1

The Contradiction of Trotsky - Claude Lefort Claude Lefort writes on Leon Trotsky for Socialisme Ou Barbarie. (Translated from LES TEM S MO!E"#ES$ %& ('&()-'&(&* in +The olitical ,orms of Modern Society*

Let us hold out our hands to each other and rally around our Party's committees. We must not forget even for a minute that only the Party committees can worthily lead us, only they will light our way to the Promised Land.
It was in these words, with the turn of phrase now familiar to us all, that as early as 190 !talin addressed the "ussian wor#ers on the occasion of their first revolution. It may well have $een on that very same day, %rots#y notes, that Lenin dispatched from &eneva the following appeal to the masses' '(a#e way for the anger and hatred that have accumulated in your hearts throughout the centuries of e)ploitation, suffering and grief* +1, -othing could $e more typical of the two men, or $etter $ring out the contrast $etween them, than these two statements, one made $y a revolutionary for whom the oppressed masses are the essential force of history, the other made $y a party militant, already a '$ureaucrat', for whom the party apparatus alone #nows what the future is to $e and is capa$le of $ringing it a$out. .or us who are familiar with the course that events have ta#en since then, this psychological opposition assumes a more general significance, for it forms part of a $roader opposition that is essentially historical in character. In his long $oo# on !talin, %rots#y tried to e)pose the character of his protagonist and the nature of his $ehaviour $efore his accession to power and to show how $oth were in a sense legitimated $y history during the decline of the revolution, with the formation of a new social stratum, the $ureaucracy. In su$stantiating his thesis. Wrots#y used the traditional methods of the historian' he e)amined the documents, e)plored the annals of /olshevism, cited eye0witnesses, interpreted dates, placed side $y side documents written prior to 1912 and the commissioned panegyrics composed after the advent of the $ureaucracy.+1, In the first phase of his political activity, !talin is shown to have $een a 'provincial' militant, intellectually mediocre and politically inept. In &eorgia, he never managed to $ring together a /olshevi# fraction to confront the (enshevi#s within the social0democratic fold3 he attended the first /olshevi# Party congresses only in the capacity of an o$server, since he never managed to win a sufficient num$er of votes to get elected as a delegate. 4t the London 5ongress, the mandate that he claimed was shown to $e fraudulent and he was deprived of voting rights. 6e was a$le to 7oin the /olshevi# 5entral 5ommittee only $y co0option, that is, without ever having $een elected $y the

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party militants. %he uprising of .e$ruary 1918 suddenly gave him, in Lenin's a$sence, an e)ceptional degree of power which he used as $adly as possi$le' he was in favour of supporting the provisional government, the revolutionary war and, in the final analysis, the revolution in two stages. 6e was one of those opportunistic conciliators whom the wor#ers in the party wanted to e)pel, +2, and whom Lenin was later to return to their places, when he put forward his famous 4pril theses and rearmed the party with a view to the sei9ure of power. %hese fragments of information ena$le %rots#y to s#etch a portrait of a rather uninteresting character, a 'functionary' as %rots#y says, $y which he wished to stress !talin's narrow preoccupation with his wor#, his limitations as a theoretician and his propensity for routine. %rots#y's intention is o$vious' he wanted to show that the ':ualities' which ena$led !talin to $ecome the man of the $ureaucracy are precisely those which prevented him from $eing a revolutionary figure. %he argument is clear enough and sufficiently supported with evidence. /ut, in that case, one cannot $ut $e surprised that a political writer of %rots#y's a$ilities should have $elieved it his duty to devote such a large $oo# to him, to underta#e a tas# that consists very largely of anecdotal history, almost of detective wor#, to prove that, through0out the pre0revolutionary and revolutionary period, !talin was an o$scure figure, and that it was precisely this fact which ena$led him to emerge, in 191;, as a 'ready0male dictator'. !talin's life was not un#nown to the pu$lic. In 192 <2oris !ouvarine had pu$lished a su$stantial wor# on !talin, +;, to which %rots#y added little that was new and of which, curiously enough, he pretended to $e unaware. If we assume that %rots#y felt that he had a duty to inform the revolutionary vanguard a$out the $ac#ground and development of the current dictator of "ussia, then this duty had already $een carried out. /ut !ouvarlne was not content, as %rots#y had $een in his three hundred pages, to descri$e !talin's $ehaviour. 6e had s#illfully integrated this study into a much $roader and more interesting analysis 0 the /olshevi# Party. %he single0minded determination with which %rots#y stresses the mediocrity of his 'hero', and the su$ordinate nature of the posts that he occupied in the revolutionary apparatus has, of course, $een ta#en as an indication of %rots#y's personal resentment and desire for self0 7ustification. %rots#y, it is said, set out to compare his own situation and destiny with those of !talin $efore the revolution3 he wanted to $ring out the enormous distance that separated himself from that o$scure functionary of /olshevism. 6owever, if one #nows anything a$out %rots#y's temperament one soon reali9es that such concerns were :uite alien to him and that such an interpretation is artificial. If one must spea# of self07ustification, it would $e more appropriate to do so $y giving this term a political sense. =ne might say, for instance, that %rots#y wished to show that he had $een deprived of power not $ecause of any lac# of political intelligence, $ut $y the overwhelming power of o$7ective factors. 4nd this power of o$7ective factors could $e proved $y the very mediocrity of the new leader. %he end of %rots#y's Introduction

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ma#es this interpretation a very tempting one, '6e >!talin< too# possession of power', writes %rots#y, not with the aid of personal :ualities, $ut with the aid of an impersonal machine. 4nd it was not he who created the machine, $ut the machine that created him. %hat machine, with its force and its authority, was the product of the prolonged and heroic struggle of the /olshevi# Party, which itself grew out of ideas. %he machine was the $earer of the idea $efore it $ecame an end in itself ... Lenin created the machine through constant association with the masses, if not $y oral word, then $y printed word, if not directly, then through the medium of his disciples. !talin did not create the machine $ut too# possession of it.+ , %rots#y was already e)pressing, in a different form, the same sentiments when, in (y Life, he wrote' 4nd the fact that today he is playing first is not so much a summing0up of the man as it is of this transitional period of political $ac#sliding in the country. 6elvetius said it long ago' '?very period has its great men, and if these are lac#ing, it invents them.' !talinism is a$ove all else the automatic wor# of the impersonal apparatus of the decline of the revolution.+@, 6owever I do not $elieve that this interpretation is entirely satisfactory either. %rots#y's study of !talin does not stri#e me so much as a conscious attempt at self07ustification3 it seems to me, a$ove all, to play the role of a su$stitute. When we open his !talin, we are in no dou$t that %rots#y has written under this title a new study of the A!!", that he has ta#en up again the whole pro$lem of !talinism and tried to give it an economic and social characteri9ation' this was certainly his concern, as we #now from his last pu$lished articles. It is what we e)pected of him. /ut this !talin, this imposingly long wor# which la$oriously follows the steps of the then anonymous master of the Bremlin, showing us that he was una$le to direct a particular stri#e, or that while in deportation he went around with common0law criminals and was despised $y the political prisoners' this wor# that one would have li#ed to regard as important is restricted to demolishing a legend in which serious people do not $elieve. I regard this wor#, therefore, as a #ind of a$orted attempt. %rots#y gossips :uite unnecessarily a$out !talin, $ecause he would li#e to, $ut cannot, define !talinism. -othing could $etter confirm us in this $elief than the second part of the $oo#, which is intentionally more limited and insu$stantial and which deals $y allusion with events of the first importance'' this is $ecause it concerns specifically the period of the crystalli9ation and triumph of the $ureaucracy, that is, not so much !talin himself as !talinism. /ut %rots#y could not claim that he had e)hausted the su$7ect in the two or three chapters that he devoted to it in %he "evolution /etrayed and in (y Life.

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It is to this formative period of !talinism that I should li#e to return, $eginning with the scattered statements on the su$7ect that are to $e found in %rots#y's last wor#. /y its inade:uacies, its contradictions, $y its silences as well, it calls for a criti:ue that would put %rots#y $ac# in his place as an actor in a situation which, when writing his $oo#, he tries all too easily to master. %rots#y's !truggle against !talin 4 reading of !talin, or of the earlier %he "evolution /etrayed or (y Life, would lead one to $elieve that the attitude of %rots#y and of the Left =pposition, in the great period of 191208, was a perfectly rigorous one. It is as if %rots#y, '$earer' of revolutionary consciousness, had $een swept aside $y the ine)ora$le course of things that were then developing in a reactionary direction. %here were a great many who, ta#ing sides against %rots#y and in a way for !talin, reproached %rots#y only for not having $een realistic enough, not having $een a$le to 'adapt' the politics of revolutionary "ussia to the difficult circumstances of a capitalist world undergoing reconsolidation. %hey did not dispute that %rots#y had then adopted a clearly revolutionary attitude, $ut it was precisely this attitude that they denounced as a$stract. In any case, it is not usually denied that the Left =pposition had a coherent strategy, whether it was 7ustified at the level of revolutionary morality or whether it was regarded as inopportune. %rots#y himself largely lent support to this view. In his wor#s, he spea#s of this period with perfect serenity, repeating that he acted as he had to act in the given o$7ective situation. 6istory, he says in essence, was ta#ing a new course. -o one could $loc# the e$$ing tide of the revolution. %hus, recalling the events of the decisive year 1918, he writes in (y Life' We went to meet the inevita$le de$acle, confident, however, that we were paving the way for the triumph of our ideas in a more distant future ... It is possi$le $y force of arms to chec# the development of progressive historical tendencies3 it is not possi$le to $loc# the road of the advance of progressive ideas for ever. %hat is why, when the struggle is one for great principles, the revolutionary can only follow one rule' .ais ce :ue tu dois, advienne :ue pourra. +C, It would $e :uite admira$le, when one is in the midst of historical action, to retain such lucidity and to $e a$le to stand a$ove day0to0 day events, perceiving what is permanent in the heart of what is immediately present. /ut one must as# whether %rots#y was as lucid when he was acting as he was when he was writing. .or it is one thing to 7udge one's own past actions, to loo# $ac# on a relatively closed period in which the most diverse actions seem to ta#e on a single, a$solute meaning3 it is a :uite different thing to act in an e:uivocal situation with an indeterminate future. In his !talin %rots#y defines once again the principles of the Left =pposition in its anti0!talinist struggle'

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-umerous critics, pu$licists, correspondents, historians, $iographers, and sundry amateur sociologists, have lectured the Left =pposition from time to time on the error of its ways, saying that the strategy of the Left =pposition was not feasi$le from the point of view of the struggle for power. 6owever, the very approach to the :uestion was incorrect. %he Left =pposition could not achieve power, and did not hope even to do so00certainly not its most thoughtful leaders. 4 struggle for power $y the Left =pposition, $y a revolutionary (ar)ist organi9ation, was conceiva$le only under the conditions of a revolutionary upsurge. Ander such conditions the strategy is $ased on aggression, on direct appeal to the masses, on frontal attac# against the government. :uite a few mem$ers of the Left =pposition had played no minor part in such a struggle and had first0hand #nowledge of how to wage it. /ut during the early twenties and later, there was no revolutionary upsurge in "ussia, :uite the contrary. Ander such circumstances it was out of the :uestion to launch a struggle for power. /ear in mind that in the years of reaction, in 1 90C01911 and later, the /olshevi# Party refused to launch a direct attac# upon the monarchy and limited itself to the tas# of preparing for the eventual offensive $y fighting for the survival of the revolutionary traditions and for the preservation of certain cadres, su$7ecting the developing events to untiring analysis, and utili9ing all legal and semi0legal possi$ilities for training the advance stratum of wor#ers. %he Left =pposition could not proceed otherwise under similar conditions. Indeed the conditions of !oviet reaction were immeasura$ly more difficult for the =pposition than the conditions of the %sarist reaction had $een for the /olshevi#s. +9, %he first o$servation to $e made is that this interpretation of the years following 1918 is in contradiction with %rots#y's general theses on the nature of !talinism. In all his wor#s he has said that !talinism is $ased on a proletarian infrastructure' it is reactionary, $ut it is a moment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. .or e)ample, in '%he Wor#ers' !tate, %hermidor and /onapartism' %rots#y writes' %his usurpation >of power $y the $ureaucracy< was made possi$le and can maintain itself only $ecause the social content of the dictatorship of the $ureaucracy is determined $y those productive relations that were created $y the proletarian revolution. In this sense we may say with complete 7ustification that the dictatorship of the proletariat found its distorted $ut indu$ita$le e)pression in the dictatorship of the $ureaucracy. +10, 6ow, then, if one maintains %rots#y's general theses on the nature of !talinism, could the struggle against !talin, still regarded $y him as a political struggle, re:uire, as he says in his last wor#, a revolutionary upheavalD When %rots#y compares the situation of the Left =pposition with that in which the /olshevi#

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Party found itself in its struggle against %sarism, he implies00:uite rightly, in my opinion, $ut in contradiction with all his theses00that the struggle against the $ureaucracy could only $e a class struggle. I can only agree with the conclusions that he draws from this' the maintenance of revolutionary traditions, the preservation of the cadres, the tireless analysis of events in order to instruct the most conscious wor#ers. /ut it is no accident if these conclusions, whose true import he fails to grasp, correspond in no way to the real tactics which were his and those of the Left =pposition in practice. Indeed it is stri#ing to see, when one e)amines the events of this period closely, that the struggle of the Left =pposition against !talin almost never assumed a revolutionary form and always developed around compromise. %he pro$lem is not the one that %rots#y poses, namely, whether it was possi$le or desira$le to underta#e a struggle for power. %he :uestion was to lead the struggle00or to lay the ground for the future00in a revolutionary spirit. %he /olshevi#s were in retreat $etween 190C and 1911 and postponed until later the struggle for the sei9ure of power3 $ut, on the theoretical plane, they did not ma#e the slightest concession to their adversaries. 4t no time did the /olshevi#s ever indulge in a policy of compromise or conciliation with %sarism. /y contrast, it is %rots#y himself who declared in -ovem$er 192;, referring to his attitude to ?astman when the latter revealed on his own initiative the e)istence of Lenin's %estament' '(y statement at that time on ?astman cannot $e understood e)cept as an integral part of our line, which, at that time, was orientated towards conciliation and appeasement.' +11, In 1919 he was writing from the same point of view and in a much more $rutal manner' "ight up to the last minute, I avoided the struggle, for, in the first stage, it had the character of an unprincipled conspiracy directed towards me, personally. It was clear to me that a struggle of this nature, once $egun, would inevita$ly assume an e)ceptional vigour and, in the conditions of the revolutionary dictatorship, might lead to dangerous conse:uences. %his is not the place to try to find out whether it was correct at the cost of the greatest personal concessions to tend to preserve the foundations of a common wor#, or whether it was necessary for me to throw myself into an offensive all along the line, despite the a$sence, for such an offensive, of ade:uate political $ases %he fact is that I chose the first solution and that in spite of everything I do not regret it. +11, %rots#y spea#s here in an intentionally vague way of personal concessions'. /ut it is clear that, given his situation, those conditions could only have a political character. Without going into detail as to what those concessions were, in other words, what the Left =pposition's policy of conciliation and appeasement' actually was, something should $e said a$out a period that %rots#y usually passes over fairly rapidly' the year 1912, when Lenin was still alive and preparing a '$om$ against !talin' for the %welfth 5ongress, when %rots#y was still

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regarded as the second most important /olshevi# leader $y the ma7ority of the party, and when, a$ove all, !talin had not yet succeeded in achieving complete control of the party apparatus and the newfound power of the $ureaucracy was still vulnera$le. It is usually thought that the antagonism $etween %rots#y and !talin was much more severe than that $etween !talin and Lenin. Eet it appears, :uite indisputa$ly, according to %rots#y's own memoirs, that it was not he, at this time, who wanted to ta#e up the struggle against !talin, $ut Lenin. While fatally ill, Lenin had perceived, :uite lucidly, the e)treme danger that !talin and his $ureaucratic methods represented for the future of the party. %he documents that he left and which are #nown as the %estament leave no dou$t on this :uestion. %hey show in the most stri#ing way that Lenin had decided to launch a decisive struggle against the heads of the $ureaucracy' !talin, =rd9honi#id9e and F9er9hins#y. %rots#y's memoirs show 7ust as clearly that, although he $asically shared Lenin's point of view, he did not wish to trigger off decisive hostilities against the !talinists. "elating a conversation that he had had at this time with Bamenev, who had already gone over to !talin's side and was acting as his emissary, %rots#y writes' '!ometimes,' I said out of fear of an imaginary danger, people are capa$le of $ringing real danger down upon themselves. "emem$er, and tell others, that the last thing I want is to start a fight at the congress for any changes in organi9ation. I am for preserving the status :uo. If Lenin gets on his feet $efore the congress, of which there is unfortunately little chance, he and I will discuss the matter together anew. I am against removing !talin, and e)pelling =rd9honi#id9e, and displacing F9er9hins#y from the commissariat of transport. /ut I do agree with Lenin in su$stance.'' +12, 4part from %rots#y's memoirs, the documents are there to show that, against Lenin's will, %rots#y turned the %welfth 5ongress of the /olshevi# Party into a congress of unanimity3 the '$om$' concerning the Gnational :uestion that Lenin had advised %rots#y to e)plode at this congress was set aside. 4gain it is %rots#y who prides himself on having avoided any struggle with !talin $y contenting himself with amending his resolution instead of fighting it. !ignificant too was his refusal to present the political report to the congress in Lenin's a$sence. 4nd the 7ustifications that he gave are no less significant. 6is whole conduct seems to have $een dictated $y a concern not to present himself as a pretender to Lenin's succession. It is difficult to understand these preoccupations, these sentimental scruples on the part of a /olshevi#, when a vital political :uestion was at sta#e. In fact, %rots#y had refused from the $eginning, even when in a superior position, to initiate a struggle to regenerate the party $y attac#ing the $ureaucracy. When he maintains that a struggle for power was impossi$le, it is difficult to $elieve him 0 at least in the case of the year 1912, when nothing had yet $een decided. Indeed he himself was to write later'

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Would Lenin have $een a$le to carry out the regrouping in the party direction that he plannedD 4t that moment, he undou$tedly would ... =ur 7oint action against the 5entral 5ommittee at the $eginning of 1912 would without a shadow of a dou$t have $rought us victory. 4nd what is more, I have no dou$t that if I had come forward on the eve of the twelfth congress in the spirit of a '$loc of Lenin and %rots#y' against the !talin $ureaucracy, I should have $een victorious even if Lenin had ta#en no direct part in the struggle. +1;, It is true that %rots#y adds' '6ow solid the victory would have $een is, of course, another :uestion.' /ut even if one answers this :uestion negatively, as he does $y showing that the flow of history was then turning into the e$$ of the revolution, the tas# of the politician could never $e to compromise with the e$$. -ow, from that point on and 'to the very last minute', the Left =pposition practised a policy of' conciliation' and 'appeasement'. ?ven this policy could not remain coherent, for even if the Left =pposition did not want a fight, the $ureaucracy did. Its triumph involved the annihilation of the former revolutionary leader, at the very time that this leader was see#ing an understanding. !o %rots#y was led to attac# on several occasions3 $ut his attac#s $ore the sign of his wea#ness. 4s !ouvarine rightly remar#s, %rots#y wore himself out in a vain polemic within the polit$ureau. In his articles +those that he pu$lished on the -ew 5ourse in 1912, and the Lessons of 0cto$er in 191;, he piled allusion on allusion and wrote in such a way that he could $e understood only $y the leadership of the party. -one of his writing was intended to instruct the ordinary militants. .ar more seriously, while the $ureaucratic repression pitilessly trac#ed down the mem$ers or sympathi9ers of the Left =pposition, %rots#y did nothing to defend them3 $y his constantly shifting line he disarmed them politically3 he gave them no platform for struggle, no theoretical element that might ena$le them to recogni9e themselves and to regroup. %his is not the place to follow in detail %rots#y's political development throughout this period, $ut we should highlight a few particularly important episodes. 4t the time of the %hirteenth 5ongress, the first to $e completely 'fa$ricated' $y the $ureaucrats, %rots#y, after having defended his views of the !tate Plan, felt o$liged to stress the unity of the party in terms that could not fail to throw all his supporters into confusion. -one of us desires or is a$le to dispute the will of the Party. 5learly, the Party is always right ... We can only $e right with and $y the Party, for history has provided no other way of $eing in the right. %he ?nglish have a saying '(y country, right or wrong,' whether it is in the right or in the wrong, it is my country. We have much $etter historical 7ustification in saying whether it is right or wrong in certain individual concrete cases, it is my party ... 4nd if the

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Party adopts a decision which one or other of us thin#s un7ust, he will say, 7ust or un7ust, it is my Party, and I shall support the conse:uences of the decision to the end. +1 , It was %rots#y who, in his !talin of 19;0, imposes upon himself the most categorical refutation of this view when he declares that a political party is neither 'a homogeneous entity', nor 'an omnipotent historical factor', $ut 'only a temporary historical instrument, one of very many instruments and schools of history'. +l@, %he true meaning of %rots#y's statement at the %hirteenth 5ongress emerges when one reali9es that at that time he was aware of the complete $ureaucrati9ation of the organi9ation and the mystification which prevailed at the congress. Indeed, shortly $efore, there had ta#en place a massive inta#e of new mem$ers to the party which came to $e #nown as 'Lenin's levy' and which, %rots#y was to write later, was a 'manoeuvre . .. to dissolve the revolutionary vanguard in raw human material, without e)perience, without independence, and yet with the old ha$it of su$mitting to the authorities'. +18, %his levy had $een made in order to turn the party into a docile instrument in the hands of its general secretary. 6owever 'Lenin's promotion', which, %rots#y was to say on another occasion, 'delivered a mortal $low to Lenin's party', was also approved $y him during the %hirteenth 5ongress. %rots#y even pushed concession to the point of declaring that it '$rought the party nearer to $eing an elected party' +1C, It is true that the struggle against %rots#yism had not yet come out into the open and, more importantly, that !talinism was only 7ust emerging as a political entity. %rots#y's concessions seemed all the more tragic when $attle commenced. 4fter the first phase of this $attle, after %rots#y had triggered off a struggle in favour of the -ew 5ourse, after he had $een the o$7ect of a campaign of systematic attac#s from the polit$ureau, after !talin had put forward his view of socialism in one country,' +19, %rots#y pu$lished an article in Pravda +Hanuary 191 , in which he denies ever having thought of opposing a platform to the !talinist ma7ority.'+10, %his was to state clearly that there was no fundamental divergence $etween him and this ma7ority. 5apitulation appears again in that year 191 , on the occasion of the ?astman affair. In a wor# entitled !ince Lenin Fied, the 4merican 7ournalist, a /olshevi# sympathi9er, had ta#en it upon himself, as I have already indicated, to reveal the e)istence and the content of Lenin's %estament, which %rots#y, in agreement with the 5entral 5ommittee, had thought good to conceal not only from the "ussian masses, $ut also from the party militants and from communists throughout the world. %rots#y's declaration, at this time, would deserve to $e :uoted in full, so stri#ing is the degree to which it reveals %rots#y's $ad faith and the practice of the 'supreme sacrifice' %rots#y accuses ?astman of 'despica$le lying' and implies that he is an agent of international reaction. '5omrade Lenin', he writes, 'did not leave a testament' the nature of his relations with the Party and the nature of the Party itself e)cludes the possi$ility of such a testament.'

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"eferring to Lenin's letter on the reorgani9ation of the Wor#ers' and Peasants' Inspection +in which !talin had the upper hand,, %rots#y does not hesitate to declare' '?astman's affirmation according to which the 5.5. was an)ious to conceal, that is to say, not pu$lish, 5omrade Lenin's article on the Wor#ers' and Peasants' Inspection is e:ually erroneous. %he different points of view e)pressed in the 5.5., if it is actually possi$le to spea# of a difference of points of views, in this case, was of a$solutely secondary importance.' +11, 6ow could %rots#y spea# in this way, when Lenin, on this very point, was ma#ing a fundamental attac#, and when %rots#y was fully in agreement with him, as he has repeated a hundred timesD We cannot complete the $alance sheet of this politics of conciliation without showing that, even on the theoretical level, %rots#y was confused. I have already shown that he did not regard the struggle against the theory of socialism in one country, when it was 'discovered' $y !talin, as a matter of fundamental principle. =ne must also recogni9e that %rots#y did not oppose the entry of the 5hinese communists into the Buomintang nor the tactics used $y the /ritish communists within the trade0union 4nglo0"ussian 5ommittee. In each case, he too# up the struggle against the !talinist policy only when it was o$viously turning into a disaster.' +11, I said a$ove that the tactics of the Left =pposition had helped to disarm the revolutionary vanguard in "ussia3 I should add, in the light of these e)amples, that it also had a negative effect on the revolutionary vanguard throughout the world. %rots#y said that !talin appeared to the world one day as a 'ready0made dictator' 00 he forgot to mention his own responsi$ility in this regard. .inally, it was in the last stage of the struggle $etween the =pposition and the !talinist leadership, as this struggle $ecame more violent, that the capitulations $ecame more radical and more tragic. =n two occasions, in =cto$er 191@ and in -ovem$er 1918, the Left =pposition, which then had the support not only of %rots#y $ut also of Bamenev and Iinoviev, solemnly condemned itself, repudiated its supporters a$road and undertoo# its own dissolution. .inally, when there was no hope left for it, when !talin had at his disposal a 5ongress +the .ifteenth, that o$eyed him $lindly, the =pposition made a final attempt to return to favour, and drew up a new condemnation of its own activity, namely, the Feclaration of the 111. %his is a document of the greatest historical importance, $ecause it represents the last pu$lic action of the Left =pposition in "ussia. %he declaration $egins $y proclaiming that the unity of the 5ommunist Party is the highest principle during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We find the same terms that %rots#y had used in his speech to the %hirteenth 5ongress :uoted a$ove. %he party is regarded as a divine factor in historical development, independently of its content and its line. %he declaration thus underlines the danger of a war against the A!!" and declares that there is nothing more urgent than to re0esta$lish 'the com$atant unity of the party' =ne may find it e)traordinary that the =pposition was see#ing a$ove all to

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preserve the facade of party unity, whereas the gravest dissensions were setting it against the leadership of this party. /ut the 111 had decided to regard their dissensions with the party as insignificant. =f course, on several occasions, they repeated that they were convinced of the correctness of their views and that they would continue to defend them, as the organi9ational statutes allowed them to do, after they had dissolved their fraction3 $ut at the same time they proclaimed' ' %here is no programmatic difference $etween us and the Party' +12, 4nd they $itterly denied that they had ever $elieved that the party or its 5entral 5ommittee had followed a %hermidorian course. -ow, not only had the party completely lost its revolutionary and democratic character in 1918, $ut it had adopted the perspective of socialism in one country, that is, it had in fact renounced the perspective of world revolution. /olshevism and the "ise of /ureaucracy !o that royal road, along which %rots#y, if his !talin is to $e $elieved, would have led the Left =pposition, never in fact e)isted. .or five years %rots#y improvised a policy from day to day, a policy of harsh concessions, of revolt 0 when the domination of the $ureaucracy $ecame too un$eara$le 0 then of capitulations which led to new e)plosions. It is not possi$le here to follow the $ehaviour of the various representatives of the =pposition. /ut there were many defectors among them, not to mention Iinoviev and Bamenev, who had $ecome professionals of capitulation. =f course, the face of %rots#y stands out from the group, for he was not a man to give in completely. /ut his responsi$ility can only $e more stri#ing. 6ow could he $lame the defectors when his entire policy tended to deny any 'programmatic difference' with the !talinistsD %his policy can $e summed up in the formula that he used in 1918' 'What separates us >from the $ureaucracy< is incompara$ly less than what unites us.' +1;, It was a policy of suicide, since, despite all his practical declarations, %rots#y was not ta#en in $y the $ureaucratic degeneration, as a thousand details prove. 6is interventions in the higher $odies of the party and the notes that he himself mentions in his memoirs leave no dou$t on the matter. 6e deli$erately misled pu$lic opinion in the name of higher ends, that is, in order to defend the !oviet state in the world . 6ow can we understand that %rots#y, while perceiving the complete $ureaucrati9ation of the party and the reactionary character of the policies of its leaders, continued to feel at one with this party and its leadersD =ne can only answer this :uestion $y standing $ac# and placing %rots#y and %rots#yism in their o$7ective development. What is interesting, for me, is not to see whether %rots#y acted well or $adly in a given situation, $ut to e)plain his attitude. In this sense, much of. !ouvarine's criti:ue seems to me to $e artificial. In many passages, he critici9es %rots#y for leading the struggle $adly, for provo#ing the hatred of the leaders $y inopportune polemics, for pushing Iinoviev and Bamenev in !talin's direction instead of driving them apart, in

12
general for $eing una$le to wait for the $loc of his enemies to crum$le, for $eing una$le to play for time and manoeuvre as his adversaries were doing. I do not share !ouvarine's point of view. ?ven if %rots#y had often $een intransigent and clumsy, despite his general line of conciliation, this is merely a minor aspect of the :uestion3 and, in any case, he should not $e critici9ed for $eing incapa$le of manoeuvring within the circles of leadership, $ut, on the contrary, for having all too often confined his actions to these circles. Indeed, !ouvarine seems to appreciate this all too well when he levels his criticism, not at %rots#y's personality, $ut at the development of his positions. If we are to offer an o$7ective criti:ue of %rots#y and of the Left =pposition, we must put aside evaluative criteria in favour of a concrete, historical point of view. %rots#y seems to adopt this point of view when he tries to reduce everything to some such e)planation as 'the revolution was at an e$$'. In fact this e)planation, though not incorrect, is unsatisfactory, for it is much too $road. %he conception of the revolutionary e$$ may ena$le us to understand the failure of the =pposition, $ut not its ideological disarray. It is $ecause the e)planation is too $road that %rots#y often invo#es another one, this time too narrow' the machinations of !talin and his supporters. In fact we can understand the policies of %rots#y and of the revolutionary leaders who surrounded him, after 1912, only $y integrating them into the previous development of the /olshevi# Party. .or it is certainly /olshevism that continued to $e e)pressed in the Left =pposition, and what we have to try to e)plain is its ina$ility to survive as a revolutionary ideology and strategy. In a passage in his !talin, %rots#y attempts to elude the pro$lem' !terile and a$surd are the !isyphean la$ours of those who try to reduce all su$se:uent developments to a few allegedly $asic original attri$utes of the /olshevi# Parry ... %he /olshevi# Party set for itself the goal of the con:uest of power $y the wor#ing class. In so far as that party accomplished this tas# for the first time in history and enriched human e)perience with this con:uest, it fulfilled a tremendous historical role. =nly the $ewildered with a li#ing for a$struse discussion can demand of a political party that it should su$7ugate and eliminate far weightier factors of mass and class hostile to it. +1 , =ne cannot $ut agree as to the prodigious historical role of the /olshevi#s. /ut the :uestion is $adly put. It is o$viously not a matter of re:uiring the party to win some sort of triumph over the course of history, $ut to understand how the course of history is e)pressed through the structure and life of the party itself. %he fact that the /olshevi# Party carried out the =cto$er "evolution must not lead one to deify it and to see its su$se:uent failure as a mere accident. %he failure of the /olshevi# Party in 1912 must $e understood in terms of the internal dynamics of that party. In no sense am I trying to

13
minimi9e the role of o$7ective factors, $ut rather to discern, on the $asis of the /olshevi# e)perience, the enduring power which they may have. I have no wish to go over again 0 enough $oo#s and studies of every #ind have $rought this out 0 the very particular character of "ussia within the capitalist world prior to 1918, the $ac#ward nature of its economy and the lac# of education among the masses. If this very situation, as has also $een stressed, was favoura$le to the formation of a vigorous revolutionary party, the social contradictions having $een carried to their $rea#ing point, then it is no less true 0 and commentators have usually had little to say a$out this aspect of things 0 that it had fundamental conse:uences as regards the structure and functioning of the party. %he development of the professional revolutionary in "ussia was pro$a$ly uni:ue and unparalleled in other countries' the necessities of illegality in the face of the %sarist autocracy, the ha$it of living under oppression and in great poverty, helped to create the type of revolutionary practitioner represented par e)cellence $y the /olshevi#. /ut one must also see that, $y the very logic of his situation, the professional revolutionary was led to detach himself from the masses, to maintain only superficial relations with the real vanguard in the factories. !ecrecy o$liged the revolutionary to live in small, relatively closed circles. %his climate was favoura$le to centrali9ation, not to democracy. In his !talin, %rots#y supports this view' %he negative aspect of /olshevism's centripetal tendencies first $ecame apparent at the %hird 5ongress of the "ussian !ocial0Femocracy. %he ha$its peculiar to a political machine were already forming in the underground. %he young revolutionary $ureaucrat was already emerging as a type. %he conditions of conspiracy, true enough, offered rather meagre scope for such of the formalities of democracy as electiveness, accounta$ility and control. Eet, undou$tedly the committeemen narrowed these limitations considera$ly more than necessity demanded and were far more intransigent and severe with the revolutionary wor#ingmen than with themselves, preferring to domineer even on occasions that called imperatively for lending an attentive ear to the voices of the masses. Brups#aya notes that, 7ust as in the /olshevi# committees, so at the 5ongress itself, there were almost no wor#ingmen. %he intellectuals predominated. '%he GcommitteemanG,' writes Brups#aya, 'was usually :uite a self0confident person3 he was fully aware of the tremendous influence wielded $y the 5ommittee's activities on the masses3 the Gcommittee0manG, as a rule, did not recogni9e any internal party democracy.' +1@, =f course, this divorce $etween certain professional revolutionaries and the masses was less mar#ed in the great revolutionary moments, $ut the effects were nonetheless very serious. %hey could $e o$served on the occasion of the 190 revolution, when the /olshevi#s refused to recogni9e the !oviets that had $een spontaneously created $y the wor#ers. '%he Peters$urg 5ommittee of the /olshevi#s', notes %rots#y,' was frightened at first $y such an innovation as a

14
non0partisan representation of the em$attled masses, and could find nothing $etter to do than to present the !oviet with an ultimatum' immediately adopt a !ocial0Femocratic programme or dis$and.' +18, It may $e said that, if the /olshevi#s did not $ring a$out a series of catastrophes, it was than#s to Lenin and to his e)ceptional a$ility to discern the revolutionary significance of every situation. /ut even Lenin's pre0eminence deserves reflection3 one is struc# $y how insu$stantial the $est /olshevi# leaders appeared to $e without him. %here is a verita$le gulf $etween Lenin and the other /olshevi# .leaders, as well as a gulf $etween those leaders and the average militants of the party organi9ation. Innumera$le cases might $e cited as evidence, $ut no dou$t the $est #nown is provided $y the events of .e$ruary 1918 when, with Lenin in e)ile, Bamenev and !talin too# over the leadership of the party in his a$sence. When Lenin returned and presented his 4pril theses, he was almost alone against the entire party, finding support only among the /olshevi# wor#ers of Ji$org. It would not $e an e)aggeration to say that the strength of the party was hanging on a thread. =f course, the /olshevi# wor#ers were the $est guarantee of its power, $ut they could not $y themselves run the party organi9ation and, among the cadres, no one other than Lenin could. %his very special physiognomy of the /olshevi# Party $ecame all the more apparent in the aftermath of the revolution and throughout the period of the civil war. Indeed the civil war, com$ined with economic chaos and the low level of education of the "ussian masses, necessitated an increased concentration of power and an increasingly voluntarist political strategy in the face of an increasingly difficult situation. !ouvarine descri$es perfectly the evolution, in these conditions, of the 5ouncil of People's 5ommissars, which soon $ecame the $lue0print of the /olshevi# 5entral 5ommittee and did nothing more than give a constitutional form to its decisions. 6e also shows that the 5entral 5ommittee in turn e)isted less and less as a 'college' and that real power was concentrated in the hands of an oligarchy within the polit$ureau. In all institutions, in the trade unions and in the !oviets, there was only one power and one policy, that of the /olshevi#s, who more and more $ecame mere functionaries, alienated from the masses and from the wor#ers in particular. %he same logic led the /olshevi#s to eliminate all opposition. We #now only too well the e)ceptional violence with which Lenin set a$out e)terminating his adversaries, whether they were left0wing socialist revolutionaries or anarchists. Jolin provides some stri#ing information on this point. =ne sees the /olshevi#s fa$ricating compromising documents against the anarchists in order to inculpate them for criminal activities of which they were a$solutely innocent. %he terror that $egan $y e)terminating all the opposition parties and competing groups, and which culminated, within the /olshevi# Party itself, $y for$idding the e)istence of factions, reached its paro)ysm with the repression of the wor#ers of Bronstadt who, once regarded as the revolutionary elite and fighting for demands some of which were confused $ut most of which were

15
democratic, were treated as agents of counter0revolution and ruthlessly crushed. +1C, 4ll the facts concur' the party which, from its origin and $y reason of the o$7ective situation, tended to develop towards a military structure and functioned as a $ody loosely lin#ed to the masses $egan to accentuate these traits considera$ly during the post0revolutionary period. =ne cannot $ut follow !ouvarine when he ta#es up /u#harin's definition of the party as 'entirely apart from and a$ove everything'.+19, =n the other hand, it seems to me that !ouvarine oscillates $etween a +su$7ective, criticism of the leaders' attitude and an o$7ective interpretation that lin#s this development of /olshevism to the given economic, social, national and world situation. I repeat, the first criticism has no significance for me3 let us put aside that #ind of value 7udgement. %he political strategy of the /olshevi# Party $etween 1918 and 1912 was that of a revolutionary organi9ation struggling desperately to preserve, until the out$rea# of world revolution, a proletarian victory unprecedented in history. %his strategy was essentially contradictory, since it led to the adoption of an anti0proletarian content in the name of the higher interests of the proletariat. /ut its contradictions were themselves o$7ective, for they e)pressed the contradictions of the victorious "ussian proletariat, stifled in its victory $y negative factors on a national and international scale. %he post0revolutionary period in "ussia is the tragic moment of /olshevism, torn apart $etween its ends and the nature of the forces that it tried to animate. %his tragedy culminated in the repression of the wor#ers of Bronstadt $y %rots#y, who was led to crush them and to forge false evidence in order to persuade the whole world of their guilt. /ut this moment of contradiction was essentially transitory. /olshevism could not remain split $etween its real $ehaviour and its principles3 whatever the supreme ends at which it aimed, it could not survive if it were cut off from its real content 0the proletarian masses that it represented. It could not remain without a social $asis, as a pure will determined to force the course of history. 4t the very heart of the party, the contradiction was e)pressed as the difference $etween the strategy of Lenin and %rots#y, who side $y side were 'steering towards world revolution', and the very $ody of the party, which was $eginning to crystalli9e socially and was already ta#ing on the form of a privileged caste. It is only from this point of view that one can understand the defeat of %rots#y, his li:uidation in 1918 and, a$ove all, his ideological collapse from 1912 on. %rots#y's struggle against the $ureaucracy lac#ed any $asis $ecause %rots#y himself was o$7ectively an artisan of that $ureaucracy. %rots#y could not reproach !talin for carrying out an anti0proletarian and anti0 democratic policy when he had himself inaugurated that policy. 6e could not critici9e the repression practised on the =pposition when he himself had ta#en part in the repression of the 'Wor#ers' &roup' and 'Wor#ers' %ruth'. 6e was no longer free to find support among the vanguard of the factories $ecause he

16
had cut himself off from it. 6e had no overall platform against !talin $ecause he had allowed himself to $e caught up in the contradiction that consists in directing the proletariat, according to its higher interests and against its immediate interests. %he turning0point of 1912 often seems difficult to understand. In fact, at this period the revolutionary character of /olshevism was already hanging $y a thread, in so far as the policies of Lenin and %rots#y were orientated towards world revolution. In the a$sence of this revolution, the thread could only snap. %he contradiction was too intense and could not persist. %hus the rise of !talin represents the eclipse of the contradiction and the emergence of a new term. In order to strengthen its hold, the new regime did not need to wage war against all the preceding values. %hey had destroyed themselves and, losing their true content, had already $ecome, in a sense, the means of mystification. %hus !talin could emerge without his policy seeming at first to $e in opposition to /olshevi# policy. %hus the struggle he conducted against %rots#y could appear as a struggle $etween individuals. 4nd %rots#y himself could declare that it was an 'unprincipled conspiracy, directed against him personally'. In fact it was an a$solute $rea# with the past, as the future was to show, $ut it appeared to $e no more than an impercepti$le transition, a :uestion of individuals. %rots#y wanted to see the very e)istence of the party and the formal survival of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an historical guarantee of world revolution3 he wanted to $elieve that this $ureaucrati9ed party, which was pursuing a counter0revolutionary strategy, was an essential element for the international proletariat. %his is the significance of the strange declarations referred to a$ove on the unity of the party and the significance, in general, of his conciliatory line. !uch, too, was the significance of his intermittent shifts and changes. 4t one and the same time, he concealed the %estament and accused !talin of a$andoning Leninist policy3 at one and the same time, he called for a 'new course', a true democrati9ation of the party, and declared, despite its $ureaucrati9ation, that 'the Party is always right'. 6e was no longer free to act as a revolutionary $ecause he participated in a process which led him to turn his $ac# on the masses. 6e was no longer free to act as a $ureaucrat $ecause he always sought to act, whatever his tactics might have $een, in accordance with the revolutionary ideal. Perhaps these contradictions are most stri#ingly e)pressed in his hesitation over the dating of '%hermidor'. In 1912, he re7ected any analogy with the %hermidorian reaction. In 191@, he was predicting the possi$ility of a %hermidorian course3 at the same time he violently attac#ed the Leftists of Femocratic 5entralism, who were declaring that %hermidor was already a fact. In -ovem$er 1918, following a demonstration in the streets in which supporters of the =pposition were molested $y !talinist gangs, he declared that they had 7ust witnessed a general repetition of %hermidor. In 1918, with the 111, he declared that he had never thought that the party or its 5entral

17
5ommittee were %hermidorian. In 191C09, he announced yet again that there was a %hermidorian threat3 then, in 1920, he $rus:uely declared' 'With us, %hermidor has dragged on.' .inally, in 192 , in his pamphlet, '%he Wor#ers' !tate, %hermidor and /onapartism', he writes' '%he %hermidor of the &reat "ussian "evolution is not $efore us $ut already far $ehind. %he %hermidoreans can cele$rate, appro)imately, the tenth anniversary of their victory.' +20, It was worth e)amining carefully %rots#y's attitude at the dawn of !talinism, for it ena$les us to elucidate the +theoretical, policy to which he adhered until his death. I have said that %rots#y represented, $etween 1912 and 1918, the contradictions of /olshevism. I should now add that he never emerged from this divided situation. !u$se:uently he transported into the domain of revolutionary theory the contradiction in which he had $ecome o$7ectively enclosed. =f course, he was forced $y events to perceive the counter0 revolutionary character of !talinism, $ut he was not capa$le of ta#ing an overall view of the new !talinist society and of defining it. 6e transferred on to economic categories +collectivi9ation, state planning, the fetishism that he had first professed with regard to political forms +party, !oviets,. 6e declared $oth that 'in contradistinction to capitalism, socialism is $uilt not automatically $ut consciously. Progress towards socialism is insepara$le from state power', +21, and that 'the dictatorship of the proletariat found its distorted, $ut un:uestiona$le e)pression in the dictatorship of the $ureaucracy'.+21, 6e shows how $ureaucracy found an autonomous economic and social $ase, +22, $ut he continues in all his wor#s to maintain that $ureaucracy is not a system of e)ploitation, that it is simply a parasitical caste. 6e writes, :uite $rilliantly, that 'the "ussian %hermidor would have undou$tedly opened a new era of $ourgeois rule, if that rule had not proved o$solete throughout the world',2; thus indicating that the mode of e)ploitation $ased on private property had $een superseded in the course of history without, for all that, resulting in the reali9ation of socialism3 and yet elsewhere he reiterates his view that the reign of $ureaucracy was purely transitory and would inevita$ly collapse $efore the only two historical possi$ilities' capitalism or socialism.>K K K< -=%?! 1 Leon %rots#y, !talin, trans. 5harles (alamuth +London' 6ollis and5arter, 19;L8,, p. @;. 1 I$id., p. 1C. 2 I$id., p. 1C8. ; /oris !ouvarine, !talin, trans. 5. L. ". Hames +London' !ee#er and War$urg, 1929,. %rots#y, !talin, p. )v.

18
@ Leon %rots#y, (y Life +London' %hornton /uttenvorth, 1920,, p. ;21. 8 %he wor#, it is true, was left unfinished, $ut %rots#y indicates in the Introduction that he intentionally gave a secondary place to the post0 revolutionary period. C %rots#y, (y Life, p. ; 2. 9 %rots#y, !talin, pp. ;020;. +6ere, and in what follows, the emphasis is Lefort's., 10 Writings of Leon %rots#y +192;02 , +-ew Eor#' Pathfinder Press, 1981,,p. 182. 11 -ew International +-ov. 192;,. 11 %rots#y's What happened and how', :uoted in Political 5orrespondence of the Wor#ers' League for a "evolutionary Party +(arch 19;8,, p. 18. 12 %rots#y, (y Life, p. ;1;. 1; I$id., p. ;10. 1 /oris !ouvarine, !talin, pp. 2@102. 1@ %rots#y, !talin, p. ;02. 18 Leon %rots#y, %he "evolution /etrayed, trans. (a) ?astman +London'.a$er and .a$er, 1928,, pp. 980C. 1C !ouvarine, !talin, p. 2@1. 19 !talin, =cto$er and the Permanent "evolution +=cto$er 191;,. 10 4fter the %hirteenth 5ongress, certain new pro$lems concerning the domain of industry, the !oviets or international politics arose or $ecame more clearly defined. %he idea of opposing any platform to the wor# of the 5entral 5ommittee of the Party with a view to their solution was a$solutely alien to me. .or all the comrades who assisted at the meetings of the Polit$ureau, the 5entral 5ommittee, the !oviet of La$our and Fefence, the "evolutionary (ilitary !oviet, this assertion does not need proof. +:uoted in Political 5orrespondence, 11 %e)t of %rots#y's letter :uoted in %he /ulletin of the Wor#ers' League for "evolutionary Party +!ept.0=ct. 19;8,, p. 20.

19
11 %wo e)tracts :uoted in Political 5orrespondence are significant in this respect. In a speech to students from the .ar ?ast, %rots#y declares' 'We approve of the communist support given to the Buomintang in 5hina where we are trying to $ring a$out a revolution.' +"eported $y International Press 5orrespondence, (ay 191;., .urthermore, to the 5ongress of %e)tile Wor#ers, %rots#y says' '%he %rade Anion 4ngle0 "ussian 5ommittee of Anity is the highest e)pression of this change in the ?uropean and especially /ritish situation, which is operating under our eyes and is leading to the ?uropean revolution.' +"eported $y Pravda, Hanuary 191@., 12 Muoted in %he /ulletin +!ept.0=ct. 19;8,. 1; Muoted $y !ouvarine, !talin, p. ; 1 %rots#y, !talin, p. ;02. 1@ I$id., p. @1. 18 I$id., p. @;. 1C In this study, written in 19;C, I merely allude to the crushing of the Bronstadt 5ommune and the repression practised $y /olshevi# power against the wor#ers' opposition movements. 4s far as Bronstadt is concerned, my sources were Joline's La revolution inconnue +repu$lished in 19@9 $y Pierre /elfond, and an article $y Jictor !erge, 'Bronstadt', in Politics +4pril 19; ,. !ince then, a great deal more information has $een pu$lished. %he following should $e mentioned' Ida (ett, La 5ommune de 5ronstadt +Paris' !partacus, 19;9,3 ". J. Faniels, '%he Bronstadt "evolt of 1911', 4merican !lavic and ?ast ?uropean "eview +Fec. 19 1, L. !chapiro, %he =rigin of the 5ommunist 4utocracy +London' London !chool of ?conomics, 19 ,, ch. NJI3 &eorge Bat#ov, '%he Bronstadt "ising', !t 4nthony 's Papers, no. @ +19 9,3 La 5ommune de 5ronstadt. "ecueil de documents +Paris' /Oli$aste, 19@9,, which includes a translation of Bronstadt's Itvestia and e)tracts from the diary of an eye0 witness, the anarchist /er#man3 and P. 4vrich, Bronstadt 1911 +Princeton' Princeton Aniversity Press, 1980,. 4s far as the repression of the opposition movements is concerned, see especially the testimony of 5iliga, analysed in my ?lements d'unecriti:ue de la $ureaucratie +Paris' &allimard, 1989,, pp. 1; ff., and ?. 6.5arr, %he Interregnum, 191201; +6armondsworth' Penguin, 19 ;,, pp.CC092, 18@0C, 2000 1. =n the 'Wor#ers' &roup' see L. !chapiro, %he 5ommunist Party of the !oviet Anion +London' 5onsta$le, 19@0,, pp. 18@083 ". J. Faniels, %he 5onscience of the "evolution +5am$ridge, (ass' 6arvard Aniversity Press, 19@0,, pp. 1 C09. =n 'Wor#ers' %ruth' see Faniels, 5onscience of the "evolution, pp. 10; and 110, and 4 Focumentary 6istory of 5ommunism, +-ew Eor#' Jintage, 19@0,, vol. I, pp. 1i00123 !chapiro, 5ommunist Party of the !oviet Anion, pp. 19C010;. .

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19 !ouvarine, !talin, p. 219. 20 Writings of Leon %rots#y +192;02 ,, p. 1C1. 21 I$id., p. 189. 21 =ne may also compare this statement with the final lines of %rots#y's !talin which completely contradict it' 'L'?tat, c'est moi' >I am the !tate< is almost a li$eral formula $y comparison with the actualities of !talin's totalitarian regime. Louis NIJ identified himself only with the !tate. %he Popes of "ome identified themselves with $oth the !tate and the 5hurch 0 $ut only during the epoch of temporal power. %he totalitarian state goes far $eyond 5aesaro0Papism, for it has encompassed the entire economy of the country as well. !talin can 7ustly say, unli#e the !un Bing 'La !ociety c'est moi' >I am !ociety<. +!talin, p. ;11' Lefort's emphasis, 22 .or e)ample in the passage of his !talin where, referring to the period that saw the li:uidation of the #ula#s, %rots#y writes' '%hus opened the irreconcila$le struggle over the surplus product of national la$our. Who will dispose of it in the nearest future 0 the new $ourgeoisie or the !oviet $ureaucracyD 0 that $ecame the ne)t issue. 6e who disposes of the surplus product has the power of the !tate at his disposal.' +!talin, p. 298, 2; I$id., p. ;0@.