Student: Pop Ctlin Marian Crisis and conflict management Master

The Cuban missile crisis- Analysis Civilization, Culture and Conflict in the Contemporary world

Babes Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca 2014

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The Cuban Missile Crisis

1. Preamble
In order to properly understand the Cuban Missile Crisis we should go back in time. In 1959 after sixty years of Imperialism, the government of Cuba which was a Pro American one is overthrown by the Communist Fidel Castro. A Fidel Castro that is going to make an alliance with the USSR. This provoked a giant fear in the US, thinking what is going to happen now that Russia is in our back yard. The US president Dwight Eisenhower put together a plan to overthrow Castro, a plan, continued after its mandate by J.F. Kennedy, also known by the name Bay of pigs. During this operation Americans funded anti-revolutionary Cuban troops.

Launched from Guatemala, the invading force was defeated within three days by the Cuban armed forces, under the direct command of Prime Minister Fidel Castro (Bay of Pigs Invasion, 2014). After the failed takeover orchestrated by the Americans, Khrushchev signed a secret deal with Castro according to which Russia will place nuclear missiles on Cuban territory. Fidel considered that the missiles would kept him safe preventing other actions against hes regime. The missiles were sent to Cuba, and soon after they were spotted by an American U2 plane. On 14th of October the most ample Crisis that the world has seen from then until now has begun.

2. The analytic paradigm: The rational actor model

This type of process implies that people have clear objectives that they pursue in a rational way. The rational actor model is applied by following a few steps: a. The nature of the problem is identified; b. Using a hierarchy of preferences an objective or a goal is set; c. The means for achieving that goal are chosen based on their efficiency, their cost and the level of trust; d. The decider picks from the available alternatives the one that he believes will help him get closer to its goal;

a. The nature of the problem; The main issue was to avoid a nuclear war. Neither Russians nor Americans wanted this to happen. So, both sides tried to reduce the nuclear capabilities of the other.
b. Using hierarchy of preferences an objective or a goal is set;

Kennedys goal was to prevent communism in the western hemisphere. Kennedy tried many times to overtly get rid of Castro and/or its government, but failed. Due to these threats from America, Castro called upon its larger ally, Khrushchev, to help him defend his small island from Kennedy. Khrushchevs goal was to apply pressure on Kennedy, and force him to remove the nuclear missiles from Turkey. USSR also wanted a communist partner in the West.

c. The means for achieving that goal are chosen based on their efficiency, their cost and the level of trust; American secret services tried a few times to assassinate Fidel Castro, but failed miserably. They even funded anti-revolutionary troops of Cuban soldiers, to take down Castros regime. Nikita Khrushchev embraced Cuba, when they were asked for help, but instead of sending only short range missiles for defense they sent also medium and long range missiles. They took advantage of the urgent Cubans need for defense, to achieve their goals. d. The decider picks from the available alternatives the one that he believes will help him get closer to its goal Kennedy had six options at hes disposal from which he had to pick the one that would not lead do a catastrophic nuclear war. 1. The first of which is just to do nothing. American, up till then, had always been under the target of Soviet missiles. In addition, America did not want to escalate to nuclear war. America did not want to make an action that would set off a chain reaction of events that would lead to such a catastrophe. 2. A second option was to put diplomatic pressures on the Soviets. This option would entail giving Khrushchev an ultimatum or bringing up the issue to the United Nations or the Organization of American States to see if those organizations would get involved with getting rid of the missiles. 3. A third option was to secretly approach Castro to defect against the Soviets. This would make sure that Castro understood that it was either split or fall to the United States.

4. A fourth option was an invasion of Cuba. This was considered a last resort, but it would make sure that Cuba could not or would not be occupied by Soviets or their missiles. 5. A fifth option was to conduct an air strike on the missile sites. This option would take out all defense sites as well as the missiles and the capabilities for the Soviets to launch those missiles. 6. A sixth and last option was a naval blockade of the coast of Cuba. This option would not allow any ships to pass, especially Soviet ships, through a blockade, thereby stopping the flow of supplies for more Soviet troops or missiles into Cuba. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) Kennedy pick the sixth option which proved to be a good choice, as the saying goes is not important to have good cards, what is important is how you play the ones you have. Kennedy had no good cards; he had no option that could guarantee him if used will diffuse the situation.

3. The Course of the crisis

On 14th of October 1962 the American U2 surveillance plane discovered the nuclear missiles, and the nuclear sites, near the Cuban capital Havana. Shortly after that president John Fitzgerald Kennedy, talked to the nation in a press conference: Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception nor offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace. (Museum)

Khrushchev response was: You and I mister President are pulling on a rope that has a knot, and if that knot gets to tight that maybe only the sword could open it (Gunther Klein) It can be stated very clear that neither of the leaders wanted a war, stating the fact that they were both conscious of the destruction capabilities of the other. United States informs its German allies of the situation. Canceler opinion was clear, do not back down on any account, now is the time to drive a wedge between Castro and Khrushchev. Canceler of Germany believed that Castro did as he pleased for a too long time, and the same goes with Khrushchev who divided Germany with a wall. The German leader believed that the balance of power will be disturbed if Kennedy refuses to act resolutely. Soon after, Kennedy announced the blockade around Cuba. The blockade was seen as an act of strength, sixty heavily armed ships were sent to form a ring of steal around Cuba. No military equipment was able to enter or leave the island. Even though USSR did not agree with the blockade they were relieved because they saw the opportunity to negotiate. Later that night after the blockade was announced the Nikita Khrushchev attended opera. The lead singer was an American actor, an actor that had champagne with the Russian Leader after the play ended. This was the Russians way of saying, we also want to negotiate. On October 24, Pope John XXIII sent a message to the Soviet embassy in Rome to be transmitted to the Kremlin, in which he voiced his concern for peace. In this message he stated "We beg all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity. That they do all that is in their power to save peace." With the permission of Kennedy and Khrushchev, this appeal went public on October 25 on radio, asking leaders to do "all in their power to preserve peace" and to "save the world from the horrors of a war". The intervention of Pope John was significant, as on the same day confrontation started to settle down. (Wikipedia)

The United States requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25. US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an emergency meeting of the SC challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer. Adlai Stevenson asked the Cuban ambassador: Do you ambassador Zorin deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium and intermedium missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? the Cuban ambassador answered: I am not in a court room sir, so I am not going to answer to a question that is put to me in the faction that the prosecutor does, please continue your course and you will have your answer. Adlai Stevenson had a brilliant reply. He said that: I am going to wait for my answer until the hell freezes over (Gunther Klein). In fact as was proven later the Cuban ambassador had no idea of the missiles so he could not give an accurate answer. Americans tried through the UN to put more pressure on the Russian Prime Minister. On October 26 President Kennedy and hes advisors started to consider a plan according to which American troops will sabotage the missile sites and make them inoperable. Later that night Kennedy received a letter from Prime Minister Khrushchev according to which he was willing to remove the missiles and in exchange US will promise never to invade Cuba. On October 27, after the previous private letter, Khrushchev issued a public demand: the Soviet Union would withdraw the missiles from Cuba if the US pledged to never invade Cuba and agreed to withdraw its missiles from Turkey. (Affairs) After consulting with its staff President John Fitzgerald Kennedy agreed to the Russians offer. Shortly after on October 28 The Soviet government announced they had accepted the American offer to never invade Cuba in exchange for removing the nuclear weapons from Cuba. The Soviets did not mention the secret deal that the Americans would also remove their missiles from Turkey.
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On November 5th 1962 the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, 2 weeks after on November 20 USA ends the blockade and in April 24 1963, US withdraws the last Jupiter missile from Turkey.

4. Regulatory mechanisms of the crisis

a. Cessation of hostilities Hostilities ended when both leaders realized that if the crisis continues, the possibility for a human error that could lead to a disaster is immense. Neither Russians, Cubans, nor American soldiers were prepared for all possible scenarios. The possibility of a miscommunication or a human error was getting higher each day.

b. Structure of the peace negotiations Peace negotiations were possible because both leaders knew that in order to reach an agreement they must satisfy each other needs. They both knew that "A nuclear war cannot, be cannot be won and must therefore never be fought. (J.F.Kennedy, 1963) Nuclear crisis management was too dangerous; therefore confrontations that could force an adversary to choose between humiliating retreat or nuclear war should be avoided at all costs. Based on these simple principles the strongest leaders on the planet at that time managed to negotiate peace. c. Posterity of the agreements and their systemic effects The practical effect of this Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that it effectively strengthened Castro's position in Cuba, guaranteeing that the US would not invade Cuba. It is possible that Khrushchev only placed the missiles in Cuba to get Kennedy to remove the missiles from Italy

and Turkey and that the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were outgunned by the Americans. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides were careful to avoid circumstances that could lead to another crisis of the same scale. One Missile Crisis was enough.

5. Conclusion
Looking back on the crisis, we can see that the world was only one step away from a nuclear disaster. "Having come so close to the edge, we must make it our business not to pass this way again." (National Security Advisor) That step was the President of United States who could have ordered the invasion of Cuba. An invasion that would most likely failed because the Americans underestimated the troops stationed on the island. Perhaps the scariest part of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the lack of a reliable form of communication between Washington and Moscow. It could take up to seven hours to transmit a message from one capitol to the other. As a result of the crisis, a "hotline" was established between the Kremlin and the White House so that the two world leaders could communicate directly. Neither side wanted to risk starting another nuclear war over poor communications. Nine months after the crisis ended, Kennedy and Khrushchev signed an agreement to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere. (Kennedy, 1969) Cuba perceived the outcome as a partial betrayal by the Soviets; given that decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro was especially upset that certain issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of the US Naval Base in Guantnamo, were not addressed. This caused Cuban-Soviet relations to deteriorate for years to come. (Ignacio, 2007)

Bibliography
Bay of Pigs Invasion. (2014, January 21). Retrieved January 24, 2014, from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_of_Pigs_Invasion Affairs, B. C. (n.d.). About the crisis - Timeline. Retrieved from cubanmissilecrisis.org: http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/timeline/ Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. D. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Gunther Klein, G. K. (n.d.). Youtube. Retrieved from History Channel - The Cuban Missile Crisis Declassified - Full Length: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15mpFT4g_J0 Ignacio, R. (2007). Fidel Castro: My life. Penguin Books. J.F.Kennedy. (1963). Kennedy, R. F. (1969). Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York. Museum, J. F. (n.d.). Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962. Retrieved from jfklibrary.org: http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/sUVmCh-sB0moLfrBcaHaSg.aspx National Security Advisor, M. B. (n.d.). Swanson, E. (2002, 12 6). The Rational Actor Model. Retrieved 01 24, 2014, from http://www.oocities.org/: http://www.oocities.org/eric731/The_Eric_Papers/rational.htm Wikipedia. (n.d.). Cuban missile crisis. Retrieved from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis

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