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“ The truth, “Lacan declared in 1964, “ is that which runs after truth—and that is
where I am running, where I am taking you , like Actaeon’s hounds, after me. When I
find the goddess’s hiding place, I will no doubt be changed into a stag, and you can
devour me, but we still have a little way to go yet.”
奔跑,打獵,追蹤,這就是真理認出獵犬的方法,跟性愛選擇的堅持沒什麼
兩樣,類似死亡,總之,相當非人道,也許戴安娜也知道。
Truth takes her lovers for a ride, and that how she loves them: thrown off the trail,
frustrated, grasping only her tracks. And how could it be otherwise, since this truth is
the truth of desire, the indefatigable huntsman never satisfied with any prey, always
turning it loose for the nothing he pursues?
真理帶領她的追求者前往奔馳,這就是她熱愛他們的方式:讓人迷失了路徑,
心灰意冷,卻又急切想找到蹤跡。此外,你還想要她怎樣?既然真理就是慾望的
真理,不屈不橈的獵人從來不滿足於他的獵物,總是欲擒故縱地追逐空無。
But we must ask this: Would Actaeon continue this pursuit, persist in this dog’s
life, if he did not imagine someday stumbling onto the Goddess? Isn’t it Diana’s bath,
and nothing else, that haunts his desire?
但是我們要問:
「假如阿克鐵特並沒有想像有朝一日能邂逅女神,他會繼續他
的追求嗎?他會堅持狗兒的生活嗎?縈繞他的慾望的難道不就是戴安娜的沐
浴,沒有別的?」
In short, and in spite of everything, doesn’t desire have an object? The Goddess
certainly cannot appear to the man who is dying to see her, and yet he would not
............
總之,儘管如此,慾望難道沒有一個客體?女神確實無法出現在一個渴望想
要見她的男人面前,可是假如她以某種方式出現在他面前,他就不會渴望她。這
就是科洛梭斯基所謂的「惡魔」艱困的難題:嚴格地說,慾望不能純淨,空無的
慾望僅僅是慾望的欠缺。
How will our hero, Actaeon/Lacan, solve this problem? In the Lacanian doctrine,
it is clear, desire cannot really have any object at all, if desire is to remain what it is:
the pure negativity of a subject who desires himself in his objects( Hegel), and who
can do so only by perpetually negating himself in them, by negating them as what he
is not—a “ given object” ( Kojeve), a thing “ in-itself” ( Satre).
我們的英雄,阿克鐵特或柆崗如何解答這道難題?拉崗的思想表達得很清
楚:假如慾望想要保持原有的樣子,它不可能真正擁有客體,也就是黑格爾所說
純然否定主體想要在客體身上慾望自己的本身。或照柯傑夫的說法:只有不斷在
客體中否定自己,用非自己的方式的「指定客體」否定客體的存在。或依沙特的
說法,用「物自體」的方式。
Thus we must exclude the possibility that this subject/desire has even the
slightest relation to an object ( the famous “ object relation” of the post-Freudians; )
since this object, far from being something with which he would maintain a
complementary or harmonious relationship, is instead what he himself is, ,by not
being it.
因此我們必須排除主體或慾望跟客體有任何關係的可能性,這就是後佛洛伊
德時代著名的「客體關係」,因為這個客體,他絲毫無法維持一個互補或和諧的
關係,相反地,由於不在客體裡,他才能保持原有樣子。
In this sense, the object is always a “ failed” object—that is, as Sartre explains in
Being and Nothingness, what desire “ lacks”; for example, it is not the full moon tht
the crescent lacks in order to become finally what it is ( in-itself), but rather the “ lack
of being” that defines the crescent from the insde as crescent ( for-itself).