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This essay, by Colette Sciberras, for the Environmental Ethics module, was proposed for the site as it is both

well structured and is a very good exposition of the different ways of understanding intrinsic value.

What might it mean to say nature has intrinsic value? Do you think it has?
Introduction

Many environmental philosophers turn to the idea that nature has intrinsic value in order to respond to two problems in environmental philosophy, which can be drawn out from Richard Routleys article Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic? In the scenario that Routley describes, the last man, who knows that he is the last of the human species, sets about destroying the natural environment Routley argues that although intuition tells us that what the last man does is wrong, according to traditional !estern ethical systems it is entirely permissible "his is because according to the dominant !estern ethic human beings are the only morally considerable class of beings, and any constraint on peoples treatment of nature comes out of concern for other people, who might be deprived of its use #ince no future human beings will be affected by his actions, the last man is under no obligation to treat nature any better$
$ #ylvan %Routley&, R Is there a need for a new, an environmental ethic? in 'immerman, M et al %eds & Environmental Philosophy: rom !nimal "ights to "adical Ecology %(ew )ersey* +rentice, -all Inc $../& pp $0 , 12

"he first problem then, is the ethical 3uestion of whether nature is valuable only as a means to the purposes of humans, or whether it might be valuable for its own sake 4n anthropocentric ethic values nature only insofar as it is useful to humans, whereas biocentric and ecocentric ethics propose that at least some parts of non, human nature have 5intrinsic value which means that they are valuable apart from their usefulness and are direct ob6ects of moral concern "his therefore, is the first interpretation of the term 5intrinsic value, and is intended to establish that nature is valuable for its own sake I shall be using the term 5final value to refer to this type of value, which is contrasted with 5instrumental value, that is, valuable as a means to something else

"he second problem is a meta,ethical one and is also implied in Routleys thought e7periments "he 3uestion concerns the source of value8 whether value e7ists 5out there in the world, independently of humans, who therefore discover it, or whether it is humans who assign value to things in the world "hese two positions are known as value, ob6ectivism and value,sub6ectivism respectively "he 3uestion is relevant for our purposes since it could be argued that if sub6ectivists are right, there is no reason for the last man to refrain from damaging the environment, since he does not destroy anything of value "hat is, since there will be no people to value nature, no loss of value can result from his actions 9b6ective values are believed to be necessary for environmental ethics for a number of other reasons too I will outline these reasons and provide some arguments against them further below :or now, it is sufficient to note that the second

interpretation of 5intrinsic value identifies it with ob6ective value, and is supposed to establish that nature is valuable whether or not there are people in the world who value it

Intrinsic value is ascribed to nature in environmental philosophy in both these senses and the two meanings are very often conflated 4rne (aess, for e7ample, argues that the well, being and flourishing ;non,human life on <arth =has> value in =itself> %synonyms* intrinsic value, inherent worth&; independent of the usefulness of the non,human world for human purposes and that the presence of inherent value in a natural ob6ect is independent of any awareness, interest or appreciation of it by any conscious being1

"here is also a third sense of 5intrinsic value that one could argue is what the term properly means "his is the value that a thing has independently of its circumstances, as opposed to e7trinsic value, which is value a thing has due to its relations with other things ?nless otherwise stated, the term 5intrinsic value will be used in this sense, which will be discussed more fully below

"hus there are three distinctions in value @ that between instrumental and final value, that between sub6ective and ob6ective values and that between intrinsic and e7trinsic value In each case one of the poles is sometimes called 5intrinsic value @ which can therefore mean value that is independent of usefulness %final value&, value that is independent of human valuing %ob6ective value& and value that is independent of circumstances %intrinsic value proper&
1 (aess, 4 "he Aeep <cological Movement* #ome philosophical 4spects in 'immerman, M et al %eds & Environmental Philosophy: rom !nimal "ights to "adical Ecology %(ew )ersey* +rentice, -all Inc $../& pp $.B , 1$$ %p $.C , 0&

I will argue against the idea that nature has 5intrinsic value, when this is taken to mean value that a thing has independently of its circumstances, since this interpretation of intrinsic value fails to account for most of the value that environmentalists find in nature I will also argue against a standard method of establishing ob6ective value in nature that locates the desired ob6ectivity in the fact that natural ob6ects have a good of their own I will then e7amine whether the two problems mentioned above are valid reasons for preferring an ob6ectivist meta,ethic and argue that a sub6ectivist account of the final value of nature fulfills both purposes that the concept of the 5intrinsic value of nature is e7pected to fulfill8 i e to establish that nature can be valued independently of its usefulness, and also that it would have value even if there were no humans around to value it "o say that nature has 5intrinsic value therefore is best interpreted as meaning that people can, or ought to, value nature for its own sake, independently of its usefulness

Does nature have intrinsic value?

In "wo Aistinctions in Doodness Ehristine Forsgaard shows that intrinsic value is often taken to be the same thing as the converse of instrumental value, that is, final value If a things value does not derive from its utility, if it is valuable as an end or for its own sake, then it is claimed that it has intrinsic value Indeed what most environmental philosophers try to secure when they argue for the 5intrinsic value of nature is that it is valuable for its own sake, and not only for the sake of humans Eallicott, for e7ample,

argues that something is intrinsically valuable ; if its value is not derived from its utility, but is independent of any use or function it may have in relation to something or someone else B Forsgaard points out that this is not what the term 5intrinsic value means and she reminds us that intrinsic value is properly opposed to e7trinsic value, whereas instrumental value, is contrasted with final value, or valuable for its own sakeG

4ccording to Forsgaard, something is intrinsically valuable if it includes its own goodness, while an e7trinsically good thing gets its value from something else "he distinction originates in the moral theory of D < Moore, for whom intrinsic value is something that depends on the intrinsic nature of the thing in 3uestion, which turns out to be its non,relational properties "herefore, the distinction in goodness between intrinsic and e7trinsic value is meant to distinguish between things that are always good, independently of their circumstances, and things that are good only sometimes, and because of their relations with other things

)ohn 9(eill and Faren Dreen point out that when environmental philosophers argue that nature has 5intrinsic value they do not usually mean that it has value independently of its circumstances2
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"he value of some natural ob6ects, such as particular organisms or

species, at least from an environmentalists perspective, is necessarily tied up with the ob6ects relations with other things :or e7ample, a particular tiger is considered especially valuable, because it is a member of an endangered species, of which there are a
B Eallicott, ) Haird, #n defense of the land ethic* Essays in Environmental Philosophy %(ew Iork* #tate ?niversity of (ew Iork +ress $./.& p $B$ G Forsgaard, E 5"wo Aistinctions in Doodness in Forsgaard, E Creating the $ingdom of Ends, %(ew Iork* Eambridge ?niversity +ress $..0& pp 1G.,10G 2 9(eill, ) 5"he Jarieties of Intrinsic Jalue in The %onist 02 %$..1& pp $$. ,$B0 C Dreen, F 5"wo Aistinctions in <nvironmental Doodness in Environmental &alues ' %$..C& pp B$,GC

limited number "his is a relational property @ it is not part of the intrinsic nature of the particular tiger, but rather depends on its circumstances If tigers were as numerous as cows say, this particular tigers value would be considerably less8 it might possibly even become negative value, since the tiger might then be a threat to other species Kikewise, to determine the value of a species it cannot be taken in isolation, since a species always e7ists in an environment 4 species may have value in its natural environment, where it plays a role in maintaining the stability of the ecosystem, but none in a foreign one, where it causes disruption 4s Faren Dreen points out the central properties valued by environmentalists, such as rarity, uni3ueness, diversity, and stability all form part of an organism or species e7ternal relations and thus cannot be called their intrinsic values at all

It is only the survival of the biosphere as a whole, which may be intrinsically valuable, Dreen claims, since it is something we always value, irrespectively of the circumstances "o this one might add that other comple7 wholes, that is, ecosystems such as forests might also be said to have intrinsic value in this sense, since diversity and stability form part of their intrinsic natures #till, the concept of intrinsic value in Moores sense is not able to accommodate much of the value that environmentalists seek to protect in nature

"his of course, does not establish that nature does not have intrinsic value in the sense used by Moore, only that when environmental philosophers talk about nature having intrinsic value they do not usually mean it in Moores sense, unless perhaps they are referring to the value of the whole biosphere, or an ecosystem

!hen final value is given the name 5intrinsic value, this leads to the confusion of things that have value independently of their circumstances, with things that have value for their own sakes It also leads to the mistaken conclusion that anything that is not always valuable, such as the tiger, but that is valuable only in some circumstances, and not in others, is valuable only instrumentally "herefore, it is supposed that since the tiger is valuable because it is rare, and would not be as valuable if it were more pervasive, it is valuable only as a means to something else, perhaps diversity 4s 9(eill shows this is wrong, a thing valued because of its relational properties, such as its rarity, can still be valued for its own sake If we keep the two distinctions in mind, that is between intrinsic and e7trinsic value and instrumental and final value, it becomes evident that what is valued for its e7trinsic relations, although it does not have intrinsic value, can still be valued as a final good, for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else

It was pointed out earlier that when environmental philosophers, like Eallicott, try to establish that nature has 5intrinsic value, it is usually in order to counter the idea that it is only valuable as means to human purposes "hus what they re3uire is that nature can be said to have final value, which we have seen is not the same thing as being intrinsically valuable It is perhaps regrettable that environmental philosophers talk of 5intrinsic value, when what they mean is that something is valuable for its own sake, since then, their theory unnecessarily opens itself to the criticism that the notion of intrinsic value in Moores sense has been sub6ect to

"o conclude* 4lthough it may be possible to speak of the intrinsic value of the survival of the biosphere and of other comple7 wholes like ecosystems, it seems that most of the values that environmentalists seek to establish in nature depend on the relations of natural ob6ects and can change according to the ob6ects circumstances "hus environmentalists cannot say that these things have intrinsic value, if they mean it in Moores sense "his does not e7clude the possibility that nature has final value which is what most environmental philosophers mean by 5intrinsic value and which is the kind of value re3uired for an argument against anthropocentrism

Does nature have objective value?

9(eill points out that 5intrinsic value, as was mentioned earlier, is sometimes used as a synonym for 5ob6ective value, value that an ob6ect possesses independently of the valuations of valuers0 -ence a third distinction in value besides those between intrinsic and e7trinsic value and instrumental and final value, has to do with meta, ethics8 the debate of whether value has ob6ective e7istence, or whether it is conferred upon things by people 9b6ective value e7ists in the world whether or not there are people to perceive it, and whether or not they actually do perceive it 4rguing for 5intrinsic value in this sense, therefore, denies the sub6ectivist view, that the source of all values lies in valuers @ in their attitudes, preferences and so on/

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4 standard way of establishing the ob6ective value of nature links the re3uired ob6ectivity to the fact that things in nature have their own good, irrespective of human interests and preferences Jarious environmental philosophers, like -olmes Rolston and +aul "aylor, seem to subscribe to this view 9(eill makes a similar case for ob6ective values, the best e7amples of which, he claims, are to be found in nature

9(eills argument for ob6ective values rests on the premise that individual organisms and also collective entities, such as species and ecosystems can flourish or be in6ured, they can have lives, or be in states that are better or worse "herefore these things can be said to have their own good 4n animal or ecosystem that is flourishing will display certain properties, like being healthy or being stable, other properties such as being defective, abnormal, or unstable are evidence that the thing has not achieved its own good #imilarly, "aylors theory of respect for nature assumes that animals are beings to which it is correct to apply the ob6ective concept of entity,having,a,good,of,its,own .

Moreover, a natural ob6ect or collective entity has this good independently of human interests and preferences "o determine what it takes for a natural ob6ect to flourish or to realiMe its own good, we only need to know the characteristic features of the kind of thing that it is, its normal conditions, and we need make no reference to human preferences :or e7ample, greenfly has its own good to which mild winters are conducive, and this is independent of whether humans think greenfly ought to flourish or be in6ured 4gain, an ecosystem will flourish if it is stable, an animal will achieve its own good if it is healthy

. "aylor, + ! , 5Respect for (ature in Henson, ) Environmental Ethics, !n #ntroduction with "eadings %Kondon* Routledge 1LLL& pp 1$2,111 %p 11L&

4s 9(eill puts it the good of these things is independent of both human interests and any tendency they might have to produce in human observers feelings of approval or disapproval$L

:or 9(eill it is only humans who confer value, and therefore, since the evaluative properties such as being healthy, stable and so on point to a good that is independent of human values, these evaluative properties and goods must be ob6ective It will be noted that 9(eills argument is a lot more elaborate than the outline I have given8 I have simplified it a great deal mostly in order to draw a parallel with similar arguments that make a case for ob6ective value in nature on these grounds

In 9(eills e7ample, greenfly was said to have its own good, even though humans might prefer to see it unachieved, and this good therefore is independent of human preferences Iet to call a particular state of an organism or collective entity its 5good, does seem to presuppose certain general human values "hat is, to use words like 5flourishing or 5good,of,it,own and not a more value neutral word such as 5growing or 5state, one must presuppose that there is a broad human preference for life and health over sickness and death "herefore, though humans might not value the flourishing of greenfly, overall, they do value flourishing, and this is what enables them to speak of the 5good of greenfly 9therwise 9(eill has to show is how a particular state can be called a 5good, unless we take account of humans ordinary preference for life, how can we say that mild winters affect greenflies favorably by enabling them to 5flourish, rather than simply affect them neutrally by enabling them to grow in numbers?
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My argument here is against the claim that living beings and collective entities have 5goods, of @ their @own that are independent of any preferences for them at all Referring to these states as 5goods in the first place, presupposes human beings general interest in, and approval of health, life and so on, and therefore the value we ascribe to things in calling them healthy or defective remains sub6ective "o further clarify this point it might help to point out that an entirely ob6ective language that was independent of what humans prefer would describe the differences between a healthy and a defective sample of a species simply as differences without implying that one was better or worse !ithout the notion that health and life are better than sickness and death, a defective organism, say a three,legged dog, might be described as 5original "o move to the evaluative term 5defective it is true that we need to know what the normal characteristics of the species are, but this is not all Heing normal does not always carry positive evaluation, what is needed in this case is a preference for dogs being normal over being deformed "he property that e7ists ob6ectively in the dog then, is its having three legs, a natural property "he evaluative dimensions of 5defective depend on a further preference for health to deformity

If we allow that other species can be said to have preferences, or interests then humans can take the standpoint of other species to discover what is good from their perspective "hus we might value deformity in the dog negatively because it is seen to be contrary to its %biological not psychological& interests -owever these non,human biological interests and preferences are nothing like human psychological ones, which are normally

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accompanied by thoughts about what is right or desirable "he 5good of a natural ob6ect, then, becomes nothing more than its biologically determined end, and loses a great part of what the word 5good normally indicates "his is in fact what 9(eill seems to mean by the good of an ob6ect, and as he readily admits the concept is of limited use to the environmentalist, since it entails no moral implications "here is no way of deriving from the fact that beings have a biological end or norm towards which they strive, any obligations to promote it, or not to impede it "o use 9(eills e7amples, a dictatorship and a virus can also be said to have their own good and to flourish, yet this does not mean we have any moral obligation to promote them It would seem that this sort of ob6ective value, then, is necessarily divorced from prescriptivity, and is therefore irrelevant for an environmental ethic

"o establish that there are ob6ective values by claiming that a thing has a good of its own independently of whether humans value this good or not renders the concept of the good of a natural ob6ect ethically uninteresting 4 more promising approach, I believe would be to recogniMe the sub6ective aspect in valuing the good of an ob6ect "hat is, we call a particular state of a natural ob6ect its 5good because we sub6ectively place value on natural organisms flourishing, and developing in their biologically determined way, even though we might not value this particular ob6ects flourishing In this way we can let our other sub6ective preferences decide when and what sort of flourishing we value #ub6ectivism however is considered suspect in environmental ethics for a number of reasons, which I will outline in the ne7t section

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Subjective final value is sufficient for an environmental ethic

Many environmental philosophers argue for the ob6ectivity of values as it is believed to be a necessary starting point for a satisfactory reply to the last man e7ample "he reasons for this are twofold, and correspond to the two problems which we saw the last man e7ample raises "hus the first reason is the belief that a sub6ectivist account of value leads necessarily to anthropocentrism, the idea that only humans can be valuable for their own sakes, and the second is the idea that sub6ectivism cannot account for value in a world without humans

"he first reason is easily dismissed8 as 9(eill demonstrates, there is nothing in sub6ectivism that e7cludes non,anthropocentric values "he suggestion that if value is conferred upon things by humans then it is necessarily conferred only upon humans, confuses claims about the source of values with claims about their ob6ects <ven if what is valuable does depend upon the preferences and attitudes of people, this does not mean that people can only value other people Moreover, people may value non,human ob6ects for their own sakes, even though this value is sub6ectively conferred "hus I might value the e7istence of a rainforest, for its own sake, and not for any instrumental use it might be to me even though I recogniMe that ultimately this value depends on my preferences and attitude

Indeed, the distinction between valuing something as a means and valuing it as an end seems to have more to do with the sub6ective aspect of valuing, since it is a distinction in

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the way we value things "o value something for itself rather than as a means to something else re3uires only a change in attitude on our part, that is, that we adopt a disinterested perspective, to enable the ob6ect to reveal its properties, for which we might value it "herefore a sub6ectivist meta,ethic is compatible with the idea that nature is

valuable for its own sake8 it simply states that this value is something that we confer upon nature, by attending to it disinterestedly "hus we might value deformity in the dog negatively because it is seen to be contrary to its %biological not psychological& interests "he second reason for which environmental philosophers might prefer an ob6ectivist meta,ethic, rests on the premise that if value originates in the e7periences of a valuer, and does not e7ist ob6ectively in the world, then a world without human beings cannot possibly have any value "he problem therefore, is how there could be loss of value in the state of the natural environment after the last man is gone "hat is, if nature is valuable only because people find it so, then once people are out of the picture, there is no way of saying that the world as the last man left it was any better or worse than it would have been had he left it intact In other words, the last man has destroyed nothing of value, because there will be no people to confer value on it 4gain, according to 9(eill, this confuses the source and ob6ect of values8 even if values are conferred upon things by people, there is no reason why they cannot be conferred on a world without people in it

Robert <lliot, in :acts about (atural Jalues, elaborates further on this point "he fact that there is a world, here and now in which valuers e7ist, means that possible worlds that are empty of valuing agents, can be valued from the perspective of this actual world

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"here is no need for a valuer to be in direct interaction with a state of affairs in order to value it8 he or she can rather represent it to himself or herself, through words, and presumably other methods such as mental pictures and so on$$ "herefore a possible future world without human beings but where a rainforest is preserved can still be more valuable than one in which the rainforest too is gone, because people in this present world do place value on rainforests, and this value is e7tended even to rainforests in possible worlds where people do not e7ist Kikewise, we can, from the perspective of this present world, assess the last mans actions as wrong, because he has destroyed something of value, even though there are no people in his hypothetical world to perceive the loss of value

"here are still other, more general ob6ections to sub6ectivism in ethics, to which I will now turn It is argued that sub6ective values do not allow for disagreement, and that conse3uently there is no point in moral debate If my values are dependent on my preferences and attitudes and yours are likewise dependent on yours, then you and I cannot possibly disagree about whether a rainforest has intrinsic value or not $1 "his is because what our arguments amount to, is a statement of our preferences8 for e7ample, what Rainforests are valuable for their own sakes really means is something like I have a preference for rainforests "hus engaging in debate with another would involve no disagreement, an opponent in a debate would not disagree that I have a preference for rainforests Eonse3uently, we cannot be wrong about our values either, since we are always correct about our own preferences %e7cept in unusual cases for e7ample when we
$$ <lliot, R 5:acts about (atural Jalues in Environmental &alues 2 %$..C& pp 1B$,1BG $1 "his argument is made in 4ttfield, R 5+ostmodernism, Jalue, and 9b6ectivity in Environmental &alues $L %1LL$& pp $G2,$C1

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are being insincere& and there is no ob6ective truth to be discovered #ub6ectivism implies that nothing is good or bad, right or wrong ob6ectively

)ames Rachels shows that this argument rests on the mistaken idea that ethical 6udgments are simply a statement of fact, that what we do when we engage in moral discussion is report our preferences Moral utterances are not made simply to report ones preferences, but involve an attempt to influence others "hat is, if I claim that 5rainforests are valuable for their own sakes, my purpose in making the utterance is to influence peoples behaviour, to enable them to appreciate the value of rainforests, and not to state that I have a preference for rainforests "hus the argument that there cannot be disagreement rests on a mistaken notion of what moral utterances are meant to do$B

Moral debate does have a purpose8 it is undertaken in the attempt to align others preferences and values to ones own 4lthough a sub6ectivist meta,ethic implies that there is no ob6ective truth about values, this does not mean that there can be no value 6udgments that are better or worse 4 value 6udgment, though it e7presses an attitude or preference, is backed by reasons, and therefore we can after all, discover that we were wrong about our values if after we have considered the facts we feel differently about the matter, and our attitude and preferences change "o paraphrase Rachels, a thing will be said to have value if a completely reasonable and impartial person would find it valuable after having thought through the facts "his is the standard then to which sub6ectivist value 6udgments can appeal

$B Rachels, ) 5#ub6ectivism in #inger + %ed& ! Companion to Ethics %97ford* Hasil Hlackwell Ktd $..$& pp GB1,GG$

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9f the three different meanings ascribed to 5intrinsic value in the introduction then, only one turns out to be necessary for an environmental ethic 5Intrinsic value in Moores sense, it was argued, is not what most environmentalists mean by the intrinsic value of nature In addition, for the concept of the 5intrinsic value of nature to be useful for environmental ethics, there is no reason to suppose that this value must be ob6ective, since sub6ectively conferred final value can satisfy both re3uirements that nature is valued for its own sake, and that it is valuable even if there are no people in the world at the time to value it 4ll that is re3uired of the notion of 5intrinsic value for an environmental ethic then, is that it establishes that nature 5has value for its own sake, meaning that people confer this value on it

!hat might it mean then to say 5nature has intrinsic value, on this account of intrinsic value? It would be to say nothing about nature ob6ectively, rather it would be to e7press an attitude that leads one to value it for its own sake, and not only as a means to ones purposes Jaluing it in this way would, however, still rely on reasons "hus we might value the rainforest, apart from any medicinal properties its species might have, but rather for other properties that are not particularly useful to humans If engaged in debate with a person who did not so value rain forests, one might give reasons for ones evaluation of it, perhaps by pointing to its beauty, natural harmony and e7ceptional biological diversity It would be basically to argue that there is another way of looking at the forest, that does not perceive it as a means to another good, and to try to change others attitudes to the forest in order that they might begin to look at it in this way

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onclusion

I have argued that to say that nature has intrinsic value can be interpreted in three ways, that it has intrinsic value in the terms proper sense of value that is independent of circumstances, that it has intrinsic value in the sense of final value, or valuable for its own sake, and that it has intrinsic value in the sense of ob6ective value, independently of whether people actually do place value on it

Intrinsic value in its proper sense is not what environmentalists have in mind, since most things in nature are valued because of their e7ternal relational properties, and therefore this value is very much dependent on circumstances !hen environmental philosophers talk of the intrinsic value of nature, what they usually mean is that it is valuable for its own sake

Many environmental philosophers argue that there is value in nature that is ob6ective, and a standard way of establishing this is to claim that natural ob6ects have a 5good that is independent of human preferences I have argued that calling this a 5good or claiming that a thing 5flourishes depends on a general preference for life, health and so on 9therwise the 5good of an ob6ect turns out to be its biologically determined end, and can have no conse3uences on our actions, since there is no way of deriving moral obligations from it

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"he reasons for preferring an ob6ectivist to a sub6ectivist account of value were outlined and re6ected, and it was therefore concluded that the only sense of 5intrinsic value that is necessary to ascribe to nature, for an environmental ethic, is that of final value, and that a sub6ectivist meta,ethic is compatible with what the concept must accomplish "o say that 5nature has intrinsic value therefore can be best interpreted as meaning that it can %or ought to& be valued by people for its own sake I have not argued for whether it does 5have value in this sense, since it seems evident that anything at all can be valued in this way, and re3uires only a change of attitude on our part

!ibliogra"hy# 4ttfield, R 5+ostmodernism, Jalue, and 9b6ectivity in Environmental &alues $L %1LL$& pp $G2,$C1 Henson, ) Environmental Ethics: !n introduction with readings %Kondon* Routledge 1LLL& Eallicott, ) Haird, #n defense of the land ethic* Essays in Environmental Philosophy %(ew Iork* #tate ?niversity of (ew Iork +ress $./.& <lliot, R 5:acts about (atural Jalues in Environmental &alues 2 %$..C& pp 1B$,1BG Dreen, F 5"wo Aistinctions in <nvironmental Doodness in Environmental &alues ' %$..C& pp B$,GC Forsgaard, E 5"wo Aistinctions in Doodness in Forsgaard, E Creating the $ingdom of Ends, %(ew Iork* Eambridge ?niversity +ress $..0& pp 1G.,10G Mackie, ) K Ethics: #nventing "ight and (rong %Middlese7* +enguin Hooks $./$& 9(eill, ) 5"he Jarieties of Intrinsic Jalue in The %onist 02 %$..1& pp $$. @$B0 RabinowicM ! N ROnnow,Rasmussen " 5IIP4 Aistinction in Jalue* Intrinsic and :or Its 9wn #ake in Proceedings of the !ristotelian Society $LL %1LLL& pp B$,2$ Rachels, ) 5#ub6ectivism in #inger + %ed& ! Companion to Ethics %97ford* Hasil Hlackwell Ktd $..$& pp GB1,GG$

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Rolston, -olmes Environmental Ethics: )uties to and &alues in the *atural (orld %+hiladelphia* "emple ?niversity +ress $.//& 'immerman, M et al %eds & Environmental Philosophy: rom !nimal "ights to "adical Ecology %(ew )ersey* +rentice, -all Inc $../&

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