent to the >eneral6s sense o. 6good horse .lesh.6 :hat is "ost re"arkable is that although he had considered others9 >ro8es )as 99 percent decided Oppy )as his "an a.ter only one or t)o "eetings. 3 "onth later9 in <o8e"ber 19&$9 >ro8es and Oppenhei"er9 )ith a hand.ul o. others9 )ere at a boys ranch standing atop a -9$22-.oot-high plateau in <e) 0eAico. Oppenhei"er9 )ho o)ned property in <e) 0eAico and lo8ed the 8ast9 scenic eApanses o. countryside9 had suggested the location o8er se8eral ri8als9 so"e close by9 others as .ar a)ay as !tah and :ashington state. 3s they stood under the cotton)ood trees - .or )hose /panish appellation the boys school had been na"ed9 Cos 3la"os - >ro8es consented to purchase the property as the sight .or 3"erica6s ne) ato"ic bo"b laboratory.Al8iii 3 .ull .our "onths a.ter that9 in the end o. 0arch 19&%9AliA the s"all group )ould .inally return9 acco"panied by a nucleus o. scientists that )ould ulti"ately gro) to be one o. the greatest collections o. intellects concentrated on one task e8erB 5nrico 4er"i9 5"ilio /egrL9 Hans #ethe9 Otto 4risch and "any others9 all Cos 3la"os personnel during the )ar9 )ere ?ust a .e) o. se8eral scientists at the pro?ect )ho had already )on or )ould go on to )in the <obel Pri7e and other top a)ards o. science. 3long )ith the" they brought e;uip"ent co""andeered .ro" laboratories across the !nited /tatesl and a support .orce o. al"ost (222 people9 "any )ith their .a"ilies. *espite the thin chance9 and so .ar al"ost non-eAistent success9 that the 3"erican e..ort had to achie8e separating uraniu" isotopes9 >eneral >ro8es "ade an early and .ull co""it"ent to the pro?ect. #e.ore he had pinned the ne) general6s star on his collar (an induce"ent to get hi" to accept the 0anhattan Pro?ect assign"ent o8er his pre.erence to ser8e in a theater o. )ar)9 be.ore he e8en ran to #erkeley to .ind )hat le8el o. scienti.ic talent )as a8ailable9 >ro8es signed the directi8e that began the purchase o. (99222 acres o. "ostly unde8eloped land in 5astern ennessee. he co"pleA built there )ould soon co"e to be kno)n as Oak +idge9 and it )ould house "ost o. the technologies tried - "any o. )hich )ould .ail or only achie8e no"inal success during the )ar - to enrich production ;uantities o. bo"b-grade uraniu".li On the site e8entually )ould be established a gaseous di..usion isotope separation plant )hat )ould utili7e hundreds o. thousands o. stacks o. pipes in an all-but-.ailed e..ort to enrich uraniu" be.ore the )ar )as o8er. his plant )ould enclose al"ost &$ acres under a single roo. and cost one-hal. a billion dollars9 the greatest single eApenditure o. the )ar-ti"e progra". 3 li;uid ther"al di..usion plant under the operation o. the <a8y )ould be constructed as )ell. #y .ar the "ost success.ul .or" o. isotope separation )ould be the electro"agnetic isotope separators pioneered by 5rnest Ca)rence. >ro8es )ould one day brag that e8ery gra" o. !$%( produced .or the 0anhattan Pro?ect had been processed through Oak +idge6s "agnetic isotope separators - called calutrons9 a.ter the Cali.ornia /tate !ni8ersity (Cal. !.) at #erkeley9 )here it )as de8eloped. #ut e8en )ith the calutrons9 none o. these processes )ere close to being 8iable at productionle8el ;uantities at the end o. 19&$. 3nd the .a"ous clai" that all o. the uraniu" enriched passed through the celebrated calutrons during that process has no) beco"e ;uestionable9 based on recently disco8ered in.or"ation. 4i8e days less than a year a.ter the bo"bing o. Pearl Harbor9 on *ece"ber $9 19&$9 Italian L"igrL physicist 5nrico 4er"i and his research tea"9 )orking in an old s;uash court under the !ni8ersity o. Chicago6s /tagg 4ield grandstand9 opened another door leading to an ato"ic bo"b - they produced the .irst "an-"ade sel.sustaining nuclear chain reaction.lii he eAperi"ental reactor pile9 built o. o8er &22 tons o. graphite and uraniu"9 pro8ided not only proo. that a slo) chain reaction could be achie8ed and controlled9 but the "eans

to .urther test the theory that uraniu" bo"barded by neutrons )ill absorb those neutrons until it "eta"orphs into a ne) and pre8iously unkno)n ele"ent - )hich the theorists called plutoniu". Plutoniu"9 besides being the .irst "an-"ade ele"ent9 )ould .ission as easily as !$%(. he bo"b "akers counted this a blessing. 3nd plutoniu" as an ele"ent all its o)n9 rather than an isotope o. one9 had che"ical characteristics that )ere di..erent .ro" other substances.liii #y .inding these di..erentiating properties9 the plutoniu" could then be separated .ro" its parent9 uraniu"9 by che"ical "eans9 a .ar less eApensi8e and co"parati8ely easy process than the i"possibly de"anding physical separation procedures re;uired to har8est one ato" at a ti"e9 as )as necessary to enrich uraniu". here )as no) a second9 "uch better9 option .or de8eloping an ato"ic bo"b. Hopes )ere high. 58eryone .ro" >ro8es and Oppenhei"er to 4er"i and Ca)rence )ere enthused o8er the plutoniu" prospect.li8 In .act9 the )hole ob?ect o. creating a reactor pile changed .ro" creating heat to "ake stea" .or industrial po)er to breeding plutoniu" .or a bo"b. >ro8es i""ediately )ent to )ork establishing a plutoniu" pilot plant at Oak +idge9 as )ell as beginning the procure"ent o. property in the state o. :ashington .or the purpose o. constructing a series o. plutoniu" breeding reactors. he researchers9 ho)e8er9 soon .ound proble"s )ith the plutoniu" option. Pre8ious plutoniu" breeding eAperi"ents had been per.or"ed in a cyclotron that could bo"bard target uraniu" )ith only 8ery s"all a"ounts o. neutrons. he result )as the eApected trans"utation o. !$%8 to plutoniu" $%9 (Pu$%9). he co"parati8e .lood o. neutrons released in a chain reacting pile9 ho)e8er9 placed the parent !$%8 a)ash in stray neutrons. :hile so"e o. the !$%8 absorbed one neutron to beco"e Pu$%99 "any o. the nuclei absorbed t)o neutrons9 trans"uting to Pu$&29 a highly spontaneous .issioning isotope o. plutoniu".l8 his )ould ha8e been good ne)s eAcept that the spontaneous .ission rate o. Pu$&2 is three ti"es .aster than that o. !$%( or Pu$%9. he latter t)o isotopes .ission slo)ly enough that9 theoretically9 to asse"ble a critical "ass one needed si"ply to shoot one subcritical piece o. "aterial into another piece. he total o. the t)o pieces ca"e together to achie8e critical "ass at about %9222 .eet per second - roughly the 8elocity o. a high-po)ered cannon. 1oile9 a nuclear eAplosion. Pu$&29 on the other hand9 releases its nuclear energy9 in the .or" o. eAtre"ely high te"peratures9 so .ast upon .issioning that the resulting burst o. heat blo)s the surrounding ato"s a)ay. he probability that released neutrons )ill collide )ith9 and there.ore split9 other neutrons is greatly reduced - thus the chain reaction ends be.ore it has e8er begun. >ro8es and his cadre o. scientists no) had a challenge creating a plutoniu" bo"b as perpleAing and proble"atic as the original isotope separation assign"ent. hey "ust .ind a )ay to trigger a critical asse"bly9 in other )ords9 to "o8e "ultiple blocks o. "atter at 8elocities no hu"an9 .or any reason9 had e8er en8isioned atte"pting9 and to "o8e the" in less than 1'%222th o. a second. he plutoniu" option )as no) ?ust as "uch a long shot as the original uraniu" bo"b. <otesB AA8i 5.+. @ette to C./. /"ith "e"orandu"B Production rate o. $(9 *ece"ber $89 19&&9 !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C.9 38&-219--2-$& AA8ii 3rnold Hra"isch9 he >ri..in AA8iii +obert :ilcoA9 @apan6s /ecret :ar9 pp. 1(91, AAiA /harkhunters H # 12%9 p. - and H # 1129 p. 12 AAA 3rnold Hra"isch9 he >ri..in AAA +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. A8ii AAAi +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,91 AAAii 5ric @ette9 "e"o dated *ece"ber $89 19&&9 <ational 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C. AAAiii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,1$ AAAi8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 AAA8 +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. A8 AAA8i Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %%( AAA8ii Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. $1% AAA8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. %1%9 %1& AAAiA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &2, Al +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &2, Ali Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 1( Alii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &$-= Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. 8% Aliii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. %%9%& Ali8 Chap"an Pincher9 Into he 3to"ic 3ge9 p.Al8 /tephen >roue..9 0anhattan Pro?ect9 p. %, Al8i Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 9,

Al8ii +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 introduction Al8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. &(29 &(1 AliA +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. iA

Cha$ter Three " #ranium EOh )hat idiots )e ha8e all been.E <iels #ohr9 physicist9 <obel Pri7e )inner9 upon hearing o. the splitting o. the ato". !ntil 1& 0ay9 19&(9 the day !-$%& surrendered to the !nited /tates at sea9 >er"any had al)ays held the lead in the race .or the ato"ic bo"b - e8en be.ore anybody kne) there )as a race being run. :ay back in 1-899 1(2 years be.ore the pernicious purpose o. uraniu" )as concei8ed9 0artin Hlaproth disco8ered this last9 and hea8iest9 o. the ele"ents .ound in nature. 3ppropriately9 gi8en later physics history - or "aybe ine8itably - Hlaproth )as >er"an. In the century and a hal. bet)een Hlaproth6s disco8ery and the splitting o. the .irst ato" - a uraniu" ato" - little happened )ith the ele"ent. In the s"all a"ounts that it could be .ound9 uraniu" )as considered relati8ely rare9 although it has since been disco8ered in 8arying ;uantities al"ost e8ery)here on earth. Prior to the e..ort to build a bo"b9 ho)e8er9 uraniu" )as used al"ost eAclusi8ely as a pig"ent in cera"ic gla7es= no one could de8ise any other practical use .or it. #ut )hen the .irst ato" )as split at the end o. 19%89 the )hole )orld changed. 3d8ances in physics9 particularly the e..ort to understand the "ake-up o. the ato"9 had physicists and radioche"ists across the globe eAperi"enting )ith uraniu"9 the natural )orld6s largest ato". 3s a result9 the .irst ato" )as split9 ;uite by accident9 by Otto Hahn and 4rit7 /trass"ann9 t)o >er"ans9 at the Haiser :ilhel" Institute o. Physics in #erlin. Hahn and /trass"ann - both radioche"ists not physicists - did not i""ediately reali7e )hat they had achie8ed. hey had been bo"barding uraniu" )ith slo) neutrons eApecting its trans"utation to other isotopes o. uraniu" or other hea8y ele"ents. #ut the result o. their eAperi"ent sho)ed9 along )ith isotopes o. uraniu"9 o. )hich !$%8 is the "ost co""on9 e8idence o. traces o. bariu" )ere present as )ell9 )hich has an ato"ic "ass slightly larger than hal. o. uraniu"6s "ass. 3t .irst9 neither scientist could reckon ho) the ato"ic )eight had been cut in hal.. he clea8ing o. an ato"9 )ith its po)er.ul internal .orce holding it together9 )as considered i"possible and splitting the ato" had ne8er crossed their "inds. he pair assu"ed they had not carried out their eAperi"ents correctly= but care.ul checks using control sa"ples they kne) )ere pure pro8ed they had not conta"inated the eAperi"ent )ith "aterial already containing bariu". Only then did they consider that the i"possible "ay ha8e happened. Hahn )rote his .or"er co-)orker9 Cise 0eitner9 an 3ustrian-born @e) )ho9 no) in her ,2s9 had o8er &2 years eAperience in radioche"istry and a nati8e genius .or diagnosing che"ical and nuclear pu77les. On Christ"as 58e9 )hile conte"plating the re"arkable e8ents )ritten to her in Hahn6s letter during a holiday at the seaside in /)eden9 0eitner )as 8isited by her nephe) and .ello) researcher Otto 4risch. 4risch )ould later be the one )ho coined the ter" 6.ission6l8i - borro)ed .ro" the "icrobiology leAicon and )hich describes the di8iding o. li8ing cells - as the "oniker .or the splitting o. ato"s. He )ould also shortly i""igrate to the !nited /tates and per.or" the .a"ous9 and 8ery dangerous9 critical "ass eAperi"ental studies on uraniu" at Cos 3la"os kno)n as Etickling the tail o. the dragon.E 0eitner and 4ritsch discussed ho) it could be possible that bariu" should co"e .ro" uraniu"9 and in the course o. considering se8eral possibilities conte"plated the pu77le in the light o. <iels #ohr6s ne) "odel o. the nucleus - not a collection o. tightly bound neutrons and protons9 but E.reelyE bound neutrons and protons. hey reasoned that9 although the nuclear .orce holding these co"ponents together is undoubtedly the strongest on earth - e8en though acti8e .or eAtre"ely s"all distances only - each proton in the nucleus contains a s"all electrical .orce o. its o)n that counters9 to a degree9 that nuclear .orce. 3s the nucleus o. each ele"ent in ascending order contains one or "ore additional protons than the pre8ious ele"ent9 by the ti"e uraniu" - the natural ele"ent )ith the "ost protons o. all9 at 9$ - is reached9 the countering .orce o. the cu"ulati8e protons is barely less than the total nuclear .orce. he scientists reali7ed that this )ould eAplain )hy there are no "ore natural ele"ents beyond uraniu" - because the accu"ulated electrical .orce o. the eAtra protons in an ato" larger than uraniu" )ould counter the ato"ic .orce to a point )here the nucleus is no longer able to hold itsel. together. 3ny ele"ents beyond uraniu" "ust ha8e disintegrated to other ele"ents earlier in earth6s history. #ut the uraniu" nucleus holds together barely9 the opposing .orces causing the sub-nuclear particles to .loat ElooselyE around one another in a li;uid-like .or". he unstable geo"etric construction o. a !$%( ato"9 particularly9 )hen struck by the energy o. a neutron9 "ay then start E)obbling9E possibly beco"ing narro)er in the "iddle9 allo)ing the nuclear .orce in each o. the t)o outer lobes to take control and parse o.. the lobes into independent9 non-uranic spheres o. their o)n - one o. the" bariu". hus 0eitner and 4risch had eAplained9 and there.ore 8alidated9 Hahn6s and /trass"ann6s disco8ery - and set in "otion )ith their eAplanation the .ear.ul9 surreal absurdity that )ould beco"e "an6s .uture. 0eitner also calculated that the nuclear reaction a.ter the split caused by the repulsion o. the protons in each nucleus pushing a)ay .ro" each other at one-thirtieth the speed o. light9 )ould generate about $22 "illion electron 8olts o. energy per ato".l8ii In co"parison9 the strongest o. che"ical reactions such as a dyna"ite

eAplosion9 produces a 8ery paltry .i8e electron 8olts. Hahn had )ritten not only Cise 0eitner on that .ate.ul *ece"ber night9 he had also contacted Paul +osbaud9 the editor o. >er"any6s .ore"ost scienti.ic publication9 <atur)issenscha.ten.l8iii +osbaud )ould soon co"e to be kno)n in 3llied intelligence circles as he >ri..in9 the code-na"e assigned hi" upon ?oining the ranks o. >er"ans spying .or the 3llies9 and )ould .ro" beginning to end o. the )ar pro8ide constant updates on the progress o. >er"any6s ato"ic bo"b pro?ect9 including 3rdenne6s and Houter"ans6 e..orts. 0any o. +osbaud6s acti8ities are recorded in 3rnold Hra"isch6s eAcellent book9 he >ri..in. Presu"ably9 >eneral >ro8es )ould ha8e recei8ed +osbaud6s reports through the !nited /tates'#ritish intelligence "aster9 /ir :illia" /te8enson9 and there.ore kno)n on an ongoing basis )hat )as the condition o. his ne"esis6 progra". /tate"ents the >eneral "ade during the )ar indicating that he o.ten thought the ene"y )as a year or t)o ahead o. the !nited /tates6 progra" can9 there.ore the author belie8es9 generally be considered accurate. I. this is the case9 assertions "ade by >eneral >ro8es a.ter the )ar indicating that he had been )rong in this conclusion )ere probably designed to di8ert attention .ro" the >er"an isotope separation progra". he idea being that i. the eAistence o. the >er"an uraniu" enrich"ent progra" could be hidden9 then the co8er story could be established that >er"any6s ato"ic bo"b e..ort consisted only o. .ailed e..orts to create a reactor pile to breed plutoniu". his )ill be re8ie)ed in "ore detail in a later chapter. On Hahn6s re;uest9 +osbaud had agreed to hold space in the neAt issue o. his ?ournal .or an upco"ing paper Hahn pro"ised to prepare by print ti"e. he article not only ran in early @anuary 19%99 ;uickly spreading the ne)s throughout the global scienti.ic co""unity9 but 4risch returned to )ork )ith <iels #ohr in Copenhagen a.ter his Christ"as holiday )ith 0eitner and told 6 he >reat *ane96 as he )as a..ectionately called9 o. their theory.liA #ohr responded be.ore 4risch had hardly .inished eAplaining9 gasping9 EOh )hat idiots )e ha8e all beenO Oh but this is )onder.ulO his is ?ust as it "ust be.E he >reat *ane le.t *en"ark )ithin a )eek o. this re8elation on a pre8iously-planned trip to the !nited /tates to )ork .or a short period at the Institute .or 3d8anced /tudy. Once there9 he )as instru"ental in disse"inating the ne)s to the rest o. the )orld. hen the ne) disco8ery6s ulti"ate outco"e )as calculated - that a nuclear chain reaction "ight be created. /7illard and eller9 ;uickly recogni7ing the unthinkable possibilities9 contacted 5instein9 )ho )rote his .a"ous letter to +oose8elt in response to such a prospect. he chain reaction conclusion also "ade Hahn consider an action he had ne8er be.ore conte"plated. !pon reali7ing that the likely outco"e o. his disco8ery )ould be the loss o. tens- or hundreds-o.-thousands o. li8es - possibly "illions - Otto Hahn seriously considered taking his o)n li.e.lA he taking o. one li.e )ould ha8e been a s"all "atter and a .utile action9 ho)e8er. he door had been opened and could ne8er be closed again. *espite later and persistent clai"s that >er"any put little e..ort and that erring - into the de8elop"ent o. an ato"ic bo"b9 ;uite the opposite actually appears to ha8e occurred. 3s a nation )ith a disciplined9 precise and loyal nationalistic character and a tradition o. culti8ating the ulti"ate in technology9 under the rule o. a dictator )ith a .etish .or inno8ati8e ar"a"ents and a co""it"ent to using the"9 >er"any )as already on the 8erge o. )aging )ar using the "ost technicallyad8anced .ighting "achine e8er. he airplanes9 tanks and sub"arines o. #lit7krieg )ere unsurpassed and it )ould be years be.ore the 3llies e;ualed the ar"a"ents o. the hird +eich. *uring the course o. the )ar9 Hitler added rocketry9 silent electric torpedoes and ?ets to his arsenal9 none o. )hich )ere "atched by any other belligerent nation during the course o. the con.lict. In truth9 on the )hole9 >er"an )eaponry )as probably ne8er e;ualed during the )arB 0any eAperts "aintain that >er"any lost :orld :ar II directly because o. strategic blunders co""itted by 3dol. Hitler and little else. :ith a superior technical culture9 a lead on the .ield9 and "any o. the best scientists a8ailable - all at the behest o. a "ad"an )ell-established to ha8e a penchant .or ingenious and decisi8e )eaponry - it certainly )ould be eApected that >er"any )ould be running hard in the nuclear ar"s race and )ould break out o. the gate .irst. he idea accepted )holesale in the traditional history9 that >er"an e..orts to produce the deciding )eapon o. the )ar9 an ato"ic bo"b9 )ere 8apid9 poorly eAecuted9 uninspired pro?ects9 runs )holly counter to the character o. the regi"e and the >er"anic race9 )hich to this day9 in a )orld o. global parity9 is still looked up to as a technical leader o. the )orld. 3ccording to author'historian *a8id Ir8ing9 in his book9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 the post-)ar criticis" o. >er"any6s supposedly insipid e..ort to create an ato"ic bo"b is both inaccurate and un)arranted.lAi 3nd Ir8ing adds that those )ho spread the "isin.or"ation should ha8e kno)n better= they kne) the story and had all o. the docu"entation. 4ar .ro" the o..icial story o. a hand.ul o. hal.-hearted >er"an scientists )orking on an i"potent reactor pile intended9 but .ailing9 to breed plutoniu" - as goes the story pro"oted by >eneral >ro8es and the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s intelligence ar"9 3lsos (>reek .or 6gro8e96 3lsos )as the codena"e gi8en the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s ene"y in.or"ation gathering .unction) - Ir8ing states that so"e (2 >er"an scientistslAii toiled night and day throughout the )ar9 in both plutoniu" breeding and uraniu" separation e..orts9 "any o. )hich achie8ed high le8els o. success. #y the /u""er o. 19%99 scant "onths a.ter Hahn6s and /trass"ann6s disco8ery had been published9 the

>er"an 3r"y had established a uraniu" pro?ect in >otto)9 near #erlin9 )ith *r. Hurt *iebner at the head.lAiii #y the ti"e )ar broke out9 >er"any )as the only country studying the use o. ato"ic po)er .or "ilitary "eans9 and it pushed .or)ard )ith 8igor. #y contrast9 the !nited /tates e..orts stalled and )ere not to be purpose.ully pursued until >eneral >ro8es )as appointed head o. the progra" "ore than t)o years later9 near the end o. 19&$. 3 .irst secret con.erence on ato"ic po)er )as held in #erlin on /epte"ber 1,9 19%9.lAi8 0ost o. the +eich6s top nuclear scientists soon a.ter)ard )ere inducted into the ar"y - an action >ro8es )ould later seriously consider .or the 3"erican progra" but )as con8inced other)ise by Oppenhei"er -and assigned to laboratories throughout the 4atherland to study nuclear .ission .or "ilitary uses. he .irst laboratory9 in *ahle"9 near #erlin9 )as established and called 6 he 1irus House96lA8 a na"e concocted as a ruse to culti8ate an at"osphere o. .ear around the .acility and thus dri8e o.. un)anted obser8ers. *espite later assertions9 the hird +eich 8ery soon had on hand copious a"ounts o. ra)9 as )ell as 8ery highly re.ined9 uraniu"9 and controlled a great deal "ore - al"ost a li"itless supply .or its needs. he .irst ton o. EeAtre"ely pureE uraniu" oAide )as deli8ered in the .irst )eeks o. 19&2.lA8i his had already been re.ined .ro" the ra) uraniu" ore and )as9 .or all intents and purposes9 ready to be used .or eAperi"entation - or .or enriching to bo"b grade as soon as the technology could be de8eloped. 4ro" @une o. 19&2 to the end o. the )ar9 >er"any sei7ed %9(22 tons o. uraniu" co"pounds .ro" #elgiu" - al"ost three ti"es the a"ount >ro8es had purchased .ro" !nion 0iniNre - and stored it in salt "ines in /tass.urt9 >er"any.lA8ii >ro8es brags that on 1- 3pril9 19&(9 as the )ar )as )inding do)n9 3lsos reco8ered so"e 19122 tons o. uraniu" ore .ro" /tass.urt and an additional %1 tons in oulouse9 4rance9 as )ell as eight tons o. re.ined oAide .ro" the /tass.urt "ines.lA8iii 3nd he clai"s that the a"ount reco8ered )as all that >er"any had e8er held9 asserting 9 there.ore9 that >er"any had ne8er had enough ra) "aterial to process the uraniu" either .or a plutoniu" reactor pile or through "agnetic separation techni;ues. Ob8iously9 i. /tass.urt once held %9(22 tons and only 191%2 )ere reco8ered9 so"e $9%-2 tons o. uraniu" ore )as unaccounted .or - still t)ice the a"ount the 0anhattan Pro?ect possessed and is assu"ed to ha8e used throughout its entire )arti"e e..ort - and a ;uantity certainly .ar in eAcess o. the a"ount >er"any )ould ha8e used .or eAperi"ental needs. he "aterial has not been accounted .or to this day. /uch copious ;uantities o. this little-used "aterial could ha8e been e"ployed 8irtually no)here else9 i. not in .ull-scale ato"ic bo"b production processes - as )as the case )ith the !nited /tates using co"parably colossal a"ounts in its enrich"ent e..orts. 3s early as the /u""er o. 19&19 according to historian 0argaret >o)ing9lAiA >er"any had already re.ined ,22 tons o. uraniu" to its oAide .or"9 the .or" re;uired .or ioni7ing the "aterial into a gas9 in )hich .or" the uraniu" isotopes could then be "agnetically or ther"ally separated or the oAide could be reduced to "etal .or a reactor pile. In .act9 Pro.essor *r. +iehl9 )ho )as responsible .or all uraniu" throughout >er"any during the course o. the )ar9 says the .igure )as actually "uch higher.lAA In addition9 the <a7i progra" )as eAtracting one ton per "onth o. uraniu" oAide .ro" separate ore stocks le.t o8er .ro" a pri8ate co""ercial 8enture .ollo)ing a pre8ious eAtraction o. radiu" to be used in >er"an toothpasteO o create either a uraniu" or a plutoniu" bo"b9 at so"e point uraniu" "ust be reduced to "etal. In the case o. plutoniu"9 !$%8 is "etalici7ed= .or a uraniu" bo"b9 !$%( is "etalici7ed. #ecause o. uraniu"6s di..icult characteristics9 ho)e8er9 this "etallurgical process is a tricky one. he !nited /tates struggled )ith the proble" early and still )as not success.ul reducing uraniu" to its "etallic .or" in large production ;uantities until late in 19&$.lAAi he >er"an technicians9 ho)e8er9 true to their )hi7-kid reputations9 by the end o. 19&2lAAii had already processed $82., kilogra"s o. uraniu" into "etal9 o8er a ;uarter o. a ton. *r. :erner Heisenberg headed the plutoniu" bo"b e..ort .or >er"any. 3s )ith the !nited /tates progra"9 the >er"ans early had reali7ed the bene.its o. a plutoniu" bo"b o8er a uraniu" eAplosi8e.lAAiii hey kne) plutoniu" could be bred .ro" uraniu" and separated che"ically "uch easier9 .aster and less costly than the isotopes o. uraniu" could be separated .ro" one another. In addition9 because the plutoniu" .ission process )as three ti"es "ore po)er.ul than uraniu"6s9 theoretically9 to "ake an e;ualsi7e bo"b only one-third the a"ount o. plutoniu" )as re;uired. Heisenberg6s e..orts ran into a roadblock9 ho)e8er9 )hen9 in 19&29 his co-)orker *r. :alther #othe seriously "iscalculated the neutron absorption rate o. graphite9lAAi8 )hich the researchers thought to use as a "oderator to pre8ent any eAperi"ental chain reaction .ro" beco"ing ungo8ernable and causing a "eltdo)n. he error )ould pro8e to ha8e a pro.ound i"pact on the success o. the >er"an plutoniu" pro?ect. In )ant o. an alternate "oderator9 the scientists turned to deuteriu" oAidelAA8 - hea8y )ater - an isotope o. co""on )ater but )ith an additional neutron. he ne) re;uire"ent .or hea8y )ater9 a rare substance not .ound in nature but re;uiring long a"ounts o. ti"e to process9 )ould ulti"ately resign the >er"an plutoniu" e..ort to - not .ailure9 a chain reaction )as e8entually achie8ed - but to second place behind the 3"erican plutoniu" pro?ect.lAA8i he carbon "iscalculation co"bined )ith the shortage o. hea8y )ater constituted the .ailure o. the >er"ans to build a plutoniu" bo"b9 )hich pro8ed later to be the per.ect screen behind )hich >eneral

>ro8es )as to hide >er"any6s other ato"ic bo"b e..ort9 uraniu" isotope separation. 3s see"s to ha8e happened at al"ost e8ery serious ?uncture9 the t)o nations6 progra"s appear to ha8e .ollo)ed parallel thinking and parallel processes. #ut >eneral >ro8es has buried the history o. the >er"an uraniu" enrich"ent e..ort. *esiring a.ter the )ar to destroy the e8idence o. >er"an uraniu" isotope separation .or reasons to be re8ie)ed later9 the >eneral de-e"phasi7ed the <a7i uraniu" enrich"ent e..ort until its historic pro.ile )as s"all enough to be hidden sa.ely behind the .ailed plutoniu" picture. >eneral >ro8es does not appear to be the only person a.ter the )ar to distort the .acts o. this episode to suit his o)n purposes. Pro.essor Heisenberg and others9 purportedly desiring to di8est the"sel8es o. )hat they said )as the undeser8ed stig"a o. )orking on an ato"ic bo"b .or the <a7is9 but in reality desiring to hide their .ailure to build a nuclear reactor despite great and earnest e..orts9 decided to inculcate the .antasy9 as )ell - and success.ully did so9 possibly in collusion )ith >ro8es. Heisenberg later contended that he and others o. his sta.. had innocuously but bra8ely resisted their .ascist go8ern"ent. He insisted that he did not belie8e at the ti"e the "aking o. an ato"ic bo"b to be a possibility at all9 but had acted as though it )ere in order to keep the <a7is happy and distracted.lAA8ii he pro.essor assured those )ho )ould listen that he had been resisting and sub8erting the ob?ecti8es o. the <a7i regi"e by "onopoli7ing the in8aluable ser8ices o. so"e o. the +eich6s greatest "en o. science9 )ho "ight other)ise ha8e been .orced to put their e..orts to use .or Hitler in pro?ects "ore producti8e to the 4uehrer6s pernicious purposes. In reality Heisenberg9 like "ost scientists o. his bent and pro.essional stature9 not only could not resist the pursuit o. his science .or the sheer induce"ent o. disco8ering )hat lay around the neAt cos"ic corner9 but he did indeed belie8e a nuclear blast initiated by "an )as possible. He had ad"itted to 0an.red 8on 3rdennelAA8iii and to <iels #ohr9 be.ore the latter had escaped *en"ark upon its occupation by the <a7is9 that he thought an ato"ic bo"b )as possiblelAAiA - e8en though #ohr9 hi"sel.9 at this ti"e9 did not belie8e such an eAplosion )ould e8er be achie8ed. Heisenberg tried to eAplain a)ay this state"ent a.ter the )ar as ha8ing been "isunderstood by the *anish <obel Caureate= but the >reat *ane )as certainly con8inced he had understood correctly )hat had been said. 4urther"ore9 *r. Heisenberg )as in the .ore.ront .ro" 4ebruary to @une o. 19&$9 in an e..ort to get party leadership to "ore .ully appreciate the 8alue that ato"ic eAplosi8es could ser8e in the )ar.lAAA In @une9 he esti"ated a bo"b could be built in as little as t)o years.lAAAi :hile de8elopers o. the 3"erican plutoniu" pro?ect )ould reali7e relati8ely late-in-the-ga"e that they had a proble" )ith triggering the plutoniu" bo"b9 and up to that ti"e had gi8en the plutoniu" progra" their pri"e e..ort and resources9 serious doubts about the success o. the >er"an plutoniu" progra" ca"e early because o. the hea8y )ater crisis9 .orcing the <a7is .ro" al"ost the 8ery beginning to concentrate their e..orts9 resources and eApectations on isotope separation to enrich uraniu". #y 8irtue o. this .act alone9 one )ould eApect that the >er"an isotope separation progra" )ould ha8e been "ore success.ul than the plutoniu" e..ort9 and )ould not ha8e been le.t co"pletely unpursued9 as is asserted. 3t about this ti"e9 in "id-19&$9 3"erican @a"es #. Conant9 one o. the ci8ilian ad"inistrators o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect and a personal con.idant o. +oose8elt9 reported to the president that the >er"ans E"ight be ahead o. us by as "uch as a year.ElAAAii Considering #ritish spy9 Paul +osbaud6s9 position in the "idst o. the >er"an e..ort9 one can assu"e that Conant got this esti"ate .ro" good sources. In .act9 this esti"ate "ay ha8e understated >er"any6s lead. #y this ti"e9 >er"any already had at least .i8e9 and possibly as "any as se8en9 serious isotope separation de8elop"ent progra"s under)ay. 4ro" a"ong these de8ices9 three 8ery inno8ati8e technologies )ere being pioneered9 beginning )ith *r. 5rich #agge6s Eisotope sluiceE and a si"ilar "achine constructed by a *r. Horsching. #e.ore the "iddle o. 19&&9 #agge6s isotope sluice )ould enrich uraniu" on a single pass to .our ti"es that reported in the !nited /tates using gaseous di..usion.lAAAiii >aseous di..usion is supposed to ha8e sa8ed the bo"b enrich"ent progra" in the )aning days o. the 3"erican separation e..ort by pro8iding needed9 partially enriched9 .eedstocks to Ca)rence6s beta calutrons in the .inal hour. (Oak +idge records disco8ered by the author and re8ie)ed later in this book9 ho)e8er9 contradict this assertion.) :hile Oak +idge6s .irst-phase production calutrons produced only partially enriched "aterial9 raising the !$%( concentration .ro" .- percent to around 12 to 1$ percent9 #agge6s eAperi"ental isotope sluice alone had yielded $.( gra"s o. E"uch enrichedE uraniu".lAAAi8 I. a production ;uantity 8ersion o. the isotope sluice )as e8er actually built9 the yield )as probably signi.icantly higher than the !nited /tates6 output. Had the >er"ans actually enriched uraniu" on a large-scale basis9 and there is a"ple e8idence they did9 they "ay ha8e used a "ulti-stage techni;ue. Passing already enriched uraniu" through enrich"ent processes a second or third ti"e to .urther increase the le8el o. !$%( concentration )as a procedure used by the 3"erican e..ort to bring enrich"ent le8els up into the high eighty and lo) ninety percentiles re;uired .or a bo"b. One "ay assu"e that the >er"an e..ort .ollo)ed a si"ilar ob8ious path9 as so o.ten happened bet)een the t)o progra"s9 and that the product o. the isotope sluice - or any o. the other separation technologies - "ight there.ore ha8e been used as .eedstocks .or one o. the other .our separation techni;ues.

he isotope sluice )as not the strongest o. the <a7is6 separation e..orts. 3 stronger per.or"er )as the centri.uge9 and then its progeny9 the ultracentri.uge. 3 special alloy called 6#ondur6 had already been de8eloped in 19&1 speci.ically designed to handle the harsh9 corrosi8e uraniu" co"pounds used in the ultracentri.uge.lAAA8 he !nited /tates6 isotope separation e..ort9 on the other hand9 struggled to .ind a si"ilar "aterial that )ould ser8e )ell against the corrosi8e uraniu" gases. #y 0ay 19&&9 co"pared )ith 3"erican production e..orts that at their best resulted in enriching uraniu" .ro" its ra) state o. .- percent to about 12 to 1$ percent on the .irst pass9 the .irst >er"an eAperi"ental ultracentri.uge succeeded )ith enriching the "aterial to se8en percent.lAAA8i he eAperi"ental result )as less than 3"erican production e..orts and )hat had been predicted by its >er"an in8entors9 but it )as a good sho)ing in its .irst eAperi"ental outing co"pared to )hat the 0anhattan Pro?ect )ould produce .ro" its already-t)eaked production "odel calutrons. !ltracentri.uge output )as so i"pressi8e9 in .act9 that .ollo)ing its 8ery .irst eAperi"ental run9 .unding and authority )ere established to build ten additional production "odel ultracentri.uges in Handern9 a to)n in the south)est o. >er"any .ar .ro" the .ighting. :hen 3llied bo"bing beca"e continuous in the north9 "any separation processes had been "o8ed south= #agge6s isotope sluice )ent to Hechingen and the 12 ultracentri.uges )ent to Handern9 located near the ?uncture o. the borders o. >er"any9 /)it7erland and 4rance. he <a7is )ere no) co""itted in a big )ay to ultracentri.uge production - and there.ore to enriching uraniu". rue to .or"9 ho)e8er9 >ro8es once again )arped the truth9 do)nplaying the production plants by "entioning only that E!$%( separation eAperi"entsE )ere being conducted in Celle and 4reiburglAAA8ii ne8er anything o. the ten ultracentri.uge production plants being built near the latter city or o. 3rdenne6s e..orts at Cichter.elde. *espite such sub?ugation o. the truth9 *a8id Ir8ing9 in his book he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 identi.ies )hat9 at least .or a ti"e9 )ere thought by the 3llies to be .ourteen isotope separating .acilities being built in the area.lAAA8iii >ro8es hi"sel. ad"itted concern that these plants )ere being erected to enrich uraniu". 3ccording to >ro8es9 he sa) patterns si"ilar to Oak +idge in these plants= but ;uick intelligence analysis suggested the .acilities )ere crude and ine..icient .actories .or synthetically con8erting shale to oil. /uch a re8elation hints at their actually being a co8er .or nuclear )eapons acti8ity. 3.ter all9 synthetic processing )as the co8er gi8en the buna plant at 3usch)it7. 3nd there appears to ha8e eAisted a Egentle"en6s agree"entE bet)een I.>.4arben and 3llied .orceslAAAiA not to bo"b synthetic processing plants. *espite the Eshale oilE plants6 see"ing inconse;uence9 as ulti"ately described by >ro8es9 co"pared to the i"portant schedule o. non-nuclear strategic targets needing attention9 3llied bo"bers )ere di8erted .ro" so"e o. their i"portant "issions to destroy the chain o. plants. /urely the bo"bing )as counter to the Egentle"en6s agree"entE unless there )as so"ething that ?usti.ied their destruction beyond the .act they )ere allegedly synthetic processing plants. he con8erting o. shale to oil is a synthetic gasi.ication process pioneered by I.>. 4arben and its technology is in "any )ays si"ilar to that o. producing synthetic rubber9 also called buna. >i8en e8ents related later in this chapter and else)here9 it )ould not be surprising to .ind that these plants had9 indeed9 been enriching uraniu". 58en the i"pressi8e successes o. the ultracentri.uge do not "atch up to the E"ost .ar reachingE achie8e"ents attained in isotope separation by #aron 0an.red 8on 3rdenne. 3rdenne and his associate9 4rit7 Houter"ans9 as early as 19&19 had already calculated the critical "ass Ac o. !$%( and had begun construction o. Ea "agni.icent laboratoryE underground - sa.e .ro" the bo"bing o. 3llied airplanes - in #erlin Cichter.elde.Aci he laboratory contained a t)o "illion-8olt electrostatic generator and a cyclotron - at the ti"e there )as only one other cyclotron throughout the +eich9 that o. the Curies9 )hich had been co""andeered in 4rance. #y 3pril 19&$9 3rdenne also had in his laboratory a co"pleted "agnetic isotope separatorAcii not unlike the calutrons o. 5rnest Ca)rence9 )hich >eneral >ro8es )ould not deploy at Oak +idge .or another year-and-a-hal.. 3rdenne had designed the separators in 19&29 barely on the heels o. the disco8ery o. a possible .ission eAplosion. 3nd so9 supplied )ith his "illion-8olt generator to pro8ide the copious a"ounts o. po)er needed to operate the "agnetic separator9 he see"s to ha8e been ahead o. e8erybody else in the .ield o. uraniu" enrich"ent. In addition9 the ion plas"a source 3rdenne had designed .or his isotope separator to subli"e the uraniu" co"pound )as .ar superior to that pro8ided .or the calutrons - a key distinction considering the calutron6s subli"ation process )as one o. its key )eaknesses. Calutron e..iciency .or subli"ation ran bet)een &2 and -( percent. 3rdenne6s in8ention )as .our ti"es "ore e..icient - and has co"e to be the pre"iere source )orld-)ide .or e"itting particle rays9 and is kno)n to this day as 6 he 3rdenne /ource.6 One other i"portant distinction separated 3rdenne6s and Houter"ans6 )ork .ro" the other >er"an e..orts. he other progra"s all )orked under the direction and as part o. the >er"an 3r"y9 supplied by and accountable to the "ilitary. #y contrast9 all o. 3rdenne6s .acilities - the bo"b-proo. lab9 the "illion-8olt

generator9 the cyclotron9 and the "agnetic isotope separators the"sel8es - )ere pro8ided by9 and ongoing .unding "ade a8ailable through9 the patronage o. one "an9 +eich 0inister o. Posts and "e"ber o. the +eich President6s +esearch Council on <uclear 3..airs9 :ilhe" Ohnesorge. Cike the 0anhattan Pro?ect scientists9 3rdenne and Houter"ans )orked )ithin the intellectually .reer en8iron"ent o. a ci8ilian organi7ation. Production .or the >er"an isotope enrich"ent pro?ects9 once the eAperi"ental and design )ork )ere co"pleted by 3rdenne and the others9 appears to ha8e been undertaken by the I.>. 4arben co"pany under orders o. the <a7i Party. he co"pany )as directed to construct at 3usch)it7 a buna .actory9Aciii allegedly .or "aking synthetic rubber. 4ollo)ing the )ar9 the 4arben board o. directors bitterly co"plained that no buna )as e8er produced despite the plant being under construction .or .our-and-a-hal. years= the e"ploy"ent o. $(9222 )orkers .ro" the concentration ca"p9 o. )ho" it "akes note the )orkers )ere especially )ell-treated and )ell .ed= and the utili7ation o. 1$9222 skilled >er"an scientists and technicians .ro" 4arben. 4arben also in8ested 922 "illion reichs"arks (e;ual to approAi"ately K$ billion o. today6s dollars) in the .acility. he plant used "ore electrical po)er than the entire city o. #erlin yet it ne8er "ade any buna9 the substance it )as EintendedE to produce. :hen these .acts )ere described to an eApert on poly"er production (buna is a "e"ber o. the poly"er9 or synthetic rubber9 .a"ily)9 0r. 5d Candry9Aci8 0r. Candry responded directly9 EIt )as not a rubber plant9 you can bet your botto" dollar on that.E Candry )ent on to eAplain that )hile so"e types o. buna are "ade by heating9 )hich re;uires using relati8ely large a"ounts o. energy9 this energy is in8ariably supplied by burning coal. Coal )as plenti.ul and )ell-"ined in the area and )as a key reason .or locating the plant at 3usch)it7 )hen it )as still intended to be a buna .acility.Ac8 he heating-o.-buna process9 to Candry6s kno)ledge9 )as ne8er atte"pted using electricity9 nor could he en8ision )hy it )ould ha8e been. Candry totally dis"issed the possibility that a buna plant9 had it tried an electric option9 )ould e8er use "ore electricity than the entire city o. #erlin. 3nd the in8est"ent o. K$ billion is9 E3 hell o. a lot o. "oney .or a buna plantE e8en these days9 according to 0r. Candry. he probability o. the 4arben plant ha8ing been co"pleted to "ake buna appears to be 8ery sli" to none. he plant contained all o. the characteristics o. a uraniu" enrich"ent plant9 ho)e8er9 )hich undoubtedly it )ould ne8er ha8e been identi.ied as9 but it )ould ha8e had an appropriate co8er story to ca"ou.lage it such as it supposedly being a buna plant. In .act9 buna )ould ha8e been an eAcellent co8er because o. the high le8el and types o. technology in8ol8ed in both. Indeed9 as has been noted pre8iously9 >eneral >ro8es and his intelligence analysts had already identi.ied )hat he later alleged to be a si"ilar process as a potential enrich"ent .acility. One last detail o. interest regarding this phanto" .actoryB I.>.4arben had close ties )ith and o.ten .inanced or other)ise ser8ed directly the clandestine purposes o. 3dol. Hitler - usually )orking through the 4uehrer6s top aid9 0artin #or"ann9 or through #or"ann6s bureaucracies. 3rdenne6s ?u"p on the co"petition and superior technology9 also supported by 0artin #or"ann through his .riend +ichard Ohnesorge and his postal "inistry9 co"bined )ith the possibility that the I.>. 4arben plant "ay9 indeed9 ha8e housed the production 8ersions o. 3rdenne6s uraniu" enriching "agnetic separators or the >er"an ultracentri.uges9 likely "eans that >er"any produced enriched uraniu" earlier9 and in greater ;uantities9 than did the !nited /tates. his is true especially )hen considering the possibility that the <a7is9 to)ard the end o. the )ar9 "ay ha8e co"bined all ato"ic bo"b e..orts. hey "ay ha8e "ulti-staged the partially-enriched product9 as the 0anhattan Pro?ect did9 .ro" the isotope sluice and'or the ultracentri.uges9 then run the product through the 3rdenne electro-"agnetic isotope separators at 3usch)it79 or 8ice 8ersa. 3nd this easily could ha8e been done )ith a high degree o. secrecy9 e8en .ro" other high-le8el <a7is9 gi8en #or"ann6s close-knit relationships )ith Ohnesorge= /ch"it79 )ho )as the chie. o. I.>. 4arben= Hoess9 the co""andant o. 3usch)it7= and Heinrich 0ueller9 )ho9 a"ong his "any other duties as head o. the >estapo9 o8ersa) the supplying o. .orced laborers to 3usch)it7.Ac8i <otesB l Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. 19& li +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &$-= *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p.1(2 lii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. &%, - &&$ liii Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. --= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. %889 %89 li8 Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p %$&9 %$(= Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. -9= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. %,89 &1,9 &%1 l8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. (&8= Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. $29 l8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $,% l8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $(9 l8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $(% liA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $,1

lA *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &( lAi *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %2$ lAii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 1-9 lAiii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. &19&$ lAi8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. && lA8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. (, lA8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. (1 lA8ii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -1 lA8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. ,2- - ,12 lAiA *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 99= ;uoting .ro" >o)ing6s #ritain and 3to"ic 5nergy lAA *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9 lAAi *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9 lAAii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 8% lAAiii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $$$ lAAi8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 8( lAA8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. (8= Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 pp. -%9 -& lAA8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $11 lAA8ii 0c>eorge #undy9 *anger and /ur8i8alB Choices 3bout he #o"b In he 4irst 4i.ty Dears9 pp. 1( - 18 lAA8iii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -lAAiA *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 12$ lAAA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. &2$9 &2% lAAAi 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p. $1 lAAAii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &2, lAAAiii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. pp. 899 92 and $8& lAAAi8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $%& lAAA8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 91 lAAA8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. 919 1-%9 $$9 lAAA8ii Ceslie +. >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. %%lAAA8iii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $(% lAAAiA @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 1%2 Ac *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 9$ Aci *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $92= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %-19 Acii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -, - -89 11,9 $%( Aciii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1(% Aci8 5d Candry9 personal inter8ie) )ith the author9 0ay $$9 199,= President and >eneral 0anager o. Heystone Poly"ers9 Inc. o. Houston9 eAas. 0r. Candry holds a degree in che"istry )ith e"phasis on poly"er science9 earned on a t)o-year .ello)ship at the !ni8ersity o. 3kron9 the ho"e o. the >oodyear +ubber Co"pany and the leading school on poly"ers in the !nited /tates. Ac8 @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11( Ac8i Disrael >ut"an and 0ichael #erenbau"9 3nato"y o. the 3usch)it7 *eath Ca"p9 p. %9

Cha$ter ,our " The Hidden Bomb E3rdenne )orked on so"e sort o. ato"ic pro?ect appro8ed at the highest le8el9 his 8illa )as 8isited on se8eral occasions by Hitler during the latter6s periods o. residence in #erlin.EAc8ii *r. *a8id Picking .ro" his book Hitler6s abletalk 3rdenne6s technology Ehad clear si"ilarities to the tracks at Oak +idge9EAc8iii *a8id Ir8ing he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b On 1% 0arch9 19&(9 one and a hal. "onths be.ore the end o. the )ar9 3dol. Hitler addressed the o..icers and generals o. the >er"an 9th 3r"y. he 5nglish and 3"ericans )ere closing in .ro" the )est and south= the :ehr"acht )as in shreds in .ront o. the" and .alling back. he +ussians )ere ?ust outside #erlin and closing .ro" the east= in three )eeks the >er"an capital )ould be surrounded. he Cu.t)a..e )as deci"ated= it could barely get aircra.t o.. the ground. >er"any had all but lost. Det Hitler stood be.ore his soldiers and announced9 E)e still ha8e things that need to be .inished9 and )hen they are .inished9 they )ill turn the tide.EAciA heir 4uehrer )as intent on buying ti"e until he could thrust his ne)est9 "ost secret )eapon into battle.c /cores o. later obser8ers and historians )ould attribute his E"iracle )eaponE rhetoric to de"entia that had set in under the in.luence o. drugs and duress. Or they suggested it )as a 8ain and e"pty pro"ise "eant to buttress >er"an "ilitary resol8e to buy ti"e )hile the 4uehrer tried to negotiate )ith the 3llies - or break the" up9 depending on )ho one listens to. #ut Hitler6s 8isionary prediction no) appears to ha8e been "ore than )ar-)earied )ishing or drug-induced hallucinations. In .act9 according to none other than Hitler6s top lieutenant9 0artin #or"ann9 in all things the consu""ate realist9 Hitler )as neither )ishing nor hallucinating. :ith the end o. the )ar closing in9 #or"ann had told >auleiter Hell"uth that a secret )eapon soon )ould be .orthco"ing e8en as >er"any )as being de.eated.ci Party big)igs )ere being told by #or"ann9 and .ir"ly belie8ed9 that a "ost-secret "iracle )eapon )as about to be unleashed9cii )rote @ochen 8on Cang. // >eneral Harl :ol..9 )ho9 it )ill be learned9 probably had special kno)ledge o. the secret )eapon9 re8ealed in post-)ar interrogations that he had spoken pri8ately )ith Hitler about the secret )eapon.ciii 3ccording to Cang9 #or"ann .ocused Eall his energyE on "aking sure the "iracle )eapon )ould happen.ci8 #or"ann insisted a "iracle )eapon )as co"ing because9 in all likelihood9 #or"ann had seen it - or at least he had seen its "ost integral and di..icult to obtain co"ponent - )hile touring )ith Hitler the laboratory )here it )as created. 3s )as his .ashion9 #or"ann .ollo)ed Hitler al"ost e8ery)here and )rote do)n on s"all )hite cards al"ost e8ery )ord that .ell .ro" Hitler6s lips and nearly all his co"ings and goings. 4ro" these re.erences *r. Henry Picking )rote his book Hitler6s abletalk. 3nd using those re.erences Picking a..ir"s that Hitler (probably acco"panied by #or"ann - author6s note) "ade a habit o. 8isiting the pri8ate laboratory o. nuclear physicist 0an.red 8on 3rdenne. E3rdenne )orked on so"e sort o. ato"ic pro?ect appro8ed at the highest le8el9E )rote Picking9 Ehis 8illa )as 8isited on se8eral occasions by Hitler during the latter6s periods o. residence in #erlinEc8 (e"phasis the author6s). /uch singular attention by the leader o. the hird +eich9 )hose ti"e )as in great de"and and )ho during this period thought and )orked only on i"portant issues relating to the )ar9 bespeaks a "an .ully supporting a progra" upon )hose success he )as counting. Hitler by these repeated 8isits9 despite later assertions other)ise9 appears to ha8e understood the i"portance o. the 8on 3rdenne nuclear progra" in the )orld )ide "ilitary'political arena. I. anything9 his 8isits to the laboratory sho) Hitler )as a)are9 kno)ledgeable9 in8ol8ed and supporti8e o. nuclear )eapons and that9 interpreting the reason .or his successi8e 8isits9 the progra" "ust ha8e been progressing. /o i. Hitler belie8ed a "iracle )eapon )as .orthco"ing )hen he addressed the 9th 3r"y9 ha8ing been an eye )itness to 3rdenne6s de8elop"ents9 he probably had good reason .or that con8iction= as did #or"ann. #or"ann9 in .act9 had already .ocused a considerable a"ount o. energy on "aking the E"iracle )eaponE happen.c8i He had acti8ely resisted 3r"a"ents 0inister 3lbert /peer6s atte"pts to induct al"ost 1(9222 scientists and technicians into the "ilitary - (9222 o. )ho" had already been inducted )ere released - so they could continue their research e..orts on )eapons de8elop"ent. 3"ong the" )ere se8eral ato"ic scientists sa8ed .ro" conscription into #or"ann6s o)n 1olkstur" 3r"y. He then issued a decree that protected all scienti.ic personnel .ro" any .uture co"bat operations other than as re;uired .or de.ensi8e operations in the regions o. their o)n ho"es. #ut e8idence eAists that 0artin #or"ann had a "ore direct connection to nuclear de8elop"ent than establishing and en.orcing broad policies about scienti.ic personnel and their relationships )ith the "ilitary9 and irregular tours through nuclear laboratories. In his book Inside he hird +eich9 3lbert /peer related ho) Hitler recei8ed an update about the de8elop"ent o. nuclear )eapons .ro" #or"ann6s old .riend *r. +ichard Ohnesorge. /peer gi8es a brie. accounting o. Ohnesorge and his chie. physicist9 the young 0an.red

8on 3rdenne.c8ii #or"ann had )orked closely )ith *r. Ohnesorge9 the "athe"atician and physicist )ho )as 0inister o. Posts9 on deciphering the intercepted "essages bet)een 4ranklin +oose8elt and :inston Churchill9 and had arbitrated a deal bet)een the postal "inistry and Hitler on the usage o. Hitler6s likeness. <o) Ohnesorge )as in Hitler6s presence again reporting on the nuclear progra"9 an achie8e"ent not possible )ithout #or"ann6s appro8al at the 8ery least9 and "ost probable only )ith his )holehearted support. he possibility see"s )orth considering that #or"ann )as not only Ohnesorge6s cha"pion and inter"ediary in Hitler6s court9 based on their pre8ious success decrypting the +oose8elt-Churchill hotline and the .act that al"ost nothing )as presented to Hitler )ithout ha8ing recei8ed #or"ann6s support .irst9 but #or"ann appears to ha8e been in8ol8ed )ith nuclear de8elop"ent on a broader le8el as )ell. 4or eAa"ple9 )hene8er the "iracle )eapon )as "entioned at the end o. the )ar9 #or"ann6s na"e )as al)ays tied to it9 as /peer reported in the case o. >auleiter Hell"uth ha8ing been told about the )eapon by #or"ann9 and @ochen 8on Cang docu"ented that E#or"ann6s co""issarsE re8ealed the eAistence o. the )eapon. he "iracle )eapon progra"9 in its entirety9 also .ollo)s )hat had long been the pattern and had all the ear"arks o. a #or"ann intrigueB it )as a shado) progra" co"posed o. people strongly aligned )ith #or"ann9 per.or"ing tasks outside o. the structures one )ould eApect people in those .unctions to per.or". /peer9 )ithout "entioning #or"ann by na"e9 e8en co"plained about a"ateuris" and E/unday-supple"entE reporting o. the progra"9 a co"plaint he o.ten thre) at #or"ann9 but at .e) others. he production co"ponent o. the pro?ect9 as )ell9 appears to ha8e been asse"bled and controlled by a )eb o. close #or"ann cronies at I.>. 4arben9 3usch)it7 and in the >estapo and //. In addition9 other po)er.ul leaders9 led by /peer9 resisted the enterprise but )ere unable to bring it do)n9 another strong sign #or"ann )as in8ol8ed and used his po)er )ith Hitler and else)here to uphold the e..ort. /peer usually had his )ay )ith the 4uehrer on "ost sub?ects= eAcept those that #or"ann contested. Hitler6s personal and long-standing interest in the pro?ect supports )idely docu"entable e8idence that 3rdenne9 )ith Ohnesorge6s backing9 )as )orking )ith co""it"ent and aggressi8eness e;ual to those )ho )ere stri8ing to de8elop an ato"ic bo"b in 3"erica. 3dditional e8idence suggests 3rdenne achie8ed .ar "ore success in nuclear energy de8elop"ent than any other >er"an research tea" - including and .ar surpassing *r. :erner Heisenberg and his .ollo)ers9 )ho in the traditional history are su""arily held .orth as >er"any6s nuclear leaders. 3t his 8illa in #erlin Cichter.elde9 supported by Ohnesorge6s "assi8e .unding9 3rdenne had built his o)n .irst-rate underground laboratory sa.e .ro" the inter"ittent bo"bings deli8ered by 3llied airplanes.c8iii *espite e..orts during and a.ter the )ar to "ini"i7e 3rdenne6s achie8e"ents9 he actually succeeded by "id)ar in de8eloping an isotope separation technology that Ehad clear si"ilarities to the tracks at Oak +idge9E according to *a8id Ir8ing9 author o. he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b.ciA Ir8ing added that Ethe 3rdenne source9E as it ca"e to be kno)n9 )as9 in .act9 better than those at Oak +idge and continued to be the ion plas"a source o. choice globally .or decades a.ter the )ar.cA :hat Ir8ing does not say directly is that 3rdenne concei8ed the idea o. his "agnetic isotope separator in early 19&29 at the beginning o. the )ar9 not too late in the )ar to be o. ser8ice to the >er"an progra"9 as is o.ten in.erred in the traditional history. In .act9 de8elop"ent o. 3rdenne6s technology occurred at the sa"e ti"e 5rnest Ca)rence .irst began toying )ith the idea o. con8erting his cyclotron into a si"ilar type o. de8ice. #y then9 3rdenne had already dra)n up plans .or his o)n isotope separator.cAi #e.ore the year )as out9 Ohnesorge had under)ritten 3rdenne6s e..ort and the e;uip"ent .or the great laboratory had been purchased. #y "id-19&$9 at the sa"e ti"e the "odi.ication o. Ca)rence6s eAperi"ental cyclotron in 3"ericacAii )as co"pleted9 3rdenne6s isotope separator had been co"pleted as )ell9cAiii construction ha8ing begun in 19&1.cAi8 In essence9 at "id-)ar 3rdenne )as neck and neck )ith 3"erica6s leading electro-"agnetic isotope separation bo"b progra". 4or all intents and purposes9 so .ar9 he )as in a tie in the race .or the ato"ic bo"b9 so"ething neither Heisenberg nor any o. his >er"an cohorts could clai". 3nd a .act ne8er openly ad"itted by the !nited /tates at the ti"e or during the years since. Ca)rence6s "achine partially enriched a 122-"icrogra" speci"en o. uraniu" a.ter a "onth in operation. <o record o. the output o. 3rdenne6s "achine has been .ound by this author .or co"parison9 but gi8en the reports o. the ;uality o. 3rdenne6s enriched uraniu"9 he certainly had processed so"e "aterial. 3nd considering 3rdenne6s )ork during the )ar has been described as Ethe "ost .ar-reaching )ork on isotope separation9EcA8 based on the success o. the 3rdenne ion source9 3rdenne6s isotope separator appears to ha8e been superior to the 3"erican calutrons. he e8idence certainly indicates that 0an.red 8on 3rdenne succeeded in de8eloping a 8iable technology .or enriching uraniu" both )ithin the applicable ti"e .ra"e and to a le8el o. ;uality that cannot be "ini"i7ed. 3nd based on that e8idence9 it see"s possible i. not probable the >er"an de8ice outper.or"ed its 3"erican counterpart. :hen calutron technology had been pro8en in the 3"erican uraniu" enrich"ent progra"9 it )as handed o8er to the big industrial co"bines .or transitioning into production "ethods and "odels= and subse;uently

uraniu" enrich"ent production on an industrial scale )as begun. #ecause such a course o. research and de8elop"ent and then production )as9 and still is9 the nor"al and eApected paradig" o. technology de8elop"ent= and because the t)o nation6s progra"s so closely rese"bled each other in so "any other .acets= it see"s probable the >er"ans )ent into de8elop"ent o. a production phase o. 3rdenne6s technology at about the sa"e ti"e the !nited /tates6 progra" started building co""ercial calutrons= perhaps )ithout Ohnesorge6s and 3rdenne6s kno)ledge or co"plete inclusion. Once the technology had been created9 it )ould not ha8e been necessary .or the de8elopers to participate in its adoption to industrial production processes9 though it certainly )ould ha8e been help.ul. here re"ains the i"portant ;uestions o. )hat happened to 3rdenne and his progra" bet)een "id-19&$9 )hen his "achine appears to ha8e been co"pleted and )as success.ully enriching uraniu"9 and the end o. the )ar= and )hat happened to any enriched uraniu" that "ay ha8e been produced at 3rdenne6s laboratoryJ 3t the end o. the )ar9 hundreds o. tons o. >er"an uraniu" )ere "issing and unaccounted .or9 possibly because they had been enriched to the 1'1&2th o. the "ass that )as !$%(. 3t that ratio9 "any kilogra"s o. enriched uraniu" could still ha8e been produced. 58en tiny a"ounts o. enriched uraniu" )ere 8aluable and i"portant. he progra" had been "o8ing )ith great "o"entu". 3lthough 3rdenne6s .acility )as bo"bed about a year a.ter his "achine )as co"pleted9cA8i gi8en the "o"entu" o. 3rdenne6s )ork9 "uch progress "ust ha8e been acco"plished by then. 3rdenne had repaired the isotope separator ;uickly a.ter the bo"bing and there is no reason to belie8e i"pro8e"ents in the laboratory that could be added to the industrial-le8el production separators did not continue right up to the end o. the )ar. he ;uestions o. )hether 3rdenne continued to operate and i"pro8e his enrich"ent process9 and )hat happened to any enriched product he created are unans)ered by the traditional history. Critical 0ass proposes ans)ers to these "ysteries. *espite his achie8e"ents9 signi.icant e..ort has been "ade to discredit 3rdenne6s )arti"e )orkcA8ii and9 in .act9 to hide it )hene8er possible9 including by 3rdenne hi"sel.. 3rdenne9 )ho )as essentially sel.-taught in physics and "athe"atics but )hose 7eal .or the sub?ect "atter and his personal connections allo)ed hi" to "ake great strides )ith his uncon8entional pro?ects9 )as belittled personally and pro.essionally by "any o. his counterparts .or not being a true acade"ic9 "ost especially by Heisenberg and another leading >er"an theoretician Carl-4riedrich 8on :ei7sacker9 and because o. the"9 3lbert /peer.cA8iii 3rdenne )as supposedly9 in turn9 "islead by Heisenberg and :ei7sacker into thinking a bo"b )as not possible .or technical reasons9 e8en though Heisenberg9 along )ith Hahn9 )as one o. the theoreticians )ho had re8ealed to 3rdenne the esti"ated critical "ass o. an ato" bo"b.cAiA *espite Heisenberg6s later alleged disin.or"ation to 3rdenne regarding the technical un.easibility o. a )eapon9 3rdenne9 using Heisenberg6s pre8ious argu"ent .or a bo"b9 secured Ohnesorge6s .unding .or his pro?ect9 )ho in turn used the argu"ent to gain his audience )ith Hitler - again9 "ost likely through #or"ann. 3rdenne6s practical application o. physics )as not )ithout the direction o. a strong theoretical "ind that kept hi" current and ga8e hi" guidance in his ;uest to unleash the ato". He had hired Pro.essor 4rit7 Houter"ans9 a .ascinating and brilliant 3ustrian )ho )hile still a student in >er"any9 like Oppenhei"er in 3"erica9 had )orked out the ther"onuclear theory o. solar energyB )hat .ueled the stars - and later hydrogen bo"bs. In .act it is Houter"ans and astrono"er +obert 3tkinson )ho9 together9 are gi8en credit .or .irst deciphering and articulating the ther"onuclear theory= so na"ed because o. the i""ense heat inside the stars that is released )hen hydrogen ato"s collide and .use together to .or" heliu".cAA hus an ato" bo"b is the result o. energy released by the .ission9 or splitting o. ato"s9 )hile a ther"onuclear )arhead - or hydrogen bo"b -- is the result o. energy released by the co"bining9 or .usion9 o. ato"s. Houter"ans6 genius )as not li"ited to astrophysics. 3s early as 19%$9 the sa"e year the nucleus o. the ato" )as disco8ered and siA years be.ore the ato" )as .irst split9 Houter"ans )as the .irst to recogni7e and cha"pion the potential .or nuclear po)er .ro" ato"ic chain reactions. cAAi :hen Houter"ans6 3ustrian co"patriot Hitler ca"e to po)er in >er"any9 Houter"ans i""igrated to the /o8iet !nion. :hile there he ad8anced the theory9 in 19%-9cAAii o. neutron absorption9 )hich )ould e8entually be used to create plutoniu"9 another .irst. #e.ore the )ar had e8en begun9 Houter"ans6 po)er.ul and i"aginati8e "ind in /talin6s hands could ha8e placed the /o8iet !nion as .ront-runner a"ong the nations in the race .or an ato"ic bo"b9 had the +ussian leaders paid "ore attention to the unusual physicist and not co""itted a serious error instead. 4or ha8ing thus ?u"ped out o. Hitler6s .rying pan and into /talin6s .ire9 Houter"ans )as arrested in one o. /talin6s paranoia-dri8en purges in 19%-. Houter"ans6 )i.e and children escaped to the !nited /tates but Houter"ans )as i"prisoned .or t)o years9 constantly at threat o. death9 and tortured in an e..ort to gain a con.ession o. ha8ing been a saboteur. In one -$-hour session all o. his teeth )ere knocked out. In a .ollo)ing interrogation9 Houter"ans .alsely ad"itted to ha8ing spied .or >er"any by ascertaining +ussian aircra.t speeds using a de8ice he had Ein8ented.EcAAiii he torture stopped )hile his Ein8entionE )as re8ie)ed. he contri8ance turned out to be )holly in8alid on scienti.ic grounds9 as Houter"ans planned it )ould9 and higher o..icials correctly deduced his con.ession had been coerced .ro" hi" by Eunscienti.icE

"eans9 all according to Houter"ans6 plan. :hile Houter"ans a)aited re8ie) o. his case in 19%99 Hitler negotiated )hat )ould be a short-li8ed peace )ith /talin9 and Houter"ans )as turned o8er to the >estapo as part o. a general prisoner eAchange. Heinrich 0ueller6s police .orce locked hi" up again .or a short ti"e9 then .reed hi" on re;uest o. <obel laureate *r. 0aA 8on Caue9 )ith the pro8iso Houter"ans )as under >estapo super8ision and the understanding he )ould not be allo)ed to )ork .or any state agencies or uni8ersities.cAAi8 /oon he )as e"ployed in the pri8ate laboratory - though .unded by the Postal /er8ice9 a state agency - o. the unorthodoA #aron 0an.red 8on 3rdenne. he reno)ned theoretical and eAperi"ental "astery o. Houter"ans - )ho despite his pro8en theoretical leadership )as actually degreed as an eAperi"ental physicist - certainly pro8ided signi.icant contributions to the unappreciated but substantial enthusias" and eAperi"ental genius o. 3rdenne. 4or eAa"ple9 although 3rdenne had been told an esti"ate o. the re;uired critical "ass o. a uraniu" bo"b )ould be Eonly a .e) kilosEcAA8 by Heisenberg and Hahn9 Houter"ans actually per.or"ed the eAact calculations .or critical "ass )hile )orking .or 3rdenne in 19&19cAA8i thus pro8iding a crucial piece o. in.or"ation needed to create an ato"ic bo"b. 4or co"parison9 the !nited /tates6 progra" did not deduce its .inal .igure .or the a"ount o. enriched uraniu" to be used in the bo"b until .our years later9 in 3pril 19&(. Houter"ans also had calculated not only the cross sections o. a .ast9 or eAploding9 chain reaction9 but the cost o. 8arious isotope separation "ethods9 as )ell. In addition9 )hile in 3rdenne6s e"ploy Houter"ans per.or"ed serious research on de8elop"ent o. a nuclear reactor. 0uch has been "ade in pre8ious histories o. Houter"ans6 co8ert resistance to the <a7is )aging )ar using the .ruits o. his "ind and the in.inite po)ers o. the uni8erse it disco8ered= and undoubtedly "uch9 i. not all9 o. )hat is reported about his opposition to Hitler is true9 .or Houter"ans appears to ha8e been a "an o. ;uality conscience. his .act9 and his contributions to a >er"an bo"b9 as listed abo8e9 not)ithstanding9 history suggests that his "ain obstruction to the <a7is coopting his "ar8elous "ind ca"e in the .or" o. steering 3rdenne and others a)ay .ro" a bo"b and to)ard the de8elop"ent o. nuclear reactors .or creating energy .or industrial purposes. #esides Houter"ans6 research into the sub?ect9 there is e8idence that 3rdenne6s laboratory )as9 in .act9 actually building a reactor as )ell as a "agnetic isotope separator.cAA8ii he .act9 ho)e8er9 that both 3rdenne and Ohnesorge understood and pro"oted the de8elop"ent o. a bo"b be.ore Houter"ans arri8ed on the scene and that they continued to pursue one a.ter his e"ploy"ent indicates that Houter"ans6 politics had little e..ect upon the purposes o. the laboratory or upon its achie8ing those ob?ecti8es. In addition9 gi8en the >estapo6s close control o. Houter"ans9 it can hardly be eApected that he )ould ha8e e..ecti8ely tried to th)art 3rdenne6s9 and by eAtension Ohnesorge6s9 e..orts to)ard a bo"b. 3lthough all >er"an scientists )ere )atched closely9 none had his actions so care.ully scrutini7ed as 4rit7 Houter"ans. In .act9 it is entirely possible that Houter"ans6 )orking at 3rdenne6s laboratory )as the result o. >estapo 0ueller ha8ing in.or"ed his "entor9 #or"ann9 that the e"inent physicist )as in >estapo hands .ollo)ing the prisoner eAchange )ith the /o8iets. !pon hearing this9 #or"ann9 in an e..ort to eApand his o)n nuclear progra"9 "ay ha8e "anipulated his bureaucratic strings9 steering Houter"ans into EhisE progra" run by Ohnesorge and 3rdenne9 kno)ing they could use Houter"ans6 substantial capabilities. Considering the >estapo6s order .or Houter"ans not to )ork at any state progra"9 and then Houter"ans ulti"ately )orking .or a state agency9 such a course see"s likely. 4or )orking at 3rdenne6s .acility9 )hich9 though pri8ate9 )as .unded by a "a?or go8ern"ent branch that per.or"ed i"portant )ar research on the "ost secret )eapon o. all9 )ould al"ost certainly ha8e been considered a breach o. the >estapo directi8e. Only )ith the >estapo6s blessing9 and9 by eAtension9 #or"ann6s9 is it likely Houter"ans )ould ha8e been allo)ed to )ork on the Postal 0inistry6s nuclear bo"b pro?ect. he >estapo6s directi8e to Houter"ans "ay ha8e been a de8ice to keep Houter"ans out o. the control o. #or"ann6s nuclear bo"b de8elop"ent co"petitors in the "ilitary and the uni8ersities9 as )ell. 4rit7 Houter"ans had been the EguestE o. one too "any state police organi7ations not to kno) )hat )as eApected o. hi" i. he )anted to sur8i8e. #esides9 he )as a physicist at heart - to not pursue his )ork )as the sa"e as not breathing. On the s"oky9 ash-co8ered banks o. the 1istula +i8er hulked the "iserable Polish to)n o. Os)ieci". he cause o. its )retchedness surrounded itB o the south)est one kilo"eter stood a concentration ca"p established by the occupying >er"ans )ho had o8errun Poland. o the )est t)o kilo"eters stood another9 "uch larger ca"p )ith an e8en "ore ne.arious purpose. 4ro" its s"okestacks the constant sno) o. hu"an ash settled upon the to)n. #et)een the stacks and the to)n stood the train station through )hich hu"ans9 like ignoble beasts o. the .ield9 )ere trundled to these ab?ect ca"ps. o the east siA or se8en kilo"eters )as a third ca"p9 reser8ed .or prisoners o. conscience )ho dared de.y the <a7i regi"e9 as co"pared to "ost o. those in the other ca"ps )ho ?ust happened to be unlucky and )ere born across the )rong boundary line or o. arbitrary parentage. 3 .e) kilo"eters north o. that stood yet another ca"p9 )here the EluckyE prisoners )ere star8ed "ore slo)ly on slightly higher rations )hile their "ilitary "asters in the // sold their 18-hours-

a-day labor .or a pittance but kept all o. the earnings .or the"sel8es. he to)n had e8en been se8ered .ro" using its o)n Polish appellation and )as .orced to use the eutonic 8ersion o. its na"eB 3usch)it7. o slap )icked insult on cutting in?ury9 1$9222 residents o. the to)n had been thro)n out o. their ho"es and >er"an scientists9 technicians and .actory )orkers9 all e"ployees or contract )orkers o. the )orld6s largest che"ical cartel9 Her"ann /ch"it76s I.>. 4arben9 "o8ed in.cAA8iii 4ro" then until the end o. the )ar nothing )ould be held back in the e..ort to erect and put into operation )hat )ould be one o. the "ost9 i. not the "ost9 technically ad8anced processing plants in the )orld9 according to authors Peter Hayes and +ichard /asuly9 )ho )rote Industry and Ideology and I.>. 4arben9 respecti8ely. he site had been care.ully selected .or its purposeB it )as outside o. >er"any and .ar .ro" 3llied bo"bing and the )atch.ul eyes o. reconnaissance operations= it )as neAt to a "a?or railroad center allo)ing easy access .or "o8ing e;uip"ent and "aterials .ro" around 5urope to and .ro" the site= it had a nearly ineAhaustible supply o. "anual labor .ro" the death ca"ps .or building the .ences9 barracks9 o..ices and other non-technical structures re;uired and .or operating e;uip"ent that "ight other)ise be dee"ed too dangerous .or indi8iduals )hose li8es )ere 8alued= and it had ;uick and ready access to 8ast stores o. coal .ro" the #r7es7c7e-@a)is7o)ice coal "ine.cAAiA he purpose o. the plant appears to ha8e been hidden behind an illusory )all care.ully cra.ted to ca"ou.lage the truth .ro" the )orld. /o "uch o. )hat )ent into building and operating the plant9 and the paucity o. product reported to ha8e been produced .ro" it -8irtually nothing - is not congruent )ith the history o. the co"pany that o)ned and operated it or its alleged purposeB the "aking o. synthetic gasoline and synthetic rubber9 kno)n as buna. 4irst9 and "ost telling9 according to "any sources the plant consu"ed "ore electricity than the entire city o. #erlin.cAAA Considering the installation ne8er "ade a pound o. buna9 ne8er e8en )ent into production9 and is alleged to be the biggest .ailure in the history o. I.>. 4arben because o. that .act9 such electrical consu"ption is incredible i. not entirely unbelie8able. hat such ;uantities o. po)er )ere re;uired to build the .acility is highly i"probable. Certainly #erlin9 the eighth-largest city in the )orld at the ti"e9 constantly bo"bed by the 3llies and continually rebuilt to keep the )ar "achine going9 had "any construction and reconstruction pro?ects )ithin its boundaries that indi8idually "atched or eAceeded the electrical de"ands o. 3usch)it76s single buna plant9 not to "ention the total consu"ption o. all #erlin6s construction pro?ects co"bined. 3dd to these the electrical consu"ption o. the hundreds o. thousands o. businesses and residences throughout the si7able city and the electrical consu"ption discrepancy bet)een the city and the buna installation is "assi8e and uneAplainable. 58en had the plant been "aking buna but it )as kept secret a.ter the )ar .or so"e uneAplained reason9 the electrical consu"ption )ould still ha8e been astrono"ical gi8en the buna "anu.acturing process9 .ar eAceeding any po)er usage that could ha8e been eApected .or the .acility. he only eAplanation9 had the plant been "aking buna9 that could begin to eAplain such a high le8el o. electrical consu"ption9 although this e8en stretches the bounds o. plausibility9 is that the plant )as designed to be totally po)ered by electricity9 including heating the buna directly )ith electrical po)er9 )hich )ould ha8e been eAtre"ely ine..icient since electricity at 3usch)it7 )as created by burning coal. <or"ally9 the burning o. coal heats )ater to create stea"9 )hich )ould then e..iciently be used .or the buna heating processes. o burn coal to create stea" to create electricity9 )hich )as and is the con8entional )ay to create electricity9 )hich )ould then be used to heat buna9 is .unda"entally ine..icient - and greatly so. here is no concei8able reason to ha8e done such a thing. #ut by all accounts9 the plant ne8er e8en )ent into production o. buna9 so9 ha8ing re8ie)ed this process to pro8e the point9 there still is no rationale .or the enor"ous electrical consu"ption on that basis. 5d Candry9 President and >eneral 0anager o. Heystone Poly"ers9 Inc. o. Houston9 eAas and an eApert on synthetic rubber production9 )hen he )as told about the electrical consu"ption o. the buna plant9 responded9 Ethat )as not a rubber plant - you can bet your botto" dollar on that.E #ased on other in.or"ation pro8ided9 as )ell9 Candry belie8es it is hardly concei8able that the so-called EbunaE plant at 3usch)it7 )as pri"arily designed to "ake synthetic rubber. :hen the author contacted another leading eApert on buna production9 a senior "anager )ith o8er $( years o. eAperience in the building and operating o. at least three buna plants bet)een the 19,2s and the 1992s9 this eApert supported 0r. Candry6s assess"ent co"pletely. !n.ortunately9 due to e"ploy"ent re;uire"ents9 the eApert is not allo)ed to re8eal his identity. He .urnished considerable details9 ho)e8er9 about the construction9 costs o. construction and de8elop"ent o. buna .acilities that ha8e been con.ir"ed by the author using current trade ?ournals9 and the author has used this in.or"ation to substantiate his e8idence. he in.or"ation on the de8elop"ent o. buna plants is easily a8ailable to anybody )ho cares to pick up al"ost any ?ournal on synthetic rubber production and re8ie) the pro?ect construction .oru"s. /econd9 the plant had cost o8er 922 "illion reichs"arks9 o8er $(2 "illioncAAAi 19&( !nited /tates dollars based on the initial currency eAchange o. "arks .or dollars .ollo)ing the )ar. he 8alue o. the "ark9 ho)e8er9 had already begun spiraling be.ore the end o. the )ar. !sing the conser8ati8e K$(2 "illion .igure

ad?usted .or in.lation to today6s dollars9 nonetheless9 the buna plant )ould ha8e cost K$ billion.cAAAii E hat6s a hell o. a lot o. "oney .or a buna plant9E asserts 0r.Candry9 again ;uestioning the assertion that buna )as9 in .act9 )hat the .acility )as built to produce. he a8erage buna plant that produces 1(29222 tons o. buna annually costs approAi"ately K82 "illion to build - in 1999 dollars. hat is K12.( "illion ad?usted to 19&( dollars. he eApenditure o. K$(2 "illion 19&( dollars reported to build the buna plant at 3usch)it7 is not ?ust t)ice the a"ount eApected9 or e8en three or .our ti"es the su" one )ould anticipate the plant )ould ha8e cost9 but t)enty-.i8e ti"es that o. the a8erage buna plant o. the day. 3nd today6s costs are greatly in.lated in co"parison )ith 19&(9 in order to "eet the higher costs o. en8iron"ental restrictions that doing business on the cusp o. the $1st Century entails. In addition9 a plant that produces 1(29222 tons o. buna per year is producing the sa"e a"ount o. buna that the 3usch)it7 plant and the t)o other eAisting plants o. the ti"e at /chopau and Huens9 cAAAiii >er"any (each produced 1$9222 tons per year) and one additional plant (capacity e;ual to 3usch)it7) that )as planned to be built at the sa"e ti"e as the buna plant at 3usch)it79 )ere all intended to produce9 co"bined.cAAAi8 hat being the case9 in essence9 the alleged buna plant at 3usch)it7 )ould ha8e cost about hal. as "uch to build as the 19&( K12.( "illion esti"ate= in other )ords9 K(.$( "illion - about one.i.tieth the cost o. the 3usch)it7 construction. !lti"ately9 it his hard to concei8e o. a buna plant producing product that "ust9 o. necessity9 cost (2 ti"es that o. si"ilar product created at other .acilities. hird9 the suggestion that I.>. 4arben in the .our years bet)een the beginning o. construction o. the plant in early 19&1 and the plant6s shutdo)n at the end o. 19&&9 co"pleted only one installation in the buna plant and )as still unable to produce bunacAAA8 runs counter to the co""ission gi8en to 4arben regarding the construction o. the plant= counter to the priority gi8en by both the <a7is and 4arben to the building o. the plant= and counter to the history o. the co"pany and its eAperience building buna .acilities and its pro8en capabilities as the largest che"ical concern on earth. Considering its great in8est"ent9cAAA8i the $(9222 in"ates and 1$9222 >er"an e"ployees and contractors )ho )orked on the pro?ect=cAAA8ii and the intense interest and pressure put on the pro?ect by Hitler and his //9 it see"s doubt.ul i. not inconcei8able I.>. 4arben )ould ha8e co"e up e"pty on such an i"portant 8enture. 5specially since buna technology had already been de8eloped t)o decades earlier and buna product )as allegedly needed so badly. I.>. 4arben6s reputation had been "ade on technological achie8e"ents. he .orerunner to the I.>. 4arben co"pany )as #3/49 )hose .ounder9 Carl #osch9 had been one hal. o. the t)o-"an tea" that .irst de8eloped synthetic nitrates .or .ertili7ers and eAplosi8escAAA8iii called the Haber-#osch process. he ne) process9 )ith another 4arben-de8eloped technology9 the #ergius synthetic oil and rubber process )ith )hich buna is "ade9 )as the .irst production-le8el technology that re;uired eAtre"ely high pressures=cAAAiA a challenge #osch "et )ith great success and .or )hich he )as the .irst engineer to earn a <obel Pri7e. In 19$19 #3/46s synthetic nitrate plant in Oppau9 >er"any eAploded9 killing ,22 and )ounding $9222.cAl #3/4 needed to rebuild the .acility .ast but re;uired 129222 skilled )orkers to do so. he proble" )as sol8ed by hiring entire co"panies9 paying the" so )ell that they dropped all other business and )ent to )ork concentrating only on Oppau6s reconstruction and operation. 3s a result the plant9 pre8iously esti"ated to re;uire a year in reconstruction9 )as rebuilt and operating )ithin three "onths= a testa"ent to the acu"en and boldness o. Carl Hrauch9 )ho had been assigned by #3/46s Her"ann /ch"it79 to rebuild Oppau. )enty years later9 Hrauch no) )earing the duel hats o. chie. operations o..icer o. I.>. 4arben and plenipotentiary general .or special che"ical production .or the hird +eich9cAli had been assigned9 once again by 0artin #or"ann6s old business buddy Her"ann /ch"it79 to a task that re;uired si"ilar handling9 the buna plant at 3usch)it7. EIn the ne) arrange"ent o. priority stages ordered by 4ield 0arshal Heitel9 your building pro?ect (the buna plant) has .irst priority9E )rote Hrauch to Otto 3"bros9 )ho headed the day-to-day building o. the buna .acility.cAlii >eneral Heitel9 )ith )ho" Hrauch liaised9 )as Hitler6s chie. "ilitary ad8isor9 and e8entual cochair"an )ith 0artin #or"ann on )hat )ould co"e to be kno)n as the highest seat o. <a7i po)er9 subser8ient only to 3dol. Hitler hi"sel. - he Co""ittee o. hree. 3"bros )as an interesting choice .or the assign"ent. He )as considered the leader in the .ield o. highpressure and synthetic rubber technology and he )as the "an )ho o8ersa) the construction and operation o. #3/46s .irst large-scale buna plant at /chopau in 19%(.cAliii He )as also9 oddly9 4arben6s leading eApert on poison gas. 3"bros dabbled in physics as )ell9 ha8ing pioneered theory in "agnetic tape technology in 19%$= and he studied under <obel Pri7e-)inning organic biologist +ichard :illstaeter. On all .ronts9 3"bros had special ;ualities .or the special pro?ect at 3usch)it7. >i8en 4arben6s eAperience )ith the Oppau reconstruction and the priority placed by the highest po)ers in the land - political9 co""ercial and "ilitary - on building the buna plant9 there appears to be little reason .or the installation6s construction ha8ing taken .our years9 and yet to not ha8e been co"pleted at all. he buna process had been in8ented t)o decades earliercAli8 and )as9 by no)9 old hat so to speak= t)o large

production plants )ere already built and operating success.ully. 0anpo)er9 both skilled and unskilled9 )as "assi8ely a8ailable at 3usch)it7. 58en though e..orts )ere supposedly being "ade to update buna technology9 there see"s to ha8e been little to hinder 4arben .ro" repeating Hrauch6s success at Oppau )hen constructing the buna plant at 3usch)it7. >i8en the directi8e o. high priority and the ;uick results the directi8e de"anded9cAl8 certainly the buna plant )ould ha8e co"e to .ruition )ithin .our years had buna been the pro?ect6s true ob?ecti8e. #ut a.ter .our years in construction9 at the end o. 19&& )hen it )as dis"antled and carried a)ay in the .ace o. the approaching /o8iet 3r"y9 the buna plant at 3usch)it7 still had not produced a drop o. buna. Certainly there is so"ething )rong )ith this picture. 3 co"pilation o. the three central and readily kno)n .acts ?ust outlined - electrical consu"ption9 construction costs9 and I.>. 4arben6s pre8ious record - does not easily .or" a picture that a buna processing plant )as the type o. pro?ect being constructed at 3usch)it7. /uch a co"pilation does sketch a picture9 ho)e8er9 o. another i"portant )arti"e production process9 though secret at the ti"e. he process is uraniu" enrich"ent. 4irst9 )hile buna re;uires al"ost no electricity to produce9 electro-"agnetic isotope separation re;uires staggering a"ounts o. electricity to po)er the i""ense "agnets used to separate the ioni7ed uraniu" particles. 3s docu"ented9 the buna plant at 3usch)it7 de8oured as "uch electricity as the entire city o. #erlin9 the eighth-largest city in the )orld in the 19&2s. 4e) things9 e8en today9 consu"e as "uch energy as the buna plant did gi8en its s"all relati8e si7e. he .act that I.>. 4arben had built an electrical plant neAt to the buna operation9 a 8ery rare occurrence in those days o. ineApensi8e electricity9cAl8i is stark testi"ony o. the plant6s 8oracious appetite .or 8oltage. /econd9 although $( ti"es the cost o. a buna installation9 the cost o. construction o. the 3usch)it7 plant is strikingly in line )ith )hat one )ould eApect to see .or an isotope separation plant. 4or co"parison9 the !nited /tates calutrons progra" at Oak +idge spent K$2 "illion on research9 K, "illion on engineering9 K$2& "illion on construction9 and K12 "illion on operations9 .or a total o. K$&2 "illion9 according to >eneral >ro8es6 o)n .igures.cAl8ii his co"pares to K$(2 "illion .or the EbunaE plant at 3usch)it7. he har"ony o. the >er"an and 3"erican .igures is striking i. not co"pelling. hird9 )hile 4arben had a strong reputation .or ;uick construction o. its priority pro?ects9 the delays o. the EbunaE .acility and the proble"s that caused those delays "irrored to a signi.icant degree the chie. di..iculties eAperienced at Oak +idge. he buna plant en?oyed top-priority status o8er all other pro?ects in the +eich9 Ee8en at the eApense o. other i"portant building pro?ects or plans )hich are essential to the )ar econo"y9EcAl8iii Hrauch had declared. hus9 priority-)ise9 the EbunaE plant held a position roughly e;ual to that en?oyed by the 0anhattan Pro?ect in the !nited /tates. #ut e8en early in the )ar9 be.ore shortages beca"e pre8alent9 the EbunaE plant at 3usch)it7 su..ered continual delays caused by "al.unctioning e;uip"ent and "aterial shortages.cAliA /uch setbacks )ere totally out o. character .or the technically ad8anced and highly e..icient (e8en .or a >er"an co"pany) I.>. 4arben that )as supposed to be installing buna technology already )ell-de8eloped= and that )as supposedly being led by "anagers )ho )ere the leading eAperts in their .ields9 and9 personally9 had already success.ully o8erseen si"ilar pro?ects. In addition9 due to the 8ast nu"bers o. people re;uired .or the installation9 there )ere di..iculties pro8iding housing and transportation as )ell as the other essentials o. daily li.e9 again paralleling si"ilar challenges )ithin the 0anhattan Pro?ect.cl he ob8ious clues and history o. the .acility strongly indicate an installation "uch "ore like that o. isotope separation than buna processing. 3dd to this the re;uire"ent .or absolute secrecy about uraniu" enrich"ent during )arti"e and the .act that isotope separation )as such a uni;ue and costly process at the ti"e9 unlike any other9 and it beco"es hard to i"agine the so-called buna installation being anything but a co8er .or a uraniu" enrich"ent .acility. Other clues9 )hile not conclusi8e indi8idually9 do8etail so alar"ingly hand-in-glo8e )ith the pre"ise that the buna plant )as actually a uraniu" enrich"ent plant as to place a collecti8e eAcla"ation "ark a.ter the conclusion. 3 .e) eAa"plesB 4irst9 despite the reported drastic and ongoing setbacks9 the I.>. 4arben leaders9 <a7i big)igs and the // co""and at 3usch)it7 appear to not only ha8e )orked a"icably hand-in-hand throughout to resol8e the proble"s9 but they e8en cordially )ined and dined one another throughout the duration o. the pro?ect9 )ithout allo)ing their supposedly dis"al .ailures to get in the )ay o. their personal relationships.cli /uch relaAed accord could not ha8e been eApected )ithin the <a7i regi"e - nor9 indeed9 )ithin "any other regi"es - had the challenge been as high priority9 essential and yet as .a"iliar and as easily eApected to bring to producti8ity as the construction o. a buna installation. I. the challenge9 ho)e8er9 )as pioneering unkno)n science )ith the hope o. creating a decisi8e "iracle )eapon9 certainly an at"osphere o. tea")ork and esprit d6corp )ould ha8e pre8ailed9 as )as the case )ithin the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 and as see"s to ha8e been the case o. the leadership at 3usch)it7. /econd9 I.>. 4arben9 traditionally kno)n as a che"ical concern9 on the heels o. de8eloping synthetic nitrates shortly a.ter the turn o. the century actually had built an eAplosi8es e"pire une;ualed in 5urope by

gaining controlling interests o. the other "a?or "unitions "anu.acturers on the continent. 4arben then aligned the operations to create 5urope6s largest broad-based 8ertical eAplosi8es "anu.acturing e"pire9 causing author @oseph #orkin to )rite that 4arben Ehad .ocused a portion o. its strategy on the )aging o. )ar.Eclii :ould it not ha8e been the natural neAt step in that strategy to be the "anu.acturer o. the neAt generation o. )eapons - nuclear )eaponsJ 3nd )ould it not ha8e been the <a7i6s "ost logical neAt step to ask the leading "unitions pro8ider to undertake this endea8or= especially )hen the relationship )as as close as that o. I.>. 4arben and the <a7i PartyJ Once again9 the >er"an and 3"erican nuclear progra"s appear to ha8e .ollo)ed si"ilar paths on this .ront= che"ical co"panies led the key industrial concerns that produced the 3"erican ato"ic bo"bsB *uPont and ennessee 5ast"an a"ong the largest. /uch institutions )ere the only organi7ations that )orked )ith the high-pressure and high te"perature technologies that "ost closely rese"bled nuclear technologies. 58en co"bined9 ho)e8er9 3"erica6s largest .our che"ical co"panies did not e;ual the si7e9 stature9 capabilities or eApertise o. I.>. 4arben. 3nd at least one such 3"erican co"pany9 *uPont9 participated only .or the sake o. patriotis" and to ensure the conser8ation o. de"ocracy. he leaders o. *uPont not only intentionally precluded nuclear )eapons de8elop"ent .ro" its business strategy9 but they accepted only one dollar o8er and abo8e its eApenses .or the entire )arti"e pro?ect9 as a sho)ing o. their re.usal to pro.it .ro" )ar. 3.ter the )ar9 *uPont )ithdre) .ro" nuclear )eapons de8elop"ent altogether. Presu"ably9 a co"pany like 4arben that had integrated )ar production into its business plan as a basic tenet o. its gro)th9 )ould be the .irst to ?u"p on such a potentially pro.itable "arket as nuclear )eapons. hird9 e8en the backgrounds o. the chie. "en in8ol8ed at 4arben all appear9 to one degree or another9 to lend the"sel8es to ato"ic in8ol8e"ent. 3"bros6 association and apparent )illingness to lead the de8elop"ent o. )eapons o. indiscri"inate "ass-destruction9 as illustrated by his eApertise )ith poisonous gases= co"bined )ith his interest and kno)ledge o. theoretical and eAperi"ental physics9 as sho)n by his pioneering )ork )ith "agnetic tape technology= and his ulti"ate 8ocation as the chie. high-pressure eApert and construction pro?ect "anager at 4arben9 co"bine to pro8ide a "an singularly prepared to be the chie. architect o. a uraniu" enrich"ent "ass-production .acility. 0artin #or"ann6s relationship )ith /ch"it79 and through /ch"it79 Hrauch and 3"bros9 as )ell as #or"ann6s relationship )ith >eneral Heitel9 )ho has already been connected "ilitarily )ith the buna plant9 and 3usch)it7 co""andant Hoess9 // +eichsleiter Heinrich Hi""ler9 and e8en Hi""ler6s ad?utant and liaison )ith both Hitler and I.>.4arben9 // >eneral Harl :ol..9 can all be connected - through #or"ann - to the >er"an ato"ic bo"b. :ol..9 in .act9 had been Hi""ler6s liaison to the buna plant. 4ourth9 construction on the plant had started so"e ti"e in or shortly a.ter 4ebruary 19&1. he ti"e .ra"e is interesting because it )as a year a.ter Ohnesorge6s .irst ato"ic con.erence )ith Hitler and about the sa"e ti"e that 3rdenne started building his isotope separation "achine. >er"an and !nited /tates ato"ic progra"s o.ten paralleled each other. #oth the Oak +idge and the Han.ord .acilities6 construction )ere begun )hile the technologies .or each )ere still in de8elop"ental stages. Perhaps >er"any "irrored the !nited /tates6 policy o. starting to build .acilities .or technologies that )ere only still on the dra)ing board9 in order to gain an ad8antage in ti"e. 3s in 3"erica9 ti"e constraints )ere a chie. issue9 and )ith the risks o. .ailure being geo-political9 econo"ic and "ilitary obli8ion9 it )ould be eApected that the >er"an progra"9 too9 had initiated pro?ects be.ore the technology had been pro8en - on the con.idence the cogent piece o. the pu77le )ould be ready )hen the re;uired ti"e arri8ed. o .ail to initiate concurrent design9 engineering and construction )ould ha8e consu"ed additional "onths9 or e8en years9 in construction )hen ti"e )as so crucially )anting. Or9 "ore probable9 perhaps the installation )as originally intended to be a buna .acility and its design )as "odi.ied only a.ter the pro?ect )as begun. /peer in his recounting o. history9 perhaps belie8ing a nuclear progra" under #or"ann ne8er could ha8e succeeded9 holds the post-)ar party line that >er"any had not pursued a nuclear initiati8e )ith any con8iction= a party line readily e"ployed to hide the .act that >er"any had9 in .act9 8igorously pursued an ato"ic bo"b but hid that e..ort9 )ith help .ro" the 3"ericans9 a.ter the )ar. /peer castigates Ohnesorge6s and 3rdenne6s e..orts and "ini"i7es Hitler6s con8iction to nuclear )eapons and e8en his ability to co"prehend their use.ulness. He ad"its to ha8ing been disabused by his o)n scienti.ic sta.. by this ti"e o. the 8alidity o. an ato"ic bo"b )ithin the ti"e-.ra"e o. the )ar9 and particularly o. the eApertise o. Ohnesorge9 3rdenne and their tea". He )as also an uns)orn ene"y o. 0artin #or"ann. He rails on those )ho supported the 3rdenne bo"b as Eunreliable and inco"petent in.or"ants ()ho ga8e Hitler) a /unday-supple"ent account9E an accusation he o.ten thre) at #or"ann in other "atters. /peer considered #or"ann to be all o. the abo8eB unreliable9 inco"petent and a"ateurish in his approach to politics9 po)er and leadership. /peer states9 in a bi7arre sort o. argu"ent9 that Hitler resisted de8elop"ent o. a bo"b out o. a "oral sense. He then .alls back on the )ork o. *r. Heisenberg as the un;uestioned leader in >er"an nuclear physics to substantiate his position that >er"any ne8er ga8e ato"ic )eapons serious consideration. #ut in

his diatribe /peer totally .ails to address the idea that it )as co""on political )isdo" by then - e8en i. the potential .or a bo"b )as kno)n only )ithin 8ery high national leadership and scienti.ic circles - that )hoe8er obtained the bo"b .irst )ould control the )orld9 )hich )as the essence o. 3dol. Hitler6s li.e9 the <a7i cause9 and the reason .or the )ar Hitler had begun and continued to eAecute. +oose8elt9 Churchill9 Hirohito and /talin all understood this precept. o think Hitler did not is .olly. Ohnesorge6s .irst great contribution to Hitler6s cause )as the decryption o. the +oose8elt-Churchill hotline9 )hich presu"ably re8ealed the 3"erican-5nglish nuclear )eapons alliance9 since the t)o 3llied leaders are al"ost certain to ha8e discussed it in their hotline con8ersations.cliii I. an ene"y achie8ed nuclear )eapons be.ore >er"any9 Hitler )ould ha8e lost his li.e6s task by de.ault )hether he liked the idea o. ha8ing or using a bo"b or not. His E"oral senseE did not stop hi" .ro" co""itting a plethora o. the "ost heinous atrocities eAperienced in this )orld. he i""inence o. a nuclear )eapon being created by one o. his ene"ies - there )as little he could do to stop it - could only be countered by his de8eloping and using one o. his o)n .irst9 and thus )inning the )ar and ruling 5urope9 and9 )ith the help o. the @apanese9 possibly the )orld. Can anyone really belie8e that the "an )ho introduced to the )orld #lit7krieg9 terror bo"bing9 3usch)it7 and the Escorched earthE policy9 so gallantly re?ected a nuclear )eapon at the cost o. his o)n li.e6s )ork and his nation6s .inal .ul.ill"ent o. )hat he belie8ed to be its supre"e purpose9 based on "oral groundsJ /peer6s argu"ent that the 4uehrer )as too dull to understand the abstract physics o. a nuclear bo"b see"s "ost strained9 too. Hitler had been capable o. understanding and 8isuali7ing the bene.its o. such cutting edge technology as ?et propulsion and rocketry9 both o. )hich >er"any .irst introduced to the battle.ield9 not to "ention so"e o. the politically ingenious ad8ances he eAecuted in his rise to po)er and 5uropean do"ination. It sounds a hollo) clai" that Hitler had not the intellect to Egrasp the re8olutionary nature o. nuclear physics9E as /peer suggests. he ti"e .ra"e o. /peer6s re.erence to the Ohnesorge report is "id-19&$9 the "iddle o. the )ar. Ohnesorge had .irst approached the 4uehrer eighteen "onths earlier9 at the end o. 19&29 )ith his nuclear proposal.cli8 Hitler is said to ha8e sco..ed at the suggestion at that ti"e9 and ?oked that )hile his other leaders E)ere )orrying about ho) to )in the )ar9 it )as his 0inister o. Posts )ho had to bring hi" the solution.Ecl8 One "ust ask i. .ollo)ing the .irst "eeting and Hitler6s reputed re?ection9 Ohnesorge )ould ha8e gone .or)ard )ith nuclear )eapons research in the .ace o. Hitler6s supposed ?eeringJ Possibly. #ut i. he had9 he probably )ould not ha8e done it openly and )ith disregard .or the 4uehrer6s .eelings about it. One did not eApect to be s"iled upon by Hitler i. one )ere openly ;uestioning9 by his o)n actions9 the 4uehrer6s ?udg"ent. /o )hy )ould Ohnesorge eApose hi"sel. to Hitler6s reproach9 as /peer6s later account suggests9 by gi8ing hi" an update on the pro?ect9 especially i. it sho)ed the lack o. pro"ise /peer insinuates9 )hich )ould ha8e con.ir"ed Hitler6s supposed reser8ations about nuclear )eaponsJ he .act that Ohnesorge )as discussing nuclear ar"s )ith the 4uehrer again and Hitler )as inter"ittently 8isiting 3rdenne6s laboratory9 probably "eans either Ohnesorge and 3rdenne had in .act achie8ed a signi.icant le8el o. success that 8alidated the progra"9 or Hitler )as not actually a8erse to the progra" in the .irst place9 as so "any interpretations o. history9 including and o.ten based on /peer6s assertions9 ha8e tried to "ake us belie8e. <otesB Ac8ii *r. *a8id Picking9 Hitler6s abletalk9 (as ;uoted by #rooks9 Hirsch.eld in Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-#oat <CO9 19&2-19&, p. $%2 Ac8iii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $%( AciA @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %1, c Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 11% ci 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p. (%1 cii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %1% ciii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I&&-,9 1 *ece"ber9 19&-9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82= also Interrogation /u""ary I&&(%9 1, *ece"ber9 19&-9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82 ci8 @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %1( c8 *r. *a8id Picking9 Hitler6s abletalk9 (as ;uoted by #rooks9 Hirsch.eld in Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-#oat <CO9 19&2-19&, p. $%2 c8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. $(,9 $(8 c8ii 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p. $-1 c8iii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. -89 $92 ciA *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $%( cA *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $%( cAi *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. --9 11,= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %,2 cAii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &88

cAiii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -, - -89 11,= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &8cAi8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %-1 cA8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $%( cA8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $92 cA8ii #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld in Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !#oat <CO9 19&2-19&, p. $%2 cA8iii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -8 cAiA *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -cAA +obert @ungk9 #righter han 3 housand /uns9 pp. $-9 $89 9%= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %-2 cAAi +obert @ungk9 #righter han 3 housand /uns9 pp. &89 9& cAAii +obert @ungk9 #righter han 3 housand /uns9 p. 9& cAAiii +obert @ungk9 #righter han 3 housand /uns9 p. 9%9 9& cAAi8 +obert @ungk9 #righter han 3 housand /uns9 p. 9& cAA8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -cAA8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 9$ cAA8ii #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld in Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-#oat <CO9 19&2-19&, p. cAA8iii Peter Hayes9 Industry and Ideology9 p. %&9 cAAiA Peter Hayes9 Industry and Ideology9 p. %&9= Disrael >ut"an and 0ichael #erenbau"9 3nato"y o. the 3usch)it7 *eath Ca"p9 p. %8 cAAA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1(%= @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 pp. %9 11,= cAAAi @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11, cAAAii 4orbes9 4or Dour In.or"ation9 $( <o8e"ber 1991 (the eAchange rate )as !/K1.22 to *eutsch"ark -.(,) cAAAiii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. ,%9 11& cAAAi8 @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11& cAAA8 Peter Hayes9 Puest 4or 5cono"ic 5"pire9 p. ,% cAAA8i @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11, cAAA8ii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. %= Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1(%= Peter Hayes9 Industry and Ideology9 p. %&9 cAAA8iii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 899 cAAAiA @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 pp. &(9&, cAl @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. %cAli @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11( cAlii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11, cAliii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11( cAli8 @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. (2 cAl8 @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11& cAl8i Pri"o Ce8i9 /ur8i8al In 3usch)it7B he <a7i 3ssault On Hu"anity9 p. 1$% cAl8ii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 9cAl8iii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11, cAliA @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 118 cl @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 119 cli @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 119 clii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. &% cliii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 1(2 cli8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. -cl8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. --

Cha$ter ,i-e " !ak Ridge E o separate 122 gra"s (%.( ounces - author6s note)... o. !$%( per day...9 $9222 &-.oot... calutrons could enrich "aterial enough .or one bo"b core e8ery %22 days.E Fcl8iG +ichard +hodes9 author he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b he "ad scra"ble that "arked the beginning o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect under >eneral >ro8es6 ad"inistration "ust ha8e see"ed like a carni8al to the outside 8ie)er. he inertia that "arked Colonel 0arshall6s ad"inistration )as ;uickly replaced by .renetic acti8ity9 but 8ery little o. it see"ingly tied to a "aster plan. 0uch o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect )ould be operated this )ay throughout the )ar. O.ten parallel progra"s )ere being de8eloped and i"ple"ented that depended on one another .or success9 e8en though none o. the interdependent9 and 8ery sophisticated9 highly technical and eAtre"ely de"anding9 parts had been pro8en success.ul be.ore the neAt co"ponent )as begun. he de"ands o. ti"e9 .ro" the 8ery beginning9 did not allo) .or this. Huge in8est"ents )ere "ade9 so"eti"es speciously9 o. ti"e9 "oney and e..ort9 ?usti.ied only on a tre"ulous belie. that technologies could and )ould be created9 the need .or )hich had not yet been concei8ed "uch less the technologies the"sel8es en8isaged. >ro8es had .aith that re;uisite ans)ers )ould be .ound be.ore they )ere needed9 and that all risks )ere ?usti.ied by the global i"perati8es re.lected in the )ar itsel.9 e8en i. it )ere all lost in the end. In >er"any in 3pril 19&$9 #aron 0an.red 8on 3rdenne already had co"pleted an operational "agnetic isotope separator in his laboratory in #erlin Cichter.elde9 his associate 4rit7 Houter"ans ha8ing correctly calculated the critical "ass o. !$%( the pre8ious year. 0anhattan Pro?ect scientists9 too9 had tried to calculate the critical "ass o. enriched uraniu" but ca"e up )ith a surprising range o. 8alues that 8aried )idely. he 03!* Co""ittee9 the #ritish group that liaised )ith the 0anhattan Pro?ect pro8iding technical support and personnel9 calculated the critical "ass o. !$%( to be $( pounds. Physicists 4risch and Peierls had at di..erent ti"es predicted the bane.ul nu"ber to be either eight kilogra"s (1-., pounds) or .i8e kilogra"s (11 pounds).cl8ii +obert Oppenhei"er hi"sel.9 be.ore ?oining the pro?ect9 had esti"ated critical "ass at about 122 kilogra"s ($$2 pounds). His theoretical group at #erkeley ;uickly upped that by three ti"es to %22 kilogra"s (,,2 pounds).cl8iii 3s late as 3ugust 19&%9 )hen theorists at Cos 3la"os pro8ided a critical "ass esti"ate o. &2 kilogra"s (88 pounds)9 the !nited /tates6 target nu"ber .or enriched uraniu" production )as still unkno)n. 3nd )hile 3rdenne )as already pro8ing the e..ecti8eness o. his isotope separator9 the !nited /tates progra" at the end o. 3pril 19&$ )as still trying to co"plete de8elop"ent o. its calutrons.cliA *espite this and other setbacks9 in the !nited /tates electro-"agnetic separation )as unrealistically anticipated to begin enriching uraniu" by the su""er o. 19&%.clA /u..ering .ro" choking .its and starts9 the progra" )ould not actually begin any kind o. serious production9 and e8en then production )ould be in such s"all ;uantities as to be 8aluable only .or eAperi"entation9clAi until o8er a .ull year later9 in the su""er o. 19&&. 3rthur Co"pton9 in a report he )rote .or the !raniu" Co""ittee in 19&19 had already stated Eato"ic bo"bs can hardly be anticipated be.ore 19&(.EclAii <o) it appeared bo"bs )ould not be a8ailable until <o8e"ber or *ece"ber o. that year9 possibly not until 19&,. he challenges and uncertainty being clear9 >ro8es supported other .or"s o. uraniu" enrich"ent - as had the >er"ans - along )ith electro-"agnetic separation9 including gaseous di..usion9 a "ethod o. separating the lighter isotope o. uraniu" .ro" the hea8ier ones by 8apori7ing the uraniu" and .orcing its ato"s through a series o. E.ilterE barriers. he Ce)is Co""ittee9 the select scienti.ic'political re8ie) board responsible .or o8ersight o. nuclear de8elop"ent at the ti"e9 during the )inter o. 19&$ had appro8ed gaseous di..usion as the "ost likely "ethod to achie8e success.clAiii he co""ittee "ade this prediction despite the .act gaseous di..usion )as calculated to re;uire one hundred thousand barriers and the 8essels in )hich to contain the"9 and se8eral "onths o. processing9 to enrich enough uraniu" .or a bo"b9clAi8 and despite the .act that9 as o. yet9 the technology )as totally unpro8ed. >ro8es also had supported an e..ort initiated at the !ni8ersity o. 1irginia to study isotope separation by centri.uge.clA8 Outside o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 the !nited /tates <a8y )as de8eloping a li;uid ther"al di..usion process .or producing enriched uraniu" to po)er its )arships. +oose8elt had gi8en strict instructions to the 0anhattan Pro?ect not to co"ingle )ith the <a8y progra"9clA8i the technology o. )hich pu"ped li;uid uraniu" through concentric tubes o. di..ering te"peratures to separate the lighter and hea8ier isotopes. Ci;uid di..usion allo)ed one "ore a8enue o. success .or "aking the bo"b9 and allegedly )as e8entually utili7ed despite the President6s orders. In addition to building up these technologies9 >ro8es had to establish a laboratory to study the .unda"entals o. "aking and detonating a bo"b itsel.9 as )ell as "aintaining a center .or studying and i"ple"enting the "etallurgical processing o. uraniu" that )ould be re;uired. he ato"ic bo"b de8elop"ent plan - )hat "eaning.ul plan there )as - depended on the progra"s "o8ing along and9 as the laboratories hope.ully started pro8iding accurate ans)ers and technologies began yielding usable results9 >eneral >ro8es )ould then try to cobble together )hat he could o. the disparate successes to

produce a 8iable progra" .ro" this eclectic asse"blage o. science. +eali7ing it )as critical that each step )as acco"plished at the earliest possible "o"ent9 in his 8ery .irst )eek >ro8es signed the appro8al to purchase (99222 acres in ennessee to house uraniu" enrich"ent e..orts. He also ;uickly appro8ed a K122 "illion eApenditure to begin construction o. the gaseous di..usion plant - the plant )as code na"ed H-$( - be.ore the technology had e8en been pro8en.clA8ii H-$( )ould e8entually consu"e hal. a billion dollarsclA8iii o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s K$ billion )ar-ti"e outlay but9 despite the traditional history i. recently declassi.ied records are belie8ed9 the progra" )ould contribute nothing to the ato"ic bo"bs dropped on Hiroshi"a and <agasaki. >aseous di..usion did9 ho)e8er9 produce enriched uraniu" .or triggering the post)ar nuclear generation o. )eapons - the hydrogen bo"bs. H-$( )ould stand .or "any years as the )orld6s largest totally enclosed single building9 and )as t)ice the si7e o. the calutrons6 electro-"agnetic isotope separation .acility9clAiA )hich beca"e kno)n as D-1$. #ut D1$ )ould be the one and only !nited /tates plant through )hich e8ery gra" o. 3"erican-"ade bo"b-grade enriched uraniu" is clai"ed to ha8e been processed.clAA *espite the Ce)is Co""ittee6s reco""endation .or gaseous di..usion9 the calutrons )as still the only technology that had success.ully enriched uraniu" and it re"ained the "ethod o. choice .or the 0anhattan Pro?ect.clAAi he original calculations o. calutrons re;uire"ents )ere nearly as di77ying as those .or H-$(. 5Aperi"ents indicated that $222 uraniu" ioni7ation sources and an e;ual nu"ber o. collectors to gather the .inal enriched product )ere re;uired to yield 122 gra"s - only three and one-hal. ounces - o. enriched uraniu" per day.clAAii /uch a rate )ould re;uire &(( days9 one and one-;uarter years9 to produce enough enriched product .or the bo"b that )as e8entually dropped (+hodes calculates %22 days per bo"b9 based on a s"aller bo"b esti"ate than the bo"b actually dropped). 3nd the abo8e calculations assu"ed the calutrons )orked reliably. In .act9 the calutrons throughout their )arti"e li8es pro8ed to be "odels o. ine..iciency and poor operation. 3nother hu"bling .act )as that the .irst production calutrons contained only t)o9clAAiii not t)o thousand9 sources and collectors. >round had been broken 18 4ebruary9 19&% .or the .irst Etrack9E as it )as called because its o8al shape rese"bled that o. a race track - and it )ent into operation .or the .irst ti"e 1 3ugust9 19&%. #ut the de8ice ran so poorly due to "echanical and technical shortco"ings that it still had not been tested by /epte"ber. /tone and :ebster9 the engineering contractor hired to run the operation9 .inished repairs and .inal installation in October and Epo)ered upE the "achine again in <o8e"berclAAi8 - to eAperience a si"ilar .ailure. 3n engineering .la) caused the apparatus to be co"pletely disasse"bled and shipped back to its "anu.acturer in 0il)aukee to be cleaned and rebuilt. he entire year passed )ith so little uraniu" enriched that it could not be counted as production "aterial but only as eAperi"ental stock.clAA8 3lso9 the enrich"ent rate )as no"inal9 ha8ing raised the le8el o. !$%( .ro" .- percent to 12 percent. rue9 this )as o8er a 19222 percent i"pro8e"ent9 but bo"b-grade enrich"ent needed to be 82 to 92 percent enrich"ent. 3 19222 percent increase to ?ust 12 percent )as disheartening. here )as still a long )ay to go. *espite the setbacks9 >ro8es not only appro8ed a second track to be built9 )ith "ore sources and collectors9 but he added plans .or a third9 )ith a ne) )rinkle. he ne)est track )ould be used to run already-enriched product9 the end result being bo"b-grade enrich"ent resulting .ro" using the EseededE slightly enriched .eedstock. he t)o di..erent types o. track )ere designated E3lphaE tracks9 )hich )ere those that consu"ed ra) uraniu" and produced 12 percent-enriched uraniu"9 and E#etaE tracks9 )hich consu"ed the 12 percent-enriched uraniu" and produced bo"b-grade uraniu". 3t about the sa"e ti"e9 the >eneral decided to reduce the nu"ber o. planned tracks .ro" $222 to (229 trusting that technology )ould beco"e "ore e..icient and bridge the )ide chas" bet)een political'"ilitary re;uire"ents and uraniu"6s realities.clAA8i he second 3lpha track )as in operation by "id-@anuary 19&&clAA8ii and the .irst9 dis"antled9 3lpha track )as returned to Oak +idge9 reinstalled and placed back in operation by 0arch.clAA8iii #ut proble"s persisted. o "ake "atters )orse9 spare parts )ere non-eAistent and operators rue.ully ineAperienced. here )as no track record to guide the"= no eAperience base upon )hich to rely. 3nd the #eta tracks )ere su..ering "uch the sa"e setbacks as the 3lpha tracks. In the spring o. 19&&9 )ith only a year le.t to achie8e success9 still no enriched uraniu" had been produced in anything close to production ;uantities.clAAiA /till9 >ro8es and his gargantuan9 though dubious9 enterprise carried on. #y the end o. @une9 .i8e 3lpha tracks and t)o #eta tracks )ere operating9 but to 8ery poor per.or"ance le8els. he ioni7ation sources in the calutrons that con8erted the uraniu" .eedstocks to a Esubli"edE gas in order to separate the ato"s9 only 8apori7ed up to -( percent o. the .eedstocks. a condition that re"ained pre8alent e8en to the end o. the )ar9 lea8ing any)here .ro" $( to &2 percent o. the "aterial )ith enrich"ent potential sitting useless in the E.eed canE at the beginning o. the process.clAAA 3ll o. this had to be cleaned out9 reclai"ed che"ically9 and reprocessed be.ore it could be rerun - to the sa"e

result. In addition9 losses o. subli"ed "aterial accu"ulated throughout the "echanical syste" o. the calutrons9clAAAi lea8ing partially-enriched uraniu" e"bedded in e;uip"ent sur.aces and linings )ithin the de8ice. he enriched "aterial9 e8en in "icrogra" ;uantities9 )as so 8aluable that .ollo)ing each run the tracks )ere disasse"bled and thoroughly cleaned using geiger-counters (to locate each s"all particle)9 appropriate che"icals and special technologies9 in order to reclai" e8ery scintilla o. enriched uraniu". Calutrons operators6 clothing )as specially laundered each day as )ell9 to ensure e8ery "icrogra" that "ay ha8e been captured in their clothing )as reco8ered. he su" total o. all o. these e..orts9 on all o. these "achines that )ere operated and supported by literally thousands o. people9 )as still an enriched uraniu" a8erage daily yield o. 11.( gra"s per day throughout the "onth o. @ulyclAAAii - not e8en hal. an ounce. 0ore calutrons )ere installed to increase production le8els. #y <o8e"ber9 nine 3lpha tracks and three #eta tracks - "ost o. the" )ith a .ull contingent o. 9, sources and collectors each - )ere operating to only slightly better e..iciency per.or"ance than their predecessors9 but the additional "achines put production on the rise. *aily output in the .irst )eek o. <o8e"ber a8eraged &( gra"s (1., ounces). In the second )eek it )as (- gra"s ($ ounces). he third )eek production dropped slightly to (2 gra"s9 but in the .ourth )eek o. <o8e"ber9 production cli"bed to 81 gra"s ($.8& ounces) per day.clAAAiii 3 signi.icant increase but a rate that )ould still re;uire ,$2 days9 a .ull one and t)o-thirds years9 to accu"ulate enough enriched uraniu" to .uel the bo"b that "ust be used against a belligerent ene"y - either >er"any or @apan - )ithin eight short "onths or the !nited /tates )ould .ore8er lose the politico'"ilitary nuclear initiati8e it stood on the cusp o. grasping. *espite the .act that output had not yet reached re;uired le8els9 the enriched "aterial that had been produced )as "any ti"es "ore 8aluable than any other co""odity present on earth at the ti"e - i. a price could be set on it at all. he potential this "aterial held to change the )orld "ade it9 in "any )ays9 8aluable beyond the "ere co"putation o. cost-to-produce 8ersus 8olu"e-o.-gra"s. o protect his enor"ous in8est"ent .ro" )hat could be an i""easurable loss9 >ro8es prepared a secure location .or its storage be.ore transit. Inconspicuous a"ong the indigenous households o. east ennessee9 a lone .ar" house stood at the end o. a dusty dirt road. Cu"bering .ar"hands in the peace.ul pastures )ere actually a patrol o. security guards. he innocuous silo neAt to the barn hid a "achine-gun nest. he e"bank"ent that .ra"ed the pictures;ue ho"estead harbored a sub"erged bunker "ade o. rein.orced concrete buried under the escarp"ent6s lea.y .oliage. Inside the in8incible bunker a 8ault stood9 surrounded on all sides by yet another cadre o. )atch.ul guards.clAAAi8 Inside the 8ault )as a .e) ounces o. enriched uraniu" )aiting .or the )eekly courier to )hisk it a)ay to a "ountaintop in <e) 0eAico. >aseous di..usion at H-$( )as ?ust beginning to recei8e )orking barriers .or .iltering the ato"s9 but only a .e) at a ti"e.clAAA8 3s they arri8ed9 the barriers )ere installed in the head"ost possible stage and tested .or integrity9 the plan being to allo) the .irst-stage o. Econ8erterE 8essels to begin the long di..usion process be.ore the nu"erous ensuing stages had e8en been co"pleted. In other )ords9 H-$( )as "aking eAcruciatingly slo) head)ay and had still not produced an ato" o. enriched uraniu". o crank o8erall production to a higher le8el9 >eneral >ro8es either ignored9 circu"8ented or had other)ise persuaded President +oose8elt to belay his presidential order re.using <a8y in8ol8e"ent in the ato"ic bo"b pro?ect9 and >ro8es adopted the li;uid ther"al di..usion technology the <a8y had been de8ising as his o)n. :ithin H-$(9 besides the "assi8e gaseous di..usion apparatus9 stood a 122-colu"n li;uid ther"al di..usion pilot plant that >ro8es had ordered constructed in @anuary 19&& and that had been co"pleted in @uly o. the sa"e year.clAAA8i he plant )as soon eApanded and began production9 according to >ro8es9 at the end o. October9 and9 he clai"s9 it reached peak production in @une 19&(.clAAA8ii Herbert Childs9 author o. 3n 3"erican >enius9 di..ers .ro" >ro8es in his account o. e8ents9 stating that li;uid ther"al di..usion production output actually began on 1 0arch9 19&( three "onths earlier than >ro8e6s assertion. Care.ul re8ie) o. charts based on daily #eta calutrons production output9 ho)e8er9 sho)s no hint )hatsoe8er o. an increase o. production in 0arch or any other ti"e bet)een the beginning o. the year and the "iddle o. @une. In .act9 charted a8erage daily output is so consistent throughout the .irst siA "onths o. the year as to .or" an al"ost straight line9 )ith the lone eAception being a s"all dip in production during the third )eek o. @anuary. his .act not only dra)s into ;uestion 0r. Childs6 state"ent regarding )hen the ther"al di..usion plant began operating9 but >eneral >ro8es6 i"plication9 as )ell9 that li;uid ther"al di..usion continuously rose in producti8ity until it peaked in @une. he record sho)s a signi.icant up)ard production cur8e .ro" "id<o8e"ber 19&& to the end o. the year9 corroborating >ro8es6 8ersion o. )hen ther"al di..usion production began9 but by the beginning o. the ne) year daily production had reached a plateau9 consistently producing about $&2 gra"s (8.& ounces) per day9 )ith no .urther increase in daily producti8ity.clAAA8iii Production did take a signi.icant up)ard turn the .ourth )eek o. @une 19&(9 but this ad8ance certainly is related "ore to other in.luences than to continuously i"pro8ing li;uid ther"al di..usion processes. >ro8es tries9 nonetheless9 to account .or the signi.icant9 i""ediate9 and other)ise ano"alous increase o. #eta

production in "id-@une by crediting the increase to the ther"al di..usion process. Cater9 he credited the gaseous di..usion process )ith the sa"e production eApansion9clAAAiA although gaseous di..usion is reported to ha8e .irst gone into operation less than t)o "onths a.ter ther"al di..usion did9 on $2 @anuary9 19&(.cAc :hile the process )ould not ha8e born an i""ediate i"pact on output since it is a cu"ulati8e process that re;uires se8eral )eeks .or end-product to be a8ailable9 it )ould ha8e undoubtedly begun producing enriched "aterial long be.ore the siA-"onth ti"e period re.lected bet)een the @anuary start-up and the @une up)ard surge. he #eta output records the"sel8es sho) that neither gaseous di..usion nor ther"al di..usion caused a late-spring dyna"ic production upturn9 as the traditional history assert. In .act9 li;uid ther"al di..usion )as shut do)n .or good ?ust a .e) )eeks a.ter the "aterial .or the bo"b )as accu"ulated in @une9cAci suggesting its ine..ecti8eness. he "id-@une 19&( ti"ing o. the increase in enrich"ent .its per.ectly )ith e8ents o. the o..loading o. the enriched uraniu" captured .ro" !-$%&. :ith or )ithout the @une 19&( spike in enriched uraniu" output it appeared at the ti"e that the co"bined isotope separation technologies )ere going to be success.ul. Output )as .inally on track to produce (2 kilogra"s o. enriched uraniu" by early 3ugust - the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s goal .or the uraniu" bo"b pro?ect.cAcii 3nd9 e8en better9 the critical "ass .or !$%( .inally had been deter"ined to be only 1( kilogra"s9 only one-third the a"ount o. enriched uraniu" that )ould be a8ailable )hen it ca"e ti"e to start .abricating bo"bs. I. desired9 at the present rate o. production9 the !nited /tates )ould be able to asse"ble as "any as three uraniu" bo"bs in early 3ugust. /uccess appeared to be ?ust around the corner. <otesB cl8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &88 cl8ii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,99 9( cl8iii Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 pp. %$19 %&& cliA +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. AAiA clA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &2, clAi Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 9, clAii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %,( clAiii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &89 clAi8 Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p.(% clA8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ((2 clA8i Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. $$= Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %(2 clA8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9% clA8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9, clAiA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. &9&9 &9( clAA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 clAAi Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %%% clAAii Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&1= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &88 clAAiii Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&1 clAAi8 Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&,= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &91 clAA8 Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 112 clAA8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &89 clAA8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9$ clAA8iii Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&9 clAAiA /tephen >roue..9 he 0anhattan Pro?ect9 p. %1$ clAAA @erry +ice9 D-1$ #eta shi.t super8isor9 inter8ie) 8ia telephone )ith the author (date not recorded) clAAAi Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %(2 clAAAii P.#.O. +eport (daily #eta output report)9 <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia clAAAiii P.#.O. +eport (daily #eta output report)9 <ational 3rchi8es9/outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia= also co"pare to= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. ,229 ,21 clAAAi8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,2$ clAAA8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,2$ clAAA8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ((1 clAAA8ii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 1$$ clAAA8iii co"pare to +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 clAAAiA Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. ,9 cAc +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,2$

cAci Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. %-9 cAcii #eta OAide rans.er +eport9 <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia= also co"pare to +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21

Part T*o " The Plutonium Bomb Cha$ter Si. " Timing ECt. (@>) H 5 0organ9 Ct. (@>) 4 0 3bbott9 5ns 4 C >ranger )ith *r. /chlicke PO: in custody lea8ing 3nacostia noon 4riday 8ia plane. his party eApert in bo"b disposal and proAi"ity .uses and being sent to assist in securing certain in.ra red proAi"ity .uses i"portant #!O+* F<a8y #ureau o. Ordnance - author6s noteG and in cargo !-$%&. 4uses )hen secured to be returned :ashington custody abo8e party.EccAAA *ispatch .ro" Chie. o. <a8al Operations to Ports"outh <a8al Dard9 $( 0ay9 19&( E3.ter *r. /chlicke co"pletes his lecture he )ill be a8ailable .or ;uestions that people ask. #ut )e )ill kindly ask you not to ask any ;uestions during the lecture and a.ter the lecture 0r. 3l8are7 )ill sit at the table and the person )ho )ishes to ask a ;uestion is asked to co"e .or)ard so that )e can get in the "icrophone and keep a record o. all the ;uestions and ans)ers.EccAAAi 4ro" the transcript o. an introduction to a lecture gi8en by *r. Hein7 /chlicke to the <a8y *epart"ent. E0r. 3l8are7E appears to be *r. /chlicke6s handler. 0anhattan Pro?ect physicist Cuis 3l8are7 )as credited )ith at the last "inute sol8ing the plutoniu" bo"b6s .use proble"s !raniu" does not appear to be the only co"ponent aboard !-$%& capable o. being used to "ake an ato"ic bo"b. here )ere the steel dru"s and )ooden barrels .ull o. .luids9 noted in Chapter One9 )hich 0anhattan Pro?ect personnel tested9 apparently to see i. the "aterials had been9 or could be9 part o. a plutoniu" breeder reactor.ccAAAii 3nd there )ere tons o. lead9 possibly .or radiation protection= "ercury9 possibly .or 8ery .ast "ercury s)itches= and in.ra-red proAi"ity .uses. he in.ra-red .uses )ere disco8ered )ithin .i8e days o. !-$%&6s landing at Ports"outh9 apparently as the result o. *r. Hein7 /chlicke6s interrogation. 3 "e"orandu" )ritten by @ack H. 3lberti dated $& 0ay 19&(ccAAAiii stated9 E*r. /chlicke kno)s about the in.ra-red proAi"ity .uses )hich are contained in so"e o. these packages....*r. /chlicke kno)s ho) to handle the" and is )illing to do so.E 3ccording to the .ollo)ing trans"ission9 at noon the 8ery neAt day9 /chlicke )as placed on an airplane )ith a three-"an escort and .lo)n back to Ports"outh9 .or the sole purpose o. retrie8ing the proAi"ity .uses. ECt. (@>) H 5 0organ9 Ct. (@>) 4 0 3bbott9 5ns 4 C >ranger )ith *r. /chlicke PO: in custody lea8ing 3nacostia noon 4riday 8ia plane. his party eApert in bo"b disposal and proAi"ity .uses and being sent to assist in securing certain in.ra red proAi"ity .uses i"portant #!O+* F<a8y #ureau o. Ordnance - author6s noteG and in cargo !-$%&. 4uses )hen secured to be returned :ashington custody abo8e party.EccAAAi8 he dossier on the technology port.olio /chlicke took to @apan )as eAtensi8e. He )as either re.erenced by other prisoners o. !-$%&9 listed in docu"ents onboard !-$%&9 or ad"itted to being kno)ledgeable in or responsible .orB 8ery high technology radar and radio syste"s9ccAAA8 guided "issile de8elop"ent9 and 1$ rockets.ccAAA8i :hile still in >er"any9 he also had "et )ith a long list o. scientists. He noted in his interrogation that the intent o. "any o. these "eetings )as .or hi" to recei8e the trans.er o. their technologies and to later disse"inate the" in @apan9 and to ser8e as the listed scientists6 liaison and ad8isor )ith @apan.ccAAA8ii 3"ong the scientists )ith )ho" he had coordinated9 )hich he listed .or 3"erican interrogators9 )ere Pro.essor *r. 5sau and Pro.essor >erlach9ccAAA8iii both o. )ho"9 at one ti"e or another9 )ere i"portant "e"bers o. >er"any6s ato"ic research progra"s.ccAAAiA *r. 5sau had ser8ed as head o. the Haiser :ilhel" Institute and )as a "e"ber o. the +eich +esearch Council. 0uch o. the technology acco"panying /chlicke to his destination )as the product o. this group o. (&9 ob8iously 8ery high-le8el9 scientists. hat /chlicke )as personally and al"ost i""ediately .lo)n back to !-$%& speci.ically to retrie8e the in.rared .uses9 .ro" a"ong all the technology .or )hich he )as responsible9 see"s 8ery re8ealing. It suggests that the in.ra-red .uses )ere o. i""ediate interest to the !nited /tates9 not ?ust as the booty o. )ar9 as )ere all the other technologies on the boat9 but eApediting retrie8al o. the .uses see"s to ha8e been dri8en by a need to ha8e the" i""ediately a8ailable .or so"e purpose. hat purpose "ay ha8e been hinted at a short ti"e later. On 19 @uly 19&(9 *r. /chlicke presented a lecture to "e"bers o. the <a8y *epart"ent. 3 portion o. the transcribed introduction o. *r. /chlicke bears an innocuous clue to the possible purpose o. the in.ra-red .uses. E3.ter *r. /chlicke co"pletes his lecture he )ill be a8ailable .or ;uestions that people ask. #ut )e )ill kindly ask you not to ask any ;uestions during the lecture and a.ter the lecture 0r. 3l8are7 Fitalics addedG )ill sit at the table and the person )ho )ishes to ask a ;uestion is asked to co"e .or)ard so that )e can get in the "icrophone and keep a record o. all the ;uestions and ans)ers.EccAl he presence o. a E0r. 3l8are7E as *r. /chlicke6s apparent host or EhandlerE "ay be a singular indicator regarding the i"portance o. the in.ra-red .uses. he re.erence to 0r. 3l8are7 )as not the .irst to be "ade .ro" a"ong !$%&6s passengers and cre). hree )eeks earlier9 >eneral Hessler had )ritten a letter

regarding "issing personal ite"s in )hich he identi.ied a ECo""ander 3l8are7E as ha8ing seen so"e o. these ite"s.ccAli he identi.ication that 3l8are7 held the rank o. co""ander appears on the .ace to indicate he )as a <a8y O..icer= no other !nited /tates ser8ices "aintain a rank o. Co""ander eAcept the Coast >uard9 )hich is 8ery unlikely to ha8e been in8ol8ed )ith the !-$%& intelligence operation. !-$%&6s skipper9 Captain Cieutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler9 also identi.ied 3l8are7 in a letter )ritten decades a.ter the )ar9 but he identi.ied 3l8are7 as a Cieutenant Co""ander.ccAlii he distinction bet)een )hether 3l8are7 )as a .ull Co""ander or a Cieutenant Co""ander )ould be "ini"al9 eAcept that it "ay be a "oot point altogether. 3l8are7 "ay not ha8e been a <a8y o..icer at all. In parenthesis in his letter9 4ehler9 .ollo)ing his identi.ication o. 3l8are79 noted that 3l8are7 is Eprobably not his real na"e.E 4ehler see"s to ha8e sensed that there )as so"ething disingenuous about 3l8are7 but assu"ed that it )as his na"e9 not his rank9 that )as dubious. he na"e9 in .act9 "ay ha8e been a counter.eit. here is no listing o. any o..icer surna"ed 3l8are7 in either the +egister o. Co""issioned and :arrant O..icers o. the !nited /tates <a8y and 0arine Corps .or either @uly 19 19&% or it publication t)o years later on @uly 19 19&(. #ut there is another eAplanation. he na"e 3l8are7 "ay ha8e been real9 but the rank o. co""ander )as a .raud9 and that )as the ill-de.ined deception 4ehler )as sensing. 3t the ti"e !-$%& )as escorted into Ports"outh Harbor9 the 0anhattan Pro?ect )as near desperation. #ecause >ro8es appears to ha8e decided to use so"e o. the already enriched uraniu" to .uel the plutoniu" reactors at Han.ord9 he )as short o. enriched uraniu" .or the uraniu" bo"b. he 0anhattan Pro?ect scientists had not .igured out a )ay to e..iciently trigger the plutoniu" bo"b. 3nd the "id-3ugust deadline .or any kind o. bo"b )as .ast approaching. he plutoniu" bo"b consisted o. a hollo) sphere o. plutoniu" the si7e o. a s"all orange. he key re;uire"ent to "ake the bo"b eAplode - besides the creation o. the re;uisite a"ount o. plutoniu" - )as to co"press the plutoniu" sphere so it )ould reach critical "ass. o achie8e this co"pression9 %$ redundant detonators - ,& in all - needed to be .ired )ithin 1'%9222th o. a second9 or the bo"b )ould .ail. he challenge )as daunting. 4or a year-and-a-hal.9 the Cos 3la"os scientists tried to de8elop a si"ultaneously .iring detonation syste". @ust a "onth be.ore !-$%& landed9 there )as E"ore than a bare possibility that the detonators )ill be unsatis.actoryEccAliii )rote <orris #radbury9 )ho headed the tea" responsible .or triggering the eAplosion. Indeed9 into late @une and early @uly9 ?ust t)o )eeks be.ore the .irst ato"ic bo"b test at 3la"ogordo9 <e) 0eAico9 the detonator ti"ing proble" )as still not resol8ed.ccAli8 he eAperts at Cos 3la"os had been )orking on the ti"ing proble" since the .all o. 19&%9ccAl8 but had .ailed to sol8e it )hen9 in October 19&&9 +obert Oppenhei"er created a co""ittee to tackle the detonator proble". he .irst na"e on the three-"an tea" )as Cuis 3l8are7.ccAl8i 3l8are7 had begun his )arti"e )ork in the +adiation Cab at 0I 9 then )orked on >round Controlled 3pproach +adar9 )hich allo)ed controllers to Etalk do)nE a pilot )hose 8ision )as i"paired.ccAl8ii He then )orked on Phased-array +adar9 )hich allo)s a radar syste" to track an ob?ect electro-"agnetically rather than steering the syste" by "anual "eans. 3.ter the )ar9 3l8are7 )ent on to )in the <obel Pri7e .or Physics in 19,8 .or his )ork on aeronautical na8igation syste"s. 3nd he9 )ith his son :alter and geologist 4rank 3saro9 )ere the .irst to .or)ard the theory that 5arth )as struck by a "eteorite that caused the eAtinction o. the dinosaurs. hey based their theory on .indings o. high le8els o. iridiu" in concentrated locations on earth. 3t .irst scorned9 the theory has beco"e )idely accepted. Cuis 3l8are7 also beca"e one o. the great heroes o. the ato"ic bo"b story )hen he sol8ed the plutoniu" bo"b detonator ti"ing proble" in the last days be.ore the rinity est.ccAl8iii In his o)n account o. his )ork in the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 he )rote si"ply that he Ecleaned up so"e loose ends in detonator design.EccAliA he understate"ent and lack o. detail "ay be telling - especially i. it )as "eant to hide ho) he Ecleaned upE those details. O. all the 0anhattan Pro?ect personnel )hose na"e one )ould eApect to see connected to Hein7 /chlicke6s and !-$%&6s in.ra-red proAi"ity .uses9 i. there )as a connection9 Cui7 3l8are76s na"e )ould be at the top o. that list. he t)o scientists6 backgrounds )ere strikingly si"ilar= both "en )ere leaders in the .ield o. high .re;uency light )a8es. :hen it ca"e to science9 they spoke the sa"e language. I. the 0anhattan Pro?ect )anted so"ebody to debrie. /chlicke or anyone aboard !-$%& about ato"ic bo"b de8elop"ent9 3l8are7 )ould ha8e been the logical choice. He )as one o. the 8ery .e) people )ho had a broad 8ie) and understanding o. all the aspects o. the progra". #y late spring 19&(9 )hen !-$%& arri8ed on 3"erican shores )ith ?ust t)o "onths le.t until the rinity est - the .irst test o. an ato"ic bo"b - the detonator proble" )as still unsol8ed and its resolution )as no) para"ount to the success o. the entire progra". 3l8are79 as the key "an assigned to the proble"9 )as in desperate need o. a .using syste" that could .ire "ultiple detonators si"ultaneously. /chlicke had .uses that )orked on the principles that go8ern light presu"ably they )orked at the speed o. light. In .act9 a"ong the docu"ents /chlicke )as acco"panying to @apan )as a report on Ethe in8estigation o. the usability o. ultra8iolet (in8isible) light .or trans"itting "essages or co""ands and particularly .or the

re"ote ignition o. )arhead .uses.Eccl he report had been prepared based on research done .ro" 19%9 through 19&1 by Hans Hlu"b and #ernard Hoch. In suggesting that Ethe ultra8iolet "ethod per"its the trans"ission o. "uch "ore concentrated energy co"pared )ith the in.ra-red "ethod9E the in.erence is "ade that in.rared )as also usable .or si"ilar purposes9 though lo)er concentrations o. energy "ade it proble"atic. !ltra8iolet light9 on the other hand9 according to the sa"e report9 appears to ha8e presented its o)n challenges to the task because it had a Estronger absorption rate.E Certainly nothing is pro8en regarding /chlicke6s .uses .ro" this independent report9 but the docu"ent appears to sho) that the technology could be used .or controlling the type o. )arhead detonation Cuis 3l8are7 re;uired .or the plutoniu" bo"b. he .act that so"ebody na"ed E3l8are7E )as in contact )ith /chlicke and apparently in8ol8ed in his and others o. !-$%&6s passengers6 interrogations9 see"s to be "ore than a coincidence. 3nd the .act that ECo""ander 3l8are7E )as not actually percei8ed by Captain 4ehler as being )ho he clai"ed to be9 pro8ides an interesting9 i. sub?ecti8e9 obser8ation regarding Co""ander 3l8are7. 4ehler "entioned in his letter that 3l8are79 )ho )as his interrogating o..icer9 Ehas al)ays been correct9 e8en )hen so"eti"es trying to press so"e kno)ledge out o. "e and to threaten "e in a rather pri"iti8e )ay.E (sic) he state"ent that 3l8are7 )as Eal)ays being correct9 e8en )hen threatening in a pri"iti8e )ayE see"s on the .ace o. it to be incongruent. #ut i. 3l8are79 )hoe8er he )as9 )as not used to interrogating people - as Cuis 3l8are7 surely )ould not ha8e been - i. he )as doing his best )ithout the interrogation skills re;uired9 )ould that not ;uali.y as a pri"iti8e interrogation9 tooJ 5specially i. the language in )hich you )ere describing the e8ent - 5nglish - is your second language9 as it )as 4ehler6sJ #ut )hat about the identi.ication o. 3l8are7 as a Co""ander in the <a8yJ >eneral Ceslie >ro8es9 )ho )as in charge o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 supplied "ilitary identities - uni.or"s9 ranks and papers - to scientists +obert 4ur"an and @a"es <olan9 so they could escort the enriched uraniu" bo"b cores to inian on board the !// Indianapolis )ithout raising suspicion.ccli Harlo) +uss also recounted in his )ritings ho) a 0a?or 1anna9 an intelligence o..icer responsible .or the technical cre) o. the plutoniu" bo"b9 al)ays carried )ith hi" a cigar boA .ull o. rank insignias .ro" e8ery "ilitary ser8ice. He passed one to each o. the tea" o. ci8ilian technicians to )ear on their uni.or"-looking co8eralls9 so they )ould not be hindered by "ilitary personnel as they concluded their secret pro?ect.cclii >eneral >ro8es9 hi"sel.9 corroborated this story in his book <o) It Can #e old9 )hen he recounted ho) each ci8ilian in the %--"an tea" o. the 4irst echnical /er8ice )as re;uired to )ear a uni.or" )ith a si"ulated 3r"y rank.ccliii hat /chlicke )as returned to !$%& speci.ically to pick up the proAi"ity .uses .urther see"s to substantiate that Co""ander 3l8are79 /chlicke6s handler9 and Cuis 3l8are79 )ho sol8ed the plutoniu" bo"b .using proble"9 are one and the sa"e. his suggestion is also strongly supported by t)o .actors. 4irst9 according to Harlo) +uss9 )ho )rote in his book Pro?ect 3lberta about his )ork on the tea" that asse"bled the plutoniu" bo"b9 t)o signi.icant changes )ere "ade to the bo"b design at the last "inute. One )as the de8elop"ent and inclusion in the plutoniu" bo"b o. Edetonator chi"neysEccli8 that )ere de8eloped so late in the process that they )ere not included in the .irst .our ship"ents o. e;uip"ent to inian9 the Paci.ic air.ield .ro" )hich the bo"bs )ere dropped on @apan. he second design addition )as a series o. s"all-dia"eter stainless steel tubes that E8entedE radiation .ro" the plutoniu" core9 according to +uss6s eAplanation9 to allo) the technicians to "onitor acti8ity at the core.ccl8 +uss "akes a point o. stating both additions )ere ne) and ?ust in ti"e .or the rinity est. hese "odi.ications suggest that 8ery late be.ore the plutoniu" bo"b6s use9 passages )ere being built into the bo"b that9 presu"ably9 )ould allo) the .ree .lo) o. radiation9 or light )a8es9 throughout the de8ice. heoretically9 )ith these passages in place9 once any one o. the ,& detonators )as ignited9 the syste" allo)ed e"itted in.rared )a8es to tra8el at the speed o. light through the Edetonator chi"neysE to the other detonators'.uses and si"ultaneous ignite all the .uses at the speed o. light. 3s a back-up plan9 once any one o. the .iring detonators co"pressed the plutoniu" core at the center enough to achie8e e8en a partial chain reaction9 the radiation .ro" that e8ent )ould be e"itted out to the detonators9 again at the speed o. light9 and9 again9 si"ultaneously .ire all o. the detonators. Ob8iously9 this is speculation based on 8arious9 o.ten apparently unrelated e8idence. #ut gi8en the ti"ing o. the de8elop"ents9 .ro" 3l8are76s arri8al on the !-$%& scene9 to /chlicke6s special trip to retrie8e the .uses9 to 3l8are76s sol8ing the ti"ing proble" so late in the process9 and +uss recei8ing last-"inute design changes apparently initiated to pro8ide paths .or the .ree "o8e"ent o. light )a8es )ithin the bo"b9 such a scenario certainly see"s 8iable. In an e..ort to substantiate or eli"inate this theory9 I tried to call Harlo) +uss on the telephone at his ho"e in Cos 3la"os to ask hi" about the detonator chi"neys9 8enting tubes9 and i.9 in general9 there )ere any signi.icant changes to the actual detonators the"sel8es. !n.ortunately "y call ca"e too late= I )as in.or"ed 0r. +uss had died in the .e) "onths bet)een )hen I recei8ed .ro" hi" his book and )hen I had de8eloped the abo8e scenario.

he second .actor suggesting the detonators used to .ire the plutoniu" bo"b ca"e .ro" *r. /chlicke is the striking success o. the rinity est o. the plutoniu" bo"b. rinity )as Esuccess.ul beyond the "ost opti"istic eApectations o. anyone9E )rote >eneral >ro8es.ccl8i E<early e8eryone )as surprised9Eccl8ii +obert /erber recorded. In his ;uintessential to"e on the sub?ect9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 +ichard +hodes )rote that rinity )as .our ti"es its eApected yield.ccl8iii :hat could ha8e caused such a re"arkable "iscalculation by the eApertsJ hose )ho kne) the proble"s the syste" )as eAperiencing in .iring all o. the detonators at once by "echanical "eans9 but )ere una)are that the proAi"ity .uses )ere being utili7ed to "ake detonation occur at the speed o. light9 certainly )ould not ha8e eApected the pro.oundly superior results. hinking the detonation )as still li"ited by hard-cable restrictions and physical s)itches9 and based on tests o. these syste"s9 the scientists )ere eApecting a "uch less dra"atic e8ent. Instead9 they )ere surprised by the po)er and e..iciency o. the eAplosion. hat so "any )ho kne) )hat the outco"e o. the detonation should ha8e been )ere so surprised by ho) e..icient it actually )as9 tends to indicate that /chlicke6s in.ra-red proAi"ity .uses )ere used to co"press the plutoniu" core at the speed o. light. <otesB cAciii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &88 cAci8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,99 9( cAc8 Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 pp. %$19 %&& cAc8i +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. AAiA cAc8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &2, cAc8iii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 9, cAciA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %,( cc +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &89 cci Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p.(% ccii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ((2 cciii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. $$= Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %(2 cci8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9% cc8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9, cc8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. &9&9 &9( cc8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 cc8iii Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %%% cciA Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&1= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &88 ccA Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&1 ccAi Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&,= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &91 ccAii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 112 ccAiii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &89 ccAi8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &9$ ccA8 Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %&9 ccA8i /tephen >roue..9 he 0anhattan Pro?ect9 p. %1$ ccA8ii @erry +ice9 D-1$ #eta shi.t super8isor9 inter8ie) 8ia telephone )ith the author (date not recorded) ccA8iii Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %(2 ccAiA P.#.O. +eport (daily #eta output report)9 <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia ccAA P.#.O. +eport (daily #eta output report)9 <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia= also co"pare to= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. ,229 ,21 ccAAi +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,2$ ccAAii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,2$ ccAAiii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ((1 ccAAi8 Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 1$$ ccAA8 co"pare to +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 ccAA8i Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. ,9 ccAA8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,2$ ccAA8iii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. %-9 ccAAiA #eta OAide rans.er +eport9 <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia= also co"pare

to +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 ccAAA !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 !-$%& .ile9 secret dispatch .ro" chie. o. na8al operations to Ports"outh <a8al Dard9 $( 0ay9 19&( ccAAAi !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 transcription o. a lecture gi8en by *r. Hein7 /chlicke to the <a8y *epart"ent9 19 @uly 19&( ccAAAii !/ 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 0ani.est o. Cargo 4or okio On #oard !-$%&9 translated .ro" >er"an9 $% 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*92%21(9 <3+3 *ate 1$'11'9% ccAAAiii !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 "e"orandu" )ritten by @ack H. 3lberti to Captain @ohn C. +ihalda..er9 $& 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*92%21(9 <3+3 date 1$'1$'91 ccAAAi8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 secret dispatch .ro" chie. o. na8al operations to Ports"outh <a8al Dard9 $( 0ay9 19&( ccAAA8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 +eport o. Interrogation9 !-$%& PO: Hay <ieschling9 $& 0ay 19&( ccAAA8i >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $1$9 $1% ccAAA8ii !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 +eport o. Interrogation9 !-$%& PO: Hein7 /chlicke9 3ppendiA 1 and 1I9 declassi.ied I<<*-(21$$9 <3+3 date 9'1('9ccAAA8iii !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 +eport o. Interrogation9 !-$%& PO: Hein7 /chlicke9 3ppendiA 1 and 1I9 declassi.ied I<<*-(21$$9 <3+3 date 9'1('9ccAAAiA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. &2$9 (1%= *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ccAl !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 transcription o. a lecture gi8en by *r. Hein7 /chlicke to the <a8y *epart"ent9 19 @uly 19&( ccAli !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 letter )ritten by Cu.t)a..e >eneral !lrich Hessler9 /ub?ectB Personal #elongings - hroughB Channels9 $8 3ugust 19&( ccAlii Heinrich 4ehler9 in an undated letter to /harkhunters9 p.$ ccAliii !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >a9 "e"orandu" .ro" <.5. #radbury to <. +a"sey9 18 3pril 19&(9 38&-219-8$-1, ccAli8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >a9 "e"orandu" .ro" >.#. Histiako)sky to C. 4ussell9 Q !nits .or rinity9 , @une 19&(9 3-8&-219-((-9= "e"orandu" .ro" <.4. +a"sey to @.+. Oppenhei"er9 :./. Parsons and <orris #radbury9 !nsatis.actory 4eatures o. :eapons Progra"9 $% @une 19&(9 3-8&-219-8$-$(= "e"orandu" .ro" 4. Oppenhei"er to H. >reisen9 *.4. Hornig9 5.@. Co.gren9 +ehearsals at +9 $, @une 19&(= "e"orandu" .ro" *.4 Hornig to <.5. #radbury9 /chedule o. 4iring ea" at +9 $8 @une 19&(9 3-8&-219-((-9= "e"orandu" .ro" *.P. Irons to :./. Parsons9 @uly Hing"an /chedule +e8ision I9 % @uly 19&(9 3-8&-219-,--ccAl8 +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. ,2 ccAl8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >a9 0inutes o. 0eeting on the 5lectric *etonator Progra"9 p.$9 $( October 19&(9 3-8&-219-&1-11 ccAl8ii >lenn /eaborg9 he Plutoniu" /toryB he @ournals o. Pro.essor >lenn . /eaborg9 pp. 8,$9 8,% note ccAl8iii +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. A8ii note ccAliA Cuis 3l8are79 3l8are79 p. 1%ccl !./. <ational 3rchi8es <3+3 II9 docu"ent surrendered )ith !-$%& titled91er)endung ultra8iolette /trahlung9 4# 1(989 by Hans Hlu"b and #ernhard Hoch - < :a %2(-1'&& ccli 0aA 0organ :itts and >ordon ho"as9 5nola >ay9 pp. 1,99 1-2 cclii Harlo) +uss9 Pro?ect 3lberta9 pp. 189 (8 ccliii Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. $8$ ccli8 Harlo) +uss9 Pro?ect 3lberta9 p. (( ccl8 Harlo) +uss9 Pro?ect 3lberta9 pp. ((9 (,9 ccl8i Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p.&%% ccl8ii +obert /er8er9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. ,2 ccl8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,--

Cha$ter Se-en " Hanford EIrradiated enriched sa"ple intended .or you being re"o8ed .ro" Clinton (Oak +idge) pile today...9EccliA /a"uel 3llison 4ro" a cable to +obert @. Oppenhei"er 0arch 1-9 19&& ( he traditional history asserts plutoniu" )as bred in reactor piles .ueled )ith ra) uraniu"9 not enriched uraniu" - author6s note) #ecause the long road to a 8alid uraniu" enrich"ent progra" .ro" the beginning )as thought to be a longshot9 the disco8ery o. plutoniu" in *ece"ber 19&2 )as a godsend to the bo"b "akers. 0ore than a year a.ter >lenn . /eaborg9 @oseph :. Hennedy and 3rthur C. :ahl con.ir"ed they had re-created an ele"entcclA hea8ier than uraniu" that had long ago disappeared .ro" earth9 /eaborg and his tea"9 along )ith Italian physicist 5"ilio /egre9 pro8ed that the ne) substance )ould .ission. he clea8ing o. this .irst "an-"ade ele"ent allo)ed the great 3"erican nuclear braintrust a second9 "ore sensible option than trying to pluck a s"all "inority o. nearly identical ato"s .ro" an other)ise ho"ogenous body o. "atter9 as )as the re;uire"ent .or enriching uraniu". Plutoniu" )as an ele"ent unto itsel.9 )ith characteristics all its o)n.cclAi he di..erence "eant that instead o. de8ising "ethods to di..erentiate and take ad8antage o. in.initesi"al )eight discrepancies bet)een sub-"icroscopic ato"ic particles9 as )as the case )ith separating uraniu" isotopes9 the plutoniu" created by bo"barding ra) uraniu" )ith neutrons9 )hich absorbs !$%8 and thus "eta"orphs into plutoniu"9 could si"ply be separated .ro" the uraniu" by dissol8ing the "ass and rinsing the solution )ith a che"ical .ound to bind )ith plutoniu" but not )ith uraniu". 3s the EbinderE later )as separated a)ay9 the plutoniu" )ould be eAposed .or the taking. /uch an eAplanation is a 8ast o8ersi"pli.ication but suitable .or a basic understanding. he process )as substantially si"pler9 nonetheless9 than that o. enriching uraniu". here still eAisted signi.icant barriers to o8erco"e= like9 ho) could uraniu" be bo"barded )ith enough neutrons to trans"ute into plutoniu"9 as )ould be re;uired to reach production-le8el outputsJ he cyclotron that /eaborg6s tea" used to create plutoniu" )as .ar too s"all and neutron-ane"ic to produce anything but "icroscopic a"ounts o. plutoniu". 3nd once the irradiated9 plutoniu"-carrying slugs o. uraniu" )ere ready to be dissol8ed9 ho) could the task be acco"plished )ithout radiation poisoning the people assigned the task o. )orking )ith the highly radioacti8e "aterialJ Plutoniu"9 in theory9 )as a great solution .or a bo"b but its practical application )ould pro8e to be a prickly challenge in and o. itsel.. he che"ical di..erences9 ho)e8er9 )ere not the only ad8antages plutoniu" held o8er enriched uraniu". :ith !$%8 being 1%9 ti"es "ore co""on in natural uraniu" than !$%(9 and plutoniu" being a product o. neutron bo"bard"ent o. !$%89 it )as possible to create "uch "ore plutoniu" out o. an e;ual a"ount o. uraniu" than )ould e8er be possible to separate !$%( .ro" the "other substance.cclAii 3nd con8ersely9 e8en )hile "ore plutoniu" .issile "aterial could be "ade .aster and cheaper than enriched uraniu"9 only one-third as "uch plutoniu" )as needed .or a bo"b than enriched uraniu" because plutoniu" is "ore radioacti8e.cclAiii 0ore nuclear .uel9 at higher ;uality9 .or less ti"e and "oney - the ad8antages )ere ob8ious. *espite all o. the ti"e and e..ort and "oney being poured into uraniu" enrich"ent9 pursuit o. plutoniu" ;uickly beca"e the pri"ary ob?ecti8e o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect. he 0anhattan Pro?ect6s scienti.ic co""unity rallied around the proposal. In .act9 5rnest O. Ca)rence9 the .ather o. the calutrons9 plutoniu"6s Eco"petitor9E led the charge in .a8or o. plutoniu" )ith Oppenhei"er6s blessing.cclAi8 3rthur Co"pton9 <obel laureate in physics and one o. the original "o8ers and shakers that "ade the bo"b pro?ect possible9 thought in 19&19 be.ore isotope separation had been pro8en9 that the plutoniu" alternati8e sa8ed 3"erican bo"b research altogether.cclA8 Co"pton6s co""ittee9 in .act9 reco""ended the creation o. a central lab ?ust to handle the de8elop"ent o. a plutoniu" bo"b.cclA8i @e)ish->er"an )ar re.ugee Hans #ethe9 )ho" one )ould ha8e thought )ould ?u"p at the slightest chance o. de8eloping a success.ul bo"b to be used against the <a7is9 )ho had dri8en hi" .ro" his ho"e9 had re.used to ?oin an ato"ic bo"b research group. #ethe considered the creation o. a bo"b i"possible= until the plutoniu" option beca"e a8ailable9 at )hich ti"e he ?u"ped into the pro?ect )ith both .eet.cclA8ii >eneral >ro8es9 )ho recei8ed his assign"ent to lead the 0anhattan Pro?ect in the "idst o. the plutoniu" option de8elop"ent9 put his best hope in creating a plutoniu"-.ueled bo"bcclA8iii and "ade it the nu"ber one priority. 3ll o. this )as )ell and good but plutoniu" research9 though an eAcellent prospect9 )as Egetting out o. the blocksE late. 3ssessing a plutoniu" bo"b6s legiti"acy took ti"e. 3n ans)er .or the )eak neutron bo"bard"ent proble" caused by the cyclotron6s li"itations )as not .ound until al"ost the end o. 19&$. On $ *ece"ber o. that year9 5nrico 4er"i6s research group success.ully sustained the .irst "an-"ade nuclear chain reaction during their .a"ous eAperi"ent in a s;uash court under the bleachers o. the !ni8ersity o.

Chicago6s .ootball stadiu". he astounding success "eant neutrons could be released in uni"aginable nu"bers9 to be absorbed by !$%8 and thus trans"ute the uraniu" into plutoniu". he success o. 4er"i6s plutoniu" breeding pile resulted in a "a?or change o. plans. :hile the original purchase o. the property at Oak +idge included plans to house plutoniu" de8elop"ent .acilities9 >eneral >ro8es soon reali7ed the risks o. building production-si7e breeder reactors )ere too great .or a highly populated area like HnoA8ille9 )hich )as close to Oak +idge. 3 ne) reser8ation had to be .ound9 .ar .ro" a large population center and prying eyes. 3 site tea" )as dispatched to locate such a location9 8isiting sites in Cali.ornia9 Oregon9 Idaho and :ashington9 and e8entually returning to >ro8es )ith a reco""endation Han.ord9 on the barren9 eastern plains o. the state o. :ashington.cclAiA >ro8es soon .le) out to :ashington and appro8ed the site. #ut in 4ebruary 19&%9 )ith barely t)o and one-hal. years le.t to success.ully .ul.ill the .uture ti"e ob?ecti8e (as yet unkno)n9 since +ussia )as not sho)ing any signs o. declaring )ar on @apan) the property at Han.ord )as still in the process o. being purchased.cclAA Construction on the site )as o..icially begun 0arch $$9 )ith a "ultitude o. de8elop"ent9 construction and research pro?ects running concurrently9 not only at Han.ord9 but at Oak +idge9 Chicago9 and else)here. #y the end o. 19&%9 ho)e8er9 the building o. the .irst reactor pile - so na"ed because a reactor )as si"ply a sophisticated pile o. graphite blocks )ith uraniu" slugs and control de8ises inserted in holes drilled through the graphite - had not been begun. 5ighteen "onths to )hat )ould be the .uture ob?ecti8e9 and counting9 and still no production reactors )ere under construction. :hich is not to say no )ork )as being acco"plished. 3 s"all pilot reactor at Oak +idge had been asse"bled and )as beginning to pro8ide "illigra" ;uantities o. plutoniu" .or eAperi"entation and "etallurgical research.cclAAi Progress in the che"ical process o. plutoniu" separation )as being "ade9 )ith the proposal and e8entual 8alidation o. bis"uth phosphate as a plutoniu" carrier to separate plutoniu" .ro" uraniu". Inno8ati8e "ethods in "iniaturi7ation and robotics9 and to so"e degree tele8ision9 )hich )ould lay the ground)ork .or the .uture high-tech industry that )ould burst .orth a ;uarter-century later9 )ere being de8eloped to per.or" the dirty9 dangerous )ork o. separating plutoniu" .ro" its "other ra) uraniu" )ithout irradiating the people per.or"ing the )ork. 3nd at Han.ord9 although reactor piles had not been started9 great strides )ere already being "ade to)ard the construction o. the "echanical aspects o. the che"ical separation .acilities.cclAAii he separation tea" had de8ised a se"i-auto"ated syste" )here irradiated slugs "echanically )ere dropped into a huge EtroughE that contained the e;uip"ent and substances re;uired to run the slugs through the series o. steps necessary to dissol8e the slugs and then separate the di..erent ele"ents according to re;uire"ents. he trough )as buried al"ost co"pletely in the ground and lined )ith huge ce"ent )alls and $29222 tons o. steel plate and cellulose9 as )ell as -9(229222 s;uare .eet o. 0asonite9cclAAiii all .or"s o. biological shielding to protect operators .ro" the dangers o. radioacti8ity. 3t its peak9 &$9&22 construction )orkers plied their trades building the Han.ord reser8ation.cclAAi8 58en "ore than in the uraniu" enrich"ent progra"9 e8erything )as being thro)n into the endea8or to "ake the plutoniu" bo"b succeed. /till9 the chances o. producing "ore than ?ust a .e) gra"s o. plutoniu" in 19&%9 and not "uch "ore in 19&&9 e8en under the best o. circu"stances9 )as all they could hope .or9 according to >eneral >ro8es.cclAA8 >ro8es did not eApect production le8els o. plutoniu" until 19&(9 and there )ere "any doubts about that. he doubts )ere )ell-.ounded. 3 year earlier9 in the beginning o. 19&$9 /eaborg had )ritten that bo"bs )ere planned to be in production around the beginning o. 19&&.cclAA8i Ob8iously9 that had not occurred. <o plutoniu" )as produced in 19&% at all9 at Han.ord or at the scaled-do)n eAperi"ental pilot reactor at Oak +idge9 )hich had been built as a )orking "odel to de8elop the Han.ord technology. he Oak +idge plant had been loaded )ith uraniu" .uel in early <o8e"ber9 ho)e8er9 and )ent critical soon a.ter)ard. 3s a result9 the .irst day o. 19&& sa) the inaugural deli8ery o. "illigra" ;uantities o. plutoniu" sent to Chicago .or eAperi"entation.cclAA8ii he Oak +idge reactor continued to send eAperi"ental a"ounts o. plutoniu" to the "etallurgical laboratory in Chicago and to the nuclear laboratory at Cos 3la"os. #ut bo"b-production ;uantities .ro" Han.ord )ould not be produced .or al"ost another .ull year9 beginning on $& <o8e"ber9 19&& (# reactor9 the .irst to be .ueled at Han.ord9 )ent critical $, /epte"ber9 19&&).cclAA8iii Only eight "onths )ere le.t on the countdo)n to 3ugust 19&( )hen the .irst s"all ;uantity o. production plutoniu" )as created. Cike the uraniu" enrich"ent e..ort9 continual dile""as and delays had slo)ed the plutoniu" progra". 3 "ost serious proble"9 reali7ed be.ore production e8en started9 )as the lo) concentration o. plutoniu" the initial pile design )ould produce.cclAAiA he di..iculty9 si"ply put9 )as that ra) uraniu" contains so .e) !$%( ato"s9 only one out o. e8ery 1&2 uraniu" ato"s. hese !$%( ato"s .ission and release neutrons that in turn either .ission "ore !$%( - continuing the chain reaction - or are absorbed into !$%8 ato"s and thus trans"ute the uraniu" to plutoniu"9 )hich is the desired end-product. #ut e8en a.ter the "aAi"u" a"ount o. .ission occurred9 a.ter long )eeks in the reactor )hen the !$%( )as .inally spent9 "uch "ore !$%8 re"ained that could ha8e been trans"uted to plutoniu". Plutoniu" production9 )hile better than

enriched uraniu" output9 )as still )oe.ully lean. 38ailable records o. the ti"e appear to indicate the plutoniu" content o. the initial Han.ord discharge )as so lo) that the che"ical separation process had to be .urther re.ined to opti"i7e the product yield to an acceptable le8el.cclAAA 3s early as 19&19 ho)e8er9 Philip 3belson9 a physicist .or the !nited /tates <a8y9 had reali7ed that using enriched uraniu" to .uel a reactor )ould "ake the reactor rich in .ree neutrons. he reactor )ould not only be "ore po)er.ul9 )ith a greatly reduced si7e re;uire"ent9cclAAAi but9 "ost i"portantly9 the "odi.ication )ould produce signi.icantly "ore plutoniu". 4ro" the beginning and throughout the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 all a8enues to i"pro8e success )ere pursued. /o it )as )ith e..orts to increase plutoniu" yield. Plutoniu" )as the top priority .or a bo"b= and )ith a gro)ing arsenal o. ne)ly de8eloped technologies .ro" )hich to dra)9 >ro8es and his ad8isory board appear to ha8e "ade a logical and ob8ious9 but 8ery .ate.ul9 decision. !nkno)n to history up to today9 they appear to ha8e used the in8aluable enriched uraniu" .ro" Oak +idge - )hich )as .at in !$%( that )ould pro8ide the neutron .lood needed to create signi.icantly "ore plutoniu" per production run - to .uel the reactors at Han.ord. he decision )as not )ithout risk and potential political .allout9 ho)e8er9 and so it )as 8igilantly guarded at the ti"e= and .ollo)ing later dubious de8elop"ents9 it appears to ha8e been care.ully buried e8er since. he traditional history si"ply tells us that the Han.ord reactors6 design )as "odi.ied .ro" heliu"-cooled piles to )ater-cooled piles. Purportedly this )as done to increase the po)er o. the reactors9 )hich )ould proportionately increase plutoniu" production - and )hich )ould re;uire )ater6s better cooling characteristics - and .or ease o. design and cost sa8ings in construction.cclAAAii he "odi.ication itsel.9 ho)e8er9 al"ost certainly i"plies the piles )ere actually "odi.ied to be uraniu" enriched. hree keys pro8ide e8idence o. this .act. 4irst9 according to *r. #ernard :ehring9 *irector o. the @.@. Pickle +esearch Center .or <uclear 5ngineering at the !ni8ersity o. eAas9 cclAAAiii and *r. *el"ar #ergen9 a retired physicist .ro" the Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratories9cclAAAi8 )ater-cooling a pile )ould be used only to cool a uraniu"-enriched reactor9 not one .ueled by ra) uraniu". #oth scientists agree that )ater absorbs neutrons 8oraciously and there.ore is in co"petition .or neutrons )ith !$%( - )hich9 as "entioned9 needs the" to "aintain the chain reaction - and )ith !$%89 )hich needs to absorb the neutrons to trans"ute to plutoniu". 3 ra) uraniu" reactor cooled by )ater )ould produce e8en less plutoniu" than )ould a heliu"-cooled pile9 not "ore. he neutron-hungry )ater in the pile )ould consu"e the 8ery neutrons needed to "ake plutoniu". 4ueling the reactor pile )ith uraniu" signi.icantly enriched in !$%(9 on the other hand9 )ould increase the neutrons to a le8el that supports a high rate o. .ission. 3t the sa"e ti"e9 su..iciently enriched uraniu" )ould pro8ide "ore neutrons .or trans"uting "uch greater ;uantities o. !$%8 to plutoniu"9 all the ti"e .eeding the cooling )ater6s hungry appetite .or neutrons as )ell. he )ater )ould be re;uired to cool the "ore po)er.ul enriched reactor9 .or )hich heliu" )ould be insu..icient. he end result9 depending on the le8el o. uraniu" enrich"ent utili7ed9 )ould be "ore plutoniu" produced at a .aster rate. *rs. :ehring and #ergen both ad"it to not being historians o. nuclear physics and that )ithout kno)ing the .ull background o. the Han.ord reactors they could not declare )ith certainty that the reactors )ere .ueled by enriched uraniu". #ut on theoretical grounds alone9 neither o. the" could concei8e o. a case in )hich a ra) uraniu" reactor )ould be cooled by )ater. /econd9 according to *r. :ehring9 there are only t)o alternati8es .or increasing the plutoniu"-producing capacity o. a reactor pile= either add "ore ra) uraniu"9 .orcing the pile to be larger9 or .uel the pile )ith a "ore .issile "aterial - either enriched uraniu" or plutoniu". /ince the .irst Han.ord pile9 at least9 )as .irst .ueled by natural uraniu" and )as housed in a .acility built .or such9 there see"s to ha8e been li"itations on the si7e o. the pile that could ha8e been installed in the building. he author9 .ollo)ing eAtensi8e research9 could .ind no re.erence speci.ically to alteration o. the si7e o. the Han.ord piles9 e..ecti8ely eli"inating the addition o. "ore ra) uraniu" to increase the po)er o. the reactor. <o such e8ent ha8ing taken place suggests a second proo. that the enriched uraniu" alternati8e )as adopted as the "ethod to increase reactor po)er and there.ore increase plutoniu" production at Han.ord. 3 third and co"pelling proo. that the Han.ord reactor piles )ere .ueled by enriched uraniu" lies in the uses o.9 and changes "ade to9 their .orebearer and "odel9 the pilot reactor at Oak +idge. Co""unications beginning in 0arch 19&& bet)een /a"uel H 3llison9cclAAA8 )ho )orked at the !ni8ersity o. Chicago "etallurgy laboratory - called the 0et Cab - speci.ically sol8ing plutoniu" proble"s9 and +obert @.Oppenhei"er clearly sho) that the Oak +idge reactor )as being used to eAplore enriched uraniu" as a reactor .uel. 3pparently Phillip 3belson6s reco""endations three years earlier )ere being .ollo)ed. EIrradiated enriched sa"ple intended .or you being re"o8ed .ro" Clinton (Oak +idge) pile today...9EcclAAA8i states the .irst co""uni;uL .ro" 3llison to Oppenhei"er "atter-o.-.actly. 3 portion o. a letter sent .ro" 3llison to Oppy the .ollo)ing day to pro8ide "ore details said9

I a" sending you in a separate package (- "illigra"s o. enriched %O8 (E E stood .or E ubealloy9E the code na"e .or uraniu"9 EOE .or oAide= thus the "aterial )as enriched uraniu" oAide - author6s note). his is part o. the sa"ple )hich )as eAposed at Q (EQE )as the code na"e .or Oak +idge). Dou should recei8e the irradiated "aterial directly .ro" Q in the neAt ship"ent o. product )ithin about a )eek9 and "aterial I a" sending you )ill ser8e as a control. (e"phasis the author6s) 3llison6s plainly )ritten co""unications re8eal )ith certainty that eAperi"entation using enriched uraniu" as a reactor .uel9 in at least so"e o. the Oak +idge pile6s .uel9 )as under)ay. It is di..icult to belie8e that the plutoniu"-producing enhance"ent o. using enriched uraniu" to .uel the reactors9 )hich pro8ed co"pletely success.ul - 8irtually all later reactors )ere .ueled by enriched uraniu" or plutoniu" -)as ignored at such a critical "o"ent in history )hen its need )as so great. :hile 3llison6s re.erences to irradiating enriched uraniu" in the Oak +idge pile are the only direct docu"entation the author has been able to unco8er o. enriched .uel in reactors during the )ar9 the i"plication that the change )as co8ered up is seen in ho) this "odi.ication )as later recorded .or o..icial history. H.*. /"yth9 )ho )rote the .irst history o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 3to"ic 5nergy 4or 0ilitary Purposes9cclAAA8ii )rites that in the spring o. 19&&9 Ea change )as "ade in the distribution o. uraniu"E )ithin the reactor. :ithout "entioning enriched uraniu"9 he goes on to describe ho) the uraniu" .uel cells )ere recon.igured )ith .e)er uraniu" slugs in the "iddle so po)er could be increased )ithout o8erheating the reactor pile. he result )as that reactor per.or"ance in @une 19&& Econsiderably eAceeded eApectations.E o produce "ore plutoniu" )ith less uraniu" )ould ha8e been i"possible - unless the uraniu" )as enriched. 3nd thus9 it appears9 is purposely hidden the real reason .or the increased output enriched uraniu" had apparently )orked its "agic. he ti"ing o. the recon.iguration o. the pile in the spring not only coincides )ith 3llison6s enriched uraniu" eAperi"ents9 but the description coincides )ith a state"ent "ade by *r. :ehring )hen such a recon.iguration )as described to hi". *r. :ehring theori7ed that the core realign"ent )ould ha8e been re;uired to increase the si7e and'or nu"ber o. cooling passages in order to control the additional heat created by the introduction o. at least so"e enriched-uraniu" cells to the pile. In addition9 although /"yth states .latly that the pile )as run at higher po)er le8els as a result o. the recon.iguration9 he ne8er suggests that the pile )as eApanded in si7e to achie8e that increase. In .act9 as noted pre8iously9 research sho)s no increase in the si7e o. the reactor9 lea8ing enrich"ent the only option. he apparent cloaking o. "aterial in.or"ation about the use o. enriched uraniu" in the Oak +idge reactor suggests a si"ilar subter.uge )as used )hen the Han.ord reactor designs )ere described as ha8ing been con8erted .ro" heliu"-cooled to )ater-cooled. 3s has been articulated9 )ater cooling is used to cool enriched uraniu" reactors and not to cool ra) uraniu" reactors9 so9 in essence9 saying a reactor is )ater cooled is saying it is enriched uraniu" .ueled - or plutoniu"-.ueled i. plutoniu" )as a8ailable9 )hich it )as not. 3ll o. this in.or"ationB the kno)ledge that )ater-cooling and an increase in po)er )ithout increasing pile si7e both denote enriched .ueling9 and the re8elation that Oak +idge had already per.or"ed research on irradiated enriched slugs "ay suggest that other9 "ore "inor9 details o. the Han.ord pile de8elop"ent support the enriched .uel theory as )ell. 4or eAa"ple9 the "anage"ent o. Han.ord )ent to great eApense and e..ort a.ter the redesign o. the reactor piles to re"o8e an eAisting syste" designed to store the radioacti8e )aste by-products o. the pile9 and installed in its place a syste" .or eAtracting uraniu" .ro" the e..luent.cclAAA8iii he reason gi8en )as to reduce the )aste o. uraniu". #ut the cost o. the "odi.ication probably .ar eAceeded the 8alue o. the Era)E uraniu" sal8aged - unless the uraniu" still contained residual a"ounts enriched in !$%(. In that case9 the inesti"able 8alue o. the reclai"ed uraniu" )ould ha8e ?usti.ied the eApense o. the recla"ation pro?ect "any ti"es o8er. 3 si"ilar recla"ation process )as already being used in the calutrons .or the sa"e reason. 3nd shortly a.ter the )ar ended9 the syste" )as discontinued9 suggesting the success.ul plutoniu" bo"b negated the need .or the eApense o. reclai"ing the entrained enriched uraniu". Perhaps the recla"ation syste" is yet another e8idence the Han.ord piles )ere .ueled by enriched uraniu". In 3pril 19&& - again9 note the ti"e .ra"e relati8e to 3llison6s eAperi"ents in 0arch o. the sa"e year - a puri.ication syste" .or Han.ord6s reactors re;uired redesigning )hen Ecriticality re;uire"entsE )ere eased.cclAAAiA he essence o. using enriched uraniu" instead o. ra) uraniu" in the pile )as to increase criticality )ithin the slugs to abo8e the "arginal le8el o. critical acti8ity pro8ided by ra) uraniu". 0ight this "odi.ication to the syste" herald a change in the types o. .uel used9 alsoJ 3nd lastly9 the che"ical laboratory at Cos 3la"os eAperienced an uneApected increase in the output o. product recei8ed .ro" Han.ord9 straining the depart"ent6s resources.ccAc 5sti"ates o. plutoniu" product co"ing .ro" Han.ord should ha8e been easy to "ake and reliable not to ha8e drastically increased - unless so"ething drastic had been done to increase plutoniu" output - so"ething drastic9 like .ueling the reactors )ith enriched uraniu". he e8idence see"s po)er.ul i. not incontro8ertible that enriched uraniu" )as used to .uel the plutoniu"

breeding reactor piles at Han.ord and Oak +idge. he enriched uraniu" could ha8e co"e .ro" no other source than the hard-earned but negligibly gro)ing cache o. !$%( .ro" D-1$. <otesB ccliA /a"uel 3llison classi.ied cable to @.+. Oppenhei"er9 1- 0arch 19&&9 <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia9 38&-219-1,-8 cclA Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1%% cclAi Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. -cclAii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 9% cclAiii +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 pp. A89 A8i cclAi8 Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %$( cclA8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. %,8 cclA8i Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. -9= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. %889%89 cclA8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &1, cclA8iii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &%1 cclAiA Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1%, cclAA Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. -, cclAAi Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1%9 cclAAii Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 pp. 1%89 1%9 cclAAiii Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 pp. 1%89 1%9 cclAAi8 +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ((cclAA8 Ceslie >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. (1 cclAA8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &1$ cclAA8ii Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1%9 cclAA8iii Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1&1 cclAAiA Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1&2 cclAAA Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1&2 cclAAAi +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. (&9 cclAAAii Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 pp. 1%,-1%9= 0ystery #ook9 pp. 11%9 11&= Celand @ohnson and *aniel /cha..er9 Oak +idge <ational CaboratoryB he 4irst 4i.ty Dears9 p. $2= H.*. /"yth9 3to"ic 5nergy 4or 0ilitary Purposes9 p. 1$9 cclAAAiii *r. #ernard :ehring9 personal telephone con8ersations )ith author9 3ugust ,9 199- and October 129 199cclAAAi8 *r. *el"ar #ergen9 personal telephone con8ersation )ith the author9 0arch $&9 1998. cclAAA8 /a"uel H. 3llison9 classi.ied cables to +obert @. Oppenhei"er o. 0arch 1- and 189 19&&9 and 0ay $$9 $, and $-9 19&&= also cable .ro" +obert @. Oppenhei"er to >eneral Ceslie >ro8es9 0ay $-9 19&&= all docu"ents located at <ational 3rchi8es /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >3= 3-8&-219-1,-8 cclAAA8i /a"uel 3llison classi.ied cable to @.+. Oppenhei"er9 1- 0arch 19&&9 <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia9 3- 8&-219-1,-8 cclAAA8ii H.*. /"yth9 3to"ic 5nergy 4or 0ilitary Purposes9 p. 1&%9 1&& cclAAA8iii @ohn 4. Hogerton9 he 3to"ic 5nergy *esk #ook9 p.$$2 cclAAAiA Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 p. 1&2 ccAc 3nthony Ca8e #ro)n and Charles #. 0ac*onald9 /ecret History o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 p. (2-

Cha$ter /ight " Sim$le Math E#y 3pril 19&( Oak +idge had produced enough !$%( to allo) a near critical asse"bly....EccAci +ichard +hodes9 author he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b (3ccu"ulation o. enough enriched uraniu" to achie8e critical "ass re;uired one year. he uraniu" bo"b prepared .or Hiroshi"a barely three "onths a.ter the .irst critical "ass )as accu"ulated contained al"ost three critical "asses - author6s note) he deter"ination to use D-1$6s hard-)on enriched uraniu" to po)er the Han.ord reactors9 like so "any other decisions >eneral >ro8es had to "ake in order to ad8ance the progra"9 "ust ha8e been a .inely balanced ?udg"ent9 )hich is re.lected in ho) he appears to ha8e chosen to eAecute it. 3s has been outlined9 only t)o options )ere scienti.ically .easible .or creating a nuclear )eapon be.ore the )ar endedB a uraniu" bo"b and a plutoniu" bo"b. echnologies to achie8e the bo"bs 8aried )idely in so"e areas and )ere interchangeable in others but progress on all .ronts )as going .or)ard. +esearch had sho)n that probability-)ise9 econo"ically and technically9 plutoniu" )as the better bet - .aster9 cheaper9 easier. #ut the )hole progra" )as still a )ager. <othing )as guaranteed. 58en considering plutoniu"6s appreciable pro"ise9 >ro8es could not a..ord to put all his eggs in one basket. o co8er all e8entualities9 the i"perati8e still )as to achie8e success )ith each )eapon. He si"ply "ust be care.ul allocating resources along the )ay - ensuring he had enough o. the necessary "aterials to "ake at least one o. each bo"b - and then he could )eight any surplus resources in .a8or o. the pre.erred plutoniu" prospect. /uch an inter"ingling o. resources at this point9 ho)e8er9 could pro8e to be proble"atic. 5nriching uraniu" ca"e at such a high price in e8ery .or" o. currency9 )hether it )as "oney9 ti"e9 or the energy eAerted to achie8e the endea8or. Consu"ing the hard-earned enriched uraniu" in an e..ort that .ailed )ould be anathe"a to those po)er.ul "en )ho had in8ested so "uch into it and )ere counting so "uch upon it. /hould the plutoniu" bo"b .all short o. success .or )hate8er unkno)n reason9 and the uraniu" progra" re;uire "ore .issile "aterial to produce "ultiple bo"bs - )hich )as belie8ed the re;uire"ent to achie8e 8ictoryccAcii - both progra"s "ay ha8e .ailed and the a"bitions o. all in8ol8ed )ould be th)arted. 4or >ro8es9 the risks o. taking enriched product originally intended .or the uraniu" bo"b and using it in the plutoniu" )eapon "ust ha8e see"ed great9 but )orth taking. 5specially i. the inter"ingling could be ca"ou.laged .ro" the eyes o. those )ho had a 8ested interest in the success o. the o8erall progra". I. no one kne) that one progra" had been put at risk .or the other9 i. either progra" .ailed it )ould be considered to ha8e .ailed on its o)n de.iciencies. :hile the brilliant brain trust he had hired )as ciphering the uni8erse o. .actors and eAponents9 o. calculus and algorith"s9 >ro8es6 decisions9 though pressure-packed and .re;uently daunting9 )ere usually sol8ed using si"ple "ath and inspired resource.ulness. 4or eAa"ple9 each calutron re;uired a gi8en a"ount o. "agnetic .orce9 and there )as a gi8en nu"ber o. calutrons at any one ti"e= there.ore9 a huge a"ount o. sil8er )as re;uired .or the electro-"agnet )indings o. the calutrons. 58entually9 o8er 1% tons o. sil8er )as re;uired .or the calutronsccAciii (copper )indings )ere out o. the ;uestion since hoarding e8ery last bit o. copper )as essential .or .ul.illing con8entional "unitions de"ands). >ro8es borro)ed 1%9(&2 tons o. sil8er9 nor"ally "easured in troy ounces - in this case %9( "illion troy ounces )orth o8er K%22 "illion - .ro" the !nited /tates reasury. Or >ro8es .aced the decision o. ho) "any 3lpha calutrons should be built and ho) "any #eta calutronsJ hrough the course o. ti"e and the accu"ulation o. eAperience he e8entually settled on nine 3lpha and three #eta calutrons.ccAci8 3nd lastly9 ho) should he allocate the enriched uraniu" bet)een the plutoniu" bo"b option and the uraniu" bo"b alternati8eJ Probably the si"plest9 "ost natural solution )as to split the enriched uraniu" originally dedicated to the uraniu" bo"b9 and to use hal. o. the concentrated product in the plutoniu" reactors )hile sa8ing hal. .or its original purpose in the uraniu" bo"b. 3 second logical option took into account that critical "ass .or the uraniu" bo"b .inally had been calculated at approAi"ately 1( kilogra"s.ccAc8 He could ha8e gauged the accu"ulation o. enriched uraniu" so 1( kilogra"s9 eApected to be enough .or one uraniu" bo"b9 )ould be on hand at a date early enough be.ore the target drop date in 3ugust 19&(.ccAc8i he bo"b6s enriched uraniu" could be reduced to "etal9 .abricated into its sub-critical slugs9 and the bo"b asse"bled in ti"e .or use )hen needed. 3nd9 o. course9 he )ould still need enough ti"e to transport the )eapon to the base o. operations9 .ro" )here it )ould be .lo)n to its target .or its deadly deli8ery. Once he had "ade the calculations o. ho) "uch enriched uraniu" per day )ould be re;uired to accrue 1( kilogra"s by9 say9 1 0ay9 19&(9 t)o "onths be.ore the drop date ob?ecti8e9 any surplus o. the precious product could be in8ested in the .a8ored plutoniu"-breeding reactors at Han.ord. I. e8erything )ent right9 in 3ugust >ro8es could si"ply add the lone uraniu" bo"b to his reser8e o. t)o or three plutoniu" bo"bs9 )hich9 once the "ore proli.ic plutoniu" started being produced

using the enriched uraniu"9 )ould gro) by one bo"b e8ery t)o to three )eeksccAc8ii (co"pared to one uraniu" bo"b e8ery .i8e "onthsccAc8iii). He si"ply had to choose no) to .uel the reactors )ith the surplus enriched uraniu". 3ctually9 both options "erged )ell together. he rate o. enriched uraniu" production as o. the beginning o. 19&( )as setting a pace to be ?ust at %2 kilogra"s around the beginning o. 0ay - %% kilogra"s )as actually achie8ed - according to the #eta OAide rans.er +eport that docu"ented bo"b-grade enriched uraniu" production.ccAciA I. the plutoniu" bo"b )as granted hal. o. the enriched uraniu" produced .or the uraniu" bo"b9 by early 0ay9 1( kilogra"s (%% pounds) could still be set aside .or the uraniu" bo"b the a"ount needed .or critical "ass. 5nough surplus enriched uraniu" )ould still be a8ailable .or the plutoniu" pro?ect to recei8e 1( kilogra"s .or .eeding the Han.ord reactors9 pro8iding a si7able boost to the "ore pro"ising e..ort. /upporting the suggestion that this path )as chosen is a pair o. re.erences by author +ichard +hodes in his book he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b that9 co"bined )ith t)o conte"poraneous docu"ents9 re8eals ho) the enriched uraniu" appears to ha8e been used. 4irst9 based on assu"ptions recorded by @a"es #ryant Conant at the beginning o. 19&(9 +hodes calculated that i. enrich"ent output )as one kilogra" per day9 one bo"b )ould be produced e8ery siA )eeks. (3ctually9 .ro" the beginning o. 19&( through all but the last three )eeks o. its applicable )arti"e production9 Oak +idge a8eraged only one-third kilogra"s a day). 4ro" Conant6s in.or"ation +hodes calculated that the uraniu" bo"b )ould e8entually need Eabout &$ kilogra"s - 9$., pounds9E )hich he then states )as approAi"ately $.8 critical "asses.ccc In other )ords9 taking &$ kilogra"s and di8iding it by the nu"ber o. critical "asses contained therein9 $.89 critical "ass can be calculated to be about 1( kilogra"s. 3t that ti"e9 nobody kne) that three ti"es that a"ount )ould actually be re;uired .or the uraniu" bo"b9 probably due to reduced e..iciency due to conta"ination. +obert /erber9 author o. the ;uintessential teAtbook on Cos 3la"os9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 )hich )as the basis o. all Cos 3la"os6 scientists6 orientation at the ti"e9 )rites the a"ount actually used in the bo"b )as so"e)hat higher at approAi"ately (2 kilogra"s.ccci /erber also 8alidates the 1(-kilogra" critical "ass .igure in a .ootnote.cccii +hodes stated later in his book that enough "aterial )as processed to achie8e critical "ass in 3pril 19&(.ccciii One can there.ore conclude that critical "ass )as 1( kilogra"s (%% pounds)9 and that the a"ount .or critical "ass .irst beca"e a8ailable in "id-3pril. #ut Oak +idge by this ti"e had enriched roughly %2 kilogra"s o. uraniu" to bo"b ;uality according to the #eta OAide rans.er +eport - t)ice the a"ount +hodes records )as a8ailable at the ti"e .or the uraniu" bo"b. In other )ords9 hal. o. the enriched "aterial )as gone and9 out)ardly at least9 unaccounted .or. he second clue that suggests >ro8es )as di8iding the enriched uraniu" bet)een the uraniu" bo"b and plutoniu" bo"b pro?ects is .ound in a docu"ent )ritten at Cos 3la"os. 5ric @ette9 the chie. "etallurgist at the <e) 0eAico laboratory9 )rote in a "e"o dated $8 *ece"ber9 19&&9 that E3t the present rate )e )ill ha8e 12 kilos about 4ebruary - and 1( kilos about 1 0ay.Eccci8 @ette6s 1( kilogra"s esti"ate by 1 0ay .alls al"ost per.ectly in line )ith )hen the uraniu" bo"b progra" actually achie8ed that "ilestone in "id-3pril. 3nd the ratio o. enriched uraniu" 8ersus uraniu" "etal to be produced as predicted by @ette9 by the sa"e 1 0ay9 19&( deadline is constant. In other )ords9 all docu"entation and predictions that the author has .ound agree on this pointB only hal. o. the enriched uraniu" processed )as accounted .or and considered in the report that said enough "aterial .or critical "ass had been produced. 3 third e8idence o. enriched uraniu" shared bet)een )eapons progra"s lies in a "e"orandu" )ritten by @. +obert Oppenhei"er to Cyril /"ith9 @oseph :. Hennedy9 /a"uel H. 3llison and +obert 4. #acher. he docu"ent ties these "en to enriched uraniu" usage despite their noted in8ol8e"ent )ith the plutoniu" bo"b9 not the uraniu" bo"b. he "e"o9 dated $8 @uly9 19&(9 .our days too late to be discussing product used in the actual bo"bs dropped on @apan9 is nonetheless interesting to this re8ie) as "uch .or the .our "en to )ho" it is addressed as .or the a"ounts o. enriched uraniu" being shipped. ( he ;uantity o. product shipped beco"es cogent in.or"ation at a later point in this narrati8e.) :ith the eAception o. "etallurgist /"ith9 )ho helped .abricate both the uraniu" and the plutoniu" bo"bs9 each "an in his o)n right )as a dri8ing .orce in the .ield o. plutoniu" bo"b de8elop"ent9 ha8ing little to do )ith the uraniu" bo"b. Hennedy )as a co-disco8erer o. plutoniu" and continued9 )ith 5"ilio /egre9 to research the radioacti8ity o. the ne).ound ele"ent. 3llison )orked closely )ith 5nrico 4er"i on the .irst chain reacting pile in Chicago that "ade plutoniu" production a possibility and continued the bulk o. his research in the .ield o. breeder reactors as it related to "aking a plutoniu" bo"b. 3nd #acher )as dedicated to heading the group that studied the de"anding re;uire"ents o. detonating a plutoniu" bo"b -- )hich )as "uch "ore di..icult than detonating a uraniu" bo"b -- and )as e8entually credited )ith success.ully leading the e..ort to de8elop the Ei"plosionE "ethod that )as used9 despite signi.icant obstacles. In the "e"orandu"9 Oppenhei"er is reporting to these "en the deli8ery schedule .ro" Oak +idge o. uraniu" enriched to a le8el o. 8,.( percent - #eta calutrons product.ccc8 :hile there "ay be a re"ote possibility these "en )ere )orking together on so"e aspect o. the uraniu" bo"b pro?ect9 such an instance

is highly i"probable gi8en the contributions to the plutoniu" progra" they are kno)n .or9 their backgrounds9 and certain aspects o. the co""uni;uL. here see"s to be no reason .or Oppenhei"er to ha8e reported enriched deli8ery schedules to these "en unless enriched uraniu" )as an i"portant co"ponent o. the plutoniu" bo"b pro?ect. he "e"o appears to be a 8ery direct 8alidation o. production ;uantities o. highly enriched uraniu" being used in the plutoniu" bo"b pro?ect. 0etallurgical .abrication o. uraniu" .or both the uraniu" bo"b itsel. and the uraniu" .uel slugs .or the reactors )as per.or"ed at Cos 3la"os. >i8en /"ith6s inclusion )ith the others in the "e"orandu"9 .or e8en /"ith6s in8ol8e"ent )as .ocused "ore on plutoniu" de8elop"ent than a uraniu" bo"bccc8i it appears the enriched "aterial re.erred to is .or use in the uraniu" slugs .or the Han.ord reactors. +eactor .uel is not co"posed o. bo"b-grade enriched uraniu" but nor"ally is enriched to only bet)een t)o and .i8e percent= and it is unkno)n to )hat enrich"ent the )ar-ti"e Han.ord reactors "ay ha8e been operated. <either the 3lpha nor the #eta calutrons )ere so sophisticated at the ti"e as to be able to control )ith any certainty their capacity to enrich uraniu" to a preset le8el= and considering the circu"stances9 it )ould ha8e been risky and ine..icient to produce anything but the highest enrich"ent possible. Instead9 the "anagers o. the calutrons "ust ha8e .ound it "ost producti8e to "ake the highest-enriched product possible9 then calculate the content o. enriched 8ersus ra) uraniu" re;uired in the uraniu" .uel to achie8e the desired concentration9 and "iAed the t)o uraniu" stocks to suit. /uch a controlled process9 presu"ably9 )ould ha8e produced opti"u" results .or plutoniu" output. /o in late 19&&9 >eneral >ro8es appears to ha8e split the enriched uraniu" stocks bet)een the )eapons progra"s. Progress appeared to be going )ell .or #rigadier >eneral Ceslie +. >ro8es and the 0anhattan Pro?ect. hen the .irst shoe droppedB 3s has been noted9 so"eti"e during the "iddle o. 3pril - +hodes places the ti"e bet)een President +oose8elt6s death on the t)el.th and his .uneral on the .i.teenthccc8ii - Otto 4risch reported to +obert Oppenhei"er the staggering .act that one critical "ass9 the a"ount ?ust beco"ing a8ailable as the bo"bing target date )as .ast approaching9 )ould not be enough to .uel a 8iable uraniu" )eapon. <o reason is gi8en .or the critical calculation correction but the culprit appears to be conta"inants in the enriched "aterial. 3t its best the uraniu" )as enriched to 92 percent9 lea8ing ten percent either !$%8 or other9 "ostly non-.issile9 ele"ents9 any o. )hich )ould obstruct the e..iciency o. the chain reaction. o o8erpo)er the neutrali7ing e..ects o. these conta"inants and produce an eAplosion that ?usti.ied the eApense and reliance that had been placed in its potential9 the bo"b re;uired signi.icantly "ore than the 1( kilogra"s that )as the "ini"u" a"ount o. pure !$%( initially thought to be re;uired to create an eAplosion. 3s has been noted9 the ;uantity ulti"ately used9 according to +obert /erber9 and indirectly but roughly supported by +hodes6 o)n calculations9 )as (2 kilogra"s - o8er three ti"es critical "ass. +hodes lightly dis"isses the short.all9 ho)e8er9 suggesting that it E)as no) only a "atter o. ti"eE be.ore the de.icit )ould be o8erco"e. :hile the state"ent is ob8iously true9 so it is true that ti"e )as a crucial "atter - "ore so than +hodes see"s to ha8e co"prehended. Or else the Pulit7er Pri7e-)inning author9 despite his laudable achie8e"ent asse"bling the "ost co"prehensi8e re.erence )ork e8er co"piled about the 0anhattan Pro?ect9 and .or )hich he ?ustly earned the Pulit7er and "any other a)ards9 .ell short in one s"all but i"portant "easure. :hile his historical re.erences are eAtensi8ely docu"ented9 .ootnoted and cross-re.erenced9 he either .ails to apply a si"ilar standard .or reconciling "athe"atical ano"alies in his book= or he9 like "any other authors on the sub?ect9 chooses not to ;uestion unresol8ed discrepancies. Possibly he assu"es any eAplanations .or disparities are buried beyond the 8alue o. their pursuit9 and the .act that history suggests they )ere resol8ed is eAplanation enough. Or9 also understandably9 he "ay ha8e chosen not to pursue the incongruity as being outside the scope o. his already "assi8e )ork. :hate8er the reason9 the nu"bers9 as has been de"onstrated9 do not add up. Oak +idge9 splitting its enriched uraniu" allot"ents bet)een the uraniu" bo"b and the Han.ord reactors9 had taken al"ost a year to pro8ide the 1( kilogra"s a8ailable .or the uraniu" bo"b by 0ay 19&(. In an e..ort to produce the balance o. the (2 kilogra"s needed9 e8en at its top production capacity in that spring o. 19&(9 the uraniu" bo"b progra" could only ha8e produced se8en or eight kilogra"s "ore bet)een 1 0ay and $& @uly. he t)enty-.ourth o. @uly is the date >eneral >ro8es9 hi"sel.9 ga8e as the last deli8ery date o. enriched uraniu" to Cos 3la"os9 ccc8iii and this is corroborated else)here.ccciA /e8en or eight kilogra"s added to the 1( kilogra"s already stockpiled )as still .ar short o. the (2 kilogra"s actually re;uired .or the bo"b. 58en in a "ost drastic action9 i. contributions to the plutoniu" reactors had been discontinued and all enriched uraniu" produced had been co""itted to the uraniu" bo"b e..ort9 a strategy not likely to ha8e been pursued gi8en plutoniu"6s superiority o8er uraniu"9 especially considering the ne) tripling o. the uraniu" bo"b6s "aterial needs9 the "aAi"u" possible enriched uraniu" a8ailable )as ?ust o8er .i8e kilogra"s per "onth. 3ccu"ulated o8er the neAt three "onths o. 0ay9 @une and @uly9 the total o. another 1( kilogra"s added to the original 1( kilogra"s )ould ha8e "ade the "aterial a8ailable .or the bo"b %2 kilogra"s. he (2-kilogra" uraniu" bo"b )ould still ha8e been short its enriched uraniu" needs by .i.ty percent. 3 serious stu"bling block had been dropped in the path o. the uraniu" bo"b.

he second shoe dropped ?ust a .e) days later. On 18 3pril9 <orris #radbury9 the "an assigned the responsibility o. o8erseeing asse"bly and .inal testing o. the .inal plutoniu" bo"bcccA and )ho )ent on to beco"e the post-)ar director o. the Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory9 reported in a "e"o the progra" )as eAperiencing serious proble"s )ith detonators. He then concludedB (a) a "uch s"aller nu"ber o. tests than %22 (the scheduled nu"ber) )ill ha8e been carried out= (b) there is "ore than a bare possibility that the detonators )ill be unsatis.actory. Particularly in the latter e8ent it "ay be necessary to postpone .inal +aytheon tests until the detonator di..iculty is unscra"bled.cccAi he detonator proble"9 the E+aytheon testsE and the ti"ing o. the "e"o itsel. all are cogent .actors in a central pre"ise o. this book= that co"ponents .ro" captured !-boat !-$%& )ere e"ployed to success.ully co"plete both o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s ato"ic bo"bs. he detonator proble" had been a long-standing issue but those in charge thought it )ould ha8e been o8erco"e long be.ore the spring o. 19&(. #y no) the .aulty detonators as )ell as the delay o. the +aytheon tests9 co"bined )ith the shortage o. enriched uraniu"9 actually represented less the .inal shoe .alling upon the progra" than one standing on the throat o. the entire 0anhattan Pro?ect. est detonations al"ost ne8er )ent right. >etting all %$ .iring points to discharge at the sa"e instant using clu"sy electro-"echanical circuits o. cables9 )ires and connectors pro8ed to be al"ost i"possible. I. the ti"ing )as o.. by a "ere .raction o. a "illisecond at any one o. the %$ .iring locations9 the "ass o. plutoniu" at the center )ould be shot out o. the undetonated hole9 like a bullet out o. a gun. he plutoniu" core )ould ha8e been thrust out by the shock )a8e o. all the other detonator eAplosions that .ired on cue. Poor detonator ti"ing could be caused by s"all inconsistencies in the ;uality o. the cabling "etal or a "iscalculation o. cable length o. ?ust .ractions o. an inch. 3ccording to none other than Cuis 3l8are79 e8en Ethe best detonators then a8ailableE )ere only achie8ing detonation )a8es spaced 12 to $2 .eet apart9 Erather than the re;uired .raction o. a "illi"eter.EcccAii he situation9 so late in the ga"e9 openly )as considered a crisis e;ual to the shortage o. enriched uraniu" .or the uraniu" bo"b.cccAiii /yste" ;uality )as so poor that less than a )eek be.ore #radbury )rote his "e"o9 a trial bo"b proAi"ity .use had eAploded barely .ollo)ing Ebo"bs a)ayE .ro" the plane.cccAi8 :hether the EproAi"ity .useE described re.ers to the sa"e detonators that )ere causing the proble"s is unkno)n9 but detonations )ere not si"ultaneous at best9 and they )ere unpredictable at )orst. In either case9 Oppenhei"er9 back in October9 had aggressi8ely pursued a resolution to the proble" and had assigned a three-"an co""ittee to Econsult on the procure"ent o. detonators to insure that the designs are satis.actory....EcccA8 he .irst "an listed on the co""ittee )as Oppenhei"er6s old #erkeley buddy9 physicist Cuis 3l8are79 )ho had trans.erred to the 0anhattan Pro?ect .ro" )orking on the de8elop"ent o. radar and other high .re;uency )a8e applications. )o other key high-ranking "e"bers o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect sta..9 Henneth #. #ainbridge and a Cieutenant Colonel Cockridge acco"panied 3l8are7 on the tea". 3l8are7 )ould later be credited .or de8eloping a net)ork o. thread-like .uses that9 )hen ignited si"ultaneously at the %$ detonator points9 )ould instantly and e8enly detonate the high eAplosi8es9 each co8ering their assigned ;uadrant o. the sphere in near-per.ect unison.cccA8i #ut .or no)9 siA "onths had passed since the creation o. the detonator tea" - and only three re"ained be.ore the rinity test - and ob8iously the detonators )ere still a serious obstacle to success. 3l8are7 and his tea" had thus .ar .ailed. 3nd this9 co"pared to the E+aytheonE dile""a9 appeared to be only a secondary proble"9 although the t)o look to ha8e been inseparably interconnected. 3ccording to >eneral >ro8es9 the "ain delay o. the plutoniu" bo"b )as Ethe co"pany "anu.acturing certain essential parts .or a non-ato"ic asse"bly in the 4at 0an (the code-na"e .or the plutoniu" bo"b) had been unable to "eet deli8ery schedules.EcccA8ii >ro8es continues9 eAplaining that the delayed part hindered testing o. the bo"b Euntil a critically late date.E he unidenti.ied co"ponent o8er )hich he la"ents )as the control unit .or discharging the si"ultaneous .iring signal .or the detonators9 kno)n as Ethe Q-unit.E +aytheon9 the unna"ed "anu.acturer "entioned by >ro8es but re.erenced by na"e in #radbury6s "e"orandu" abo8e9 )as the "aker o. the Q-unit. he de8ice9 )hich cost the e;ui8alent o. a Cadillac9cccA8iii )as a sophisticated conglo"eration o. cables9 s)itches9 trans.or"ers9 )ires9 condensers9 capacitors and relays.cccAiA he co"pleAity o. the instru"ent "ade it an engineer6s night"are. It appears that Q-unit "anu.acturing )as delayed .urther and "ade e8en "ore co"plicated because9 as the brains o. the detonation syste"9 it re;uired that the type o. detonators to be used be integrated into the Q-unit6s design speci.ications9 as see"s is suggested in #radbury6s "e"o. /urely in as precise a piece o. instru"entation as the Q-unit9 detonator selection "ust ha8e been an i"portant consideration. #ut as late as three )eeks be.ore the rinity test9 the detonator to be used still had not been selected9 and "odi.ications ?ust prior to the rinity test9 as a result9 )ere eApected to be "ade on-site to the hardly-tested Q-unit.cccAA :hate8er the case9 the scientists struggled )ith the detonator and Q-unit proble" throughout the .all9

)inter and spring and still had not resol8ed it as the .ate.ul su""er o. 19&( )as unrolling. 3 ra.t o. reports9 "e"oranda and schedules9 )ith addressees including not only 3l8are7 but those )ho recei8ed the enriched uraniu" schedule re8ie)ed earlier9 #acher9 3llison and /egre9 .le) .ro" o..ice to o..ice as e..orts )ere "ade to resol8e the detonation proble"s. he co""uni;uLs sho) that as late as 9 3pril9 19&(9 the .irst in-.light tests .or the Q-unit )ere .inally scheduledcccAAi to e8aluate Q-unit operation on an actual bo"bing run. he tests pro8ed9 ho)e8er9 that the detonators )ere still unsa.e in early 0ay9cccAAii )ith only t)o-and-a-hal. "onths le.t until the rinity test. One-and-a-hal. "onths later9 on $2 @une9 )ith less than a "onth until rinity and counting do)n9 Q-units )ere .inally scheduled to be deli8ered to Cos 3la"os .or the rinity test9 but e8en these )ere not prepared .or their .inal use. 3pparently detonators "ysteriously had been obtained that could do the ?ob9 but .or so"e uneAplained reason "odi.ications )ere still planned .or the Q-unit9 e8en a.ter deli8ery.cccAAiii In a "e"orandu" )ritten by >eorge Histiako)sky dated , @une9 19&(9 instructions )ere gi8en that one Q-unit )as to be E"odi.ied9 inspected9 and "ade shippable to rinity by 1 @uly. )o "ore units .or rinity should be on the /ite (sic) by 1 @uly9 and should be "odi.ied9 and "ade shippable to rinity by - @uly.E :hat )as done to ac;uire the ne) detonators is unkno)n9 as are the "odi.ications "ade at the last "inute to the Q-units. #ut the ti"ing o. these i"portant changes and the acti8ities o. Cuis 3l8are7 during this sa"e period "ay be 8ery telling in regard to ho) the i"plosion-ti"ing proble" )as resol8ed. 3pparently9 Cuis 3l8are7 is the sa"e 0r. 3l8are7 as the .alse ECo""ander 3l8are7E )ho recei8ed *r. Hein7 /chlicke6s proAi"ity .uses .ro" !-$%&. 3nd it appears that the sa"e enriched uraniu" so desperately needed to co"plete the uraniu" bo"b )as recei8ed .ro" the gold encased stocks o. uraniu" labeled E!$%(E that 0a?or 1ance had taken .ro" !-$%&. he .acts appear to de"onstrate that )ithout the bo"b "aterials surrendered )ith !-$%&9 the !nited /tates6 ato"ic bo"b e..ort to )in the )ar by "id-3ugust )ould ha8e .ailed. he ;uestion is= ho) did those po)er.ul nuclear co"ponents .all into 3"erican handsJ <otesB ccAci +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,1$ ccAcii Ceona Cibby9 he !raniu" People9 p. $&&= +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,91= Harlo) +uss9 Pro?ect 3lberta9 p. (( ccAciii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. &92 ccAci8 Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >enius9 p. %(2 ccAc8+ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,1& ccAc8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 ccAc8ii Ceslie +. >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. %29 ccAc8iii Harlo) +uss9 Pro?ect 3lberta9 p. ,, ccAciA !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 /outheast +egion9 5ast Point9 >eorgia9 #eta OAide rans.er +eport ccc +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,21 ccci +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. A8 cccii +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. %% ccciii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,1$ ccci8 5ric @ette9 "e"o9 Production rate o. $(9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219--2-$& ccc8 @. +obert Oppenhei"er9 "e"o9 /chedule .or *eli8ery o. Q 0aterial9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219--2-$& ccc8i +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,(ccc8ii +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,1& ccc8iii Ceslie +. >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. 1$& ccciA +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking O. he 3to"ic #o"b9 p. ,91 cccA >eorge #. Histiako)sky9 "e"o9 Organi7ation o. the Q *i8ision Participation at rinity9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 38&-219-((-9 cccAi <orris 5. #radbury9 "e"orandu" to <or"an +a"sey9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219-8$-1, cccAii Cuis 3l8are79 3l8are79 p. 1%% cccAiii +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. A8 cccAi8 0aA 0organ :itts9 >ordon ho"as9 5nola >ay9 p. 11% cccA8 Henneth . #ainbridge9 "e"orandu"9 0inutes o. a 0eeting on the 5lectric *etonator Progra"9 p. $9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219-1&-11 cccA8i +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"er9 p. A8ii cccA8ii Ceslie +. >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e old9 p. %&1

cccA8iii 0aA 0organ :itts9 >ordon ho"as9 5nola >ay9 p. 12% cccAiA C. 4ussell "e"orandu"B *etonator Circuits 1isit to +aytheon Co.9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219-&1-11 cccAA 4. Oppenhei"er "e"orandu" to <.5. #radbury9 @une $19 19&(9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219-((-9= also 4. Oppenhei"er "e"orandu" to H. >reissen9 *.5. Horning9 5.@. Co.gren9 @une $,9 19&(9 3- 8&-219-((-9 cccAAi <or"an 4. +a"sey9 "e"orandu"9 9 3pril 19&(9 #oosters .or -$,9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219-,--cccAAii :illia" /. Parsons9 "inutes o. 1 0ay 19&( 0eeting On *etonators9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219-8$-1, cccAAiii >eorge #. Histiako)sky9 "e"orandu" , @une 19&(9 Q !nits .or rinity9 Cos 3la"os <ational Caboratory 3rchi8es9 3-8&-219-((-9

Part Three " Martin Bormann Cha$ter Nine " Maiden 0oyage EI think it )as about 1& 3pril )hen I ga8e the captain a signal )hich readB 6!-$%&. Only sail on the orders o. the highest le8el. 4uehrer HP6E FcccAAi8 :ol.gang Hirsch.eld Chie. +adio Operator o. !-$%& EI directed the radar bea" directly on the attacker. 3t %9%22 yards the aircra.t ineAplicably pulled o.. its headlong course and turned a)ay.... 3.ter thirty "inutes there )as another approach .ro" the )est9 but...it disengaged at %9%22 yards.... he ga"e )ent on all night= three ti"es it )as repeated E FcccAA8 :ol.gang Hirsch.eld Chie. +adio Operator o. !-$%&9 *escribing a curious e8ent )hen !-$%& and three other !-boats )ere located at sea by ene"y aircra.t but ineAplicably )ere not attacked. Caden )ith $&2 tons o. )ar "aterials9 including9 according to the e8idence9 enriched uraniu" and in.ra-red proAi"ity .uses9 !-$%& )as prepared .or her "aiden - and )hat )ould pro8e to be her only - "ission. /he had recently been e;uipped )ith a 6snorkel96 >er"any6s ne)est sub"arine de8ice that under nor"al sailing conditions allo)ed its user to stealthily sail the /e8en /eas )ithout the necessity o. ascending .or air. he $& "ine-laying tubes on the boat had been re"odeled as storage co"part"ents. he outer keel plates had been re"o8ed and the keel duct )as loaded )ith a cargo o. "ercury and optical glass be.ore the plates )ere re)elded into place. )o hundred .orty tons o. cargo destined .or @apan )as esti"ated by !-$%&6s o..icers to ha8e been loaded onto the boat= and no) it stood at the dock in Hiel )aiting to "ake its desperate dash to sa.ety. he chie. o..icers o. the boat9 like the boat itsel.9 appear to ha8e been hand picked .or the assign"ent. Indeed9 it is hard to i"agine a co""anding o..icer )ho )ould ha8e been a )iser selection .or his "ission than Captain Cieutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler. 4ehler9 like so "any !-boat skippers9 had begun his career .resh out o. na8al school on sur.ace ships. He and his e8entual .irst o..icer9 +ichard #ulla9 brought a breadth o. eAperience to !-$%& that had been gained on one o. the "ost .a"ous )ar 8essels - or in.a"ous9 depending on one6s point o. 8ie) -in "odern ti"es= that o. the >er"an raider 3tlantis. FcccAA8i In the early days o. the )ar9 the 3tlantis FcccAA8ii had roa"ed the Paci.ic9 Indian and 3tlantic Oceans disguised as a ship neutral or .riendly to 3llied countries. !pon locating and approaching a 8essel .ro" one o. these countries9 3tlantis )ould unloose its siA 1(2"" ca"ou.laged guns and attack )ith torpedoes and its t)o deck attack planes9 one o. )hich )as piloted by #ulla. FcccAA8iii he ploy )as usually so bold and uneApected that the "atter )as o8er in "o"ents and 4ehler9 )ho )as the "unitions o..icer onboard the ship and )ho had there.ore earned the nickna"e 6*yna"ite96 )ould then apply charges that )ould scuttle the captured 8essel. #y such "eans 3tlantis sunk or captured $$ 3llied ships. 3tlantis6 "odus operandi took daring and cunning9 a kno)ledge o. ho) to eAecute deception on the open seas9 and an understanding o. the .ine balance bet)een audacity and idiocy that di..erentiates the success.ul stratage" that creates a hero .ro" the clu"sy ruse9 )hose outco"e is ruin. he 3llies e8entually caught on to 3tlantis6 tactics9 ho)e8er9 and9 its i"pact neutrali7ed9 the ship )as .orced to .orego its acti8ely belligerent role to be relegated to relie8ing other .ront boats )ith supplies and )eapons. 58en a.ter 3tlantis )as con8erted .ro" rogue )arrior to sur.ace supply ship9 4ehler ;uietly carried )ithin hi" all o. those lessons hard-learned in battle9 to be used later )hile co""anding !-$%&. 3tlantis6 .inal .oray has beco"e legend. :hile tied to !-1$, in the /outh 3tlantic in a resupply "aneu8er on $$ <o8e"ber9 19&19 H0/ *e8onshire9 a #ritish cruiser9 happened upon the boats. *ead still in the open )ater and intert)ined in .uel lines9 the t)o ships6 cre)s suddenly had to race to clear the u"bilicals to ha8e a chance at sur8i8al. Once .ree9 !-1$, do8e to sa.ety. :ith *e8onshire bearing do)n on her9 3tlantis )as a sitting duck. o a8oid capture o. the ship according to standing orders9 "unitions o..icer 4ehler9 as he had done )ith so "any ene"y 8essels be.ore9 scuttled his o)n ship9 adding 3tlantis FcccAAiA to the list o. 8essels he had sent to the botto" o. the sea. he 122 cre) and o..icers )ho )ent into the li.e ra.ts )ere later .ound on the open sea by !-$1,9 but there )as no roo" in the !-boat .or eAtra hands. >ross 3d"iral Harl *oenit7 thought so highly o. 3tlantis and her cre)9 ho)e8er9 that he ordered t)o additional !-boats to aid the casta)ays and bring the" ho"e ali8e. he ra.ts )ere tied to these !-boats and the !-boats9 tra8eling on the sur.ace and "o8ing eAcruciatingly slo)ly9 sailed .or 4rance. he plan9 should it be re;uired by ene"y attack9 )as to release the ra.ts upon approach o. a hostile cra.t and allo) the" to .loat a)ay9 their occupants to be killed or captured9 as the

escorting !-boats do8e .or sa.ety. 4ortunately .or 4ehler and his 99 "ates9 the plan )as ne8er re;uired to be carried out. he three !-boats9 the sur8i8ors o. 3tlantis in to)9 success.ully tra8ersed thousands o. "iles o. open ocean to ulti"ately reach 4rance. he reco8ery o. the 3tlantis sur8i8ors no) stands in the annals o. na8al history as one o. the greatest "ariti"e rescues o. any "ilitary ser8ice. hree and a hal. years a.ter the return o. the 3tlantis sur8i8ors to >er"any9 at % p.". on the a.ternoon o. $( 0arch9 19&(9 .i.ty-.i8e days be.ore its dubious surrender and entrance into Ports"outh <a8al Dard9 FcccAAA !-$%& )ith Captain @ohann Heinrich 4ehler in co""and9 its de8astating cargo and "any o. its passengers sealed a)ay in its bo)els9 slipped a)ay .ro" its base in Hiel9 >er"any. FcccAAAi Once the tending tugboat had dra)n !-$%& a)ay .ro" the dock9 Captain 4ehler took o8er control o. the !-boat and raced E)ith great speedE do)n the Hiel 4?ord. o reduce the chance o. being caught and bo"bed by ene"y anti-sub"arine aircra.t )hile 8ulnerable in the narro)9 shallo) )ater)ay9 !-$%& sailed sur.aced and at near"aAi"u" 8elocity do)n the narro) channel. Heading to)ard the entrance o. the harbor9 the sub"arine passed the to)ns o. Caboe and 4riedrichsort and then raced out into the open #altic /ea9 )here a t)o-!boat escort ?oined it. In Hiel9 the loading o. the boat had been co"pleted and her "assi8e hull sealed up .or the ?ourney. he cre) o. ,% FcccAAAii (a 8ery large cre) .or a !-boat - e8en o. this si7e) )as ?oined by eight passengers9 including the t)o @apanese o..icers9 >en7o /ho?i and Hideo o"onaga9 and enig"atic engineer9 *r. Hein7 /chlicke. *r. /chlicke )as dressed in a Cu.t)a..e (>er"an 3ir 4orce) colonel6s uni.or" FcccAAAiii by so"e accounts. He )as identi.ied in other docu"ents9 ho)e8er9 both as a na8y o..icer FcccAAAi8 (perhaps EhonoraryE according to !-$%& radio o..icer :ol.gang Hirsch.eld FcccAAA8G)9 and as a ci8ilian specialist in high-.re;uency and radar technology )ho )as being transported to @apan. FcccAAA8i 3lthough !nited /tates <a8y records re.er to hi" una"biguously as a "e"ber o. the >er"an <a8y9 )ith signi.icant re.erences to his in8ol8e"ent there9 such re.erences do not preclude the possibility that he actually )orked .or a di..erent authority. 3ccording to !-$%& head radio"an :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 /chlicke )as aboard as an ad8isor'consultant .or the !-boat6s radar syste". FcccAAA8ii /chlicke is docu"ented as ha8ing shared his substantial intellectual ser8ices )ith Hirsch.eld during the 8oyage. *espite not kno)ing eAactly )ho this "an )as9 .ro" all o. the e8idence a8ailable9 his ser8ices eAtended .ar beyond sub"arine radar technology. 3lso on board )as <a7i big)ig and <a8al 4leet @udge Hay <ieschling9 )ho9 e8en as the +eich )as .alling do)n around hi"9 )as being sent hal.)ay round the )orld on the no) .utile "ission o. trying spies in the in.a"ous case o. the +ichard /orge spy ring. FcccAAA8iii @oining <ieschling9 /chlicke and the @apanese duo )ere .our othersB <a8al Ct. Hillendorn9 ci8ilian airplane engineer #ringe)ald9 <a8al Captain 4alk9 and ci8ilian engineer +u.. +ichard #ulla9 4ehler6s old "ate during their daring 3tlantis raids and rescue9 already had been re"o8ed .ro" the guest list and added to the cre) as 4ehler6s second-in-co""and. :hen the originally-assigned .irst )atch o..icer9 3l.red Hlingenberg9 )as caught personally by 4ehler in .lagrante delictato )ith another cre)"e"ber9 the Captain re"o8ed hi" .ro" duty and assigned #ulla in his place. FcccAAAiA #esides reuniting 4ehler and #ulla9 the assign"ent had another .ortunate outco"eB eli"inating one person in the already o8ercro)ded sub"arine reduced the total nu"ber o. people aboard !-$%&. Ho) 4ehler6s old 3tlantis "ate #ulla ca"e to be on the list o. high priority passengers destined .or @apan can only be speculated upon. #ulla had .lo)n deck planes - short takeo.. aircra.t - o.. o. 3tlantis and had a )ealth o. eAperience earned on the raider during daring assaults on ene"y targets on the high seas9 and there.ore )as a 8alued and kno)ledgeable na8al o..icer and .lyer .or such operations. !-$%& )as .ull o. ?et aircra.t and rockets - and nuclear bo"b "aterials and technical eAperts o. all kinds - destined .or @apan. @apan )as trying to .ind a )ay to deli8er an o..ensi8e )ith teeth in the Paci.ic that could be success.ul turning the tide o. the )ar in its .a8or9 but the distances in8ol8ed in island hopping to attack 3llied bases )ere too great .or round trip .lights .ro" @apan. 3nd 3llied air superiority )as keeping @apan6s less capable planes .ro" ha8ing their )ay against the". 3t the sa"e ti"e9 >er"any )as de8eloping plans .or its 1$ rockets to carry nuclear )arheads FcccAl and to be launched .ro" sur.ace ships. 3nd9 according to >eneral Hessler6s and @udge <ieschling6s later interrogations9 @apan )as "odi.ying 1-1 bo"bs )ith ka"ika7e pilot cockpits built into the"9 FcccAli and )ere ;uite possibly thinking o. doing the sa"e )ith 1-$ rockets. >er"any also had de8ised another plan .or piggy-backing a "odi.ied 0essersch"idt $,$ - the sa"e type o. ?et that !-$%& )as transporting to @apan - as a bo"ber on a long-range Henkel aircra.t .or long-distance deli8ery o. a bo"b. FcccAlii 0ight #ulla6s na8al piloting eAperience be 8aluable in de8ising a plat.or" .or launching >er"an-"ade ato"ic )eapons to)ard 3llied bases in the Paci.ic - part o. )hat "ight ha8e been a last-ditch9 but potentially unstoppable9 e..ort "ade by the @apanese to )in the )arJ 3s !-$%& raced out o. Hiel 4?ord into the #altic9 she turned :est into the open bay leading to the "outh o. 5ckern 4?ord. FcccAliii here she )aited until dark to begin the .irst leg o. her run .or .reedo". /hortly a.ter "idnight9 in the early "orning hours o. $, 0arch9 !-$%& and her t)o-!-boat escort ?oined )ith three s"aller ype QQIII !-boats and turned its course to)ard <or)ay. Her orders )ere to re"ain in the co"pany o. the three s"aller boats until they reached the <or)egian coastal to)n o. Hristiansand. he

s"all .lotilla tra8eled 5ast belo) the island archipelago o. 5astern *en"ark9 then <orth up the narro) neck o. )ater bet)een *en"ark and /)eden. hey passed Copenhagen )hile it )as still dark and entered the )ider body o. )ater bet)een upper *en"ark and /)eden kno)n as he Hattegat. Here the t)o-!-boat escort broke o.. and !-$%& and her three s"aller shado)s crept up the /)edish coast9 !-$%& slo)ed by the 12 statute-"ile-per-hour top speed o. the ype QQIIIs. 3t %B22 p.".9 chie. radio"an Hirsch.eld re;uested per"ission .ro" the bridge to discontinue radar operations "o"entarily in order to change out a "al.unctioning co"ponent. he bridge9 a.ter reconnoitering the surrounding sea and sky .or ene"y aircra.t or )arships9 ga8e the all clear. he radar had been out o. ser8ice barely 12 "inutes )hen sirens screa"ed throughout the boat that ene"y aircra.t )ere approaching. 3)are that the ne)ly installed co"ponent had a reco""ended 1( "inute )ar"-up ti"e9 and not kno)ing )hether the aircra.t had spotted the" yet9 Hirsch.eld turned to *r. /chlicke9 )ho had been obser8ing the radio"an6s "aintenance procedure9 and asked i. it )ould be per"issible to po)er up the radar syste". /chlicke si"ply nodded. #y the ti"e the syste" )as acti8ated9 the aircra.t )ere )ithin (222 "eters9 and by the ti"e Hirsch.eld sent )ord to the bridge9 they had closed to %222 "eters. 4ehler9 )ho had already ordered the anti-aircra.t guns "anned9 no) ga8e the order to .ire at )ill. <obody responded. In the din o. battle preparations they had not been able to hear the Captain6s co""and. 3s the air ar"ada .le) o8erhead $222 "eters to starboard9 4ehler personally )ent to take control o. the anti-aircra.t guns .or the return engage"ent. #ut the airplanes ne8er ca"e about= presu"ably9 according to Hirsch.eld9Hirsch.el9H ha8ing ne8er seen !-$%& and its triple tail ()hich is doubt.ul since the radar o. 3llied aircra.t .lying at 129222 .eet could spot a nor"al si7ed - "uch less triple si7ed - sur.aced !-boat as .ar a)ay as 82 "iles FcccAli8). he ene"y air patrol "ay ha8e been on a dedicated "ission else)here and si"ply )as not interested in the "ini-ar"ada. Or the aircra.t "ay ha8e been ordered only to reconnoiter the !-boats9 an odd but plausible possibility gi8en ensuing e8ents. :hate8er the case9 the !-boats continued their course to)ard <or)ay. @ust be.ore "idnight o. the sa"e day9 the !-boat brigade passed behind a southbound con8oy o. >er"an torpedo boats. /hortly a.ter)ard9 those on the bridge o. !-$%& sa) the con8oy attacked by ene"y aircra.t and the resulting .ire.ight )as apparently ;uite a spectacle. he screen o. !-$%&6s radar glo)ed )ith s)ar"ing ene"y aircra.t attacking the s"all ar"ada o. sur.ace ships. 4ear.ul that the planes )ould turn on the"9 and unable to di8e because o. the shallo)9 thickly "ined )aters9 the cre) o. !-$%& )ould ha8e liked to race a)ay= but obedience to the order to re"ain )ith the s"aller9 slo)er !-boats kept her at their sides. 1ery soon the airplanes did9 indeed9 spot the !-boat con8oy - again )ith curious results. 4lying 8ery lo) to a8oid radar9 but according to Hirsch.eld not succeeding9 a group o. ene"y aircra.t headed directly .or !-$%& and her di"inuti8e detail. Hirsch.eld recorded the e8entB EI directed the radar bea" directly on the attacker. 3t %9%22 yards the aircra.t ineAplicably pulled o.. its headlong course and turned a)ay.... 3.ter thirty "inutes there )as another approach .ro" the )est9 but...it disengaged at %9%22 yards.... he ga"e )ent on all night= three ti"es it )as repeated E FcccAl8 :hat could ha8e caused the apparently )illing and able assault aircra.t to approach the s"all group o. 8ulnerable !-boats but not attackJ !nder nor"al circu"stances any !-boat9 but "ost particularly a group o. !-boats9 could eApect a .ull con.rontation in such circu"stances. In addition9 i. 3llied intelligence kne) about the i"portant passengers and cargo on board !-$%& - and intercepted radio trans"issions suggest they )ere 8ery a)are o. !-$%& and its passengers and so"e o. its cargo9 FcccAl8i but not the uraniu" - no doubt e8ery e..ort )ould ha8e been "ade to sink the boat. :hen 3"erican .orces in the Paci.ic had intercepted a report o. a @apanese general tra8eling by aircra.t9 a s;uadron o. .ighters )as sent to .ind the plane and shoot it do)n. Certainly i. the identity o. !-$%& )as kno)n by those controlling the attacking planes9 the sa"e )ould ha8e been done .or !-$%&9 )hich )as carrying a general and se8eral other highranking >er"an and @apanese o..icers )ho )ere escorting kno)n high technology9 )ar "aking cargo. hat no e..ort )as "ade to sink !-$%& suggests the !-boat )as being "onitored and its passage protected9 .or so"e unkno)n reason9 at a higher le8el )ithin 3llied co""and. Ob8iously9 !-$%&6s progress being tracked by the 3llies )ould probably not ha8e been kno)n by the cre)s o. the attacking aircra.t. #ut those )ho kne) the possibilities o. !-$%&6s cargo certainly )ould ha8e kept a close eye on its )hereabouts and the conditions under )hich it )as tra8eling - and had channels to the proper authorities necessary to di8ert disaster i. so desired. :ithout .urther in.or"ation9 one can only guess )hat those conditions )ere that caused the planes to approach three ti"es and then cancel the golden opportunity to eli"inate .our ene"y 8essels at once. 4ortunately9 .urther in.or"ation is a8ailable and )ill be re8ie)ed later )ithin these chapters. 3t any rate9 !-$%& )as allo)ed to proceed9 and the tiny ar"ada slipped sa.ely into Oslo 4?ord ?ust be.ore sunrise o. $- 0arch9 and anchored at Horten9 <or)ay. 3t Horten9 !-$%& began trials o. its ne)ly installed snorkel de8ice. )o days a.ter arri8al9 during one o. these trials the !-boat )as accidentally ra""ed by another !-boat that )as also undergoing trials. #oth boats )ere slightly da"aged. 3 di8e tank and a .uel oil tank o. !-$%& )ere punctured but the boat )as able

to continue its testing .or .our "ore days9 at the end o. )hich 4ehler steered his charge to Hristiansand in hopes o. "aking repairs. 3 proble" arose )hen it )as reali7ed that placing the boat in dry-dock )hile it )as .ull o. cargo "ay stress the hull to the point o. .urther da"age. 3 resource.ul solution )as .ound. /ince the da"age )as to the a.t o. !-$%&9 the .or)ard di8ing tanks )ere .looded9 .orcing the nose o. the boat to sub"erge and the stern to rise out o. the )ater. he inno8ati8e idea )orked )onder.ully and the necessary )elding )as co"pleted )ithout .urther proble"s. In the "eanti"e9 the last o. the passengers arri8ed in Hristiansand9 FcccAl8ii including9 according to Hirsch.eld9 >eneral Hessler and his retinue9 Colonel 4rit7 8on /andrath= Cieutenant 0ensel9 an airplane torpedo eApert= and an engineer Hlug. Including the t)o @apanese o..icers and other pre8iously boarded guests9 !-$%& no) contained 1$ passengers and a cre) o. ,%9 a total o. -( people - al"ost (2 percent "ore than the a8erage personnel load o. a !-boat. Chie. radio operator :ol.gang Hirsch.eld reported that during the repair ti"e in Hristiansand he personally tra8eled each day to pick up radio "essages intended .or !-$%&. He o..ers no eAplanation as to )hy these "essages could not be recei8ed by !-$%& itsel.9 since the radio did not appear to be da"aged. *uring one o. these 8isits he recei8ed the .ollo)ing trans"issionB E!-$%&. Only sail on the orders o. the highest le8el. 4uehrer HP.E FcccAl8iii :hat occurred be.ore and a.ter recei8ing this cryptic correspondence9 and )hat )ent through Hirsch.eld6s "ind as a result9 he doesn6t say9 but certainly such a co""unication .ro" the 4uehrer6s bunker directly to a speci.ic !-boat is startling. :hen Hirsch.eld returned to !-$%& )ith the note and handed it to 4ehler9 the Captain6s i""ediate response9 understandably9 )as to call .or Hessler. he >eneral perused the pu77ling order and cal"ly predicted that so"eone )as co"ing .ro" #erlin. FcccAliA EProbably the 4at One9E he la"ented9 i""ediately re"arking that9 i. so9 he (Hessler) )ould ha8e to lea8e the boat. Hirsch.eld9 )hether ha8ing heard it .ro" Hessler6s lips or other)ise9 suggested in his )riting that the allusion )as probably to >oering9 at that ti"e Hitler6s heir apparent - though not .or long. Hessler6s co""ent about dise"barking !-$%& i. >oering )as going to be along .or the ride 8alidates the authenticity o. Hirsch.eld6s account o. !-$%&9 since it is a true9 i. little kno)n9 .act that Hessler and >oering disliked one another intensely. Fcccl o put it bluntly9 >oering )as 6out .or6 Hessler and9 in .act9 had de"oted hi" .i8e years pre8iously .ro" a diplo"atic position to co""ander o. an air )ing during the attack on Poland. ra8eling )ith >oering )ould ha8e been a 8ery unsatis.actory condition .or the >eneral9 indeed9 and one can be certain that Hessler did not look .or)ard to a 8oyage hal.)ay round the )orld that )as bound to take "onths9 stuck in tight sub"arine ;uarters )ith E he 4at One.E /till9 Hirsch.eld "akes the unlikely but accurate state"ent regarding en"ity bet)een Hessler and his superior that 8alidates )hat he has )ritten. On that sa"e a.ternoon9 Hirsch.eld and /econd :atch O..icer Harl P.a.. )ere ordered to appear be.ore the 4lotilla Chie.. 3.ter sca8enging a pair o. acceptable uni.or"s to )ear be.ore the 4lotilla Co""ander9 they "ade their appearance. he Co""ander placed a code green - top leadership .re;uency - trans"ission on the table be.ore the" and asked )hat the trans"ission )as and ho) did it get on a high-priority .re;uency. he "essage readB E o head radio chie. Hirsch.eld on !-$%&9 .or your last trip9 "uch luck and healthy return ho"e. Dour #ubbiE E:ho is #ubbiJE asked the 4lotilla Co""ander. Hirsch.eld told the co""ander that #ubbi )as Ethe head radio "an o. 12th 4lotilla in Corient9 #ernhard >eiss"an9E apparently a lie intended to protect the identity o. #ubbi. 4or Hirsch.eld then eAplains in his narrati8e that the !-boat base in Corient9 4rance had been captured by the 3llies by this ti"e9 so it )ould be i"possible to 8eri.y )ho had actually sent the trans"ission and there.ore deter"ine )ho #ubbi )as. /uch an eAplanation )as strange and unnecessary i. >eiss"an9 i. there )as such a person9 truly )as #ubbi. hat >eiss"an )as #ubbi9 there.ore9 see"s as doubt.ul as Hirsch.eld6s suggestion that a captured >eiss"an )ould ha8e kno)n Hirsch.eld )as on his last 8oyage. I. >eiss"an had been captured at Corient9 it also )ould be a sa.e bet that the occupying .orces )ere not allo)ing >er"an radio"en to send and recei8e unscreened and'or personal "essages on high-priority .re;uencies. #ubbi "ay indeed ha8e been a .riend o. Hirsch.eld6s playing a "ischie8ous ?oke. #ut considered in co"bination )ith these other .acts and the day6s pre8ious trans"ission recei8ed9 and .uture radio signals yet to co"e9 it see"s "ore likely the "essage .ro" #ubbi )as so"e sort o. coded co""uni;uRC89 ca"ou.laged to look innocuous. :hat )as the origin o. the cryptic co""uni;uRC8J 3rrange"ents "ay ha8e been "ade .or any highpriority trans"issions bet)een !-$%& and the 4uehrer bunker prior to the !-boat lea8ing Hiel to be sent to a co""unications center at Hristiansand specially e;uipped to recei8e such high-le8el "essages. 3pparently these trans"issions )ere sent to a speciali7ed co""unications center the .re;uencies o. )hich !-$%& )as incapable o. recei8ing9 or to keep the con.idential co""uni;uRC8s .ro" the kno)ledge o. the regular !-boat co""and. Once the initial contact had been "ade9 per plan9 then Hirsch.eld could in.or" the sender in the 4uehrer bunker o. !-$%&6s location and pro8ide contact in.or"ation .or keeping in touch. In response9 the "ysterious "essenger in the 4uehrer bunker could then de.ine a plan .or .urther con.idential

co""unications on "ore open channels - using a code na"e9 #ubbi9 .or identi.ication )ithout re8ealing the sender6s actual identity. he re.erence to a Ehealthy return ho"eE "ay also ha8e been a pre-arranged signal to 6return ho"e6 to >er"any .or so"e secret purpose9 according to a pre8ious directi8e. /hortly therea.ter9 apparently still on the sa"e day9 Hirsch.eld )as called to return to the radio station .or yet another "essage. his one readB E!-$%& is to lea8e under "y co""and only. 3.ter you ha8e "ade your calculations9 lea8e. #d!.E #d! )as the personal co""and designation o. none other than >rand 3d"iral Harl *oenit79 co""ander o. the >er"an na8y. his trans"ission is docu"ented not only by Hirsch.eld9 but in the !nited /tates <ational 3rchi8es by O// records o. intercepted >er"an trans"issions. Fcccli *oenit76s "essage "akes clear that a struggle .or control o. !-$%& )as taking place bet)een the supre"e !-boat co""ander and the 4uehrer6s top brass. In .act9 Hirsch.eld identi.ies this struggle directly9 co""enting that *oenit7 Edoesn6t let hi"sel. be sub"itted to the top leaders6 orders.E 3pparently9 *oenit7 by this ti"e had beco"e a)are o. the plan to use !-$%& as an escape 8ehicle .or 8ery high-ranking Party o..icials at the 4uehrer6s head;uarters. Possibly the co""unications center co""ander had seen through the inconsistencies in Hirsch.eld6s story about the "ysterious 6#ubbi6 "essage and in.or"ed *oenit7. :hether *oenit76s deter"ination to keep control o. the boat )as an e..ort si"ply to "aintain proper chain o. co""and )hile still helping to i"ple"ent the escape plan9 or )hether his e..orts to control the !-boat )ere to obstruct the plan9 is unkno)n. he latter is doubt.ul gi8en later history. !lti"ately9 history records that 0artin #or"ann9 .ro" the besieged bunker in #erlin9 spent considerable attention on negotiations )ith *oenit7 in order to e..ect his escape .ro" the strangling city. 3nd it records that >rand 3d"iral Harl *oenit79 )ithout political eAperience or9 indeed9 any political .ollo)ing9 e8entually9 and 8ery uneApectedly9 replaced Her"ann >oering - )ho" #or"ann had succeeded in bringing do)n as Hitler6s successor - and *oenit7 succeeded Hitler as Chancellor o. the hird +eich. <otesB cccAAi8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2%= also see :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(cccAA8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2$ cccAA8i +eport On Interrogation O. he Cre) O. !-$%& :hich /urrendered o he !// /utton On 1& 0ay9 19&( in Position &-(-2-6< - &$(-$(6:9 !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C.9 *eclassi.ied 3uthority <<*8-%2$$9 date 1$'%1'91 cccAA8ii +obert H. :ilcoA9 @apan6s /ecret :ar9 pp. 1&1-1&% cccAA8iii /harkhunters H # 12(9 p. $1 cccAAiA /harkhunters H # 12,9 p. 9 cccAAA +eport On Interrogation O. he Cre) O. !-$%& :hich /urrendered o he !// /utton On 1& 0ay9 19&( in Position &-(-2-6< - &$(-$(6:9 !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C.9 *eclassi.ied 3uthority <<*8-%2$$9 date 1$'%1'91 cccAAAi :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p.%(& cccAAAii Passenger and Cre) Cist O. !-$%&9 !./. 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C.= :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p.%(cccAAAiii Peter Hansen9 /harkhunters H # 12-9 p. 11 cccAAAi8 >eneral !lrich Hessler9 interrogation report I($%,9 $8 0ay9 19&(9 <ational 3rchi8es9 :ashington *.C.= !// /utton EPassenger and Cre) o. !-$%&E receipt9 <ational 3rchi8es9 :ashington *.C.= /harkhunters H # 11$9 p. %1 cccAAA8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $22 cccAAA8i Peter Hansen9 /harkhunters H # 12-9 p. 11 cccAAA8ii :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p.%(( cccAAA8iii /harkhunters H # 12%9 p. 8 cccAAAiA Peter Hansen9 /harkhunters H # 12-9 p. 11 cccAl *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 18(= >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $1$9 $1%= *on 3ngel 3lca7ar de 1elasco9 /harkhunters H # 1119 p. 1(= cccAli !./. 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C.9 +eport o. Interrogation o. Ct. >en. !lrich Hessler9 $1 0ay9 19&(9 +> 1,( #oA &9( and +eport o. Interrogation o. Hay <ieschling9 $& 0ay9 19&(9 cccAlii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $%,= see also !./. 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C.9 +eport o. Interrogation I (%99 o. Ct. >en. !lrich Hessler9 $( @une9 19&(9 +> 1,( #oA &9( cccAliii :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(& cccAli8 /harkhunters H # 11$9 p. , cccAl8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2$ cccAl8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 signal intelligence su""ary titled

3dditional to our J1JJJ'&( /ecret. 3dditionally shipped aboard (!-$%&)9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-221 <3+3 date 9'1('9cccAl8ii :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(cccAl8iii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2%= see also :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(cccAliA :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %( cccl +eport On Interrogation I1(&29 o. P': H5//C5+9 !lrich9 >en. der 4lieger9 !./. 3rchi8es9 :ashington9 *.C. cccli op /ecret !C +3 intercept9 1$ 3pril 19&( and 1% 3pril 19&(9 <ational 3rchi8es9 :ashington *.C.9 declassi.ied <<*9(-221

Cha$ter Ten " A Pig +igging ,or A Potato EI studied #or"ann6s techni;ue )ith Hitler and reali7ed he controlled the 4uehrerOE Chie. o. <a7i .oreign intelligence :alter /chellenberg #or"ann )as Ethe secret "aster o. a despot.E Hitler courtesan Hans 4rank. E58erything had to be done through this sinister guttersnipe (#or"ann).E Hitler6s >eneral Chie. o. /ta.. Hein7 >uderian E#or"ann stayed )ith Hitler night and day and gradually brought hi" under his )ill so that he ruled Hitler6s )hole eAistence.E Her"an >oering Hitler6s heir-apparent until )ar6s-end #eneath the city o. #erlin9 under the +eischstag building9 burro)ed in a hole like a .rightened rabbit seeking desperately to a8oid being torn apart by hungry9 angry )ol8es9 ;ui8ered the once in8incible 3dol. Hitler. #y the last days o. 3pril 19&(9 the +ussians had pressed their ad8ance to the outskirts o. #erlin9 al"ost co"pletely surrounding it9 and9 )ith the )inking appro8al o. the 3"ericans and 5nglish9 had begun pu""eling the sy"bolic center o. <a7is" under a steady9 $&-hour-a-day9 barrage o. artillery .ire. he )ar)earied9 ghost-.aced resident sur8i8ors huddled .orlorn and resigned in the sub)ay tunnels as the constant thunder o. shells rattled )hate8er structure )as le.t o8erhead that separated the destitute and despairing .ro" destruction. he )arren-like underground bunker that constituted the 4uehrer Head;uarters see"ed little "ore than a li8ing to"b. o "ake "atters )orse9 in the claustrophobic con.ines o. the ca8erns Hitler6s "oods s)ung desperately bet)een raging paranoiac psychopath and drugged derelict. <u"b .ro" the i"posing reality o. abys"al .ailure9 eAhausted by unre"itting pressure9 partially paraly7ed .ro" a "inor stroke su..ered )hile in the bunker9 though still o..icially in co""and9 the 4uehrer )as .ar .ro" the co""anding .igure he once had been. Holed up al"ost continuously in his pri8ate ;uarters inside the bunker9 the inner sanctu" o. the )arren - actually a cell )ithin this sel.-induced prison - he alternately snarled at and 8iciously attacked )hat re"ained o. his loyal co""anders and sta..9 and dri.ted in and out o. eAhausted and drug-induced stupors. he .or"er great ones - "inisters9 generals and ad"irals9 territorial go8ernors - shuttled in and out9 putting on the .aces o. de8out supporters sacri.icing their all to sustain their leader. 3ctually9 behind his back they )ere planning to .lee the ter"inal to"b at the .irst opportunity and slide silently .ro" the heinous history they had helped )rite into so"e .oreign back)ater )here they )ould be .orgotten. hose )ho re"ained )ere the ill-.ated9 lo)er-le8el sta..ers )ho shu..led ;uietly up and do)n the di"ly lit concrete corridors in support o. their beleaguered 4uehrer and a .e) o. his closest high-ranking courtesans. 0ost o. the" )ere there under orders9 but they )ere loyal to the last. he at"osphere9 e"otionally as )ell as physically9 )as hardly breathable. <e)s )as ne8er good. In the .inal stand .or <a7is"9 the old "en9 young boys and )alking )ounded )ho de.ended the city )ere eAperiencing .e) successes but "assi8e desertions. he city )as being gi8en up inch by inch at great cost - hal. a "illion people )ould e8entually die in the battle. +eports o. +ussian atrocities9 rape and torture o. the captured )ere legion. he ine8itable - the unspeakable - )as "orosely "o8ing to)ard these doo"ed dependents o. Hitler and there )as little one could do to halt the inescapable. 58eryone despaired. 58eryone eAcept 0artin #or"ann. his 0achia8ellian "inister to the 4uehrer - hardly kno)n outside the close cortege o. Hitler6s inner circle - )ith characteristic energy9 .ocus and deter"ination9 in contrast to and ;uite unconcerned about those around hi"9 )as constantly sending and recei8ing radio trans"issions .ro" the bunker co""unications center. In addition to9 or as part o.9 )orking out his escape9 he is kno)n to ha8e been under"ining or negotiating )ith others o. Hitler6s hench"en .or control o. the +eich - apparently con.ident there )ould be a +eich to control despite the bleak outlook .or >er"any. 0ost students o. these e8ents ha8e considered #or"ann6s "achinations as "adness9 gi8en the +eich )as in its death thro)s. #ut upon closer scrutiny o. his actions and re8ie) o. the e8idence9 it appears 0artin #or"ann )as )orking a "aster plan9 )ith Hitler6s consent - and )ithin )hich !-$%& played an i"portant part. !nderstanding the lo)-pro.ile 0artin #or"ann and his une;ualed po)er in Hitler6s court is a 8ital key to understanding Hitler and his po)er o8er the "asses9 not to "ention the <a7i Party and the hird +eich. #or"ann6s post-)ar acti8ities - .or the e8idence is 8ery strong that he did sur8i8e the )ar9 )ith 3"erican help - and the i"pact they had on the <uclear 3ge "ust also be considered against the history o. his prior beha8ior9 as )ell9 to pro8ide conteAt to our chronicle. #ritish historian re8or +oper-/"ith calls 0artin #or"ann9 EHitler6s 0ephistopheles9E his Ealter ego9E his Ee8il genius.E #or"ann )as kno)n in Hitler6s inner circle as E he #ro)n 5"inenceE behind the 4uehrer6s

throne9E Fccclii (author6s noteB he is as o.ten called E he >ray 5"inenceE). he 8ery .act that this one-ti"e .ar" super8isor should9 )ith Hitler6s appro8al9 cli"b to "anage the barbarous <a7is6 a..airs o. state speaks 8olu"es o. the eAceptional political and .inancial acu"en and skullduggery this sinister /hylock possessed. Hitler e8entually ca"e to rely on and appreciate his "ost trusted lieutenant6s talents so "uch that #or"ann - despite al"ost no "ilitary eAperience - )as not only "ade an honorary "a?or general o. the // but he )as a)arded // nu"ber ((( - Hitler6s o)n original // nu"ber. Fcccliii #or"ann in return .a)ned on his 4uehrer e"barrassingly yet unapologetically= )riting Hitler6s nearly e8ery )ord on s"all )hite cards he carried at all ti"es. He seldo" took 8acations or trips o. any kind that )ould separate hi" .ro" the 4uehrer .or "ore than ?ust a .e) days9 .or .ear o. losing court status. E#or"ann stayed )ith Hitler night and day9E Her"an >oering later recounted9 Fcccli8 Eand gradually brought hi" under his )ill so that he ruled Hitler6s )hole eAistence.E 58en though ser8ing as his "aster6s sla8ish lap dog - in .act9 because o. it - #or"ann ca"e to )ield co"plete authority o8er the +eich. He acco"plished this accu"ulation o. po)er in a 8ariety o. )ays9 8irtually all o. the" ste""ing .ro" his position )ith Hitler. He had access to and kept copious .iles o. e8idence and "aterials ai"ed at eAposing .or so"e "isdeed or another9 i. needed9 al"ost e8ery person o. authority in the go8ern"ent9 "ilitary or the party - including Hitler hi"sel.. He also discreetly distributed lo)-interest or nointerest loans .ro" party co..ers9 Fcccl8 so"e that did not re;uire repay"ent9 to those )ho" he .elt it )ould be ad8antageous to ha8e indebted to hi"9 such as // leader Heinrich Hi""ler9 )ho accepted .ro" #or"ann "illions o. reichs"arks per year. Fcccl8i he po)er.ul group o. &1 >auleiters9 the 6go8ernors6 - actually 8irtual dictators - o. the +eich6s 8arious 6states6 or 6pro8inces96 reported directly to #or"ann as head o. the <a7i Party. He culti8ated and "aintained a strong relationship )ith this group collecti8ely and "any o. its "ost po)er.ul "e"bers indi8idually9 throughout his tenure until the end o. the )ar. #or"ann6s position as +eichsleiter o. the <a7i Party also "ade hi"9 in theory at least9 the second "ost po)er.ul "an in the +eich. 3t party rallies as early as 19%&9 Hitler had declared that the party ga8e orders to the go8ern"ent9 not the other )ay round. Fcccl8ii Cater interrogations that )ere part o. the <ure"berg rials 8eri.ied this relationship. Fcccl8iii he party9 there.ore9 controlled the go8ern"ent9 and #or"ann controlled the party. he +eichsleiter underpinned his po)er-base by duplicating )ithin the party al"ost e8ery .unction re;uired and operated by the 8iable go8ern"ent. In essence9 #or"ann created and held the strings to a 8ery po)er.ul Eshado) bureaucracy9E FcccliA co"plete )ith its o)n police .orce - the >estapo - and its o)n ar"ies - the :ehr"acht // - both under the direction o. one o. #or"ann6s chie. acco"plices9 Heinrich Hi""ler - and the 1 "illion-"an-strong 1olkstur". FccclA #or"ann )as ruthless in his ;uest .or po)er9 to the point that his one-ti"e boss9 <a7i Party reasurer /ch)art79 co"pared hi" to @oseph /talin lurking behind Cenin9 saying9 E#or"ann )as the "ost pernicious egotist around.... He )ould kill9 like /talin.E FccclAi 3uthor :illia" /te8enson echoed that senti"ent in his book9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 also co"paring #or"ann to /talin9 FccclAii as ha8e "any authors and historians since. FccclAiii In truth9 Hitler and #or"ann )ere co"ple"entary pieces to the sa"e per8erted pu77le. heir personalities and psyches .ully understood and inter"eshed )ith one another across the co"plete spectru" o. po)ero8er-the-"asses leadership they practiced - and recogni7ed in each other the eAceptional counterbalances o. their strengths and )eaknesses. :here Hitler6s political acu"en and charis"a .ailed9 #or"ann )ould use his )eb o. intrigue and bureaucratic po)er to achie8e the desired end9 eAplains #or"ann biographer @oachen 8on Cang. FccclAi8 :hether #or"ann on his cli"b to the top astutely identi.ied Hitler6s de.iciencies and deter"ined consciously to .ill the" hi"sel.9 or )hether the "arriage )as si"ply a .ortuitous "atch o. .ate personality-)ise9 )ill probably ne8er be kno)n. 58entually this sy"biotic co"pact - )hether spoken or unspoken nobody kno)s9 either - ga8e #or"ann the con.idence he needed to take the bold step o. cordoning o.. the 4uehrer .ro" all others9 to be accessed only through hi" )ho )ould beco"e Ethe dictator o. the ante-roo"E FccclA8 - #or"ann hi"sel.. In 19&%9 #or"ann success.ully con8inced Hitler - based on their co-dependent relationship and the .act that Hitler9 )ho had appointed hi"sel. /upre"e Co""ander o. the 3r"y and )as spending all o. his ti"e and energy personally running the >er"an )ar e..ort - to sign a decree appointing a Co""ittee o. hree9 FccclA8i co"posed o. #or"ann and t)o others9 to o8ersee the e8eryday operations o. the +eich and to screen the 4uehrer .ro" un)anted distractions. 3ll co""unications9 reports and re;uests intended .or Hitler had to pass through the Co""ittee o. hree .irst. In typical #or"ann .ashion9 he then sub?ugated the other t)o co""ittee "e"bers and controlled all in.or"ation co"ing to and going .ro" the 4uehrer. FccclA8ii Co"bined )ith his position as head o. the <a7i Party9 )hich )as already operating in proAy .or the .ederal go8ern"ent9 )hich in turn )as no) nothing "ore than a shell9 0artin #or"ann had solidi.ied his hold as the second "ost - so"e said the "ost - po)er.ul "an in >er"any. EI studied #or"ann6s techni;ue )ith Hitler and reali7ed he controlled the 4uehrerOE recorded the chie. o. the <a7i .oreign intelligence ser8ice :alter /chellenberg. FccclA8iii #or"ann )as Ethe secret "aster o. a

despot9E according to Hitler courtesan Hans 4rank. FccclAiA E58erything had to be done through this sinister guttersnipe (#or"ann)9E co"plained Hitler6s o)n >eneral Chie. o. /ta.. Hein7 >uderian. FccclAA 4ollo)ing years o. care.ul conni8ing and sinister strategies9 #or"ann had reali7ed his drea" - he )as9 "any )ho )ere there at the ti"e and so"e later historians agree9 in substance i. not in title9 the leader o. the hird +eich. FccclAAi :hile 0artin #or"ann6s na"e9 position and the pro.ound po)er he )ielded in <a7i >er"any are al"ost unkno)n to the a8erage person - and such )as the case e8en )hen #or"ann )as en?oying une;ualed .raternity )ith Hitler as his <a7i Party chie.9 ad"inistrati8e right-hand "an and personal paladin - those close to the 4uehrer at the ti"e9 to a "an9 understood that the key to Hitler during the "id- to late-)ar years9 and possibly earlier9 )as clenched .ir"ly in #or"ann6s .ist. o understand ho) 0artin #or"ann possessed the po)er at the end o. the )ar to negotiate a)ay <a7i >er"any6s de8eloping nuclear arsenal in order to sustain hi"sel. and the <a7i cause a.ter the )ar9 one "ust understand the sy"biotic relationship bet)een hi" and Hitler. he de.ining ele"ents o. their li8es9 so"eti"es detailed in "irror-like re.lections and then so"eti"es balanced by )hat see" like polar opposites9 )hile at other ti"es punctuated )ith bi7arre and une;ualed uni;ueness9 are as striking as the surprisingly co"ple"entary nature o. their beings. hat t)o "en could be so )ell .itted .or .or)arding the rare a"bitions o. one another hardly see"s probable. Det the peculiarities they shared and the di..erences that .illed the holes )here each )as lacking resulted in t)o re"arkably co"patible counterparts - although not psychologically healthy ones. 3dol. Hitler )as born the son o. a lo)-ranking 3ustrian bureaucrat9 a custo"s o..icial )ho )as a drunken sadist9 already ($ years old )hen 3dol. )as born9 and )ho beat his son and )i.e9 s;uandered the .a"ily "oney on alcohol9 and taught through his actions that ErightE is al)ays in the hands o. the "ost po)er.ul. 3dol. Hitler learned this lesson - and ho) to hate - .ro" his .ather9 .or )ho" he gre) great loathing and ani"osity. 0artin #or"ann )as the son o. a ci8il ser8ant9 too9 a >er"an postal )orker. FccclAAii #ut )hile Hitler hated his .ather and had only one sister9 younger than he9 #or"ann adored his .ather and paid ho"age to hi"9 o.ten to the point o. heaping upon his "e"ory blatant and unearned eAaggeration o. his achie8e"ents. Holding his .ather in such re8erence )as undoubtedly the result o. 0artin not really ha8ing kno)n his .ather9 )ho died )hen 0artin )as less than three years old. FccclAAiii he elder #or"ann had actually li8ed a si"ple9 ordinary li.e9 had been "arried once pre8ious to his "arriage to 0artin6s "other and had sired three children (one died in in.ancy) .ro" that early union. !pon his death his )ido)9 to support her t)o natural children and the t)o step-children she had inherited .ro" her husband6s pre8ious "arriage9 ;uickly re"arried her o)n dead sister6s )ido)ed husband. #or"ann6s ne) step-.ather brought .i8e children o. his o)n9 0artin6s cousins9 into the no) hodgepodge .a"ily. 0artin i""ediately disliked this intruder9 and his gaggle9 )ho" he considered )as trying to take his .ather6s place. he .eeling )as later eAacerbated )hen9 during the hardships caused to all >er"ans during :orld :ar One9 rather than ser8ing in the ar"ed .orces9 his step.ather the to)n banker gloated o8er the "oney he )as "aking .ro" )ar lending. 0artin6s en"ity .or the "an and his unsee"ly beha8ior9 ho)e8er9 did not keep #or"ann during the neAt )orld )ar .ro" indiscri"inately e"ulating si"ilar )ar pro.iteering conduct9 but on a "uch grander scale. he t)o "en re"ained distant throughout their li8es. he lack o. a respected .ather .igure9 the eclectic and tangled .a"ily tree and the distorted relationships these conditions .ostered "ust ha8e been the source o. "uch unusual and per8erse psychological progra""ing .or the young 0artin #or"ann. hus in the petrie dish o. dys.unctional .a"ilies and .la)ed .atherhood )ere the psychotic psyches o. 3dol. Hitler and 0artin #or"ann born. #oth Hitler and #or"ann9 in a society that 8alued highly the >er"anic ideals o. education and intellectual achie8e"ent9 dropped out o. high school9 neither one achie8ing consistently good per.or"ances in their "atriculations but both sho)ing .lashes o. real genius in the disciplines they personally en?oyed. Hitler9 "olded by the hea8y hand o. his abusi8e .ather9 eAtended the un"itigated "alice resulting .ro" this eAcessi8e beha8ior to all authority .igures he .aced9 )hich caused hi" trouble in the classroo". He )as e?ected .ro" a catholic school .or de.ying a no-s"oking rule9 o8erbearingly insisted on being the leader a"ong his class"ates despite any hint o. trying to earn such a position or the respect that goes )ith it9 and openly Esabotaged co"pletely9E in his o)n )ords9 any school endea8or not to his liking. FccclAAi8 He later 8ili.ied or other)ise repudiated as stupid or cra7y educators in general9 "aking eAception only .or *r. Ceopold Poetsch9 a .er8ent >er"an nationalist9 a"ong all the teachers o. his childhood. >er"an pre-:orld :ar One schools9 "ost particularly in the :ei"ar region )here #or"ann gre) up9 )ere teaching a searing brand o. nationalis"9 pan->er"anis" and >er"an cultural superiority9 too. FccclAA8 Cike e8ery other youngster in >er"any at the ti"e9 0artin #or"ann )as seeped in this doctrine )hose spirit s)ept the >er"an nation right up and into the .irst )orld )ide con.lict. #or"ann absorbed the nationalistic .er8or and carried it )ithin hi" throughout his li.e9 though in his case9 as in Hitler6s9 it )ould gro) in a "onstrous9 "utated .or".

3 patriotic appreciation9 in )hate8er .or" and ho)e8er i"portant to his later li.e9 )as one o. the .e) bene.its #or"ann )ould recei8e .ro" his schooling. :hile later e8ents pro8ed he )as anything but stupid9 in the classroo"9 .or )hate8er reason9 he appears to ha8e struggled. !sing dates he later pro8ided in go8ern"ent docu"ents and applications9 it appears 0artin #or"ann took eight years to co"plete se8en grades9 apparently also sabotaging his o)n education= and he eAited high school ungraduated9 as had Hitler be.ore hi"9 a.ter the ele8enth grade. FccclAA8i *ri8en by 8isions o. grandeur and a staunch belie. in his o)n genius9 at the age o. 18 years Hitler le.t his )ido)ed9 incurably ill "other in the to)n o. his childhood and "o8ed to 1ienna to beco"e an artist. He )andered the streets o. the "etropolitan city9 painted9 drea"ed and star8ed. He )as re?ected .or acceptance at the 1ienna 3cade"y o. 4ine 3rts )hen he .ailed the entrance eAa"ination9 a re?ection he ne8er .orga8e9 and .or the neAt hal.-decade he )andered the streets9 took s"all ?obs9 painted and sold his art)ork in the streets )hen he could9 and panhandled .or .ood and shelter )hen he could not. His EgeniusE unrecogni7ed and eApectations o. riding his talent to easy )ealth and .a"e thus un.ul.illed9 Hitler looked outside hi"sel. .or the reasons .or his .ailure. he bla"e9 he decided9 lay in a )eak go8ern"ent9 in this case a parlia"entary de"ocracy9 that allo)ed @e)s to control and there.ore o)n its econo"y and thus disen.ranchise the right.ul heirs o. the .ruits o. that go8ern"ent9 those o. >er"anic blood. #ecause so "any @e)s at the ti"e supported 0arAist ideals9 he deduced that the t)o parties )ere colluding on a grand scale to control the )orld. Co""unis" ?oined @e)ry and de"ocracy as a cause .or his .ailings and9 in his "ind9 the .ailings o. the >er"anic race. :here his .ather taught hi" to hate9 and dise"bo)eled drea"s "agni.ied this "ale8olence9 Hitler no) had a .ocus upon )hich to ai" his 8irulence. :allo)ing in his "isery9 penniless9 o.ten ho"eless and usually sick9 his li.e )as in an unpro"ising9 spiraling descent )hen E he :ar o 5nd 3ll :ars9E :orld :ar One9 erupted to send "uch o. the ci8ili7ed )orld into the depths o. hell - and to sa8e 3dol. Hitler. On the crucible o. the battle.ield he .ound the 8ehicle to 8ent his rage - )ar. /er8ing in no less than &battles in a .our-year span9 Hitler )as )ounded t)ice9 .or )hich he spent se8eral "onths in recuperation and earned the Iron Cross9 both 4irst and /econd Classes. FccclAA8ii 3lthough ne8er rising abo8e the rank o. corporal during the .our )ar years in )hich he ser8ed9 he sho)ed an inkling o. the boldness .or )hich he )ould later beco"e kno)n )hen he captured an ene"y o..icer and 1( o. his "en. *uring the )ar9 a ne) 8ision began to .or" in Hitler6s .e8ered head. he i"ages that once he placed on can8as )ere no) being replaced )ith a ske)ed 8ision o. ho) the )orld should be ordered. /oon his brushes9 pencils and painter6s palette )ould be replaced by a "ore .or"idable "edia - death and destructionB grenades and guns and tanks9 )ith )hich he )ould paint a ne) and 8ery real picture o. )hat he thought the )orld should be. E0ight is rightOE I. there is an opposite o. li8ing the daring9 #ohe"ian9 but inspired eAistence o. the artist9 as had 3dol. Hitler9 it is li8ing the structured9 precise9 but a"ple li.e o. a bureaucrat. /o it )as )ith 0artin #or"ann. Cea8ing school during the closing "onths o. the )ar9 #or"ann ?oined the ar"y and spent )hat .e) "onths re"ained o. the already-lost con.lict a8oiding a useless death .ro" bullet or grenade by ser8ing as an o..icer6s orderly. Here he learned not only ho) to e8ade placing hi"sel. in har"6s )ay but9 ena"ored )ith his proAi"ity to i"portant people - in .act9 tutored by the" - he began his li.elong a8ocation9 )hich "igrated into a 8ocation9 o. licking the boots o. those higher than he in order to get ahead. he instinct )as one that Hitler9 )ho as a school boy had insisted all others .ollo) hi" in the ga"e o. 4ollo) the Ceader9 )ould later enthusiastically ackno)ledge )as the "ost essential characteristic o. his "ost 8alued and trusted lieutenant9 0artin #or"ann. One should not consider #or"ann6s position that o. )eakness. he po)er that .lo)ed through hi" .ro" his "aster and protected hi" by 8irtue o. his sla8ish align"ent )ith his "aster6s )ishes )as une;ui8ocal and untouchable by all others sa8e the source o. that po)er. 3s long as #or"ann re"ained un;uestionably attenti8e9 the po)er.ul host )ould continue to .eed the parasite. 3nd the parasite )ould continue to .eed on the throng that )as dra)n to his "aster )hile at the sa"e ti"e .orcing that throng to do their "aster6s bidding. #or"ann6s parasitic beha8ior )as to)ard the throng9 not his "aster= the relationship )ith the "aster )as sy"biotic9 each bene.iting .ro" the beha8ior o. the other. #or"ann6s innate and in.allible instincts .or sur8i8al ser8ed hi" )ell a.ter :orld :ar One. :ith the country in ruins9 the econo"y in chaos and the populace i"po8erished and star8ing9 0artin #or"ann9 re8ealing a latent predilection .or al)ays incisi8ely cutting to the kernel o. an issue9 ;uickly di8ined that i. lack o. .ood is the proble" he .aced9 going to the source o. .ood is the solution. His instincts dro8e hi" not only to get )ork on a .ar" but also to achie8e a position o. control on the .ar". I""ediately upon being "ustered out o. the ar"y he .ound )ork as an estate "anager trainee in 0ekle"burg9 <orth >er"any. FccclAA8iii He appears to ha8e done )ell9 .or he recorded that less than t)o years later he had )orked his )ay up to general "anager o. the 8on reuen.els estates9 )hich9 co"bined9 totaled al"ost 89222 acres. /o"e historians ;uestion #or"ann6s assertion he beca"e general "anager in t)o years based on the idea that he could not ha8e learned the entire .ar" business in 18 "onths9 and the .act he )as still a "inor. #ut

such a rise does not stretch the i"agination gi8en #or"ann6s later pro8en and re"arkable skills o. ad"inistration - and the tell-tale lapdog relationship he ;uickly culti8ated )ith the lady o. the estate9 5hrengard 8on reuen.els9 the #aroness 8on 0alt7ahn. Indeed9 the .riendship )as "aintained at least until his escape .ro" bo"bed-out #erlin a ;uarter-century later and his disappearance into the back alleys o. history= and 0artin e8en na"ed a daughter 5hrengard a.ter the #aroness. In any case9 #or"ann honed and .urther integrated the skills o. ad"inistration and 8assalage into a potent po)er base )hile ser8ing the reuen.els at 0eckle"burg. he eAperience o. the 8ictors o. the )ar placing the reckoning o. accounts at the 8an;uished6s door caught cross)ise in both Hitler6s and #or"ann6s throats. Consu"ed by hate and inspired by the po)er o. carnage9 Hitler took bitter u"brage to the "ountainous )ar reparations the 3llies de"anded o. the >er"an people despite the country6s then non-eAistent econo"y and star8ing population. In the act o. de"anding such onerous reparations alone did the 3llies incite :orld :ar )o. 4or had the reparations been less burdenso"e it is doubt.ul Hitler )ould ha8e had the .uel he needed to ignite )ith his pri8ate rancor the .ires o. 8engeance in the >er"an people that )ould propel the <a7i cause. #or"ann shared Hitler6s con8ictions9 although he probably had not actually heard o. Hitler by then= but .or this cause both Hitler and #or"ann9 during their early political acti8is"9 spent ti"e in prison. Hitler .or his part in the 0unich #eer Hall Putsch o. 19$% that )ould ser8e as a catalyst to bring the <a7i party to po)er (he )rote 0ein Ha"p. )hile in prison ser8ing ti"e .or the cri"e)= and #or"ann .or his part in the "urder o. a "an )ho had betrayed the nationalist cause. *uring his ti"e as a land agent9 0artin #or"ann beca"e in8ol8ed in political acti8is". In 19$%9 the year o. the #eer Hall Putsch9 #or"ann ?oined the <a7i6s predecessor and early co"petitor9 the 4reikorps +ossbach9 )here he ;uickly rose to beco"e one o. the leaders o. the 0eckle"burg chapter6s organi7ation. :hile .unctioning in this position9 #or"ann )as an acco"plice in the "urder o. another "e"ber o. the organi7ation9 :alther Hado)9 a .or"er ele"entary school teacher o. his. FccclAAiA Hado) had been suspected o. betraying a third party "e"ber9 the soon-to-be <a7i "artyr 3lbert Ceo /chlageter9 to the 4rench during the occupation o. the +uhr. #or"ann and others recruited a gang to eAecute Hado) - a "ob that included +udol. 4ran7 Hoess9 the .uture co""andant o. 3usch)it7. Hado) )as dragged into a .orest and beaten )ith clubs and hea8y branches be.ore ha8ing his throat cut and being shot t)ice. FccclAAA here is no e8idence that #or"ann had a hand in the actual killing= the "ob o. "e"bers under his direction per.or"ed the deed9 but #or"ann )as tried and conde"ned to a year in prison .or pro8iding the )eapons and leadership .or the act. Dears later9 3dol. Hitler )ould a)ard #or"ann the #lutorden (#lood Order) .or his part in the "urder and the ti"e he paid in prison because o. it. FccclAAAi Hitler9 too9 )as i"plicated .or "urder )hen he )as a young "an9 long be.ore he "ade cold-blooded killing a co"ponent o. o..icial go8ern"ent policy. Hitler6s suspected ho"icidal action9 unlike #or"ann6s calculated9 prag"atic act9 )as the result o. ?ealous and unthinking rage. 3ccording to one 8ersion9 he appears to ha8e 8iciously "urdered his niece9 )ith )ho" he )as ha8ing an incestuous9 turbid relationship9 .ollo)ing a 8iolent9 ?ealousy-dri8en argu"ent. he niece9 3ngela E>eliE +aubal9 )as trying to break o.. their relationship. FccclAAAii EHe6s a "onster. <obody can i"agine the things he )ants "e to do9E she once con.ided. /he disclosed that he had .orced her to urinate on hi" and to per.or" other heinous obscenities. He also reportedly co"pleted a nu"ber o. artistic renderings o. >eli eAecuted )ith ;uestionable taste and o. detestable sub?ect "atter. #or"ann is said to ha8e later located all o. these pictures and ;uietly bought the" back to a8oid .uture contro8ersy. 3s >eli tried to eAtricate hersel. .ro" the a..air ( she not only detested her relationship )ith Hitler but she )as interested in another "an ) Hitler is thought to ha8e con.ronted her in his apart"ent in 0unich during one o. their .orced liaisons. Possibly she threatened to re8eal his per8erted predilections but it is not kno)n .or certain )hat led up to the killing or ho) it )as co""itted. 3ccording to :illia" /te8enson in he #or"ann #rotherhood9 there )ere )itnesses to the cri"e - >erhard +ossbach and *r. Otto /trasser - but they )ere close Hitler cronies )ho re.used to re8eal )hat they kne). 3ll that is kno)n is that >eli6s dead body )as .ound naked on the .loor9 her nose broken9 killed by a bullet .ro" 3dol. Hitler6s pistol. FccclAAAiii 4or Hitler9 the "urder )as a disaster about to be unleashed that )ould not only ruin his career but probably his li.e as )ell. :hile he had consolidated his position as leader o. the <a7i Party9 he )as not yet a citi7en o. >er"any "uch less its uncontested leader. hree "ore years )ould pass be.ore he could protect his "urderous "adness )ith that shield. #y no)9 /epte"ber 19%19 #or"ann had been released .ro" prison9 ?oined the <a7i Party9 and in siA short years had burro)ed his )ay into the party leadership and )as looking .or opportunities to de"onstrate de8otion to his de"igod9 3dol. Hitler. In the "urder o. >eli +aubal he recogni7ed an opportunity to pro8e to his "urderous "aster his allegiance and his shre)d9 i. i""oral9 penchants. /te8enson goes on to describe ho) 0unich6s intelligent9 hard-)orking chie. inspector9 Heinrich 0ueller9 )ho up to that point had been )orking hard to eli"inate the <a7i Party9 had begun in8estigating the apparently open-and-shut case. #or"ann stepped in. :hen he stepped back again the chie. inspector dropped the

case9 Hitler )alked .ree9 and 0ueller )as soon on a train to 0osco) to learn the black art and septic science o. running a secret police depart"ent9 all at <a7i Party eApense. he net result o. #or"ann6s arbitrationJ 3dol. Hitler escaped that "ost desperate personal and political predica"ent to e8entually beco"e arguably the "ost po)er.ul "an in the )orld. Heinrich 0ueller )as installed on a career track that )ould propel hi" to the pinnacle o. the >er"an police state - the police state o. all police states - as chie. o. the 8aunted and .eared >estapo. In .act9 0ueller )ould e8entually carry to his gra8e the nickna"e E>estapoE 0ueller. 3nd 0artin #or"ann )ould grasp Hitler6s attention and allegiance in a )ay that )ould create a "echanis" .or perpetual eApansion o. #or"ann6s po)er base through the 0aster6s increasing trust and appreciation. 3dd to this the po)er that )ould .lo) to #or"ann .ro" #or"ann6s co-opting o. Heinrich 0ueller and the "assi8e intelligence and control "echanis" that )ould soon be supplied to hi" through the >estapo9 and #or"ann6s position had9 indeed9 increased by se8eral orders o. "agnitude as a result o. this single a..air. 3ccording to so"e Hitler biographers9 the story o. Hitler6s "urder o. >eli +aubal is anecdotal and has been pro8en to be .alse. heir account says Hitler )as booked in a hotel .ar .ro" 0unich on the day >eli )as killed. his in .act "ay be true9 but i. /te8enson6s 8ersion that #or"ann and 0ueller E.iAedE the outco"e is true9 this e8idence "ay be part o. the co8er-up rather than the true account o. e8ents. Perhaps )hat actually occurred )ill ne8er be kno)n. *uring the siA years bet)een #or"ann6s release .ro" prison in 19$(9 )hen he ?oined the <a7i Party9 and his alleged bold intercession on Hitler6s behal. in >eli +aubal6s "urder9 0artin #or"ann had already cli"bed a considerable distance )ithin the <a7i party hierarchy. Presu"ably his stature )as ele8ated upon his 8ery entrance into the party as a result o. his already-pro8en co""it"ent to the ideals and operational "ethods o. the <a7i Party as con.ir"ed by ti"e spent in prison .or the Hado) "urder. :ithin t)o years he )as the regional press o..icer .or the <a7i Party in huringia and the .ollo)ing year )as ele8ated to chie. business "anager in the sa"e regional party chapter9 as )ell as being "ade >auleiter (<a7i Party go8ernor) o. huringia. FccclAAAi8 He )as also pro"oted to the supre"e co""and o. the party6s "ilitary ar"9 the /.3. (/tur"abteilung). #y the end o. that sa"e year9 19$89 #or"ann )as )orking .or Hitler6s personal secretary and right-hand "an9 +udol. Hess. FccclAAA8 #or"ann had been re.erred to Hess by <a7i Party reasurer 4ran7 Qa8ier /ch)ar79 FccclAAA8i )ho recogni7ed in #or"ann a shre)d and astute .inancial "anager and e..icient co""issar )ho could bring the party6s business dealings into control9 )hich Hess had been unable to acco"plish. #ecause o. #or"ann6s penchant .or )orking ;uietly in the background9 throughout his career his 8ersatile nature )ent largely unnoticed despite his latent genius .or .inance - "agni.ied and unbridled by a co"plete lack o. "oral or ethical circu"spection. His 8ersatility re8itali7ed the party. It "ade Hitler a rich "an. 3nd it "ade #or"ann a rich "an. he .ollo)ing year9 #or"ann "arried the daughter o. another ardent party "e"ber )ho )ould soon beco"e the top ?udge in <a7i >er"any9 +eichstag *eputy :alther #uch9 )ho en?oyed Hitler6s respect (Hitler )as a )itness to the #or"ann )edding9 being .riend o. both bride and groo"). :ith his ne) )i.e >erda9 #or"ann began a .a"ily that )ould e8entually include ten children and )ould9 i. possible9 in so"e respects be e8en "ore per8erse than the .a"ily in )hich he gre) up. He openly and )ith >erda6s blessing9 and9 in .act9 )ith her encourage"ent9 carried on "ultiple seAual relationships si"ultaneously )ith a be8y o. other )o"en9 despite uni8ersal agree"ent that #or"ann9 in the ElooksE depart"ent9 had little to o..er )o"en. Physical attraction not )ithstanding9 his oily char" and po)er.ul position "ade hi" an attracti8e coup to "any ladies. #et)een these liaisons and his o..icial duties he )as seldo" ho"e9 and )hen he )as he ruled his )i.e and .a"ily )ith an iron .ist. Det he )rote >erda lo8ingly al"ost e8ery day9 ensured she )as al)ays )ell taken care o.9 and9 despite his other)ise secreti8e nature9 he entrusted her in )riting )ith his inner"ost thoughts and .eelings on al"ost e8ery sub?ect. he #or"ann6s relationship is an enig"atic paradoA that "akes a .ascinating study in and o. itsel. o. the "an and the 0achia8ellian "anner in )hich he operated. Hitler continued )ith his con8oluted relationships9 too. #or"ann9 as Hess6 deputy responsible .or Hitler6s sa.ety including co""and o. his bodyguard9 FccclAAA8ii and .or the "anage"ent o. his personal business a..airs9 .ound yet another opportunity to )rap his sticky tentacles around his "isguided "essiah. /hortly a.ter Hitler beca"e Chancellor o. >er"any in 19%%9 he )as threatened )ith the kno)ledge being spread that he had been per.or"ing and ha8ing per.or"ed upon hi" per8erted seA acts. FccclAAA8iii Henny Ho.."an9 the daughter o. photographer Heinrich Ho.."an9 had told her .ather about her t)isted trysts )ith the 4uehrer. he elder Ho.."an9 understandably9 )as at .irst enraged. hreatening to prosecute or other)ise "ake public the accusations9 Ho.."an de"anded that ?ustice be done. 3t this point in Hitler6s career his care.ully-cra.ted i"age o. a hu"ble and "orally incorruptible leader o. the do)ntrodden "asses - upon )hich his po)er )as .ounded - )ould not stand the scrutiny o. such a disclosure. 4urther"ore9 at this ti"e9 neither Hitler nor the Party )ere su..iciently entrenched to e"ploy traditional <a7i strong-ar" tactics to resol8e )hat )as a personal proble". hose tactics )ere reser8ed and 6acceptable6 only .or resol8ing

political issues9 such as co""unis" or Ethe @e)ish proble".E #or"ann again stepped into the breach. He suggested that Ho.."an be "ade the 4uehrer6s personal photographer9 a position that pro"ised .a"e9 .urther eAposure .or his photography business9 and a resulting increase o. inco"e .ro" royalties recei8ed .ro" e8ery copy o. the photographs he took o. his .a"ous potential client. !pon hearing the proposal9 Ho.."an6s righteous indignation o8er his daughter6s barbarous abuse "elted a)ay into prag"atic pro.iteering9 and the deal )as consu""ated. :hat really "ade Hitler take notice9 ho)e8er9 )as that #or"ann had at the sa"e ti"e negotiated )ith :ilhel" Ohnesorge9 the 0inister o. Posts9 a royalty to be paid to Hitler as )ell as to Ho.."an9 )hene8er the 4uehrer6s likeness )as used - as it )as on sta"ps. FccclAAAiA #or"ann again had turned Hitler6s careerthreatening9 possibly li.e-threatening9 proble" into a public relations and .inancial coup9 )hile at the sa"e ti"e once again pro8ing his un;uestioned allegiance. :hile the inco"e per transaction )as s"all (the cost o. a sta"p9 a.ter all9 is "ini"al)9 the 8olu"e o. transactions )as huge. he resulting inco"e .ro" this cle8er contri8ance alone "ade Hitler a )ealthy "an. 0ore i"portant9 #or"ann6s negotiations )ith Posts 0inister +ichard Ohnesorge appears to ha8e opened a long relationship bet)een the t)o "en that cul"inated in an alliance that contributed to the political .ortunes o. both= and that )as central to #or"ann6s later escape .ro" #erlin and his post-)ar sur8i8al. Hitler9 )ho en?oyed his ne)-.ound )ealth but disliked the details o. accu"ulating it9 and )ho in .act9 .or political purposes care.ully pro"oted an i"age o. austerity9 ;uickly recogni7ed and appreciated #or"ann6s astute perceptions= taciturn9 con.idential nature= and E.iscalE talents. #or"ann )ould go on to de8ise and eAecute a great "any other sche"es through the years9 legal and other)ise9 that lined the 4uehrer6s pockets - as )ell as his o)n. /hortly a.ter the Henny Ho.."an a..air9 Hitler appointed #or"ann to be Hess6s chie. o. sta... he appoint"ent ca"e9 no doubt9 not only as a re)ard .or #or"ann6s assistance )ith the Henny Ho.."ann and >eli +aubal incidents and other past acco"plish"ents9 such as the Hado) "urder9 but because #or"ann )as also piling up a body o. )ork that aided Hitler in a )ide 8ariety o. other .unctions. In 19%29 .or eAa"ple9 recogni7ing party co..ers )ere in dire straits9 #or"ann created the Hil.skasse9 a co"pulsory Eaccident insuranceE .und .or party "e"bers )ho )ere in?ured )hile bra)ling )ith co""unists. FcccAc 3ll party "e"bers had to pay into the .und. his capital not only supported the )ounded but also generated a substantial surplus that allo)ed the party to .ul.ill signi.icant .inancial obligations and still pro8ide .unding .or .uture operations. /hortly a.ter Hitler took o..ice9 #or"ann also .ounded the 3dol. Hitler 5ndo)"ent 4und o. >er"an Industry. FcccAci he endo)"ent Estrong-ar"edE co"panies that en?oyed success as a result o. Hitler6s econo"ic policies into "aking contributions to his go8ern"ent. he .unds )ere then hoarded in Hitler accounts "anaged by #or"ann or dispersed according to Hitler6s and #or"ann6s directions. #y the end o. 19%&9 Hitler had been in po)er a year9 #or"ann )as ser8ing as his personal secretary and business "anager9 and considerable ad8ances had been "ade in #or"ann6s e..orts to )eld hi"sel. to the "an he could no)9 )ith the rest o. the nation9 call his 4uehrer. #or"ann had beco"e inseparable .ro" the 4uehrer9 .ollo)ing hi" night and day and )riting nearly his e8ery )ord on little )hite sheets o. paper9 to be acted upon i""ediately or to be treasured up .or a .uture history that he )as certain )ould one day be chronicled in a to"e that )ould glori.y his 0aster. FcccAcii In 19%(9 leaning on his old estate "anage"ent eAperience9 0artin #or"ann initiated construction o. and o8ersa) the "anage"ent and building o. the i""ense9 no) nearly "ythical9 "ulti-"illion reichs"ark #a8arian co"pleA at #erchtesgaden that Hitler )ould co"e to regard as his ho"e and sanctuary .ro" the de"ands and pressures o. public o..ice. In 0ay 19&19 #or"ann6s position rose again )hen +udol. Hess9 #or"ann6s direct superior9 in an act that stunned the )orld9 secretly .le) his personal 0essersch"idt airplane to /cotland. His sel.-appointed purpose - )hich he hoped )ould bring hi" back into the good graces o. Hitler9 )ith )ho" he .elt a ri.t )as .or"ing ostensibly )as to sue .or peace and a united >er"an'#ritish .ront against #olche8is". He )as i""ediately re)arded )ith i"prison"ent in the !nited Hingdo". 3s a result9 #or"ann )as gi8en on a sil8er platter eAactly )hat he )as prepared to )ork - and conspire - hard .orB the chancellorship o. the <a7i Party. /o"e ha8e suggested that #or"ann "ay ha8e been responsible .or inspiring Hess6s deranged atte"pt FcccAciii - "ay ha8e9 in .act9 suggested it to his superior )ith .orekno)ledge o. the results - in order to re"o8e Hess .ro" blocking #or"ann6s path to greater po)er. :hether true or not9 #or"ann did ascend to the position o. <a7i Party Chancellor by Hitler6s co""and9 )hich )as added to his responsibilities o. personal secretary and "anager to the 4uehrer that he had already held be.ore Hess6s de.ection. Hitler also disco8ered in 19&19 through one o. the greatest spy coups e8er9 that +oose8elt and Churchill had established a secret transatlantic telephone connection. FcccAci8 Charles Ho)ard 5llis9 possibly one o. the <a7is "ost 8alued underco8er agents as second-in-co""and to the re"arkable /ir :illia" /tephenson ()ho ran the co"bined intelligence e..orts o. #ritain and the !nited /tates9 reporting directly to :inston Churchill) had recei8ed in.or"ation about the hotline and passed it to Heinrich 6>estapo6 0ueller9 his <a7i controller.

E>estapoE 0ueller )as the sa"e Heinrich 0ueller )ho )as chie. inspector .or the city o. 0unich )ith )ho" 0artin #or"ann had allegedly negotiated a resolution o. the >eli +aubal "urder case. 0ueller )as no)9 perhaps as a result o. those negotiations and the path #or"ann had put hi" on9 the head o. >er"any6s .eared secret police9 the >estapo. On hearing o. the +oose8elt'Churchill hotline9 Hitler ;uickly passed an order to #or"ann to break into it and ha8e the Econ.identialE con8ersations decrypted9 at )hate8er cost necessary. #or"ann turned again to another o. his .or"er conspirators9 +ichard Ohnesorge9 the postal "inister. he 0inister o. Posts "aintained a research and de8elop"ent institute inside the "inistry that )orked on an eclectic assort"ent o. scienti.ic proble"s. he )ork )as )ell-.unded .ro" the regular postal ser8ice. :hen9 se8eral "onths later Ohnesorge6s progra" success.ully decrypted its .irst transatlantic con8ersation9 Hitler )as delighted9 and9 .ro" then until the end o. the )ar9 he glee.ully read the transcriptions o. these con8ersations only hours a.ter the )ords had been breathed .ro" the "ouths o. his t)o great ene"ies. he research institute o. the 0inistry o. Posts )as not )orking on cryptology only. >reat a"ounts o. reichs"arks )ere being in8ested in nuclear bo"b de8elop"ent9 FcccAc8 as )ell9 o. )hich Ohnesorge - )ho9 as a doctor o. physics and "athe"atics9 )as on the +eich +esearch Presidential Council9 FcccAc8i the organi7ation that o8ersa) nuclear de8elop"ent .or Hitler - )as a great proponent. 3s noted pre8iously9 at least t)ice Ohnesorge personally reported be.ore Hitler the progress and "erits o. the >er"an ato"ic bo"b progra"s. !ndoubtedly #or"ann9 in his position as Hitler6s secretary and personal "anager9 and later as his secret o8erseer as )ell as through his relationship )ith Ohnesorge9 )as pri8y to these "eetings and in.or"ation. rue to his shre)d nature9 #or"ann "ust ha8e di8ined its )orth. Hitler6s ad"iration and dependence on #or"ann gre) to i""ense proportions - noticed9 but )ith little concern until too late9 by the court elite. <one o. the" appeared to see in the crude9 bulbous9 s"ar"y 0artin #or"ann the cunning and dangerous threat he represented to the". he "en #or"ann considered his co"petition .or Hitler6s attention and as the 4uehrer6s possible e8entual successor9 >oering9 >oebbels9 Hi""ler9 /peer9 and at one ti"e e8en Hess9 )ere "en9 like Hitler9 )ho cha"pioned the grand design o. <a7is" in o8erblo)n speeches9 s)eeping dra"atic de"onstrations o. their po)er9 and open adulation o. their 4uehrer9 .or )hich they en?oyed in return the adulation o. the cro)ds o8er )hich he lorded. hey echoed Hitler but9 )ith the possible eAception o. /peer9 added little to hi" and there.ore they added little to their o)n potential as )ell. #or"ann )as an altogether di..erent ani"al. Instead o. assu"ing the 8oice o. Hitler9 )hich a.ter all )as Hitler6s greatest strength and needed little assistance9 #or"ann )as Hitler6s hands and .eet9 his eyes and ears. He did the details and dirty )ork Hitler detested )ith an eye dedicated to the sa"e purposes the 4uehrer espoused. #or"ann did the 4uehrer6s bidding9 anticipating his )ants and re;uire"ents )ithout being told 9 and then .ul.illing the" )ith .orce and po)er )ithout ha8ing to be directed= so "uch so that years later9 )hen #or"ann started to plant in Hitler6s "ind his o)n ideas and then act upon the"9 Hitler did not percei8e the transition. 3s a result9 #or"ann to a large degree e8entually beca"e Hitler6s heart and "ind as )ell as his eyes9 ears9 hands and .eet= controlling hi" and the e"pire he go8erned )ithout the "aster e8er suspecting control had slipped .ro" his hands. #or"ann had positioned hi"sel. speci.ically .or this task. <ot only had he catered to Hitler sla8ishly to create an unbreakable bond o. appreciation9 trust9 and dependence - it is i"portant to note here that #or"ann6s allegiance to the 4uehrer )as al)ays genuine and total - but #or"ann continually culti8ated and eApanded his resources to .ore8er )iden his )eb o. control on behal. o. hi"sel. and the 4uehrer. 3ccording to biographer :illia" /tephenson9 #or"ann6s great talent )as a genius .or E)hat really "attered in a bureaucracy.E FcccAc8ii /tephenson goes on to eAplain ho) #or"ann dredged police9 "ilitary and political organi7ations to .or" alliances9 either by .orce or by .inesse9 that he )ould later "anipulate to .ill his purposes. 3dd to this his great propensity .or na8igating in and9 in .act9 .or"ing9 "olding and operating bureaucracies9 and one sees a "aster )ho controlled all the strings that ran the party and the go8ern"ent. His "ind Ethri8ed upon this kind o. nutrition9E FcccAc8iii /tephenson )rote. E:here the 4uehrer6s genius and aura .ailed to )ork9 (#or"ann) )ould step in and eAert po)er9E FcccAciA )rote @oachen 8on Cang in his biography o. #or"ann9 he /ecretary. #or"ann used the bureaucracies around hi" to consolidate his position and control the .orces - pro and con -against and )ithin )hich he had to operate. hese bureaucracies )ere his source o. all control through the currencies they co""anded9 hard currencies such as the "illions o. reichs"arks cached in his9 Hitler6s and the party6s 8arious .unds and business operations9 and so.t currencies9 like the personal intelligence collected on 8arious leaders inside and outside the party and the country. he constitutional go8ern"ent o. >er"any controlled the country6s legal ad"inistration= in the early years o. Hitler6s chancellorship the party9 on paper9 held little po)er. #or"ann9 as pri"arily a .unctionary o. the party9 there.ore9 could only ad"inister in party "atters9 not go8ern"ent policy. o circu"8ent this incon8enience #or"ann created and constantly gre) a Eshado) bureaucracyE Fcd o8er the ensuing years that duplicated each crucial go8ern"ent .unction and then allo)ed hi" to control the strings he desired to

pullB he state police )as shado)ed by the >estapo9 )ith #or"ann6s alleged protLgL 0ueller at its head. he pro8ince chie.s and "ayors )ere shado)ed by <a7i Party >auleiters (district go8ernors)9 and their ad"inistrati8e regional structures9 )ho 8ied .or control o. their ?urisdictions. #or"ann )ould usually side )ith the >auleiters9 or con8ince Hitler to do so9 thus e"po)ering the" o8er their counterparts and eApanding the in.luence o. #or"ann9 lea8ing >auleiters and other party o..icials in his debt Fcdi - o..icials )ho )ould e8entually 8irtually run the country )hen Hitler later placed the <a7i Party in control. #or"ann also placed large nu"bers o. key o..icials under his bondage through bald-.aced bribery9 pro8iding Ediscrete distributions o. loansE .ro" party co..ers to )hoe8er he dee"ed )ould be a 8aluable leader to o)n. Fcdii E3l"ost all the top party .unctionaries recei8ed gi.ts .ro" this .und9E Fcdiii )rote /peer9 )ho added that such gi.t gi8ing9 though innocuous9 had the 8ery real e..ect o. con.erring "ore po)er upon #or"ann than al"ost any other person in the land. Hi""ler approached #or"ann .or one such loan o. 829222 reichs"arks so he could buy a house near #erchtesgaden .or his "istress and their illegiti"ate child. Fcdi8 #or"ann not only produced the loan but he encouraged >erda to be.riend Hi""ler6s "istress. he )o"en )ould share co7y con8ersation and children6s clothing in the years ahead9 until #or"ann se8ered Hi""ler6s relationship )ith the 4uehrer in the )aning days o. the )ar. #ut the #or"anns6 and Hi""lers6 Epseudo-.riendship9E Fcd8 and #or"ann6s ongoing contributions to Hi""ler6s personal cache therea.ter - totaling "illions Fcd8i - )as a 8aluable protection .or #or"ann later )hen the real eAtent o. his po)er beca"e apparent a"ong Hitler6s coterie and en8ious courtesans tried to destroy hi". E3gain and again I ha8e co"e to ter"s )ith #or"ann although it is "y duty really to get hi" out9E Fcd8ii co"plained Hi""ler. Hno)ing #or"ann had Ethe goodsE on hi"9 there )as little Hi""ler could do to dethrone the 4uehrer6s Iago. In .act9 it is doubt.ul Hi""ler really )anted to topple #or"ann9 since "uch o. his personal inco"e )ould be lost i. #or"ann .ell. #or"ann9 using 0ueller and his >estapo9 as )ell as other 8ehicles9 had access to a co"prehensi8e collection o. .iles9 reports and dossiers that pro8ided a solid engine o. po)er by black"ail Fcd8iii to dri8e #or"ann6s sche"es. he .iles included 8irtually e8ery ranking "e"ber o. the <a7i Party9 including possibly Hitler hi"sel.9 i. Hitler6s "urder o. >eli +aubal and the Henny Ho.."ann incident are true. 3s Hitler pushed his .oreign policy to)ard )ar )ith the rest o. the )orld during the "id- to late-thirties9 #or"ann increasingly and on his o)n 8olition do"inated do"estic a..airs. #y the ti"e the )ar actually broke out in 19%99 the party )as .ir"ly in control o. the go8ern"ent. he o..icial "antel o. <a7i po)er no) placed upon #or"ann9 co"bined )ith the 8ery real puissance he practiced through bureaucracy9 black"ail and bribery9 placed #or"ann at the pinnacle o. po)er. Only >oering9 >oebbels and Hi""ler could hope to unseat hi"= and Hi""ler9 as has been described9 )as in a poor position to do so. #or"ann did not stop. He continued to increase and .orti.y his position throughout the neAt year. In the )inter o. 19&$9 the others distracted by the )ar and Hitler increasingly relying on #or"ann to "anage ad"inistrati8e a..airs )hile he ponti.icated "ilitary strategy9 #or"ann slapped his .ello) courtesans )ith a "ost re8ealing9 direct and ?olting blo) that .or the .irst ti"e un8eiled hi" openly as a contender .or the throne. In an alliance )ith >eneral Heitel9 Hitler6s "ilitary second-in-charge9 and Hans Heinrich Ca""ers9 Chie. o. the +eich Chancery9 in other )ords the go8ern"ent6s chie. legal "inister9 #or"ann created the Co""ittee o. hree through )hich all business directed .or Hitler "ust pass9 e..ecti8ely cordoning o.. Hitler .ro" all others. FcdiA Hitler9 appreciati8e as al)ays that distracting details )ere being li.ted .ro" his busy schedule9 supported the arrange"ent. #arely hal. a year later9 in @uly 19&%9 #or"ann again rede.ined his role as secretary to the 4uehrer9 again )ith Hitler6s consent9 to proclai" hi"sel. the sole "ediator bet)een the go8ern"ent9 the party and the 4uehrer9 FcdA thus eli"inating e8en Heitel and Ca""ers .ro" the picture. #or"ann )as no) the sole link bet)een Hitler and his chie.s. /peer noted )ith disgust ho) i"portant issues and progra"s could not reach Hitler )ithout .irst going through #or"ann6s hands and .irst ha8ing his blessing be.ore e8en being considered by the 4uehrer. FcdAi :ith Hitler insulated .ro" opposing 8ie)s on critical a..airs9 #or"ann could no) set and eAecute agendas9 needing Hitler only to rubbersta"p his plans. /peer asserts that9 as an i"portant "ilitary "inister9 he )as not a"ong those eAcluded .ro" Hitler6s presence9 but in reality e8en Hitler6s "ost .a8ored associates )ere dealt the indignities o. ha8ing to cra)l to #or"ann .or access to the 4uehrer. O.ten an audience )as denied and #or"ann responded alone. 4or eAa"ple9 it )as #or"ann9 not Hitler9 )ho ans)ered in the negati8e /peer6s re;uest o. Hitler that he be a)arded ?urisdiction o8er the i"portant 1-1 and 1-$ rocket pro?ects and other research and de8elop"ent progra"s based at Peene"unde. FcdAii /i"on :eissenthal )rote that "any orders bearing Hitler6s signature sho)ed ob8ious e8idence o. being the product o. #or"ann6s "ind. 3nd >oering stated .latly that "any docu"ents issued .ro" Hitler bore the un"istakable sta"p o. 0artin #or"ann6s hea8y hand. FcdAiii #or"ann no) controlled Hitler and guided .ro" hi" the decisions that )ere running the country. 3ccording to biographer Paul 0anning9 E0artin #or"ann )as no) the leader in .act o. >er"any.E FcdAi8

:illia" /tephenson agrees that #or"ann co8ertly go8erned the hird +eich9 adding that historians ha8e consistently "isunderstood both E#or"ann6s role and his character.E #or"ann )as not interested in the .a"e and glory the rest o. Hitler6s courtesans desired9 according to /tephenson9 he cra8ed the real po)er. FcdA8 #or"ann )as Ethe secret "aster o. a despot9E FcdA8i said >auleiter Hans 4rank. @oachen 8on Cang9 another o. #or"ann6s biographers9 asserted9 E#or"ann no) considered hi"sel. the actual heir o. the hird +eich9E FcdA8ii i. not the one so stated in Hitler6s )ill. #or"ann no) )as looking do)n .ro" the top o. the heap9 and care.ully )atching his ;uibbling cohorts. E hose )ho )ere #or"ann6s ri8als and e8en ene"ies al)ays underesti"ated his abilities9E FcdA8iii la"ented one o. those ene"ies9 :alter /chellenberg. E hey spoke about (#or"ann)9 calling hi" a bootlicker and o.ten a pig9E described Hitler Douth Ceader #aldur 8on /chirach9 continuing9 EI. cartoonists had dra)n his picture9 his shape9 bulk9 short legs9 "ug - it actually )ould ha8e turned out to be a pig.E FcdAiA /chellenberg9 too9 likened hi" to a )ild pig digging .or potatoes. FcdAA 0ost o. Hitler6s retinue si"ply called hi" EHitler6s e8il spiritE FcdAAi9 or E he >ray (or so"eti"es E#ro)nE) 5"inenceE FcdAAii - behind his back9 o. course. #y no) #or"ann )as a general in the // co""anding a 1 "illion "an ar"y= he controlled 8ast su"s o. "oney that he used .reely .or his o)n legal and illegal purposes= he had at his .ingertips enough in.or"ation to pull do)n any party or go8ern"ent leader in the +eich= and he held in his hands the strings that controlled 3dol. Hitler. 3t the end o. the )ar9 nobody in <a7i >er"any had "ore po)er than 0artin #or"ann. <otesB ccclii re8or +oper-/"ith9 he Cetters o. 0artin #or"ann9 p. IQ cccliii @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $8( cccli8 :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. %9 cccl8 :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. $8 cccl8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I1-%99 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 p. $9 8 3pril9 19&-9 +> $%8 - 01219 +oll 82= also Interrogation /u""ary I$-9-9 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 p. $9 $( @une9 19&-9 +> $%8 - 01219 +oll 82 cccl8ii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. $8= @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. p. 129 cccl8iii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 ( /epte"ber9 19&(9 pp. 19 $9 +> $%8 1$-2 +oll $$ cccliA @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 pp. 8-9 12ccclA @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $-1 ccclAi @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 8, ccclAii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. $8( ccclAiii Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. %89 &, ccclAi8 @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $9ccclA8 @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 1-, ccclA8i 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 pp. %229 %21 ccclA8ii @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $%8 ccclA8iii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. $% ccclAiA @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 128 ccclAA :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. ,( ccclAAi Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. $99 &,= @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 pp. 1289 1299 %$8= H.+. re8or-+oper9 he Cetters o. 0artin #or"ann9 p. iA= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 18 ccclAAii *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. %,= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 1, ccclAAiii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 pp. 1,-18 ccclAAi8 *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. 1(1 ccclAA8 @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 19 ccclAA8i @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $2 ccclAA8ii *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. 1($ ccclAA8iii H.+. re8or-+oper9 he Cetters o. 0artin #or"ann9 p. iA9 A= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p.$$ ccclAAiA H.+. re8or-+oper9 he Cetters o. 0artin #or"ann9 p. A= *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. %, ccclAAA 3lan Ce8y9 he :eisenthal 4iles9 pp. $1$9 $1% ccclAAAi 3lan Ce8y9 he :eisenthal 4iles9 p. %19

ccclAAAii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. %2 ccclAAAiii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. %1 ccclAAAi8 *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. %, ccclAAA8 3lan Ce8y9 he :eisenthal 4iles9 p. %19= *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. %, ccclAAA8i Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p.$189 $19 ccclAAA8ii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $%9 ccclAAA8iii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. %ccclAAAiA 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 pp. 12%9 12&= @oachen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. (1 cccAc *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. %,= 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p.12% cccAci 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p.12& cccAcii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. %9= 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 pp. 12&9 11& cccAciii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. (2-(( cccAci8 Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. -,9 --= *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 1(2 cccAc8 *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 pp. --9 -8= 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p. $-1 cccAc8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $(, cccAc8ii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. &9 cccAc8iii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. &( cccAciA @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $9cd @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 12cdi @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 129 cdii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. $8 cdiii 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p. 12& cdi8 @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $-% cd8 @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $(, cd8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I1-%99 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 p. $9 8 3pril9 19&-9 +> $%8 - 01219 +oll 82= also Interrogation /u""ary I$-9-9 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 p. $9 $( @une9 19&-9 +> $%8 - 01219 +oll 82 cd8ii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. (2 cd8iii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. &( cdiA 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p. %21 cdA @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $%8 cdAi 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 p. %21 cdAii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. ,& cdAiii /i"on :eissenthal9 he 0urderers 3"ong !s9 p. %19 cdAi8 Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $9 cdA8 :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 18 cdA8i @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. 128 cdA8ii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %89 %9 cdA8iii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. %9 cdAiA @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $(% cdAA @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $8( cdAAi Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. %9 cdAAii H.+. re8or-+oper9 he Cetters o. 0artin #or"ann9 p. iA

Cha$ter /le-en " !$eration ,ireland E#ury your treasure9 .or you )ill need it to begin a 4ourth +eich.E FcdAAiii 3dol. Hitler o 0artin #or"ann in 19&% E:hen the story o. 0artin #or"ann is )ritten it )ill re8eal hi" to be the "an largely responsible .or :est >er"any6s post)ar reco8ery....E FcdAAi8 he <e) Dork i"es 0arch %9 19-% he turning point against >er"any during :orld :ar )o )as not the loss o. the #attle o. #ritain or the "ounting o. *-*ay on <or"andy6s shores. :hile the air battle o8er Condon )as an i"portant >er"an de.eat that allo)ed #ritain to .ight on - alone at the ti"e - other than as a "oral 8ictory9 taking the islands o. the !nited Hingdo" )ould ha8e had little strategic 8alue to >er"any be.ore the !nited /tates ?oined the con.lict. 3nd by the ti"e 3llied soldiers stor"ed the beaches o. northern 4rance9 the tide o. )ar had already turned against the <a7i horde. *-*ay9 )hile i"perati8e and i"pressi8e9 )as actually the beginning o. "assi8e "op-up operations. *uring the autu"n and )inter o. 19&$9 >er"any su..ered the "ost pi8otal de.eat o. the )ar at the #attle o. /talingrad. 4ro" that day on9 the outco"e o. the )ar )as al"ost .iAed. 3nd al"ost e8erybody kne) it. !ntil the "o"ent )hen Hitler looked up .ro" the strategic ob?ecti8e he )as pursuing in he /o8iet !nion9 the oil.ields and re.ineries o. !kraine to .uel his )ar "achine9 >er"any )as )inning the )ar. #ut the 4uehrer could not resist the "oral 8ictory that taking E/talin6s City9E no) so close9 )ould be. Planning a ;uick ca"paign that )ould take "ere )eeks9 he s)ung his /iAth 3r"y .ro" its course south)ard to)ard the oil.ields and re.ineries9 turned the" to the northeast9 and attacked. he bold "o8e )as at .irst success.ul and /talingrad )as captured. #ut in the .ro7en )inter "onths o. 19&$-&%9 a .our "illion-"an +ussian ar"y surrounded the %%29222-"an .orce o. >eneral 4riederich 8on Paulus. he /o8iets laid siege. hey star8ed the >er"ans. hey ran the" out o. a""unition. hey ran the" o8er on the rock-hard .ro7en sno) under the treads o. their hea8y tanks9 the :ehr"acht in.antry unable to dig .oAholes into the steely ice to a8oid being crushed. #y the ti"e Paulus surrendered9 // .orces had barely been able to break through and rescue only (9222 sur8i8ors. he rest )ere .orce-"arched to /iberia and "ost ne8er heard .ro" again. 3.ter the "oral loss at /talingrad and the tactical loss o. oil to .eed the hungry <a7i )ar "achine9 ulti"ate surrender .or >er"any )as ?ust a "atter o. ti"e9 barring an un.oreseen "iracle. 0artin #or"ann9 true to his pro8en9 prag"atic )ays9 )as uni;uely prepared to deal )ith the .or"er e8entuality9 and possibly capable o. pro8iding the latter. hrough his old .riend at the +eichspost9 +ichard Ohnesorge9 it appears likely he )as supporting a progra" that could .urnish the "iracle needed - 0an.red 8on 3rdenne6s uraniu" enrich"ent progra". he progra" ?ust re;uired enough ti"e. On the other hand9 i. ti"e should run out9 the last thing that 0artin #or"ann )ould allo) his 4atherland to endure )as another rapacious )ar reparations assess"ent like that .orced upon it a.ter :orld :ar One. he 3llies could kill the people9 plunder the land9 rape the )o"en9 and le8el the cities9 but in his shre)dly insight.ul )ay9 #or"ann kne) that they could not o)n >er"any itsel. i. they did not o)n >er"any6s )ealth. In the spring o. 19&%9 #or"ann began to look .or )ays to conser8e the +eich6s riches i. the )ar )as lost. He started )ith 3ktion 4euerland9 EOperation 4ireland.E 3s >er"an .orces had o8errun country a.ter country9 stor"troopers )ould .ollo) behind ad8ance )a8es and plunder each nation6s 8aluables FcdAA8 )hile the >estapo gathered its @e)s into ghettos and concentration ca"ps9 relie8ing the" o. e8ery gra" o. 8aluable property they o)ned= including the gold and platinu" in their teeth. he treasure consisted o. hundreds o. "illions o. reichs"arks= boAes and boAes o. gold and platinu"9 pearls and dia"onds= crates .ull o. the priceless art o. 5urope= and billionaire bundles o. stocks and other securities. FcdAA8i he loot )as a"assed in a series o. bank sa.es and underground 8aults throughout the +eich - until 0artin #or"ann )as "ade a)are o. its eAistence by one o. his "any internal intelligence conduits. In late 19&% he took control o. "uch9 though not all9 o. this booty and in.or"ed Hitler o. its eAistence and a plan he had .or"ulated .or its conser8ation. E#ury your treasure9 .or you )ill need it to begin a 4ourth +eich9E Hitler had responded. :ith that blessing9 #or"ann took control o. at least siA !-boats9 FcdAA8ii so"e o. the" un"arked9 .ro" >ross 3d"iral Harl *oenit79 and garnered the support o. >eneralisi"o 4rancisco 4ranco to head;uarter the !-boats in the /panish port cities o. Cadi7 and 1igo. he !-boats .or the neAt t)o years9 supplied by cargo planes .ro" >er"any that transported the treasures to the coastal to)ns on the 3tlantic9 began a non-stop circuit transporting the treasure to the .ar southern reaches o. 3rgentina - the region kno)n as ierra del 4uego9 or Cand o. 4ire. 3t their destinations they )ere unloaded by #or"ann6s "ysterious "inions and deposited into a 8ariety o. international bank accounts controlled by a cryptic cabal o. #or"ann partners. his )as Operation 4ireland.

#ut #or"ann )as not satis.ied ?ust to rob the // o. the treasure tro8e it had stolen .ro" "urdered @e)s9 plundered citi7ens and o8errun countries. 5arlier in 19&%9 he had recogni7ed .or hi"sel. the 8alue o. "asterpieces hung in "useu"s and those o)ned by Catholic and other churches and held in cathedrals9 "onasteries and con8ents throughout the +eich. He initiated a progra" to collect all that could be gathered and e8en ordered high-ranking "e"bers o. the party )ho had already assi"ilated such art)ork into their o)n collections to turn the" o8er to the Party Chancellery. FcdAA8iii 4ro" this ti"e to the end o. the )ar9 one-third o. Italy6s great art treasures9 and "uch o. the rest o. 5urope6s "aster)orks collections9 )ere lost to the <a7is= a .air share o. it going into #or"ann6s /outh 3"erican hidea)ay. #or"ann appears to ha8e laundered so"e ;uestionable treasures o. his o)n through Operation 4ireland9 as )ell. 4or eAa"ple9 in 19&$ #or"ann started heading a <a7i pro?ect designed to )eaken the #ritish )ar econo"y )hile pro8iding currency to pay .or >er"an ar"a"ents production. he #ritish currencycounter.eiting progra" o8erseen by #or"ann )as printing &229222 notes a "onth9 )hich e8entually totaled K,22 "illion. FcdAAiA #or"ann deposited the "oney into .oreign banks through his "ysterious partners. Cater he eAchanged the .unds into a "ore stable currency9 o.ten dollars9 and then9 instead o. using the .unds .or the "unitions .or )hich they )ere intended9 he )ould o.ten hold the" in one o. his EghostE accounts .or his o)n .uture use. O. the K,22 "illion o. counter.eit currency processed9 approAi"ately K%22 "illion has ne8er been accounted .or9 presu"ably lost to #or"ann6s enig"atic interchange. #or"ann also generated huge su"s o. "oney through a 8ehicle that he had already utili7ed at least t)ice be.ore to the bene.it o. the 4uehrer and the party - the creation o. a .und designed to .inance a speci.ic task and to )hich all able >er"ans )ere co"pelled to contribute. In this case9 the E:inter.undE )as established ostensibly .or the )el.are o. the soldiers and ci8ilians i"po8erished by the )ar. FcdAAA #esides "andatory donations9 the .und )as also supported by )ealthy industrialists )ho )ere )ined and dined at concerts they )ere eApected to attend9 all the )hile being coerced into contributing huge a"ounts o. "oney9 so"eti"es as "uch as 1229222 reichs"arks in a single donation. FcdAAAi 58entually the .und accu"ulated o8er % billion reichs"arks but little o. it )as used .or the support o. the needy. Presu"ably9 at least part9 i. not a great percentage9 o. these .unds "ay ha8e been included in Operation 4ireland. 5sti"ates o. the 8alue o. Operation 4ireland range .ro" the unbelie8ably lo) K1- "illion9 considering the sheer 8olu"e o. non-stop transport 8oyages o. the siA !-boats o8er t)o years9 and subse;uent 8alue o. the treasures9 into the "ore probable hundreds o. "illions and possibly e8en billions o. dollars. #ut Operation 4ireland )as s"all change co"pared to the blockbuster business 8enture #or"ann )ould soon un8eil. 3s the housand Dear +eich began to cru"ble barely a decade a.ter its inception9 "e"ories o. >er"any6s :orld :ar One .ailure )ere still .resh in 0artin #or"ann6s "ind. 3 de8astated citi7enry i"po8erished by the )ar had been saddled )ith yet e8en "ore he.ty burdens than )hat the country had already lost in the con.lict. 4ro" the scant assets that had sur8i8ed9 the >er"ans )ere .orced to pay the costs o. the losses o. the 8ictors9 as )ell= to replace their burnt out cities and to)ns9 the sunken ships and shot do)n airplanes9 their industries and lost re8enues. #ecause the con;uered had so .e) resources le.t that there )ere insu..icient assets )ith )hich to "ake reco"pense9 their .utures )ere "ortgaged - a )hole generation )as indignantly indentured to its "ortal ene"y o. yesterday. :hile the .ighting had ended9 the )ar s"oldered on in the angry hearts o. the 8an;uished9 to erupt t)o decades later in :orld :ar )o. <o) the pattern )as repeating itsel.. #ut the bitter gall o. the last de.eat )as not going to be repeated in this one. <ot )hile 0artin #or"ann had a hand in the outco"e. +eich"inister Her"ann >oering )as responsible .or the +eich6s econo"ic 4our-year Plan and9 as a result9 the econo"ic heads o. all the occupied countries (and surreptitiously9 "any o. the neutral nations9 also) reported to hi". hese countries included 4rance9 #elgiu"9 Holland9 C7echoslo8akia9 *en"ark9 <or)ay9 Dugosla8ia9 3ustria9 Poland9 /pain9 /)eden9 /)it7erland9 urkey9 Portugal9 4inland9 #ulgaria9 and +o"ania 8irtually all o. 5urope eAcept +ussia - and also included "any Catin 3"erican countries. :hat is little kno)n9 ho)e8er9 according to <a7i In 5Aile author Paul 0anning9 is that 0artin #or"ann )as the Party 0inister o. 5cono"ics FcdAAAii and there.ore he o8ersa) all econo"ic issues .or the entire +eich9 e8en outranking Hitler6s then-chosen heir9 >oering9 in .inancial "atters. In this role9 on the heels o. the /talingrad de.eat9 #or"ann had already begun to plan .or the econo"ic protection and resurgence o. >er"any .ollo)ing the )ar. :all /treet @ournal reporter >reg /tein"et7 )rites o. ho) top <a7is prepared .or >er"an post-)ar e"ergence by calling together a "eeting o. "any o. >er"any6s top co"panies in 3ugust 19&&. he "eeting9 held in a hotel in /trasbourg9 4rance9 )as con8ened eApressly Eto discuss .inancing plans .or the 4ourth +eich9E FcdAAAiii according to /tein"et7. /tein"et76s article also included in.or"ation about Operation 4ireland. #y the ti"e the /tein"et7 article ran in 3pril 199-9 ho)e8er9 it )as 8ery old ne)s. *ecades be.ore9 #or"ann biographers Paul 0anning9 :illia" /te8enson and Cadislas 4arago had already )ritten in detail about <a7i eAporting o. plundered treasure and the secret econo"ic su""it in /trasbourg. :hat )as ne) )as the .act no rebu.. o. /tein"et7 or the @ournal appears to ha8e .ollo)ed .or re8ealing the in.or"ation. In the past9 accounts printed about

Operation 4ireland and the /trasbourg Con.erence had been s;uashed or ;uickly debunked. 4or eAa"ple9 )hen this author initially proposed Critical 0ass to a publisher using only Operation 4ireland docu"entation cited by 4arago in his book 3.ter"ath9 I )as told 4arago had .orged and planted the docu"ents )ithin the top secret .iles o. .oreign go8ern"ents in order to support his E.ictitiousE clai"s. 3pparently there had been ;uite an international ro) in the publishing )orld o8er this deception9 )hich occurred )hen I )as too young to ha8e taken notice. 3t any rate9 4arago and his book had been publicly and acri"oniously denounced and 4arago died un8indicated a .e) years later. he publisher6s initial assertions con8inced "e o. the correctness o. the dis"issal o. 4arago6s clai"s9 thus stopping "e .ro" pursuing this book .urther - at least .or a ti"e. I later ca"e across Paul 0anning6s treatise o. the despoiled <a7i loot and the /trasbourg "eeting in his book9 <a7i In 5Aile and again in :illia" /te8enson6s book9 he #or"ann #rotherhood. he sa"e e8ents that 4arago had re8ealed in his book )ere pro8en in these accounts9 as )ell as so"e 8ery i"portant ne) in.or"ation9 but in "any cases using di..erent docu"entation. I contacted a "e"ber o. the intelligence co""unity )ith )ho" I had connections and )ho" I )as told had researched the sub?ect "atter o. these <a7i business dealings. :ithout "entioning 0anning or /te8enson by na"e9 he asserted that )hat they had )ritten about <a7i in8ol8e"ent in post-)ar international business preparations )as true and that !nited /tates go8ern"ent intelligence agencies - he "entioned the CI3 and its predecessor the O// by na"e - had conducted a .ull in;uiry into the issue. He asserted that these agencies had identi.ied all o. the rele8ant business dealings9 had broken up the >er"an cartels and stripped the <a7i o)ners o. their .inancial properties and placed those instru"ents in the hands o. the !nited /tates 3lien Property Custodian progra". He EsharedE this in.or"ation )ith "e in the spirit o. pro8ing that9 )hile certain >er"an business"en and high-ranking <a7is- he "entioned #or"ann speci.ically - tried to sur8i8e the )ar supported by <a7i .unds in8ested by clandestine "eans9 the !nited /tates had .ound and uprooted the deception. here.ore9 he insisted9 there )as no story and no need .or "e to research .urther. #ut i. )hat Paul 0anning and :illia" /te8enson had )ritten about <a7i international business acti8ity is true9 then the sa"e assertions that Cadislas 4arago had earlier )ritten about it are like)ise true9 as is other 8ery essential in.or"ation about )ho they all agreed initiated the /trasbourg Con.erence. he e..ort to 8ili.y 4arago there.ore )as a s"okescreen. :ith the kno)ledge "y original pre"ise )as intact and there )as no) an e..ort being put .orth to .og the truth9 I put .orth9 "ore care.ully9 once again on this book. he .act that the <a7i sche"e had supposedly been put do)n )as o. no account to "e9 the "ere a..ir"ation that the /trasbourg plan )as "ade and initially carried out is the cogent point .or the pre"ise o. this 8olu"e. In later research I disco8ered9 ho)e8er9 that the story about the .inancial properties being eApropriated once and .or all by the !nited /tates go8ern"ent9 )hile true in .or"9 )as not true in reality. It )as yet another e..ort to create a .og behind )hich the truth could be hidden. I .ully eApect that )hen Critical 0ass is published9 it9 too9 )ill be countered in a si"ilar )ay9 or possibly in a di..erent "anner. In any case9 the .act that /tein"et7 )as allo)ed to run his article unchecked )as an i"portant e8ent that begins to blo) the ha7e a)ay .ro" the central truth o. these e8ents. Perhaps the reason the article ran unassailed )as the irreproachable reputation .or integrity o. he :all /treet @ournal and its sheer stature in the )orld o. ?ournalis". Perhaps the article )as allo)ed to run because it )as triggered by a !nited /tates /enate in8estigation initiated in response to <a7i 8icti"s )ho are no) !nited /tates citi7ens trying to retrie8e personal property originally looted .ro" the" by the <a7is. Probably both reasons are true to so"e degree. #ut it is likely the "ost i"portant reason the /tein"et7 article )as allo)ed to run uncontested )as that it still hid the issues at heart9 )hich are )hat the !nited /tates go8ern"ent is really protecting. :hat are those issuesJ he .irst is that 0artin #or"ann )as the central player in the /trasbourg Con.erence. he second is that #or"ann escaped >er"any at the end o. the )ar and li8ed .or "any years rebuilding and controlling the econo"y o. :est >er"any and "uch o. 5urope and Catin 3"erica9 and that he did this all )ith the protection9 support and collusion o. the !nited /tates go8ern"ent. :hile /tein"et76s article does not say so9 0anning6s and /te8enson6s stories both ha8e a central point in co""on regarding the /trasbourg Con.erence= and 4arago6s )ork9 illustrated by other e8ents9 although not detailed in the speci.ics o. the con.erence itsel.9 supports the pointB 0artin #or"ann initiated the con.erence9 controlled it and o8ersa) its results .or "any years .ollo)ing the )ar. #or"ann6s yet unborn 4ourth +eich9 by )ar6s end9 had already ratholed K822 "illion plus 9( tons o. gold. FcdAAAi8 3nd that )as ?ust by )ar6s end. he /trasbourg Con.erence )here #or"ann introduced a ne) econo"ic initiati8e9 )as con8ened under the highest secrecy and security in 3ugust 19&&9 to discuss post-)ar preparations bet)een the <a7i go8ern"ent and the "a?or >er"an industrialists9 as )as so o.ten the pattern )ith other issues since the end o. :orld :ar One. FcdAAA8 #or"ann assigned *r. #osse9 o. the 0inistry o. 3r"a"ents9 and Cieutenant >eneral /heid to conduct the con.erence in his behal.. FcdAAA8i E>er"an industry "ust reali7e that the )ar cannot no) be )on9E #or"ann told /heid9 continuing9 Eand (>er"any) "ust take steps to prepare .or a post)ar co""ercial ca"paign )hich )ill in ti"e insure the

econo"ic resurgence o. >er"any.E FcdAAA8ii :hat #or"ann )as proposing )as de8ious9 conspiratorial and illegal9 e8en )ithin <a7i >er"any. o a8oid security breaches9 there.ore9 he ensured in e8ery possible )ay that the strictest secrecy )as "aintained. he "eeting )as held in a hotel con.erence roo" insulated .ro" 8isual or audio sur8eillance by ha8ing rented all the roo"s abo8e9 belo) and on all sides o. the cha"ber. 3ll attendees and their personal possessions )ere thoroughly inspected physically and electronically by // technicians. FcdAAA8iii High-ranking industrialists .ro" a spectru" o. >er"an .ir"s listened intently to the a"a7ing proposalB 3ll corporations that agreed )ith #or"ann6s plan to conser8e their businesses .or post-)ar operations and to share post-)ar re8enues )ith selected underground <a7i operations )ould9 until such ti"e as the hird +eich .ailed9 be protected by #or"ann .ro" the E reason 3gainst he <ationE la). FcdAAAiA his la) re;uired death .or all those )ho sub8erted currency regulations9 traded in .oreign currency or concealed o)nership o. .oreign currency. he la) also precluded .ir"s .ro" being in8ol8ed in al"ost any type o. partnership9 ?oint 8enture or licensing agree"ent )ith any country outside o. the +eich or the boundaries o. its allies. In reality9 "any o. >er"any6s largest co"panies )ere already engaged in relationships )ith businesses neutral to or hostile to the +eich9 including >er"any6s largest conglo"erate9 I.>. 4arben9 but the go8ern"ent had been turning a blind eye in order to keep the huge a"ount o. capital these co"panies generated rolling in. he )ai8er o. the reason 3gainst the <ation la) proposed at /trasbourg )as there.ore not only an incenti8e to those >er"an co"panies that desired to sur8i8e the )ar but )ere not yet participating in such acti8ities9 but it )as a 8eiled threat to those that )ere already circu"8enting the la). o the" #or"ann )as saying9 in essence9 i. you do not share the )ealth you are already gaining9 )e )ill ha8e your heads by en.orcing the la). he /trasbourg announce"ent9 .or these co"panies9 a"ounted to a .or" o. black"ail= )hich they )ere glad to pay not only to sa8e the"sel8es but to sa8e their co"panies .ro" the post-)ar co""ercial blood bath that )as sure to co"e. 3ccording to *r. #osse9 participating co"panies6 and <a7i .unds )ere to be in8ested in .oreign .inancial institutions )hile the Party "aintained access to the"9 Ein order that a strong >er"an e"pire can be created a.ter de.eat.E FcdAl #osse )ent on to eAplainB EIndustrialists )ith go8ern"ent assistance F"eaning )ith #or"ann as their "entor and protector - author6s noteG )ill eAport as "uch o. their capital as possible9 capital "eaning "oney9 bonds9 patents9 scientists and ad"inistrators.EF FcdAliG :hile hard currency )as 8aluable9 the currency )ith real potential )as the Eso.t capitalE the industrialist .ir"s heldB the trade agree"ents9 patents and braintrusts that generated colossal re8enues in perpetuity. he potential inco"e o. such intellectual and proprietary properties as international licenses sold to use the patents on stainless steel9 synthetic .uels and rubbers and other co""ercial ad8ances9 and control o. the braintrusts )ho created the" )as huge9 generating "illions9 possible tens or hundreds o. "illions o. dollars per year. 0any international co"panies9 such as #ayer9 :inthrop Che"ical9 3>43-3</CO9 Hoescht and *uPont to a large degree o)ed their eAistence and continuing prosperity to eAclusi8e use o. I.>. 4arben patents and licenses alone. FcdAlii In addition to eAporting technologies9 the >er"an .ir"s )ere directed to borro) against these and other assets to obtain "ore hard capital and thus be able to "ore ;uickly eAport additional hard currency FcdAliii into )hat )as no) being called #or"ann6s E4light CapitalE progra". echnical and business bureaus )ere to be established .or each industry and in each .oreign o..ice o. each co"pany9 )ith a co8ert <a7i liaison o..icer in each o..ice to o8ersee and9 )here possible9 personally "anage the operations. FcdAli8 4ro" a"ong these liaisons >er"an econo"ic specialists success.ully penetrated 11 nations6 econo"ies9 in addition to >er"any6s9 and e8entually controlled the" in the post-)ar period. FcdAl8 #osse reported to #or"ann a.ter the "eeting that the ter"s o. the /trasbourg con.erence had been agreed to by all in8ol8ed and there.ore the ne) 4light Capital Progra" had been success.ully initiated. FcdAl8i #or"ann in turn established -(2 ca"ou.laged corporations under the na"es o. co"panies or indi8iduals .or )hich he held po)er o. attorney9 and there.ore o8er )hich he had total control9 FcdAl8ii as 8ehicles .or "anaging the inco"e o. the 4light Capital Progra". hese businesses )ere scattered across countries throughout 5urope9 the 0id-east and Catin 3"erica. Holdings )ere e8en kept in bank accounts in the !nited /tates o. 3"erica9 FcdAl8iii so"e o. )hich e8entually )ere in his o)n na"e9 including accounts )ith 0anu.acturers Hano8er rust9 he Chase 0anhattan #ank9 and 4irst <ational City #ank9 according to author Paul 0anning. 3lthough not listed as a co"pany represented at the /trasbourg con.erence9 >er"any6s largest industrial cartel9 the che"ical concern I.>. 4arben9 )as acti8e in the 4light Capital Progra" as )ell. In .act9 it had not been necessary .or 4arben representati8es to attend the progra"6s introduction at all because it6s leader9 chair"an and president Her"ann /ch"it79 had been integrally in8ol8ed in the 4light Capital Progra"6s creation. I.>. 4arben had supported the <a7i cause .ro" the beginning o. the its cli"b to po)er9 ha8ing donated generously through 4arben6s intelligence9 propaganda and political econo"ic operations9 kno)n as I.>. <:-. FcdAliA In his :all /treet @ournal article9 /tein"et7 un)ittingly hints at this in8ol8e"ent - and

particularly at the 4light Capital Progra" - in a portion o. the article that re8ie)s reports that >er"any6s #osch 3> co"pany during the )ar allied )ith the )ealthy :allenberg .a"ily o. /)eden to ca"ou.lage >er"an .unds. +obert #osch9 the .ounder o. #osch 3>9 )as the uncle o. Carl #osch9 Fcdl the .ounder o. I.>. 4arben. Close relationships )ere "aintained bet)een the co"panies. #e.ore taking Carl #osch6s place at the head o. I.>. 4arben9 /ch"it7 had been #osch6s top lieutenant and handpicked successor. Fcdli He had o8erseen all o. I.>. 4arben6s international business9 and9 bet)een the )ars9 )as responsible .or concealing 4arben6s huge global inco"e .ro" >er"an taA ad"inistrators through the use o. .oreign EblindsE he had created. hese ca"ou.lage de8ices operated re"arkably like the alleged arrange"ent bet)een #osch 3.>. and the :allenberg6s. Fcdlii #e.ore the )ar9 /ch"it7 took o8er the hel" o. I.>. 4arben and had beco"e a close Econ.idant and ad8isor to 0artin #or"ann9E Fcdliii )rites Paul 0anning in his book 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile. 0anning adds that #or"ann )as a student in a sort o. personal9 and con.idential9 tutelage under /ch"it7. Fcdli8 #or"ann9 in .act9 surreptitiously ga8e the title o. E/ecret Councilor to the <a7i Party and 0artin #or"ann9E to Her"ann /ch"it79 Fcdl8 in return .or the latter6s intellectual contributions and "entoring. !nder /ch"it76s direction and )ith the co"plicity o. #or"ann9 I.>. 4arben looted the che"ical properties o. the nations >er"any had con;ueredB 3ustria9 C7echoslo8akia9 Poland9 <or)ay and 4rance. Fcdl8i #y the end o. the )ar9 4arben had interests in o8er -22 co"panies9 not including operations )ithin its o)n corporate structure that stretched across 9% countries. Fcdl8ii In all9 /ch"it79 in league )ith #or"ann9 )ho cleared the path o. go8ern"ent constraints9 eApanded 4arben6s .oreign in8est"ent to at least - billion reichs"arks during the )ar. Fcdl8iii 3s the t)o "en )ea8ed their )eb they "ade "any pacts= a"ong the" one that ensured all 4arben leaders o8erseas )ere <a7i Party "e"bers accountable to 0artin #or"ann - a precursor to the 4light Capital Progra". :orking together9 the t)o "en eApanded this relationship to other >er"an .ir"s in the .or" o. the 4light Capital Progra". he ob?ecti8e o. the 4light Capital Progra" )as not to "ake "oney in and o. itsel.. he ob?ecti8e #or"ann6s "aster plan - )as to sa8e and protect >er"any6s industries and econo"y .ro" being looted at the hands o. the con;uerors as had happened at the end o. the 4irst :orld :ar. 3.ter the )ar9 the 4light Capital Progra" )ould control and direct not only the >er"an econo"y9 but also other econo"ies linked to the underground 4atherland9 in an e..ort to produce a ;uick >er"an rebirth and e8entual 5uropean econo"ic do"ination. #or"ann and /ch"it7 "et on "ultiple occasions )hile de8eloping the 4light Capital Progra". FcdliA /o thoroughly did #or"ann capture all o. the .unds trans.erred out o. the +eich that )hen Her"ann /ch"it7 died in 19,29 at the age o. -99 he )as nearly a pauper. FcdlA E o this day no one has been able to eAplain )hat happened to his .ortune. 4e) )ho kne) hi" can belie8e it doesn6t eAist9E )rote @oseph #orkin9 author o. he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben. /trategies .or co8ertly redeploying the econo"y included the i"ple"entation o. a E.oreign trade o..ensi8e9E according to Peter Hayes6 book Industry and echnologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra. FcdlAi hey also included a E65uropean econo"ic co""unity6E that positioned >er"any as the hub and E.lag bearerE o. a con.ederated 5urope that )ould Epredo"inate by 6elastic political "ethods6... not )ith brutal .orce.E hese ele"ents are certainly recogni7able in the history o. post-)ar 5urope as it actually un.olded9 and9 in .act9 continues )ith a high pro.ile in the 5uropean econo"ic "odel o. today. he e8idence re.lects that the 4light Capital Progra" and #or"ann6s partnership )ith I.>.4arben not only paid o.. as planned9 but it set the .oundation .or the 5uropean econo"y o. today9 and by eAtension that o. the )orld. #ut in 3pril 19&(9 )ith #erlin succu"bing to the +ussian siege9 a hysterical Hitler 8isibly cru"bling in .ront o. hi"9 and the +eich reeling in its death thro)s9 #or"ann9 true to his brutish9 realistic9 prag"atic nature and leaning hea8ily on his inco"parable bureaucratic procli8ities9 )as .ocused on escaping. #or"ann )as )illing9 able and sel.-authori7ed to negotiate any agree"ent that secured his - and presu"ably9 at one ti"e9 the 4uehrer6s - escape. /ignals .ro" E he #ro)n 5"inence6sE radios bounced to and .ro" 8arious >er"an generals authori7ed to negotiate )ith +ussian and !nited /tates "ilitary leaders. he 3llies9 in co"plete control and deter"ined to achie8e nothing but total and unconditional surrender - out)ardly at least - )ould not negotiate. 5scape )as the only option. <otesB cdAAiii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $9 cdAAi8 Paul 0anning9 <e) Dork i"es9 0arch %9 19-%9 p. %19 colu"n $ cdAA8 Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. $21-$2%= Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $2-9 $28= 3lan Ce8y9 he :eisenthal 4ile9 p. $$$ cdAA8i >reg /tein"et79 he :all /treet @ournal9 $8 3pril9 199-= Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $2-= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. $21-$2%= 3lan Ce8y9 he :eisenthal 4ile9 p. $$$ cdAA8ii >reg /tein"et79 he :all /treet @ournal9 $8 3pril9 199-= Harry Cooper9 /harkhunters H # 12&9 p. 8= Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $2-= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. $2$ cdAA8iii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 pp. 1-$9 1-%9 18%

cdAAiA :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 1(2-1($ cdAAA Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. $$2. $$1 cdAAAi Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. && cdAAAii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 11& cdAAAiii >reg /tein"et79 he :all /treet @ournal9 $8 3pril9 199cdAAAi8 :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. ,, cdAAA8 Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $%= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. ,cdAAA8i Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $% cdAAA8ii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $& cdAAA8iii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $& cdAAAiA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $( cdAl Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $, cdAli Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $cdAlii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 11cdAliii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $( cdAli8 Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $,9 $cdAl8 Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 11& cdAl8i Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $cdAl8ii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 11= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. ,8 cdAl8iii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. 1%99 $2( cdAliA +ay"ond >. /tokes9 *i8ide and Prosper9 p. $& cdl @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. (, cdli @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 1,( cdlii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 182 cdliii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 caption9 second photo section cdli8 Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 11& cdl8 Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 11& cdl8i @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. $ cdl8ii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1(% cdl8iii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $8 cdliA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. 1(--1,$= Peter Hayes9 Industry and echnologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra9 p. %,8 cdlA @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 1,, cdlAi Peter Hayes9 Industry and IdeologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra9 p. %,8

Cha$ter T*el-e " The Pig ,inds A Potato EIrre.utable proo. eAists that a s"all plane le.t the iergarten at da)n on 3pril %29 .lying in the direction o. Ha"burg. hree "en and a )o"an are kno)n to ha8e been on board. It has also been established that a large sub"arine le.t Ha"burg be.ore the arri8al o. the #ritish .orces. 0ysterious persons )ere on board the sub"arine....E FcdlAii 4ro" a /o8iet intelligence co""ission o. in;uiry report9 as ;uoted by @a"es 0c>o8ern9 CI3 agent in charge o. researching the post-)ar sur8i8al o. 0artin #or"ann E/talin told Harry Hopkins in 0osco) that he belie8ed #or"ann escaped. <o) he )ent .urther and said it )as #or"ann )ho got a)ay in the .leeing !-boat. 0ore than that /talin re.used to disclose.E FcdlAiii :illia" /te8enson author he #or"ann #rotherhood E hat da"n 0artin "ade it sa.ely out o. >er"any.E FcdlAi8 :alter #uch op <a7i ?udge and 0artin #or"ann6s .ather-in-la)9 upon his deathbed EO. course F#or"ann escapedG. He is a natural sur8i8or.E FcdlA8 Colonel >eneral 3l.red @odl 3t the signing o. the 5uropean capitulation )hen asked i. 0artin #or"ann "ade it sa.ely out o. #erlin 4or o8er .i.ty years a debate has raged about )hether 0artin #or"ann escaped .ro" #erlin in the spring o. 19&( or )hether he )as killed in a .iery eAplosion on :iedenda""er #ridge in that city9 or )hether he "ysteriously died a .e) hours later at the Cehrter /tation #ridge a .e) "iles a)ay. O8er that hal.-century9 so "any accounts o. his last days in #erlin ha8e been generated9 .abricated9 a"ended9 "odi.ied9 denied9 rebutted9 in8estigated9 eApunged9 reborn9 reshaped and abridged that nothing is certain but a black "ist o. con.usion and suspicion that hangs o8er the )hole a..air like a thick pall. Indeed9 the truth "ay ne8er be kno)n. <ot ?ust because the e8idence supporting any outco"e is inconclusi8e9 but because there see"s to be .e) participants )ho )ere or are ob?ecti8e on the "atter9 and there.ore the testi"ony and e8idence they pro8ide "ust9 o. prudence9 be 8ie)ed )ith 8arying degrees o. skepticis". :hat is kno)n9 despite the bleak picture that is al)ays painted9 is that 92 percent o. those )ho )ere in the bunker at the end sur8i8ed. FcdlA8i :hy not 0artin #or"annJ he only Eeye )itnessesE to #or"ann6s death did not actually 8eri.y either that they )ere certain they sa) hi" die9 or that they )ere sure they sa) hi" in death. 3ll eye )itnesses )ere a8o)ed <a7is and there.ore "ay ha8e had 8ested interests in the )orld thinking #or"ann )as dead9 and there.ore9 the argu"ent goes9 "ay ha8e pro8ided "isin.or"ation in e8idence o. his death. 3dditional Eproo.sE o. #or"ann6s de"ise beyond the eye )itness accounts did not sur.ace until decades later. he 8eracity o. their pro8enance has been e..ecti8ely argued pro and con since. hose )ho argue .or his death9 "ost notably the >er"an go8ern"ent and9 in a "ore innocuous "anner9 certain !nited /tates agencies9 al"ost in8ariably ha8e i"portant interests o. their o)n to protect. 0any o. those )ho say he sur8i8ed see" to ha8e their reasons .or "aintaining his ongoing eAistence9 as )ell9 so"eti"es based on only the .li"siest e8idence to support their clai"s9 but o.ten )ith substantially "ore con.ir"ation. he e8idence9 in .act9 is signi.icant in support o. both theories and9 despite clai"s o. certainty by both ca"ps9 a detailed study o. all the e8idence a8ailable tends to "uddy the already shado)y history beyond e8er .inding certain resolution. #ut by .iltering the in.or"ation through t)o criteria9 one "ay possibly gain9 i. not a crystal clear understanding o. the outco"e o. e8ents9 at least the "ost probable outco"e o. #or"ann6s last days in #erlin that can be belie8ed )ith so"e con.idence. One o. these criteria is to look at disassociated stories surrounding these e8ents and see )hat parallels "ight 8eri.y each other and create a strong enough pattern to 8alidate a gi8en scenario. he other criteria is that o. ?udiciously )eighing the e8idence against )ho presented and'or supports it9 in an e..ort to identi.y and properly interpret political and other in.luences that "ay ha8e "oti8ated and de.ined the in.or"ation presented. #y co"bining these t)o "ethods o. analy7ing the in.or"ation9 a relati8ely coherent and belie8able - in .act9 this author belie8es9 probable though disturbing - picture .or"s. he o..icial 8ersion o. #or"ann6s last days ends )ith his death at the Cehrter /tation #ridge. Or possibly he died not .ar a)ay at :iedenda""er #ridge a .e) kilo"eters north o. the +eichs Chancellery building9 under )hich 3dol. Hitler6s bunker )as hidden. he Eeye )itnessE accounts disagree. 3ccording to reports later pro8ided by occupants o. the bunker9 in the late hours o. 1 0ay9 19&( the s"all gaggle o. sur8i8ors still burro)ed in the 4uehrer #unker a.ter Hitler6s suicide separated into a .e) s"all

groups and9 at inter8als9 sneaked out o. the ground and into the .right.ul night. 3rtillery and tank shells )ere .alling indiscri"inately around the". 3 .e) hundred "eters a)ay9 the sounds o. gun.ire could be heard as .ire.ights occurred in the darkness9 splashing the acrid9 s"oky air )ith bursts o. red and streaks o. light. 5ach group )as responsible to .ind its o)n )ay to sa.ety. In one o. these pathetic patrols reportedly stalked the potbellied9 short-legged9 bull-necked pro.ile o. 0artin #or"ann9 co""ander o. the <a7i party and Hitler6s closest con.idant. 3ccording to the pro8ided scenario9 the s"all group slo)ly picked its )ay through the bo"bshells9 bodies and debris littering the streets to a local sub)ay station9 )here9 once again9 it slipped under co8er o. earth. :alking the rails in the dark sub)ay tunnels9 the silent group o. stragglers "ade its )ay north9 )here it again sur.aced to .ind a "eans to cross the /pree +i8er. 3t :iedenda""er #ridge the group ran into hea8y .ighting bet)een >er"an tanks and +ussian .orces. One story asserts that #or"ann tried to cross the bridge under co8er o. a >er"an tank na8igating the narro) span. he tank )as shelled by a ba7ooka and eAploded in a 8iolent burst o. .la"e9 killing #or"ann FcdlA8ii according to Eeye)itnessE 5rich He"pka9 Hitler6s chau..er and a "e"ber o. the 4uehrer #unker escape party. He"pka ad"itted during his <ure"burg testi"ony at #or"ann6s in absentia trial9 that he did not approach the body to con.ir" #or"ann had been killed but )as certain .ro" the eAtent o. the 8iolent blast and the "anner in )hich #or"ann6s body )as seen E.lying a)ay9E FcdlA8iii that the +eichsleiter )as dead. 3t least .our others o. Hitler6s trusted insiders reported seeing 8irtually the sa"e e8ent9 but again9 none had inspected the body or could declare )ith certainty it )as dead9 though all )ere con8inced o. it. FcdlAiA <ot to )orry9 a siAth eye)itness later clai"ed to ha8e obser8ed the e8ents at :eidenda""er #ridge9 also9 and to be able to 8eri.y #or"ann )as killed by the tank blast. 5Acept this )itness9 the /paniard @uan +ocaPinar9 )ho9 as an a8o)ed <a7i )as .ighting near the bridge as part o. a s"all // unit9 later reported that #or"ann )as not at the side o. the tank but riding inside the tank )hen it )as hit by the ba7ooka shell. FcdlAA +oca-Pinar reported that he )as ordered to board the tank and sa8e #or"ann9 but )hen he opened the hatch to rescue sur8i8ors9 he .ound #or"ann dead .ro" the blast. He nonetheless pulled #or"ann6s corpse .ro" the tank be.ore being .orced to abandon it in the street under pressure o. ene"y .ire. Harry 0engerhausen9 a "e"ber o. Hitler6s bodyguard9 agreed )ith +oca-Pinar - #or"ann had been inside a tank. #ut he declared .ir"ly that #or"ann )as not killed in the blast because he )as not in the tank hit9 but in an entirely di..erent tank. FcdlAAi he con.licting stories9 )hile containing signi.icant discrepancies9 at least agreed9 )ith the eAception o. 0engerhausen9 that #or"ann died during a tank eAplosion on :eidenda""er #ridge. #ut other accounts soon spun these see"ingly si"ilar scenarios on their heads. 3rtur 3A"ann9 the one-ar"ed leader o. the Hitler Douth9 clai"ed to ha8e run into #or"ann a.ter the :eidenda""er #ridge catastrophe and asserted that #or"ann )as ali8e9 )ell and co"pletely unhar"ed. FcdlAAii In .act9 the t)o "en9 in co"pany o. others9 tried .or so"e ti"e to escape together be.ore later separating to .ind their o)n passages to .reedo". 3A"ann headed )est9 but9 .inding the )ay blocked9 subse;uently retraced his steps and clai"s to ha8e again co"e across #or"ann and *r. /tu"p.egger9 one o. Hitler6s physicians9 on a railroad trestle at the Cehrter 4airgrounds train station. #or"ann and /tu"p.egger )ere lying side by side on the bridge and appeared to be dead= 3A"an leaned close to #or"ann6s body to check .or breathing and could discern none. He later )ould not s)ear )ith certainty9 ho)e8er9 that the +eichsleiter )as dead. Indeed9 their EdeathsE )ere strange. <either corpse had any indication o. being )ounded or in?ured or sho)ed any signs o. 8iolence - ;uite out o. line )ith the reports .ro" :eidenda""er bridge9 e8en i. #or"ann had sur8i8ed the tank blast - and .urther "ysti.ying gi8en their deaths ha8ing taken place during a hea8y battle. hey lay cal"ly neAt to each other in peace.ul repose9 their ar"s resting casually at their sides9 as i. they had lain9 or so"ebody had lain the"9 there. 3A"ann )ondered i. they had been poisoned or poisoned the"sel8es9 but could think o. no reason )hy they should do so9 eAcept perhaps that they had lost hope o. escape and pre.erred not to be captured. He le.t the bodies )here he .ound the" and e8entually escaped to the yrol to co""and a s"all band o. Hitler Douth deter"ined to keep .ighting a.ter the )ar. 3"erican .orces captured hi" there. 3nd so the se"i-o..icial 8ersion o. #or"ann6s de"ise is dubiously docu"ented in a "elee o. "isaligned eAplanations and see"ingly uneAplainable inconsistencies. he picture )ould get .urther obscured. 3 rash o. post-)ar #or"ann sightings across 5urope began to be reported. He )as in /)eden9 Italy9 /pain9 *en"ark9 >er"any9 /)it7erland9 <or)ay9 e8en as .ar a)ay as 3rgentina. 0any sightings )ere eAplained a)ay as "isidenti.ications. Others )ent uneAplained. /talin )as sure he )as ali8e and accused the !nited /tates o. hiding hi". FcdlAAiii he e8idence .or his death )as so uncertain that a year a.ter his reported de"ise9 the <ure"burg court con8ened by the 3llies to bring )ar cri"inals to ?ustice9 tried and con8icted #or"ann in absentia9 thinking .ro" the e8idence that it )as probable #or"ann had sur8i8ed the )ar. :ith so "any sightings and so "any unans)ered ;uestions9 people - and go8ern"ent agencies - began the ;uest to ans)er the contro8ersy o8er #or"ann6s .ate. 3rticles and books .looded the "edia arguing that #or"ann died - and arguing that

#or"ann li8ed. /earches began .or e8idence that pro8ed either case. he sightings continued9 but al"ost no hard e8idence )as .ound9 though "uch )as clai"ed. <e) theories and additions to the eAisting stories began to appear9 and then e8en to be re8ersed= such as that asserted by /i"on :eisenthal. 3.ter .ir"ly assuring the )orld .or "any years that #or"ann had sur8i8ed - and strongly hinting that he kne) )here the .ugiti8e resided FcdlAAi8G :eisenthal abruptly re8ersed hi"sel. and asserted that #or"ann had co""itted suicide that night in #erlin )hen he reali7ed escape )as not possible. FcdlAA8 Historian Hugh re8or-+oper9 considered by "any to be the leading eApert on #or"ann6s .ate9 reported he )as dead9 then ali8e9 then dead9 then ali8e again. :hat caused these s)eeping re8ersals is hard to kno)9 but they illustrate the high state o. con.usion and uncertainty around #or"ann6s .ate. @ournalist Paul 0anning9 .or his part9 reported that #or"ann )as ali8e9 thanks to the help o. >estapo Chie. Heinrich 0ueller9 )ho had searched .or9 and .ound in the /achsenhausen concentration ca"p9 a "an )ho could ser8e as a EdoubleE .or #or"ann. 0ueller6s assistance can be attributed to the .act that he not only "ay ha8e o)ed his position to #or"ann9 but Hitler had ordered #or"ann to ser8e as a go-bet)een .or 0ueller and his direct superior Heinrich Hi""ler9 FcdlAA8i )ho" 0ueller hated. In the "onths prior to 0ueller6s and #or"ann6s anticipated escapes - both "en .elt surrender )as a probability that ought to be prepared .or - 0ueller ordered that the double be coached to beha8e like #or"ann and that his dental )ork be redone to "atch that o. the +eichsleiter6s. FcdlAA8ii :hile the clai" o. a double .or #or"ann initially see"s .ar-.etched9 one "ust re"e"ber that it )as 0ueller )ho .ound9 arranged and prepared the )ellkno)n double .or Hitler9 presu"ably under #or"ann6s orders since #or"ann held ulti"ate responsibility .or Hitler6s sa.ety. he 4uehrer6s bodyguard9 and e8en his pilots9 )ere under #or"ann6s co""and. 0anning eAplained .urther that he )as pro8ided the initial in.or"ation about #or"ann6s double .ro" a highly placed #ritish intelligence source. He recei8ed con.ir"ation o. the incredible story .ro" one o. >eneral +einhard >ehlen6s top aids. FcdlAA8iii 0anning subse;uently treated the account as accurate and ne8er ;uestioned the story. Indeed9 the suggestion that a double actually Estood inE .or 0artin #or"ann during the last kno)n day o. his li.e resol8es "any ano"alies about the e8ents o. 1 0ay9 19&(. >eneral >ehlen )as Hitler6s chie. intelligence o..icer .or 5astern 5urope be.ore the >er"an surrender9 at )hich ti"e >ehlen beca"e the Central 5uropean eApert .or the CI39 and e8entually head o. the secret ser8ice in the 4ederal +epublic o. >er"any. FcdlAAiA He )as9 nonetheless9 still .inanced by 3"erican "oney and thus pro8ided 3"erica )ith 5ast-bloc intelligence. FcdlAAA 3ccording to 0anning9 the #or"ann post-)ar story )as at one point e8en .urther con8oluted )hen >ehlen )as .orced by the CI3 to )rite in his "e"oirs that #or"ann )as a /o8iet spy )ho had died in +ussia in 19,9. It )as one o. the agency6s "any e..orts to ob.uscate the .acts around #or"ann6s .ate9 to "ake any clear eAploration i"possible. >ehlen later retracted the clai". O8er t)o decades passed be.ore the .irst physical e8idence suggesting #or"ann6s .ate sur.aced. 3t that ti"e9 a report )as unco8ered that )as )ritten shortly a.ter #or"ann disappeared. he report declared the +ussians had .ound #or"ann6s and *r. /tu"p.egger6s bodies )here 3A"ann had said they )ere9 on the Cehrter /tation #ridge9 and the +ussians had the corpses buried a .e) "eters a)ay in the Cehrter .airgrounds ?ust days a.ter the city6s surrender. FcdlAAAi hey identi.ied the body .ro" a ?ournal o. #or"ann6s that )as .ound in the pocket o. the dead "an6s o8ercoat. FcdlAAAii In the "id-19,2s9 the >er"an /tate o. Hesse asked that the body be eAhu"ed9 but )hen eAcessi8e digging )here the body )as reportedly buried ca"e up e"pty9 the ;uest )as abandoned. FcdlAAAiii hen in *ece"ber 19-$9 ?ust as t)o separate series o. articles by Cadislas 4arago and Paul 0anning began being published that con8incingly argued that #or"ann had escaped #erlin9 FcdlAAAi8 a construction cre) EaccidentallyE unearthed t)o skulls and so"e bones $2 yards .ro" the location pre8iously dug up by the o..icial #or"ann search party. FcdlAAA8 he skull )as eAa"ined to see i. it )as #or"ann6s but there )as a proble"B no records o. #or"ann6s dentistry or any other identi.ication "arks that could be co"pared against the skeletal re"ains )ere eAtant. he only record a8ailable )as a sketch dra)n .ro" "e"ory by #or"ann6s by-then-deceased dentist9 *r.Hugo #laschke9 )ho dre) the sketches during interrogations .or the <ure"berg trials. FcdlAAA8i he accuracy o. the chart )as attested to by 4rit7 5cht"ann9 a dental technician )ho had ne8er actually seen #or"ann6s teeth9 but )ho had built a dental bridge .or a patient he Eassu"edE )as #or"ann9 based on data gi8en by *r. #laschke. !sing this data9 the pathologists in the case co"pared the sketch )ith the unearthed skulls and proclai"ed a "atch. he riddle o. the .ate o. 0artin #or"ann had been sol8edB 0artin #or"ann had died on Cehrter #ridge in #erlin on $ 0ay9 19&( as 3rtur 3A"ann had asserted= all o. the stories regarding his sur8i8al9 there.ore9 )ere .alse. he 8ersion )as "ade se"i-o..icial )ith a press con.erence9 although it )as not certi.ied or recogni7ed by a court. FcdlAAA8ii 3 great "any ?ournalists therea.ter reported that the search )as o8er and the )hole )orld could breath easier kno)ing that Hitler6s closest con.idant )as dead and gone. One o. the great unans)ered secrets o. :orld :ar )o no) )as resol8ed. 5Acept the skull probably )as not #or"ann6s. In 19(%9 al"ost $2 years be.ore the skull )as .ound and eight

years a.ter it had been buried9 CI3 agent @a"es 0c>o8ern )as operating in #erlin )ith the assign"ent o. 8eri.ying .or his agency )hat had happened to #or"ann. He later )rote that in discussions on the "atter )ith the H>#9 the CI3 had learned that #or"ann6s body had been identi.ied9 by "eans o. the diary .ound in the pocket o. the corpse6s o8ercoat9 )ithin days o. its burial at Cehrter /tation9 and 0osco) had ordered that the body be disinterred. FcdlAAA8iii he corpse )as dug up and re"o8ed - presu"ably to conduct .orensic testing to see i. it )as9 indeed9 0artin #or"ann6s re"ains. he re"nants )ere subse;uently reburied else)here in 5ast >er"any. I. the /o8iet report that the body )as buried so"e)here outside o. #erlin is true9 #or"ann6s re"ains could not ha8e been at Cehrter /tation )hen the skull )as dug up by )ork"en. here.ore9 the skull .ound there could not ha8e been #or"ann6s and the identi.ication o. the skull as his9 )as9 at the least9 a serious "istake o. ine..iciency and sloppiness9 and at the )orst9 a .raud. Indeed9 Cadislas 4arago docu"ents that the skull )as actually .our skulls9 or it at least )ent through .our iterations9 FcdlAAAiA each succeeding craniu" beco"ing "ore and "ore aligned )ith the dental sketch o. *r. #laschke as succeeding co"plaints ca"e in about ob8ious inconsistencies. In .act9 )rites 4arago9 Pro.essor +eider 4. /ognnaes9 a specialist in oral biology and anato"y )ho had positi8ely identi.ied Hitler6s burnt corpse .ro" its dental records9 )as so uncertain o. the positi8e #or"ann skull identi.ication that he )rote a letter o. concern to :est >er"an Chancellor :illy #randt. /ognnaes later stated9 according to 4arago Ethat he did not belie8e that the skull .ound...)as the skull o. #or"ann.E FcdAc 0anning con.ir"s this e8idence regarding the skull9 )riting that one o. >eneral >ehlen6s aids - one o. three independent sources re.uting the clai"s about the skull con.ided to hi" that Ethe skull is a .raud.E FcdAci In the latest de8elop"ent regarding the skull9 *<3 tests )ere begun in 0ay 199- and a positi8e identi.ication o. #or"ann )as announced in 0ay 19989 though no speci.ic results ha8e been "ade public. FcdAcii /uch a .inding )ould be the .inal )ord on the "atter i. the pro8enance o. the skull )as i"peccable and the disposition o. those )ho controlled the relic )as beyond ;uestion neutral. #ut9 as has been sho)n9 the incontinuities regarding the skull6s )hereabouts .or al"ost t)o decades9 the reported gross inconsistencies bet)een the dubious dental records and the ne)-.ound skull itsel.9 the (2-odd years that ha8e transpired since #or"ann6s disappearance at age &( - "eaning that #or"ann al"ost certainly had died by 199- and his handlers "ay ha8e sub"itted sa"ples .ro" his actual skull .or *<3 testing - and the .act he )as not e8en in the gra8e to begin )ith9 i. the /o8iet report is true9 all co"bine to cast considerable doubt upon the authenticity o. the *<3 tests. One last possibility is )orth "entioning regarding *<3 testing o. the skull. I. the /o8iet report is )rong and the skull disco8ered )as actually that o. the person buried in Cehrter /tation )ith *r./tu"p.egger9 it probably )as that o. #or"ann6s double. 0ueller9 under #or"ann6s direction as chie. o. Hitler6s security9 had success.ully .ound a double .or Hitler in one o. the 4uehrer6s distant cousins. 0ight he ha8e done the sa"e .or #or"ann )hen de8eloping #or"ann6s doubleJ @a"es O6*onnell9 author o. he #unker9 noticed on a personal 8isit to #or"ann6s ho"eto)n that a large percentage o. the people there looked like #or"ann9 and )ere possible relations. FcdAciii I. the body )as that o. a #or"ann relati8e9 *<3 tests ;uite possibly )ould ha8e sho)n a "atch )ith the *<3 pro8ided by another relati8e9 )ithout the skull being that o. 0artin #or"ann. In all cases9 the identity o. the skull .ound at Cehrter /tation is .ar .ro" abo8e suspicion. he author belie8es9 )hen considered against the preponderance o. other e8idence and the pro8enance o. the skull itsel.9 the skull "ost likely is not that o. 0artin #or"ann. /o )hat really happened to 0artin #or"annJ 3"ong the "any scenarios detailing #or"ann6s escape9 although it )as ne8er gi8en )eight in the :est9 )as an accusation @oseph /talin "ade stating /o8iet intelligence had reported #or"ann )as .lo)n out o. #erlin in a s"all airplane on the da)n o. %2 3pril. FcdAci8 Irre.utable proo. eAists that a s"all plane le.t the iergarten at da)n on 3pril %29 .lying in the direction o. Ha"burg. hree "en and a )o"an are kno)n to ha8e been on board. It has also been established that a large sub"arine le.t Ha"burg be.ore the arri8al o. the #ritish .orces. 0ysterious persons )ere on board the sub"arine.... FcdAc8 In addition9 according to author :illia" /te8enson9 E/talin told Harry Hopkins in 0osco) that he belie8ed #or"ann escaped. <o) he )ent .urther and said it )as #or"ann )ho got a)ay in the .leeing !-boat. 0ore than that /talin re.used to disclose.E FcdAc8i /talin later reiterated his belie.9 clai"ing that #or"ann )as being harbored by the !nited /tates go8ern"ent in his escape and continued .reedo". he 3llies9 led by the !nited /tates9 re.used to gi8e this story credence and ignored /talin6s de"ands .or an eAplanation9 and9 in .act9 began clai"ing in de.ense that the /o8iets held #or"ann. #ut /talin insisted until his death that his )as the correct account o. 0artin #or"ann6s .ate. :hy )ould /talin "ake such a clai"J :hat did he stand to loose i. it )as trueJ :hat 8alue could he gain .ro" such an assertion i. he kne) it )as .alseJ 3nd i. it )ere true9 )hy )ould the !nited /tates discount it out o. handJ hese see" to be the ob8ious ;uestions concerning the "atter. #ut e;ually i"portant9 though "uch less glaring9 are the s"all ;uestions= the ;uestions about the innocuous details that "ake up the .abric o. /talin6s 8ery speci.ic story. I. /talin )as not telling the truth9 )hy )ould he include such uni;ue and

see"ingly contestable details as the .act the airplane carried .our people )hen the only t)o airplanes capable o. using the ad hoc run)ay - the 4ieseler-/torch and the 3rada - )ere designed to carry only t)o. :hy did he include a )o"an in the escape party )hen it )ould be al"ost inconcei8able that a )o"an )ould be on such a desperate and dangerous "issionJ 3nd )hy )ould /talin assert the escape )as continued .ro" Ha"burg on a ElargeE !-boatJ he 3llies )ere .airly certain that all but t)o o. >er"any6s largest !boats had been sunk during the )ar9 and one o. those )as in the Paci.ic. he chances see"ed sli" that such an escape as /talin described )as e8er "ade. 3 series o. totally independent accounts9 ho)e8er9 corroborate 8ery )ell /talin6s unlikely tale. 4irst9 a "akeshi.t run)ay is no) )ell-kno)n to ha8e been operating in the iergarten to ser8ice the 4uehrer #unker during the last days o. the )ar9 FcdAc8ii although at the ti"e o. /talin6s co""ent that kno)ledge )as not so )ide spread. 3lbert /peer9 Hitler6s 0unitions 0inister9 described .lying into the stop-gap landing strip on the occasion o. Hitler6s .i.ty-siAth birthday - celebrated a )eek be.ore #or"ann6s "ysterious escape - )hen the +ussians )ere still at the outskirts o. #erlin. FcdAc8iii 3ccording to /peer9 as an airplane prepared to land or take o..9 a detach"ent o. // soldiers )ould light a series o. lanterns placed along both sides o. the )ide a8enue that stretched .ro" the #randenburg >ate to the +eichs Chancellery. he airplane )ould use the strip and then the lanterns ;uickly )ould be eAtinguished again. /econd9 the great >er"an a8iatriA9 Hanna +eitsch9 a conte"porary o. 3"elia 5arhart6s and close .riend o. 3dol. Hitler9 had .lo)n into #erlin only a .e) days pre8ious to the "ysterious escape .light. FcdAciA +eitsch had in the past recei8ed personally .ro" Hitler the Iron Cross (the only )o"an to do so) both .irst and second class9 FdG .or bra8ely test piloting the .lying capabilities o. a 1-1 rocket9 )hich had been "odi.ied )ith a cockpit. <o)9 she had piloted a 4ieseler /torch airplane to bring Cu.t)a..e >eneral +obert +itter 8on >rei" to #erlin so Hitler could "ake hi" the o8erall co""ander o. the Cu.t)a..e in place o. the recently dethroned >oering. *uring the .light into #erlin9 8on >rei" )as in?ured by ene"y anti-aircra.t shrapnel. 3.ter landing9 +eitsch and 8on >rei" )ere harbored in the bunker .or a .e) days )hile 8on >rei" lay in bed recuperating be.ore "aking the eAit .light. +eitsch recorded in her "e"oirs that she9 )ith a hea8ily bandaged >eneral 8on >rei" by her side9 .le) out o. #erlin .ro" the iergarten - at da)n on %2 3pril according to her ( *ece"ber9 19&( press inter8ie) FdiG - eAactly the sa"e ti"e /talin reported the "ysterious escape .light took o... hen she recorded in her "e"oirs an odd e8ent. Instead o. .lying to 3ustria9 their intended destination9 +eitsch )rites ho) they .le) &22 dangerous "iles9 partly o8er ene"y territory9 )ith the badly in?ured and 8ery i"portant >eneral 8on >rei"9 to Ploen9 3d"iral *oenit76s head;uarters. FdiiG /he gi8es the reason .or this detour as the desire to )ish the 3d"iral a .ond .are)ell. /uch a detour .or such a super.luous reason see"s re"arkably i"probable gi8en the desperate state o. a..airs on the "ilitary .ront and the in?uries to >eneral 8on >rei". :ould not a radio "essage ha8e doneJ :hat i. all the re"aining >er"an leaders decided to tra8el to each other in order to )ish one another .are)ellJ here see"s to be no indication that *oenit7 and 8on >rei" had any special relationship beyond t)o pro.essionals doing their ?obs. he reason .or the detour see"s highly suspect. o be sure9 other reasons )ere later gi8en .or the strange .light de8iation9 but9 despite their out)ard 8eracity9 )hen sub?ected to e8en "ini"al scrutiny they see" al"ost as hollo) as the reason +eitsch describes. he chie. assertion is that 8on >rei" )as .lo)n to Ploen a.ter Hitler had concluded Hi""ler )as a traitor )ho had begun separate surrender negotiations )ith the :est. /upposedly 8on >rei" )as sent to arrest Hi""ler.FdiiiG #ut the 4uehrer #unker )as in radio contact )ith *oenit7 "any ti"es a day and could ha8e had *oenit7 "ake the arrest. he )ounded 8on >rei"9 )ith his one-)o"an retinue9 )as in .ar less able condition to arrest Hi""ler than the healthy *oenit7 )ith his considerable cortege. *oenit7 )as a strict and e..icient "ilitary pro.essional )ith a strong reputation .or carrying out his co""and. Indeed9 at the end o. the )ar Hitler entrusted hi" )ith the post-)ar leadership o. the entire nation. I. *oenit7 )as not capable o. .ul.illing the order9 to send the in?ured 8on >rei" to en.orce the order o8er *oenit76s head and in his o)n head;uarters9 surrounded by the 3d"iral6s .ull retinue and in the .ace o. Hi""ler6s substantial // bodyguard9 see"s unlikely. 3nd i. they had9 in .act9 .lo)n to *oenit7 .or this purpose9 )hy )ould not +ietsch ha8e stated so in her "e"oirs9 )ritten "any years laterJ he order .or Hi""ler6s arrest )as ne8er a secret - not e8en at the ti"e it )as issued9 "uch less decades later )hen she )rote her book. 3nd in the end9 )hen 8on >rei" "et )ith Hi""ler9 he only told the +eichs.uehrer // that Hitler had denounced hi"9 Fdi8G .urther suggesting that 8on >rei" )as not really sent to Ploen to arrest the // chie.. In short9 there see"s to be no 8iable reason )hy +eitsch and 8on >rei" had .lo)n alone to Ploen. here is a reason .or the huge .light de8iation9 ho)e8er9 i. they )ere not alone. he traditional history docu"ents )ell #or"ann6s intense e..orts to "ake his )ay to 3d"iral *oenit7 during this ti"e.Fd8G #or"ann had told his .a"ily they )ould be escaping on a !-boat to @apan= Fd8iG and so"e o. #or"ann6s closest associates9 including >auleiter 5rich Hoch and others9 eApected to escape by !-boat as )ell9 )ith #or"ann6s help.Fd8iiG /o strong )as #or"ann6s e..ort to reach *oenit7 that by %B%2 the "orning o. %2 3pril9 #or"ann had Hitler issue an order to his pilot9 Hans #aur9 to .ly #or"ann to *oenit7.Fd8iiiG

o think that #or"ann and #aur )ere a)are that Hanna +eitsch )as preparing to .ly out o. #erlin )ithin hours a.ter this order )as issued - an order that #or"ann success.ully had "anipulated .ro" Hitler and that pro8ided possibly his last chance .or escape - but that #or"ann .ailed to capitali7e on the opportunity9 see"s eAceptionally unlikely gi8en #or"ann6s prag"atis"9 po)er and legendary dri8e to sur8i8e. It see"s especially so considering that +eitsch did9 in .act9 pilot the airplane to *oenit76s head;uarters9 although there see"s to be no other 8iable reason .or her to ha8e gone there - as noted abo8e - and there )ere "any reason .or her not to go to *oenit7. Possible 8alidation o. this phanto" .light is pro8ided in another .light supposedly "ade .ro" the eirgarten9 )hich )as reported to ha8e occurred late on the night o. $9 3pril9 19&(. he pro8enance o. this account is suspect9 but i. it is true9 it certainly adds to the argu"ent that #or"ann and Heinrich 0ueller "ay ha8e escaped together by airplane. In 199,9 author >regory *ouglas published the .irst o. three 8olu"es titled he 19&9 Interrogation o. >estapo Chie. Heinrich 0ueller. he books are clai"ed to ha8e been )ritten .ro" 0ueller6s o)n records as pro8ided to *ouglas by the 0ueller .a"ily9 and *ouglas has done a considerable ?ob o. pro8ing the in.or"ation in the docu"ents is true9 e8en i. the docu"ents the"sel8es "ay be suspect. *etails o. such a li"ited nature that .e) people )ould kno) the" are included in the book9 and they ha8e been re8ie)ed by +obert :ol.9 )ho )orked .or "any years as an archi8ist speciali7ing in :orld :ar )o .or the !nited /tates <ational 3rchi8es and +ecords 3d"inistration. In a telephone inter8ie) )ith the author9 0r. :ol.9 though ob8iously .inding his co""ents personally disheartening9 i. not distaste.ul9 ad"itted that all o. the details he could .ind ob?ecti8e re.erence to that )ere clai"ed in *ouglas6s account pro8ed to be true. he records are purported to be a post-)ar interrogation o. Heinrich 0ueller by the O//9 .orerunner o. the CI39 )hen the agency )as considering hiring 0ueller and the substantial spy apparatus that the .or"er >estapo Chie. operated throughout the /o8iet !nion and else)here. *uring the alleged interrogation9 0ueller described his escape .ro" #erlin on the night o. $9 3pril9 ?ust hours be.ore +eitsch clai"s to ha8e escaped in a 4eiseler /torch airplane9FdiAG in the sa"e type o. aircra.t +eitsch clai"s to ha8e .lo)n. In his account9 0ueller is .lo)n out alone9 )ith a "ale pilot the only other person in the airplane. Instead o. .lying to Ploen9 0ueller contended the 4ieseler /torch )as .lo)n south to the 3ustrian'/)iss border9 the approAi"ate location Hanna +eitsch describes as her and >eneral 8on >rei"6s .inal destination .ollo)ing their detour to *oenit76s head;uarters. here are ob8ious inconsistencies in this tale co"pared to +eitsch6s - besides the .act that it "ay not e8en be true. #ut the discrepancies "ay be easily eAplained i. it is true. 4irst9 i. #or"ann and 0ueller did escape secretly in co"pany o. +eitsch and 8on >rei"9 it )ould see" that as ?oint conspirators they all )ould ha8e agreed to protect their secret. 4or that reason9 +eitsch )ould not ha8e identi.ied #or"ann or 0ueller as ha8ing been on the .light she piloted to *oenit7. !nder the sa"e agree"ent9 0ueller )ould not ha8e identi.ied any o. his .lying "ates either9 there.ore he reported he .le) alone= and he "ay e8en ha8e reported a di..erent take-o.. ti"e to .urther separate hi"sel. .ro" the other escapees. Or possibly he considered the pre-da)n hours o. %2 3pril as part o. the night o. $9 3pril. /econd9 i. the .light to *oenit7 )as e8er tied to !-$%& - considering the in.erences that could later be "ade .ro" that connection - 0ueller again )ould not ha8e )anted to re8eal it. <o one kne) as )ell as 0ueller ho) co"part"entali7ed go8ern"ents9 and intelligence agencies in particular9 are )hen it co"es to "aintaining state secrets. He could not assu"e that the O// o..icer interrogating hi" )as a)are o. a possible #or"ann'!-$%& connection )ith the !nited /tates= that in.or"ation )ould ha8e been a8ailable )ithin the agency on a Eneed to kno)E basis only. Certainly 0ueller and #or"ann both )ould ha8e agreed in the original escape negotiations not to discuss a #or"ann'!-$%& arrange"ent )ith anyone9 and to keep it as .ar .ro" being disco8ered as possible. /ince there )as no need .or his interrogators to kno) o. the !-$%& deal9 in .act9 there )ere good personal and !nited /tates national security reasons .or the" not to kno) o. it9 0ueller si"ply eAcluded any re.erence to it .ro" the interrogation. hose in the kno) )ithin the CI3 )ould ha8e eApected hi" to do so9 and he kne) it. hird9 i. 0ueller escaped )ith #or"ann onboard !-$%&9 he could not ha8e been .lo)n to the /)iss border o. 3ustria on the airplane9 as he reported in the interrogation 8ersion o. his escape. rue9 but i. he escaped on !-$%&9 he9 like #or"ann9 )ould not ha8e )anted anyone to kno) ho) he "ade his escape9 .or the sa"e reasons as listed abo8e. I. 0ueller told the interrogator he had been .lo)n to Ha"burg9 he )ould ha8e had to tell hi" ho) he escaped .ro" there. +ather than tell the" he escaped aboard a !-boat .ro" Ha"burg9 )hich threatened to lead right back to !-$%& and .urther ;uestions9 it "ade good sense to adopt the re"ainder o. +eitsch6s and 8on >rei"6s .light as his o)n co8er story. He there.ore told his inter8ie)er that he .le) to the 3ustrian'/)iss border and escaped across the 3lps. /uch adaptation into co8er stories o. real e8ents .alls per.ectly in line )ith intelligence operati8es6 practice o. keeping decepti8e scenarios as close to the truth as possible9 de8iating only )hen necessary to protect that )hich is being co8ered. In this )ay9 i. the 4ieseler /torch bearing +eitsch and 8on >rei" had been spotted and recorded as ha8ing landed in the

area 0ueller asserted9 the sighting )ould 8alidate 0ueller6s story. !sing speci.ied portions o. reality in co8er stories )as also considerably easier than 0ueller6s alternati8e9 )hich )as to create a totally .ictitious story that )ould hold up under in8estigati8e scrutiny9 and as a result )ould ha8e been "ore di..icult to do belie8ably. One last set o. obser8ations "ay be "ade concerning 0ueller6s reputed .light. :hile it )as possible to .ly in and out o. the iergarten9 it )as not an easy thing to do and it )as ;uite dangerous - as illustrated by >eneral 8on >rei"6s in?uries a .e) days earlier. /uch .lights )ere e8en "ore risky during the last t)o days o. 3pril )hen the +eichs Chancellery )as al"ost entirely surrounded by /o8iet .orces. he "ore .lights that .le) in and out o. the "akeshi.t airstrip9 the "ore likely they )ould dra) attention o. +ussian air support9 )ho )ould shoot the slo) and de.enseless hedgehoppers do)n. In addition9 the +ussians )ere "ore likely to locate the airstrip itsel.9 and9 as a result9 identi.y the general area o. Hitler6s bunker. >i8en these considerations9 it see"s unlikely se8eral .lights per night )ere per"itted. o suggest that t)o9 and possibly three9 .lights "ay ha8e li.ted o.. .ro" the airstrip on the night o. $9-%2 3pril - 0ueller6s .light9 +eitsch6s .light9 and the one /talin clai"s - )hile Hitler )as still inside the bunker9 see"s risky i. not out o. the ;uestion. he chances o. "ultiple .lights being allo)ed to depart see" e8en less likely )hen considering +eitsch6s and 0ueller6s .lights )ere supposedly both destined .or approAi"ately the sa"e location on the 3ustrio-/)iss border. /urely Hitler6s head;uarters sta.. )ould ha8e consolidated .lights )hen possible9 rather than let se8eral take o.. and increase the risk o. eAposure. he trouble in8ol8ed in lighting9 dousing and relighting the airstrip "ultiple ti"es and in keeping a8ailable a nu"ber o. the rare airplanes capable o. using the short landing strip also )ould ha8e discouraged such acti8ity. 58en )ithout the ;uestionable 0ueller account9 using only +eitsch6s "e"oirs9 /talin6s story o. the "ysterious .light appears to ha8e a strong basis in .act. #or"ann and 0ueller )ere reported by so"e to ha8e escaped together.FdAG I. #or"ann and 0ueller )ere on the 4ieseler /torch )ith Hanna +eitsch and >eneral 8on >rei"9 /talin6s description o. .our people .lying out o. #erlin together9 one o. the" #or"ann and one a )o"an9 )ould ha8e been accurate. In addition9 the description o. the s"all party escaping in a large !-boat identi.ies itsel. particularly )ell )ith !-$%&9 )hich9 it )ill be re"e"bered9 had recei8ed at least one - and possibly t)o - radio trans"issions .ro" Hitler6s bunker= and )hich led >eneral Hessler to anticipate an i"portant passenger .ro" #erlin. In addition9 as )ill be re8ie)ed in detail in the neAt chapter9 Captain 4ehler appears to ha8e taken !-$%& on a con8oluted 8oyage9 )ith each successi8e t)ist and turn intended to hide the !-boat6s "o8e"ents and acti8ities. he description o. #or"ann6s geta)ay boat as a large !-boat links the escape to !-$%& e8en closer9 not ?ust because !-$%& )as by co"parison eAtre"ely large9 but e8en "ore so because it appears to ha8e been the only boat o. its "a""oth si7e le.t in 5urope. !-$%& )as originally built as a "inelaying9 ype Q# !-boat9 co""issioned 0arch %9 19&&. hese doublehulled9 triple-si7ed !-boats )ere designed to seed strategically chosen bodies o. )ater )ith high-eAplosi8e "ines. he 3llies beca"e so adept at detecting and eradicating these "ines be.ore any har" )as caused9 ho)e8er9 that the ype Q# ;uickly beca"e obsolete.FdAiG here )as but a hand.ul o. ype Q#s e8er builtB !-11, through !-1199 !-$199 !-$$29 !-$%% and the "ysterious !-$%&.FdAiiG :hen the ype Q# pro8ed not to ha8e the i"pact .or )hich it )as designed9 the boats )ere re.itted as supply 8essels .or the 6)ol.pack6 boats sinking 3llied con8oys on the battle.ront in the 3tlantic. Co"pared to the )ol.pack boats9 ho)e8er9 ype Q# !-boats )ere huge9 "ore than 1,22 tons displace"ent )hen sur.aced9 )hile the ubi;uitous ype 1II !-boats that constituted -( percent FdAiiiG o. >er"any6s sub"ersible .leet9 )ere (22 tons - less than one-third the si7e o. a ype Q#. he other popular !-boat9 the ype IQ9 )as larger than the ype 1II at any)here .ro" -&2 to 1122 tons. #ut the ype Q# )as (2 percent larger than e8en these "ore co""on .ront boats that9 co"bined )ith the s"aller ype 1II9 constituted al"ost the entire re"aining !-boat .leet. +ussian obser8ers o. !-boats )ere probably accusto"ed to both the ype 1II and the ype IQ and probably )ould not ha8e di..erentiated the" by si7e as out o. the ordinary. ype Q#s9 ho)e8er9 )ere al"ost unkno)n. 3s noted9 there had been only eight o. the" "ade. !-11, through !-$$29 )ith the eAception o. !-$199 )ere all sunk in the year bet)een the .irst o. October 19&$ and the end o. October 19&%.dAi8 !-$19 had .ortuitously a8oided this .ate by being stationed in the Paci.ic i""ediately upon co""issioning9 ha8ing le.t #ordeauA9 4rance on $% 3ugust9 19&& .or *?akarta9 Indonesia9 )here it arri8ed on 11 *ece"ber9 19&&.dA8 In the /outh Paci.ic it )as .ar a)ay .ro" 5urope and #or"ann and the .ierce 3tlantic .ighting )hen the )ar in 5urope ended. :hen >er"any surrendered9 !-$199 still in the Paci.ic9 )as turned o8er to the @apanese I"perial <a8y to continue the )ar under the .lag o. the +ising /un.dA8i !-$%% had been sunk be.ore co""issioning9 lea8ing !-$%& as the only re"aining ElargeE ype Q# !-boat a8ailable in 5urope at the ti"e o. #or"ann6s alleged escape. he ype QI1 !-boat )as the only other !-boat larger than the popular ype IQ and co"parable in si7e to the ype Q#. Cike the Q#9 .e) o. these boats )ere "ade - only ten - )hich )ere all built and operational by the end o. 19&$.dA8ii hey )ere designed and used as a re.ueling boat .or the )ol.pack 8essels9 and9 as a

result9 like the Q#9 had a 8ery high "ortality rate. he sinking o. a single ype QI1 shortened the co"bat patrols o. approAi"ately t)el8e .ighting !-boats9 so 3llied anti-sub"arine e..orts concentrated on )hat the >er"an !-boaters a..ectionately called their 60ilk Co)s.6 he process o. re.ueling )as dangerous9 re;uiring the ype QI1 .uel supply boat and its recipient lie still in the )ater .or hours on end during the .uel trans.er process. *uring this ti"e9 both boats )ere 8ulnerable to attack9 )hich happened o.ten9 at )hich the panicked cre)s )ould ;uickly detach the u"bilicals and both boats )ould eAecute e"ergency di8es. he s"aller .ighting boat9 )ith its "ore co"pact si7e9 greater "aneu8erability9 and )ith its "ore disciplined9 battle-seasoned cre)9 )ould in8ariably be the .irst to "aneu8er out o. har"6s )ay9 lea8ing the clu"sy behe"oth ype QI1 at the "ercy o. the ene"y. It )as an easy target. O. the %99222 >er"an sailors )ho .ought on !-boats during the )ar9 $899,$ )ere killed and an additional &9222 captured. 3 total o. o8er .i8e out o. e8ery siA !-boaters9 there.ore9 )as lost in the )ar. +e"arkably9 despite these nu"bers9 >er"any6s !-boat ser8ice )as the only one o. its "ilitary ser8ices that had "ore 8olunteers than it could use throughout the entire duration o. the )ar.dA8iii ype QI1 !-boats had an abnor"ally high "ortality rate co"pared to e8en these chilling statistics9 "aking it apparent that sur8i8al o. a ype QI1 !-boat .or e8en a .e) "onths )as "iraculous. In .act9 none o. the ype QI1 !-boats sur8i8ed to the end o. the )ar9 all ten had su..ered the .ate o. the "a?ority o. ype Q#s by the end o. 19&%.dAiA he only other large !-boat built )as the :alther !-boat9 )hich )as designed and under construction9 but not operational9 be.ore the end o. the )ar. !-$%&9 there.ore9 )as the only 6large6 !-boat le.t in the +eich6s .leet that )ould "ost closely .it @oseph /talin6s escape boat description. 3nd9 as already "entioned9 it is kno)n that !-$%& had recei8ed at least one radio trans"ission .ro" the 4uehrer #unker9 and ;uite possibly "ore= and that #or"ann9 apparently9 had so"e connection or e8en control o8er the boat. 3pparently9 the E)ild pig routing .or a potatoE had dug up the "orsel that )ould sa8e his li.e. /o )hat does the co"posite story o. #or"ann6s escape look like9 taking into account all o. the ackno)ledged tales o. #or"ann6s last days in #erlin and the additional e8idence since unco8eredJ 58en though *oenit76s order to !-$%& counter"anding the directi8e .ro" #erlin to stay put9 and then ordering the !-boat to lea8e as soon as possible9 )as recei8ed on the 1&th9 !-$%&9 as noted else)here9 did not actually set sail until t)o days later9 on the 1,th - the sa"e day the barrage o. #erlin began. Perhaps #or"ann9 .ro" Hitler6s head;uarters9 had set the .inal attack on #erlin as the auto"atic signal that 4ehler stealthily set to sea9 .ro" )here he )ould a)ait .urther orders. On the "orning o. $$ 3pril9 #or"ann radiogra""ed Hel"ut 8on Hu""el9 his top aid9 )ho )as no) )orking in Obersal7bergB Eagree to proposed o8erseas trans.er south.E he /o8iet #or"ann eApert Ce8 #esy"enski later interpreted this "essage to re.er to a prescheduled escape to /outh 3"erica.dAA In #erlin9 the +ussians )ere daily tightening their noose around the beleaguered city and the core o. Hitler6s re"aining leaders huddled in the bunker under the +eich Chancellery. *uring the .inal three days o. 3pril9 8irtually all historians agree9 #or"ann struggled "ightily to escape the strangle-hold o. #erlin and "ake his )ay to 3d"iral *oenit7. 3t the sa"e ti"e9 he held con.erence )ith Heinrich 0ueller as they tried to eAecute their escape plan and .inali7e the details o. .leeing #erlin.dAAi On the night o. $8-$9 3pril9 )hen Hitler ordered Hanna +eitsch to .ly out o. #erlin )ith ne) Cu.t)a..e co""ander 8on >rei"9 the opportunity #or"ann and 0ueller )ere looking .or had arri8ed. #or"ann ;uickly succeeded in getting Hitler to order that he should be .lo)n out to *oenit79 as )ell.dAAii In .act9 according to author @a"es P. O6*onnell9 #or"ann )as si"ply substituted .or Hitler in an escape plan Hitler6s pilot9 Hans #aur9 had prepared.dAAiii O6*onnell suggested9 ho)e8er9 that the original plan9 )hich )as ne8er co"pleted9 )as .or #aur to .ly Hitler - be.ore #or"ann )as substituted - out o. #erlin9 not .or Hanna +eitsch to .ly hi". +eitsch6s and 8on >rei"6s i"pending departure appears there.ore to ha8e been a .ortuitous opportunity to i"ple"ent #aur6s plan .or #or"ann and 0ueller to escape )ith #aur being the pilot. )o "ore considerations support the scenario that Hanna +eitsch .le) #or"ann out o. #erlinB 4irst9 #aur )as eAtre"ely loyal to Hitler and he )as a staunch <a7idAAi8 to his dying day9 and he reported directly to #or"ann.dAA8 >i8en #or"ann6s "ission to preser8e <a7is" and the 4uehrer6s legacy9 all three .acts )ould indicate that #aur did e8erything in his po)er to .ul.ill the order to get #or"ann to *oenit7. /econd9 despite the order9 #aur did not actually .ly Hitler or #or"ann out o. #erlin9 he escaped on .oot )ith the others. :hat else but the +eitsch .light could ha8e been done to i"ple"ent #aur6s escape planJ Hitler had already "arried 58a #raun and co"posed his last )ill and testa"ent9 de"onstrating that he eApected <a7is" to carry on despite his absence and its dis"al conditiondAA8i - probably as a result o. #or"ann con8incing hi" the 4light Capital Progra" )ould still )ork i. he9 #or"ann9 could escape to ad"inister it. his )as the "o"ent .or )hich #or"ann had anAiously )aited. #ut up until then9 the 4uehrer had not gi8en #or"ann .inal per"ission to .ore8er lea8e his ser8ice. #or"ann9 loyal to the end9 )ould not drea" o. deserting Hitler i. he kne) his "aster "ight yet need hi". 3t %B%2 a.". %2 3pril9 the 4uehrer had concluded his bane.ul

business on earth and all but ended his li.e. He )ould put a bullet through his head 1$ hours later9 but not be.ore he had ordered #aur9 in no uncertain ter"s9 to "ake sure #or"ann got to *oenit7 to deli8er his last )ill and political testa"ent9 )hich #or"ann )ould hand carry and personally deli8er.dAA8ii @ochen 8on Cang9 )ho inaccurately )rote that #or"ann )ould later sign the "essage in.or"ing *oenit7 that Hitler )as dead9 puts the ti"e at about noon9 hours a.ter #or"ann )ould ha8e escaped in the plane. #ut *ollinger puts the ti"e si"ply Ein the "orningE o. %2 3pril9 the in.erence being that it )as shortly a.ter Hitler6s %B%2 a.". signing o. his )ill and political testa"ent. :hate8er the case9 #or"ann6s uncanny in.luence o8er Hitler had )orked one .inal ti"e. E#or"ann has been gi8en se8eral orders )hich he "ust take to *oenit7 in person....It is "ost i"portant that #or"ann gets to *oenit79E Hitler told #aur. 3t da)n o. the sa"e day9 %2 3pril9 0artin #or"ann and Heinrich 0ueller "ost likely departed )ith Hanna +eitsch and >eneral 8on >rei" to)ard 3d"iral *oenit76s head;uarters in Ploen. #or"ann6s double re"ained to un)ittingly play his a).ul role in a .inal .raud per.or"ance. >eneral #aur ne8er "ade any atte"pt to .ly #or"ann to *oenit79 although the traditional history suggests the topic )as discussed by >oebbels and #aur on 1 0ay9 long a.ter #or"ann apparently )as gone and a .light out o. #erlin )as no longer possible.dAA8iii >i8en the con8ergence o. so "any disparate ele"ents - #or"ann and 0ueller ha8ing )orked so long and painstakingly together to de8elop his double= their escape plan preparations on the night o. $8-$9 3pril9 )hich coincides )ith the ti"ing o. Hitler6s order that #or"ann tra8el to *oenit7= the report that 0ueller had .lo)n out to .reedo" in that sa"e ti"e .ra"e= +eitsch6s ad"ission that she had .lo)n a s"all plane to *oenit7 the "orning o. %2 3pril= and9 again9 /talin6s insistence that #or"ann escaped in a s"all plane at eAactly the sa"e ti"e - the )eight o. the e8idence .or this scenario see"s .ar too co"pelling to be o8ershado)ed by any o. the historically entrenched but seriously con.licting stories. he escape described abo8e )ould ha8e gi8en #or"ann and 0ueller a day or t)o head start .ro" the others in the bunker and the opportunity to lea8e behind a 8iable alibi that )ould resol8e their .ates .or the outside )orld and eli"inate post-)ar searches. #or"ann6s and 0ueller6s detailed hard )ork appeared to ha8e paid o... Indeed9 .i8e staunch 4uehrer bunker <a7is all testi.ied that they sa) #or"ann killed on :ieddenda""er #ridge9 an assertion no) considered a patent lie. 3nd other )ould-be obser8ers pro8ided slightly di..erent 8ersions o. the sa"e story. he co8er story9 designed to end later searches9 )ould insist that #or"ann and 0ueller escaped Hitler6s head;uarters )ith the others in the bunker the night o. the breakout. !pon eAiting the bo"b shelter9 the scenario )ent9 0ueller and #or"ann )ere separated and #or"ann "ade his )ay to a location - possibly :iedenda""er #ridge had already been selected9 possibly it )as le.t to the 8aguaries o. the .luid condition o. the battle .or that to be decided. he story )ould describe ho)9 once at :iedenda""er #ridge9 0artin #or"ann )as killed by a blast to a tank he )as using to cross the bridge. #oth Paul 0anning and @a"es O6*onnell site a story o. a tank ha8ing been speci.ically pre-arranged to be at :eiddenda""er bridge at the .ate.ul "o"ent to co"plete the illusion.dAAiA 0anning belie8ed the story9 O6*onnell did not. o .urther 8alidate the death9 #or"ann6s double )ould be taken to the bridge and killed 8ia cyanide or so"e other .or" o. poisoning to later be .ound )ith #or"ann6s diary placed in the un.ortunate corpse6s pocketdAAA to identi.y the body as #or"ann6s and conclude the illusion. he body )ould 8alidate the Eeye )itnessE reports o. the +eich 0inister6s de"iseB #or"ann6s death )ould be assured and he )ould .ade into the shado)s o. history. Once the co8er story )as co"pleted and disse"inated to Hitler6s re"aining top aids .or post-surrender circulation9 #or"ann and 0ueller .le) )ith +eitsch and 8on >rei" to Ha"burg9 )here !-$%& )ould soon pick the" up ?ust as /talin insisted had happened. he only eAception to /talin6s story is his assertion that the )o"an and all three "en boarded the !-boat. Possibly his contacts reported so because Hanna +eitsch and 8on >rei" had .lo)n to sa.ety )ith #or"ann and 0ueller and the obser8ers assu"ed they had thus continued the escape together9 )hen later e8ents re8ealed they had not. Or9 ;uite possibly considering Hanna +eitsch6s ad8enturous9 in;uisiti8e and Eto"boyishE nature9 she boarded the !-boat te"porarily )ith >eneral 8on >rei" .or a ;uick look around and to )ish her co"panion .lyers .are)ell be.ore continuing her ?ourney to the south. Perhaps the spies ne8er sa) her return to the !-boat deck and then dockside. :hate8er the case9 upon dise"barking Ha"burg9 the !-boat took #or"ann and 0ueller to a prearranged rende78ous point in the #ay o. #iscay9 )here the t)o "en boarded another 8essel and )ere .erried to the north coast o. /pain. here9 #or"ann and 0ueller ;uietly co"pleted their 5uropean business a..airs behindthe-scenes and under the protection o. /pain and9 by secret eAtension9 the !nited /tates6 )atch.ul eye. he plan )as a good one9 detailed and )ell thought out considering all the possibilities. #ut the unpredictability o. battle9 the serendipitous nature o. .ate9 and the persistence o. people )ho re.used to let ?ustice go undone9 undid it. 4irst9 the integrity o. the scenario )as not kept a.ter the key bearers o. the co8er story )ere captured. 5rich He"pka9 Hitler6s chau..er= Hans #aur9 Hitler6s pilot= Hein7 Cinge9 Hitler6s 8alet= @ohann +attenhuber9 chie. o. Hitler6s detecti8e bodyguard= and Otto >unsche9 Hitler6s // ad?utant9 )ere the sur8i8ors o. #erlin )ho )ere closest to Hitler and #or"ann during the .inal days in the bunker. hey all asserted that they sa) #or"ann die in the tank eAplosion on :eidenda""er #ridge. 3s the keepers o. the co8er story9 this )as )hat they )ere eApected to do. #ut others s)ore to di..erent e8ents9 both on the

bridge and o... 3s noted abo8e9 +oca-Pinar and Harry 0engerhausen testi.ied to 8ery signi.icant 8ariances in the :eidenda""er #ridge episode. hese 8ersions )ere possibly the result o. their later capti8ity )ith the o..icial keepers o. the escape scenario - .ro" )ho" they apparently heard the story - and a desire to be kno)n9 possibly .alsely9 as a participant in the historical e8ent9 but ha8ing "odi.ied the story to their o)n ends. he later identi.ication by 3A"ann o. the dead #or"ann on the Cehrter /tation #ridge .urther undid #or"ann6s and 0ueller6s caper. here is little reason to belie8e 3A"ann )as lying9 other than the bi7arre details9 )hen he told his odd story o. cal" corpses lying unin?ured in the "idst o. the great battle. He probably had9 in .act9 checked the breathing o. the poisoned body o. #or"ann6s double lying peace.ully neAt to that o. *r. /tu"p.egger9 thinking it )as the actual #or"ann. Presu"ably9 /tu"p.egger )as in on the escape scenario and it )as his task to poison #or"ann6s double - as he had poisoned >oebbels6 children - to conclude the desired illusion.dAAAi /tu"p.egger "ay ha8e decided to Edo inE the counter.eit #or"ann on Cehter /tation #ridge9 instead o. according to the co8er story on :eidenda""er #ridge9 because the +ussians already controlled the latter o8erpass by the ti"e the duo reached their planned destination. he *octor possibly then calculated the Cehrter trestle )as as close as he )as going to get to .ul.illing the details o. the co8er story and so co""itted the eAecution there. Once the deadly deed )as done9 apparently seeing he )as on his o)n and de8oid o. hope o. escaping the tightening /o8iet ring9 /tu"p.egger concluded his grotes;ue killing spree by taking his o)n despicable li.e as )ell= .ollo)ing Hitler9 >oebbels9 >eneral #urgdor. and others9 in suicide. hus 3A"ann .ound #or"ann - or actually #or"ann6s double - and *r. /tu"p.egger lying dead9 but other)ise unhar"ed9 peace.ully reclined side by side on Cehrter /tation #ridge. #or"ann )as supposed to ha8e been escaping #erlin eApressly to deli8er Hitler6s )ill and political testa"ent9 )hich he )as personally carrying9 to 3d"iral *oenit7. he body .ound )as identi.ied as #or"ann6s )hen the +eichleiter6s personal ?ournal )as .ound in its o8ercoat pocket. Hitler6s )ill and political testa"ent are ne8er "entioned as ha8ing been .ound on the body9 ho)e8er9 although at least one account indicates they )ere se)n into the lining o. his // uni.or".dAAAii Perhaps they )ere o8erlooked9 but it see"s doubt.ul gi8en the .act that i. the diary )as .ound9 al"ost certainly e8erything else about the corpse9 including its gar"ents9 )ould ha8e been care.ully scrutini7ed .or .urther proo. it )as #or"ann6s body. 3s already noted9 the body )as later eAhu"ed according to the /o8iet report to the CI39 probably to per.or" .orensics tests to con.ir" or dispro8e it )as actually #or"ann6s re"ains. he second series o. scenario-crippling conclusions ca"e )hen additional .acts related to the escape began to arise. 4or instance9 although the disappearance o. Heinrich 0ueller )as lost on "any in the con.usion surrounding the escape atte"pt9 a gra8e reportedly containing his re"ains )as later identi.ied in the Hreu7berg garrison ce"etery in #erlin.dAAAiii /upposedly9 he had been killed in street .ighting during the escape. /ince then .lo)ers had been lo8ingly placed regularly at his headstone .or 18 years - presu"ably by "e"bers. Cater reports )ere recei8ed9 ho)e8er9 suggesting that possibly the >estapo Chie.6s re"ains )ere not in the co..in under the headstone bearing his na"e and at )hich .lo)ers )ere regularly being placed. #y order o. the :est #erlin *istrict 3ttorney6s o..ice9 the re"ains )ere eAhu"ed and .orensics tests per.or"ed. he .indings sho)ed that bits and pieces o. three "en shared the gri77ly gra8e9 but none o. the" )as Heinrich 0ueller.dAAAi8 he depth and breadth o. so"e o. the escape plans )as beginning to beco"e clear. Had #or"ann and 0ueller "ade plans so co"plete9 so airtight9 that they included detailed9 care.ully prepared ca"ou.laging tactics to conceal the escapes9 and carried out "acabre charades .or decades a.ter to ensure their sa.etyJ he ans)er9 8ie)ed against the con.licting testi"onies and cryptic ano"alies linked to the supposed de"ise o. 0artin #or"ann9 caused those )ho suspected #or"ann "ight not ha8e died in #erlin to look e8en closer at the e8idence. 5specially interested )ere those in8estigators9 such as Paul 0anning9dAAA8 Cadislas 4aragodAAA8i and :illia" /te8enson9dAAA8ii )ho belie8ed #or"ann and 0ueller care.ully )orked out their escapes together. 0anning ;uotes an unna"ed #or"ann eApert as saying E#or"ann planned this .light )ith eAtre"e care and part o. the grand design )as a sche"e to lead .uture .orensic and dental specialists astray.EdAAA8iii he ?ournalist later sited 0ueller6s skill and considerable pro.essionalis" at such endea8ors9dAAAiA )hich )as e8idenced by the phony gra8e he le.t behind. 58en 8on Cang9 )ho ulti"ately insists #or"ann died in #erlin9 inti"ates #or"ann and 0ueller "ade plans to escape together.dAl I. 0ueller and #or"ann )ent to such pains to hide the escape9 the in8estigators started asking9 )hat had they done to prepare .or itJ 3s the in8estigators .ound and started pulling on loose threads9 the care.ully constructed tapestry began to unra8el. 0any )ill assert that it )as i"possible .or #or"ann to ha8e escaped #erlin because the testi"ony o. )itnesses )ho )ere )ith hi" and the long litany o. radio trans"issions he authored .ro" the 4uehrer #unker pro8es he )as intact in Hitler6s head;uarters until ?ust hours be.ore the escape atte"pt. 3 care.ul9 chronological re8ie) o. the "essages and o. his actions9 ho)e8er9 re8eals so"e interesting irregularities

that9 i. nothing else9 "ay be telling in their incongruities. !p until the night o. $9 3pril9 the historical record see"s .airly unassailable eAcept .or one s"all9 perpleAing detail. he record sho)s #or"ann )as paying particular attention to keeping 3d"iral *oenit7 in.or"ed o. e8ents in #erlin. #or"ann6s constant contact )ith *oenit7 is no) accepted )idely9 (2 years later9 and is un;uestioned9 but in its conte"porary political conteAt9 such acti8ity on #or"ann6s behal. is be)ildering. !pdating *oenit7 on the "ilitary situation in #erlin )as undoubtedly needed9 but it )ould ha8e been a "ilitary "atter and should ha8e been carried out by Hitler6s "ilitary chain o. co""and9 )hich )as still intact in the bunker9 not through a ci8ilian o..ice9 )hich )as #or"ann6s do"ain. Hitler6s generals )ere9 in .act9 in constant contact )ith one another through "ilitary channels during the course o. the battle9 and this should ha8e included *oenit79 as )ell. :hy #or"ann )as in contact )ith *oenit7 see"s to be unkno)n. Hitler had not yet announced his EuneApectedE appoint"ent o. *oenit7 as his successor9 so it )as too early .or #or"ann to initiate go8ern"ent business )ith the 3d"iral. *espite all #or"ann6s "achinations in the past9 through )hich he9 at ti"es9 had in.luenced "ilitary "atters9 Hitler had ne8er allo)ed #or"ann to participate directly in "ilitary a..airs= and #or"ann seldo" sho)ed "ore than passing interest in doing so. *espite these conditions9 #or"ann9 .or so"e reason9 )as no) in regular contact )ith *oenit79 constantly updating hi" on the state o. the battle. On $9 3pril9 the +eichsleiter )ired *oenit79 E/ituation 8ery serious.... hose ordered to rescue the 4uehrer are keeping silent.... *isloyalty see"s to gain the upper hand e8ery)here.... he +eichs Chancellery a rubble heap.... :e are staying on.EdAli 3lone such an update9 though abnor"al9 )ould not ha8e - and has not - been considered re"arkable. #ut considered in light o. later de8elop"ents9 such co""unications "ay appear to ha8e been part o. a narro)er conteAt9 rather than a si"ple update on the state o. the battle. 5arlier that night9 the last gasps o. Hitler6s housand Dear +eich had begun in earnest. he 4uehrer "arried9 concluded all his )orldly a..airs9 and began his last day on earth a)aiting the "o"ent to igno"iniously end his li.e. #e.ore "idnight on the $8th or in the early "orning hours o. the $9th9 he had asked his old .riend Hanna +eitsch to .ly >eneral 8on >rei" out o. #erlin.dAlii :hile it is .airly certain Hitler ga8e the order .or the .light on the night o. the $8th9 historical accounts 8ary as to )hen the order )as actually carried out. /o"e9 such as >eneral Holler in his account o. e8ents9 clai" the .light took place on the night o. the $8th.dAliii Others clai" the .light occurred on the $9th= and still others9 such as +eitsch hersel. according to a ne)s account to )hich 4arago re.ers9 clai" she and 8on >rei" .le) out at da)n on the "orning o. the %2th.dAli8 hese disparate dates "ay be eAplainable as ske)ed pieces o. an o8erall co8er story or si"ply as the results o. aging on "e"ories or the con.usion o. )ar9 but certainly9 i. taken at .ace 8alue9 +eitsch6s account should be gi8en precedence. 3t about 1 a.". the "orning o. the $9th9 Hitler "arried 58a #raun in a short ci8il cere"ony )itnessed by #or"ann and >oebbels and attended by a .e) others.dAl8 He then se;uestered hi"sel. )ith a secretary and dictated his last )ill and testa"ent and political "ani.esto9 )hich he co"pleted and signed about & a.". 3 .e) "o"ents later9 at &B1- a.".9dAl8i #or"ann sent his "essage to *oenit7 in.or"ing the 3d"iral o. the dire state o. the "ilitary situation in #erlin and o. the +eichs Chancellery being Ea rubble heap9E but that they )ere deter"ined to Estay on.E He "entioned nothing o. Hitler6s "arriage or preparations .or his death9 although Hitler had already "ade his absolute decision to die in #erlin9 as attested by granting 58a #raun her last )ish o. "arriage to hi" and preparing his )ill. *espite this decision9 apparently later the sa"e day9 #or"ann sent another "essage to *oenit7 challenging hi" to pro8e his loyalty by i""ediately relie8ing the 4uehrer.dAl8ii #ut *oenit7 had already sent t)o di8isionsdAl8iii and a contingent o. sea cadet traineesdAliA - "ost o. )ho" )ere slaughtered - to #erlin. Hno)ing that Hitler 8ehe"ently had re.used days earlier to escape to #a8aria9 and that he had no) deter"ined and started the preparations to die in #erlin9dl it see"s re"arkable that #or"ann encouraged *oenit7 to in8est "ore "en on so"e sort o. rescue atte"pt o. the 4uehrer9 unde.ined as that "ay be. he "essage9 ho)e8er9 see"s to continue a series o. deceptions and stone)all techni;ues #or"ann )as playing )ith *oenit7 .or so"e "ysterious end. he neAt $& hours in the bunker "ust ha8e .elt hopelessly "acabre .or the subterranean sur8i8ors9 )ith the .inal hours inter"inably passing and the incessant ru"bling o. hea8y guns and artillery constantly ?arring the earth o8erhead. Hitler6s generals sent co""uni;ues .ar and )ide9 continually trying to sa8e the desperate9 i. not hopeless9 situation. #ut /o8iet .orces )ere too strong and held a stranglehold on the city. 3t %B1( a.". %2 3pril9 the day a.ter Hitler6s .inal preparations to die9 0artin #or"ann sent 3d"iral *oenit7 another "essage.dli He described brie.ly ho) the :ehr"acht6s rescuers )ere Estubbing their toes9E in.erring that a rescue by the" )as doubt.ul9 and then added a post script o. sortsB E3ddition .ro" #erlin. 3tte"pts )ill probably be "ade to ?a" radio trans"issions. *o not let it upset you. 4uture co""unication )ill be .or)arded to Ploen.E he "essage appears to be instructions to eApect the possibility o. co""unications .ro" the 4uehrer #unker by )ay o. di..erent trans"ission centers than .ro" the bunker itsel.9 or possibly by a di..erent "anner o. co""unication altogether. 3t da)n a hal.-hour to an hour later9dlii depending on )hich account one chooses to belie8e9dliii Hanna +eitsch and >eneral +obert +itter 8on >rei" .le) out o. the iergarten in a s"all aircra.t. *espite the

plane6s short take-o.. capacity and the .act se8eral pre8ious .lights had already pro8en the landing strip to be plenty long .or the s"all hedge-hopper9 the airplane barely cleared the statuary atop the #randenburg >ate.dli8 he reason gi8en .or the dangerous near "iss )as that the aircra.t had taken o.. )ith the )ind. Perhaps so. #ut perhaps the aircra.t9 )hich )as designed to carry only t)o people9 )as carrying t)ice the )eight it )as designed to9 in the .or" o. t)o additional passengers. /uch a scenario )ould eAplain the o8erlong takeo.. and )ould certainly add credence to /talin6s deter"ined assertion that three "en and a )o"an took o.. in a s"all airplane at the sa"e ti"e and place as the .light noted abo8e. 3round %B%2 p.".9 3dol. and 58a Hitler killed the"sel8es. )o hours later9 #or"ann in.or"ed *oenit7 that the 3d"iral had been chosen the 4uehrer6s successor9 but9 "ysti.yingly9 he did not tell the 3d"iral that Hitler )as dead.dl8 *oenit7 asked #or"ann .or 8eri.ication .ro" )itnesses9 apparently suspecting #or"ann "ight be playing hi" .or a dupe.dl8i #or"ann "ade no e..ort to pro8ide the re;uested )itnesses - probably because he )as no longer in the bunker to recei8e and .ul.ill the re;uest= nor had he been .or t)o or three hours. In addition9 #or"ann )ould ha8e .eared that )itnesses )ould tell *oenit7 the 4uehrer )as dead9 )hich )ould ha8e ruined #or"ann6s plan. 4ourteen hours a.ter that9 at -B&2 a.". on 1 0ay9 #or"ann again contacted *oenit79 this ti"e to tell hi" that Hitler6s testa"ent )as in .orce9 but once again he did not re8eal directly that the 4uehrer )as dead.dl8ii he +eichsleiter then reco""ended to *oenit7 that he not publish this in.or"ation. Historians .or o8er .i.ty years ha8e tried to understand in the conteAt o. the traditional history these strange9 out)ardly unnecessary and see"ingly "eaningless9 deceptions. In the conteAt o. the traditional history9 #or"ann6s "essages see" to "ake little sense9 though "any )riters ha8e strained to read "eaning into the". #ut against the background o. the earlier reported radio signals to !-$%& .ro" the 4uehrer #unker9 and *oenit76s struggle to "aintain chain-o.-co""and o. the !-boat9 #or"ann6s strange con8olusions begin to be clear. he +eichsleiter9 as only he could9 appears to be playing a ga"e o. cat-and-"ouse )ith the 3d"iral. he e8idence throughout appears to suggest *oenit7 )as undecided as to helping #or"ann escape9 or possibly had decided not to help hi" at all. here is strong e8idence *oenit7 )as concerned #or"ann )as "anipulating hi"9 such as *oenit76s re;uest .or )itnesses to his being Hitler6s successor. Indeed9 later *oenit7 issued an arrest order .or #or"ann should he "ake it to Ploen.dl8iii 3s a result9 apparently #or"ann .elt it necessary to "anipulate the !-boat /er8ice co""ander9 .irst by earlier con8incing hi" to co""it to help Hitler6s escape - e8en though he9 #or"ann9 )ould be the one escaping. Presu"ably9 *oenit76s thinking he )as helping Hitler escape )ould ha8e con8inced hi" to release !-$%& .ro" its staging area near Ireland9 to slide into Ha"burg to pick up its .ugiti8e passengers. 3nd later9 once !-$%& )as on its )ay back to >er"any9 #or"ann appears to ha8e kept *oenit7 Eon the stringE by hanging the bait o. being post-)ar leader o. >er"any in .ront o. hi"9 )hich the 3d"iral )as guaranteed )hen Hitler na"ed hi" his successor. Probably9 #or"ann had con8inced the 4uehrer to select *oenit7 as his successor .or his strong leadership and clean9 non-political9 but a8o)ed nationalist loyalties9 )hich )ould "ake hi" a good choice as >er"any6s leader a.ter the capitulation. hat the 3llies )ould not allo) such an arrange"ent had yet to be pro8en and )as no "atter to #or"ann. he real reason #or"ann con8inced Hitler to appoint *oenit7 )as to gi8e the +eichsleiter a hand he could play to get *oenit76s cooperation )ith his escape - #or"ann needed that !-boat. :ith *oenit7 .eeling he )as on the 8erge o. leading the nation9 #or"ann kne) the 3d"iral )ould be care.ul not to displease the 4uehrer. #ut once *oenit7 kne) Hitler )as dead9 the 3d"iral6s co""and )ould be la) and #or"ann )ould be one o. the .irst o. Hitler6s paladins he )ould seek to bring do)n9 and #or"ann kne) it. !ntil *oenit7 beca"e a)are o. Hitler6s death9 ho)e8er9 #or"ann )ould ha8e the upper hand. /o #or"ann kept the death a secret. He .le) out o. #erlin9 not to Ploen straight a)ay9 but to Ha"burg9 )here he9 instead o. Hitler9 )aited .or !-$%& to land. 3t ( p.". on %2 3pril9 #or"ann probably )as sa.ely hidden a)ay not in the besieged bunker in #erlin but in Ha"burg9 a)aiting the arri8al o. !-$%&9 )hen he buttressed his .rail position )ith *oenit7 by sending the "essage in.or"ing the 3d"iral that he had been chosen Hitler6s successor. *oenit7 )ould not ha8e been o8erly concerned e8en i. he could identi.y the "essage as co"ing .ro" Ha"burg9 or any other point .or that "atter9 since #or"ann9 in anticipation o. his escape re;uire"ents9 had )arned the 3d"iral to eApect co""unications to co"e .ro" al"ost any)here because o. possible signal ?a""ing. In addition9 *oenit7 )ould not necessarily ha8e assu"ed Hitler "ust be dead in order to succeed hi" as 4uehrer= i. Hitler escaped 5urope and )ent into hiding the testa"ent )ould be in .orce and *oenit7 )ould be in charge. o this end *oenit7 )as )orking. 4inally9 probably so"e ti"e on % or & 0ay9 the giant !-boat /talin reported had ser8ed as #or"ann6s escape 8ehicle9 slipped into Ha"burg. #ut on 1 0ay9 #or"ann6s .inal piece )as already in place .or the escape and *oenit7 could not ha8e stopped #or"ann6s breakout. #or"ann probably sent his last "essage to *oenit7 )hile sa.ely ensconced in Ha"burg9 )hile *oenit7 thought he )as in #erlin9 but undoubtedly #or"ann )as still care.ul not to let the 3d"iral kno) o. the 4uehrer6s de"ise. Possibly he did not kno) o. Hitler6s death hi"sel. since he had not been in the bunker since hours be.ore the suicide. In any case9 #or"ann appears

to ha8e tried to "ake *oenit7 think he )as in the 3d"iral6s controlB E esta"ent in .orce. :ill ?oin you as soon as possible. 3d8ise delay publication until then.E :ith that sketchy in.or"ation9 *oenit7 )ould be care.ul not to o8erstep his bounds and )ould )ait patiently .or an eAplanation )hen #or"ann arri8ed - and then he )ould arrest hi". #ut #or"ann ne8er sho)ed. he suggestion he )as co"ing to *oenit7 )as a ruse9 not ?ust to neutrali7e *oenit7 )hile #or"ann )aited .or the !-boat at Ha"burg9 but it )ould )ork as )ell to ca"ou.lage his escape )hen in8estigators later pursued his )hereabouts. :hile *oenit7 later )as told #or"ann had been killed in the street .ighting9 actually #or"ann9 presu"ably acco"panied by 0ueller9 set out to sea on the !-boat9 )hich )as by then out o. *oenit76s hands. :hat !-boat captain could resist ha8ing the 4uehrer6s top lieutenant on board personally gi8ing hi" orders9 especially i. it )as part o. a pre8ious planJ Indeed9 there "ust ha8e been a pre-agreed upon !-boat escape plan intact long be.ore #or"ann e8er entered the boat9 or )hy )ould #or"ann6s children and se8eral o. his political cronies all clai" #or"ann had "ade arrange"ents .or the" to escape by !-boat. 3nd )hy )ould the giant !-boat ha8e been brought into Ha"burg to pick up the "issing +eichsleiter in the .irst placeJ Cha"pions o. the traditional history )ill assert there are serious .la)s in this chronology. hey )ill ask9 ho) could #or"ann be in Ha"burg )aiting .or the !-boat )hile he is kno)n to ha8e been participating in Hitler6s death and burial and the unsuccess.ul surrender negotiations )ith the /o8iets during the early "orning hours o. 1 0ayJ Or they )ill ;uestion #or"ann6s alleged signing9 )ith >oebbels9 o. the "essage later in.or"ing *oenit7 that Hitler )as dead9 sent so"eti"e bet)een $B1( and %B1( p.". 0ay 19 long a.ter #or"ann is supposed to ha8e been in Ha"burg )aiting .or the !-boat. he serious .la)s in these accounts are actually in the traditional history. 4or despite assertions that #or"ann o8ersa) the /o8iet surrender negotiations9 >eneral Hrebs9 )ho )as sent to the /o8iets to parlay9 states that he could not agree to the /o8iet de"and .or unconditional surrender because he did not ha8e >oebbels6 authori7ation to do so.dliA He ne8er "entioned #or"ann in this conteAt9 e8en though #or"ann signed the authori7ation to initiate negotiationsdlA - he probably pre-signed all necessary docu"ents that could be anticipated .or the surrender be.ore lea8ing the bunker - and he )ould al"ost certainly ha8e been eApected to pro8ide leadership during negotiations had he still been present. @a"es O6*onnell9 author o. he #unker9 agrees that Hrebs )as negotiating only under >oebbels6 direction.dlAi 3nd although the traditional history insists >oebbels .orced #or"ann to sign the docu"ent noti.ying 3d"iral *oenit7 o. Hitler6s deathdlAii that a.ternoon9 a photograph o. the actual docu"ent as sho)n in *ollinger6s he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan sho)s that >oebbels alone signed the co""uni;ue to *oenit7 - #or"ann6s signature is not on it.dlAiii his is an i"portant and 8ery telling discrepancy9 since up until then all co""unications )ith *oenit79 .or so"e "ysterious reason9 had apparently gone through #or"ann. he telephone eAchange o. the bunker )as also under #or"ann6s direct co""and up until %2 3pril9 a.ter )hich >oebbels took control o. the syste".dlAi8 3pparently9 .ro" the e8idence9 the +eichsleiter see"s to ha8e 8anished. #or"ann still had a presence in the bunker9 though - in the .or" o. his >estapo-supplied double9 )ho )ould soon be sacri.iced on Cehrter #ridge. 3nd undoubtedly those )ho did not kno) any better continued to account .or the +eichsleiter in this inconse;uential counter.eit. #ut those )ho kne) #or"ann )as gone ga8e the double no consideration. hat is )hy Hrebs and >oebbels .ailed to take hi" into account in their dealings )ith the /o8iets.dlA8 3nd thus )e read eye)itness reports that #or"ann .ecklessly )as participating in these e8ents and nothing signi.icant )as e8er done under #or"ann6s hand again. he presence o. #or"ann6s double acting in his place eAplains the rash o. eye)itness accounts describing ho)9 a.ter Hitler6s death9 #or"ann6s de"eanor see"ed to ha8e changed .ro" o8erbearing to ti"id.dlA8i 0any ha8e eAplained this as #or"ann6s sur8i8al reaction to the loss o. his protector9 Hitler9 )ho )as no) dead. #ut such a beha8ior s)ing see"s out o. character )ith the persona o. the "an9 as illustrated by his radiogra" sent a.ter Hitler6s death in )hich #or"ann9 )hile in.or"ing *oenit7 he is Hitler6s successor9 is still .orce.ul and con.ident in his position. he aberrant beha8ior o. the E#or"annE obser8ed in the bunker9 ho)e8er9 could be eApected o. a co""on "an thro)n into such bi7arre circu"stances as playing the role o. a 8ery i"portant international leader during the catastrophic .all o. the e"pire that leader ser8ed. 3d"ittedly9 the scenario abo8e assu"es "uch in certain areas o. the account. here is no direct proo. that #or"ann and *oenit7 e8er actually co""unicated speci.ically about !-$%& or that any o. the trans"issions .ro" #or"ann to *oenit7 originated .ro" any other location than the 4uehrer #unker. <or is there direct docu"entary e8idence that !-$%& )as part o. an escape plan or that #or"ann )as e8er aboard her. #ut the preponderance o. e8idence - especially )hen 8ie)ed through the t)o .ilters o. co"paring disparate stories to .ind speci.ic si"ilarities and patterns9 and o. )eighing e8idence against the possible 8ested interests o. its sources - certainly tends to 8alidate this scenario abo8e any other9 e8en and including the traditional history. 3nd the eAplanations .or the .ar less substantial con.licts and incongruities o. this scenario are "uch less incredible than those o. the history presently accepted.

/talin6s report o. the .light .ro" #erlin and #or"ann6s boarding a !-boat in Ha"burg9 the Hanna +eitsch .light and #or"ann6s deter"ination to get to *oenit7 and Hitler6s order that #or"ann be taken to *oenit79 all happening 8irtually at the sa"e ti"e9 co"bine to present the "ost credible9 co"pelling story .or #or"ann6s escape. It is hard to belie8e that Hanna +eitsch departed to .ly to *oenit7 at the sa"e ti"e #or"ann )as trying to get to the 3d"iral9 by order o. Hitler9 and yet that #or"ann )as not on that airplane. here appears to ha8e been little reason .or /talin to lie about such an episode9 .or )hat could he ha8e hoped to gain .ro" itJ I. he had "ade it up9 the :estern 3llies )ould ha8e paid little attention to it9 so such a concoction )ould be o. little 8alue. I. it )ere true9 ho)e8er9 especially considering the i"plications to the /o8iet !nion o. the cargo !-$%& carried9 i. /talin kne) about it9 then /talin )ould ha8e e8ery reason to be upset and insist the "ystery be resol8ed. He could be eApected to ne8er let the sub?ect die9 )hich he did not during his li.eti"e.dlA8ii #ut certainly to protect its ad8antage9 the !nited /tates )ould deny and "ini"i7e any such accusation - )hich it did and has done e8er since9 including thro)ing the sa"e co"plaint in the /o8iet6s .ace o. harboring #or"ann9 - in order to belittle9 con.use and de.use in the public6s "ind /talin6s clai". I. /talin )as telling the truth about the .light .ro" #erlin9 as the details he included tend to de"onstrate he )as9 then )hy not about the large !-boat9 as )ellJ #ritish 4ield 0arshall #ernard 0ontgo"ery )as reported in early /epte"ber 19&( to ha8e said #ritish Intelligence recei8ed a report o. #or"ann in Ha"burg the night o. 1 0ay9dlA8iii apparently 8eri.ying /talin6s assertion that #or"ann had been .lo)n to Ha"burg9 or else ho) )ould he ha8e gotten there so .ast. hat #or"ann .le) to Ha"burg and escaped in a sub"arine is .urther supported by an episode Cadislas 4arago described )hen he asked #ritish Intelligence about a report that #or"ann escaped in a !-boat. He )as told by one o. #ritain6s highest ranking intelligence o..icers that they had in8estigated the report i""ediately a.ter the )ar9 but that the in;uiry )as "ore interested in the !-boat he escaped in than in the "issing +eichsleiter hi"sel..dlAiA )o points are o. interest in this response. he .irst is that there )as no denial that #or"ann had escaped by !-boat. On the contrary9 the connotation is that the report )as true and there see"ed to be so"e speci.ic kno)ledge about the escape and the escape 8ehicle9 )hich )ould tend to 8alidate the !-boat escape story. he contact noted that the in8estigation )as later dropped= )hich is ;uite possibly a telling e8ent9 as )ell. he in8estigation )ould ha8e been dropped once it )as disco8ered the !-boat )ound up in 3"erican hands9 and probably not until then or until the )hereabouts o. the )ay)ard !-boat and #or"ann had been deter"ined. he second point is that al"ost all >er"an !-boats had surrendered by this ti"e9 and9 )ith the )ar o8er9 held little "ore 8alue than as surplus sub"arines .or the 3llied na8ies. 0ost )ere sunk as target practice shortly a.ter the )ar. On the other hand9 the 3llies kne) by then that #or"ann controlled all o. Hitler6s 8ast )ealth as )ell as the <a7i Party6s "assi8e .unds and properties and se8eral colossal go8ern"ent accounts. In addition9 he had untold kno)ledge about the )orkings o. the hird +eich9 its intelligence ser8ices and international business dealings that )ere )orth billions o. dollars. hese )ere the spoils o. )ar9 and under the guise o. reparations9 the 3llies )ere intent on clai"ing the"9 i. they could identi.y the". 4or that9 it )ould be "ost help.ul to ha8e #or"ann. :hat #or"ann controlled9 there.ore9 )as .ar "ore 8aluable than a single sub"arine. Certainly Hitler6s "issing lieutenant )ould take top billing o8er any single !-boat and its cargo9 )hich #ritish intelligence see"ed so interested in - )ith the possible eAception o. the )orld-"olding critical cargo o. !-$%&. he "ysterious acti8ities o. !-$%& - )hich )ill be re8ie)ed in the neAt chapter - support the idea that #or"ann )as picked up by the !-boat in Ha"burg. Indeed9 :illia" /te8enson noted a direct link bet)een #or"ann and !-$%& )hen he described ho) #or"ann Ehad at his .ingertips all the details re;uired .or..."o8ing special cargoes like the dis"antled rockets shipped by !-boat to @apanEdlAA as )ell as the EscientistsE )ho de8eloped >er"any6s ato"ic bo"b.dlAAi <otesB cdlAii @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1$cdlAiii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 1,& cdlAi8 Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. &( cdlA8 Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 18( cdlA8i @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. $2 cdlA8ii @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 pp. 1%(9 1%,= Couis /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 pp. %,9 %-= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1&%= /i"on :eisenthal9 he 0urderers 3"ong !s9 p. %$1 cdlA8iii @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1%, cdlAiA @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1&-= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1&% cdlAA @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1&-

cdlAAi Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1&2 cdlAAii @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1$1= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1&& cdlAAiii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 1--9 1-8 cdlAAi8 Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. ,( and p. ,( note cdlAA8 3lan Ce8y9 he :eisenthal 4iles9 p. $$, cdlAA8i Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 92 cdlAA8ii Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. 1-9 1-9-18% cdlAA8iii Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 182 cdlAAiA :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 192 cdlAAA :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 11% cdlAAAi @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1,8 cdlAAAii @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1,8 cdlAAAiii Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. %,19 %,$= Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1, cdlAAAi8 Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. %1= Paul 0anning9 <e) Dork i"es9 0arch %9 19-%9 p. %19 colu"n $ cdlAAA8 Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1, cdlAAA8i Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. $,9 $-= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 1%9 1& cdlAAA8ii Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. $, cdlAAA8iii @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1,8 cdlAAAiA Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. $8 cdAc Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. $8-%2 cdAci Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 182 cdAcii ##C9 /unday9 % 0ay9 1998 cdAciii @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. $9, cdAci8 @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1$-= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 9&9 1,% cdAc8 @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1$cdAc8i :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 1,& cdAc8ii 3lbert /peer9 he +ise and 4all o. the hird +eich9 p. (-(= @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 122 cdAc8iii 3lbert /peer9 he +ise and 4all o. the hird +eich9 p. (-( cdAciA Hanna +eich9 4liegen9 0ein Ceben pp. 9$9 9%= Couis /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 pp. 1$,9 1$-9 1$9= Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 pp. $$-= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 pp. %$,9 %$-= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 81= Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1-1 d Couis /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. $91 di Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. &1 dii Hanna +eitsch9 MMMMMM 9 p. 9$ diii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $$8= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %$,= Couis /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. 1$-= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 81 di8 Couis /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. 1$d8 Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. 1((9 1(89 %&2= Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 pp. $$89 $%--$&2= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %,d8i @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $81 d8ii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 8(9 12d8iii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $&2= diA >regory *ouglas9 >estapo Chie.B he 19&8 Interrogation o. Heinrich 0ueller9 p. $19 dA :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 1,19 $92 dAi /harkhunters H # 12(9 p.11 dAii *eutsche !-boote 192,-19,, dAiii /harkhunters H # 11,9 p. %2 dAi8 /harkhunters H # 1299 pp. -9991%919 dA8 /harkhunters H # 1219 p. 1, dA8i /harkhunters H # 11-9 p.1% dA8ii /harkhunters H # 1189 p. , dA8iii /harkhunters H # 11(9 p. $$ dAiA /harkhunters H # 1189 p. ,

dAA @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%$ dAAi :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 1-(9 $92= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1(8= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $92 dAAii @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 pp. $9-9 $98= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %$9= Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $&2 dAAiii @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. %29 dAAi8 @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. %82 dAA8 @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. $98 dAA8i @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. $(& dAA8ii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $&2= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %$9 dAA8iii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%$ dAAiA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. SSSSS= @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. %21 dAAA @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 1,8 dAAAi @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%$ dAAAii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%$ dAAAiii @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 pp. 1($9 1(%= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1--= :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. $929 $9,9 %22 dAAAi8 :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. $929 $9,9 %22= @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 pp. 1($9 1(%= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1-dAAA8 Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. 1-(9 1-9-18% dAAA8i Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1(8 dAAA8ii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. 1,1 dAAA8iii Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1dAAAiA Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. 1-9-18% dAl @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. $92 dAli Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $%dAlii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $$8 dAliii >eneral Holler9 he Cast 0onth9 as ;uoted by Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $$8 dAli8 Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. &1 dAl8 Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 pp. $$89 $%9= @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 p. 12& dAl8i Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $%dAl8ii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 pp. $$89 $%8 dAl8iii @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. 1&dAliA @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. %&% dl @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. 1,9 dli Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $%9 dlii @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 pp. $1,9 %2$ note dliii Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. &1 dli8 Peter Pad.ield9 Hi""ler9 p. ,22 dl8 Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $&2= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1%9= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%2 dl8i @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%1 dl8ii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $&1= Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. 1%9= @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%1 dl8iii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%$ dliA Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $$8 dlA @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 pp. %%29 %%1 dlAi @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. %,& dlAii @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%1

Cha$ter Thirteen " /sca$e and Surrender 1$ 0ay 19&( 4ro"B !$%& (4ehler) oB >TT 12 Position (2.22 < - %2.22 :. /ur.aced9 course $,29 speed 8. *'4 F*irection 4inder 4iA - author6s noteG (1.22 < - $-.22 : 2,$%T F,B$% a.". - authors noteGdlAAii /urrender trans"ission sent .ro" !-$%& at ,B$% a.".9 1$ 0ay9 19&( 1$ 0ay 19&( 4ro"B !-$%& (4ehler) oB Co"subs Op /ur.aced at 2822#'1$'('&( Position (2.22 < - %&.22 : Course $,2. /peed 8. *'4 Position (2.22 <. - %&.22 : $%&2T F11B&2 p.". - authors noteGdlAAiii 3 second trans"ission .ro" !-$%& sent o8er 1- hours later reporting9 by coordinates9 an unchanged position since the "orning trans"ission9 )hile reporting a 8elocity o. 8 knots in both trans"issions. *espite the reported unchanged position9 direction .inder .iAes sho) !-$%& )as tra8elling )est)ard t)ice as .ast as the 8elocity reportedB in the .irst trans"ission !-$%& actually )as )ell east o. its reported position9 and it actually )as )ell )est o. its reported position in the second trans"ission. here are "ore "ysteries related to !-$%& than its enig"atic passengers and cargo. he )hereabouts o. !$%& .ro" 3pril 1, until 0ay 1$9 19&(9 al"ost a "onth9 are9 see"ingly9 a conundru" - a pu77le )hose ans)er leads to another riddle9 )hich leads again to another pu77le9 and so on9 until you arri8e back at the original ;uestion - )hat happenedJ +e8ie) o. the !-boat6s logbook itsel. re8eals a perpleAing collection o. contradictions )hen co"pared against intercepted radio trans"issions9 other accounts o. the 8oyage9 and e8en other in.or"ation )ithin the sa"e logbook9 suggesting that at least part o. its record is .alsi.ied. In .act9 e8en a cursory glance at )hat are purported to be 8arious pages o. the )ar log re8eals astounding inconsistencies in the physical nature o. the book and the hand)riting therein9 leading to ;uestions and doubt regarding its 8ery pro8enance. In addition9 the .e) apparently clear .acts pro8ided by the )ar log re8eal a bi7arre and uneApected tra8el routine .or a .leeing !-boat. 3nd the actions taken by the !-boat co""ander in the .inal days prior to its surrender are duplicitous and deceit.ul - and apparently in coordination )ith !nited /tates <a8y acti8ities. In short9 the e8idence suggests that !-$%& "ay not to ha8e le.t <or)ay under the conditions it )as reported to9 "ay not ha8e cruised the course across the 3tlantic it )as clai"ed to ha8e tra8eled9 and de.initely did not surrender )hen9 )here and to )ho" it )as ordered to capitulate. Instead9 in al"ost e8ery case9 its co""ander9 Captain Cieutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler9 appears to ha8e been intent on achie8ing a di..erent9 unkno)n end. #ut e8en be.ore the !-boat cast o.. .ro" the pier9 its presence )as generating considerable interest - both in >er"any and across the 3tlantic in the !nited /tates. 3 captured >er"an !C +3 radio encoder'decoder had allo)ed the 3llies to break the >er"an codes and thus recei8e and decode !-boat trans"issions describing !-$%&6s secret "ission and other aspects o. its operations. !-$%&6s Chie. +adio Operator :ol.gang Hirsch.eld6s t)o accounts o. these e8ents corroborate and add enlightening detail to this data. 3ccording to these sources9 as noted in a pre8ious chapter9 !-$%& had recei8ed i"portant radio trans"issions that see"ed to indicate a struggle o8er chain-o.-co""and o. the !-boat )as taking place bet)een Hitler6s head;uarters and !-boat >rand 3d"iral Harl *oenit7. Probably on 1$ 3pril9 !-$%& recei8ed a special order that Hirsch.eld later )rote had originated .ro" Hitler6s bunker head;uarters. EOne day )e recei8ed the .ollo)ing trans"ission9 6!-$%& is not to lea8e yet. :ait .or orders. - he 4uehrer Head;uarters6EdlAAi8 he signal intelligence itsel. see"s to substantiate at least the basics o. Hirsch.eld6s story9 although there are di..erences in the details bet)een his accounts and the intercepted radio trans"issions. 4or instance9 in an 5nglish 8ersion o. Hirsch.eld6s "e"oirs9 the order told 4ehler to E6only sail on the orders o. the highest le8el6 - 4uehrer HP.EdlAA8 3n 5nglish translation o. the >er"an 8ersion o. Hirsch.eld6s account ;uotes the order as9 E6!-$%& is not to lea8e yet. :ait .or orders6 - 4uehrer HP.EdlAA8i 3n actual intercepted dispatch si"ilar to9 and there.ore probably connected to the one Hirsch.eld )as re.erencing9 co""anded !-$%& to re"ain at Hristiansand until Eespecially ordered.EdlAA8ii he intercepted radio trans"ission put the date o. receipt o. this order as 1$ 3pril9 but Hirsch.eld6s recollection put the day he sa) the order as Eabout 1& 3pril.E 3nd although Hirsch.eld in both o. his accounts identi.ied the dispatch he sa) as originating .ro" the 4uehrer #unker9 the intercepted 8ersion o. the trans"ission is identi.ied as co"ing .ro" the >er"an Co""ander o.

/ub"arine Operations. Here is our .irst conundru"= )as there truly a "ysterious "essenger in the 4uehrer #unker9 and9 i. so9 )hat )as his intent in ordering the !-boat to stayJ /tandard co""and center procedure )ould suggest that9 had !-$%& recei8ed a specially coded "essage .ro" Hitler6s head;uarters9 the !-boat co""and co""unication center )ould auto"atically relay the trans"ission to !-$%& on behal. o. the 4uehrer #unker. 3lthough the 3llies6 captured !C +3 decoder could decipher the !-boat co""and code9 apparently it )as not e;uipped .or the special leadership .re;uencies or codes o. the 4uehrer #unker. he original "essage .ro" the bunker )ould not ha8e been intercepted. Presu"ably9 !-$%& )as not e;uipped )ith the special e;uip"ent to recei8e such a "essage either. /o the !-boat co""and co""unications operators needed to rephrase the )ording to do)nplay Hitler6s head;uarters connection9 in order not to re8eal to prying ears the high priority o. the "essage or the #unker6s in8ol8e"ent in it= but to insure9 nonetheless9 that !-$%& recei8ed appropriate operating orders. 4ollo)ing this procedure )ould also conser8e proper chain o. co""and. 3nd it )ould also eAplain )hy Hirsch.eld read the 4uehrer #unker "essage a day or t)o later in the co""unications center. Possibly he recogni7ed the relayed "essage .or )hat it )as and )ent to the co""unications center to read the original. Hirsch.eld )rites that he "ade a special daily 8isit to the .lotilla co""unications center )hile in Hristiansand to pick up "essages .or the !-boat.dlAA8iii /uch a practice see"s odd9 since !-$%& appears to ha8e been capable o. recei8ing all standard !-boat trans"issions - 8is-a-8is the present relayed dispatch. he daily 8isits there.ore suggest Hirsch.eld9 and 4ehler by eAtension9 )ere eApecting the special "essage. :hate8er the case9 as a result o. one o. these 8isits9 Hirsch.eld )rites that he kne) the trans"ission originated .ro" the 4uehrer #unker because he )as gi8en a copy o. the order and that it )as identi.ied as ha8ing co"e .ro" Hitler6s head;uarters. 3n interesting set o. co"parisons about this "essage can be "ade bet)een Hirsch.eld6s .irst 8ersion o. the incident in his book 4eind.ahrten9 )ritten in >er"an9 and his second account )ritten )ith >eo..rey #rooks9 Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO - 19&2-19&,9 )ritten in 5nglish se8eral years later. he details in Hirsch.eld6s earlier 8ersion o. the episode described ho) 4ehler sho)ed the dispatch to his passenger9 >eneral Hessler9 )ho sur"ised that a "ystery guest )as co"ing .ro" #erlin.dlAAiA he later 8ersion o. this episode "akes only a 8eiled9 obli;ue9 passing "ention o. this discussion.FdlAAAG 4ro" "y contacts I learned that9 a.ter the .irst book9 4ehler and others Ein the kno)E about the "ysterious 4uehrer #unker dispatch9 8igorously censured Hirsch.eld .or ha8ing re8ealed anything about it. 5nsuing clai"s )ere "ade that Hirsch.eld had9 in .act9 .alsely elaborated his report o. this episode. /uch a.ter-the-.act editing see"s suspect9 ho)e8er9 gi8en the pro8en 8eracity o. "any other ele"ents o. Hirsch.eld6s accounts o. e8ents - )hich )ill be pointed out as our narrati8e continues - and the chain o. ano"alies and enig"as other)ise le.t in !-$%&6s )ake. 3t any rate9 in Hirsch.eld6s early 8ersion9 Hessler sur"ised that #erlin )as sending another passenger to tra8el in the !-boat and that he guessed the uneApected tra8eler )ould be Her"ann >oering9 )ho"9 to 4ehler6s horror9 he called E he 4at One.E Hessler )ent on to eAplain that >oering6s presence in the !-boat )as unacceptable to hi" because he and >oering had had a .alling out and so he )as not prepared to spend se8eral "onths con.ined in s"all !-boat ;uarters )ith the Cu.t)a..e +eich 0arshall. *espite the eAclusion o. this e8ent .ro" Hirsch.eld6s second account9 to a large degree9 re8ealing this little-kno)n detail ;uali.ies Hirsch.eld6s authenticity as a )itness o. this e8ent9 and by eAtension9 the 8eracity o. his original clai" that the order .or !-$%& not to lea8e Hristiansand ca"e .ro" the 4uehrer #unker. *uring Hessler6s interrogation .ollo)ing !-$%&6s surrender9 Hessler9 indeed9 re8ealed the details o. an other)ise little-kno)n .alling out he had had )ith >oering.FdlAAAiG /hortly9 according to Hirsch.eld6s .irst account9 a second dispatch ca"e through the .lotilla co""unications center. ellingly9 Hirsch.eld6s later 8ersion o. e8ents once again eAcludes any "ention o. this trans"ission. he co""uni;uRC89 also sent on a leadership-dedicated .re;uency9 though benign on the .ace o. it9 )as e8en "ore "ysterious than the .irst. he dispatch read9 E o lead radio chie. Hirsch.eld on !-$%&9 .or your last trip9 "uch luck and healthy return ho"e. Dour #ubi.E :hen called be.ore the 4lotilla Co""ander to account .or the enig"atic "essage9 Hirsch.eld eAplained that the trans"ission had been sent .ro" #ernhard >eiss"ann9 the head radio"an at 12th 4lotilla in Corient9 4rance. He then )rites obli;uely that this ans)er could not be .ollo)ed up on because Corient had been captured. he ob8ious intent o. his response thus )as to protect the identity o. E#ubi.E E#ubiE "ay9 in .act9 ha8e been #ernhard >eiss"ann9 but that see"s unlikely since it is al"ost certain the 3llied .orces that captured Corient )ould not casually allo) an ene"y prisoner to trans"it a personal "essage on a captured ene"y6s special .re;uency trans"itter. :ho9 then9 )as #ubi9 and )hat )as the "eaning o. the "essageJ I.9 indeed9 it )as not .ro" #ernhard >eiss"ann9 then it )ould see" the trans"ission )as a coded "essage .ro" an unkno)n sender9 presu"ably including a prearranged signal designed as part o. a predeter"ined plan. Perhaps the phrase Ehealthy return ho"eE indicated the plan no) )as in place .or !-$%& to return to >er"any upon the proper signal to pick up the "ystery guest - )e )ill probably ne8er kno). :ithin a .e) hours o. this dispatch9 according to Hirsch.elddlAAAii - but probably the neAt day according to a second radio

intercept recei8ed 1% 3prildlAAAiii - Co""ander 4ehler recei8ed another order. his "essage ca"e .ro" >rand 3d"iral Harl *oenit79 co""ander o. the !-boat .leet9 and told 4ehler not to accept orders .ro" anyone but the 3d"iral hi"sel.9 and then co""anded 4ehler to depart as ;uickly as he could "ake the appropriate preparations.dlAAAi8 !pon recei8ing the order9 according to Hirsch.eld9 4ehler openly ackno)ledged the clash o8er chain-o.co""and o. the !-boat by ?oking about *oenit76s )illingness to take on the top brass= but really9 4ehler )as in a tight spot. Ho) could he eApect to eAecute con.licting orders .ro" both the supre"e co""ander o. the !-boat na8y and .ro" the 4uehrer6s head;uarters itsel.J /hould he .ail to do either9 the personal conse;uences could be catastrophic. Certainly9 at the 8ery least9 an order directly .ro" the 4uehrer6s head;uarters to 4ehler had to ha8e a pro.ound in.luence personally on !-$%&6s co""ander. He "ust ha8e .elt great pressure as he )as ground bet)een his t)o po)er.ul leaders. 4ehler )ould need to )ork "agic to s;uee7e out o. this9 his 8ery .irst pickle as the !-boat6s captain - and he had not e8en le.t .riendly shoresO Det he see"s to ha8e )orked so"e e..ecti8e sleight o. hand9 .or radio trans"ission intercepts record that !$%& apparently see"s to ha8e .ul.illed both ordersO he "assi8e !-boat is actually docu"ented by these intercepted radio trans"issions to ha8e le.t port t)ice. Here is the second o. our circular pu77les. he intercepts record that !-$%& had Eput out o. Hristiansand southE on 1, 3pril9 according to one trans"ission.dlAAA8 #ut another trans"ission t)o days later9 on 18 3pril9 reported !-$%& )as on its )ay Eout o. port at present.EdlAAA8i Ho) could the !-boat ha8e le.t port on the 1,th and still be lea8ing Hristiansand t)o days later on the 18thJ Possibly 4ehler had changed plans and returned. 3ccording to !$%&6s Eo..icialE log9 ho)e8er9 on 18 3pril the !-boat )as already approAi"ately $22 "iles a)ay9 heading north in the opposite direction reported on the 1,th9 and )as then in the latitudes around #ergen9 <or)ay.dlAAA8ii 3pparently9 the !-boat had not been called back i. the log is correct - but then9 )e shall see that the log9 itsel.9 is suspect. 4or there is another Eo..icialE log= a log that ends abruptly on 18 3pril9 the 8ery day o. the second report o. !-$%& eAiting port. :e shall return to this con8oluted chronicle "o"entarily. he strange contradiction o. the t)o "essages regarding !-$%& lea8ing port t)ice "ay be ans)ered once again by radio"an Hirsch.eld9 in another o. his cryptic9 abstruse passages that appears to shine light on these "ysterious "o8e"ents. In both o. his accounts o. the ?ourney he )rites that9 once !-$%& )as clear o. Hristiansand9 !-boat Co""ander <orth Captain Hans +osing sailed to and boarded the !-boat .ro" a Eco""unications launchE Fitalics addedG. his e8ent had al)ays perpleAed "e because9 although Hirsch.eld in.ers it occurred o.. Hristiansand9 I kne) +osing )as head;uartered in #ergen. rue9 he "ay ha8e been 8isiting Hristiansand on o..icial business9 the !-boat base )as certainly )ithin his ?urisdiction9 but )hy )ould he )ait .or !-$%& to lea8e Hristiansand and then chase it do)n in a s"all cra.t rather than address its cre) at the pier9 as )as the co""on practiceJ 3.ter re8ie)ing Hirsch.eld6s )ords and the intercepted Esecond eAit .ro" portE "essage9 co"bined )ith the e8idence o. the strangely truncated logbook on the one hand9 and the position o. !-$%& near #ergen9 as posted in that logbook on the other hand9 it see"ed to "e that !-$%& secretly "ay ha8e been detoured to #ergen .or an unkno)n purpose. I. this )as the case9 and it )as supposed to be kept secret9 it )ould eAplain the logbook ha8ing been abruptly concluded on that day rather than record the .act o. the #ergen 8isit. 3 E"ockE or replace"ent logbook )ould then ha8e to ha8e been created to hide the clandestine detour - possibly right a)ay9 possibly at a later date - thus the Eo..icialE logbook. Hirsch.eld6s description o. the "eeting )ith +osing strongly supports the idea that !-$%& 8isited #ergen9 since that )as +osing6s head;uarters. 3nd9 as "entioned9 the pu77le re8ealed by the intercepted radio trans"ission reporting that !-$%& le.t port a second ti"e see"s to support that conclusion as )ell. !-$%& )as9 indeed9 at the right longitude9 and only a .e) "iles o..shore at #ergen on the 18th. o "ake a surreptitious stop there to take on +osing )ould ha8e been ;uick and easy. he tersely ended logbook supports the likelihood o. the secret sidetrack on that date. 3s does the .act that according to Herbert :erner9 author o. the !-boat classic book Iron Co..ins9 and hi"sel. a !-boat co""ander ser8ing in <or)ay at the ti"e9 +osing )as9 in .act9 in #ergen during 1, through 19 3pril9 19&(.dlAAA8iii +osing hi"sel. asserts that he does not re"e"ber his )hereabouts at the ti"e9FdlAAAiAG although the e8ent see"s so singular that one )ould eApect the key details to re"ain in one6s "ind. :hether at Hristiansand or #ergen9 al"ost certainly +osing and 4ehler did not risk their one-o.-a-kind !boat9 priceless cargo and i"portant passengers and cre) sitting openly in the dangerous )aters o.. port )here #ritish sub"arines and anti-sub"arine cra.t regularly pro)led to interdict !-boat acti8ities - ?ust so +osing could gi8e three cheers .or captain and cre). One can only speculate )hat the purpose o. the detour "ight ha8e been. he .e) s"all clues Hirsch.eld pro8ided9 and kno)ing that 4ehler )as caught in the "iddle o. a perilous ga"e o. cat-and-"ouse bet)een *oenit7 and the 4uehrer6s Head;uarters9 surely "ust pro8ide conteAt. here "ust ha8e been an i"portant operational reason .or this secret side trip. Probably that reason is re8ealed in Hirsch.eld6s description o. the boat that brought +osing to !-$%&6s side - he described it as a co""unications launch Fitalics added by authorG.

3pparently9 certain co""unications )ere o. such high i"portance or o. such a secret nature that they )ere not entrusted o8er the regular !-boat ser8ice air )a8es9 e8en in encrypted .or". 3t least9 such see"s to be the case here. Possibly +osing )as hand deli8ering one o. the special-.re;uency dispatches .ro" the 4uehrer #unker that !-$%& )as not e;uipped to recei8e= so this detour )as !-$%&6s Eat seaE 8ersion o. Hirsch.eld6s 8isits to the Hristiansand co""unications center on land. o ensure secured receipt o. an i"portant secret "essage9 a special boat see"s to ha8e been e"ployed )ith a )ell-trusted "essenger9 !boat <orth Co""ander +osing9 )ho" one )ould suspect under the circu"stances personally deli8ered to 4ehler a "ysterious "issi8e. :e "ay speculate that such a "essage )as "ost likely operational orders .or !-$%&9 possibly resol8ing the struggle bet)een *oenit7 and #erlin o8er )ho )ould co""and the !-boat9 or perhaps gi8ing instructions on ho) to deploy until ti"e to pick up its secret guest .ro" #erlin. Or the co""unications launch itsel. "ay ha8e been sent to trans.er to !-$%& the e;uip"ent re;uired to recei8e the special-.re;uency "essages .ro" #erlin. his is con?ecture9 but certainly not outside the real" o. possibility. Hirsch.eld "akes it clear in his )ritings that the radio co"ponents o. the boat )ere "odular and easily changed in and out o. the console=dAc and that the boat )as e;uipped )ith the 8ery latest instru"entation and e8ery possible technical ad8antage. +osing6s .inal )ords to captain and cre) "ay be telling about )hat he kne) o. the "ission o. !-$%&= he said9 ECo"rades9 )hen you return .ro" this "ission9 )e )ill ha8e our .inal 8ictory.E >i8en the desperate situation .or >er"any - it )ould .all )ithin t)o )eeks - the cre) right.ully9 though ;uietly9 ;uestioned his sanity. #ut gi8en the purpose o. !-$%&6s "ission9 i. there )as hope o. 8ictory at all .or the hird +eich9 it )as in the success o. this "ade-o8er "inelayer - and9 tellingly9 +osing kne) it. :hile our .irst conundru" is still so"e)hat o. a "ystery - to be ans)ered later - it )ould see" our second conundru"9 !-$%&6s lea8ing port t)ice9 is sol8ed. #ut )hat o. the strangely truncated logbook - )hich leads to our third conundru"B )hy does one logbook end abruptly and its supposed se;uel not ?i8e )ith the rest o. the e8idence regarding !-$%&6s "o8e"entsJ :hen I .irst re;uested a copy o. the captured )ar log o. !-$%& .ro" !nited /tates archi8es at the beginning o. "y research9 I )as told by an archi8ist that the logbook had been thro)n into the sea by !-$%&6s captain. He asserted that 4ehler got rid o. the ?ournal prior to the !-boat6s surrender to a8oid co"pro"ising the docu"ent. #ut !-$%& carried <a7i >er"any6s greatest secret )eapons9 I reasoned9 including the 1-$ rocket9 the 0essersch"idt $,$ ?et .ighter9 all o. the plans and docu"ents re;uired to "anu.acture the"9 ato"ic bo"b co"ponents and presu"ably plans to build those )eapons9 as )ell. I. 4ehler did not kno) the i"portant details about his .reight9 )hich see"s i"probable despite his later clai"s9 he at least kne) the basic reason and deep i"portance o. his cargo and passengers9 and yet he surrendered the" all intact. I reasoned that this )as a signi.icant incongruity in the report that Captain 4ehler had surrendered the 8aluable <a7i secrets and personnel9 apparently )ithout a second thought9 but had re.used to surrender his co"parati8ely tri8ial logbook. he ?ournal9 presu"ably9 si"ply reported the course he cruised prior to surrender. :hat could be da"ning about that i. the story )as as si"ple as suggestedJ <o9 the logbook itsel. apparently held i"portant secrets that 4ehler did not )ant re8ealed9 and thus 4ehler had indeed consigned it to the deep and )e )ould ne8er kno) !-$%&6s )hereabouts bet)een 1, 3pril and 1$ 0ay9 19&(. Or9 possibly9 the book )as intact but held da"ning e8idence9 and thus )as being kept in so"e separate archi8e9 out o. circulation .ro" prying eyes. :hen9 during a research session in :ashington in 199-9 I )as told the Cibrary o. Congress held a collection o. captured >er"an docu"ents9 I raced o8er to the 8enerable old building in hopes o. locating the "issing log. I )as in.or"ed the captured docu"ents did indeed contain a ?ournal .ro" !-$%&9 but that all the docu"ents had been "icro.il"ed and returned to >er"any to be archi8ed there. /atis.ied )ith the opportunity to read the "icro.il" rolls9 I began searching .or traces o. a logbook .ro" !-$%&. +oll 18 held )hat I )as looking .or - al"ost. 3 logbook identi.ied as that o. !-$%& began on $& 0arch9 19&(9 the day be.ore the !-boat6s departure .ro" Hiel to Hristiansand. 3s noted pre8iously9 it ended abruptly on9 o. all days9 18 3pril9 19&( - the sa"e day o. !-$%&6s "ysterious Esecond eAitE .ro" port. I use the )ord EabruptlyE because9 )hile the !-boat6s acti8ities are detailed through the days and )eeks leading up to and through 13pril9 including lea8ing port on 1, 3pril - corroborating the .irst intercepted "essage o. it lea8ing port on that day - the heading E18 3prilE is )ritten in longhand hal.)ay do)n the page9 but the rest o. the page is blank. here are no entries in the hal.-page underneath the date. <o course coordinates9 no )eather reports9 no ti"es9 no bearings. In other )ords9 the re"aining hal.-page is blank. here is no in.or"ation .or 18 3pril9 the sa"e day that intercepted trans"issions "ysteriously identi.ied !-$%& as lea8ing port .or the second ti"e in three days. 3nd there are no entries .or the 19th or $2th - the log does not pick up again until 1$ 0ay9 the day !-$%& .irst trans"itted its intent to surrender to 3llied .orces.dAci #a..led by the inconsistencies and the gargantuan gap in the record9 I approached a Cibrary o. Congress archi8ist9 )ho in.or"ed "e the original logbook had been sent to the #undesarchi8 in >er"any= he suggested perhaps I could get the .ull record .ro" there. I .aAed the #undesarchi89 re;uesting the log. In

return I )as "ailed a photocopy o. record +0 98',-,9 )ith the )ords E!boot !$%&E )ritten in blue .ountain pen ink on the .ront co8er. <o)here throughout the entire docu"ent is !-$%& identi.ied as an organic9 photocopied part o. the ?ournal as the !-boat o. record. he copy o. the log begins on 19 3pril9 per "y re;uest (I no) )ish I had re;uested it .ro" $& 0arch9 )hen !-$%& le.t Hiel. I )onder i. the record )ould ha8e started then or abruptly on 18 3prilJ) and ends on 1$ 0ay9 the day 4ehler surrendered his 8essel to the !// /utton. #ut there are t)o proble"s )ith this logbook= the positions9 speeds9 bearings and coordinates gi8en .or the last day be.ore surrender sho) a course "aterially di..erent than that actually sailed by 4ehler9 as re8ealed by 3llied radio direction-.inding coordinates9 and as substantiated by Hirsch.eld. 3nd the #undesarchi8 logbook is neither the sa"e printed layout nor are its entries )ritten in the sa"e hand)riting as that o. the logbook "icro.il"ed by the Cibrary o. Congress9 o. )hich it is supposed to be part and parcel. /ince both the intercepted trans"issions and the #undesarchi8 logbook are pri"ary e8idence authoritati8e9 conte"poraneous and organic to the e8ents under study - these con.licts are signi.icant. he inconsistencies in the e8idence suggest gross negligence or )ill.ul deceit in co"pleting one or both o. the records. +adio intercepts are and )ere dispassionately dated intelligence .or the purpose o. tracking i"portant e8ents9 and there see"s to be no reason )hy anyone )ould "anipulate this particular record. On the other hand9 that there are "a?or inconsistencies in the physical and in.or"ati8e aspects o. the #undesarchi8 logbook casts considerable doubt on its 8eracity9 in the opinion o. this researcher. he data recorded in the logbook in "any cases does not .it either the o..icial account or uno..icial recollections gi8en o. !-$%&6s ?ourney= and on another le8el9 in .act9 the entries appear to try to hide the !-boat6s actual "o8e"ents. here is a long list o. details )ithin the logbook that con.lict )ith other data in the log or )ith other substanti8e e8idence regarding the "o8e"ents o. !-$%&9 or that is incongruous )ith the !-boat6s stated "ission and the rest o. its acti8ities. 58en so"e o. the e8idence eAternal to the logbook con.licts )ith !-$%&6s "ission and logbook9 thus all the in.or"ation taken together suggests an organi7ed e..ort to ca"ou.lage !$%&6s "o8e"ents. On $1 3pril9 .or eAa"ple9 as !-$%& )as supposedly .leeing to @apan on its specially dedicated "ission9 and out)ardly at least9 )as under orders not to participate in any other operational acti8ities9FdAciiG intercepted radio trans"issions sho) the !-boat recei8ed an order to Eguard Ireland.EFdAciiiG Certainly such an operational assign"ent )as incongruous )ith the eAtraordinary nature o. !-$%&6s "ission9 cargo and passengers. 3nd the !-boat )as not built .or co"bat patrol9 ha8ing only t)o torpedo tubes9 both at the stern9 and ?ust se8en torpedoes.dAci8 hat !-$%& undertook patrol operations9 as the dispatch see"s to suggest9 is there.ore highly unlikely. In the conteAt o. these considerations9 the dispatch to Eguard IrelandE see"s "ore likely to ha8e been a signal telling 4ehler to proceed )ith his "ission by circu"na8igating Ireland9 or other)ise positioning hi"sel. no .urther a)ay .ro" the 5uropean "ainland than the Celtic island. *uring $2 3pril9 the day ?ust prior to this order9 according to the coordinates gi8en in the logbook9 !-$%& "ysteriously had broken o.. .ro" its pre-planned routedAc8 to @apan. he route )as supposed to take !-$%& on a bearing al"ost due north through the strait bet)een the 4arroe Islands and Iceland= instead !-$%& had been turned roughly due )est. 3nd according to its daily noon-ti"e coordinates postings9 the !-boat9 specially e;uipped to sail sub"erged at eight to ten "iles-per-hour9 and al"ost $2 "iles-per-hour sur.aced9dAc8i )as hardly "o8ing9 tra8eling at bet)een one and t)o-and-a-hal. "iles per hour - ?ust enough speed to "aintain steerage. he a8erage "an )alks at bet)een t)o and t)o and-a-hal. "iles-per-hour. 3ccording to the logbook9 this is the speed the !-boat tra8eled throughout the ?ourney until its last .e) days at sea. :hile 4ehler later suggested this slo) speed )as the "ost econo"ic 8elocity .or such a long "ission9dAc8ii intercepted trans"issions indicate !-$%& "ay ha8e planned to re.uel in Indonesia9dAc8iii e8en though it appears to ha8e had enough .uel to "ake @apan sailing under relati8ely nor"al conditions.dAciA Considered against this in.or"ation and the nature o. the "ission9 the special capabilities o. the !-boat9 and reports that it later sailed sub"erged .or siA days apparently unnecessarily and 8ery ine..iciently9 the slo) 8elocity recorded in the log see"s rather to suggest 4ehler )as "arking ti"e in an e..ort to re"ain close to ho"e. :hen the "essage later ca"e ordering 4ehler to Eguard Ireland9E the !-boat )as turned north again to)ard its originally planned course9 but still at the sa"e slo) speed. he receipt o. the order to guard Ireland9 and 4ehler6s suspiciously slo) speed and )esterly direction ?ust be.ore recei8ing the dispatch - suggesting he intended to stay in the <orth /ea rather than heading out to the 3tlantic - see" to support the possibility Captain 4ehler )as eApecting an order that )ould re;uire hi" to re"ain relati8ely close at hand. 3lthough the apparent holding pattern )as broken o.. )ith the dispatch to guard Ireland9 the order to stay close to Ireland and thus keep !-$%& )ithin three-days proAi"ity to >er"any9 tends to substantiate a higher-le8el plan )as being .ollo)ed in support o. so"e "ysterious ob?ecti8e. :hile obeying the order and ad?usting his course appropriately9 4ehler continued to sail at a snail6s pace9 apparently still anticipating a change o. plans that9 )hen recei8ed9 )ould re;uire hi" to be in the region. 3ccording to the #undesarchi8 logbook9 !-$%& no) turned north at t)o "iles-per-hour on its )ay back to its

preplanned course9 but .or the neAt t)o days the !-boat co8ered less distance than other)ise )ould ha8e been eApected9 e8en at its t)o-"iles-an-hour speed. Indeed9 the !-boat6s coordinates sho) a position change o. barely ten "iles during the $& hours bet)een noon on the $$nd and "id-day o. the $%rd. his delay appears to ha8e a di..erent cause than the intentional stalling acti8ities 4ehler had practiced until then9 ho)e8er9 and it .urther 8alidates Hirsch.eld6s accounts.FdcG 3ccording to the log9 late on the e8ening o. the $$nd9 !-$%& )as abruptly turned northeast. #ut a.ter less than an hour6s sailing its course )as re8ersed again to the south)est .or o8er three hours be.ore co"ing about once "ore to a corrected course that intersected the original planned ?ourney. his strange episode in the log occurs al"ost due )est o. rondhei"9 <or)ay9 )hich is the longitude Hirsch.eld gi8es .or a near "iss )ith a .reighter that al"ost churned under !-$%& in the stea"er6s propellers as the !-boat )as "aking )ay at snorkel depth. 4ehler )as .orced to Ee"ergency di8eE to a8oid a collision and certainly "ust ha8e .ollo)ed the eAercise )ith a standard drill to ensure he had e8aded detection. he record o. apparent e8asi8e "aneu8ers tends there.ore9 once again9 to 8alidate as accurate the general authenticity o. Hirsch.eld6s account o. e8ents. *uring its ?ourney9 !-$%& s)ung .ro" one direction to another a .e) ti"es9 as recorded throughout the log9 but these appear to be standard check-up "aneu8ers and possible course corrections. here are other si7eable and apparently uneAplainable discrepancies9 ho)e8er9 bet)een )here the !-boat )as at a gi8en ti"e as recorded in the logbook according to celestial or electronic na8igation coordinates9 and )here it )as plotted to be according to reckoning by distance and direction. +ecords o. both techni;ues )ere kept in the log. /"all disparities bet)een these t)o .or"s o. na8igation are to be eApected as they are used to crosscheck one another. #ut the errors recorded in the case o. !-$%& occur too o.ten and are too large - o.. by as "uch as $22 percent or "ore in distance and al"ost 92 degrees in direction in a single day6s tra8el - and occur as o.ten as one-third o. the !-boat6s days at sea. In short9 )hile certain critical e8ents see" to be accounted .or in the log9 like the near-"iss )ith the stea"er and an electrical .ire that is recorded in Hirsch.eld6s account9 as )ell9 the general plotting in the logbook appears to be patently and ineAplicably sloppy and inaccurate. he gross disparities in the record suggest so"eone )as co"pleting the logbook 8ery ;uickly and )ithout caring )here !-$%& actually )as )hen the entries )ere being "ade. In .act9 co"pletion o. the log see"s to ha8e been done )ith little concern .or ensuring the t)o .or"s o. na8igation )ould 8alidate one another at allO 3nd as the ?ourney progressed9 the errors beca"e greater. 3t the sa"e ti"e9 other uneApected but see"ingly i"portant changes occurred. 4or eAa"ple9 in the opening hours o. 1 0ay - about the sa"e ti"e 0artin #or"ann is reported to ha8e been preparing to "ake a rende78ous )ith a giant !-boat in Ha"burg - !-$%& again broke .ro" its planned ?ourney and turned due east9 back to)ard the <orth /ea9 .ro" a south)esterly course. he logbook records that this di8ersion lasted only an hour. +e8ie) o. the e8ents leading up to and a.ter this strange course change9 ho)e8er9 "ay be re8ealing. #eginning in the early "orning hours o. %2 3pril9 about the ti"e #or"ann )as concluding a series o. decepti8e dispatches to *oenit7 to arrange the .inal details o. his escape .ro" #erlin9 a series o. changes in the )ay !-$%& )as controlled occur in the log. 4irst9 and perhaps "ost telling9 although the #undesarchi8 log and Hirsch.eld both agree that a.ter the near "iss )ith the stea"er !-$%& had run sur.aced al"ost e8ery night until beyond the Iceland'4arroe Island <arro)s9FdciG the logbook records 4ehler no) chose to run sub"erged in the 3tlantic. Ha8ing already run perhaps the "ost dangerous part o. the ?ourney sur.aced at night - the <orth /ea and the narro)s )ere hea8ily patrolled .or anti-sub"arine acti8ity - the logbook sho)s that 4ehler no) chose to go .or)ard slo)ly and ine..iciently beneath the )ater6s sur.ace. 3ccording to the logbook9 !-$%& sailed continuously )ithout sur.acing .ro" the early hours o. %2 3pril until late ( 0ay - the crucial ti"e span bet)een #or"ann6s disappearance .ro" #erlin starting on the %2th o. 3pril9 to *oenit76s capitulation on the (th o. 0ay. I. true9 running .or al"ost siA .ull days either .ully sub"erged or at snorkel depth )as a rare e8ent .or any !-boat. I"portantly9 Hirsch.eld6s account - pro8en eAtre"ely accurate thus .ar - con.licts )ith the logbook9 saying !-$%& continued to proceed Esub"erged by day and sur.aced at night under the protection o. our radar.EFdciiG 58en 4ehler ad"itted the logbook is only partially true )hen he later )rote that on the .irst t)o nights a.ter passing through the strait his e..orts to sur.ace )ere th)arted by unidenti.ied aircra.t on his radar.FdciiiG He a..ir"s9 ho)e8er9 that on the third night the !-boat )as able to re"ain sur.aced E.or se8eral hours.E He gi8es no account o. the .ourth9 .i.th and siAth nights. +egardless o. )hat !-$%& actually )as doing9 these accounts de"onstrate the protection pro8ided by the special radar )ith )hich the !-boat )as e;uipped= )hich could search the ocean and skies .or "iles around )ithin a split second )ithout gi8ing a)ay the !-boat6s location.Fdci8G he cutting-edge radar syste" had already sa8ed the !-boat serious incident once9 ha8ing early in the 8oyage detected anti-sub"arine airplanes9 allo)ing 4ehler to e8ade danger long be.ore the planes could get a .iA on the !-boat.Fdc8G Hirsch.eld6s account o. these critical .irst days in the 3tlantic9 )hile brie.9 di..ers "arkedly .ro" 4ehler6s. He states that Eduring the .irst night )e )ere obliged to di8e t)ice because o. aircra.t9EFdc8iG the connotation being that during the rest o. the .irst night and on the re"aining nights9 the boat ran sur.aced. Cater

analysis o. 4ehler6s account )ill pro8e e8en greater disparity bet)een )hat )as )ritten in the logbook and )hat appears to ha8e actually occurred. In trying to decide )hich record is true9 4ehler6s9 Hirsch.eld6s or the see"ingly .aulty logbook9 the operational situation o. the !-boat "ust be considered. 4ehler )as no) on the open 3tlantic )here !-boat interdiction )as considerably leaner than on the <orth /ea and )here he had "uch "ore roo" to "aneu8er sur.aced and the bene.it o. the best radar. 3dditionally9 in this part o. the 3tlantic )here it )as harder to support antisub"arine acti8ity .ro" land bases9 !-boat detection by the ene"y )as usually "ade only upon a !-boat attack upon an ene"y ship9 and there.ore a !-boat that did not attack )as relati8ely sa.e .ro" detection. 4ehler ad"itted as "uch in an undated letter )ritten to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters9Fdc8iiG in )hich the captain stated he )as little concerned about being disco8ered= he had no intention )hate8er o. attacking anything. In .act9 he intended to steer clear o. all contact. Considering his superior radar and all o. these .a8orable conditions and the greatly i"pro8ed .uel econo"y and speed o. running sur.aced as opposed to snorkeling9 4ehler had co"parati8ely good reason to run sur.aced9 at the 8ery least during the dark o. night. He e8en )rites in his letter to Cooper9 ECater on in the open ocean9 staying sub"erged during dayti"e o..eres (sic) a .air chance to pass through undetected9EFitalics added .or e"phasisG in8ersely in.erring that he did9 indeed9 sail sur.aced at night9 despite the logbook6s entries and again corroborating Hirsch.eld6s account.Fdc8iiiG Con8ersely9 4ehler had 8ery little reason to run sub"erged. PerpleAing and contradictory as it see"s9 ho)e8er9 the logbook records that 4ehler had9 in essence9 Egone to groundE and re"ained sub"erged. Considered against the !-boat6s operations in the Iceland'4arroe Island <arro)s9 its superior radar e;uip"ent9 4ehler6s supposed concern .or .uel econo"y9 and other conditions as ha8e been outlined9 sailing sub"erged in the open 3tlantic .or siA days straight see"s unlikely. In the conteAt o. a second9 "ore intriguing9 escape scenario9 ho)e8er9 as )e shall see9 such entries in the #undesarchi8 logbook "ake good sense - as a co8er-up .or the period o. ti"e bet)een %2 3pril through ( 0ay9 )hen !-$%& "ay ha8e disappeared on a secret side trip. 3 second set o. telling data regarding such a detour arises .ro" con.licts )ithin the #undesarchi8 logbook and bet)een the logbook and another record9 as )ell. *uring the 8oyage9 >eneral Hessler )as entering in his diary the !-boat6s position coordinates taken at noon each day.FdciAG His postings "atch eAactly those o. the logbook until %2 3pril9 )hen Hessler9 .or the .irst ti"e during the ?ourney9 .ailed to post coordinates. On that day9 the #undesarchi8 logbook sho)ed coordinates at noon o. ,1J (86 <9 1&J &9.( :9 a distance .ro" the pre8ious coordinates that roughly represented the !-boat6s a8erage speed thus .ar. he .ollo)ing day9 Hessler posted the eAact sa"e coordinates .or 1 0ay that the logbook sho)ed .or %2 3pril - ,1J (86 <9 1&J &9.( :. 4or 1 0ay9 the logbook in its turn sho)ed ,1J 1&6 <9 1,J 286 :9 indicating !-$%& had tra8eled the a8erage daily distance again. !p to this point9 because the logbook entries re"ain consistent )ith daily distances co8ered9 one )ould assu"e the logbook is correct and Hessler had ?ust "ade a "istake. hat Hessler6s diary eAactly "atched the coordinates in the logbook until %2 3pril and then9 e8en )hen it di..ered9 it sho)ed only an apparent error in transcription o. being o.. by one day9 supports this theory. Probably Hessler )as recei8ing his data secondhand as pro8ided by the sophisticated radio na8igation syste" !-$%& deployed. #ut Hessler ne8er corrected his 1 0ay entry9 e8en though it ob8iously )ould ha8e been )rong )hen he updated his diary the .ollo)ing day9 on $ 0ay. +e8ie)ing the coordinates gi8en in the #undesarchi8 log beginning the 8ery neAt day9 ho)e8er9 on noon o. 1 0ay and again on noon o. the .ollo)ing day9 sho)s the !-boat tra8eled barely hal. o. its already slo) a8erage daily distance. /uch an ad?ust"ent considered )ith Hessler6s erratic entries o. a .e) days prior "ay suggest a correction o. so"e sort )as "ade in the log. his suggestion beco"es "ore plausible )hen considering that the distance tra8eled .or the sa"e $& hours9 as actually )ritten in the log9 is o8er ,2 statute "iles - .i8e statute "iles abo8e the daily a8erage - despite the logbook coordinates sho)ing a hal.-day6s a8erage tra8el. One "inor course change recorded during that period )ould hardly ha8e i"pacted the o8erall distance tra8eled and there.ore could not be accountable .or the discrepancy bet)een the t)o entries. he record there.ore suggests uncertainty about )here !-$%& )as9 beginning on %2 3pril. he strea" o. con.licts )ithin the logbook consistently increased .ro" this point in ti"e .or)ard. 3 second inaccuracy occurred t)o days later9 bet)een % and & 0ay9 )hen the posted coordinates recorded the !-boat again "o8ed only a hand.ul o. "iles9 certainly .e)er than ten. #ut the logbook posted (&.- statute "iles tra8eled )ith no course changes signi.icant enough to account .or the di..erence. Perhaps tellingly9 >eneral Hessler6s diary on % 0ay .ails .or the second ti"e to record any daily coordinates at all. his herky-?erky "otion o. the !-boat .ro" day to day as recorded in the logbook9 )hich is out o. phase )ith Hessler6s also herky-?erky data9 but )hich Hessler see"s to try to account .or9 see"s again to indicate uncertainty as to )here the sub"arine actually )as a.ter %2 3pril. 3 third con.lict that continues the uncertainty - the largest o. the three - occurs in the $& hours bet)een ( and , 0ay. he coordinates posted sho) distance tra8eled o. about hal. o. the ((-statute "ile daily a8erage9 .or a total tra8el distance o. about %2 statute "iles= but the actual distance reported records a )hopping 99

"iles - close to t)ice the a8erage distanceO his is the .urthest distance !-$%& tra8eled9 by .ar9 recorded to that point in the ?ournal. :hat co"pounds this truly signi.icant and 8ery ob8ious error is that course bearings gi8en throughout the $&-hour period are al"ost consistently $$2J9 a straight line )est south)est9 but the end coordinates sho) !-$%&6s position )as about %2 "iles southeast o. its position $& hours prior. In other )ords9 both the distance and the direction tra8eled are in serious discrepancy )ithin the log. he distance tra8eled9 as entered directly in the logbook9 di..ers not only by about ,2 "iles9 or three ti"es the distance calculated .ro" the coordinates9 but the logbook is o.. by al"ost 92J in direction9 or one-;uarter the arc o. the co"pass9 as )ell. 3s noted earlier9 "arginal di..erences in a course tracked by coordinates co"pared against a course tracked by bearings and distance are to be eApected. :inds9 currents and hu"an error o. ?ust .ractions o. a degree )ill create 8ariances in position )hen na8igating a sub"arine. #ut the si7e o. the discrepancies listed abo8e are hardly eAplainable by anything but the "ost pro.ound errors9 suggesting al"ost no regard .or )here the !-boat actually )as. he 8ariance bet)een the coordinate positions posted on ( and , 0ay9 co"pared to the direction and distance plotted9 is ?ust too eAtre"e. I. one does not belie8e !-$%& actually sailed southeast - per the coordinates posted - but rather sailed according to the dead reckoning in.or"ation9 or 8ice 8ersa - an entire day is lost. #ut there is nothing in the docu"ent to suggest a correction )as "ade .or a lost day. In our scenario o. !-$%& "aking a secret side trip9 unaccounted .or days are central to understanding )hat the !boat "ay ha8e been up to during this ti"e. he only other ans)er .or the Elost dayE )ould be i. the !-boat ca"e to a co"plete standstill .or $& hours9 )hich runs counter to all accounts. #ut e8en i. it had9 )hy )ould 4ehler ha8e recorded !-$%& )as tra8eling in t)o directions at onceJ !-$%& did not stand still= ;uite the opposite. 3 last9 and also substantial9 series o. con.licts bet)een the #undesarchi8 logbook and other sources occurs on 11 through 1$ 0ay9 )hich included the .inal $&-hour period recorded in the log - )hich ended on the 1$th9 )hen 4ehler apparently .irst radioed his intent to surrender. he .inal coordinates entered in the logbook - &9J $26 <9 %1J (1 : - )ere .or noon 1$ 0ay. his is in a line )ith the course plotted .ro" - through 1$ 0ay9 )hich adhered to an a8erage bearing o. $$2J9 or south south)est. /urprisingly9 ho)e8er9 actual bearings on the 11th and 1$th s)ung )idely9 .ro" 182J9 or straight south - a course pursued throughout "ost o. 11 0ay - to a course change to $,2J9 al"ost due )est9 )hich turn occurred at $B%( on the "orning o. the 1$th. he distance co8ered during - through 12 0ay9 as calculated .ro" the daily coordinates9 )as about ,2 to -2 "iles per day9 again about the a8erage. #ut on the 11th9 the coordinates sho) a doubling o. 8elocity to about 1$2 "iles. he actual total distance sailed entered in the logbook .or 1$ 0ay is $21 statute "iles9 )hich9 )hile a great increase in speed9 gi8en the dri8e south then dogleg )est9 calculates closely enough to "atch the 1$2 "iles represented by a straight line .ro" start coordinate to end point. 3t the outset these entries appear to be accurate9 although9 as noted9 representing a great increase in !-$%&6s 8elocity. Intercepted radio trans"issions .ro" !-$%& to Hali.aA that included direction-.inder bearings corroborated that the !-boat )as sailing to)ard $,28 on the co"pass. FdcAG he direction-.inder also sho)ed9 ho)e8er9 that on the "orning o. 1$ 0ay9 !-$%& )as actually at a position -2 to 82 "iles north9 and "ore i"portantly9 1(2 "iles east o. the position calculated .ro" the ti"es and bearings recorded in the logbook. 3t &B1( a.". on 1$ 0ay9 the intercept6s direction-.inder coordinates had put the !boat at (1J 226 <9 $-J 226 :. he !-boat6s position as eAtrapolated .ro" the logbook6s speeds and bearings9 ho)e8er9 indicate it should ha8e been at &98 $26 <9 %18 226:9 gi8e or take a .e) "iles. here.ore9 as noted9 it )as trailing about 1(2 "iles east-northeast o. the position recorded in the logbook. 4ehler .urther co"plicated things - apparently )ith a plan in "ind - by .alsely trans"itting during that sa"e &B1( a.". radio "essage that !-$%&6s position )as (2J 226 <9 %2J 226 :9 signi.icantly di..ering both .ro" the direction-.inder coordinates and the calculations "ade .ro" the logbook data. /o )e ha8e three considerably di..erent positions gi8en .or !-$%& at &B1( a.". 1$ 0ayB one .ro" the direction-.inder o. the intercepted trans"ission9 one calculated .ro" the #undesarchi8 logbook9 and one that 4ehler reported to Hali.aA. he direction-.inder location is by .ar the "ost likely to be accurate9 since it is the only ob?ecti8e source. *ra)ing a line on a "ap )ith one end touching the point "arking the direction- .inder coordinates and the other end the point "arking the logbook position posted .or noon 1$ 0ay9 sho)s that 4ehler6s radioed .alse position .alls directly on that line and al"ost at its center. In the &B1( a.". trans"ission he also ga8e his speed as 8 knots9 but he )as actually sailing 1, knots according to calculations "ade .ro" the intercepted trans"issions as )ell as 4ehler6s o)n later ad"ission.FdcAiG 4ro" !-$%&6s actual position as re8ealed by the direction-.inder9 at the 1,-knot speed it )as sailing9 !-$%& )ould "ake the position .alsely recorded in the logbook ?ust about noon - the ti"e o. the daily logbook posting. *oing so )ould bring it in con.or"ance )ith the .abricated logbook scenario suggesting that !-$%& )as heading on a "uch "ore southerly course )ell )est o. its real position9 rather than the .ast )esterly track it had actually been on. hus he )ould continue an illusion he had created that !-$%& )as sailing a con8entional course to @apan on the >reat Circle. 3nd !-$%&6s position )ould be directly in line )ith the pre8ious siA days o. posted coordinates9 .urther 8alidating the .alse entries in the logbook.

4ehler then does a strange thing. Ha8ing care.ully set up the deception to the point o. entering .alse data in the logbook9 instead o. heading straight .or those noon coordinates already posted to co"plete the illusion9 4ehler proceeded on a "ore )esterly route. He also abruptly discontinued his second logbook. here are no "ore entries in the #undesarchi8 log a.ter noon 1$ 0ay. :hyJ Possibly because 4ehler6s decepti8e .irst trans"ission to 3llied .orces reported a .alse position not only calculated to ca"ou.lage his "o8e"ents9 but those coordinates )ould sho) !-$%& proceeding on a course that passed eAactly through the intersection o. the boundaries o. 3llied na8al control o. the 3tlantic Ocean. 5ast o. this point )as the ?urisdiction o. the #ritish and 4rench9 )hich he )as racing out o.. :est and north o. it )as the ?urisdiction o. Canada= and )est and south o. it )as the ?urisdiction o. the !nited /tates. Probably at &B1( a.". - the soonest 4ehler .elt )ith con.idence that he could reach the desired coordinates by noon - he .alsely radioed the in.or"ation to the 3llies that he )as at that "o"ent breaking into the 3"erican-controlled sector o. the 3tlantic. He )ould be eApecting to capitulate to the !nited /tates and surrender his boat9 passengers and deadly cargo and then his "ission )ould be o8er. Instead o. the !nited /tates responding to 4ehler6s radio "essage9 ho)e8er9 Canada6s Hali.aA station .irst hailed the !-boat and co""anded it to sail .or <o8a /cotia. 4or 4ehler9 surrender to Canada9 apparently9 )as unacceptable= de"onstrated by the .act that he began a series o. acti8ities designed to a8oid Canadian capture. 4irst9 instead o. heading to)ard the noon coordinates he appears to ha8e so care.ully set up .or his co8er story and had apparently already posted in the logbook9 he continued on a 8ery .ast )esterly track )ell north o. the ca"ou.lage course he had created. Presu"ably9 reali7ing that Canadian .orces )ere going to try to clai" !-$%&9 4ehler concluded the best )ay to a8oid the Canadians )as to stay a)ay .ro" )here they eApected hi" to be. Instead o. heading southeast9 as reported9 he stayed north .or the ti"e being. /econd9 .urther reali7ing that general kno)ledge o. his duplicitous "aneu8ers )ould re8eal a hidden agenda9 and there.ore concluding that he should lea8e no record hence.or)ard9 4ehler discontinued keeping his se"i-.ictional second logbook. #eyond this point9 he probably reali7ed it )ould be "ore di..icult to create a )orkable co8er story .or a con8oluted logbook than to eAplain his reasons .or .ailing to co"plete the diary. He could easily say the )ar )as o8er .or his boat9 passengers and cre) and so there )as no need .or .urther entries. 3t 9B&( p.".9 4ehler reported to Hali.aA !-$%&6s position again9 (2J 226 <9 %2J 226 :9 the sa"e position he clai"ed to hold at &B1( that "orning9 e8en though he also reported a speed o. eight knots in both dispatches9 in.erring the !-boat )as on the "o8e the entire ti"e. he direction-.inding coordinates .or this second trans"ission9 ho)e8er9 placed the !-boat at (2J 226 <9 %&J 226 :. He had no) "o8ed .ro" being )ell east o. his reported position9 as indicated in the "orning trans"ission9 to )ell )est o. that sa"e double-reported position. 3ccording to the direction-.inder coordinates .or this dispatch9 !-$%& had tra8eled approAi"ately $22 "iles in 18 hours - or at least three ti"es the a8erage speed recorded in the logbook. he !-boat )as running at o8er 1, "iles-per-hour9 as noted earlier9 or at o8er 92 percent o. its top sur.aced speed. Captain 4ehler ad"itted to "aking this "ad dash o8er the 3tlantic at E1, or 1,1'$E knots on Ethe night o. 1$ or 1% 0ayE in his letter to /harkhunters already "entioned. Hirsch.eld con.ir"ed9 as )ell9 that 4ehler had ordered hi" to report .alse speeds and directions to Hali.aA.FdcAiiG hus9 once again9 either the #undesarchi8 logbook and 4ehler6s uncoded trans"issions are )rong9 or the radio intercepts and both 4ehler and Hirsch.eld6s later accounts are incorrect. he direction-.inder in.or"ation is by .ar the "ost ob?ecti8e o. the e8idence= it see"s certain9 there.ore9 that the dubiously-"arked #undesarchi8 logbook no) can be accepted 8irtually as a ruse to co8er co8ert acti8ities. 4ehler had an eAplanation .or these "ysterious "achinations9 though. In his letter to /harkhunters9 )hich is a response to /harkhunters President Harry Cooper6s o)n suspicions about the acti8ities o. !-$%&9 the Captain described ho) he "et )ith his o..icers and >er"an passengers a.ter hearing about the +eich6s capitulation on 8 0ay to discuss )hat he should do about surrendering. :hile "any opinions )ere openly 8oiced in this "eeting9 according to radio chie. :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4ehler ne8er di8ulged his o)n opinions or intentions.FdcAiiiG >eneral Hessler independently con.ir"ed this in a post-)ar interrogation. #ut 4ehler later reported in the /harkhunters letter that he and >eneral Hessler had decided prior to lea8ing <or)ay that i. capitulation )as necessary he )ould not surrender to #ritish .orces9 allegedly because the .ood9 conditions and treat"ent o. PO:s )ould not be as good as in the !nited /tates. 3s a result9 according to the letter9 4ehler had deter"ined to get out o. the #ritish ;uadrant o. the 3tlantic and so )as racing to)ard the setting )estern sun in the direction o. 3"erica. 4ehler6s eAplanation o. !-$%&6s desperate dash does not hold up under close scrutiny9 though. He asserted in his letter that on the night o. 1$ or 1% 0ay9 )hen o"onaga and /ho?i9 the @apanese o..icers on board9 heard the high re8olutions o. the propeller sha.ts9 that they deduced 4ehler had decided to surrender the !boat.FdcAi8G 3ccording to 4ehler9 rather than be captured ali8e9 )hich )ould be disgrace.ul .or the t)o /a"urais9 the 5"peror6s o..icers co""itted a .or" o. hara kari by each taking an o8erdose o. Cu"inal9 a sleeping drug. hey )ere le.t to this less dra"atic .or" o. suicide because 4ehler had con.iscated all o. the

passengers6 )eapons )hen they boarded the !-boat in Hiel9 including o"onaga6s cere"onial sa"urai s)ord.FdcA8G 4ehler stated in the letter he sent to Cooper that he planned9 had the @apanese not taken their li8es9 to drop the o..icers either on the /panish or Portuguese coast or on the Canary Islands. he discrepancies in 4ehler6s assertion are ob8ious and t)o .old. 4irst9 the radio intercepts o. 1$ 3pril are in plain teAt9 they are not coded "essages9 and they included .alsi.ied coordinates9 both conditions indicating the "essages )ere intended to open co""unications )ith the 3llies - albeit either 8ery cautiously or )ith a hidden agenda in "ind. +egardless o. his agenda9 the >er"an capitulation already ha8ing occurred9 4ehler kne) better than to think he could open co""unications )ith the 3llies and then ?ust sail about the sea )here8er he pleased. He kne) the 3llies )ould de"and a s)i.t capitulation o. !-$%&9 too9 )hich they did. hus al"ost certainly9 the e8idence de"onstrates that 4ehler )as already in the beginning stages o. surrendering )hen he )as in.or"ed the @apanese had taken the poison9 )hich contradicts his story about planning to take the t)o o..icers to sa.e harbor. 3nd second9 4ehler .reely ad"itted that at the ti"e the @apanese poisoned the"sel8es9 !-$%& )as headed )est at high speed9 and had been doing so .or about $22 "iles - supposedly since $B%( that "orning according to the logbook9 but certainly since &B1( a.". He added that his reason .or this run )as to escape the area o. #ritish control. #ut the three locations 4ehler clai"ed he planned to drop o.. the @apanese /pain9 Portugal or the Canary Islands - )ere in 8ery di..erent directions than the one he )as racing to)ard9 and they )ere )ell )ithin the #ritish area o. ?urisdiction. he .act he )as racing )est )hen the boat6s doctor told hi" the @apanese had taken the poison contradicts his eAplanation o. intending to take the" to the Iberian Peninsula or the Canaries9 again re8ealing that he had no intention o. taking o"onaga and /ho?i to sa.e ha8en. he e8idence sho)s he )as bent on surrendering to the !nited /tates regardless o. the conse;uences to o"onaga and /ho?i. In .act9 according to his o)n account9 upon hearing the @apanese had taken the poison9 4ehler e8en re.used to stop his !-boat to sub"erge belo) the stor"y sur.ace )eather long enough .or !-$%&6s doctor to recuperate .ro" an alleged case o. seasickness so he could treat the poisoned "en. Hirsch.eld6s account9 )hile not stating )hether *r. :alter )as or )as not sick9 described :alter6s acti8ities in )ays that de"onstrate he )as acti8e and participating in the e8ents under)ay throughout their entire span9 apparently contradicting 4ehler6s report o. *r. :alter being sick.FdcA8iG 3nd 4ehler6s assertion that the seas )ere so hea8y as to cause a seasoned !-boater like *r. :alter to beco"e seasick does not ?i8e )ith the account pro8ided in the !// /utton6s day log that described the )eather as clear and that the seas )ere "oderating on that day.FdcA8iiG In .act9 on the contrary9 the doctor )as healthy enough according to Hirsch.eld9 that 4ehler ordered hi"9 in essence9 to o8ersee the @apanese6s deaths. E onight )e "ust get the @apanese o8erboard9E 4ehler eAplained to :alter. EI. the 3"ericans get to the"9 they6ll do e8erything they can to bring the" round. /ee to it that they die peace.ully9EFdcA8iiiG he ordered the doctor. >ranted9 4ehler "ay ha8e been trying to .ul.ill o"onaga6s and /ho?i6s last )ish to die in peace and )ith honor. #ut )hy )ould he tell a series o. lies in his letter )ritten .orty years later9 in ?usti.ication .or not re8i8ing the"9 rather than tell the si"ple9 honorable truthJ he e8idence suggests that )hate8er 4ehler6s hidden purpose9 its end )ould be better ser8ed i. o"onaga and /ho?i )ere dead. Perhaps they had disco8ered the Captain6s underlying orders and 4ehler .eared they )ould talk too openly i. captured. Or perhaps he .eared they )ould sabotage the !-boat be.ore he could surrender it9 rather than let its i"portant cargo .all into ene"y hands. :hat e8er the case9 considerations that 4ehler )as planning to get clear o. the #ritish area o. control and later re-enter it to drop the @apanese o..icers o.. in the Canaries or /pain are highly i"probable. 58erything 4ehler did at this ti"e see"s to be designed to surrender !-$%& to the !nited /tates. 4ehler later asserted9 again in his letter to /harkhunters9 that .ollo)ing his talks )ith >eneral Hessler be.ore lea8ing Hiel9 and a.ter at least t)o discussions )ith his o..icers and non-@apanese passengers )hile on the high seas - including Hessler again - that he had decided to surrender to the !nited /tates. his he said he did )ith Hessler6s support. #ut Hirsch.eld )rote that in the surrender discussions at sea9 Hessler )as in .a8or o. co"pleting the "ission to @apan or o. heading .or 3rgentina9 as )ere "ost o. the other o..icers in !-$%&9 a .e) o. )ho" .a8ored returning to >er"any. FdcAiAG Hessler unkno)ingly corroborated Hirsch.eld6s clai" in a post-)ar interrogation9 adding also that 4ehler ne8er eApressed an opinion about )here to surrender. FdcAAG 3rgentina9 as an alternati8e9 )as a co8ert ally o. >er"any6s and surrender there allo)ed the eApectation a"ong the passengers and cre) o. !-$%& that they )ould ha8e a short9 unco"plicated stay in /outh 3"erica be.ore a ;uick return ho"e to .a"ily and .riends - and rebuilding li8es in >er"any. 3 .e) dissenters9 ho)e8er9 pre.erred to land on so"e /outh /ea island paradise instead o. ending their ?ourney in 3rgentina. Hirsch.eld reported that only Party @udge Hay <ieschling and the boat6s doctor9 *r. :alter9 8oiced their support .or surrendering to the !nited /tates.

I"portantly9 as noted9 Hessler )as not in that s"all group. hus )e ha8e yet another con.lict in the record - one o. se8eral that crop up bet)een 4ehler and Hirsch.eldB )as Hessler in .a8or o. surrendering to the !nited /tates or notJ 3gain )e "ust try to deter"ine )ho is telling the truth. >i8en 4ehler6s ob8ious pre8arication regarding his intentions to)ard o"onaga and /ho?i9 and his intentional "isrepresentations in the #undesarchi8 logbook9 as )ell as the deceptions in his trans"issions to Hali.aA co"pared against Hirsch.eld6s consistently pro8able and accurate accounts9 Hirsch.eld6s 8ersion is probably correct. hus Hessler6s pre.erence to go to @apan or 3rgentina is "ore probable than 4ehler6s later assertion that Hessler had agreed to surrender to the !nited /tates. 4ehler6s uncoded radio trans"ission o. 1$ 0ay9 intended to open the )ay to surrender9 co"pared against his re.usal to surrender to Canadian or #ritish .orces9 clearly lea8es only the !nited /tates as 4ehler6s intended surrender ob?ecti8e. 3pparently he later tried to rationali7e this plan by pro8iding co8er .or his real intentions by cunningly suggesting Hessler agreed to it in the conteAt o. other considerations. 3nd Hirsch.eld6s )riting that 4ehler ne8er actually re8ealed his intentions to any o. his passengers or cre) about )here he )ould surrender9 in 8ie) o. the .act al"ost all o. the passengers and o..icers desired a course other than surrender9 .urther supports the pre"ise o. this hidden agenda.FdcAAiG he e8idence suggests Captain 4ehler ?ust continued to ;uietly "anipulate e8ents until !-$%& )as EcapturedE by the !// /utton. he only eAplanation he "ade .or his decision to surrender to the !nited /tates appears to ha8e been the one recorded .our decades later in the dubious account he ga8e in the /harkhunter6s letter. 3s has been sho)n9 Captain 4ehler had de"onstrated by both )ord and action that he )as bent on surrendering !-$%& to the !nited /tates. His apparent deter"ination to do so e8en be.ore the !-boat le.t >er"any - his alleged9 though no) dubious9 discussions )ith Hessler )hile still in Hiel to achie8e this end9 i. true - indicates he already "ay ha8e been laying the ground)ork e8en then. Or perhaps he )as si"ply "aintaining the illusion so"e .orty years later )hen he )rote this account in the /harkhunters letter. 3t any rate9 his "ad dash across the 3tlantic9 care.ully "anipulated to reach 3"erican controlled )aters at a critical point in ti"e9 dri8es ho"e his apparent deter"ination to surrender only to the !nited /tates. /o does his silent decision to land there against the desires o. his o..icers and high-ranking passengers. 4ehler6s intentional deceptions to Hali.aA co"bined )ith his deter"ination to sacri.ice his @apanese passengers rather than o..-load the" in /pain9 Portugal or the Canary Islands - or to e8en "ake an e..ort to sa8e their li8es at all - all testi.y o. a personal co""it"ent on 4ehler6s part to surrender only to the !nited /tates. his .iAation see"s .ar out o. keeping )ith a reasonable assess"ent o. the situation he )as in. 58en "ore shocking - and re8ealing - is the .act that the !nited /tates <a8y aided and abetted 4ehler in his e..orts to escape Canadian control. Hirsch.eld recorded that )hile 4ehler )as in contact )ith Hali.aA9 sending deliberately .alse reports about his position and "o8e"ents9 !-$%&6s radio co""unications suddenly )ere ?a""ed by 8ery po)er.ul trans"issions.FdcAAiiG 3pparently so"ebody did not )ant !-$%& in co""unication )ith Hali.aA. 5ach ti"e Hirsch.eld tried to trans"it to the Canadian station9 regardless o. )hich .re;uency he used9 the ?a""ing )ould begin ane)9 )hich suited 4ehler ?ust .ine=FdcAAiiiG the o8errunning o. his radio co""unications kept the Captain .ro" ha8ing to continue his deceptions to Hali.aA. /oon9 the !// /utton could be seen cresting the hori7on. he /utton reached !-$%& shortly be.ore dark. !sing 0orse code .ro" a la"p9 the destroyer ordered !-$%& to Ehead .or the >ul. o. 0aine and to ignore all .urther co""unications .ro" Hali.aA.FdcAAi8G 4ro" this Hirsch.eld deduced that the /utton had done the radio ?a""ing. /oon the /utton slipped alongside the !boat ?ust a .e) hundred yards to port9 but )aited until "orning to send a boarding party. In the "eanti"e9 Hirsch.eld )itnessed *r. Hein7 /chlicke thro) se8eral s"all tubes o. "icro.il" o8erboard .ro" the conning to)er into the Ocean.FdcAA8G E here goes the rocket that could .ly the 3tlantic9E re"arked /chlicke. 3s history )ill so"eday disco8er9 /chlicke possessed "ore than plans .or a "issile that could .ly .ro" 5urope to 3"erica. In the "orning9 a hea8ily-ar"ed pri7e cre) .ro" the /utton crossed the distance bet)een the t)o 8essels in a s"all cra.t and boarded !-$%&.FdcAA8iG <er8es )ere on edge as the outnu"bered but )ell-ar"ed /utton contingent chained the hatch open to ensure Captain 4ehler did not try a last-"inute di8e. *ocu"ents )ere gi8en to 4ehler instructing hi" in the procedures .or surrendering his boat and cre)= then a skeleton cre) o. >er"an sailors )as le.t on board to operate the 8essel )hile the re"aining passengers and cre) )ere .erried .ro" !-$%& to the /utton. Hirsch.eld9 one o. the .e) >er"an cre)"en le.t onboard the !-boat9 later noted that !-$%& )as ordered to "ake .or the >ul. o. 0aine. Cater9 this order )as changed to direct !-$%& to head .or the <a8al Dard at Ports"outh9 <e) Ha"pshire.FdcAA8iiG Once again Hirsch.eld6s i"peccable account is 8eri.ied9 this ti"e by the /utton6s acti8ity report9FdcAA8iiiG )hich recounted ho) the order )as changed .or the /utton to escort !-$%& to Ports"outh instead o. the pre8ious order that it report )ith the !boat to Cascoe #ay9 0aine. he /utton9 .or its part9 be.ore locating !-$%& had been )orking alongside t)o Canadian ships that )ere also trying to .ind the !-boat. 3ccording to eAcerpts prepared .ro" the /utton6s )ar diary FdcAAiAG - the diary itsel.9 perhaps signi.icantly9 apparently is not a8ailable - during the operation the /utton had broken a)ay

.ro" the Canadian 8essels9 )hich continued on an east-northeasterly bearing to)ard the last reported location o. !-$%&. he /utton headed south instead9 on a tra?ectory that allo)ed it to intercept the !-boat based on direction .inder coordinates the destroyer had recei8ed. he /utton6s )ar diary notes that the Canadian ships apparently reali7ed they had E"issed their target9E but continued to head o.. in an east northeasterly direction. <othing is said in the )ar diary eAcerpts o. the /utton6s ha8ing ?a""ed the !-boat6s radio trans"issions or o. ordering !-$%& not to respond to Canadian radio co""unications. /o9 ha8ing un)ound the circular pu77les and unlocked the conundru"s o. !-$%&9 ho) do )e interpret the )eb o. in.or"ation9 disin.or"ation and contradictions surrounding the !-boat6s surrenderJ he .irst step is to try to deter"ine )hich e8idence is sound and )hich is not= an ob?ecti8e )e ha8e tried to achie8e throughout this and other chapters. <o) )e "ust su""ari7e our .indings about the e8idence and its sources. O. the .i8e sources o. in.or"ation about !-$%&6s "o8e"ents - the direction-.inding coordinates9 the #undesarchi8 logbook9 the accounts recorded in Hirsch.eld6s t)o books9 4ehler6s letter to /harkhunters9 and 4ehler6s position reports to Hali.aA - the direction .inding coordinates are by .ar the "ost ob?ecti8e and there.ore reliable. he e8idence appears to indicate - i. not outright pro8e - that large portions o. the #undesarchi8 logbook are .abrications. 3nd they appear to be so at least .ro" the .irst "is"atched coordinates recorded by Hessler on %2 3pril9 i. not earlier. hey eAtend through the three series o. unaligned bearings and coordinates recorded bet)een 1 and , 0ay9 and continue through the outright lies apparently recorded by 4ehler .ro" then through to 1$ 0ay. Possibly the logbook )as counter.eited .ro" the 8ery beginning9 but "ore likely it )as casually kept up to "aintain an illusion .or later in8estigators9 )hich )as that !-$%& had ne8er 8aried .ro" its intended "ission to @apan until 4ehler "ade the decision to surrender. Considering all o. this9 the direction-.inder data can be considered "ost trust)orthy )hen "easured against other hard docu"entation. #ut )hat about the hu"an co"ponentJ Hirsch.eld con.ir"s in his "e"oirs that 4ehler ordered hi" to report .alse speeds and bearings to Hali.aA9FdcAAAG thus indirectly substantiating the idea that 4ehler "ay ha8e intentionally .alsi.ied other data about !-$%&6s tra8els as )ell. 3lthough Hirsch.eld so"eti"es con.used the dates o. certain e8ents9 he other)ise has pro8en to be accurate about the e8ents he recorded. People o.ten .orget eAact dates (2 years past but still 8i8idly recall the e8ents9 eAperiences or .eelings that occurred in association )ith those dates. Hirsch.eld6s uni;ue but accurate recounting o. the en"ity bet)een Hessler and >oering9 the electrical .ire .u"es that he described )ere 8ented by re8ersing the snorkel 8al8ing9 and the harro)ing story o. al"ost being chopped into pieces by the propeller o. the stea"er9 are all 8alidated by corroborating docu"entation that authenticates Hirsch.eld6s accounts. His .inal recounting o. the change o. orders taking !-$%& .ro" 0aine to Ports"outh <a8al Dard9 as )ell as the accuracy o. other details9 puts an eAcla"ation "ark on his reliability. he one point o. contention bet)een Hirsch.eld6s account and the theory posited in this teAt lies in the .act that9 despite re.erencing the "ysterious "essage .ro" Hitler6s #erlin #unker9 Hirsch.eld ne8er "entioned any acti8ity )hile !-$%& )as at sea that can be construed as picking up a secret passenger. He detailed acti8ities that occurred on the boat throughout the rele8ant ti"e.ra"e9 and e8en once stated that !-$%& Econtinued to head south at .ull speedE during a ti"e )hen9 according to the secret detour scenario9 it "ust ha8e been heading )est. #ut none o. these acti8ities can be interpreted either to relate to9 or to dispro8e that !-$%& secretly picked up a "ysterious passenger. he only incongruity9 and it is signi.icant9 is that according to the #undesarchi8 logbook9 !-$%& )as still sailing at steerage speed during this ti"e span9 not at .ull speed as Hirsch.eld )rites. he idea that !-$%& )as tra8eling at .ull speed at any ti"e prior to 11 0ay )ould indicate the !-boat )as actually racing )est to re?oin its ca"ou.lage course. I. it had raced south at .ull speed .or any a"ount o. ti"e at all9 !-$%& )ould ha8e )ell o8ershot to the south o. its surrender point on the day it )as turned o8er to the /utton9 )hich9 o. course9 did not happen. Only in reporting that !-$%& had sailed at .ull speed prior to 11 0ay does Hirsch.eld suggest a .rag"ent o. the pre"ise that the !-boat actually "ust ha8e been tra8eling )est9 not south. It see"s i"plausible that 4ehler could ha8e secretly picked up a "ystery passenger )ithout his chie. co""unications o..icer kno)ing about it. Certainly Hirsch.eld9 as )ere all others in8ol8ed in the "aiden 8oyage o. !-$%&9 )as s)orn to silence i. it had9 indeed9 carried an i"portant enig"atic passenger to sa.ety in the .inal days o. the )ar. Perhaps Hirsch.eld6s )riting that the boat )as sailing south is a single lapse representing his lone concession to the )eighty burden o. carrying such a secret .or so long a ti"e. !ncharacteristic as it "ay see"9 it appears to be the lone detail that )ould stay )hat is other)ise an a8alanche o. e8idence .a8oring the theory that !-$%& "ade a detour to pick up a "ysterious passenger )ho "ade his escape on board !-$%&. In an e..ort to resol8e this ;uestion and to learn "ore about the ?ourney o. !-$%&9 in late 1998 I sent 0r. Hirsch.eld a letter through the /harkhunters organi7ation9 re;uesting an inter8ie). 3s I had been ad8ised probably )ould happen9 0r. Hirsch.eld chose not to respond to "y re;uest. !nlike Hirsch.eld6s lone i"propriety9 4ehler6s acti8ities are riddled )ith deceit.ulness. 4ro" the .alsi.ied #undesarchi8 log to his handling o. the @apanese prisoners9 .ro" his docu"ented lies to Hali.aA to his contradicted stories about Hessler6s inclusion in the plan to surrender to 3"erica9 4ehler6s story is grossly

inconsistent )ith the kno)n .acts and ob8iously and intentionally "isleading. he only ;uestion is9 .or )hat purposeJ :ith this in "ind9 co"bining the in.or"ation )e ha8e learned in this and in pre8ious chapters9 )hat picture can )e asse"ble o. !-$%&6s acti8ities and surrender and #or"ann6s escapeJ Is any i"age beco"ing clear that )ould indicate the !-boat6s "issionJ aking e8erything )e kno) about !-$%& into account - the "essages to it .ro" the 4uehrer #unker= the )restling .or co""and o. the !-boat= the pro.oundly slo) reported tra8el speed throughout "ost o. the ?ourney= the "ysteriously truncated Cibrary o. Congress logbook and secret 8isit to #ergen= the carelessly doctored #undesarchi8 logbook= the coincident ti"ing as recorded in the #undesarchi8 log o. 4ehler6s alleged but illogical decision to run sub"erged during the siA critical days bet)een %2 3pril and , 0ay co"pared )ith the reported escape o. 0artin #or"ann during that sa"e ti"e period= and considering the little-kno)n but see"ingly reliable report that #or"ann escaped in a ElargeE !-boat= #or"ann6s connections and control o. !-$%&6s cargo9 and probably9 although co8ertly9 his control o. *oenit7 hi"sel.= as )ell as !-$%&6s "ysterious dash )est)ard apparently .ro" points unkno)n east o. its pro.essed position be.ore surrender= and 4ehler6s deter"ination at all costs to capitulate to none but the !nited /tates - considering all this9 it see"s probable !-$%& )as the Elarge !-boatE reported by /o8iet intelligence that had the secret "ission o. rescuing 0artin #or"ann .ro" >er"any9 deli8ering hi" sa.ely to /pain9 and deli8ering the cargo to the !nited /tates in eAchange .or #or"ann6s .reedo". Heeping in "ind that both the abo8e and the .ollo)ing are assu"ptions based upon the best e8idence as detailed pre8iously9 the "ost probable scenario that can be reconstructed appears to look so"ething like thisB :ith a struggle o8er chain-o.-co""and o. !-$%& raging bet)een *oenit7 and #erlin9 and ha8ing already recei8ed co""unications .ro" Hitler6s bunker to stay put9 4ehler departed Hristiansand according to *oenit76s order9 but at 8ery slo) speed in order to re"ain close at hand )hen the ti"e ca"e to respond to an eApected dispatch to pick up a po)er.ul passenger .ro" #erlin. 3pparently9 the chain-o.-co""and issue )as still being contested on 18 3pril9 )hen 4ehler secretly altered course to #ergen to check .or .urther co""unications 8ia #d! <orth Co""ander +osing and the !-boat co""unication center there. +eali7ing upon his decision to detour to #ergen that his logbook later )ould re8eal his surreptitious "o8e"ents and potentially eApose his secret "ission9 he abruptly discontinued keeping this log .ro" the 18th .or)ard. 4ehler )ould later begin a ne) log designed to ca"ou.lage !-$%&6s "o8e"ents. 3t #ergen 4ehler apparently did not recei8e the co""unication .ro" +osing he anticipated so he continued on a holding pattern )est)ard across the <orth /ea. He proceeded eAtre"ely slo)ly - no .aster than a "an )alks9 ?ust .ast enough to "aintain steerage o. the !-boat - so he )ould be close at hand )hen !-$%& )as needed .or the secret pick-up o. his "ysterious passenger. On $1 3pril9 4ehler recei8ed another order9 apparently coded9 that ad8ised hi" not to proceed beyond the 8icinity o. Ireland. !pon receipt o. this order9 he broke .ro" his holding pattern in the <orth /ea and continued slo)ly around the north o. the !nited Hingdo" isles. In the early "orning hours o. %2 3pril9 at about the sa"e ti"e 0artin #or"ann )as escaping #erlin by light aircra.t9 !-$%& began a ;uick siA-day cruise back to >er"any and out to sea again under co8er o. a reported siA-day sub"erged 8oyage in the 3tlantic. he .alsi.ied Esub"erged 8oyageE )ould in e..ect "ake !-$%& EdisappearE during the decepti8e detour9 in order to "aintain a co8er story should she be seen else)here or should another 8essel .ail to spot her in a location she other)ise should ha8e been. here is no record o. !-$%& recei8ing a "essage to return to >er"any to pick up its passenger9 but the author belie8es such a "essage )as sent and recei8ed. he author suggests it )as at this point that 4ehler turned his !-boat east9 sub"erged during the day and sur.aced at night9 and headed back into the hea8ily patrolled <orth /ea through the strait bet)een /cotland and the /hetland Islands9 then turned south - straight .or Ha"burg. !-$%& "ade Ha"burg in under three days9 sailing at top snorkeling speed )hen sub"erged9 )ith radar acti8e9 and probably )ith co8ert support and protection .ro" )ell-placed :estern 3llied sources - re"e"ber the planes that did not attack in the Hattegat. Puickly picking up #or"ann9 the large !-boat described by /talin6s intelligence reports then "ade )ay9 again under surreptitious :estern 3llied protection9 through the 5nglish Channel and into the #ay o. #iscay9 )here it rende78oused )ith an unkno)n cra.t to o..load 0artin #or"ann and possibly his escape partner Heinrich 0ueller. +acing )est and needing to "aintain a co8er story that )ould stand as the o..icial history o. the 8essel9 4ehler reali7ed he )as running out o. ti"e to surrender .ollo)ing the >er"an capitulation order on 8 0ay. He needed to be in a credible location along his pre8iously planned ?ourney be.ore surrendering9 in order to keep his co8er story intact9 or else his )ay)ard "o8e"ents "ight be re8ealed. In .act9 and "ore i"portant9 he also needed to ensure he )as in the 3"erican sector o. ene"y surrender responsibility to guarantee his cargo )ould be recei8ed by the pre-agreed upon country9 the !nited /tates - and its 0anhattan Pro?ect. #y 1$ 0ay9 he .elt he could report a position in the 3"erican 7one that he could reach be.ore it )as disco8ered

to be .alse9 and so he duly reported that position by radio. #ut cala"ity nearly ensued )hen Canada9 through Hali.aA9 recei8ed !-$%&6s .irst surrender trans"ission and ordered 4ehler6s capitulation be.ore the !nited /tates responded. o "aintain his co8er and a8oid surrendering cargo and passengers to an unintended party9 4ehler )as .orced to abort his ca"ou.lage course. He turned instead to an e8en deeper le8el o. deception9 running .ree to the north and reporting inaccurate bearings and speeds - and .or a period o. ti"e not reporting at all - until the !// /utton )as able to decoy Canadian ships a)ay and ?a" !-$%&6s trans"issions. he /utton then located and took possession o. the !-boat and her .ugiti8e9 in8aluable cargo and passengers and escorted her to Ports"outh. <otesB dlAiii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. $&1 dlAi8 @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 p. %&8 dlA8 @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 p. %%1 dlA8i @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 pp. %%19 %%$ dlA8ii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 pp. 1--9 1-8 dlA8iii Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. &2 dlAiA Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 p. ,& dlAA :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. ,& dlAAi :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p.( dlAAii !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 radio trans"ission .ro" !-$%&9 1$ 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-2219 <3+3 date 9'1('9dlAAiii !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 a second radio trans"ission .ro" !-$%&9 1$ 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-2219 <3+3 date 9'1('9dlAAi8 :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(-= see also9 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2% dlAA8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2% dlAA8i :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(dlAA8ii !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 intercepted radio trans"issions declassi.ied I<<*9(-2219 <3+3 date 9'1('9dlAA8iii :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(-= >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2% dlAAiA :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(dlAAA >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2% dlAAAi !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 interrogation report o. >eneral !lrich Hessler I1(&29 p.& (date unkno)n)9 declassi.ied I<<*-(2-$$9 <3+3 date 9'1,'9dlAAAii :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %(8= >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2% dlAAAiii !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 intercepted radio trans"ission9 1% 3pril9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-221 dlAAAi8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2%= !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 intercepted radio trans"ission9 1% 3pril9 19&(9 declassi.ied I <<*9(-2219 <3+3 date 9'1('9 dlAAA8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 intercepted radio trans"ission 1, 3pril9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-2219 <3+3 date 9'1('9dlAAA8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 intercepted radio trans"ission 18 3pril9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-2219 <3+3 date 9'1('9dlAAA8ii #undesarchi8 $&'8$ +0 98',-, dlAAA8iii he author personally )itnessed a telephone call bet)een Harry Cooper9 /harkhunters president9 and 0r. Herbert :erner9 on @anuary $19 1999 in )hich 0r. :erner con.ir"ed to 0r. Cooper +osing6s presence at #ergen throughout the ti"e span in ;uestion. dlAAAiA Cetter .ro" /harkhunters president Harry Cooper to the author dated 11 0ay9 1999 dAc >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $21 dAci !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 +eport On the Interrogation o. the Cre) On !-$%& :hich /urrendered to the !// /utton on 1& 0ay9 19&(9 In Position &-J-2-6< - &$J-$(6:. declassi.ied I<<*8-%2$$ dAcii !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International9 p.1 dAciii !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 intercepted radio trans"ission9 $1 3pril9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-221 dAci8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. 19$= /econd undated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters

International p. 1 dAc8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 "ap o. !-$%&6s planned route as .iled in !-$%&6s o..icial surrender report dAc8i >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. 19(9 $21= also9 co"pare )ith speeds o. !-$%& calculated .ro" radio intercepts reported direction .inding on 0ay 1$9 19&( dAc8ii !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International9 p. 1 dAc8iii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 </3 +ecords9 secret >er"an trans"ission .ro" 0arine /pecial 4orces to Penang9 /honan9 *?akarta9 okyo9 1% 4ebruary9 19&(9 +> &(--192-%$-$-dAciA >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. 19$= !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International9 p. 1 dc :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %,2 dci >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $2,9 $2, dcii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2-Bsee also :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %,1 dciii !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International p.$ dci8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 +eport o. Interrogation o. !-$%& passenger Hay <ieschling9 $& 0ay9 19&( dc8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2-= :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %,1 dc8i >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2-= :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %,1 dc8ii !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International p.1 dc8iii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $2-= :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten9 p. %,1 dciA !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 +eport o. Interrogation o. >eneral !lrich Hessler9 eAtract .ro" PO:6s diary9 declassi.ied <<*-(21$$ dcA !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 intercepted radio trans"ission9 1$ 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-221 dcAi !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International9 p. % dcAii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $129 $11 dcAiii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $12 dcAi8 !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International dcA8 !ndated letter .ro" CaptainCeiutenant @ohann Heinrich 4ehler to Harry Cooper9 president o. /harkhunters International dcA8i >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $12-$1$ dcA8ii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 !// /utton acti8ity report titled Capture o. !-$%&-58ents Ceading to9 p. $9 18 0ay9 19&( dcA8iii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $1$ dcAiA >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $12 dcAA !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 >eneral !lrich Hessler interrogation +eport I(899 dcAAi >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $12 dcAAii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $119 $1$ dcAAiii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $119 $1$ dcAAi8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $1$ dcAA8 >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $1$9 $1% dcAA8i >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $1$9 $1%= !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 !// /utton acti8ity report report titled Capture o. !-$%&-58ents Ceading to9 p. %9 18 0ay9 19&( dcAA8ii >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $1, dcAA8iii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 !// /utton acti8ity report report titled Capture o. !-$%&-58ents Ceading to9 pp. %9 & (unnu"bered)9 18 0ay9 19&(

dcAAiA !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 !// /utton acti8ity report report titled Capture o. !-$%&-58ents Ceading to9 pp. $9 %9 18 0ay9 19&( dcAAA >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. $11

Cha$ter ,ourteen " !ccam1s Ra2or EIt is aAio"atic that you keep your eye on the nu"ber t)o "an - the one )ho does the )orkE FdcAAAiG 3llen *ulles Co""enting during the )ar about 0artin #or"ann E hyssen )as F#or"ann6sG ace in the hole i. he e8er needed a personal pipeline to 3llen :. *ulles.E FdcAAAiiG Paul 0anning9 author 0artin #or"ann9 <a7i in 5Aile here is no hard docu"entary9 conclusi8e e8idence that the secret escape "ission o. !-$%& described in the chapters abo8e rescued 0artin #or"ann. here is no Es"oking gunE or proo. beyond reasonable doubt. In .act9 i. the !nited /tates )as in collusion behind the scenes9 because such a re8elation )ould ha8e "ade an eAtre"ely negati8e i"pact on 3"erican "oral authority and its treaty obligations )orld)ide9 it is ;uestionable )hether a paper trail o. the escape )ould ha8e been le.t at all. he rare.ied po)ers that )ould ha8e o8erseen the negotiations )ould surely be care.ul not to lea8e tale-tale signs in this "ost singular o. diplo"atic dealings. On the contrary9 they )ould be certain to co8er any tracks that "ay ha8e been le.t behind. he "ost proo. )e can hope .or in this 8acuu"9 there.ore9 is circu"stantial e8idence9 ano"alies and tale-tale indications o. so"e uneAplained e8ent. he si"plest eAplanation that includes all o. the e8idence )ould be the "ost likely ans)er .or )hat occurred. /o says Occa"6s +a7or9 the scienti.ic principle that de.ines any reputable theory. It statesB 5ntities "ust not be "ultiplied beyond )hat is necessary. In other )ords9 the si"plest theory that .its the .acts o. a proble" is the one that should be selected. I. history is an ob?ecti8e science9 Occa"6s +a7or should apply. *espite the lack o. irre.utable proo.9 the 8olu"e o. circu"stantial e8idence suggesting #or"ann success.ully escaped is substantial. his e8idence includes Hitler6s order that #or"ann be .lo)n out o. #erlin9 )hich "atches /o8iet intelligence reports that he )as9 in .act9 .lo)n out )ithin $& hours o. that order. In turn9 the report o. this escape .light aligns re"arkably )ell )ith "any details o. a singularly uni;ue9 but true9 actual escape .light that )as docu"ented separately .ro" the /o8iet account and separate o. those )ho re8ealed Hitler6s order .or #or"ann6s escape .light. here is the report that the second stage o. #or"ann6s escape )as "ade in a large !-boat9 )hich "eshes )ell )ith the details o. the "a""oth !-$%& ha8ing recei8ed radio "essages that )ere interpreted by >eneral Hessler to "ean a senior o..icial .ro" #erlin )as on his )ay to !-$%&. he con8oluted record o. the !-boat6s tra8els and the eAcess o. e..ort eApended to hide those actions add 8eracity to this report. 3nd there is the e8idence suggesting that Captain 4ehler )as deter"ined to surrender his i"portant passengers and cargo to the !nited /tates - e8en at the cost o. the li8es o. the @apanese o..icers onboard - rather than co"plete his i"portant "ission to @apan or to surrender else)here. Con8ersely9 the !nited /tates appears in ad8ance to ha8e kno)n about and been deter"ined to obtain the !-boat and its cargo. On t)o di..erent occasions 3llied )ar planes easily could ha8e sunk !-$%& but did not9 apparently opting to ?ust "onitor the !-boat6s "o8e"ents. In the end9 the !nited /tates ?a""ed !-$%&6s radio trans"issions to Hali.aA9 thus ensuring the !-boat )ould .all into 3"erican hands. Co"bined9 the pri"arily ob?ecti8e9 disparate .acts recounted in this 8olu"e9 and all the detailed e8idence supporting the"9 create a scenario .or #or"ann6s escape .ar "ore likely to ha8e occurred than the traditional history9 )hich is co"posed al"ost entirely o. the suspect9 o.ten irrational eye )itness accounts o. <a7i sy"pathi7ers and Hitler hench"en. he )itnesses .or the traditional history all potentially had reasons .or ensuring #or"ann )as presu"ed dead9 as do "any others )ho )ould like the )orld to co"e to the sa"e conclusion. he traditional history lea8es "any crucial e8ents uneAplained9 ho)e8er9 )hile the theory ad8anced )ithin these pages resol8es al"ost all - and certainly all o. the critical - pre8iously ignored ano"alies and "ysteries surrounding the e8ents. #y applying Occa"6s +a7or to the e8idence9 .ar "ore o. the ob?ecti8e e8idence is considered and "ysteries eAplained by the ne) scenario than by the old9 dis?ointed account= so one "ust conclude that it is ti"e the traditional history gi8e )ay to the ne)9 "ore congruent one. o belie8e a great portion o. the actions outlined in this book actually occurred9 ho)e8er9 one "ust belie8e that the !nited /tates go8ern"ent9 in so"e .or" and at so"e high le8el9 )as in league )ith 0artin #or"ann and those in8ol8ed in his escape. hese go8ern"ent entities )ould probably ha8e assisted in the escape by ensuring sa.e passage .or the !-boat by Epulling stringsE )here necessary9 as de"onstrated in the EnonattacksE by the )arplanes o8er.lying !-$%& in the Hattegut and the 3tlantic9 and possibly by allo)ing !-$%& to sail uni"peded through the 5nglish Channel. Certainly the ?a""ing o. !-$%&6s radio trans"issions to break contact bet)een Hali.aA and the !-boat appears to be direct inter8ention on behal. o. the !nited /tates go8ern"ent to eAclude its ally9 Canada9 .ro" participating in the capture. 3nd to belie8e the !nited /tates took part in such e8ents is to ad"it it also "aintained a clandestine relationship o. so"e nature )ith 0artin #or"ann a.ter the )ar9 protecting hi" .ro" a distance. /uch an a..iliation )ith one o. the kingpins o.

the <a7i 5"pire )ould be anathe"a to the 3"erican people and also to the "a?ority o. 5uropeans )ho su..ered under his <a7i Party regi"e. 0ost especially9 the +ussians )ould be enraged. I. a connection bet)een the !nited /tates and 0artin #or"ann beca"e kno)n9 @oseph /talin i""ediately )ould ha8e suspected treachery on behal. o. his ally the !nited /tates - )hich9 in .act9 he did. In /epte"ber 19&(9 /talin had broadcast the assertion that #or"ann )as in 3llied hands.FdcAAAiiiG I. his accusations )ere genuine9 /talin )ould ha8e )ondered )hat #or"ann had gi8en to recei8e such rare.ied assistance. :hate8er it )as )ould ha8e been o. ut"ost i"portance on the )orld stage9 and )ould ha8e been in direct 8iolation o. the 3llies6 unconditional surrender treaty re;uire"ent. he participating 3"erican leaders kne) this9 there.ore e8idence suggesting a relationship bet)een #or"ann and the !nited /tates )ould need to be care.ully a8oided9 i. possible9 or destroyed or buried deep9 i. not. /o it is that proo. o. an arrange"ent bet)een 0artin #or"ann and the !nited /tates9 i. there )as one9 does not appear to eAist. :hat is apparent9 ho)e8er9 is that the !nited /tates )ent to so"e trouble to ensure that such e8idence o. a relationship does not eAistO *uring "y research in the <ational 3rchi8es I and II in College Park9 0aryland9 I tried to locate all o. the docu"entation about #or"ann that I could .ind )ithin /tate *epart"ent and9 speci.ically9 O..ice o. /trategic /er8ices .iles. I located se8eral second-party reports noti.ying these agencies o. sightings o.9 and "eetings )ith9 #or"ann9 suggesting the sur8i8al and )hereabouts o. a 8ery ali8e 0artin #or"ann .ollo)ing the )ar. I also located a key report in +ecord >roup &(- .ile 192-%--11-1 boA 19$ that identi.ied top <a7i .ugiti8es unaccounted .or i""ediately a.ter the )ar9 )hich does not include 0artin #or"ann or Heinrich 0ueller.FdcAAAi8G 3pparently9 they )ere considered accounted .or by the O//9 although e8eryone else in8ol8ed )as searching high and lo) .or the". In addition9 "any other authors9 including 0anning and 4arago9 ha8e re8ealed co"pelling docu"entary e8idence o. a si"ilar nature. 0any o. these reports are substanti8e FdcAAA8G and )ere pro8ided by sources the agencies labeled as reliable9 such as a /tate *epart"ent report I .ound that indicated #or"ann )as li8ing in /pain )ith a certain Ceon *e>relle9 and )as running a <a7i escape operation .ro" there.FdcAAA8iG his docu"entation is i"pressi8e. #ut )hile researching the e8idence9 the sa"e indeA that led "e to these docu"ents also contained cards re.erencing "ysterious other .iles about #or"ann )ithin +ecord >roup $$,.FdcAAA8iiG Instead o. being reports about sightings9 the indeA descriptions see"ed to suggest the docu"ents )ere agency records regarding personal in.or"ation about #or"ann. hese included details about his apart"ent in 0unich9 .ound in +ecord >roup $$, .ile nu"ber 1$$,&2. His head;uarters in Pullach is re.erenced in +> $$, .ile nu"ber 1$%922= and9 "ost stunning9 in +> -192-%-%$-% boA 12$$9 resides an apparent e8aluation stating that 0artin #or"ann )as Ethe "ost po)er.ul "an in >er"any.E :hen I searched .or these records9 ho)e8er9 they )ere not in their .iles. here )ere no placeholder cards substituted .or the "issing docu"ents telling researchers the records )ere checked out to so"eone else. here )ere no slip sheets indicating the .iles )ere still classi.ied and there.ore not a8ailable. here )as nothing. @ust "issing nu"bers in the se;uence o. the .iles. I ha8e spent "any hours researching in the <ational 3rchi8es I and II9 the Cibrary o. Congress and the /outheast +egional 3rchi8es in 3tlanta9 >eorgia. *uring these research sessions I ha8e re8ie)ed thousands - probably tens o. thousands - o. docu"ents that at the ti"e o. their origins )ere highly classi.ied. hese included Presidential records9 eAtensi8e 0anhattan 4ile +ecords9 captured >er"an records9 :ar Cri"es rials records and the records o. !-$%& and her captured passengers and cre) "e"bers9 as )ell as records .ro" other !-boats and the /tate *epart"ent and O//. <o)here in "y research ha8e I co"e across docu"ents "issing .ro" their .iles )ith absolutely no eAplanation9 eAcept in the case o. 0artin #or"ann. /uch an o"ission is al"ost unheard o. in the )ell-protected 3rchi8es9 )hich has a stringent procedure .or the handling o. docu"ents to ensure they are not lost or da"aged. In e8ery other instance I encountered9 )hen a docu"ent )as not in the .ile as it should ha8e been9 either a card )as le.t in its place eAplaining that the docu"ent )as at that ti"e checked out to an archi8ist. Or a sheet o. paper )as le.t in its place stating that the docu"ent )as still classi.ied due to its i"portance to national security and there.ore )as not a8ailable .or re8ie). he only eAceptions that I ha8e .ound are these three "issing docu"ents about 0artin #or"ann. Certainly they are not re;uired .or national security a hal.-century a.ter the e8ents. 58en i. they )ere9 there should ha8e been an in.or"ation card signi.ying this distinction. :hen I described this situation to an archi8ist9 I )as at .irst greeted )ith "ild disbelie.. :hen he had looked through the .ile boAes and not .ound the .iles9 ho)e8er9 he shook his head and eAclai"ed that so"eone had either re.iled the" incorrectly or that the /tate *epart"ent had re"o8ed the". He o..ered no .urther eAplanation. hinking they "ay ha8e been incorrectly .iled9 I care.ully searched e8ery .older in each o. the de.icient boAes9 but could not .ind the "issing docu"ents. One o. the hard and .ast rules in the archi8es is that a researcher "ay ha8e only one boA on a research table and that all other boAes "ust re"ain closed and on the cart pro8ided .or the transport o. the docu"ent boAes. he boA on the table is the only one allo)ed to be opened at any ti"e. 3ll docu"ents "ust be returned to that boA and the boA returned to its cart be.ore another boA "ay be re"o8ed .ro" the cart to the table and opened. #oAes are

not allo)ed opened at all )hile on the cart. his syste" is designed to ensure docu"ents are not incorrectly .iled or lost. hat three .iles .ro" 8arious boAes9 and e8en .ro" di..erent record groups9 all concerning the sa"e sub?ect - #or"ann - )ere accidentally "isplaced9 )hile the records o. 8irtually e8ery other sub?ect )ithin the archi8es see" to be i""aculately kept9 there.ore9 see"s highly i"probable. he "ore likely e8ent is that the /tate *epart"ent or O// - or its successor the CI3 - )hich9 like all contributing agencies "aintain control o. their docu"ents )hile in the archi8es9 intentionally re"o8ed the "issing .iles about 0artin #or"ann. :hy )ould the /tate *epart"ent or O//'CI3 ha8e re"o8ed the .iles )ithout eAplanationJ he reason see"s ob8ious. here )as in.or"ation in the .iles that the agency did not )ant re8ealed= ;uite possibly in.or"ation pro8ing #or"ann )as ali8e and the O// or /tate *epart"ent had helped )ith his escape and .reedo". 3ny concei8able in.or"ation about #or"ann di..erent than this should not re;uire uneAplained re"o8al .ro" the .iles. I. the docu"ents )ere sensiti8e to national security9 certainly those )ho re"o8ed the .iles )ould ha8e used the national security dispensation to co8er the other)ise uneAplained "issing docu"ents9 rather than allo) the" to be conspicuous by their absence. he docu"ents6 uneAplained disappearance certainly see"s to indicate so"ebody is stone)alling. *espite the traditional history9 the o8er)hel"ing preponderance o. particulars appears to de"onstrate that #or"ann sur8i8ed9 see"ingly )ith 3"erican collusion. his e8idence is supported by a plethora o. reliable reports o. #or"ann6s being ali8e and )ell .ollo)ing the )ar9 ad8anced by a broad 8ariety o. obser8ers "any o. )ho" had nothing to gain .ro" such re8elations. I ha8e personally re8ie)ed "any such reports - possibly as "any as .i.ty. :hile so"e reports are .raudulent or specious at best9 "any others9 )hen care.ully scrutini7ed9 continue to )ithstand the tests o. ti"e and concerted e..orts to debunk the". /o"e are so sound in their details and the integrity o. their sources as to see" uni"peachable - although "any people ha8e tried to pro8e the" )rong - such as the eAtensi8e account gi8en by *r. Otto #iss9 )ho pro8ided "edical ser8ices to #or"ann in 19(9.FdcAAA8iiiG he only substanti8e e8idence that #or"ann did not sur8i8e #erlin is the reported positi8e *<3 identi.ication o. the re"ains unearthed at the Cehrter 4airgrounds /tation. 3s has been noted in another chapter9 these .indings "ust be 8ie)ed )ith skepticis" since the body supposedly tested and positi8ely identi.ied )as not buried at the location )here the re"ains )ere disinterred9 according CI3 in8estigating agent @a"es 0c>o8ern. 3nd by 0ay 19989 )hen the testing )as done9 0artin #or"ann al"ost certainly had .inally died and the re"ains tested "ay9 in .act9 ha8e been his - substituted .or those o. the person eAhu"ed at Cehrter /tation. I. 0artin #or"ann escaped onboard !-$%&9 one piece o. in.or"ation regarding his escape - one 8ery i"portant piece -re"ains uneAplained. Ho) could #or"ann9 at the seat o. the <a7i Party and the hird +eich9 Hitler6s top lieutenant and "ortal ene"y o. the !nited /tates9 ha8e negotiated secretly )ith the top leadership o. 3"erican intelligence9 politics and the "ilitary to arrange the surrender o. !-$%& and its potent cargoJ hrough )hat conduit could he ha8e "ade a secret peace o8erture9 a proposal that )ould not ?eopardi7e hi" personally but )ould be taken seriously by the !nited /tatesJ he ans)er is not conclusi8e9 as is little about #or"ann6s .ate. Considering Occa"6s +a7or and the .acts outlined abo8e9 it "ay not be possible nor is it critical to this study to pro8e )ith certainty that #or"ann .ound a pipeline to9 and negotiated )ith9 the !nited /tates. he re;uire"ent is to sho) only that such capabilities )ere a8ailable and that such e8ents are the "ost plausible eAplanation o. the e8idence. In looking at the possibilities concerning these negotiations and history as it un.olded9 it is not surprising that another suspicious string o. e8ents and personalities )ith #or"ann6s sta"p on the" see" to be EcoincidentallyE connected. I. certain e8ents are9 indeed9 linked9 as they appear to be9 they sol8e "ore historical ano"alies that pre8iously ha8e been dis"issed or ignored by the traditional history. 3llen *ulles9 President +oose8elt6s personal en8oy FdcAAAiAG in continental 5urope and leader o. the O// on he Continent9FdcAlG )as operating an intelligence apparatus .ro" #erne9 /)it7erland in 4ebruary 19&( )hen he )as secretly approached by an e"issary o. // >eneral Harl :ol...FdcAliG >eneral :ol.. )as :ehr"acht Plenipotentiary .or Italy9 )hich "eant he )as responsible .or all >er"an occupation troops not .ighting on the Italian 4ront9 and he )as head o. the /ecurity Police and /ecret Police in Italy.FdcAliiG Prior to this assign"ent he had been Hi""ler6s personal chie. o. sta..9 // ad?utant to Hitler and liaison bet)een the // and I.>. 4arben FdcAliiiG - especially .or the buna plant at 3usch)it7 during its construction. hrough these o..ices and responsibilities :ol.. )as .ully pri8y to the "ysterious )orkings o. the I.>. 4arben plant at 3usch)it7 and its apparently enriched uraniu" product= and he )as )ell connected )ith 0artin #or"ann and his inner circle o. bureaucrats and industrialists. 4or "any years9 :ol.. held the purse strings to Hi""ler6s personal .unds9 "ost o. )hich )ere garnered .ro" Hi""ler6s ECircle o. 4riends9E a s"all but po)er.ul cartel o. business "agnates that included I.>. 4arben industrialists #uete.isch and *uer.eld.FdcAli8G #oth "en )ere central .igures in the I.>. 4arben plant at 3usch)it79 and both )ere connected to #or"ann through 4arben6s chair"an9 their boss Her"ann /ch"it7. /iAty percent o. the .unds :ol.. "anaged .or Hi""ler6s personal interests and pro?ects )as pro8ided by the Circle o. 4riends9 )hile .orty percent )as pro8ided to :ol.. .ro" #or"ann9FdcAl8G either directly .ro" party co..ers or through the Party6s 3dol. Hitler

.und9 )hich #or"ann also controlled. he traditional history o. the surrender o. the >er"an troops in Italy holds that :ol.. suggested to *ulles through a secret e"issary that they open negotiations .or a separate capitulation o. the >er"an ar"ies in Italy. *ulles listened to the en8oy )ith interest and on 8 and 9 0arch FdcAl8iG "et )ith >eneral :ol.. in person at *ulles6 apart"ent in Turich. 3ccording to :inston Churchill9FdcAl8iiG and supported by the o..icial reports o. the negotiations9FdcAl8iiiG *ulles told :ol.. that the only acceptable capitulation )as .ull and unconditional surrender. he 3"erican9 #ritish and /o8iet >o8ern"ents )ere then noti.ied o. :ol..6s ;uery9 according to Churchill. he traditional history asserts that :ol.. then agreed to Epa8e the )ayE .or the unconditional surrender o. >er"any6s southern ar"y9 )hich he appears to ha8e done. In the process o. de8eloping )hat )as to be called Operation /unrise9 se8eral "ore "eetings )ere held bet)een *ulles or his en8oys and :ol.. or his en8oys o8er the span o. the neAt t)o "onths. 3ccording to this traditional historical account9 on the sur.ace all see"s )ell and good= but it contains incongruities. 4irst9 according to Churchill6s state"ent - although it is not necessarily supported by *ulles6 o..icial report and the .iles o. Operation /unrise9 )hich are 8ague on the sub?ect - /talin had been in.or"ed o. the initial talks and e..orts )ere "ade to get the /o8iets in8ol8ed9FdcAliAG but they ne8er participated in the /)iss discussions.FdclG he reason gi8en )as the di..iculty on the :estern 3llies6 behal. o. s"uggling a /o8iet representati8e into neutral /)it7erland9 )ith )hich the /o8iet !nion had no diplo"atic ties.FdcliG 0ore di..icult challenges9 ho)e8er9 did not keep the operation .ro" s"uggling an 3llied radio operator straight into :ol..6s chie. o. sta.. head;uarters in >er"an occupied 0ilan9 to pro8ide co""unications to co"plete the surrender details9 )hile the )ar )as still raging.FdcliiG <or did it keep the" on "ultiple occasions .ro" s"uggling general sta..-le8el 5nglish and 3"erican intelligence and "ilitary o..icers across se8eral borders in and out o. /)it7erland9 to "anage the surrender.FdcliiiG 0ore i"portantly9 the surrender o. Italy )as 8ery "uch in both +ussian and /)iss interests. It see"s unlikely the t)o countries could not )ork out a co8ert agree"ent i. their sole and "utual ob?ecti8e )as to conclude the Italian surrender. >i8en such considerations9 the eAcuse .or eAcluding the +ussians appears hollo). /oon the perpetually paranoid /talin9 stirred up by <a7i innuendo Fdcli8G - the >er"ans )ere playing .or both a separate peace and an 3llied break o. ranks9 )hiche8er ca"e .irst Fdcl8G- )as angrily accusing the :estern 3llies o. secretly negotiating )ith the >er"ans. /talin pestered the 3nglo-3"ericans until the :est e8entually decided to end the contact )ith :ol.. rather than .ind a solution that allo)ed the /o8iets to participate.Fdcl8iG O. course9 by this ti"e the talks had gone on .or t)o "onths. 3t the 8ery last "inute the progra" )as sa8ed9 but still +ussian obser8ers )ere not allo)ed to be present until the 8ery .inal details o. the surrender docu"ent )ere being co"pleted.Fdcl8iiG I. this is true9 it indicates perhaps that there )as "ore happening surreptitiously than Churchill and *ulles ad"itted. he !nited /tates consistently denied /talin6s accusations9 and the o..icial record o. the operation appears to support this stance= *ulles and his en8oys and 3llied leaders clearly state in their co""unications the i"portance o. not gi8ing i"pressions that could be construed as negotiating. 3ll talks )ere characteri7ed as discussions opened .or the purpose o. arranging .ull and unconditional surrender. In a cable sent on ( 3pril9Fdcl8iiiG +oose8elt denied to /talin that agree"ents had been reached or that negotiations )ere e8en ongoing. He )roteB EI ha8e co"plete con.idence in >eneral 5isenho)er9 and kno) that he certainly )ould in.or" "e be.ore entering into any agree"ents )ith the >er"ans. He is instructed to de"and9 and )ill de"and9 unconditional surrender o. ene"y troops that "ay be de.eated on his .ront.... I a" certain that there )ere no negotiations in #erne at any ti"e9 and I .eel that your in.or"ation to that e..ect "ust ha8e co"e .ro" >er"an sources9 )hich ha8e "ade persistent e..orts to co"e bet)een us.... 4inally9 I )ould say thisB it )ould be one o. the great tragedies o. history i. at the 8ery "o"ent o. the 8ictory no) )ithin our grasp such distrust9 such lack o. .aith9 should pre?udice the entire undertaking a.ter the colossal losses o. li.e9 "aterial9 and treasure in8ol8ed. 4rankly9 I cannot a8oid a .eeling o. bitter resent"ent to)ard your in.or"ers9 )hoe8er they are9 .or such 8ile "isrepresentation o. "y actions or those o. "y trusted subordinates.E :hile it is true the >er"ans )ere trying to play the 3llies against each other9 +oose8elt could not kno) )hen he blasted /talin6s Ein.or"ersE that the chie. "an he )as denigrating )as none other than Hi" Philby9 the /o8iet "aster spy.FdcliAG Philby )ould later de.ect to the /o8iet !nion and a co""unist hero6s )elco"e .ollo)ing three decades o. .aith.ul ser8ice as a +ussian spy )ho intrigued throughout the top echelons o. #ritish intelligence. Philby had been the source o. /talin6s in.or"ation in an incident that reportedly occurred se8eral "onths earlier9 )hen *ulles secretly "et )ith another shady e"issary suing .or peace .or >er"any - a Herr Cangbehn.FdclAG Hi""ler9 notably :ol..6s boss at the ti"e9 ostensibly had sent Cangbehn9 but to *ulles Cangbehn described hi"sel. as connected to the >er"an 4oreign 0inistry. o sho) *ulles he )as acting in good .aith9 Cangbehn presented certain 4oreign 0inistry records that )ere co"pelling to *ulles in their 8alue and in pro8ing Cangbehn6s bona .ides9 and that his negotiation ;uery )as in earnest. *ulles later described in enthusiastic tones the i"pact and 8alue o. the goods Ein all their pristine .reshness.EFdclAiG *ulles had the papers copied and sent to O// head;uarters in :ashington and Condon. In Condon9 Hi"

Philby recei8ed the papers and pro"ptly .or)arded the" to /talin. 0oles at O// head;uarters in :ashington con.ir"ed to /talin Philby6s .indings. 3ccording to the traditional history9 the Cangbehn Epeace initiati8eE set in "otion by Hi""ler9 purportedly )ith Hitler6s blessing9 )as actually planned as a .or" o. political sabotage - part o. the process o. breaking up the 3llies. he intent )as to )eaken the 3llies6 5ast':est alliance )ith arti.icial docu"ents that )ould put the /o8iets at odds )ith the !nited /tates and #ritain. Counter to Hi""ler6s plan9 ho)e8er9 the docu"ents Cangbehn presented to *ulles )ere 8ery real9 not the specially .orged papers that Hi""ler thought )ere being used. 3nd9 as noted9 they )ere 8ery co"pelling to *ulles. :hat9 or )ho9 caused the i"portant s)itch o. the docu"ents .ro" .ake to real papers "ay pro8e interesting )hen considered against ensuing de8elop"ents. he in.or"ation )ithin the docu"ents9 the actual ti"ing o. the "eeting and its results9 the author has been unable to ascertain other than that it )as initiated in the su""er and .all o. 19&%. In .act9 certain in.or"ation around this negotiation appears to actually ha8e been connected )ith Operation /unrise9 too9 or perhaps the t)o are one9 )ith the ti"ing con.used. I ha8e been unable to untangle the t)o using the in.or"ation I ha8e disco8ered. he ti"ing9 go8ern"ent ser8ices in8ol8ed and personalities participating in the a..air are all aligned9 ho)e8er9 to suggest a possible connection bet)een the Cangbehn and :ol.. negotiations. In .act9 Cangbehn6s na"e )as "entioned by :ol.. )hen he )as interrogated as a )itness .or the <ure"berg trials9 FdclAiiG in.erring he kne) the "an and )orked )ith hi" as one o. Hi""ler6s industrialist contacts9 "entioning speci.ically Cangbehn6s connections )ith /)edish #anker +aoul :allenberg. 3t any rate9 Cangbehn had approached *ulles on behal. o. Hi""ler )ith 8ery real and co"pelling E4oreign 0inistryE docu"ents9 )hich one "ust assu"e )ere i"portant papers relating to >er"any6s relationship )ith at least one other country9 or "ore. he papers )ould either ha8e been "ilitary9 intelligence or co""ercial in nature9 or a co"bination o. these= and )ould ha8e been i"portant enough to get *ulles6 rapt attention and a ;uick dispatch up the chain o. co""and. hey could ha8e been any docu"ents that .it this bill9 but it is reasonable to assu"e the docu"ents dealt )ith the recent agree"ent .or technology eAchange bet)een the hird +eich and @apan. his agree"ent certainly .its the criteria o. all the re;uire"ents abo8e and )ould ha8e been an eye-popping re8elation to *ulles. 3 portion o. this "aterial )ould beco"e the cargo o. !-$%&9 including the enriched uraniu" .ro" the I.>. 4arben plant at 3usch)it7. Hi""ler thought the docu"ents being co"pro"ised )ere the .aked papers. #ut .or Cangbehn9 or anyone else .or that "atter9 to ha8e "ade a si"ple "istake o. accidentally eAchanging intentionally .raudulent docu"ents created only .or this political sabotage9 in place o. real9 8ery i"portant9 4oreign 0inistry docu"ents that one "ust belie8e )ere )ell guarded9 see"s highly i"probable. 0ore likely9 so"eone behind the scenes got the real docu"ents into Cangbehn6s hands and )as playing Hi""ler .or the .ool9 apparently in a 8ery real9 but guarded9 co""unication to the :est through hi". In this scenario9 Hi""ler ser8ed as an un)itting .ront "an and bu..er9 thus sa8ing the unidenti.ied arbiter .ro" eAposing hi"sel. to Hitler6s possible )rath i. the deceit )as disco8ered. 4ro" the outset9 the ploy looks like a classic #or"ann intrigue. #y the spring o. 19&%9 )ith /talingrad .allen9 #or"ann had concluded that the )ar )as all but lost and he had already begun his secret ca"paign to eAport as "uch o. >er"any6s econo"y as possible outside o. the hird +eich. o ensure he )ould be around a.ter the )ar to control that .ortune9 he needed to guarantee his post-)ar .reedo" and protection )ith those )ho )ould then be in control. <aturally9 he )ould ha8e begun looking .or a conduit to the :est9 and through his broad range o. dealings )ith Hi""ler possibly .ound Hi""ler6s ruse and then co-opted it= using :ol.. to send the technology eAchange papers to /)it7erland through Cangbehn in place o. the .raudulent docu"ents. !n.ortunately9 agents in /)it7erland reported back to Hitler that real docu"ents had been leaked and Hitler9 .urious9 held Hi""ler to account. Hi""ler )as only able to sa8e hi"sel. by arresting his e"issary to #erne - )ho )as presu"ably Cangbehn. #or"ann )ould no) ha8e needed to .ind another pipeline to the :est. 5nter >eneral :ol... Or9 as noted9 possibly :ol.. already had ser8ed as the contact that got #or"ann6s technology eAchange papers into Cangbehn6s hands in the .irst place. 3s has already been stated9 :ol. and Cangbehn shared a )orking relationship through Hi""ler. 3nd as also noted pre8iously9 :ol.. had connections )ith #or"ann as )ell. :ol.. had been Hi""ler6s personal chie. o. sta..9 Hi""ler6s // ad?utant to Hitler9 and // liaison to the I.>. 4arben plant9 all o. )hich re;uired inter.acing )ith 0artin #or"ann. In addition9 :ol.. )as no) the "aster o. all o. occupied Italy. hese positions and the eAperience gained .ro" the" )ould ha8e "ade :ol.. per.ect .or #or"ann6s negotiation needs. 3s Italian plenipotentiary :ol.. had a degree o. autono"y and physical distance .ro" #erlin and close proAi"ity to /)it7erland that allo)ed hi" to relati8ely easily contact9 and e8en "eet )ith9 e"issaries .ro" the :est. He also co""anded the occupying troops in Italy and "aintained good relations )ith the co""anders o. the .ighting troops there. hus he had the capacity to bring the surrender to .ruition - or at least play the role as a co8er story possibly .or the real negotiation at hand9 that o. eAchanging the enriched uraniu" and other cargo o. !-$%& .or #or"ann6s .reedo". 3s an o..icer in Hitler6s

court9 :ol.. had learned the tricky political landscape and ho) to engage in sophisticated high-le8el negotiations )hile )atching his back9 )hich #or"ann )ould be )ell placed to protect any)ay. 3s Hi""ler6s personal chie. o. sta..9 :ol.. had been responsible .or collecting and distributing #or"ann6s "ulti-"illion reich"arks-per-year contributions to Hi""ler6s personal accounts. his "ade :ol.. a tool o. #or"ann as )ell9 and eAposed hi" to a healthy appreciation .or #or"ann6s po)er and "odus operandi. 3nd as a key player in >er"any6s enriched uraniu" production pro?ect9 :ol.. )as singularly kno)ledgeable about its secret purpose and 8alue9 and there.ore its use as a bargaining chip )ith the !nited /tates. 4or #or"ann9 :ol.. )as per.ect .or handling the delicate "atters o. the secret negotiations and to address the ;uestions and details the 3"ericans surely )ould ha8e regarding the ranso" being o..ered. In turn9 :ol.. could gain "uch .ro" this sy"biotic relationship. :ith #or"ann in #erlin to )atch his back and possibly e8en by then to ha8e con8inced Hitler secret negotiations )ith the :est "ight be prudent :ol. could )in his .reedo" along )ith #or"ann6s by practicing his discrete diplo"acy )ith a .air le8el o. sa.ety - as it appears he did. In .act9 according to :ol..6s post-)ar interrogations9 as early as , 4ebruary 19&( :ol.. had discussed )ith Hitler9 should the Esecret )eaponE not be co"pleted in ti"e9 approaching the :est )ith surrender options.FdclAiiiG He indicated in the interrogation that Hitler not only did not .orbid hi" .ro" pursuing contact )ith the :est9 but that he9 :ol..9 interpreted this to be Hitler6s unspoken appro8al o. such a progra"9 )hich :ol.. then .ollo)ed. In a .ull report on Operation /unrise that 3llen *ulles and his assistant >ero 8an >ae8ernit7 )rote at the end o. the )ar9 according to :ol..9 Hitler had e8en issued a Esecret order to seek any possible contact )ith the 3llies.EFdclAi8G It see"s doubt.ul gi8en Hitler6s penchant .or getting e8en )ith traitors9 that :ol.. )ould ha8e gone .or)ard on the basis o. Hitler6s no-co""ent alone9 )ithout #or"ann9 or so"eone9 assuring hi" o. Hitler6s appro8al. Cater9 )hen :ol..6s actual surrender e..orts )ere re8ealed to Hitler9 the 4uehrer co"pli"ented :ol.. on .ollo)ing his course and on his apparent success9 and thanked hi" .or pursuing that course.FdclA8G Hitler6s appro8al ca"e despite the .act :ol.. had been threatened by his detractors - including Hi""ler - )ho )ere going to re8eal his surrender acti8ities to the 4uehrer9 and )ho assured :ol.. the 4uehrer )ould take drastic "easures against hi".FdclA8iG Hi""ler did not )ant :ol..6s negotiations con.licting )ith secret talks he )as conducting )ith the 3llies through the +ed Cross9 nor did he )ant )ord o. his negotiations getting back to Hitler and ha8ing Hitler s;uelch all such negotiations. 3gain9 #or"ann6s in.luence appears to ha8e been present in these e8ents9 .or )ho else had the in.luence )ith Hitler to garner his support .or :ol.. to pursue peace negotiations )ith the :est9 )hen the opportunity )as denied to Hi""lerJ Hi""ler6s arrest )as ordered by Hitler )hen he learned Hi""ler )as parlaying )ith the :est through the +ed Cross. :hy )ould Hitler ha8e applauded :ol.. and denounced Hi""ler .or pursuing the sa"e action9 unless a di..erent9 secret9 desired result )as being pursued by :ol..9 )hich #or"ann supportedJ 3nd the .act that #or"ann stirred Hitler to order Hi""ler6s arrest9 probably to stop Hi""ler6s negotiations .ro" inter.ering )ith :ol..6s9 attests to the .act that the "aster o. the plan )as #or"an9 hi"sel.. 3dd to this the .act that Hitler9 despite .orsaking his o)n sur8i8al9 had ordered that #or"ann be rescued .ro" #erlin in order to preser8e the political paper)ork testi.ying o. the 4uehrer6s consent to preser8e the <a7i cause a.ter his death9 and it see"s the secret )eapons discussion bet)een Hitler and :ol.. "ay ha8e held greater i"portance than at .irst re8ie). >eneral Hesselring had co"plained to :ol..9 EOur situation is desperate9 nobody dares tell the truth to the 4uehrer9 )ho is surrounded by a s"all group o. ad8isors9 )ho still belie8e in a last speci.ic secret )eapon )hich they call the 61er7ei.lunga6 )eapon.EFdclA8iiG Interestingly9 the report goes on to eAplain that Hesselring did not appear to doubt the eAistence or 8iability o. the secret )eapon - in .act9 he belie8ed the )eapon )ould Eprolong the )ar FbutG could not decide it.E #ut the >eneral stated he )ould re.use to order its use9 .earing the bloodbath it )ould cause. Hesselring6s belittling accusation o. the )eapon being controlled by a s"all group o. ad8isors rings o. /peer6s charge o. Hitler being guided by E/unday supple"entE reporting regarding the ato"ic bo"b - apparently a re.erence to 0artin #or"ann. 3nd9 as has been sho)n in a pre8ious chapter9 )hene8er the secret )eapon )as "entioned9 particularly during the last days o. the )ar9 it )as al)ays tied to #or"ann9 )ho appeared to be its o8erseer. In reality9 Hitler probably )as so eAhausted and da7ed by his i""inent do)n.all that #or"ann probably had to do little "ore than "ake the suggestion .or this scenario and Hitler9 )eary and desperate .or a chance at so"e type o. positi8e legacy9 )ould ha8e accepted it. One "ust ask9 assu"ing there )as9 indeed9 a secret )eapon close to co"pletion - as the e8idence certainly attests there )as - )hat )ould ha8e been the disposition o. those )eapon co"ponents i. they )ere not used by >er"any be.ore the end o. the )ar9 )hich they ob8iously )ere notJ I. the secret )eapon did eAist9 but )as not used by the >er"ans9 )hat happened to itJ It is easy to assu"e and reasonable to belie8e that :ol..6s discussion )ith Hitler regarding the >er"an surrender and the secret )eapon continued until resolution o. the ;uestion )as reached. I. Hitler9 on behal. o. #or"ann9 )as )illing to entertain and e8en encouraged :ol.. to pursue an agree"ent )ith the :est on

his behal.9 certainly the purpose .or such negotiations9 and )hat currency )as a8ailable )ith )hich to negotiate9 )as discussed. Hitler "ade clear during his last inter8ie) )ith :ol.. that9 )hile he appro8ed o. the dialogue )ith the :est9 unconditional surrender )as out o. the ;uestion. On the other hand9 they had to kno) they )ere not going to get so"ething .or nothing. Hitler9 #or"ann and :ol.. al"ost certainly )ould not ha8e le.t the outco"e open9 barring only unconditional surrender9 but also )ould ha8e recogni7ed that )hate8er )as agreed to could not .ly in the .ace o. the 3llies6 8ery public co""it"ent to unconditional surrender. >i8en the outco"e o. e8ents9 as described throughout this book9 Hitler6s purpose .or the negotiations9 it see"s9 )as to get #or"ann to .reedo" )ith Hitler6s .inal orders and last )ill and political testa"ent9 to pro8ide a breath o. hope that so"e .or" o. <a7is" )ould sur8i8e. #or"ann apparently had con8inced Hitler that his plan to eAport and rebuild >er"any6s econo"y a.ter the )ar9 and thus ulti"ately )in the con.lict .or >er"any by econo"ic "eans9 still had potential. Indeed9 as noted in a pre8ious chapter9 Hitler appears to ha8e supported the plan .ro" its inception. Cike)ise9 it is reasonable to belie8e that #or"ann con8inced Hitler that such an outco"e )ould post-hu"ously ?usti.y the 4uehrer6s li.e6s )ork and e8entually honor his legacy. he eAchange currency .or .acilitating this agree"ent )ith the :est )ould be the secret )eapon. I. the :ol..'*ulles negotiations )ent .urther than a si"ple unconditional surrender - as /talin6s insistence and other indications suggest - and the secret "ediation originated as an o8erture .ro" #or"ann to *ulles9 upon hearing #or"ann6s na"e *ulles "ost likely )ould ha8e been .ascinated. 4or *ulles had identi.ied #or"ann years earlier as the Hitler "inion "ost )orth )atching. EIt is aAio"atic that you keep your eye on the nu"ber t)o "an - the one )ho does the )ork9E *ulles once said o. #or"ann9 )ho" he had "et at a pre-)ar reception.FdclA8iiiG *ulles6 older brother9 @ohn 4oster *ulles9 )ho )ould soon be 5isenho)er6s /ecretary o. /tate9 also had connections to 0artin #or"ann - through #or"ann6s old consort9 I.>. 4arben chair"an Her"ann /ch"it7 FdclAiAG - )ho" he had "et during the 1ersaille reaty negotiations. #or"ann9 in his turn9 recogni7ed the 8alue o. 3llen *ulles as a conduit to +oose8elt and had already gone to great lengths to create a pipeline to *ulles i. he e8er needed one. Industrialist 4rit7 hyssen and 3llen *ulles had "et and hit it o.. .ollo)ing :orld :ar One9 )hen the pair represented also their respecti8e countries in the industrial reparations negotiations .ollo)ing that )ar. hyssen beca"e an ardent supporter o. Hitler in the early years o. the <a7i Party9 but later )ithdre) his support and openly critici7ed Hitler in a public letter in protest o. he 4uehrer6s hu"an rights 8iolations. Hitler9 enraged9 thre) hyssen into a concentration ca"p. #or"ann ho)e8er9 E.elt hyssen )as his ace in the hole i. he e8er needed a personal pipeline to 3llen :. *ulles9E )rote Paul 0anning.FdclAAG 3nd so #or"ann ensured that hyssen and his )i.e )ere kept in a pri8ate ho"e outside the "ain ca"p. 3lthough it is ;uestionable )hether #or"ann e8er used hyssen to contact *ulles9 his .oresight and in8est"ent in case the need e8er arose speaks 8olu"es regarding his understanding that *ulles )ould be the right person to contact )hen the critical "o"ent arri8ed. hus a re"arkable concentration o. connections to #or"ann )ere centered )ithin Operation /unrise - the 3llied code na"e .or the :ol..'*ulles talks to surrender occupied Italy. here is no e8idence surrounding the secret talks that precludes #or"ann ha8ing used the "eetings as an opportunity to negotiate his .reedo" .or the enriched uraniu" and other co"ponents on board !-$%&. Pro8ing9 ho)e8er9 that #or"ann actually took part in or in.luenced /unrise is i"possible. In light o. #or"ann6s apparent connections to !-$%& and the !boat6s acti8ities9 including 4ehler6s deter"ination to surrender its i"portant cargo and its high-pro.ile passengers9 e8en at the eApense o. o"onaga6s and /ho?i6s li8es9 it see"s probable secret agree"ents )ere being .ollo)ed. I.9 indeed9 this )as the case9 the "ost logical place .or these agree"ents to ha8e been prepared )as during the talks o. Operation /unrise. hree additional points are )orth considering in support o. the abo8e scenario. 4irst9 although the unconditional surrender agree"ent )as )ritten out in detail9 during post)ar discussions and interrogations :ol.. o.ten re.erred to the Eoral agree"entE he had "ade )ith 3llen *ulles. :hy )ould he speci.y 8erbal agree"ents rather than the surrender in )hole unless he )as trying to in.er a separate i"portance to his discussions .ro" the actual surrender itsel.9 and thus that so"e o. the agree"ents he and *ulles had concluded )ere not part and parcel o. the instru"ent o. surrenderJ Ha8ing re8ie)ed "uch o. the Operation /unrise .iles in the <ational 3rchi8es9 I )as unable to .ind any notes actually taken during the "eetings. 3ll docu"entation concerning these discussions are either reports su""ari7ing the conclusions o. the talks or indices o. )ireless trans"issions that record the )orking out o. logistics and reporting in broad ter"s on their progress. he lack o. actual "inutes or personal notes recording the proceedings "ay indicate a saniti7ing o. the record to eli"inate proo. o. actual agree"ents "ade. /upporting this scenario .urther is the .act that in the days i""ediately .ollo)ing the Italian capitulation9 :ol.. spent three days )hile still secured in his o)n head;uarters in 4asano9 Italy se;uestered )ith 3llen *ulles6 right-hand "an9 >ero 8on >ae8ernit7. hese "eetings9 ostensibly to help :ol.. co"pose his

"e"orandu" o. e8ents9 )ere attended only by >ae8ernit7 and :ol..= not e8en >ae8ernit76s O// co"panion9 a "an )ho )as sent speci.ically to "onitor the surrender process9 )as allo)ed to participate.FdclAAiG he unidenti.ied O// agent - thought to be *onald @ones9 *ulles6 "an in Cugano FdclAAiiG - recorded9 ho)e8er9 that :ol.. had t)ice re;uested the "eeting i""ediately .ollo)ing the EunconditionalE surrender Eto discuss the settle"ent o. certain urgent "atters.EFdclAAiiiG :hat conditions )ere le.t to be settled in pri8ate .ollo)ing the unconditional surrenderJ :hat could not be discussed in the presence o. >ae8ernit76s colleague9 "uch less be included in a report about the supposedly abo8e-board Eunconditional surrenderEJ here see"s to ha8e been no basis .or such secret con.erences i. the unconditional surrender )as actually i"ple"ented per the traditional history. In addition9 certain passages about the negotiations alluded to in the secret Operation /unrise report9 .iled by 3llen *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit7 a.ter the close o. the 5uropean )ar9 ha8e been censored.FdclAAi8G 3gain9 this )as done despite the .act the talks )ere supposedly based solely on unconditional surrender9 )hich )ould see" not to re;uire such "ystery. he section introducing :ol..6s report )ithin that sa"e docu"ent also ad"its that Eone or t)o ite"sE o. :ol..6s report had been eli"inated because they )ere Enot pertinent to this phase o. our story.E 3 second possible proo.-point suggesting :ol.. pro8ided secret concessions as part o. the surrender includes the .act that >eneral :ol.. )as not tried at <ure"berg i""ediately a.ter the )ar )ith the other key de.endants9 despite his co"plicity in cri"es against hu"anity. 3lthough he )as Hi""ler6s direct inter"ediary )ith I.>. 4arben at 3usch)it79 and he )as // leader and secret police chie. in Italy9 :ol.. see"s to ha8e been i""une .ro" )ar cri"es prosecutions at the <ure"berg rials. O. course he denied his co"plicity9 as did 8irtually all others in8ol8ed in such acti8ities9 e8en though he ad"itted that the idea o. using .orced labor .or // pro.it )as his idea9FdclAA8G and as co""ander in charge o. pro8iding .orced laborers .or 3usch)it79 he )as responsible .or $(9222 deaths. FdclAA8iG In addition9 in Italy his troops "assacred hundreds o. Italian partisans on at least three occasions. FdclAA8iiG Certainly he )as as guilty as 4arben6s Hrauch9 3"brose and #uete.isch9 and 3usch)it76s Co""andant Hoess9 or #or"ann hi"sel.9 and less guilty than >rand 3d"iral *oenit79 all o. )ho" )ere tried and con8icted i""ediately a.ter the )ar. *oenit7 )as con8icted solely on the basis that he did not counter"and an order .ro" Hitler turning captured cre)"e"bers o. an 3llied torpedo boat o8er to the //9 )ho eAecuted the". FdclAA8iiiG Certainly this set a precedent under )hich :ol.. should ha8e been held responsible .or the slaughter o. hundreds o. helpless partisan prisoners under his co""and9 not to "ention the thousands )ho died at 3usch)it7. :ol.. )as not only ignored at the initial <ure"berg rials but he )as released in 3ugust 19&9 .ollo)ing his use.ulness as a )itness to the cri"es o. others. He )as later sentenced to .our years by a dena7i.ication court9 but )as released a.ter only one )eekO )enty years a.ter the )ar9 :ol.. dre) attention to hi"sel. by granting an inter8ie) during the 3dol. 5ich"ann trial. He aroused public opinion to the point that he could no longer be protected9 and his past .inally caught up to hi". He )as tried and sentenced to 12 years .or pro8iding @e)s to the death ca"ps.FdclAAiAG *espite the e8entual con8iction9 such protection o. an ob8ious )ar cri"inal suggests collusion on behal. o. the !nited /tates in shielding :ol.. .ro" going to trial. Perhaps his possible in8ol8e"ent in the !-$%& surrender negotiations contributed to his delicate treat"ent. /o"e )ill argue that :ol.. secretly )as granted i""unity in eAchange .or initiating the Italian surrender discussions. hese assertions "ay9 in .act9 be true9 but the agree"ents also )ould ha8e 8iolated the ter"s o. the unconditional surrender. he )ar cri"es case o. 3d"iral *oenit7 de"onstrates ho) diligent the 3llies )ere in pursuing suspected )ar cri"inals. *oenit79 )ho )as responsible .or ending the 5uropean )ar by surrendering all o. >er"any )ithin one )eek o. Hitler6s death9 )as not only tried but con8icted on charges .ar less serious than those o. )hich :ol.. )as ad"ittedly guilty. he basis .or *oenit76s trial )as so slight that e8en 3"erican and #ritish "ilitary co""anders )ere appalled that *oenit7 )as tried9 "uch less con8icted.FdclAAAG In co"parison9 :ol..6s ad"itted co"plicity as the originator o. the .orced labor idea .or I.>. 4arben alone9 co"pared against the specious charges against *oenit79 should ha8e been a gauge ensuring :ol.. )ould be tried )ith the others. 3nd in co"parison to *oenit76s surrender ending the )ar9 the Italian surrender despite :ol..6s docu"ented e..orts to eApedite and .acilitate it - took o8er t)o "onths to co"plete and did not actually occur until the sa"e ti"e the +eich6s core ar"ies in #erlin )ere capitulating and the )ar )as9 in e..ect9 already lost. here.ore9 in its .ull conteAt9 :ol..6s surrender o. the >er"an southern .ront )as "eaningless. :hy should the 3llies ha8e gi8en any special treat"ent to :ol.. .or itJ 4inally9 the shado)y Herr Cangbehn9 )ho .irst re8ealed those enig"atic9 eAtraordinary docu"ents that )ere so co"pelling to 3llen *ulles9 bears a na"e o. striking likeness to a Captain Cieutenant Cangbein o. the >er"an <a8y6s .oreign bureau9 the 0arine /onderdienst 3usland Co""ission. #or"ann biographer :illia" /te8enson )rote that 0artin #or"ann had o8erall responsibility .or the cargo o. !-$%&9FdclAAAiG )hich see"s to be corroborated by >eneral :ol..6s co""ents during interrogations as a )itness .or the <ure"berg rials9

in )hich he stated #or"ann and :alter /chellenberg9 one o. Hi""ler6s toadies9 )ere responsible .or the 3usland9 or .oreign9 co""issions.FdclAAAiiG Interrogations o. !-$%&6s prisoners and captured >er"an records indicate that Cangbein9 under co""and o. o..icer H.H. #ecker FdclAAAiiiG o. the 0arine /onderdienst 3usland Co""ission9 actually .acilitated the collection and loading o. the secret docu"ents and "aterials FdclAAAi8G onto !-$%& be.ore its departure .ro" Hiel.FdclAAA8G In .act9 Cangbein is the na"e signed at the end o. the .reight "ani.est. It "ight be a long shot9 but could Cangbehn and Cangbein ha8e been the sa"e "anJ Could the attorney )ho ostensibly )as responsible .or the 4oreign 0inistry docu"ents sho)n to *ulles9 )hich "ay ha8e included records pertaining to !-$%&6s cargo9 also ser8ed as the Ena8al o..icerE )ho o8ersa) the docu"ents and cargo loaded on to !$%&J he connection see"s too co"pelling to ignore. 0ight *ulles ha8e un)ittingly "isspelled the na"e upon hearing it= or kno)ingly altered the .or" by one se;uential letter9 an EhE to an EiE9 in order to "islead interested parties )ho "ight later put the t)o togetherJ :hat is kno)n is .ar .ro" conclusi8e= and a positi8e ans)er "ay be too "uch to eApect9 but the possibility certainly should be eAplored .urther. !n.ortunately9 as "entioned in the introduction o. this book9 .urther in8estigation into this connection )as beyond the ti"e a8ailability and resources o. the author. Others )ho are interested in the ans)er "ay choose to pursue it. <otesB dcAAAi Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $(% dcAAAii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $(& dcAAAiii :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. $9% dcAAAi8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 Intelligence /u""ary +eport - +ed9 +> &(--192-%--11-1-#oA 19$ dcAAA8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 letter titled O..icer in charge o. the 3"erican 0ission9 +> (9 8,$.$2$22'9 $$&-= letter .ro" !ruguay 3"bassador 5llis O. #riggs to /ecretary o. /tate titled 4urther *re) Pearson 3rtcile on !ruguay9 $2 @anuary9 19&89 +> (9 8%%.2$1'1 - $2&8= letter .ro" @. 5dgar Hoo8er to 3ssistant Chie. o. /ta..9 >$9 :ar *epart"ent9 $& 3pril9 19&,9 +> (9 -&2.2211,5:'&-$&&, dcAAA8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 /tate *epart"ent elegra" .ro" 0adrid to /ecretary o. /tate9 $9 3ugust9 19&-9 +> (9 8,$.$2$($'8 - $9&dcAAA8ii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 IndeA .or the O..ice o. /trategic /er8ices9 +> $$,-192-%-%$-% boA 12$$= +> $$, I1$%922= +> $$, I1$$,&2 dcAAA8iii Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 pp. $&%9 $&& dcAAAiA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 second photo section caption dcAl Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. -(= Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 second photo section caption dcAli !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 8arious .iles o. Operation /unrise9 +> $%89 01219 +oll 82= +> $%8 01$-2 +oll $$= +> $$,9 5ntry 112 #oAes 1 and $= *ollinger9 he +ise and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p.188 dcAlii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I1-9(9 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 1$ 3pril9 19&-9 +> $%8 - 01219 +oll 82= O// cable .ro" #erne I(%8 34HP .or >-$R&,ro" (>eneral) 3irey9 date thought to be $1 0arch9 19&( but unsure9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA $= +eport on the /unrise - Cross)ord Operation 4eb. $( - 0ay $9 19&(9 p. 89 by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 +>$$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $& dcAliii @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p. 11dcAli8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I1-%99 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 8 3pril9 19&-9 pp. 19 $ dcAl8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I1-%99 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 8 3pril9 19&-9 p. $= and Interrogation /u""ary I$-9-9 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 $( @une9 19&-9 +> $%8 - 012199 +oll 82 dcAl8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 pp. 12-1(9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1=also 8arious other docu"ents in sa"e .ile= Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. 188 dcAl8ii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. 188 dcAl8iii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 pp. 1,-%$9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1 dcAliA !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 pp. 1,-%$9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1= untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 p. $29 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA = Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p.188 dcl !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 p. $29 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA

1= cable .ro" #erne9 $2 0arch9 19&(9 p. $9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA $= untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 p. $%9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1 dcli !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport on Operation /unrise - Cross)ord9 4eb $( - 0ay $9 19&( by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 pp. 1(91,9 +> $$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $& dclii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 report titled /unrise +adio Operator9 +>$$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1= Cross)ord9 4eb $( - 0ay $9 19&( by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 p. $19 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA $= O// cable .ro" #erne I(&2(9)9 $2 0arch9 19&(9 +>$$, 5ntry 112 #oA $= +eport on the /unrise - Cross)ord Operation 4eb. $( - 0ay $9 19&(9 p. 89 +>$$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $& dcliii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport on Operation /unrise Cross)ord9 4eb $( - 0ay $9 19&( by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 pp. 1$-1,9 +> $$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $&= O// cable .ro" #erne I(&2(9)9 $2 0arch9 19&(9 +>$$, 5ntry 112 #oA $ dcli8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 O// cable .ro" #erne I,$,9 11 3pril9 19&(9 +> $$, 5ntry 1129 #oA $ dcl8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 pp. %%9 %(9 &-9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1 dcl8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 p. &$9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1= O// cable .ro" #erne I(&2(9)9 $2 0arch9 19&(9 +> $$, 5ntry 1129 #oA $ dcl8ii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport on Operation /unrise Cross)ord9 4eb $( - 0ay $9 19&( by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 p. &,9 +> $$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $&= untitled -,-page report about Operation /unrise9 p. &$9 +> $$, 5ntry 112 #oA 1 dcl8iii Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. 188 dcliA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 pp. 919 9$ dclA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 91 dclAi Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 91 dclAii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I%-$$9 o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 1 October9 19&-9 p. 19 +>$%8 - 012199 +oll 82 dclAiii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I&&-,9 1 *ece"ber9 19&-9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82= also Interrogation /u""ary I&&(%9 1, *ece"ber9 19&-9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82 dclAi8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport on Operation /unrise Cross)ord9 4eb $( - 0ay $9 19&( by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 p. $(9 +> $$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $& dclA8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I&&-,9 1 *ece"ber9 19&-9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82= also Interrogation /u""ary I&&(%9 1, *ece"ber9 19&-9 p. $9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82 dclA8i !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I&&-,9 1 *ece"ber9 19&-9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82= also Interrogation /u""ary I&&(%9 1, *ece"ber9 19&-9 p. $9 +> $%8 012199 +oll 82 dclA8ii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport on Operation /unrise Cross)ord9 4eb $( - 0ay $9 19&( by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 p. $(9 +> $$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $& dclA8iii Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $(% dclAiA @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 pp. 1,891,9 dclAA Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. $(& dclAAi !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 Operation /unrise o..icial reports9 unidenti.ied report9 pp. 129 1$9 1(9 $$9 +> $$,9 5ntry 119 #oA 1 dclAAii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 Operation /unrise o..icial reports9 Cist o. persons...o. the /unrise Operation9 pp. $9 %9 +> $$,9 5ntry 1129 #oA 1= also +eport on /unrise-Cross)ord9 p. &$ and +eport on e8ents .ro" $3pril to $ 0ay (apparently prepared by >eneral Harl :ol..)9 p.19 +> $$,9 5ntry 1129 boA 1 dclAAiii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 "ultiple Operation /unrise o..icial reports9 unidenti.ied report9 p. 19 +> $$,9 5ntry 119 #oA 1 dclAAi8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport on Operation /unrise Cross)ord9 4eb $( - 0ay $9 19&( by 3llen :. *ulles and >ero 8on >ae8ernit79 p. %$9 +> $$, +o) 9'$&'& 5ntry 192 #oA $& dclAA8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation /u""ary I-,99 1, *ece"ber9 19&,9 p. %9 +> $%89 012199 +oll 82

dclAA8i Peter Hayes9 he 5uropean /trategies o. I.>. 4arben9 19$( 19&(9 p. ,%= @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 p.%= Paul 0anning9 <a7i In 5Aile9 p. 1(% dclAA8ii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation *i8ision /u""ary o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 $, October9 19&(9 pp. 1-%9 +>$%8 - 1$-29 +oll $$ dclAA8iii Couis /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. -$ dclAAiA Christopher 3ilsby9 //B +oll o. In.a"y9 p. 18% dclAAA Couis /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 p. -$ dclAAAi :illlia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhood9 p. ,& dclAAAii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 :ar Cri"es +ecords9 Interrogation *i8ision /u""ary o. >eneral Harl :ol.. interrogation9 <ure"berg9 %1 3ugust9 19&(9 p. %9 +>$%8 - 1$-29 +oll $$ dclAAAiii !./. <ational 3rchi8es9 "e"orandu" .ro" H. . >herardi titled Interrogation o. <ieschling9 $- @uly9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<28-%2$$9 <3+3 date -'$2'91 dclAAAi8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport on the Interrogation o. the Cre) o. !-$%& :hich /urrendered to the !// /utton on 1& 0ay9 19&(9 In Position &-8-2-6 < - &$8-$(6 :9 $- @une9 19&(9 declassi.ied I <<*8-%2$$9 <3+3 date 1$'%'91=also +> &(-(</3 records) 192-%$-$--9 "e"orandu" titled In regard toB 4reight and /upplies o. !-$%&9 18 0arch9 19&(9 signedB Cangbein9 Hor8ettencapitan dclAAA8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 intelligence report o. interrogation o. 0anaging *irector /audel 3ircra.t :orks o. Hahla9 >er"any9 8 0ay9 19&(9 declassi.ied I<<*9(-221

/$ilogue heir )as "uch )ritten o. a post)ar 6.oreign trade o..ensi8e6 and o. a 65uropean 5cono"ic Co""unity6 in )hich >er"any )ould act "erely as the 6.lag bearer6 and predo"inate by 6elastic political "ethods...not )ith brutal .orce.FdclAAA8iG Peter Hayes9 author Industry and IdeologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra 4or a secret concern9 the ra"i.ications o. the surrender o. !-$%& had .ar-reaching e..ects. /hortly be.ore !-$%& landed at Ports"outh <a8al Dard9 a leading @apanese scientist reported to the @apanese House o. Peers that he )as about to introduce a )eapon Eso po)er.ul that it )ould re;uire 8ery little potential energy to destroy an ene"y .leet )ithin a .e) "o"ents.EFdclAAA8iiG 3ccording to +obert :ilcoA9 author o. @apan6s /ecret :ar9 Ethe re.erence )as clearly to an ato"ic bo"b.E #y eAtension9 the re.erence actually appears to ha8e been to)ard the cargo on board !-$%&9 and possibly .ro" other !-boats9 as )ell. he e8idence is strong that the @apanese progra" had neither the technical capacity nor the needed uraniu" stocks to "ake such a bo"b on its o)n. On the other hand9 in.or"ation eAists that suggests at least one !-boat carrying nuclear co"ponents besides !-$%&9FdclAAA8iiiG and possibly "ore9FdclAAAiAG le.t >er"an soil destined .or @apan. It is unlikely9 ho)e8er9 that these 8essels carried all o. the )orkings necessary to "ake a bo"b= and it is especially unlikely that they carried enriched uraniu". :ith the surrender to the !nited /tates o. !-$%& and the nuclear co"ponents that )ere no longer going to @apan9 @apanese possession o. an ato"ic bo"b to use against its ene"ies )as unlikely. 3nd yet i""ediately a.ter the attacks on Hiroshi"a and <agasaki9 a @apanese broadcast clai"ed that they had Esi"ilar )eapons and )ill retaliate.EFdcAcG Perhaps this )as a blu..9 or perhaps it )as true9 but "ore likely9 they had not yet reali7ed that the )eapons they )ere pre"aturely clai"ing to possess had already been turned o8er to their ene"ies. :hile there are reports the @apanese tested an ato"ic bo"b9 FdcAciG certainly they ne8er used one in battle. he leaders o. @apan )ere not the only ones le.t )ondering )hat had happened to their bo"b. 3 .e) "onths a.ter the !nited /tates dropped the bo"bs on @apan9 leaders in certain Catin 3"erican countries began co"plaining that the bo"bs had been stolen .ro" >er"any.FdcAciiG Ho) these leaders "ay ha8e disco8ered that .act is .ascinating9 considering that 0artin #or"ann probably continued his escape .ro" !$%& through /pain and on to Catin 3"erica9 )ith those leaders6 collusion9 and probably told the" )hat had happened. he Catin 3"erican leaders6 re8elation is there.ore not only another piece o. e8idence suggesting #or"ann6s escape9 but indirectly9 possibly o. the uraniu" being enriched9 as )ell. :hate8er the case9 the surrender o. !-$%& certainly caused a co""otion. 3ccording to .or"er na8al intelligence o..icer #ruce /cott Old9 >eneral >ro8es Eal"ost had apopleAy )hen the >er"ans launched a sub"arine called !-$%(.E FdcAciiiG Old asserted that >ro8es thought the !-$%( designation re.erred in so"e )ay to a cargo o. enriched uraniu" the !-boat )as carrying. hen Old eAplained that he thought >ro8es had con.used !-$%( )ith !-$%&. Intelligence O..icer Old "ust ha8e been right9 there "ust ha8e been so"e con.usion9 because it is highly i"probable >ro8es6 eAcite"ent )as caused solely by the surrender o. a !-boat designated !-$%(= .or t)o reasons. 4irst9 because !-$%( )as not surrendered9 it had been a training boat throughout "ost o. the )ar and then )as sunk in the #altic /ea on its "aiden co"bat "ission.FdcAci8G 3nd second9 because it )as )idely kno)n9 e8en by the 3"erican public9 that !-boats )ere designated )ith consecuti8e E!E nu"bers. Certainly there )as a !-$%(9 and there )as absolutely no reason to belie8e its E!E designation )as in any )ay related to any cargo it "ay ha8e carried or "ission it )as intended to per.or". here.ore9 there is no reason )hate8er to belie8e that a !-boat designated !-$%( )ould cause any anAiety in >eneral >ro8es= he )ould ha8e thought nothing o. it. Old )ent on to say that >ro8es )as concerned that the report on the "ysterious !-boat indicated it had been heading .or 3rgentina. Certainly9 despite the con.usion9 the details o. this story "atch eAceedingly )ell )ith those o. !-$%&. I. >ro8es )as concerned about a !-boat carrying !$%(9 it )ould al"ost certainly ha8e been !-$%&9 and >ro8es "ost probably )ould ha8e kno)n the entire story behind !-$%&. 3pparently9 the story Old recited )as a ske)ed account o. the surrender o. !-$%&. he story also adds )eight to the argu"ent that the uraniu" on board !-$%& )as9 indeed9 uraniu" enriched in !$%(. 3ll o. these ru"blings pale in i"portance9 ho)e8er9 co"pared to the larger picture o. the i"pact upon our )orld o. !-$%& and its strange cargo. Cooking back co".ortably .ro" the 8antage point o. o8er hal. a century since the end o. :orld :ar )o9 it is easy to presu"e that throughout the last hal. o. the )ar its outco"e and the race .or the ato"ic bo"b )ould reach a predeter"ined conclusion. he e8idence no) a8ailable about !-$%&6s cargo and passengers paints a .righteningly di..erent picture9 ho)e8er. he e8idence9 taken in )hole9 sho)s that the !nited /tates )as not necessarily leading in the race .or the ato"ic bo"b9 as has been clai"ed. he e8idence sho)s that >er"any )as 8ery near ha8ing all o. the co"ponents

.or a bo"b= and that the <a7is )ere dealing their bo"b to the @apanese to use in the Paci.ic. he e8idence9 in .act9 sho)s that ato"ic bo"bs "ay ha8e been ready .or use by both sides at a .righteningly close point in ti"e. he conse;uences could ha8e been abys"al. 3 key ;uestion is9 i. the >er"an progra" had the co"ponents .or a bo"b9 )hy did it not use oneJ he ans)er is si"pleB by the ti"e enough enriched uraniu" )as a8ailable to co"plete a )eapon9 the >er"ans had lost control o. the skies o8er 5urope. /ince the Cu.t)a..e had lost control o. the skies9 there )as little that could be done to transport the bo"b to a strategic target. 3ny bo"ber approaching 3llied territory )ould be attacked "ercilessly9 and there.ore had little chance o. reaching a 8iable target ob?ecti8e. Other transport syste"s )ere i"possible as deli8ery options9 or highly proble"atic at best. rains tra8eling in and out o. the +eich )ere care.ully searched - )hen they )ere allo)ed to cross the .rontier at all - as )ere all other .or"s o. ground transportation. /ur.ace ships9 like)ise9 )ere tightly controlled. 3 sub"arine deli8ery )as possible9 but )as 8ery proble"atic and too risky. o deploy the bo"b by !-boat "eant the 8essel )ould ha8e to sneak undetected into the harbor o. an ene"y "a?or city or "ilitary installation and either sacri.ice itsel. and cre) or lea8e the bo"b in the harbor )ith a "echanis" to detonate it hours a.ter the !-boat had departed. *etection o. the !-boat approaching or trying to enter the harbor - a high probability - "eant .ailure and loss o. the )eapon9 a risk too high to accept gi8en the great eApense and potential o. the bo"b. In addition to the great risk in8ol8ed in a non-air deli8ery9 up to -( percent or "ore o. the destructi8e capacity o. the )eapon )ould ha8e been lost in a sur.ace or sub-sea eAplosion. he ulti"ate in da"age e..iciency .or the bo"b )as detonation about 19(22 .eet directly abo8e the center o. its target. :ithout the capacity to deli8er the bo"b to a target o. co""ensurate 8alue9 pre.erably by air9 use o. the )eapon )ould ha8e been a )aste. #ut on board !-$%& )ere not only enriched uraniu"9 but plans9 parts and personnel to build 1-$ rockets and 0essersch"idt $,$ ?ets. 3lthough the 05$,$ )as designed as a ?et .ighter9 Hitler had ordered that it be redesigned and deployed as a s"all bo"ber.FdcAc8G hat idea )as taken one step .urther )hen a plan )as baked by >eneral Hreipe to ha8e a s"all bo"ber9 ar"ed )ith an ato"ic bo"b9 piggybacked across the 3tlantic to <e) Dork.FdcAc8iG 3t the distance li"it o. the "other plane the s"all cra.t )ould be launched in-.light to .inish the bo"b run. Once the payload had been dropped9 the pilot )ould ditch the ?et9 parachute into the ocean9 and then be retrie8ed by a !-boat. he plans and co"ponents .or a .irst high-altitude cockpit )ere reportedly also on board !-$%&.FdcAc8iiG here is no direct indication )hether this cockpit )as or )as not a co"ponent o. the 05$,$ plan. 3s bi7arre as it "ay see"9 the cockpit "ay9 in .act9 ha8e been designed .or the 1-$ rocket. Interrogations o. so"e o. the prisoners o. !-$%& "ay shed interesting light on )hat possibly )as planned .or these co"ponents. #oth >eneral Hessler and Party @udge <ieschling9 )ho )ere passengers on board !-$%&9 ans)ered ;uestions during their interrogations about cockpits that had been installed in 1-1 .lying bo"bs and @apanese rocket planes.FdcAc8iiiG Indeed9 Hanna +eitsch9 the bra8e >er"an a8iatriA already "entioned )ithin these pages .or .lying #or"ann out o. #erlin9 )as a)arded the Iron Cross by Hitler hi"sel. .or test .lying the 1-1 bo"b9 )hich had been "odi.ied .or a pilot. <ieschling indicated that in the hands o. the @apanese9 the intent o. such a )eapon )as to ha8e it piloted by ka"ika7es.FdcAciAG he @apanese )ere already using ka"ika7es to pilot their s"all9 )ooden9 one-"an9 rocket-propelled bo"b-planes that the 3"ericans disparagingly called #aka bo"bs.FdccG #aka "eans E.oolishE in @apanese. he 8ery short-range #aka bo"b )as piggybacked to its destination by a .our-engine plane9 and carried a charge o. high eAplosi8e. he #aka bo"b )as relati8ely ine..ecti8e9 ho)e8er9 co"pared to its cost to produce9 to deli8er to a target9 and especially in its steep cost o. hu"an ka"ika7e pilots. he specially designed 1-$ rocket !-$%& )as carrying9 on the other hand9 )as a po)er.ul )eapon that could carry a substantial payload across great distances9 i. Colonel /chlicke6s co""ent to radio"an Hirsch.eld regarding it being the rocket that could cross the 3tlantic is true.FdcciG 3r"ed )ith an ato"ic )arhead9 )hich the >er"ans )ere already )orking on9FdcciiG it )ould beco"e the ulti"ate )eapon o. )ar. he 1-$ also had the ad8antage o. tra8eling at great speeds. he rocket6s only shortco"ing )as lack o. a guidance syste". he ka"ika7e could sol8e that9 too. 3ll the rocket needed )as a cockpit that )ould allo) the pilot to sur8i8e in the rare.ied at"osphere o. near-space on its )ay to its target. :as this the purpose o. the high-altitude cockpitJ :ere there plans to adapt the ka"ika7e strategy o. the 1-1 and @apanese #aka rocket-plane to the eAponentially .aster9 "ore po)er.ul9 greater-distance capabilities o. the 1-$J he >er"an'@apanese strategy "ight ha8e looked so"ething like thisB !pon >er"any supplying 1-$ co"ponents9 technology and eApertise to @apan9 the @apanese )ould build 1-$ rockets e;uipped )ith controls to be operated by a ka"ika7e pilot placed in the specially-e;uipped high-altitude cockpit. he rocket )ould be ar"ed )ith a uraniu" )arhead that )ould be detonated at the appropriate ti"e by the ill.ated pilot9 sa8ing the progra" the considerable additional technological eApense and de8elop"ent o. designing altitude-triggered proAi"ity .uses. he speed and high-altitude characteristics o. the 1-$ )ere inde.ensible by the 3llies. 3nd the long range o. the rocket - )hich )ould allo) the pilot to .ly the )eapon .ro" the @apanese "ainland to the closest 3llied-controlled islands - had the double bene.it o. pro8iding the

ele"ent o. surprise to the attack. Once o8er the target island - perhaps the .irst )ould be the ene"y-held land closest to the @apanese ho"eland9 I)o @i"a - the ka"ika7e pilot )ould detonate the bo"b9 co"pletely eli"inating the ene"y outpost and huge nu"bers o. the ene"y and his )ar-"aking "aterials. :ith this sacri.ice the ka"ika7e )ould achie8e the highest possible honor a"ong his people9 and9 should the )ar be )on by his bra8ery9 he )as sure to be a national hero - posthu"ously o. course. :ith I)o @i"a )on9 the .ollo)ing suicide rocket )ould be launched .ro" that location to the neAt strategically held ene"y island9 and so on back across the Paci.ic9 roughly in re8erse order o. ho) the 3llies had )on the islands .ro" the @apanese. Presu"ably 12 to 1( bo"bs )ould be re;uired be.ore the !nited /tates9 #ritain and +ussia - the /o8iets )ould be in the )ar by then9 and )ould ha8e been bo"bed by si"ilar 1-$ attacks in China and 0anchuria )ould surrender. @apan )ould )in the )ar9 and <a7i >er"any9 as @apan6s ally9 though once de.eated9 )ould rise like a phoeniA .ro" the battle.ield ashes to control 5urope9 )hile @apan lorded o8er the 5astern He"isphere. It is hard to i"agine the conse;uences such an outco"e )ould ha8e "eant to the !nited /tates and the rest o. the 3"ericas. Certainly @apan and >er"any could not allo) 3"erican so8ereignty to continue unchecked in the :estern He"isphere. he !nited /tates had the econo"y and resources to support a signi.icant "ilitary de.ensi8e .ro" its shores9 or a substantial guerrilla resistance .orce. he @apanese and >er"ans )ould ha8e had a di..icult challenge controlling the 8ast ene"y territories they already held9 by 8irtue o. the 1-$o..ensi8e9 on their o)n continents9 "uch less "aintaining o8er-stretched co""and and co""unications and supply chains across the 3tlantic and Paci.ic. Probably a stale"ate )ould ha8e resulted bet)een the @apanese and >er"an ?uggernaut and the !nited /tates9 constructed o. dubious treaties en"eshed in ulti"atu"s - a Cold :ar )ith an ene"y other than the /o8iets and )ith an entirely di..erent co"pleAion. Or perhaps )hile the @apanese and their i"ported >er"an technicians co"pleted their bo"b progra"9 the 0anhattan Pro?ect )ould ha8e sol8ed its challenges triggering the plutoniu" bo"b9 as it appeared to be on track to do bet)een <o8e"ber and the end o. 19&(. he @apanese9 had !-$%& not dallied to escort #or"ann and then surrender to the !nited /tates9 easily could ha8e recei8ed the >er"an goods .ro" !-$%& as early as @uly9 and concluded their ato"ic bo"b and 1-$ rocket preparations by <o8e"ber - roughly the sa"e ti"e-period the 0anhattan Pro?ect6s bo"bs )ould ha8e been ready. :ho )ould ha8e used the .irst ato"ic bo"bJ 3nd )hat )ould the response ha8e beenJ Perhaps already in late 19&( or early 19&,9 nuclear )ar )ould ha8e seared our collecti8e eAperience as a .a"ily o. beings "utually inhabiting this planet. :hat )ould the outco"e ha8e beenJ :hat )ould each o. our li8es be likeJ On e;ual ato"ic ter"s9 )ould the "ission o. one nation to assure sel. deter"ination to all countries9 con.ronted by the re;uire"ent o. other nations to sustain their o)n people by anneAing the land and resources o. other so8ereignties9 ha8e dictated an uni"aginable ending to the con.lictJ Or )ould the leaders o. t)o social syste"s so dia"etrically opposed to one another9 .or the sake and at the cost o. the "arginali7ed eAistence o. "any billions o. people9 ha8e o8erlooked each other6s i""oralities to .ind li.e9 o. its o)n 8irtue9 a "ore ?usti.iable ob?ecti8e. Could the t)o sides agree to disagree9 treating the sub?ugation o. "illions or billions o. people as inconse;uential co"pared to the alternati8eJ he )orld9 in so "any9 o.ten un.atho"able9 )ays9 )ould ha8e been a "arkedly di..erent place )ere it not .or the historic outco"e o. the "ission o. !-$%&. #eyond altering )hat our )orld )ould look and .eel like had !-$%& deli8ered its cargo and passengers to @apan9 the surrender o. !-$%& also has had a )eighty and long-lasting direct in.luence on the li8es )e each lead. he surrender o. !-$%& has helped de.ine our present-day )orld. he ;uick and deep re8i8al o. the :est >er"an econo"y appears to be the .ruits o. 0artin #or"ann6s 4light Capital Progra" - triggered by #or"ann6s apparent escape and post-)ar .reedo" - guaranteed by the !nited /tates9 and all "ade possible by !-$%&6s surrender. he 4light Capital Progra" that .ueled the s)i.t post-)ar resurrection o. the :est >er"an econo"y probably )ith the co8ert support o. the !nited /tates9 and to its bene.it9 o.. course - there.ore9 appears to ha8e had a pro.ound i"pact on the 5uropean and )orld econo"ies in their turn. #or"ann6s plan .or continued >er"an do"inance a.ter the )ar apparently )as so )ell structured9 so deeply entrenched in the .abric o. the "any operations and national econo"ies co-opted9 and so rich in those assets9 that its per"utations easily can be seen up to today. he plan can e8en be seen in the 5uropean 5cono"ic Co""unity that )as recently con.ederated around the E5uro9E )ith >er"any at the heart o. the initiati8e. 3ccording to author Peter Hayes6 book Industry and echnologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra9 that con.ederation )as planned .or by #or"ann in 19&%.FdcciiiG Hayes )roteB heir )as "uch )ritten o. a post)ar 6.oreign trade o..ensi8e6 and o. a 65uropean 5cono"ic Co""unity6 in )hich >er"any )ould act "erely as the 6.lag bearer6 and predo"inate by 6elastic political "ethods...not )ith brutal .orce. Fdcci8G he sur8i8al o. and econo"ic po)er generated by such "ulti-billion-dollar titans as #ayer9 Hoescht9 1olks)agen9 3>43-3</CO and a long list o. others9 can all be traced to #or"ann6s 4light Capital Progra". 3nd their cu"ulati8e in.luence can be .elt throughout the )orld econo"y9 e..ecting each o. us inti"ately9 though i"perceptibly9 as )e li8e our li8es day to day.

he )orld9 o. course9 continues to turn in the present as it has in the past. Hal. a century a.ter the last global con.lict ended9 the echoes o. its orators and ordnance are re8erberating in e8er-so.tening tones as )e dash a)ay to)ard ne) destinies - )hich too o.ten are being de.ined by e8er "ore "eddleso"e technologies and increasingly intractable a"orality. 3t ti"es it behoo8es us to stop a "o"ent and look back. o try to )a8e clear the obscuring s"oke o. the past and discern through that a).ul "ist9 )hat caused the pall= so that ne) "ethods "ay be .ound to resol8e the critical ;uestions upon )hich our "utual peace and security lie. 3s )e look back9 )e should not be shocked to .ind that great doors so"eti"es s)ing on s"all hinges. hat an eclectic hand.ul o. "en and )o"en - so"e o. the" great9 but as o.ten people o. "iddling "ien stand at the center o. enor"ous e8ents and kno)ingly or unkno)ingly pull the le8ers and turn the knobs that de.ine our )orld. /o it )as )ith !-$%&. H5 5<* <otesB dclAAA8i Peter Hayes9 Industry and IdeologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra9 p. %,8 dclAAA8ii +obert :ilcoA9 @apan6s /ecret :ar9 p. 1-2 dclAAA8iii /harkhunters9 H # 12&9 p.& dclAAAiA /harkhunters9 H # 12%9 p.-= >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp.1899 $&1 dcAc >lenn /eaborg9 he Plutoniu" /toryB he @ournals o. Pro.essor >lenn . /eaborg9 p.-&( dcAci +obert :ilcoA9 @apan6s /ecret :ar9 pp. 1(9 1, dcAcii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p.$9& dcAciii +obert :ilcoA9 @apan6s /ecret :ar9 p. 1,2 dcAci8 elephone inter8ie) )ith /harkhunters "e"ber 0ichael Hoss9 researcher and author o. unpublished paper about the history o. !-$%(= >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 p. 199 dcAc8 !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 Interrogation +eport o. Cu.t)a..e >eneral !lrich Hessler I(%999 $( @une 19&(9 +>1,( #oA &9( dcAc8i *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. $%, dcAc8ii +obert :ilcoA9 @apan6s /ecret :ar9 p. 1&1 dcAc8iii !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport o. Interrogation o. Hay <ieschling9 $& 0ay 19&(= +eport o. Interrogation o. Cu.t)a..e >eneral !lrich Hessler I(%999 $( @une 19&(9 +>1,( #oA &9(= cockpits in 1-1s and @apanese rocket planes dcAciA !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport o. Interrogation o. Hay <ieschling9 $& 0ay 19&( dcc Hans *ollinger9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan9 p. %%(= !./. <ational 3rchi8es II9 +eport o. Interrogation o. Hay <ieschling9 $& 0ay 19&( dcci >eo..rey #rooks and :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 Hirsch.eldB he /tory o. a !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 pp. $1$9 $1% dccii *a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 p. 18( dcciii Peter Hayes9 Industry and echnologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra. P. %,8 dcci8 Peter Hayes9 Industry and IdeologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra9 p. %,8

Bibliografia3 3lan Ce8y9 he :iesenthal 4ile9 :illia" #. 5erd"ans Publishing Co.9 199% 3lbert /peer9 Inside he hird +eich9 /i"on U /chuster= +eissue edition (3pril 19 199-) 3lbert /peer9 he +ise and 4all o. the hird +eich9 /i"on U /chuster= (<o8e"ber 1(9 1992) 3nthony Ca8e #ro)n and Charles #. 0ac*onald9 /ecret History o. the 3to"ic #o"b (<e) DorkB he *ial Press'@a"es :ade9 19--) 3rnold Hra"isch9 he >ri..in (Ce >ri..on Paris9 5d. /yl8ie 0essinger9 198-) Chap"an Pincher9 Into he 3to"ic 3ge9 Condon. Hutchinson U Co. Christopher 3ilsby9 //B +oll o. In.a"y9 ItalyB 0otorbooks International9 199*a8id Ir8ing9 he >er"an 3to"ic #o"b9 /i"on U /chuster9 19,*r. Henry (*a8idJ) Picking9 Hitler6s abletalk (Hitlers ischgesprVche i" 4Whrerhaupt;uartier. 0Wnchen 19-,) *eutsche !-boote 192,-19,,9 199%9 Pa)lak 1erlag Herrsching (Her7og9 #odo) F*ollinger9 he +ise and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan (J)G *olinger9 Hans9 he *ecline and 4all o. <a7i >er"any and I"perial @apan - 3 Pictorial History o. the 4inal *ays o. :orld :ar II9 >ra"ercy9 199( >lenn . /eaborg9 he Plutoniu" /toryB he @ournals o. Pro.essor >lenn . /eaborg (199&) >regory *ouglas9 >estapo Chie.B he 19&8 Interrogation o. Heinrich 0ueller9 /an @ose9 C3B +. @a"es #ender9 199( Hanna +eitsch (+eich)9 4liegen9 0ein Ceben (19(1) (/ky 0y Hingdo". CondonB #odley Head9 19(() Harlo) :. +uss9 Pro?ect 3lbertaB he Preparation o. 3to"ic #o"bs .or !se in :orld :ar II9 5Aceptional #ooks Ctd9 3ugust 1992 Harry hayer9 0anage"ent o. the Han.ord 5ngineer :orks In :orld :ar II9 3"erican /ociety o. Ci8il 5ngineers (3/C5 Press9 199, Herbert Childs9 3n 3"erican >eniusB he Ci.e o. 5rnest Orlando Ca)rence9 5.P. *utton U Co.9 Inc.9 19,8. Henry *e:ol. /"yth9 3to"ic 5nergy 4or 0ilitary Purposes9 19&( Interscience Publishers9 Concise 5ncyclopedia o. <uclear 5nergy @a"es 0c>o8ern9 0artin #or"annB 1229222 0arks +e)ard9 <e) Dork e"po #ooks 19,9 @a"es P. O6*onnell9 he #unker9 *a Capo9 <e) Dork $221 @ochen 8on Cang9 he /ecretary9 +ando" House9 19-9 @ohn 4. Hogerton9 he 3to"ic 5nergy *eskbook9 +einhold Publishing Co"pany9 <e) Dork9 19,% @oseph #orkin9 he Cri"e and Punish"ent o. I.>. 4arben9 Pocket #ooks= (October 19-9) Cadislas 4arago9 3.ter"ath9 /i"on U /chuster9 19-& Celand @ohnson and *aniel /cha..er9 Oak +idge <ational CaboratoryB he 4irst 4i.ty Dears9 !ni8 o. ennessee Pr= (*ece"ber 199&) Ceona 0arshall Cibby9 he !raniu" People. <e) DorkB Crane9 +ussak U Co"pany9 Inc.9 19-9 >eneral Ceslie +. >ro8es9 <o) It Can #e oldB he /tory o. the 0anhattan Pro?ect. <e) DorkB *a Capo Press9 Inc.9 19,$. *r. Couis C. /nyder9 5ncyclopedia o. the hird +eich9 <e) DorkB 0c>ra)-Hill9 19-, Cuis :alter 3l8are79 3l8are7B 3d8entures o. a Physicist9 #asic #ooks= +eprint edition (0ay 1989) 0aA 0organ :itts and >ordon ho"as9 5nola >ay9 Pocket #ooks9 <e) Dork 19-0c>eorge #undy9 *anger and /ur8i8alB Choices 3bout he #o"b In he 4irst 4i.ty Dears9 <e) DorkB 1intage #ooks9 1992 0ystery #ook Paul 0anning9 0artin #or"annB <a7i In 5Aile9 Cyle /tuart Inc.9 1981 Peter Hayes9 Industry and IdeologyB I.>. 4arben in the <a7i 5ra9 Ca"bridge !ni8ersity Press9 $222 Peter Hayes9 Puest 4or 5cono"ic 5"pireB 5uropean /trategies o. >er"an #ig #usiness in the )entieth Century9 1olker +. #erghahn9 199, Peter Hayes9 he 5uropean /trategies o. I.>. 4arben9 19$( - 19&(9 in Puest .or 5cono"ic 5"pireB 5uropean /trategies o. >er"an #ig #usiness in the )entieth Century (#erghahn9 199, Peter Pad.ield9 Hi""lerB +eichs.uhrer /./. (Cassell 0ilitary Paperbacks /.) :eiden.eld U <icholson "ilitary9 $221 Pri"o Ce8i9 /ur8i8al In 3usch)it7B he <a7i 3ssault On Hu"anity9 ouchstone #ooks= +eprint edition (/epte"ber 19 199() +ichard +hodes9 he 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 /i"on U /chuster= +eprint edition (3ugust 19 199() +obert @ungk9 #righter han 3 housand /uns9 Har8est #ooks= (October 19-2) +obert H. :ilcoA9 @apan6s /ecret :ar9 0arlo)e U Co= !pdated edition (3ugust 199() +obert /erber9 he Cos 3la"os Pri"erB he 4irst Cectures on Ho) to #uild an 3to"ic #o"b9 !ni8ersity o. Cali.ornia Press= (0arch 199$)

/harkhunters /i"on :iesenthal (:eissenthalJ)9 he 0urderers 3"ong !s B he /i"on :iesenthal 0e"oirs9 ed. by :echsberg 19,8 F/tephen >roue..9 0anhattan Pro?ect (J)G /tephane >roue..9 0anhattan Pro?ect B he !ntold /tory o. the 0aking o. the 3to"ic #o"b9 #ackinprint.co"= (0ay 1$9 $222) F re8or +oper-/"ith9 he Cetters o. 0artin #or"ann (J)G he #or"ann Cetters9 ed. Hugh re8or-+oper (19(&) :ol.gang Hirsch.eld and >eo..rey #rooksB he /tory o. 3 !-boat <CO 19&2-19&,9 !nited /tates <a8al Inst.= (<o8e"ber 199,) Disrael >ut"an and 0ichael #erenbau"9 3nato"y o. the 3usch)it7 *eath Ca"p9 Indiana !ni8ersity Press= (@une 199&) :ol.gang Hirsch.eld9 4eind.ahrten X *as Cogbuch eines !-#oot-4unkers9 Heyne-1erlag 198( :illia" /te8enson9 he #or"ann #rotherhoodB 5scape and /ur8i8al o. <a7is9 <e) DorkB Harcourt9 19-% +ay"ond >. /tokes9 *i8ide and ProsperB he Heirs o. I.>. 4arben !nder 3llied 3uthority9 19&(-19(19 !ni8 o. Cali.ornia Pr9 1988