Pritchard McDowell and The New Evil Genius PDF

International Phenomenological Society
McDowell and the New Evil Genius Author(s): Ram Neta and Duncan Pritchard Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Mar., 2007), pp. 381-396 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041049 . Accessed: 14/02/2014 20:14
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and Phenomenological Research Philosophy Vol. LXXIV No. 2, March 2007 2007 International Phenomenological Society
McDowelland theNew EvilGenius

RAM NETA
University of NorthCarolina,Chapel Hill

DUNCAN PRITCHARD
of Edinburgh University 0 - regard the and externalists Many epistemologistsboth internalists "New Evil Genius Problem" (Lehrer & Cohen 1983) as constituting in favour of (one or anotherversionof) consideration an important and as requiringa substantialqualificainternalism, epistemological tion in (one or another version of) epistemologicalexternalism. for any non-object-dependent According to these epistemologists, at for time cannot be more justified, and /, any you proposition/?, envatted that than in /, believing physicalduplicate your recently p is.1 In other words, these epistemologists accept what we call the "New Evil Genius view": that at t in believing (NEG) The extentto whichS is justified which as the extent to 5"s the same is recently p just at t in believing thatp. envatted duplicateis justified are supposed to apprise us of the truth intuitions Our epistemological refer to it. of theNew Evil Genius view,or (NEG), as we'll henceforth In internalists and externalists. both by by (NEG) is widelyaccepted fact, there have been very few opponents of (NEG). Timothy Williamson(e.g., 2000) rejects(NEG), for reasons that have by now JohnMcDowell also rejects(NEG), receiveda greatdeal of scrutiny.2 but his reasons have not receivedthe scrutiny theydeserve.This is in large part because those reasons have not been well understood.We
1 envattedin orderto allow forsamenessof We specify thatthe duplicateis recently of standardversionsof semanticexternaleven giventhe truth intentional content, ism. see Joyce(2004). viewin thisregard, discussionof Williamson's For a recent
MCDOWELL AND THE NEW EVIL GENIUS J5l
believe that McDowell's challengeto (NEG) is important, worthyof fair assessment,and maybe even correct.In this paper, we explain McDowell's challengeto (NEG), and also explain how McDowell can addressa seemingly fatalobjectionto his view. 1 We beginbysetting out a bigproblem in understanding McDowell's view. The problembeginsto emerge ifwe ask: is McDowell an epistemological or an epistemological externalist? Of course, this question internalist, clarification. bearswitness to several requires Contemporary epistemology different "internalism-externalism" disputes concerningjustification mindknowledge). For instance, consider three theses: thefollowing (never forbelieving thatp is constituted (1) S's epistemic justification solelyby S's mentalstates. forbelieving thatp is constituted (2) 5's epistemic justification facts that S can know reflection alone. solelyby by forbelieving thatp is constituted (3) 5"s epistemic justification that has in S common withherrecently solelyby properties envatted physicalduplicate. Each of theses(1), (2), and (3) is a versionof internalism. The denial of each of thesethesesis a versionof externalism. And so thereare, it "internalism-externalism" seems,at least threedifferent disputes. In fact, there are manymorethanthree different ifwe replace disputes: "is constituted by" with"supervenes solelyupon" in theses(1), (2), and different internalist each of whichdefines another theses, (3), we getthree "internalist-externalist" And we can other dispute. ring changeson (1), and for forbelievinstance, (2), (3) by, replacing "epistemic justification that ing /?"with"epistemicreason to believethat/?",or by specifying that"epistemic is to be understood as propositional, or as justification" or by specifying whether thejustification at a pardoxastic, justification, ticulartime/is supposedto be constituted or proponlyby states,facts, erties at /,and so on. By ringing suchchangeson (1), (2), and (3), we can hundredsof "internalist-externalist" specify literally disputes.Many of thesedisputesare actual, and manyof themare not adequatelydistinone another. guishedfrom Now parties to such debates have long recognizedthat theses (1) - neither and (2) above are logicallyindependent entailsthe other.(See Alston,1986,Conee and Feldman,2001.) But whatis not so commonly
382 RAM NETA AND DUNCAN PRITCHARD
is that theses(2) and (3) are also logicallyindependent. Of recognized nor entails the other. But is there not some course,neither (3) (2) formally relationbetweenthemnonetheless? If (2) is necessitation metaphysical be true also? Here is an from then must not true, (3) (2) to (3): argument thatp is constituted forbelieving (2) 5"s epistemic justification facts that can know reflection alone. S by solelyby alone are facts (R) The onlyfactsthatS can knowby reflection envatted thatwouldalso obtainin S's recently duplicate. thatp is constituted forbelieving (3) 5"s epistemic justification in that S has common withher recently solelyby properties envatted duplicate. Notice also that if (3) is true,then so is (NEG): if epistemic justificathat S has in commonwithher tion is constituted solelyby properties envattedduplicate,then the extentto which S is justifiedin recently believingthatp at time / is just the same as the extentto which her in believing thatp at time/. So, envattedduplicateis justified recently from(2) and (R) to (3) is sound, thenso is the longer if the inference to (NEG). inference would accept (R), and so accept the Virtuallyall epistemologists from(2) to (3), and so to (NEG). This is whyour intuitions inference envattedduplicatesare of our recently about the epistemicproperties so commonlythoughtto be relevantto assessingthe truthof (2): the is that(2) is trueonlyif(NEG) is true. thought McDowell's We believe that the firststep towards understanding so would also he and is to see that of (R), rejects (NEG) rejection so to from to and above inference the (3), (NEG). McDowell (2) reject in at least be an internalist and and so both can thus accept (2) (1) two senses of the term while still rejecting (R), (3), and (NEG). For McDowell, as we read him,our beliefsare justified (when theyare jusand own mental of our virtue states, only by virtueof tified) only by accessibleto us. But some of thesejustifying factsthat are reflectively - thoughtheyare reflectively accessibleto us, and thoughthey factors - are nonetheless not otherthan our own mentalstates involvenothing envattedduplicate. such that we could share them with our recently factorsthatare reflectively refer to thesejustifying (We will henceforth other than our own mental involve accessibleto us, and that nothing states,as our "reasons". Empiricalreasons are reasons constituted by and/orperceptual our sensory experiences.)
MCDOWELL AND THE NEW EVIL GENIUS 383
McDowell (1998a) allows, for example,that one's empiricalreason for believinga certain externalworld proposition, /?,mightbe that one sees that p is the case. Seeing that is factive,however,in that seeing thatp entailsp. However,McDowell also holds that such factive reasons can be nevertheless accessible to the agent reflectively - indeed, he demands (though not in quite these words) that they be accessible for they must be able to serve as the agent's reasons. In criticizing what he calls the "hybrid conception of knowledge", McDowell writes: In the hybrid in the space of a satisfactory conception, standing reasons is onlypartof whatknowledge is an extrarequireis; truth ment. So two subjects can be alikein respect of thesatisfactoriness of theirstanding in the space of reasons, only one of although them is a knower, becauseonlyin hercase is whatshe takesto be so actually so. But if its beingso is external in to her operations the space of reasons, how can it not be outsidethe reachof her rationalpowers?And if it is outsidethe reach of her rational how can its beingso be the crucialelement in an intellipowers, - whatmakesthereleof herknowing thatit is so gibleconception vantdifference between her and the othersubject? Its beingso is conceived as external to theonlything thatis supposed to be episabout the knower her satisfactory herself, temologically significant in thespaceof reasons. (McDowell,1998a, standing 403) This passage requires some interpretation. First, we interpretthe "outside the reach of [an agent's]rationalpowers" in such a expression way that, for some fact p to be "outside the reach of [an agent's] rational powers" is forp to be unable to serve as an agent's reason forbelief.Second, thereis a questionabout whyMcDowell takes it to followfrom/?'sbeing outside the reach of an agent's rationalpowers - and so, on our interpretation, /?'s not being able to serve as an reason for belief that cannot be an epistemologically agent's p significantfeature of theagentherself. We suggestthat McDowell is willingto make thisinference because he holds the following view: forp to be able to serveas an agent'sreason forbelief,the agent must be able to know that/?,and know it by - we take McDowell to hold - only what reflection alone. Furthermore the agentcan know by reflection alone can be an epistemologically significant featureof the agent herself. Here is some further textualsupof McDowell: portforthisinterpretation I agreewith thatwe losethepoint ofinvoking the [Elizabeth Fricker] ifwe allowsomeone to possess a justification evenif spaceof reasons itis outside hisreflective reach. (McDowell1998b, 418)
Since McDowell does invoke the space of reasons,he must thinkthat thereis some point to doing so, and so he must thinkthat someone thatis "outside his reflective reach". Furcannotpossess a justification for to be "outside we assume that thermore, something [the agent's] is for the agent not to be able reflective reach", in McDowell's terms, - or what alone. So the agent's justification to know it by reflection - mustbe such that she can know we're callingher "epistemicreason" on McDowell's view. it by reflection alone, We should note that various texts leave it unclear whether weakerthesis: thefollowing McDowell accepts(2) or merely slightly that/?,then5"s epis(20 If S has factivereasons forbelieving thatp is constituted for believing temicjustification solely alone. by factsthatS can know by reflection But no matter whetherMcDowell accepts (2) or (2'), he will be committedto rejecting(NEG). To see why, consider the following argument: that/?,then5"s epis(2') If S has factivereasons forbelieving thatp is constituted for believing temicjustification solely alone. by factsthatS can know by reflection alone are facts (R) The onlyfactsthatS can knowby reflection envatted thatwouldalso obtainin S's recently duplicate. thatp, thenS's epis(3') If S has factivereasons forbelieving thatp is constituted for believing temicjustification solely enwith her in common has that S recently by properties vattedduplicate. (NEGO If S has factivereasons for believingthat/?,then the thatp is at / in believing extentto whichS is justified envatwhich extent to S's as the the same recently just thatp. at /in believing ted duplicateis justified (R), Now, we could read McDowell as accepting(20, but stillrejecting of McDowell's entails Since and rejection (NEGO, (NEG) (NEC). (30, McDoSo whether the him to commits rejecting popular(NEG). (NEGO to rejecting well accepts (2) or the weaker (20, he is still committed McDoin explaining and defending (NEG). Given thatwe're interested is explicto show thatthisrejection of (NEG), we intend well'srejection thesis evenifMcDowell holdsthestronger able and defensible (2).
McDowell's positionclearly thetraditional epistemological challenges thathas (R) at itscore. On theone hand,it insists thattheagent picture least the thefactors be able to access (at knowledgeable agent) reflectively thatmake herjustified in herbeliefs. This requirement seemsto make his viewinternalist. On theotherhand,however, it also demandsthatin certain cases one's epistemicstandingrequiresthat certain"outer" facts obtainotherthanthetruth of thebelievedproposition, and thisseemsto make his view externalist. Once (R) is rejected,however,these two McDowell's acceptanceof aspectsof the view are no longerin conflict. - particularly accessible factivereasons wherethese reasons reflectively concernempirical entails that the facts thatone can know propositions reflection are not restricted to the "inner" in this by way,and can instead, as it were,reachright out to theexternal world,to the"outer". One has reflective access to factsthatwould not obtainof one's recently envatted it suggests that the duplicate,on McDowell's picture.If thisis correct, distinction between "inner" and "outer" which popular epistemological derivesfrom(R) should be rejected, or at least our understanding of it shouldbe radically revised. It is their prior commitmentto (R) that has ensured that commentators on McDowell's positionhave failedfully to engage with his view. For example,whenCrispinWright reads McDowell, he (2002) doesn'ttakethefactivity ofempirical reasonsseriously, onlythereflective access requirement. on his reading, whatone has reflective Accordingly, access to are simplynon-factive empiricalreasons,and thus McDowell ends up offering a fairly familiar form of epistemic In particinternalism. the that are reflecular, Wrightargues that,strictly speaking, grounds tivelyaccessible to one are not factiveempiricalreasons, but rather reasons of the following disjunctive generalform(in the case of seeing one sees that/?, or one is in a delusionalstate.Naturally, this that):either does not entail for to since the entailment fact, disjunction any empirical followone would first need to be able to discharge the second disjunct, whichWright thinks is impossible of because of thepossibility something scenarios whichare indistinguishable from life. On this sceptical everyday who emphasizes the then,McDowell is just a classicalinternalist reading, of accessible reasons without allowing such importance reflectively reflective access to applyto factive reasons.3 empirical
3 We thinkthat the presenceof the scepticalproblemhere confusesthe issue, since even if one grantsthatone could have reflective access to factive reasons, empirical it is a further question whetherthis concessionenables McDowell to adequately it the two issues together respondto the scepticalproblem.Accordingly, by running can seem thatthe problemis the existence of reflectively accessiblefactive empirical of such reasons to the scepticalproblem.For reasons,ratherthan the applicability an argumentagainst a McDowellian employment of empiricalfactivereasons in see Pritchard (2003). responseto the scepticalproblem,
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to (R) has promptedothers to In contrast,a prior commitment as a version of epistemic McDowell offering straightforward regard John Greco (2004), for example, takes McDowell's disexternalism. of reasons seriously but downplays, as a cussion of the factivity accessible.Conresult,his claim that such reasons can be reflectively sider the following passage:
Accordingto McDowell, genuineperception gives one "a satisfactory standingin the space or reasons,"whereasmereillusiondoes not. In but not illusion, otherwords,genuineperception, givesriseto positive But on McDowell's the difference between status. view, epistemic that is knowand mere illusionis not something genuineperception alone. Hence, McDowell's view entails EE able by introspection (Greco, 2004, 8) externalism]. [epistemic
to suggestthat McDowell does not thinkthat AlthoughGreco is right that one is the victimof a radical one can tell,just by introspection, is to he wrong thinkthat on McDowell's view it scepticalhypothesis, one's knowledge, whereit is supported followsthatsometimes therefore be must also supported by further by a factive empirical reason, accessible facts. Instead, McDowell's thesisis that all non-reflectively that is requiredfor knowledgein these cases is that one formsone's on the basis of one's (possessionof the) beliefin the targetproposition reason.4 factive accessible reflectively in the backdiscussionof McDowell, (R) is lurking As withWright's ground here. Greco's guiding thought seems to be that since one betweenpossessinga factive cannot tell the difference empiricalreason a reason to such and merely (perhapsbecause one has seeming possess of one's that the been radicallydeceived),it follows standing epistemic accessible(the beliefrestsupon the combinationof what is reflectively that is that one either, say, seeing p or in a proposition disjunctive accessible fact delusional state) plus the relevant non-reflectively takes obtaining(that one is not in a delusionalstate). WhereasWright accessible empirical reasons McDowell's demands for reflectively and thus downplaysthe factivedimensionof these reasons, seriously, of the reasons at face value and therefore Greco takes the factivity
4 knowlOf course,it has to be thecase- and will be thecase, if she has the relevant - thatthe agentis not in a delusionalstate,but the point is thatthe obtaining edge of the is not a pre-requisite of this fact,while entailedby the agent's knowledge, a logical consequenceof it. That is, one can know agent's knowledgebut merely accessible factive thatp simplyin virtueof being in the possessionof a reflective - that the existenceof this knowledge reason for p and believing p on this basis accessibleto the subjectdoes not show factsthatare not reflectively entailsfurther accessiblefacts. restson further thatthisknowledge non-reflectively
holds that for McDowell the epistemicstandingof one's true belief restson further accessiblefactsobtaining. non-reflectively On neither reading, however, do we accurately capture McDowell's view, and this is because McDowell rejects (R). If we are to evaluate McDowell's positionit is essentialthat we notice this featureof his view.
2
So, as we read him,McDowell accepts (1) and (2), but he rejects(R), (3), and (NEG). We take it that one key worrythat commentators may have about McDowell's grounds for rejecting(R)- a worry which may prompt them to suppose that McDowell can't possibly - is that McDowell's hold the position that, in fact, he does hold for seem to a counterintuitive result, grounds rejecting(R) generate one that mirrors the much discussed"McKinsey-style" of the reductio combinationof a standardversionof contentexternalism and the thesis that we have privileged access to the contents of our own result does not follow thoughts.5 Showing that this counterintuitive from McDowell's view should therefore be useful in helping many to take his position more seriously.In this section, epistemologists we will first explain McDowell's grounds for rejecting (R), and then we will set out the counterintuitive result that may be McKinsey-like to follow from those thought grounds. what are McDowell's grounds for rejecting So, first, (R)? Consider again the contentionthat one's reasons are always reflectively accessible to one. The natural way to interpretthis claim is as saying that one is always in a position to know, by using only one's reflective and a priorireasoning, capacities,such as introspection what one's reasons are. Call this the reflective accessibility of reasons thesis: (RAR) One is in a position to know, by using only one's reflective capacities,what one's reasons are forbelieving thatp. This thesisis quite popular. What is unusual is McDowell's conjoining reasons,such as (RAR) withtheclaim thatthereexistfactive empirical thatone sees that/?. Call thisthe/activity of reasonsthesis:
See McKinsey(1991). For a collectionof recent articleson thisreductio, see Nuccetelli(2003).

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reasonsforbeliefs about the (FAR) There are factive empirical world. external McDowellian theNow, (RAR) and (FAR) jointlyimplythedistinctive sis (McD): (McD) One is in a position to know, by using only one's reflective capacities,what one's reasons are for believing thatp even whenthosereasonsare (as theysomereasons. timesare) factive empirical But this last claim is incompatible with (R) - since one's factive empirical reasons are reasons that one does not share with one's recentlyenvatted duplicate. We think that McDowell's reason for rejecting(R) is that it conflictswith (McD), the conjunction of (RAR) and (FAR). To understandMcDowell's view, we need to recognizethat he accepts both (RAR) and (FAR), and so accepts (McD). thatby accepting It may seem,however, (McD) we get the following of a factiveempirical is in that an possession agent problem.Suppose 'R (/?)': as will abbreviate which we reason forbelieving /?, (A) R (p) Given (RAR), it followsthat this agent is in a position to know by alone that she has this reason. We will abbreviatethis as reflection 'OKAP (R (p))': (B) OKAP (R (p)) The problemshould now be apparent:if the agent is even reasonably thenit is possible forher to come to know, intellectually sophisticated reason forbelieving if she has a factive that reflection, empirical just by true: be must then p /?, (C) OKAP (R {p) -> p) Putting (B) and (C) together with the closure of knowledge under known entailment, however, seems to entail that one could that the empiricalproposition come to know,just by reflection, p is true: (D) OKAP (p)
however,this cannot be the case; how could one ever Intuitively, come to know, by reflection alone, factsabout the externalworld? It seems that one cannot accept both (RAR) and (FAR), on pain of absurdity.It is no wonder, then, that those who read McDowell do not take his endorsementof both (RAR) and (FAR) at face value and instead treat him as emphasisingthe one thesis over the other. 3 McDowell can rebut this objection. Notice that the conclusion we just argued for is counterintuitive only if the agent concerned is acquiring knowledge of the external world via reflection.If, for example, we could show that the agent could gain her reflective knowledgeof her own reasons only provided she already had empiricalknowledgeof the relevantbit of the externalworld, then this would disarm the argument above. Rather than being a reductio of McDowell's view, the argumentcould be understoodas showing that if one already has empiricalknowledgeof the externalworld, then one is able to discover by reflectionthat one has such knowledge. But there is nothing obviously absurd about that conclusion. There is one reading of McDowell (though not one that we endorse, as we explain below) on which this way of disarmingthe - offered, available. Accordingto this reading for problemis directly example,by BarryStroud (2002) it is part of McDowell's view that if one is in possessionof a reason for believing p then this will itself entail that one has the beliefthatp. Accordingly, since nothingmore is requiredfor knowledgethat p on the McDowellian view than the factivereason for p and the belief,on this basis, that /?,it follows directlyfrom the possession of the factive reason for p that one knowsp. It oughtto be clear that on thisreadingof McDowell he can evade the counterintuitive conclusion of the argumentabove. After all, to say thatone can know by reflection accordingto thisinterpretation, thatone is in possessionof a factive to reason is tantamount empirical that one can come to know is in reflection that one saying by possession of empiricalknowledgeof the propositionwhichthis reason is a factivereason for believing.If that is right, then it certainly can't be the case that one can use this reflective access in order to acquire reflective knowledge of the target empirical proposition,since the reflective access to the reason alreadypresupposes the empirical knowledge in question.
In otherwords,assume that one is able to know by reflection alone reason: thatone is in possessionof a factive empirical (p) OKAP (R (p)) that something is One cannot be in a position to know by reflection followsthat one must be in the case if it isn't the case, so it directly reason: empirical possessionof a factive (q) R (P) On the view underconsideration, however,one cannot have a factive without reasonforbelieving believing p on its basis: p (r) B (p) And since thereis nothingmore to knowledgeon McDowell's view than the possession of a factive reason and the relevant belief (formed on this basis), it follows that one must have empirical knowledge(which we will abbreviateas 4K') of the targetproposition: (s) K (p) one cannot come to know an empiricalpropositionby Accordingly, access to the factthat reflection alone, since in orderto have reflective one is in possession of the relevantfactiveempiricalreason, it must alreadybe the case that one has empiricalknowledgeof that proposiconditionalintrotion. We can make this point explicitby employing ductionto derive(t): (t)OKAp(R(p)) -> K(p)
that one is in In words,if one is in a positionto know by reflection then one has empirical for reason of a factive /?, empirical possession this follow from that one can it doesn't course Of that p. knowledge alone. reflection that p by acquire knowledge
4
There are problems for such a reading of McDowell, however,for a gap betweenone's factivereasons and one's (knowledgeably without held) belief,it is hard to understandone's factivereasons as one's reasonsfor one's (knowledgeably held) belief,ratherthan just being
In any case, McDowell's held belief.6 equivalentto one's knowledgeably view is clearly that one can be in possession of a factiveempirical reason forbelieving a proposition and yet not believethat proposition for (see, example,McDowell, 2002, 277-8). Given that thisis the case, we need to see if there'sanotherway to block the seemingly counterintuitive of (RAR) and (FAR). consequenceof theconjunction The resolution of this problemlies in the fact that in orderfor the in our to the conclusion/?, agent exampleabove to make the inference it in she willneed to form thebelief thatp (ifshe has not alreadyformed advance of theinference). withherpossessionof a This, in combination factive her belief reason forbelieving that/?, and her forming empirical thatp rationally thatour agent on thebasis of thatreason,willguarantee meetsall theconditions forempirical thatp. Again, then,we knowledge can show that,even if theagentdoes acquire knowledge of theexternal worldby goingthrough theprocessof reflecting reasons upon herfactive and making the necessaryinferences, the knowledgethat she thereby inference An agentwho performs the McKinsey-style gains is empirical. in questionsatisfies sufficient forhavingempirical conditions knowledge of theconclusion, to hergaining evenifit happensto be causallyrelevant thatempirical thatshe engagedin somereflection. knowledge To elaborate: suppose that our protagonisthas gained reflective (whichwe will abbreviateas 4Kap) thatshe is in possession knowledge of a factiveempirical reason for believing/?,and has also gained reflective entailment: of the relevant knowledge (a) KAP (R (/?)) (b) KAP (R (p) -* p) The problematic inference now immediately follows: (c) KAP (p)
/?,and Suppose, for example,that one says that one knows a certainproposition, one is asked, 'How do you knowpT. Althoughthereis a sense in whichsayingin thatone knows responseto this,i can see thatp\ is a littlelike simplyre-iterating - namely,that you gained information /?,note that this assertiondoes add further about the source of this information the knowledgevia your sight. Furthermore, - depending your knowledgealso appeals to a certainpedigreeof the knowledge at issue,seeingthatp can be a better way of comingto know upon the proposition reasonis normally seen thatp than,say, hearingthatp. Thus, thecitingof a factive as offering epistemicsupportfor a knowledgeclaim, ratherthan simplyrepeating form. thatclaim in a different
392
of knowlNotice, however,that it followsfrom(a), via the factivity in that the has the factive reason agent empirical question: edge, (d) R (p) from(a) and (b) to (c), she Moreover,if the agentmakes the inference will have the beliefin the targetproposition p (this is entailedby the issue in she cannot have such knowledgewithout at (c) knowledge thatp): believing (e) B (p) since the agent's beliefthatp arises out of her recogniFurthermore, reason givesforthe target tion of the supportthe factive empirical proposition/?,her belief that p will be based on this factiveempirical and thisbeliefis justified since she reason. So the agentbelievesthat/?, reason. holds it on the basis of a factive Moreover,since the empirical it followsthatthe beliefis true,and hence reason is factive, supporting truebeliefin p. Finally,sincetheagent'sjustifitheagenthas a justified cation consistsof a beliefthat is based on a factiveempiricalreason, here to prevent thereis no way forGettier-style problemsto intervene that since what her belief also guarfrom the agent /?, justifies knowing antees that the belief is true. Thus, the agent has a justified,true, reason.7 beliefthatp that is based on a factiveempirical unGettiered the of for her to have empirical But this is sufficient target knowledge and therefore: /?, proposition (0K(/?) that if one has Thus we can conclude,using conditionalintroduction, of reais in a factive that one reflective empirical possession knowledge son, and one also has reflective knowledgethat this reason entailsthe forwhichit is a reason,thenit followsthatone has empirproposition of the target ical knowledge proposition:
7
There are two ways in which a justifiedtrue beliefcould be Gettiered.The first involveshavinga truebeliefon the basis of groundsthatdon't guaranteeits truth; and possessinggroundsthatguaranwhilethe second involveshavinga truebelief, but not properly of thisbelief, tee the truth basingthe truebeliefon thosegrounds. withherewill not be subjectto either It should be clear the agentwe are concerned chalShe is immuneto the first of thesestylesof Gettier typeof Gettier challenges. the truth of p; and she is reason forbelieving p guarantees lengebecause her factive to the second typeof Gettier immune challengebecause her beliefthatp is based on reasonthatshe has forbelieving the factive p.
(g) (KAP (R (p)) & KAP (R {p) -> p)) -> K (p) But it follows from this that, on the present interpretation of McDowell's view, one does not acquire knowledgeof the external world by reflection alone. That's because the conditions that are of the McKinsey-likeform necessaryfor one to make an inference describedabove are also sufficient for one to possess such knowledge in inference, empirically.So either one makes the McKinsey-style which case one satisfiessufficient conditionsfor possessingempirical knowledgeof the truthof the conclusion;or one does not make the in whichcase one does not gain knowledge inference, McKinsey-style of the truthof the conclusion by reflection alone. Either way, on McDowell's view one cannot gain knowledgeof the externalworld alone. by reflection 5 In summary, would accept thatthe manycontemporary epistemologists inference is following two-stage truth-preserving: forbelieving thatp is constituted (2) 5"s epistemic justification facts that can S know reflection alone. solelyby by alone are facts (R) The onlyfactsthatS can knowby reflection thatwouldalso obtainin S"s recently envatted duplicate. forbelieving thatp is constituted (3) S"s epistemic justification that has in withherrecently S common solelyby properties envatted duplicate. at t in believing that (NEG) The extentto whichS is justified p is just the same as the extentto which S"s recently envatted at t in believing thatp. duplicateis justified Thus, theyassume that anyone who accepts (2) must accept (NEG). But thisis not so. McDowell accepts (2), and is in thissense an interalso rejects nalist, but he rejects(R), (3), and (NEG), and therefore (NEC) Why does McDowell reject(R)? Because its denial is entailed of (RAR) and (FAR). by theconjunction This conjunctionhas been thoughtto lead to an absurd result.As we have argued, however,on eitherreadingof McDowell the absurd resultthat'sbeen alleged to followfromthe conjunction of (RAR) and
(FAR) in fact does not followfromthat conjunction.If we are right result has promptedcommentators not to that this counterintuitive view seriously, thenshowing take McDowell's avowed epistemological thisproblemshould go some way thatthesetwo thesesdo not generate to stana coherentalternative towardsshowingthat McDowell offers and also to standardforms of externalism.8 of internalism dard forms References in Epistemology'. and Externalism PhiAlston,W. (1986). 'Internalism losophicalTopics 14, 179-221. Conee, E. and Feldman, R. (2001). 'InternalismDefended', In: H. Kornblith, (ed.). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Oxford:Blackwell, pp. 231-60. and Skepticism'.In: R. Shantz, (ed.). 'Externalism J. Greco, (2004). and IntentionThe Externalist Challenge:New Studieson Cognition ality.New York: de Gruyter. J. (2004). 'Williamsonon Evidenceand Knowledge',PhilosophJoyce, ical Books 45, 296-305. Truth,and Coherence', Lehrer,K. and Cohen, S. (1983). 'Justification, 55, 191-207. Synthese McDowell, J. (1998a). 'Knowledge and the Internal',Meaning KnowLondon: Harvard University Press,pp. 395-413. ledge,and Reality, J. McDowell, (1998b). 'Knowledge by Hearsay', Meaning,Knowledge London : Harvard University and Reality, Press,pp. 414-43. McDowell, J. (2002). 'Responses'. In: N. H. Smith, (ed.). Reading London: Routledge, McDowell: On Mind and World, pp. 269-305. and 'Anti-Individualism M. Access', AnaPrivileged (1991). McKinsey, lysis5\, 9-16. and NuccetelliS , (ed.). (2003). New Essays on SemanticExternalism MIT Press. Massachusetts: . Cambridge, Self-Knowledge Pritchard,D. H. (2003). 'McDowell on Reasons, Externalismand 11, 273-94. of Philosophy EuropeanJournal Scepticism'. and the Groundingof Thought' Stroud, B. (2002). 'Sense-Experience In: N. H. Smith,(ed.). Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, London: Routledge, pp. 79-91. T. Williamson, (2000). 'Scepticism and Evidence'. Philosophyand Research60, 613-28. Phenomenological
Thanks to Michael Brady,JessicaBrown,Sandy Goldberg,Adrian Haddock, and Alan Millar fordiscussionof issues relatedto the topic of thisarticle.Thanks also to two anonymousreferees.
C. (2002). '(Anti-) SkepticsSimple and Subtle: G. E. Moore Wright, Research and John McDowell'. Philosophy and Phenomenological 65, 331-49.
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MCDOWELL AND THE NEW EVIL GENIUS 383

See McKinsey(1991). For a collectionof recent articleson thisreductio, see Nuccetelli(2003).

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