ISSN 1751-8229 Volume One, Number One - Why iek? pp 33 - 50.

Interpassivity and Misdemeanors: The Analysis of Ideology and the iekian Toolbox1
Robert Pfaller - ept. of P!"lo#op!$, %"n& 'n"(er#"t$ of )rt an* In*u#tr"al e#"+n.

Intro*u,t"on - )b#tra,t"on an* a#,et"#m "n p!"lo#op!$ Philosophy often tends to regard itself as dwelling in the "icy deserts of abstraction" (Kant) or starting its flight at "dusk", painting everything "grey in grey" (Hegel). Thus it is suggested that philosophy has to do with also fro daily life and, conse!uently, fro atters re ote not only fro concreteness but the pleasures that a colourful life can bring ost serious things, far away fro any

about. "n short, by positioning itself as a theory of the abstract, philosophy also tends to design itself as an ascetic practice, dealing only with reinforced, not only by a ore and pleasure or, at least, hu our. "n conte porary philosophy, this i age has even been ore rigid analytical philosophy but also by a good part ay well appear ore playful than the for er yet still of the deconstructivist tradition which philosophy

hardly funnier. #f course, this ascetic spirit is that of post odern culture itself, and ay be seen as too constrained to this culture or too weak to do otherwise$ or odels of good hu our even conde ned to sadness by its very nature (despite the striking presented by philosophers such as Kant and Hegel the selves). %lavo& 'i(ek)s philosophical writings, however, appear as the elaborated concepts, for e*a ple of +er an "dealis the ost down-to-earth &okes, thus not only ost striking opposition ost

to these tendencies, by their style alone. %ince 'i(ek obviously connects the

or of ,acanian Psychoanalysis, with

aking fun with the &okes, but also letting the any countries of the world, and it has

concepts appear co ical through their connection with the &okes. The pleasure thus provided by 'i(ek)s te*ts has attracted readers in

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ade people interested in philosophy who would otherwise probably never have crossed its path. "t is no wonder, then, that within an ascetic culture this is not always regarded as a philosophical erit. .ven if people appreciate 'i(ek)s works and are a used by the , they ention his ene ies. #ne ay so eti es do not recogni/e their philosophical !uality. 'i(ek)s &okes so eti es obscure his philosophy, at least for so e of his ad irers, not to therefore, as a first reaction, feel inclined to atte pt to dig out the philosophical part in 'i(ek and go for the "serious" philosophy behind the &okes. 0et this ay turn out difficult, if not i possible$ by very good, structural reasons (&ust as i possible as to find the "true artichoke" so ewhere behind its leaves, to use an i age given by 1ittgenstein). %o one has to go one step further here and take a closer look at the relationship between the concepts and the &okes2 1hat is their actual "division of labour" in a 'i(ek te*t3 "s it true that the hard theoretical work is done by the concepts whereas the &okes do the funny part3 #r is it possible that there is a theoretical function to the &okes the selves3 "s it possible that the &okes in 'i(ek)s te*t are doing theoretical "&oke-work" (to isuse the 4reudian ter )3

%ince 'i(ek does not only operate with &okes but also with a whole variety of other concrete aterial - e*a ples taken fro everyday life, fil , literature etc. -, this puts into assive presence of atter they !uestion the entire relationship between the abstract and the concrete in this philosophy, if not in philosophy as a whole. 1hat is, then, the theoretical role of this e*a ples3 1hat can we learn fro 'i(ek)s e*a ples - apart fro e*e plify, but on e*a ples in general3 5o 'i(ek)s e*a ples e*a ples can be good for3 the specific

ake a point about what

e*a ples can do in philosophy3 "n what sense are his e*a ples precisely e*a ples of what

-ater"al"#m "n p!"lo#op!$ an* t!e role of t!e e.ample The fact that 'i(ek)s theory is a philosophy which proceeds through e*a ples is a significant characteristic that &u ps i ediately to eye of any reader. This philosophy has its turning points and finds its crucial highlights in ele ents like the 6abinovitch &okes (see2 below, footnote 7), the Hitchcockian 8c+uffin or the obscenities e*changed between soldiers of the for er 0ugoslav people)s ar y. %uch a way of proceding has, in particular in the psychoanalytic tradition, been referred to as "pheno enological",9 and since this "pheno enological" ethod is one of the constant points of philosophical disagree ent with ake a few considerations regard to %lavo& 'i(ek)s theory, " want to take advantage of this specific occasion (the kind invitation by the :ritish %ociety of Pheno enology), in order ethod. about the characteristic features and the specific stakes of 'i(ek)s "pheno enological"

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8y first clai never issing

here is that proceeding through e*a ples in philosophy is a necessary, aterialis . 'i(ek)s way of proceeding has to be co pared with aterialist tradition in philosophy2 with the ethods of

ark of

those pertaining to the great

philosophers such as .picurus, %pino/a, Pascal, 8ar*, 4reud, 1ittgenstein, ;lthusser and not to forget - ,acan. 0et, as 4erdinand de %aussure (another right place. The truth that aterialis aterialist, with great e*a ples) has re arked, it is always easier to find a certain truth than to assign it to the in philosophy necessarily proceeds through e*a ples does not e*plain why this is necessary and what the role of the e*a ple is. ; first catch here it e*e plifies. 4ro would bring ay be the idea that the e*a ple stands for the particular, as aterialis

opposed to the general, and that the role of the e*a ple is to illustrate the general idea that this idea one could be inclined to draw the conclusion that close to no inalis or e piricis $ yet, as is not necessarily would, by its nature, always take the side of the particular, as opposed to the general. This aterialis aterialist philosophers aterialist$ it can be like ,ouis ;lthusser have proved, e piricis

precisely its opposite. (%ince e piricis , according to ;lthusser, often presupposes the idea that the real e*plains itself$ that there are no theoretical tools and no theoretical operations necessary in order to gain knowledge fro 0et not only the conclusion is the raw aterial of theoretical practice.)<

isleading here$ already the first concept of the

e*a ple as a concrete illustration of an abstact idea has been co pletely wrong with regard to 'i(ek. "n 'i(ek)s theory the e*a ple fulfills a co pletely different function. "n order to su up this very special, parado*ical function of the e*a ple in 'i(ek)s theory, one ay recall here the structure of the well-known "6adio .rewan" &okes that 'i(ek so eti es refers to, and ask2 "1as 'i(ek)s e*a ple a concrete ele ent that illustrated an abstract idea presented before3" - 6adio .rewan would then answer2 ""n principle2 0es. :ut, first, the idea was not totally abstract, second, the e*a ple was not ore concrete than the idea, and, third, what the e*a ple did to the idea was not to illustrate it at all."

/!at 0"1e2 *oe# 3"t! e.ample#4 an e.ample ,et us look for instance at one of 'i(ek)s classics, one of his <<-<?). %tarting fro 8ar*)s for ulation of co ost brilliant key passages2 the develop ent of thoughts concerning the "ob&ectivity of belief" (cf. 'i(ek =>7>2 odity fetishis , 'i(ek directs his argu ent along a chain of connected e*a ples2 =. the Tibetan prayer wheel "you write a prayer on a paper, put the rolled paper into a wheel, and turn it auto atically, without thinking @...A" ( 'i(ek =>7>2 <<)$

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9. the ,acanian interpretation of the role of the Bhorus in +reek tragedy "@...A we feel the re!uired e otions through the ediu of the Bhorus2 )0ou are then relieved of all worries, even if you do not feel anything, the Bhorus will do so in your place) (,acan @...A)" ( 'i(ek =>7>2 <C-?)$ <. the function of "canned laughter" in conte porary TD %it-Bo s "@...A the #ther - e bodied in the television set @...A - is laughing instead of us. %o even if, tired fro a hard day)s stupid work, all evening we did nothing but ga/e drowsily into the television screen, we can say afterwards that ob&ectively, through the ediu of the other, we had a really good ti e." ( 'i(ek =>7>2 <?)$ C. the &oke about the fool and his fear to be a grain of corn "@...A ;fter so e ti e in a ental hospital, he was finally cured2 now he knew that he was not a grain but a an. %o they let hi out$ but soon afterwards he ca e running back, saying2 )" et a hen and " was afraid she would eat e.) The doctors tried to cal hi 2 ):ut what are you afraid of3 Eow you know that you are not a grain but a an.) The fool answered2 )0es, of course, " know that, but does the hen know that " a no longer a grain3)" ( 'i(ek =>7>2 <?) 4irst, it has to be stated that the idea which 'i(ek in his elaboration points at is far fro being there at the beginning. 8ar*)s theory of co odity fetishis does not at all include on understanding of it of econo ic this idea. #n the contrary, 'i(ek uses his first e*a ple, the Tibetan prayer wheel, in order to dis iss the idea usually connected with 8ar*)s for ulation - the co relations in capitalis as an argu ent situated on the level of econo y, the hu anist criticis suggests to read 8ar*)s argu ent not as an econo ic criticis tradition, and not outside of it. The theoretical twist, the new instead of us. "t has to be re arked, though, that even this second ele ent, Tibetan prayer wheels, is far fro containing the new idea clearly and without a biguity. The idea that ay indulge in obscene phantasies while "ob&ectively" praying religious people in Tibet

("we have beco e the ob&ects of our ob&ects"). "nstead, 'i(ek but as a theory of ideology eaning that 'i(ek, with the

yet in a sense in which ideology has hardly ever been conceived of$ not in the 8ar*ist help of Tibetan prayer wheels, gives to 8ar*)s for ulation is2 things are able to believe

through their ritual instru ents is an idea that .uropean theorists have hardly dared to conceive of (despite so e state ents by the 5alai ,a a which appear to testify the parado*ical "detached" status of this ritual practice C) - be it by reasons of intercultural respect alone.

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Therefore, in a third step, a new e*a ple, connected with conceptual support by ,acanian theory, has to be introduced2 ,acan)s idea that our ost inti ate feelings, beliefs and convictions can assu e an "e*ternal e*istence" and that the chorus in +reek tragedy had precisely such a function (cf. ,acan =>7F2 9>?)2 to feel fear and co passion vicariously, on behalf of the spectators. 0et, again, ,acan)s idea ay appear as an audacious, highly speculative and arbitrary interpretation with little e pirical support and even less plausibility. "t is no wonder, then, that this passage in ,acan has for a long ti e passed unnoticed$ nobody ade any use of it or referred to it, not even within ,acanian theory. akes ,acan)s historical assu ption for the first our own

"t is here that, in a fourth step, 'i(ek

ti e clear, plausible and &ustified by connecting it with an e*a ple fro

conte porary culture. The pheno enon of canned laughter in television (connected with the observation that usually we do not laugh when this laughter appears) allows 'i(ek to give full credibility and concreteness to the idea of ,acan which had until then re ained a kind of theoretical "sleeper". 'i(ek)s erit here is considerable2 &ust as in ethnology, also in this case the ele ent belonging to another culture is not understandable as long as we are not able to overco e our strange blindness for its precise counterpart in our fa iliar conte*t. The +reek chorus re ains an enig a as long as canned laughter is treated as going by itself. #nly by "estranging" and proble ati/ing our own practice, i. e. by recogni/ing its strangeness and by transfor ing its previous evidence into a !uestion, we get a key for replacing our astonish ent and the respective assu ptions about foreign pheno ena by theoretical concepts. (,udwig 1ittgenstein proceded the sa e way when, in his critical ob&ections against 4ra/er)s theory of "savage" agic, he pointed out that there e*ists a agic, which is not based in agic odel for understanding its counterpart agic of the "civili/ed", and that precisely this "civili/ed" assu ptions or convictions, has to be taken as the in foreign cultures. cf. 1ittgenstein =>><2 =CG, =9C) :y adding a fifth ele ent, the fool-hen-&oke, 'i(ek finally points out the re arkable power our beliefs assu e once we have delegated the akes the to things2 delegating one)s beliefs the constraints e*erted by even stronger than they were before. :elieving "ob&ectively", through e*ternal

ob&ects or vicarious agents, does not provide any release fro

our beliefs$ on the contrary, as soon as we have transferred these beliefs onto e*ternal agents, they beco e "ontologically" relevant. Eow these illusions deter ine the ob&ectivity of the outer world, thus transfor ing our "enlightened" knowledge about how this world "really" is into a purely sub&ective abstraction. This reinforced status of the illusion, precisely through "detach ent", better knowledge and delegation onto things, is the reason why, as 'i(ek points out, laughter and ironical distance are far fro helping us out of ideology (as H berto being post-ideological.? .co had assu ed, cf. 'i(ek =>7>2 9I) and why, after the "end of all narrations" and the arrival of "cynical reason" in post odernity, we are far fro

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5!e ben*"n+ of t!e #t",2 ;s can be seen in this se!uence of theoretical steps, perfor ed through certain crucial e*a ples, there is no initial "abstract" idea that would beco e "illustrated" by a "concrete" ele ent. "f there is an abstract idea at all (for e*a ple, a first 8ar*ist concept of fetishis ), then the e*a ple presents another abstract idea (a different 8ar*ist concept of fetishis ). 0et what the e*a ple in 'i(ek)s te*ts usually refers to is in itself already another e*a ple, another concrete ele ent. 'i(ek proceeds by connecting one concrete ele ent with another2 for e*a ple, "canned laughter" in TD with ,acan)s idea of the role of the chorus in +reek Tragedy. The function of the e*a ple is therefore not to illustrate or to e*e plify its - in cases e!ually illustrative and e*e plary - counterpart, but to displace it$ to drag it away fro co b it against the grain, as it were - in other words2 to interpret it, against its co to the notion of "interpretation"F). "n 'i(ek)s te*ts, the e*a ple is not there in order to illustrate what can be seen in the e*e plified$ on the contrary it is there in order to another example - and a criticis e*a ples co other. The typical 'i(ek e*a ple does not present an instance to which an abstract idea could be easily applied. "t is not a passive aterial that visuali/es so ething which has already been ake so ething appear which was included in the abstract idea. "ts function is rather to ake visible what, at first, could not be seen in it. "nstead of being an illustration of an idea, the 'i(ek e*a ple is rather a caricature of of the idea usually connected with that e*a ple. 'i(ek )s to function &ust like the " yths" yth can function as the interpretation of the ent upon each other$I therefore they see ost its on

initial position$ to "estrange" it (in the sense of :ertolt :recht)$ to shed a different light on it$ to understanding and against its self-understanding (this is the violent sense that Eiet/sche gives

about which ,Jvi-%trauss re arked that one

co pletely foreign to the first idea and which this idea could only be connected to with considerable theoretical effort. The e*a ple is therefore highly active. "t is not &ust the ob&ect or the raw aterial of a theoretical e*planation, but it functions as its theoretical tool2 it akes visible a theoretical structure in the original idea which, before, was not easy to discern or which was even hidden by another structure that appeared evident. 5ue to its active nature, there is a certain retroactive force proper to a 'i(ek e*a ple2 ;fter you have heard the e*a ple, you can perceive so ething in the e*e plified ele ent that you were not able to see before. 0et, after having heard 'i(ek)s e*a ple it is probably difficult to understand the e*e plified ever again the sa e way you had understood it before. 4or e*a ple, when 'i(ek uses the &oke about 6abinovitch)s two reasons for e igration to e*plain the structure of Hegelian dialectics, 'i(ek akes clear that, in Hegel, the antithesis is

38

in itself already the synthesis, yet seen fro or clear to

another perspective.7 This had never been visible

e before " ca e upon 'i(ek )s e*a ple. 0et now " can hardly think of Hegelian

dialectics without conceiving it like this and recalling 6abinovitch)s chuzpe as well as 'i(ek)s brilliant idea to connect it with Hegel)s dialectics. #ne could say here2 precisely by using the e*a ple, 'i(ek co akes clear that what

appeared as the "idea" of Hegelian dialectics (&ust as in the case before the idea of 8ar*ian odity fetishis ) had actually not been an idea but an example in itself. %ince what 'i(ek akes visible had not been visible in the idea itself. (;nd what is an idea if not )s e*a ple

so ething in which, by its very na e, the visible should be visible.) 'i(ek )s e*a ple therefore de-centers a presu ed idea$ it refuses its clai s for universality and self-transparency and reveals its true nature, which is that of another e*a ple. Kust as psychoanalysis, according to 4reud, not know, the 'i(ek e*a ple
>

akes the analysand say what he does

akes another thing say what, until then, it did not know. ; 'i(ek atch an abstract description or concept.

e*a ple is not &ust a particular instance of a general concept or law to which it can be subsu ed. The e*a ple is not there in order to 4inding an e*a ple is therefore not a atter of judgement, as in Kant=G. 6ather, this re!uires a

kind of witty philosophical reticence: the ability to discover a given pheno enon)s power to contradict a previous idea that we had about another pheno enon. The use of e*a ples beco es here what +illes 5eleu/e calls a "concatenation" ==2 .*a ple and e*e plified can be connected because they are logically e!ual ele ents dwelling on the sa e level of generality. 0et the e*a ple has the advantage of co ing later, and has thus the chance to work upon the previous ele ent, to transfor it. #r, to put it in a ,acanian ter inology2 the e*a ple is a aster-signifier which retroactively gives a new interpretation to a previous signifier. 4or 'i(ek)s e*a ples goes therefore what 1ittgenstein describes as the role of the "picture" in his philosophy. 1ittgenstein)s pictures change the previous understanding one had about a certain case2

"" wanted to put that picture before hi , and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently2 that is, to co pare it with this rather than that set of pictures. " have changed his way of looking at things." (1ittgenstein 9GG=2 C>e (L =C>)) 1ittgenstein)s pictures are there in order to change a previous understanding, an understanding that had, itself, already been deter ined by certain other ( aybe unacknowledged) pictures. Therefore 1ittgenstein)s pictures do not give an illustration where there was nothing (or only abstract ideas) before$ rather, they are counter-pictures. They break with previous pictures$ they destroy a previous understanding which, due to the i aginary

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power of un!uestioned pictures, had presented itself as self-evident. The 1ittgensteinian picture has its crucial o ent precisely when another picture "holds us captive" (cf. 1ittgenstein =>7G2 7G @L ==?A).=9 Here we find the reason why materialist philosophy cannot do without pictures2 in order to break free fro the i aginary captivity in which we are held by certain i ages, we need other i ages, counter-i ages$ since, as %pino/a has stated, so ething can only be li ited by so ething else which is of the sa e nature.=< %uch a concept of the theoretical space is thouroughly aterialist2 it conceives it as a

field not &ust of ideas but of pictures that hold us captive, of evidences that blind us, of considerable forces that keep us down$ and of other forces, that have to be developed2 counterforces, able to break with the for er. ,ouis ;lthusser has for ulated this idea of the theoretical space, using another e*a ple - that of the bending of the stick2 aterialist

""t follows that if you want to change historically e*isting ideas, even in the apparently abstract do ain called philosophy, you cannot content yourself with si ply preaching the naked truth, and waiting for its anato ical obviousness to )enlighten) inds, as our eighteenth-century ancestors used to say2 you are forced, since you want to force a change in ideas, to recogni/e the force which is keeping the bent, by applying a conterforce capable of destroying this power and bending the stick in the opposite direction so as to put the ideas right." (;lthusser =>>G2 9=G) This idea that the theoretical space is such a physical field of forces did, by the way, not ste fro philosophical speculation. "t has been developed by one of ;lthusser)s teachers, the athe atics, :achelard found out that a science, in order to establish scholar in the history of sciences +aston :achelard. "nvestigating the history of sciences like physics, che istry and itself, has not &ust got to find so e knowledge where previously there had been none, but to break with previous, spontaneous evidences, with "episte ological obstacles" that keep the theoretical space of this very science blocked fro This is i portant to the outset.

ention since it refers to an funda ental episte ological proble that can be called the proble of the initial narcissism of

pointed out by :achelard - a proble provided by sources like co

theories. 1hen a theory does not succeed in breaking with the first spontaneous evidences on sense, then it does not even have an ob&ect. 1henever such a theory thinks to speak of an ob&ect, it speaks in fact about nothing but itself. 1hat a theory "sees" when it actually sees nothing, is itself - i. e. its own e*pectations, presuppositions and pre&udices. ;s :achelard puts it,

""t suffices us to speak about an ob&ect to ake us believe that we are ob&ective. :ut, through our first choice, the ob&ect rather designates us, than us designating it, and what we consider our funda ental ideas of the world, often are nothing but confidental

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revelations about the youthfulness of our spirit." (:achelard =>IC2 =<C$ translation2 ;strid Hager and 6obert Pfaller) :reaking with first evidences of co on sense is necessary for any theory in order to obtain

an ob&ect. :efore being able to say so ething right or wrong about an ob&ect, a theory has to leave that starting /one in which everything is neither right nor wrong and where it speaks about nothing but itself. Providing science with an ob&ect, and breaking with its inevitable initial narcissis , is a thoroughly aterialist task. This is not only so because in the history of philosophy uch ore syste atic reason for this (since aterialis any is, in schools which called the selves pri acy, of the ob&ect. There is a aterialist have stressed the i portance, or even the

the first place, not a theory of cognition). 4ollowing psychoanalytic theory, =C we can say that the secret, yet most general name for philosophical idealism is - narcissism . "n today)s culture we can discern this narcissis in the underlying philosophical atri* that governs any discourses, creating the typical preferences of these very discourses2 for e*a ple, a preference for being a sub&ect, instead of being an ob&ect$ a preference for what is constructed as opposed to what is seen as essential$ a hy nic hailing of "i
=?

aterial work" (for e*a ple by ateriality of a

8auri/io ,a//arato as well as by Hardt and Eegri )$ and, correspondingly, a funda ental distrust in ateriality (for e*a ple, in art2 be it physical ateriality or the deter inate for organi/ation, etc. The funda ental philosophical disease of our ti e can therefore be seen in these spontaneous choices which are ade, unaware of their underlying idealis and narcissis . ;s 6ichard %ennett has noted in =>IC, this narcissistic attitude can be resu ed in the for ula ":e yourselfM ;nd do not tolerate anything that appears foreign to your precious self." Today, under neo-liberal conditions, it can be seen, how this categorical i perative of our culture leads to ost affir ative for s of pseudo-e ancipatory politics, and even of self-e*ploitation. ;s opposed to this, proceeding through e*a ples the way 'i(ek does, recogni/e the eans to break that cannot be "interactively" altered or arbitrarily interpreted)$ distrust in the

ateriality of political and ideological apparatuses, neglect of the !uestion of political

with first narcissistic evidences of theory, to allow theory to accede to an ob&ect, and to ateriality of the theoretical space. ;s a conse!uence, this points to a crucial beyond the sphere of ateriality. philosophical perspective2 not to seek one)s freedo

5!e f"lt!$ e.ample# an* t!e beaut"ful #oul# 'i(ek)s e*a ples constantly show a surprising aptitude to break with given evidences. This is, to y view, what belongs to 'i(ek)s greatest erits in philosophy2 the proofs of his a a/ing ability to discover a certain theoretical structure, a transfor ative force, in a given

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ele ent - in any ele ent that culture can provide. Kust like the proverbial wise able to learn so ething fro order to teach hi intellect. This

an, 'i(ek is

everybody and everything. Eothing is too stupid or too trivial in

so ething - that)s probably the best one can say about a philosophical

eans also, in the first place, that nothing hu an is foreign to 'i(ek$ no e*isting unication)

pheno enon is able to bla e his theories as a naive, blue-eyed idealist drea . 1hereas other philosophers) ideas (for instance, Haber as) concept of non-hierarchical co appear funny at the very o ent that you try to i agine the in co parison not &ust to

ordinary petty-bourgeois 1estern acade ics, but, for e*a ple, to e!ually 1estern sadoasochist leather-gays, 'i(ek)s theory appears able to face any particular challenge e*erted by an e*isting practice - no atter how strange, kinky, awkward, dirty or cruel it ay appear.

;gain, this does not go by itself - and for the least in conte porary culture. ;re we not surrounded by "beautiful souls" who do not allow the selves (as well as others) the use of bad words or thoughts3 "s cultural theory today not totally subverted by a "childhood disease" that, at any price, tries to stay away fro "adult language" as well as fro the realities that this language designates3 (1e should not forget here that TH. childhood disease, according to psychoanalysis, is (secondary) narcissis .) "s there not a sort of "enlighten ent" and "pure reason" in power that does not hesitate to call for the police - or even tries to beco e that police - in order to prevent itself fro that, in the last instance, narcissis acknowledging "filthy" atters3 The proble is, of course by its very nature perceives every atter as filthy =F (since aterialis in

atter represents the sy bolic order which, by its rules and laws, puts constraints upon the "pure" narcissistic ego). - ;s opposed to this, we should re ind ourselves that as Bhrysippos, 5iogenes and .pictetus, and their history has always revealed itself by its dirty, sarcastic way of speaking. ;ncient authors such odern counterparts such as %pino/a, 8andeville, 8ar* or :recht have taught us lessons of sarcastic laughter with regard to unpleasant realities. These authors have not hesitated to play the role of the black sheep, of the bte noire that speaks out the dirty truth nobody wants to acknowledge or to take into his own outh. Bo pared to the background of conte porary "newspeak", the presu ptuous cleanliness that characteri/es today)s acade ic and non-acade ic theorists and police en of discourse, %lavo& 'i(ek has taken a !uite uni!ue stance. Here in particular it beco es clearly visible that his e*a ples function in order to brush so ething against its grain. "n his choice of sub&ects, aterialis atters and ways of speaking 'i(ek has never cared whether he hi self would (cf. 'i(ek =>7>2 9>), he did not hesitate to speak of bad things, and he called appear advantageously pure or virtuous. 4ollowing the "plebeian" tradition of philosophical things by their na es - preferably by their worst na es2 since only this can prevent theory fro painting reality pink and beco ing an idealist, "apologetic" narrative. "The cleaner you are, the dirtier you are" is the rule one could hear 'i(ek say so eti es. This position can be

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refor ulated in ,acanian ter s2 "f there is any chance to show respect or decency under respectless and indecent conditions, then this chance is not to be looked for on the level of the enunciated content. The level of enunciation alone - the fact that things are actually called by their na es - is the only level where an utopian wish can inscribe itself without beco ing i ediately ideological2 the wish that things ay beco e better than their outspoken na es.

;s a conse!uence, 'i(ek)s discourse never showed the least atte pt to appear "politically correct". ;s opposed to that, ost conte porary theorists as well as artists today in a narcissistic way constantly seek to look good when they speak about certain things (and keep silent about others). 0et this non-dialectical way of proceeding does not leave any roo to ove for their listeners. The latter cannot do ore than agree with what has been stated ("0es, the author is right, this are on the good side"). Hnlike 6abinovitch, conte porary politically correct authors do not have "a second reason" when they speak. They never start speaking ironically or sarcastically, fro opposed to what they ean in order to trigger a a position ove ent of thoughts, affects and responses inority really is in a deplorable situation"). This keeps the

audience in a totally resignative, yet at the sa e ti e presu ptuously satisfied position ("we

in their audience. Therefore this discourse produces nothing but the tacit satisfaction of bourgeois classes that they are not to bla e for the bad state of affairs in the world (which they, according to an obscene aesthetics of the subli e, love to observe in a safe theory or art space). 'i(ek on the contrary never followed this pattern. He willingly assu ed the role of the bte noire. 1ith regard to this gesture of his, we elegantly, assu ed guilt the selves.=I ; constant awareness of the "e*tre es" pushes 'i(ek)s thought forward and allows hi to take his very "i possible" positions which are necessary in order to render theoretical aterialist stance. ,ouis ;lthusser has aterialis "2 "not to tell beco ing thought possible.=7 This non-naivetJ of 'i(ek is a proper ay feel re inded of Eiet/sche)s re ark ore about the nobility of the +reek gods who did not e*ecute punish ent but rather,

coined for this stance a for ula which he called "the only definition of

oneself stories" ("ne pas se raconter d)histoire", ;lthusser =>>C2 9CI). Precisely by his e*a ples, which are often stories, 'i(ek succeeds in preventing his philosophy fro a story.=>

"rt$ matter# a# #!arp tool# This theoretical fa iliarity with all kinds of realities, as re ote as they characteri/es his work. ;s any observers have re arked, the "8atri*" to 8ar*, fro ay be fro acade ic life or hori/ons, allows 'i(ek to build up that uni!ue field of theoretical operation that ost heterogeneous realities beco e part of 'i(ek)s theory. 4ro one balls &oke to the other, fro

43

fistfucking to 4lintstones, fro Bo

B"; torture to children)s toys, fro

Boca Bola co

ercials to the scope

unist party secrets$ nothing is too high or too low in order to be e*cluded fro

of his philosophy. This creates an e*tre ely egalitarian at osphere in 'i(ek )s approach. 0et this egalitarian spirit does not ste only fro the fact that these ass culture

ele ents are allowed to enter into "highbrow" philosophy (as they were before, for e*a ple in 1alter :en&a in, 6oland :arthes or H berto .co). 1hat 'i(ek, as e!ually apt to serve hi co contrary, it akes 'i(ek)s proceeding so egalitarian is the fact that these ele ents are not &ust there, but that they are also regarded, by as theoretical tools - as "synthetic aprioris", as it were. The eans$ on the ercial is not &ust there in order to be analy/ed by elaborated theoretical ore or less enig atic raw

ay very well be used to analy/e a given theory, as its ob&ect. ;nd the artwork is aterial to be interpreted by refined ay beco e the theoretical tool and tell

not &ust there as a

psychoanalytic devices$ on the contrary, Hitchcock

you what you always wanted to know about ,acan (but did not dare to ask). The e*a ple is elevated to the dignity of a theoretical tool2 this is what distinguishes 'i(ek )s theory fro They feel any efforts in conte porary cultural studies which appear e!ually close aterial. ersed into their ob&ect, the cultural or to get at a to their respective realities. 0et cultural studies today often lack the distance to their ost ade!uate when they get co pletely i

subcultural reality they describe. 'i(ek on the contrary never enters into the sa e inti acy with the ele ents he uses. :eing taken as theoretical tools, the e*a ples help hi distance fro ,ouis ;lthusser has once called the "+olden 6ule" of according to its self-understanding." This uses
9G

the self-understanding of the reality he deals with. This corresponds to what aterialis 2 "5o not &udge a given reality

ay also e*plain why 'i(ek appears to show little love for his cultural ob&ects. He Hollywood ovies, but rarely refined or e*travagant productions. He refers to

ainstrea

novels, but, as has been re arked, al ost never to lyrics. 9= 0et 'i(ek)s theory is not not fil theory, but theory that works with fil $ not theory of literature, but theory that works with literature$ not theory of everyday culture including its dark sides, but theory that works with pheno ena fro ob&ects serve hi everyday culture including its dark sides. Precisely because his cultural as tools, 'i(ek does not ake his choices according to their refine ent and

cultural value, but to their e*planatory and interpretative value. Therefore 'i(ek)s way of dealing with e*a ples is not the kind of sy pathetic, orbiting editation about certain pheno ena that essayists such as 1alter :en&a in, 6oland :arthes, Kohn :erger or %tephen +reenblatt have presented. 'i(ek takes his ob&ects directly and with force, &ust like a ha care about the ha would not serve hi er in order to hit against an episte ological obstacle, and he does not er)s colour, history, provenance, inscription etc. 8ore refined ob&ects e!ually well in the role of such a tool, therefore 'i(ek obviously hesitates

44

to use the

- and, if we re e ber Kant, it is not the worst one can do if one hesitates to use

so ebody "&ust as an instru ent".99 The fre!uently ade observation that 'i(ek co pletely "flattens" his e*a ples out is ake a choice2 either the ob&ect is what you look at, or the ob&ect

not wrong here. 0et one has to re e ber their status as theoretical tools. "n the field of theoretical vision, one has to serves you as the lens through which you look at so ething else. ;nd if serves as your lens, then you do not have to care for the variety of its !ualities, but for one !uality alone2 its ability to sharpen your view on so ething else. "n the good %pino/ean tradition of producing optical lenses, 'i(ek sharpens the "definition" of his e*a ples in order to get a sharp view on another ob&ect. #nly in a second step one ay reverse this setting. 1hat has been, until then, the ake new glasses by which ob&ect of elaboration can then beco e its instru ent and serve to treat the for er instru ent as an ob&ect. ; lens aker, for e*a ple, wearing his glasses, can he, later, can sharpen his old ones. (This is the way how, for e*a ple, 4reud proceeds when, in his essay "#bsessive ;ctions and 6eligious Practices" @4reud =>GIbA he first uses religion in order to ake obsessional neurosis understandable and then, reversing this e*plicative relationship, sheds new light on the dyna ics in the history of religion with the help of his insights into obsessional neurosis.) %ince 'i(ek)s e*a ples are his tools, one has got to learn his e*a ples in order to understand hi . "t is not enough &ust to know the $ one has to be able to have the the toolbo* and to aster the present in skilfully2 one has to be able to re e ber !uickly how and

where they have to be applied in order to produce an une*pected insight. This is the way how the ancient philosophers such as the Pyrrhonean sceptics or the Kynics e*ercised the use of their e*a ples (which they called their "tropes"). Therefore they were so fit and !uick to refer to the e*a ples of dogs or noble Persians in order to dissipate i aginary for ations such as the tragical lure of the #edipus with one)s yth - by stating sarcastically, for e*a ple, that creating children other need not necessarily be regarded as such a sad thing.9<

;t this point, it can easily be shown why a recurrent ob&ection against 'i(ek)s e*a ples is besides the point. #ne can often read that, first, 'i(ek would shift too fast fro one e*a ple to another, and, second, that he would often repeat his e*a ples. "n a way, this argu ent looks !uite funny already by itself. "t re inds a bit of the one that 4reud calls the "borrowed kettle"-argu ent. ("0ou bla e e for having returned your kettle with holes in it3 - :ut, first, " did not borrow your kettle$ second, it had holes in it already when " borrowed it$ and third, " gave it back without holes in it." cf. 4reud @=>GGaA2 =<7s.) The two reasons in this argu ent see to contradict each other &ust the sa e way2 since if 'i(ek was too !uick the first ti e, then one should be glad to get the chance of a repetition. :ut what counts ore is the fact that this kind of ob&ection isrecogni/es the theoretical

45

status of 'i(ek)s e*a ples. "t takes the narrative role of the e*a ple for its logical role. "t

ay

be i polite to tell a &oke a second ti e, given the fact that the action is about narrating &okes. 0et in 'i(ek)s te*ts the &okes have a strictly logical function, and nobody would bla e a philosopher like Hegel for repeatedly applying his notion of " ediation", to realities$ or a ost diverse athe atician for repeatedly using a for ula he has invented. This status of the

theoretical tool is precisely that of the &oke in 'i(ek)s te*t. Thus we can understand 1ittgenstein)s idea of a philosophical book that consisted only of &okes, yet being co pletely serious in itself.9C (;part fro 1ittgensteinian utopia.)9? 1e can su this up by saying2 The ore aterialist a philosopher is, the less he is 'i(ek)s te*ts, "Bapital" by 8ar* appears to co e closest to this

disgusted by silly or dirty e*a ples, and the less he gets bored by their repetition. 0et there e*ists another structural reason for the necessity of co ing back to the sa e e*a ples again and again2 ;s ;lthusser has e phasi/ed, it is not sufficient to break with an episte ological obstacle and to open up a new theoretical field. This cannot be done &ust once. %ince the obstacle e*ists by reasons different fro new science, constantly theory, it continues to e*ist and to acco pany the its inside. ;s ;lthusser puts it, enacing it, even fro

"... not only does ideology precede every science, but ideology survives after the constitution of science, and despite its e*istence." (;lthusser =>>C2 99) Therefore theory has got to keep its instru ents in its hands. The "episte ological cut" has to be ade again and again. "ts opponent is too sticky to let science go alone. :laise Pascal has observed this necessity of the repeated effort and gave a beautiful for ula to it2

"These great ental efforts on which the soul occasionally lights are not things on which it dwells$ it only &u ps there for a o ent, not for ever, as on the throne." (Pascal =>>?2 9?= @L 79>A)

46

This paper has been presented at the annual conference of the :ritish %ociety of Pheno enology, %t. Hilda)s Bollege, #*ford, ;pril Ith, 9GGF.
1 2 3 4

cf. for e*a ple #. 8annoni =>7?2 <<. cf. ;lthusser =>>G2 99F.

cf. http2NNwww.dhar a-haven.orgNtibetanNdigital-wheels.ht 2 "His Holiness, the 5alai ,a a, has said that having the antra on your co puter works the sa e as a traditional ani wheel. ;s the digital i age spins around on your hard drive, it sends the peaceful prayer of co passion to all directions and purifies the area." 'i(ek )s analysis has been e*tre ely productive. ;part fro the discovery that beliefs and convictions can have an e*ternal e*istence, which has been crucial for a theory of ideology, it allowed another i portant conclusion with regard to art theory. ;t a o ent when in art an ideology of interactivity appeared predo inant, the e*a ple of canned laughter pointed into an opposite direction2 it was an artwork that contained its own observation. Here, the artwork did not leave so e creative activity to the observers$ on the contrary, it kept all for itself, even the "passivity" of the observers. ;nd apparently (as 'i(ek )s own e*a ple see ed to prove) there were observers who wanted it to be like that2 they did not want to observe, but preferred to delegate their observation to the artwork. Together with further e*a ples (such as the use so e TD-freaks ake of their videorecorders) this lead to a general theory of "interpassivity"2 the wish for delegated consu ption in art as well as in everyday culture (cf. Pfaller =>>7, (ed.) 9GGG$ 'i(ek 9GGC).
5

cf. Eiet/sche @=77IA2 9F>2 "@...A alles OberwPltigen und Herr-werden @istA ein Eeu-"nterpretieren @...A"
6

This is the way #ctave 8annoni has conceived of a "pheno enological" use of e*a ples2 "d)essayer de prJsenter des e*e ples de faQon, pour ainsi dire, !u)ils s)interprRtent les uns par les autres." (8annoni =>7?2 <<)
7

Bf. 'i(ek =>7>2 =I?s.2 "... a well-known %oviet &oke about 6abinovitch, a Kew who wants to e igrate. The bureaucrat at the e igration office asks hi why$ 6abinovitch answers2 )There are two reasons why. The first is that ") afraid that in the %oviet Hnion the Bo unists will lose power, there will be a counter-revolution and the new power will put all the bla e for the Bo unist cri es on us, Kews - there will again be anti-Kewish pogro s. ...) ):ut), interrupts the bureaucrat, )this is pure nonsense, nothing can change in the %oviet Hnion, the power of the Bo unists will last foreverM) )1ell,) responds 6abinovitch cal ly, )that)s y second reason.) The logic is the sa e here as in the Hegelian proposition )the spirit is a bone)2 the very failure of the first reading gives us the true eaning." - 'i(ek has given an e*cellent new version of this &oke in =>>=, showing that after the disintegration of Bo unis the sa e &oke could be told again, &ust by reversing the se!uence of the two reasons (cf. 'i(ek =>>=2 =).
8

Bf. 4reud =>CG2 9=9s2 "8it den Eeurotikern schlieSen wir also den Dertrag2 volle ;ufrichtigkeit gegen strenge 5iskretion. 5as acht den .indruck, als strebten wir nur die %tellung eines weltlichen :eichtvaters an. ;ber der Hnterschied ist groS, denn wir wollen von ih nicht nur hTren, was er weiS und vor anderen verbirgt, sondern er soll uns auch er/Phlen, was er nicht weiS."
9

cf. Kant2 "@...A ein :eispiel @istA nur das :esondere (concretu ), als unter de ;llge einen nach :egriffen (abstractu ) enthalten vorgestellt, und die bloS theoretische 5arstellung eines :egriffs." (Kant @=I>IA2 F9G @; =F7A, footnote)$ see also2 Kant @=I7=N=I7IA2 : =I=s.
10 11 12

cf. 5eleu/e =>7G2 ?>ss.

The counter-i age akes visible that already before we had to do with an i age. "f an i age "holds us captive", this happens because its nature as i age is not acknowledged, and ostly

because the logic of this i age in itself is not taken by its letter. This has been e phasi/ed by Eiet/sche, in his criticis of the use of the optical etaphor in widespread notions of theory2 ":ut let us, forsooth, y philosophic colleagues, henceforth guard ourselves ore carefully against the ythology of dangerous ideas, which has set up a )pure, will-less, painless, ti eless sub&ect of knowledge), let us protect ourselves fro the tentacles of such contradictory ideas as )pure reason), )absolute spirituality), )knowledge in itself) - in these theories an eye that cannot be thought of is re!uired to think, an eye which e* hypothesis has no direction at all, an eye in which the active and interpreting functions are cra ped, are absent, those functions, " say, by eans of which )abstract) seeing first beca e seeing so ething2 in these theories conse!uently the absurd and nonsensical is always de anded of the eye. There is only a seeing fro a perspective, only a )knowing) fro a perspective." (Eiet/sche =>=G2 =?<) - 4ro this re ark we can draw the conclusion that there exists no philosophy which does not think in examples. 0et so e ake believe that they did otherwise since they do not present and treat their e*a ples as such. They do not stick to their own letters but treat the as "sleeping tropes".
13 14 15 16 17

cf. %pino/a =>??2 C? %ee for this especially +runbergerN 5essuant 9GGG. cf. HardtNEegri 9GG92 <G?$ ,a//arato =>>72 CG. cf. +runbergerN 5essuant 9GGG2 9G<.

Bf. Eiet/sche @=77IA2 97=2 "5ergestalt dienten da als die +Ttter da/u, den 8enschen bis /u eine gewissen +rade auch i %chli en /u rechtfertigen, sie dienten als Hrsachen des :Tsen da als nah en sie nicht die %trafe auf sich, sondern, wie es vornehmer ist, die %chuld..."
18 19

%ee for this ;lthusser =>>G2 9G>.

Kasi ir 8alevich has, in his theories of painting, developed beautiful tableaus in which he analy/ed what he called the "inspiring environ ent" of any given painters) ove ent2 the inspiring environ ent of the ;cade ic painter is a far , with peasants and peaceful ani als in front of it$ the inspiring environ ent of the i pressionist is a feudal garden$ that of the futurist consists of ocean liners, loco otives and factories$ and that of the supre atist are skies filled with airplanes in geo etrical for ations. "t would probably be revealing to do the sa e with philosophers. #nly very few would stand such a test e!ually well as 'i(ek does. (Bf. 8alevich =>7G)
20 21

Bf. ;lthusser =>><2 9<C2 "Ee pas &uger de l)Utre par sa conscience de soi M" ore precisely lyric

Bf. Ble ens who re arks that 'i(ek)s appetite "finds its li it in poetry, poetry" (Ble ens 9GG?2 =?).
22 23 24 25

cf. Kant @=I7?A2 F=. Bf. Hossenfelder =>>F2 9>. cf. 8aruschi =>IF2 V""".

#ne could even i agine that, as 'i(ek once suggested, the e*a ples in one of his te*ts were &ust the sa e as in another te*t, yet the co plete theory was different.

Referen,e# ;lthusser, ,. (=>>G) !hilosophy and the "pontaneous !hilosophy of the "cientists # $ther %ssays , ,ondonN Eew 0ork2 Derso WWWWWWWWWW, (=>><) &crits sur la psychanalyse, Paris2 %tockN"8.B :achelard, +. (=>IC) %pistemologie' (usgew)hlte *exte +hg' v' ,' -ecourt., 4rankfurtN8. u. a.2 Hllstein 5eleu/e, +.N Parnet, B. (=>7G) ,ialoge, 4rankfurtN8.2 %uhrka p 4reud, %. (=>GGa) ,ie *raumdeutung, "tudienausgabe, /d' 00, 4rankfurtN8.2 4ischer, =>7> WWWWWWWWWW(=>GIb) 1wangshandlungen und 2eligions3bungen, in: ders', "tudienausgabe, /d' 400 , 4rankfurtN8.2 4ischer =>7>2 ==-9= WWWWWWWWWW(=>CG) ,ie psychoanalytische *echnik +(us: (bri5 der !sychoanalyse., in: ders', "tudienausgabe, %rg)nzungsband, 4rankfurtN8.2 4ischer, =>>C2 CGI-C9=. +eier, 8. (9GG9) ,ie kleinen ,inge der gro5en !hilosophen' 8Xnchen, YXrich2 Piper +runberger, :.N 5essuant, P. (9GGG) 6arzi5mus, psychoanalytische 8ntersuchung, %tuttgart2 Klett-Botta 7hristentum, (ntisemitismus' %ine

Hardt, 8.N Eegri, ;. (9GG9) %mpire' ,ie neue 9eltordnung, 4rankfurtN Eew 0ork2 Ba pus Hossenfelder, 8alte (=>>F) (ntike :l3ckslehren' ;ynismus und ;yrenaismus, "toa, %pikureismus und "kepsis' <uellen in deutscher =bersetzung mit %inf3hrungen, %tuttgart2 KrTner Kant, l. (=I7=N=I7I) ;ritik der reinen 4ernunft, :erlin (Z Kants 1erke, :d. """, ;kade ie-;usgabe) =>== WWWWWWWWWW(=I7?) :rundlegung zur 4rankfurtN8.2 %uhrka p, =>IC2 I-=G9. WWWWWWWWWW(=I>I) %uhrka p, =>I7 etaphysik der "itten, in: ders', 9erkausgabe, /d' 400 ,

etaphysik der "itten, in: ders', 9erkausgabe, /d' 4000, >' (ufl' 4rankfurtN8.2

Kross, 8. (=>>>) Philosophieren in :eispielen. 1ittgensteins H denken des ;llge einen, ;vailable at2 http2NNwww. o o-berlin.deNKrossW1ittgenstein.ht l (last visited2 9GGF-GC-=7) ,acan, K. (=>7F) -e "?minaire 400 - -@?thiAue de la psychanalyse, Paris2 %euil ,a//arato, 8. (=>>7) 0mmaterielle (rbeit' :esellschaftliche *)tigkeit unter den /edingungen des !ostfordismus, in: 6egri, *' et al': 8mherschweifende !roduzenten' " aterielle ;rbeit und %ubversion, :erlin2 "5-Derlag, <>-?9 8alevich (8alewitsch), K. (=>7G) ,ie gegenstandslose 9elt. 8ain/N :erlin2 Kupferberg 8annoni, #ctave WWWWWWWWW (=>7?) 7lefs pour l@0maginaire ou l@(utre "cBne, 8ayenne2 %euil 8aruschi, ,. ;.(=>IF) ,ie ethode des /eispiels' 8ntersuchungen 3ber die methodische Cunktion des /eispiels in der !hilosophie, insbesondere bei -udwig 9ittgenstein. .rlangen2 Pal [ .nke Eiet/sche, 4. (=77I) 1ur :enealogie der 4rankfurtN8. u. a.2 Hllstein, 9GI-<7C oral, in: ders', 9erke, /d' 000 +hg' v' ;' "chlechta. ,

WWWWWWWWW (=>=G) *he :enealogy of orals, ( !olemic, tranls. by H. :. %a uel, in2 4. Eiet/sche, The Bo plete 1orks, ed. by #scar ,evy, vol. =<, .dinburgh, ,ondon2 =>=< Pascal, :. (=>>?) !ens?es' Transl. with an "ntroduction by ;. K. Krailshei er, ,ondon et al.2 Penguin Pfaller, 6. (=>>7) )The 1ork of ;rt that #bserves "tself. .leven %teps towards an ;esthetics of "nterpassivity), in: 7entro de studiis por la scultura publica ambiental +ed'.: !resencias en el espacio publico contemporaneo, :arcelona 99>-9CG WWWWWWWWW(9GGG) 0nterpassivit)t' "tudien 3ber delegiertes :enie5en, 1ienN Eew 0ork2 %pringer %ennett, 6. (9GG=) 4erfall und %nde des Dffentlichen -ebens' ,ie *yrannei der 0ntimit)t, E>' (ufl. 4rankfurtN8.2 4ischer %pino/a, :. (=>??) $n the 0mprovement of the 8nderstanding' *he %thics' 7orrespondence' Transl. fro the ,atin, with an "ntroduction by 6. H. 8. .lwes' Eew 0ork2 5over 1ittgenstein, ,. (=>><) !hilosophical $ccasions EFE>-EFGE, ed. by K. B. Klagge, ;. Eord ann, "ndianapolis [ Ba bridge2 Hackett WWWWWWWWW(9GG=) !hilosophical 0nvestigations' Hrd ed., #*ford2 :lackwell 'i(ek , %. (=>7>) *he "ublime $bject of 0deology. ,ondonN Eew 0ork2 Derso WWWWWWWW(=>>=) Cor they know not what they do' %njoyment as a !olitical Cactor , ,ondonN Eew 0ork2 Derso WWWWWWWW(9GGC) 9ill Iou -augh for visited2 9GGF-GC-=F) e, ;vailable at2 http2NNwww.lacan.co N 'i(ek laugh.ht (last