(to be publishe d soon in Scienc e and Christian Belief ) Inde t e r m i n a c y , Divin e acti o n and Hum a n Fre e d o m John Byl

Abs t r a c t : This article exa m i n e s the idea that God creat e d the world to be inher e n tly indet er m i nis tic. It is argu e d that ontological indet er m i nis m is scientifically unwarrant e d , philosop hically ob ectiona bl e and theologically, inconsist e n t with a strong !iew of di!ine so! er eig n t y and pro!id e n c e . "uantu m m e c h a nics does not re#uire indet er m i nis m . $eith er do hu m a n free d o m nor moral respo n sibility, both of which are mor e plausibly !iew e d in co m p a ti bilist, rather than libertarian, ter m s . Key w or d s : indet er min a c y; God; quantu m mech a nics; hum a n freedo m Has God has creat e d the physical world so that it is inhere n tly nondeter ministic? numb e r of promin e n t writers on the scienc e!reli"ion interfac e thin# this is the case$ %or e&a m pl e' rthur (eacoc# e ass er t s that God cre a t e s throu " h law and chanc e $ )ons e q u e n tl y' the futur e of the physic al world is not fully det er mi n e d but' rath e r' open' so that not e*e n God #nows the futur e fully +,-$ ccordin" to (eacoc# e' God has so ma d e the world that ther e are cert ain are a s o*er which he has chos e n not to ha* e control$ By usin" chanc e God has self- limite d his omnipot e n c e and omniscie n c e $ God ta#e s ris#s$ He did this so that the world would produc e bein"s fit for fellowship with him +.-$ )hanc e ' (eacoc# e ass er t s ' ma nifes t s itself mainly throu " h qua n t u m unc er t ain t y and hu m a n freewill +/-$ 0n a similar *ein' 1eith 2ard ar"u e s that only throu"h non- deter ministic laws can there be room for creati*e freedo m to come to e&ist and to operat e +3-$ 4he ob5ect of this paper is to e&a min e some of the implications of this idea and to e&plore a deter ministic altern a ti*e$ 1. Quan t u m Choic e s and Chan c e 6uant u m mec h a nics is often cited as the prime e&a m pl e of physic al indet e r mi nis m $ ccordin" to qua n t u m mec h a nic s' a particle has both wa*e and particle prop e r ti e s $ 7ne cons e q u e n c e of this is that' at any insta n t ' we can me a s u r e accur a t el y eith e r the position or the *elocity ,

of a particle but not both at once (i$e$' the Heisen b e r " 8ncert ain t y (rinciple)$ noth e r cons e q u e n c e is that we can9t predict e&ac tly wher e an indi*idu al photo n' after pas sin" throu " h a slit' will hit a photo " r a p hic plat e$ :or can we tell e&ac tly when a particular radiu m ato m will dec a y$ ll we can calculat e are prob a bilities' so that' in the lon" run' we can predict precis e patt e r n s for lar"e nu mb e r s of e*e n t s $ funda m e n t al ques tion is wheth er such quantu m uncert ainties are mer ely huma n' episte m olo"ical artefacts' due to our inability to accura t ely mea s ur e micro- e*ents' or wheth er natur e is inhere n tly indeter ministic$ ;any physicists and theolo"ians ta#e the *iew that quant u m e*ent s are inhere n tly indeter ministic$ %or e&a m pl e' theolo"ian Gre" Boyd claims that quantu m mech a nics confirms that the future is partly open +<-$ =uch an interpre t a tion of quantu m mech a nics raises deep questions$ )onsider a radium ato m' about to decay$ 0n any "i*en instant it will either decay or not$ 2hat ma#e s the choice? 0n a deter ministic uni*ers e the choice fully dep e n d s- -althou" h perh a p s in a *ery complicat e d way- -on the pres e n t stat e of the uni*ers e$ But what ma#es the choice in an indet er ministic uni*ers e? 7ften it said that the choice is mad e by >chanc e?$ 4his raises the question: 2hat is >chanc e?? Generally' chance is mea n t here in the sens e of indeter minis m ' where there is more than one possible outco m e for an e*ent and it cannot in principle be predicte d' with certainty' which outco m e will occur +@-$ )hance' thus defined' is not itself a caus e but' rath er' indicat e s the absenc e of a sufficient caus e for an e*ent$ 4here is no reas on why a particular outco m e occurs$ 4hus 1eith 2ard ass ert s that no reaso n can be "i*en why a particular radiu m atom decays at a particular time' rath er than at some other time +A-$ He ar"u e s that physical e*ent s are not sufficiently deter min e d by their physical antec e d e n t s $ 4o such *iews Henry =tapp com m e n t s ' >;any physicists of today claim to belie*e that it is perfectly possible' and also satisfactory' for there to be choices that simply come out of nowher e at all$$$4he claim that the choice comes out of nowher e at all should be re"ard e d as an admission of conte m p o r a r y i"noranc e' not as a satisfactory final word? +B-$ Clsewher e he remar#s' >)hance is an idea useful for dealin" with a world partly un#nown to us$ But it has no rational place amon " ultimat e constitu e n t s of natur eD +E-$ 0ndeed' a basic principle of rational enquiry is that e*eryt hin" has a sufficient reas on$ 4his (rinciple of =ufficient Feason implies the (rinciple of )aus ality' which affirms that e*ery e*ent has a sufficient .

caus e$ 4o say that a qua n t u m choice is ma d e nothing ma# e s and actu a t e s the choice$ 4his of =ufficient Feas o n$ 4o say that an e*ent has science and to in*o#e ma"ic' in this cas e ma"ician$

by chanc e is to say that contr a dict s the (rinciple no caus e is to "i*e up on ma"ic without e*en a

=tanley Ja#i note s that the "re a t philosop h e r s ' includin" (lato' ristotle' quinas' and e*e n Hume' ass e r t e d that ther e was no such thin" as >chan c e ?+ , G-$ Ha*id Hume' for e&a m ple' com m e n t e d ' D0t is uni*ers ally allowed that nothin" e&ists without a caus e of its e&istenc e' and that chanc e' when strictly e&a min e d' is a mere ne" ati*e word' and me a n s not any real power which has anywh er e a bein" in natureD +,,-$ Father' they consider e d that what we call >chanc e? is 5ust a nam e for our i"noranc e of the actu al caus e$ How well establishe d is the claim that quant u m e*ent s ha*e no sufficient caus e? %irst' can we be certain that there is no sufficient physical caus e? 4o eliminat e all possible physical caus e s one must demo n s tr a t e that a quant u m e*ent is not fully deter min e d by the pres e n t stat e of the uni*ers e and!or the intern al stat e of the quantu m particle$ But neither of thes e is complet ely #nown- -or e*en #nowable- -to huma n in*esti"a tion$ How' then' can we be sure that there e&ists no inhere n t deter minis m at a deep e r physical le*el' as yet hidden from the huma n obser* er? 2e cannot definitely rule out the possibility that all quant u m e*ents ha*e sufficient physical caus e s $ =uppos e' for the sa#e of the ar"u m e n t ' that one could establish the definite abs e nc e of a physical caus e in quantu m e*ent s$ 4his still lea*es open the possibility of non% physical caus e s$ 4hes e mi"ht be huma n minds' spiritual bein"s such as an" els or demo n s' or e*en the direct action of God Himself$ =uch non- physical caus e s are' by definition' beyon d scientific enquiry$ 4hus it is scientifically unwarra n t e d to ass ert that the abs enc e of physical caus e entails the abs enc e of any caus e$ 4hat conclusion requires the m eta p h y sical assu m p tion that there are no non- physical caus e s $ 2e note in passin" that the abs e nc e of a sufficient physical caus e for quantu m e*ents implies the falsity of physicalis m' the notion that the uni*ers e is entirely e&plicable in terms of physical caus e s $ pplyin" the (rinciple of =ufficient Feason' it see m s rational that any caus al e&plan a tion of an e*ent' no matt e r how unli#ely or implausible' is prefer a ble to postulatin" no caus e at all$ Hence' the belief that quant u m e*ents are fully caus e d- --wheth e r by some (as yet) un#nown physical mech a nis m or by some non- physical force- -see m s rationally superior to the hypoth e sis that they ha*e no caus e at all$ /

2. Interpr e t i n g Quan t u m Mech a n i c s )ould one interpre t quant u m mech a nics so as to a*oid physical indeter min a c y? )ertainly$ 7ne possibility is to simply refrain from ma#in" any speculati*e ontolo"ical ass ertions about the quantu m realm$ BohrIs )openh a " e n 0nterpre t a tion' which still see m s to be the domina n t *iew of quantu m mech a nics' is bas e d on the notion that' as huma n s ' we cannot #now the quantu m world in itself$ 2e can only probe it *ia *arious classical e&perim e n t s $ 7n this *iew' scienc e does not describe nature as it is' but how it respon d s to our metho d s of obser* a tion$ 4his interpre t a tion is ess en tially positi*istic in that it is concern e d primarily with hum a n obser* a tions' lea*in" open what e* er may happ e n beyon d thes e$ 0t stres s e s our hum a n episte mic limitations$ lternati*ely' if one insists on buildin" a hypoth e tical mod el of the quant u m world' some quantu m theorists ha*e thou"h t it possible to construct mod els alon" deter ministic lines$ =uch a theory in*ol*es Dhidde n *ariablesD - quantities that do away with quantu m uncert ainty' but which cannot be me a s u r e d directly$ lbert Cinstein' in opposition to :iels Bohr' belie*ed that quantu m mech a nics should be e&plicable in terms of hidde n *ariables$ %a*ourin" hidd e n *ariable s is the fact that qua n t u m choices are in practic e constr ain e d to be within a *ery limited ran" e ' followin" a well- define d prob a bility function$ 4his su"" e s t s that the choice is perh a p s not "enuin ely rando m but det er mi n e d by definite laws at som e de e p e r ' sub- qua n t u m le*el$ )onsid er' for e&a m pl e ' a roulet t e whe el' wher e any indi*idu al e*e n t see m s to be due to chanc e ' altho u " h the outco m e s are similarly limited and predict a bl e when a*er a " e d o*er a lon" time$ Jet' in actu ality' any indi*idu al outco m e is precis ely fi&ed by the initial conditions $ 4hat the outco m e of the roulet t e whe el has the app e a r a n c e of chanc e is due only to our i"nor a n c e of the initial conditions and our inability to dedu c e the end result from the initial conditions$ ;i"ht the situa tion not be e&ac tly the sa m e for qua n t u m effects ? 0t thus see m s prud e n t to allow for possible det er mi nis tic sub- qua n t u m mec h a ni s m s $ :e*erth ele s s ' recent Bell-type e&perim e n t s +,.' ,/- ha*e put si"nificant constraints on hidden- *ariable theories$ ;ost importa n tly' it has been shown that hidde n- *ariable theories must *iolate >locality? (i$e$' the property of classical physical theories that forbids distant caus e s to ha*e instant a n e o u s nearby effects)$ *iable hidden- *ariable theory must thus be non- local$ :on- locality is in fact a prime featur e of Ha*id BohmIs pilot- wa*e model' which interpre t s quantu m mech a nics in terms of well- defined 3

deter ministic laws$ 0n Bohm9s model a particle always has both a precis e position and *elocity$ 4he force on each particle depe n d s on the precis e locations' at that instant' of all other particles in the uni*ers e$ 4he actu al calculation of thes e is in practice limited by our inability to me a s u r e precisely the initial conditions of the particle' as well as by our lac# of #nowled" e of the pres e n t confi"uration of the rest of the uni*ers e and how this influenc e s the particle$ Hence' althou" h Bohm9s model posits an ontological physical deter minis m' our huma n i"noranc e of initial conditions results in an episte m olo gical indet er minis m$ John (ol#in"horn e notes that the wor# of Ha*id Bohm and his collea" u e s shows that quant u m mech a nics can be interpre t e d within an ob5ecti*e' deter ministic ontolo"y +,3-$ Jet only a small minority of modern quant u m theorists support hidde n- *ariable mod els such as BohmIs$ ;ost dismiss hidden *ariables' due to the stran " e featur e s (e$"$' non- locality and myst erious pilot- wa*es) they entail$ Howe*er' altern a ti*e interpre t a tions of quantu m mech a nics are no less counter- intuiti*e$ 6uantu m mech a nics is una*oida bly nonclassical$ 4he ques tion is which featur e' if any' of the classical realm an interpre t a tion should retain$ (hysicist :ic# Herb er t cites ei"ht differe n t *iews of qua n t u m reality$ How is one to choos e amo n " thes e ? Herb er t writes: 4he qua n t u m reality proble m is' strictly spe a #in "' not a physics ques tio n at all' but a proble m in me t a p h y s ic s' conc er n e d as it is not with e&plainin" phe n o m e n a but with specul a tin " abou t what #ind of reality lies behind and supp ort s the phe n o m e n a $ $ $C a c h of thes e ei"ht realities from BohmI s neo- realist particle- plus- wa*e mod el to *on :eum a n n I s conscious n e s s - cre a t e d world is perfec tly comp a tible with the sam e quantu m facts$ 2e cannot use e&perim e n t s --or at least e&perim e n t s of the usual #ind- -to decide amon " thes e conflictin" pictures of what lies behind the pheno m e n al world$ +,<0t seems prudent to concur with Bohr that quantum mechanics puts a limit on human #nowled"e about the sub-quantum world$ ssertin" anythin" beyond that is speculati*e$ Here we must be "uided by our basic philosophical con*ictions$ 2hat philosophical "uidelines should we app e al to? John (ol#in"horn e 5ustifies an indet er minist *iew of quantu m mech a nics on the "round s that we should try to ma&imiKe the correlation betw e e n our #nowled" e and ontolo"ical belief +,@-$ Cpiste m olo" y' he ass erts' should be the "uide of ontolo"ical con5ectur e$ He su"" e s t s that the cumulati*e succes s of science pro*ides the neces s a r y support for the pursuit of this strat e " y$ <

0t see m s stran" e ' howe* er' that our ontolo"y should be "o*ern e d by hum a n i"noranc e$ 2hy should ob5ecti*e reality be limited to what huma n s can physically me a s u r e ? =uch an ontolo"y is unduly anthropoc e n t ric$ ny serious theist must surely repudiat e such a trunca t e d ontolo"y; theistic ontolo"y must not be dri*en by limitations of hum a n mea s ur e m e n t $ 0 conclud e that quant u m mech a nics' by itself' does not require physical indeter minis m$ 7ne may prefer an indeter minist interpretation of quant u m mech a nics' but such interpre t a tions ' li#e other interpre t a tions ' are moti*at e d lar"ely by prior philosophical and theolo"ical commit m e n t s $ . Divin e !ctio n in th e "hy si c a# $or#d 4here are further difficulties associat e d with physical indet er minis m$ 2hat implications would this ha*e for how God relate s to the physical world? )onsider GodIs pro*idenc e$ 4he tradition al )hristian position is that all thin"s came into bein" throu"h )hrist (Dall thin"s were creat e d by himD )ol$,: ,@ 1JL)$ God not only brou"h t all thin"s that e&ist into bein"' but He- -the %ather actin" throu" h )hrist- -also upholds the m (Dby him all thin"s consistD ()ol$,: ,A 1JL); Dupholdin" all thin"s by the word of his powerD (Heb$,: / 1JL)$ 4he uni*ers e is at all times entirely depe n d e n t on GodIs sustainin" power$ 2ithout GodIs continu al upholdin" 2ord the uni*ers e would instantly ceas e to e&ist$ GodIs continuin" action in the creat e d world can be unders to o d as consistin" of not only of GodIs pres er!ation of the world' but also His go!erna nc e ' whereb y He directs and rules o*er creation$ 4he "o*ern a n c e has to do with that continue d acti*ity of God where b y He rules all thin"s teleolo"ically so as to secure the acco mplish m e n t of the di*ine purpos e$ God is the primary caus e of all e*ent s$ He is the neces s a r y and sufficient caus e of all e*ent s$ C*erythin" occurs for a purpos e' in accord a nc e with GodIs compr e h e n si* e plan$ lthou"h God is the primary caus e of e*erythin"' He usually wor#s throu" h secondar y caus e s $ 0n sustainin" the uni*ers e from one mom e n t to the ne&t God "en er ally does so in accord a n c e with the properties He has assi"n e d to His creat ur e s $ God usually permits His creatur e s to act accordin" to their natur e s$ 0n particular' He norm ally allows huma n s to do what they want' ma#in" their own decisions$ Jet thes e huma n choices cannot be put into action without GodIs concurrenc e or cooper a tion$ 4hus e*ery norm al natural e*ent has two caus e s: a primary' di*ine caus e and a second a r y' natural caus e$ @

;iracles occur in thos e e&traordin ary cas es when God withholds His concurre nc e and substitut e s some other effect$ .1 "rovid e n c e and Chan c e s noted abo*e' many mod er n authors belie*e that God creat e s throu"h chanc e' so that not e*en God #nows the future outco m e of all e*ent s$ 4hey consider chanc e e*ents to be an inhere n t part of creation' neces s a r y for creatur e s to ha*e creati*e freedo m$ How is such a *iew of chanc e to be reconciled with the tradition al )hristian *iew of God? 0s it concei*able that God could creat e an entity whose actions are unpre dict a bl e e*en by God' its omniscient )reator? 4his see m s implausible$ 0f a quant u m e*ent were fully deter min e d then' no matt e r how complicat e d the chain of caus e s leadin" to the e*ent' an omniscient God would #now the outco m e $ 7n the other hand' if a quant u m e*ent is not fully deter min e d then it must be partly attribut e d to no caus e$ But' if God is the primary caus e of all that happ e n s ' this can mea n only that quantu m e*ent s ha*e no secondar y caus e and that God is here actin" directly ' in which case God must a"ain #now the outco m e $ uthors who postulat e that God wor#s throu" h chanc e rarely paus e to consider how God could creat e chanc e e*ents$ H$ J$ Bartholom e w is a notable e&ception$ He writes: D0t is difficult to concei*e of how God could be Irespo nsibleI in some sens e for pure chanc e without ha*in" desi"n e d the mech a nis m "i*in" rise to it$ =pea#in" person ally' 0 find it impossible to frame any stat e m e n t about GodIs action in "ener a tin" rando m e*ents which a*oids the notion of desi"n on his part and so 5ustifies us in sayin" that chanc e e*ents are without any e&plan a tion whats o e * e r$ 0t is more con"e nial to both faith and reason to suppos e that God "en er a t e s the requisite de"re e of rando m n e s s much as we do' by deter ministic mea n sD +,A4his implies that Dchanc eD e*ent s are actually fully deter ministic$ :e*erth ele s s ' Bartholom e w continu e s ' Dthis does not imply or require fore#nowled" e of the cons eq u e n c e s at the micro- le*el on GodIs partD +,B-$ He ar"u e s that' at botto m' chanc e is bound up with the notion of indep e n d e n c e rather than lac# of caus e$ Bartholo m e w ass ert s: D4o allow the e&iste nc e of pure chanc e in any sens e is rath er li#e sayin" that God can choos e to act so that his left hand does not #now what his ri"ht is doin"$ 7r to put it more formally: that there A

must be indep e n d e n t sources of indep e n d e n t action within the one Godhe a d$ 4here see m s to be nothin" lo"ically impossible in such a su"" e s tion but wheth er or not it can be usefully de*elop e d is not clear$D +,E4he notion that DGodIs left hand does nI t #now what his ri"ht and is doin"D entails a si"nificant limitation of GodIs self- #nowled" e of the pres e n t instant$ =uch a limitation of GodIs self- #nowled" e still see m s to lea*e the uni*ers e inhere n tly deter ministic and' thus' offers no e&plan a tion of chanc e e*ents$ 0t 5ust hamp e r s GodIs ability to ma#e predictions$ %urther' Bartholom e w I s su"" e s tion contradicts the omniscienc e' unity and simplicity "ener ally attribut e d to the God of the Bible$ ppeals to the multi- person ho o d of God do not help' since the orthodo& notion of the 4rinity ass erts an ess e n tial unity to God' particularly as it relate s to #nowled" e: each (erson is ess en tially and equally omniscient (%ather' , John /:.G; =on' ;att$ ,,:.A; Holy =pirit' 0 )or$.: ,,) +.G-$ Hence' the orthodo& concep tion of the biblical God see m s to lea*e little room for the notion that He could "ener a t e chanc e$ 4his conclusion is further stren" t h e n e d when we consider GodIs concurre nc e $ t each instant' if God is to actua t e the uni*ers e at the ne&t instant' He must ha*e prior #nowled" e of all intend e d actions of all His creat ur e s $ =uch #nowled" e is need e d for God to decide wheth e r or not He will concur$ Howe*er' if God can fully predict the ne&t state of the uni*ers e then' a"ain' chanc e see m s to be ruled out$ s it is written' Dthe lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposin" thereof is of the MordD ((ro*$,@:// 1JL)$ God deter min e s the outco m e of the lot' which to us may see m rando m$ rthur (eacoc#e tries to ma#e room for chanc e by su"" e s tin" that God has self- limited His omnipot e n c e and omniscienc e +.,-$ He su""e s t s that God has so mad e the world that there are certain areas o*er which He has chose n not to ha*e power' so that there are certain syste m s whose future state s are in principle un#now a bl e' e*en to God$ 0n a similar *ein' 2illiam lston "oes so far as to ass ert' >4o deny that God can *olunt arily limit Godself in this way would itself be to deny God9s omnipot e n c e ? +..-$ Howe*er' God9s omnipot e n c e mea n s that He can do all thin"s logically possible and consiste n t with His charact er$ %or a rational, omniscient' omnipot e n t God to construct a purely rando m ' indeter ministic mech a nis m see m s lo"ically impossible ' since it entails that God caus e s an effect (i$e$' a quantu m e*ent) that has no caus e$ %urther m or e' as stress e d by 1eith 2ard' GodIs omnipot e n c e and omniscienc e are neces s ar y properties of God +./-$ 4his mea n s ' contrary to what lston affirms' that God cannot "i*e up His omnipot e n c e B

without there b y ceasin" to be God$ God' as God ' neces s a rily must retain His full omnipot e n c e and omniscienc e at all times$ ccordin" to (eacoc#e' GodIs omniscienc e has to be constru e d as God #nowin" at any time what e* er it is lo"ically possible for Him to #now +.3-' which does not include as yet uncert ain future quantu m e*ent s +.<-$ :e*erth el e s s' e*en this limited definition of omniscienc e still implies complet e #nowled" e of the past and pres e n t$ 4his rules out Bartholom e w I s su"" e s tion that' at any instant' GodIs left hand does not #now what His ri"ht hand is doin"$ 2$G$ (ollard +.@- and' more recently' :ancey ;urphy +.Aad*oc at e that the appar e n tly rando m e*ent s at the quantu m le*el are all specific' intention al acts of God$ GodIs action at this le*el is limited in that (,) He resp ect s the inte"rity of the entities with which He coopera t e s (e$"$' He does nI t chan" e the electronI s mas s arbitrarily) and (.) He restricts His action to produc e a world that' for all we can tell' is orderly and law- li#e$ God is the hidden *ariable$ ;urphy ass ert s that this position is not only theolo"ically prefera ble to indet er minis m' but has the further ad*a nt a " e of consiste n cy with the principle of sufficient reaso n +.B-$ 7f cours e' if God is directly respo n sible for qua n t u m e*e n t s this ent ails that thes e are ther efor e predict a bl e by God$ Hence we are left with a det er mi nis tic uni*ers e ' at leas t at the qua n t u m le*el$ 0n short' the orthodo& *iew of GodIs pro*idenc e implies that the uni*ers e is fully deter min e d from GodIs persp ec ti*e$ 2heth er it is strictly deter min e d in terms of purely second a r y' physical caus e s remains an open ques tion$ =uch second ar y caus e s' e*en if they do e&ist' mi"ht well be too deep for finite hum a n s to fully compr e h e n d ' let alone utiliKe for prediction$ .2 Divin e Fore% n o w # e d g e and Chan c e ttemp t s ha*e been mad e to harmo niKe chanc e with GodIs fore#nowled" e of future e*ent s$ %or e&a m pl e' J$J$ Ha*is +.E- ass erts that' contrary to (eacoc#eI s limited *iew of di*ine omniscienc e' the Bible depicts God as ha*in" a rather complet e #nowled" e of future e*ent s (0s$ 3,- 3@)' e&te n din" e*en to huma n thou"ht s ((s$ ,/E: ,- @)$ 4his implies that God #nows also the outco m e of any future quantu m e*ents$ Ha*is see#s to squar e GodIs complet e omniscienc e with "enuine quant u m indeter minis m by me a n s of the notion of middle #nowled" e' which was first de*elop e d by the Jesuit theolo"ian Muis ;olina (,<</- ,@GG)$ ;olina tried to harmo niKe di*ine omniscienc e with huma n freedo m by ass ertin" that God has a special type of #nowled" e (>middle #nowled" e ?) of how a free a"en t would freely choos e in a "i*en hypoth e tic al situation$ 4his E

concept is e&ten d e d by Ha*is to quantu m e*ent s$ Ha*is postulat e s that God #nows wheth er or not a "i*en radium atom' placed in a "i*en caus al ne&us' would indeter ministically decay in a "i*en time$ ccordin" to Ha*is' DGod Isees I that a "i*en nucleus is about to disinte"r a t e ' and is free either to concur- -and so to ma#e certain- -or not to concur in the prope n sities and tend e n cies of the creat ur e in ques tionD +/G-$ 0n respons e ' (eacoc#e as#s how God could possibly #now that a particular nucleus will disinte"r a t e at a particular time if there are no underlyin" laws that deter min e this +/,-$ He ar"ue s that' if quant u m e*ent s are "enuin ely indet er ministic' GodIs middle #nowled" e can be only of the probability of a quantu m e*ent occurrin"$ 4his criticism of middle #nowled" e is' in my opinion' fully 5ustified$ How could God #now with certainty the future outco m e of an uncertain quant u m e*ent? 0t is impossible to #now the outco m e of an indet er ministic e*ent before it occurs$ 4o say' with Ha*is' that God #nows how a particle will beha* e in a "i*en hypoth e tical situation implies that' "i*en specific circums t a n c e s ' the particle will always beh a* e in e&actly the sam e way$ 0n that cas e the outco m e is not indet er ministic but is fully deter min e d by the circums t a n c e s $ 0n short' di*ine middle #nowled" e pres u m e s deter minis m$ &. Hum a n Fre e d o m , Creativit y and Mora# 'es p o n s i ( i#it y 4hus far 0 ha*e ar"ue d that ontolo"ical indet er min a c y is scientifically unwarr a n t e d ' philosophically ob5ectiona ble' and contrary to tradition al )hristian theolo"y$ 2hy' then' is it still so widely promot e d ? ma5or factor is the percep tion that deter minis m conflicts with huma n freedo m and respon sibility$ 4hus' for e&a m pl e' rthur (eacoc# e sees a lo"ical contra diction betw e e n huma n freewill and di*ine #nowled" e of the future +/.-; 1eith 2ard ar"ue s that the uni*ers e must be nondeter ministic if it is to "en er a t e freely creati*e bein"s +//-; and :ancey ;urphy +/3- ass erts that indet er minis m is need e d for moral respon sibility- -deter minis m ma#es God respon sible for e*il$ MetIs e&a min e thes e claims$ 2hat is neces s a r y for hum a n freedo m? Huma n freedo m is what we e&perienc e as we deliber at e about a decision (how to *ote in an election)' ma#e a choice (decide which candidat e we prefer)' and actualise that into a physical action (direct my hand to put a mar# beside the chose n nam e)$ Human freedo m surely requires a "enuine ability for us ma#e a ment al choice' as well as the power to con*ert this m en tal choice into a physical action$ ;y ment al choice may dep e n d on *arious abstr act' nonphysical factors such as' for e&a m pl e' the moral qualities of the candida t e s runnin" for office$ Hence' hum a n freedo m certainly implies ,G

physical indeter minis m' in the sens e that some physical e*ent s (raisin" my hand) must ha*e non% physical (i$e$' ment al) caus e s $ 0n the sam e physical situation different non- physical factors (my charact e r' beliefs and moral stand ar d s ) may well caus e me to choos e differently$ 4hat our free d o m dep e n d s crucially on our me n t al control of our physical body is ob*ious when one consid er s the alter n a ti* e $ 0f our minds were compl e t ely det er mi n e d by physic al proce s s e s in our brains' as ass er t e d by reductionis t s such as =ir %rancis )ric#' the n' as )ric# hims elf not e s ' all our beliefs' includin" our sens e of freed o m ' would be mer e illusions +/<-$ =ince thes e illusions includ e' for )ric#' the belief that our beliefs are caus e d by brain neuro n s ' it follows that )ric#Is position is self- refutin"$ %urth er' this *iew reduc e s hu m a n s to mer e pupp e t s ' bein"s that app e a r to choos e and act but are actu ally fully controlled by purely physical forces$ %urth er' freed o m implies that our choices are ma d e freely ' withou t coercion$ 2e choos e what we want' in accord a n c e with our own char a c t e r' history' and mor al stan d a r d s $ =uch freed o m is ess e n ti al for mor al respo n sibility$ 4o be morally responsible entails that we ma#e our own decisions; they are not be forced on us contrary to our will$ Fesponsibility for our actions implies that we ha*e a mea s ur e of control' so that we can be held account a bl e for our wilful decisions and subs e q u e n t actions$ &.1 Fre e d o m and "redic t a ( i#it y 4he most conten tious issue in freewill is wheth er our decisions are in principle fully predicta ble$ 0n the same com pr e h e n si ! e situation' with the sam e e&tern al conditions plus the sam e intern al (ment al) charact e ristics and circums t a n c e s ' would the sam e a"en t always ma#e e&actly the sam e decision? 4here are two respon s e s to this ques tion' repres e n tin" two different notions of freedo m$ 7ne notion is that of freedo m of indifferenc e ' the freedo m to choos e either of two incomp a tible actions with equal eas e and out of no neces sity$ 4his is the freedo m to act contrary to our nature' called libertarianis m $ lesser freedo m is that of spontan eit y ' choosin" and actin" as one pleas e s $ s lon" as one9s acts are e&pres sions of what one wants to do they are to be re"ard e d as free' e*en if what one wills is in some way deter min e d +/@-$ 4his latter *iew is more commo nly #nown as com patibilis m or DsoftD deter minis m (as oppos e d to the DhardD deter minis m of )ric#Is physical reductionis m)$ 4he comp a tibilist ar"u e s that our choices are always bas e d on reaso ns; they are mad e in accord a n c e with our charact er and e&perienc e s $ Hence God' one who #nows us perfectly' could surely ,,

predict our free choices$ 7ur choices are free becau s e willin"ly mad e by us' rather than coerced a"ains t our will$

they were

4he libertarian' on the other hand' ob5ects that' if our choices are predicta ble then they are pred e t e r mi n e d' which implies that we could not ha*e chos en differently$ 0n that cas e our sens e of freedo m is illusionary and henc e' it is often ar"ue d' we would ha*e no moral respon sibility$ God would then be directly responsible for all the e*il in the world$ Mibertarians conten d that our will is "enuin ely free only if our choosin" or willin" is not pre- deter min e d by e&tern al or intern al conditions$ 7ur moti*es and beliefs may incline us toward a particularly choice' but they should not "uara n t e e it$ &.2 Fre e d o m and Inde t e r m i n i s m Mibert ari a nis m' with its ass u m p ti o n that our choices are not entirely caus e d by such thin"s as char a c t e r and circu m s t a n c e s ' implies that thes e choices are' at leas t to som e e&t e n t' indet e r mi nis tic$ 7nly thus' with an ele m e n t of chanc e ' mi"ht the sa m e a"e n t choos e differe n tly in identic al situa tion s $ Bartholo m e w ass er t s ' Dthe reality of chanc e is not mer ely comp a ti bl e with the doctrin e of cre a tion but is require d by it$$$only in a world with real unc er t ain t y can people "row into free respo n sibl e childre n of their he a* e nly fath e rD +/A-$ 2e not e that' how e* e r' that in practice one canno t distin"uis h betw e e n "en uin e rand o m n e s s and the pseu d o- rando m n e s s of a det er mi nis tic proce s s too complica t e d for hu m a n s to unra* el$ 2hy' the n' should DrealD uncer t ain t y be require d' as Bartholo m e w claims? %urth er' how could we e*er pro*e that our decisions are ultima t el y bas e d on no sufficient reas o n s ? 4his would require our omniscie n c e with re" ar d s to all possible caus e s $ 4hus the ass e r tion of the nec e s sity of chanc e is no more tha n a me t a p h y s ic al ass u m p tio n$ Hume' ar"uin" a"ainst libertarian freedo m' writes' Dliberty' when oppos e d to neces sity' not to constraint' is the same thin" with chanc e; which is uni*ers ally allowed to ha*e no e&istenc eD +/B-$ 4erranc e 4iessen +/E- discuss e s a further difficulty for libertarianis m$ 0f our choices are mad e for no caus ally sufficient reas ons then what caus e s the will to choos e? nd what deter min e s which choice is mad e? 0f the answ er is Dnothin"D' then we are faced with the sam e proble m s concernin" quant u m e*ent s' as discuss e d abo*e' particularly re"ardin" di*ine pro*idenc e and fore#nowled " e$ 4he notion that our choices are not sufficiently caus e d implies that they are not entirely e&plicable in terms of second ar y caus e s$ Howe*er' a stron" *iew of pro*idenc e implies that thes e must then be attribut e d to the direct primary action of God$ 4his ma#es God directly and solely responsible ,.

for our sinful choices' there b y defea tin" huma n s responsible for their own actions$

;urphyIs

efforts to ma#e

Mibert ari a nis m see m s to require that 0 ma# e choices bas e d on no "ood rea s o n but' rath e r' capriciously' perh a p s an alo"o u s to flippin" a coin$ Jet' as =tapp notes' any play of chanc e would falsify the idea that 0' from the "round of my ess e n tial nature' ma#e a true choice +3G-$ 0ndeed' it see m s clear that uncaus e d' rando m e*ent s' occurrin" without reaso n' do not enha nc e our hum a n freewill at all' since thes e are beyond our control$ s 4iessen +3,- points out' moral respon sibility requires our acts to be intentional $ Hence rando m actions are not free in the sens e required for account a bility$ 4herefore' indeter minis m under min e s ' rath er than bolsters' moral respon sibility$ How about hum a n creati*ity? Hoes that require chanc e' as 2ard ass ert s? Here' too' it is not clear why chanc e is need e d $ )reati*ity has to do primarily with our imagination ' our ability to produc e no*el ideas $ But no*el ideas do not sprin" up from nowher e$ 4he mind produc e s the m by combinin" or modifyin" old ideas$ 4o sol*e a particular proble m our ima"ina tion may try *arious possibilities$ 4hes e possibilities may flow from particular chain of thou"ht$ 7ur intuition pic#s out li#ely candida t e s from thos e that the ima"ination pres e n t s $ lthou"h the proces s may be hard to formaliKe e&actly' no "enuine rando m n e s s appe a r s to be neces s a r y$ "ain' what is required' of cours e' is that our mind is caus ally effecti*e$ 4his' in turn' requires that our brains are not purely physically deter min e d but is open to input from our minds $ 0n other words' huma n creati*ity and freewill require a dualist *iew of reality that properly distin"uish e s betw e e n matt e r and mind$ Human freedo m is often associat e d with quant u m indet er min a c y +3.-' which is then seen as lea*in" room for hum a n s to act in the physical world$ s we ha*e seen' howe* er' quant u m mech a nics does not pro*e that nature is inhere n tly indet er ministic$ ;oreo*er' it has yet to be shown how quantu m effects can actualis e ment al choices$ 4here is certainly no e*idenc e that the huma n mind can at all influenc e where a photon will hit a photo"r a p hic plate or when a radium ato m will decay$ &. Fre e d o m an d Divin e )ov e r e i g n t y

furth er proble m with libert aria n freewill is how to reconcile this with di*ine so*er ei" n t y$ )reat u r e s ' unli#e God' can neith e r crea t e from nothin" nor sust ain the m s el * e s in bein"$ 4hey' and their pow ers ' continu e to e&ist only throu " h GodIs pro*ide n ti al pow er$ lon" thes e lines' (eacoc# e not e s that God is the Dsus t ain e r and faithful pres e r * e rD of His crea tio n +3/-$ ,/

Howe* er' if the e&ist e n c e of crea t u r e s and their pow er s dep e n d s upon GodIs upholdin" pow er' all their actions mus t li#ewis e dep e n d on that pow er$ Hence crea t u r e s canno t act inde p e n d e n t l y of God$ Fon Hi"hfield com m e n t s on libert a ri a n free d o m : D c#nowle d "in " that God mus t act for the a"e n t and to continu e in e&ist e n c e and yet cont e n di n " that God inde e d' for the sa# e of our free d o m ' mus t not- -act in so that it ma y ha* e bein"$$$la n d s open theis m contr a dictionD +33-$ its pow ers nee d not- our action in a self-

Mibert ari a n freed o m requir e s that an action of an a"e n t ' to be free' mus t ori"ina t e and be carrie d out indep e n d e n t l y of God$ 4his contr a dict s GodIs so*er ei" n t y' which is ess e n ti al to His nat ur e$ &. & Fre e d o m an d Divin e For e% n o w # e d g e 0t is some ti m e s ass ert e d that di*ine fore#nowled " e is incomp a tible with huma n freedo m +3<-$ commo n ar"u m e n t state s that if God #nows that tomorrow 0 shall do action it is therefor e true that 0 shall do ; therefore 0 do not ha*e the power to refrain from ; thus 0 am not free$ =uch reas onin" confus es deter minis m (the notion that nothin" happ e n s without a caus e) with fatalis m (the notion that 0 ha*e no control o*er my decisions)$ 7ne atte m p t to a*oid fatalis m is to postulat e that God is timeles s' so that He does not literally fore#now anythin"' and' henc e' nothin" is fated by His #nowled" e$ Howe*er' as )rai" points out' the stat e m e n t DGod #nows timeles sly that some e*ent occurs in my futureD is still true prior to the e*ent' thus fatalis m is not a*oided +3@-$ :e*erth ele s s ' )rai" ar"ue s that fatalis m is a fallacy +3A-$ %irst' why should GodIs mere #nowled" e about a future e*ent constr ain it to occur? GodIs #nowled" e of our future acts does not' in itself' influenc e our actu al decisions$ 0t ha m p e r s neith e r our freed o m nor our cre a ti*ity$ )rai" com m e n t s : D%rom GodIs fore#nowled" e of a free action we can infer only that that action will occur' not that it must occur$ 4he a"en t performin" the action has the power to refrain' and were the a"en t to do so' GodIs fore#nowled" e would ha*e been different$ "ents cannot brin" it about both that God fore#nows their action and that they do not perform the action' but this is no limitation on their freedo m$ 4hey are free either to act or to refrain' and which e*er they choos e' God will ha*e fore#now n$ %or GodIs #nowled" e' thou"h chronolo"ically prior to the action' is lo"ically posterior to the action ,3

and deter min e d by it$ 4herefore' di*ine fore#nowled" e and hum a n freedo m are not mutu ally e&clusi*e D +3B-$ 4he fatalist ar"u e s that' if the future is alre a d y det er mi n e d ' the n ther e is nothin" 0 can do to chan " e it' since e*e n my choice s are predet er mi n e d $ =uch reas o nin " fails to ta#e into accou n t that my will is an acti*e caus e that helps to det e r mi n e the future$ 2e cann o t chang e the future but we can help det er m i n e what the future will be$ 0s di*ine fore#nowled " e comp a tible with libertarian freedo m ? 7ne is a"ain faced with the question of how God could fore#now with certainty a future that is as yet uncert ain$ 7ne mi"ht su""e s t that God has a special' non- predicti*e' me a n s of *iewin" the future' perha p s li#e consultin" a crystal ball or pre*iewin" a film$ But how could such a de*ice be construct e d in the first place? 2hat- -other than God- -can possibly form the future? 4he notion that God simply fore#now s the future' without prede t e r minin" it' entails the e&istenc e of an indep e n d e n t force that forms the future$ =uch indep e n d e n c e ' we saw abo*e' contra dicts the so*er ei"nt y of the Biblical God$ Hence' di*ine fore#nowled" e is consiste n t only with com patibilist freedo m$ &.* Com p a ti (i#i s m and 'es p o n s i ( i#it y 4he free d o m that we see m to ha* e- -and to ne e d for mor al respo n sibility- -is not a libert a ri a n free d o m from causa tion but' rath e r' a free d o m from coercion by forces outsid e ours el* e s $ 2e are free when we can act upon our own want s and our own will$ =uch freed o m is ne e d e d for mor al res po n sibility$ ;oral res po n sibility does not requir e that ther e are no rea s o n s for our decisions$ %or e&a m pl e ' dam was not force d to eat the fruit a"ains t his own will; he did so for rea s o n s sufficient to him$ s Feymo n d note s ' dam did not e&ercis e an indiffer e n t will but act e d #nowin"ly' willin"ly' and spont a n e o u s l y' with no *iolenc e bein" don e to his will +3E-$ ;an is free to do what he wills' but his will is not free in that it can det e r mi n e itself$ ;an res po n d s to his natur e ' which is what it is eith er by sin or by the so*er ei" n "rac e of God$ 4his lea* e s hum a n respo n sibility fully "roun d e d ' for nothin" mor e is requir e d for holdin" a ma n accou n t a bl e tha n his actin" with the cons e n t of his will' how e* e r much this may be det er mi n e d $ 4hus the Bible holds fallen ma n wholly respo n sibl e for his words and dee d s (;att$ ,.: /<- /A)' e*e n thou" h he is born with a nat ur e ensla* e d to sin (Fom$ B: A- B)$ )omp atibilism' we noted' does not destroy freedo m but mer ely assu m e s that e*eryt hin"- -includin" our choices- -has a sufficient caus e$ 4hes e caus e s are not 5ust physical circums t a n c e s but include our own ,<

beliefs and charact e r' which ha*e in turn been forme d' at least in part' by our own wilful decisions of the past$ 2e ma#e si"nificant choices for wei"hty reas ons ' in accord a n c e with our deep e s t con*ictions and desires$ )omp a tibilism therefor e enables us to be influenc e d by reaso nin"' criticism or the prospec t of reward or punish m e n t $ 4he #nowled" e that we shall be held account a bl e for our actions is itself a factor that influence s our actions$ %or such reaso ns Ha*id Hume ass ert e d that only on the assu m p tion of deter minis m could there be moral respon sibility +<G-$ 0n short' comp a tibilism secure s' rath er than eras e s ' moral respon sibility$ *. Con c# u s i o n s 0n sum m a r y' 0 conclud e that ontolo"ic al indet e r mi nis m conflicts with di*ine so*er ei" n t y and pro*ide n c e ' as uph eld by tradition al )hristia nity$ ration al' omniscie n t' omnipot e n t God cann o t crea t e a "enuin ely rand o m entity' of which He would not be able to predict the outco m e $ God9s so*er ei" n t y rules out the possibility of a" e n t s actin" indep e n d e n tl y of Him$ 0n particular' qua n t u m mec h a nic s does not imply ontolo"ic al indet e r mi nis m ' "i*en that det e r mi nis t interpr e t a ti o n s of qua n t u m mec h a nics are possible' that non- physical secon d a r y caus e s cann o t be ruled out and that God is the primar y caus e for all e*e n t s $ %urth e r' a libert a ri a n *iew of hu m a n free d o m ' to the e&t e n t that it posits that our free decisions are indet e r mi nis tic' defe a t s ' rath e r tha n supp ort s ' the notions of hum a n freed o m and respo n sibility$ 7n the oth er han d' a comp a ti bilist *iew of hu m a n free d o m stre s s e s that we willfully ma# e our decisions for sufficient reas o n s ' in accord a n c e with our natur e ' our beliefs and our desire s$ s such' God' our )reat or and =ust ain e r' 2ho #nows us comple t el y' can fully predict all our decisions and actions$ '+F+'+,C+) ,$ (eacoc# e' rthur Theology for a Scientific &ge (Cnlar"e d ed$)' Mondon: =); (ress (,EE/)' p$,.,$ .$ ibid$' p$ ,<A$ /$ ibid$' p$,..$ 3$ 2ard' 1eith >2hy God ;ust C&ist?' Science ' Christian Belief (,EEE) ,,: <- ,/ (p$,.)$ <$ Boyd' Gre"$ God of the (ossible: & Biblical Introduction to the )pen *iew of God. Grand Fapids: Ba#er (.GGG)' p$ ,,,$ @$ this is the definition of chanc e "i*en by Bartholo m e w' H$J$ God of Chance $ Mondon: =); (ress (,EB3)' p$@A$ A$ 2ard' 1eith God, Chance ' $eces sity ' 7&ford: 7ne 2orld (,EE@)' p$.,$ B$ =tapp' Henry ($ +ind, +atter, and "uantu m +echanics ' Berlin: ,@

=prin"er- Lerla" (,EE/)' p$.,@$ E$ ibid$' p$E,$ ,G$ Ja#i' =tanley M$ God and the Cos m ologists $ 2ashin"ton' H): Fe"nery Gatew a y: (,EBE)' pp$ ,3.- ,3<$ ,,$ Hume' Ha*id &n ,n#uiry Concerning -uman .nderstan ding ' Ma =alle: 7pen )ourt (,E<B reprint of ,AAA edition)' p$,G3$ ,.$ G$ 2eihs' 4$ Jennew ein' )h$ =imon' H$ 2einfurer' $ Neilin"er DLiolation of BellIs inequ ality under strict Cinstein locality conditionsD' (hys. /e!. 0ett. B, (,EEB): <G/E- <G3/$ ,/$ 2$4ittel' J$ Brendel' :$ Gisin and H$ Nbinden DMon"-distance Bell-type tests usin" ener"y-time entan"led photonsD' (hys. /e!. &' <E(@) (,EEE): 3,<G-3,@/$ ,3$ (ol#in"horn e' John Belief in God in an &ge of Scienc e ' :ew Ha*en: Jale 8ni*ersity (ress (,EEB)' p$</$ ,<$ Herbert' :ic# ,lem e n t al +ind: -umans Conscious n e s s and the $ew (hysics ' :ew Jor#: (en"uin' p$,@G$ ,@$ (ol#in"horn e' op$cit$+,3-' p$</$ ,A$ Bartholo m e w' op$ cit$ +@-' p$,G.$ ,B$ ibid$ ,E$ ibid$' pp$,G.- G/$ .G$ for elabora tion' see Feymo n d' Fobert M$ & $ew Syst e m a tic Theology of the Christian 1aith ' :ash*ille: 4homa s :elson (,EEB)' p$/..$ s to JesusI sayin" that' not the =on' but only the %ather #nows the time of his second comin" (;ar# ,/:/.)' Feymo n d ar"u e s that this limitation in #nowled" e applies only to JesusI hum a n natur e (p$ ..3)$ .,$ (eacoc#e' op$ cit$ +,-' p$.,.$ ..$ lston' 2illiam ($ >Hi*ine ction' Huma n %reedo m' and the Maws of :ature?' 0n Fussell' F$J$' ;urphy' :$' 0sha m' )$J$(eds$) "uantu m Cosm ology and the 0aws of $ature (. nd ed$)' Latican )ity =tate: Latican 7bser* at ory (ublications (,EE@)' p$,E,$ ./$ 2ard' op$cit$ +A-' p$/A$ .3$ (eacoc#e' rthur >Fespons e to Ha*is?' Science ' Christian Belief (,EEA) E:,3<- ,3A (p$,3<)$ .<$ ibid$' p$,3@$ .@$ (ollard' 2illiam Chance and (ro!idenc e: God2s &ction in a 3orld Go!ern e d by Scientific 0aw $ :ew Jor#: =cribner (,E<B)' p$..$ .A$ ;urphy' :ancey DHi*ine ction in the :atural 7rder: BuridanIs ss and =chrodin" erI s )atD' 0n Fussell' F$J$' ;urphy' :ancey' and (eacoc# e' rthur (eds$) Chaos and Comple xity: Scientific (erspecti! e s on 4i!ine &ction $ Latican )ity =tate: Latican 7bser*a t ory (,EE<)' pp$ /.<- /<A (p$//E)$ .B$ ibid$' p$/3.$ .E$ Ha*is' John Jefferson >6uantu m 0ndet er min a c y and the 7mniscienc e of God?' Scienc e ' Christian Belief (,EEA) E: ,.E- ,33 (p$,/<)$ /G$ ibid$' p$,33$ /,$ (eacoc#e' op$cit +.3-' p$,3A$ /.$ (eacoc#e' op$cit +,-' p$ ,..$ ,A

//$ 2ard' op$ cit$ +3-' p$,.$ /3$ ;urphy' op$ cit$ +.A-' p$/<<$ /<$ )ric#' %rancis The &stonishing -ypoth e sis $ :ew Jor#: 4ouchsto n e (,EE3)' p$/$ /@$ see Feymo n d' op$ cit$ +.G-' p$,E,$ /A$ Bartholo m e w' op$ cit$ +@-' p$ ,3<$ /B$ Hume' op$ cit$ +,,-' p$ ,G<$ /E$ 4iessen' 4erranc e (ro!idenc e and (rayer: -ow 4oes God 3or5 in the 3orld6 Howners Gro*e' 0M: 0nterLarsity (ress (.GGG)' p$ .3A$ 3G$ =tapp' op$ cit$ +B-' p$ E.$ 3,$ 4iessen' op$ cit$ +/E-' p$ .3A$ 3.$ for e&a m pl e' Cccles' John )$ -ow the Self Controls Its Brain ' Berlin: =prin"er- Lerla" (,EE3)' p$,3@$ 3/$ (eacoc#e' op$cit$ +,-' p$,G<$ 33$ Fon Hi"hfield' D4he %unction of Hi*ine =elf- Mimitation in 7pen 4heismD' 7ournal of the ,!angelical Theological Society 3<!. (June .GG.): .AE- EE (p$.E@)$ 3<$ for e&a m pl e' (eacoc#e' op$ cit$ +,-' p$,..$ 3@$ )rai"' 2illiam M$ The )nly 3ise God: The Compatibility of 4i!ine 1ore5no wle d g e and -uman 1reedo m $ Grand Fapids' ;0: Ba#er (,EBA)' p$ @<$ 3A$ ibid$' p$@E$ 3B$ ibid$' p$A3$ 3E$ Feymon d' op$ cit$ +.G-' p$ /A3$ <G$ Hume' op$ cit$ +,,-' pp$,G3- ,GA$ ------------------------John Byl is profes sor of math e m a tics at 4rinity 2estern 8ni*ersity

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