COMPTES RENDUS DE LA COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES EUROPEENNES

French Senate, European Affairs Committee extract from the official report of proceedings 20 February 2014

unofficial translation

Mme Jolle Garriaud-Maylam I travelled to Scotland on 21 February at the invitation of our consul general, Pierre-Alain Coffinier, to celebrate the birthday of the poet Robert Burns, national bard of Scotland. I attended a dinner held by the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, Tricia Marwick, and I met with the French community there, which numbers over 5,000, as well as with Scottish and UK political and government leaders, to discuss the issues and consequences of the referendum on Scottish independence. Over 4 million Scottish voters aged 16 and over, as well as over 80,000 European foreigners and 400,000 [other] Brits living in Scotland have a vote on 18 September, when they will decide whether or not to remain in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the 800,000 Scots who do not live in their country cannot cast a vote. Should there be a yes vote, Scotland is set to declare independence formally in March 2016. The question being asked is a simple one: Should Scotland become an independent country? Other formulations were made, but the Electoral Commission ruled that they might influence the voters. Independence is firmly anchored in the Scotlands history and spirit: Scotland had a Parliament from the 13th century until 1707, the date when it joined together with the Kingdom of England to form the United Kingdom. Following the 1997 referendum, the Scotland Act provided for the creation of a Scottish Parliament with competence to legislate in all areas not reserved to the UK Parliament, such as foreign affairs and defence. This autonomy, limited by the UK Parliaments right to amend the acts of the Scottish Parliament, is no longer enough for a significant proportion of the population. The pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP), led by the charismatic Alex Salmond, obtained an absolute majority of seats at the elections of 5 May 2011. The white paper Scotlands Future, your guide to an independent Scotland was presented by the Scottish Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon. In her foreword, she writes: independence within the European Union will allow Scotland to play a distinct, constructive role in the development of a wide range of policies decided on at EU level that have a direct impact on the people and economy of Scotland. According to the

SNP, if an independent Scotland is to be a candidate for the European Union, it will make use of the time between the referendum and the actual date of independence to negotiate with the UK and the EU on the terms for joining. Scotlands joining the EU would be automatic, it is claimed: it would become the 29th Member State of the European Union without actually having left it. The SNPs aim, of course, is to reassure the voters. The SNP also believes that the international community would be sensitive with regard to how the separation process would take place. London has already indicated that it will respect the decision of the Scots. In order to defend its interests, which are sometimes different from those of the UK as regards the common agricultural policy (CAP), structural funds, fishing, energy, the environment and research, an independent Scotland would have its own European commissioner and judge on the Court of Justice of the European Union, and twice as many MEPs. At the same time, however, most Scots remain hostile to adopting the euro. At the end of January, London responded with a document entitled Scotland analysis: EU and international issues. Even if the polls have still been indicating a win for the no side, the pro-independence side stress that the campaign has not yet started. One poll at the end of January put support for a yes vote at 46%; this morning, Reuters gives them one third. An increasing number of opinions are being expressed by UK leaders: David Cameron asked all [other] British people to convince the Scots to reject independence, and George Osborne went to Edinburgh on 12 February to deliver a strong message, warning in particular that nothing obliged the British [rUK] to share the pound sterling. Furthermore, the finance minister accused the SNP of just making assertions and threats without foundation. The Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, in what is a sort of sacred union, have also opposed the independence process. This confirms the major anxiety of the British and the Europeans. Jos Manuel Barroso declared that he was hostile to any part of the territory of a Member State ceasing to belong to it, as that would make a third State, as far as the European Union was concerned, to which the treaties would no longer apply. Romano Prodi (in 2004) and Hermann Van Rompuy have not said otherwise. According to them, Scotland would have to negotiate its membership of the European Union according to the normal procedure. The President of the European Commission recently compared the Scottish situation to that of Kosovo. This example is debatable, as Kosovo seceded from Serbia, a State that is not a member of the European Union; the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and also Croatia, were previously secessionist States. London emphasises that, in the case of independence, continuing membership of the European Union would not be accepted, which could oblige Scotland to undergo a long process of application for membership. Would Scotland be stronger with regard to the UN if it was independent or part of the UK, which entitles it to a seat on the Security Council? Independence would also mean that it would lose access to the G8 and the G20. How would Scotland negotiate the reassignment of hydrocarbon

[oil] reserves, which make up 91% of British production, with London? How would it do without the exceptional strength of the British promotional network for tourism and Scottish products? London suggests that Scotland would not automatically benefit from the various opt-out clauses that the UK has, especially on the euro, border controls with the Schengen area and matters concerning the police and criminal law. For its part, the Scottish Government argues that Scotland is already in the EU, fully implements the acquis communautaire and therefore would not be compelled to renegotiate its membership just some adaptations to the existing treaties. On 16 February, Jos Manuel Barroso once again insisted on the requirement for all Member States to agree on the Scottish request for membership, including Spain, which, it is known, would oppose it so as not to encourage the pro-independence tendencies of Catalonia, for example. London has said that the cost of independence would be considerable for Scotland, which would be deprived of any share of the rebate granted for the British contribution to the European budget. Its net contribution would therefore increase by 2.2 billion euros over the current budgetary period, compared with staying in the UK. According to analysts in London, this would mean a cost of 840 euros per household in Scotland. The currency issue is essential. Scotland has been sharing the pound sterling with the [other] British since 1707. Following the independence of Ireland and India and the break-up of its Empire, the loss of Scotland would mean the UK losing a third of its territory, would take away 70% of its continental shelf, would reduce its GDP by 10%, would erode its international status and would threaten its seat on the UN Security Council. The defence policy of the UK, Frances foremost strategic partner, would also be particularly affected, with Scotland playing host to a significant share of the UK defence industries and the whole of its nuclear deterrent. As the UK is our one real European defence partner, that should be a matter of concern for us. There is no precedent for a region that wishes both to separate from an EU Member State and to remain in the EU. Legally, the position of those calling for Scottish independence is not guaranteed. Indeed, in international law, the break-up of a State that confers the status of successor State on the States that emerge generally concerns federal States. The UK, which is not a party to the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States, remains a unitary State, despite the progress of devolution in its various nations since 1998-1999. The party that detaches itself from a unitary State has a status of successor State, and the preexisting state takes that of continuator State upon dissolution. Only the successor state applies as a candidate for the international organisations that it wants to join. The Irish precedent, which is perhaps the most pertinent in the case of Scotland, is interesting. At the time of its creation in 1922, the new Irish State applied to join the League of Nations, whereas the United Kingdoms international position remained unchanged. According to this precedent, an independent Scotland would have to apply

to join the European Union. Even staying with a federalist scenario, the pro-independence position would not be any more secure. When a federation is dissolved, none of the successor states automatically inherits the rights and obligations of the predecessor State. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia each applied to join the UN. The situation of Russia, which was recognised as continuator State of the Soviet Union, and which inherited its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council, may be considered as an exception, essentially linked to the Soviet nuclear arsenal. In the event of an independent Scotland wishing to join the European Union, it is possible that many Member States will not seek to facilitate its application, as has been well demonstrated by the recent statements of Mr Barroso. States facing independence movements including those of the Catalans in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium or even the Northern League in Italy could prove to be hostile to the move. It is said that the larger Member States would no doubt seek to preserve the status quo, and there may be a widespread desire to avoid creating a precedent. It should be asked, however, how realistic these declarations are, bearing in mind the practical consequences that would flow from any suspension of more than 40 years of Community cooperation at the same time that an independent Scotland wishes to re-enter the Union. It seems reasonable to suppose that most Member States will align themselves with the position of London, which has already indicated that it will respect the results of the referendum. The European treaties do not contain provisions on the secession of parts of Member States. On the other hand, under the terms of article 50 of the Treaty on European Union [Maastricht treaty], the withdrawal of a Member State is subject to preliminary negotiations with the European institutions and the Member States before it can take effect. By analogy, the future of an independent Scotland in the European Union could be negotiated before its change of status in relation to the United Kingdom under article 48 of the treaty, rather than article 49, on the normal admission procedure. What could the result of the referendum be? Although most observers think that the no side should win, the campaign has only just begun. For leaders in Scotland, it is a matter of taking the step of testing how much their ideas have progressed. Despite the 2011 electoral landslide, Mr Salmond scheduled the referendum for as distant a date as possible so as to be able to convince the maximum number of voters. This year marks the 500th anniversary of the battle of Bannockburn, where the Scots defeated the English despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the latter. Scotland will also host the Commonwealth games. Nothing should be pre-judged. 71% of Scots feel that their interests would better be defended by a Scottish Government, although 65% still want London to take charge of defence and foreign relations. Mr Salmond responded to Mr Osbornes attacks by attributing them to the Westminster elites, saying that if London refused to share the currency, he would refuse to

share British public debt. Mr Cameron wants to avoid being a Lord North of Scotland, referring to his predecessor who lost the American colonies in 1776. These are fundamental issues for Europe. The secession of Scotland could affect the result of the 2017 UK referendum on EU membership. It would be useful to present a more complete report before the end of the summer. M. Simon Sutour (chairman) It would be a contradiction to call oneself a democrat and to be troubled by the result of a vote, as the Moroccan Prime Minister commented to us. In this case, we can be relieved that the no side should win. Mme Jolle Garriaud-Maylam That is not certain. M. Simon Sutour (chairman) Larger States are always worth more than their fragmentation into smaller entities, as we have seen with the break-up of Yugoslavia. Catalonia is unable to organise as clear a vote [as in Scotland], but its leaders are supporters of independence. M. Jean Bizet This is a timely report. This is a matter that could help our English friends resolve their ambiguity in relation to the European Union. I regret the fact that an ill wind is blowing over Europe and fanning identity-based tensions, as was demonstrated a few days ago by the vote in Switzerland. At the same time, Richard Yungs report clearly shows that the European Union has not failed: since the 2008 financial crisis, the EU has achieved the considerable task of restructuring and rationalisation. Regrettably, public opinion is not aware of this, and there are an increasing number of publications predicting the end of the Union. I hope that the situation will be resolved positively, and that Mr Camerons comments on Europe will be moderated. The European Union needs the United Kingdom, but the opposite is also true. M. Pierre Bernard-Reymond Do the parties of the far right in Europe have a position on the referendum? Mme Jolle Garriaud-Maylam Not as far as I know. M. Andr Gattolin Well done on this communication, which is well timed. Peoples have the right to self-determination, especially when their desire for independence rests on a genuine national culture and tradition; the European framework strongly ensures coherence. That said, such irredentism always arises in rich regions or in those that discover some economic potential that they do not wish to share. Catalonia considers that it would manage better without Spain. We have also let abnormal situations develop to the advantage of certain areas. The exceptional status of Rotterdam and Antwerp is scandalous, for example. M. Jean Bizet Quite true. M. Andr Gattolin The comments of the President of the European Commission, Mr Barroso, were quite misplaced: as the European Union

has not drawn up any rules regarding a Member State leaving, I do not see how we could make Scotland recommence accession procedures. I find it hard to understand how Scots outside Scotland do not have the right to vote. Is that to do with the status of citizenship within the Commonwealth? M. Simon Sutour (chairman) The economic aspect should not mask the identity and culture aspects: the Scottish language [presumably referring to Gaelic trans.] has been massacred, and is now only spoken in a residual sense. Scottish culture has suffered from its integration in a larger whole. The Catalans, for their part, have managed to preserve their language. It might seem unseemly to see rich regions wanting to become like Norway, effectively, but it is also a backlash. Mme Jolle Garriaud-Maylam Scotland was independent until 1707, and it developed a national culture, symbolised by Burns in particular, which lives on though the diaspora. Did you know that Carnegie was Scottish, for example? M. Andr Gattolin I did not know that. Mme Jolle Garriaud-Maylam Of course, the Spanish Government is vehemently opposed to Catalan independence. Mr Barrosos threats are inappropriate and are the result of Spanish and English pressure; London is becoming more and more concerned. They are not credible: if Scotland votes for independence, it will remain in the European Union. It is too much in Englands interests for it to be otherwise. The SNP has said that it wants the Queen to remain as sovereign in Scotland. Scots residing outside Scotland may not vote. That shocked me, too, but it corresponds with Anglo-Saxon culture [i.e. British / that of Englishspeaking countries trans.], where it is considered that only those who pay their taxes in the country may vote. That said, people living abroad also make a contribution to the wealth of their country. British people living outside of their country have the right to vote on the condition that this absence does not exceed 15 years: Mrs Thatcher provided for a limit of 18 years, but that was reduced by Labour. British emigration is different from ours: they have less temporary emigration than permanent moves. The 800,000 Scots living outside Scotland are very proud of their origins, and they could have influenced the vote. Curiously, the SNP made no protest about this. The number of European foreigners who have requested to vote has increased by 16%. One SNP member of the Parliament is French, and that is not a problem. M. Simon Sutour (chairman) So, there will be two important consultations in September: the referendum on Scottish independence and the senatorial elections. Meeting closed at 12.30. translation (unofficial) Robert Arnott, March 2014