TRUST RECIEPT LAW

Pilipinas Bank vs. Ong 387 Scra 37 (2002)

FACTS: Baliwag Mahonay Corp. (BMC) through its president, respondent Ong, applied for a domestic commercial letter lettrer of credit with petitioner Pilipinas Bank to finance the purchase about 100,000 board feet of Air Dried, Dark red Luan sawn lumber. The bank approved the application and issued Letter of Credit No. 91/725-ho in the amount of P3,500,000.00. to secure payment of the amoun, BMC. Through respondent Ong, executed two (2) trust receipt providing inert alia that it shall turn over the proceed of the good to the bank, if sold, or return the goods, if unsold, upon maturity on july 28, 1991 and August 4, 1991 On due dates, BMC failed to comply with the trust receipt agreement. On November 22, 1999, it filed with the SEC a Petition for rehabilitation and for a Declaration in a state of Suspension under Sec. 6(c) of P.D. No. 902-A,[4] as amended, docketed as SEC Case No. 4109. On November 27, 1992, the the SEC rendered a decision approving the rehabilitation Plan of BMC as contained in the MoaA and declaring it in a state of suspencion of payment. However, BMC and respondent Ong defaulted in the payment of their obligation under the reschedule payment scheme provided in the MOA. ISSUE: Whether respondent Ong violated the Trust Receipt Law. HELD: Negative, the execution of the MOA constitute a novation which place petitioner Bank in estoppels to insist on the original trust relation and constitute a bar to the filing of any criminal information for violation of the trust receipt law. It has the effect of compromise agreement, novated BMCs existing obligation under trust receipt agreement. The novation converted the parties relationship into one of an ordinary creditor and deptor. Moreover, the execution of the MOA precludes any criminal liability on their part which may arise in case they violate any provision thereof. The execution of the MOA extinguish respondent obligation under the trust receipt. Respondent liability, if any would only be civil in nature since the trust receipts were transformed into mere loan document after the execution of the MOA. This is reinforced by the fact that the mortgage contract executed by the BMC despite its non-compliance with the conditions set forth in the MOA.

Ramos vs CA 153 Scra 276 (1987)

FACTS: Trinidad Ramos filed with the Philippine National Cooperative Bank (PNCB) four applications for letters of credit. After the applications were processed and approved, domestic letters of credit were opened on the same dates of the applications and in the amounts applied for, among the papers filed for the issuance of the domestic letters of credit were commercial invoices of the different suppliers of the merchandise sought to be purchase, also bearing the same dates of the applications for letters of credit with which they were respectively attached. The different suppliers then drew sight drafts against the applicant payable to the order of the PNCB, also bearing the same dates as the respective applications and for the same amounts. Then the PNCB drew its own drafts against Ramos as the buyer of the merchandise and which drafts were accepted by the Ramos also on the same dates of the respective applications. After such acceptance, the corresponding trust receipts were signed by the Ramos also on the same dates of the respective applications. When Ramos failed to pay despite demands, PNCB charged her with estafa. Ramoss Defense: (1) Elements of Estafa are not present.(2) that there is no adequate proof of her receipt of the goods subject of the trust receipts in question or of her having paid anything on account thereof or in connection therewith;(3) that complainant Bank had suffered no damage whatever, since it had made no payment at all on account of the commercial invoices for which the trust receipts were issued; and(4) that under the laws at the time, transactions involving trust receipts could only give rise to purely civil liability.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Ramos is liable for estafa. HELD: The assailed factual findings as to the receipt of the merchandise and the damage sustained by the Bank cannot stand. The proofs are indeed inadequate on these propositions of fact. It is difficult to accept the prosecution's theory that it has furnished sufficient proof of delivery by the introduction in evidence of the commercial invoices attached to the applications for the letters of credit and of the trust receipts. The invoices are actually nothing more than lists of the items sought to be purchased and their prices; and it can scarcely be believed that goods worth no mean sum actually transferred hands without the unpaid vendor requiring the vendee to acknowledge this fact in some way, even by a simple signature on these documents alone if not in fact by the execution of some appropriate document, such as a delivery receipt.

The trust receipts do not fare any better as proofs of the delivery to Ramos of the goods. Except for the invoices, an documents relating to each trust receipt agreement, including the trust receipts themselves, appear to be standard Bank forms accomplished by the Bank personnel, and were all signed by Ramos in one sitting, no doubt with a view to facilitating the pending transactions between the parties. If, as she claims, Ramos was made to believe that bank usage or regulations require the signing of the papers in this way, i.e., on a single occasion, there was neither reason nor opportunity for her to question the statement therein of receipt of the goods since it was evidently assumed that delivery to her of the goods would shortly come to pass