FEATURE

NEW ZEALAND FORCES

By Mark Romanow

ew Zealands main defence constraints are her small population and size, her 200nm EEZ which is the worlds fourth largest covering some 3 million sq. km and her remoteness being located in the South Pacific. Constitutionally NZ Ministry of Defence (MOD) [Maori Manatu Kaupapa Waonga] is responsible for Niue and the Cook and Tokelau Islands with defence commitments ranging over a vast area of the Pacific Ocean from Tokelau in the north to the Antarctic continent in the south.

The NZ Defence Force (NZDF) recently completed its largest deployment of personnel overseas since the Korean war when it had over 1,000 personnel from all three services committed to the international force in East Timor. This commitment is still ongoing as the Kiwis are maintaining a battalion group, the 2ND Bn Royal NZ Infantry Regiment (RNZIR) which is replacing the 1ST Bn RNZIR, as part of the UN Transitional Authority. As mentioned in a recent government report the NZDF has been continuously involved in peacekeeping duties, principally with the United Nations, since 1952. Over 4,000 personnel have been deployed to peacekeeping missions in that time. The NZDF is currently deployed on 15 peace support operations world-wide across 14 locations ranging from the Sinai to Kosovo and Bougainville. Operations such as these have garnered strong support as shown by recent public opinion polls that have shown an 85% approval rate for peacekeeping. There has also been rotational frigate deployments to the

Gulf to support the Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) plus a mechanised company attached to the British in Bosnia. The 1997 Defence Review acknowledged that the continued stability of South-East Asia is one of our most important security goals. It is second only to the common security of Australia and NZ. The Asia Pacific Region is the only region where arms spending is increasing and the potential for conflict is increased due to continuing tensions on the Korean peninsula, between China and Taiwan and with conflicting territorial claims in the area. This is partially addressed by the formal security obligations of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) linking NZ with Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and the United Kingdom. Due to her remoteness NZ forces are annually required to travel vast distances to take part in FPDA exercises in the South China Sea. NZ forces have greatly benefited from the training opportunities available under the FPDA.

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Flag

The defence relationship with Singapore is the second most active after Australia with an extensive range of defence exercises occurring regularly. A benefit of this mutual cooperation, which has seen numerous training opportunities for Singapore forces in NZ and the basing of some equipment, is assistance to the NZDF w henever required as with the introduction of the Mistral VLLAD system.

Basic Facts: NEW ZEALAND

Total Area 268,680 sq km. [two-island nation, slightly larger than UK] Also: Antipodes; Auckland; Bounty; Campbell; Chatham and Kermadec Islands Democratic monarchy Wellington Predominantly mountainous with some large coastal plains. Lies across the Tasman Sea SE of Australia. 3.8 million (April 2000)

Government Capital Terrain

Population

Ethnic Gr oups 74.5% NZ European, 9.7% Maori, 4.6% European, 3.8% Pacific Islander, 7.4% Asian and other Religion 24% Anglican, 18% Presbyterian, 15% Roman Catholic, 10% Other, 33% unspecified or none English (official), Maori

Languages

As stated in the 97 Review Aus tralia is New Zealands closest and most important security partner. T he alliance wit h Aust ral ia, born of t he Canberra Pact an d formalised in ANZUS, remains central to New Zealands defence policy. The public opinion pol ls al so showed that a significant 94% consider the security of Australia to be very or fairly important to NZ. Reliance on Australia has increased ever since NZ implemented a nuclear free policy that weakened US defence relations. Since 1991, cooperation has been reinforced by a multitude of links as par t of Closer Defence Relations (CDR). These CDR have manifested themselves in a multitude of ways such as the joint ANZAC frigate program, joint exercises and training opportunities and the basing of RNZAF Skyhawks in Nowra to assist RAN fleet training. The 97 Review approved funding injections of some NZ$663 million over five years, on top of the baseline budget, for capital programs but this has been shown to be woefully inadequate, considering the range of required programs that currently lack funding. This is especially true considering the unfavourable downturn in the value of the NZ$ vs. the US$ as this drives up the cost of most capital acquisitions. Even more so than Canadian politicians, many in NZ do not seem to understand the benefits of maintaining an adequately funded general purpose military that would give the government a wider range of options. Defence spending has been cut by 30% over the past decade and currently stands at only 1.1 per cent of GDP which is well below international average. Post-election defence briefing papers have stated that the tight defence budgets of the 1980s and 1990s have resulted in a decline in current force equipment reliability, interoperability with friendly forces and combat viability. The opinion polls have shown this to be slipping out of step with public opinion as support for increasing government expenditure on defence has ri sen to over half t he respondents.

The governments previous stance was that security within the As iaPacific region is of prime importance to NZ. We are a mar itime regi on sur rounded by vast distances that can only be protect ed by a s trong and wellequipped naval and air for ce. a reform of defence force capabilities that focuses on land forces and downplays the need for a blue-water navy and air strike capability would dramatically reduce the deployment options available to a future government to respond to what is an uncertain future security environment. The new Labour government is in the midst of preparing a new Defence Assessment, to determine the future structure of the NZDF to enhance its ability to support peace support operations, it bills as the first comprehensive review of overall defence policy since the substant ive 1991 Review . T his seems to be mainly based on the conclusions of the Review of the lease of the F-16 report by former MP Derek Quigley, which is widely regarded as being based on highly flawed and erroneous assumptions, as well as using the conclusions, again heavily guided by Quigley, of the Defence Beyond 2000 report as the blueprint for its new humanitarian approach. This approach basically rests upon the tenements, as mentioned in the latest issue of NZ Defence Quarterly by commentator Colin James, that only such fighting is to be done and prepared for as is necessary to make or maintain peace and that only such money as is necessary for that limited capability is to be spent. This abrupt shift in strategic policy is already as witnessed by the recent decision to terminate the F-16 lease to free up transport funds and for re-equipping of the RNZA. Additionally, it was decided against the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate in preference of smaller multi-role patrol vessels. The future roles of the RNZAF and RNZN would seem to be as glorified transport forces for the RNZA as borne out by a recent proposal, as noted in a recent issue of the Australian Business Defence Review, to downsize the combat capability of the RNZN and sell the two ANZAC frigates back to Australia. Meanwhile the RNZAF is unlikely to be able to replace its Skyhawks once they

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must be retired by 2007 as it is unlikely that funds, much greater than the generous NZ$124.8 million for two five-year leases, NZ$238.2 million for support equipment and start-up costs for the F16 deal plus NZ$287 million for outright purchase, would be approved. This is unfortunate considering the 1999 Annual Report stated that NZ would contribute effectively to the common security of the Australia-NZ strategic area by maintaining defence capabilities that are interoperable with those of Australia and that can look after New Zealands fair share of the defence burden. This approach is at odds with the fundamental tenants of NZ defence policy and is likely to alienate both regional allies, and the US, as both naval and air combat capabilities are fundamental in demonstrating that NZ is serious abou t its own defence and

committed to regional security. This ignores the prevailing environment, such as instability in Indonesia, the rise of nationalism and expanding military capabilities of key regional states, as even Australia has the perception that the post-Cold war strategic environment has deteriorated and is publishing a new White Paper this year to reflect this updated strategic assessment of the region.

Royal NZ Army (RNZA)

The RNZA is structured around two regular land force groups based on the two main islands and would provide the capacity for one to command the field brigade while the other oversees sustainment arrangements. There are plans in place to expand the size of the Army to 4,900 by 2005/6 as well as adding a fourth rifle company to each regular force battalion (Bn), commencing in 2001 and completing by 2005. It is the main beneficiary of a NZ$500 million reequi pment progr am that aims to upgrade the RNZAs: mobility; communications; surveillance and fire-support capabilities. This is because, as noted by the NZ PM, Dr Helen Clark, we feel if there is one thing that has let us down in our overseas deployments, it is the antiquated nature of the NZ Armys equipment, and that is right at the top of our priority list for significant expenditure. At the top of the list is the program to provide new wheeled armoured vehicles, based on the Diesel Division G eneral Motors of Canada LAV-III / Bison APC family and their Australian ASLAV variants to replace the current tracked fleet which is proving very expensive to keep operating. This is expected to comprise 24 fire-support vehicles (FSV) and some 80 infantry mobility vehicles (IMV) configured for various roles. The FSV/IMV project will provide the RNZA with enough vehicles to motorise one RF Bn group and a company of the second Bn with approval to purchase to be presented to the government mid-year for an in service date of mid-2002. There is presently a program in place to refurbish 150 Unimog medium trucks to double their operational life to thirty years and allow the

medium vehicle replacement program to be postponed until at least 2010. The MOD already purchased 30 (out of total of 115) Holden Rodeo 4WD vehicles for the East Timor deployment out of a total of 423 new Light Operational Vehicles (LOV) being purchased to replace the Armys 567 obs olete Landrovers with the total purchase including some 115 non-military vehicles and the balance as standard military vehicles. A program to acquire Sincgars tactical radios under a FMS from the US is underway to improve interoperability with likely allies. New FN heavy machine guns have been acquired for Point Direct Fire Support Weapon (DFSW) role although tenders have been deferred for the Area DFSW and the Medium Range Anti-Armour Weapon as have targeting systems for the Point DFSW and the VLLAD detachment.

CURRENT DEFENCE BUDGET Cur rent Force Levels: A rm y 4,500 personnel

(plus 5,000 Territorial Force)

Royal NZ Navy (RNZN)

Of the three services the RNZN [Maori Te Taua Moana O Aotearoa] is presentl y in the best shape as it recently completed the acquisition of two ANZAC frigates for NZ$927.3 million as part of a joint Australian-NZ purchase and an ANZAC Combat System Tactical Training and System Support Facility in Auckland, while a Bridge Simulator has been ordered for installation at Devonport naval base to be operational by September 2000. Allowances have been made to fit Harpoon SSMs at a future date and are fitted for, but not with, a Phalanx CIWS. Also planned is the acquisition of a towed array sonar system for the ANZACs plus the procurement of the Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) which will allow the eight-cell Mk 41 VLS which currently carries 8 RIM-7P Seasparrow to accommodate 32 quad-packed ESSM. Approval has finally been received to proceed with the phase three conversion of the former Ro-Ro ferry Charles Upham, acquired in December 1994 but under commercial charter for the last three years, into an operational military Sealift ship as the 1991 Review noted the RNZN had insufficient transport to deploy and sustain a reinforced battalion group away from NZ. The delay in implementing the modifications has

NZ$1.6 billion (US$__?)

26 Recce (Scorpion: 18 in storage) 78 Tracked APC (M-113) 43 Towed 105mm artillery (incl. 24 Hamel) Army Unit Formations (RF = Regular Force, TF = Territorial Force) 1 8 1 1 1 1 3 Bde (2 RF plus 1 composite TF Inf Bn) Infantry Bns (2 RF + 6TF) Armoured Regt (Joint RF/TF) plus TF Recce Sqn SAS Group (2 RF Squadrons) Artillery Regt (Joint RF/TF) plus TF Bty Engineer Regt (RF) plus 1 TF Sqn Logistics Regt

Navy:
3 7 1 1

1,861 personnel

(plus 381 Volunteer Reserves)

Frigates (2 ANZAC, 1 Leander) IPC/MCM, inshore survey (2 laid up) Replenishment ship Ro-Ro (future Military Sealift) ship

Air Force :
19 7 6 4/5 14

3,065 personnel

Strike aircraft (A-4K Skyhawk) Transports (5 C-130H, 2 B727) Maritime Patrol (P-3K Orion) Light Maritime helicopters (SH-2F/G Seasprite) Light Tactical Transport helicopters (UH-1H Iroquois)

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been sorely felt as HMNZS Upham was unavailable for the East Timor deployment. The remaining 5 operational Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) of the indigenously designed and produced MOA class are operated by the RNZNVR and provide a limited MCM capability for NZ harbours, similar to that provided by the better armed Canadian Kingston class MCDVs, although it is planned to add a remote minehunting system. The decision to walk away from the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate is ill considered as the former Chief of Naval Staf f (C NS) Rear Adm. Fred Wilson noted that based on our analysis, four ANZAC frigates are required to meet current output requirements and fully meet the defence policy objectives. As noted by the current CNS Rear Adm. Peter McHaffie the ANZAC scores in terms of endurance, interoperability, supportability, and the logistics availability that comes by being part of a 10ship program with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). A previous CNS Rear Adm. Jack Welch notes that an analysis of smaller Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) being procured as an ANZAC alternative reveals that they are not as cheap overall as their capital cost would suggest. The Navy would have to purchase the infr astruct ure t o suppor t yet another class of ship and would need to train for additional special skills to man them. In a small navy such as ours, the effect would be quite profound and costly. A possible decision to dispose of the ANZACs for $500 million and purchase a new class o f patrol vessel would be a mistake because of the considerable investment outlay for both the frigates and their shore based infrastructure. Besides, as Welch noted in terms of force structure, the OPV does not sit well in the NZ situation. This is a small island nation which is assessed as unlikely to be territorially threatened in the foreseeable future. It follows that the Navy does not need to develop a force specifically for territorial defence The OPV is, by its size, limited in its ability to contribute to operations with a coalition force at long distances from NZ, in all weathers and for long periods. The frigate does not have these limitations.

The pur chase of a third ANZAC frigate would make fiscal sense as it would allow for the operational rotation of one deployed on MIF type missions and as noted in the 97 Review the Southern Ocean includes some of the roughest seas. The farthest part of the C ook Islands, for w hich we have defence responsibilities, is 4,000 km from NZ. To overcome the operational limitation of a small navy the RNZN could sign an Admiral Benelux type agreement with the RAN similar to that signed by the Belgian and Dutch navies. Operation as an integrated fleet would strengthen capability in peacekeeping, SAR and humanitarian operations and financial benefits would accrue through joint logistics procurement and training while fully utilising common infrastructures.

Royal NZ Air Force (RNZAF)

The RNZAF [Maori Te Hokowhitu o Kahurangi] operates its Iroquois fleet, which are currently receiving a lifeextension upgrade, in support of RNZA operations and the Maritime assets in support of t he RNZN. The ageing Skyhawks will require some NZ$35 million to extend their lives to 2007. The present Hercules are nearing the end of the expected service as they were some of the first H models off the production line and an option, in conjunction with the Australian buy, has been taken that is open till late 2002 on 5 C-130J models for purchase between 2005-2008. In conjunction with the ANZAC program 5 SH-2G Seasprite shipborne maritime helicopters have been purchased with deliveries having commenced this March and ending early in 2003, themselves complemented by a planned lightweight torpedo upgrade, and an interim capability being provided by 4 SH-2F which have already undertaken deployments in a full operational role. The Orions are being extensively upgraded under projects Kestrel and Sirius, having had their surveillance equipment partially upgraded in the early 1980s under project Rigel, in addition to having their obsolete autopilots replaced by early 2001. Kestrel seeks to extend airframe life by at least 20 years and should be complete by July 2001

while Sirius will comprehensively modernise the Orions tactical systems, and is similar to the Canadian planned Aurora Lift Extension project. It is suggested that it is still not too late for the NZ government to reverse its decision, influenced by the Quigley report that was highly biased towards cancellation, and continue with the lease of the 28 F-16s as this would provide new combat aircraft that would be operational until at least 2030, as supported by the 1998 Air Combat Future Options study that underpinned the origin al acquisition decision, and recoup the NZ$58 cost s already incurred, the suggested exit cost of NZ$11 million plus save the Skyhawk upgrade costs. Additionally, if the Skyhawks are sold to the Philippines for a nominal cost, just enough to cover the cost of the required ECM pods, this would show NZ commitment to regional stability. As not ed in the 99 Report the rebuilding of the NZDF is seen as a litmus test of NZs resolve and commitment to meet its fair share of the burden in maintaining peace, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. A reduction of air bases to Ohakea only, and the sale of the Macchi jet training fleet, plus participation in a multinatio nal trai ning scheme such as the NFTC should effect significant additional savings.

Prepared by Mark Romanow

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