Battle of Passchendaele From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from Third Battle of Ypres) For other uses,

see Passchendaele (disambiguation). Aadir a Google CalendarBattle of Passchendaele Third Battle of Ypres Part of the Western Front of the First World War Australian gunners in Chteau Wood near Hooge, 29 October 1917 Australian gunners on a duckboard track in Chteau Wood near Hooge, 29 October 191 7. Photo by Frank Hurley. Date 31 July 10 November 1917 (3 months and 6 days) Location 5054'1?N 31'16?ECoordinates: 5054'1?N 31'16?E Passendale, Belgium Result Tactical Allied victory Strategic Allied victory Operational Allied failure Belligerents Allies[Note 1] British Empire Australia Canada India Newfoundland New Zealand Union of South Africa United Kingdom France France Belgium Belgium German Empire Commanders and leaders United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Douglas Haig United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Hubert Gough United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Herbert Plumer France Franois Anthoine Belgium Louis Ruquoy German Empire Erich Ludendorff German Empire Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria German Empire Friedrich Sixt von Armin Strength 50 British, 6 French divisions engaged for periods between 31 July and 10 Novemb er 1917 77 83 German divisions engaged for periods between 31 July and 10 November 1917 Casualties and losses Disputed 200,000 448,614 Disputed 217,000 410,000 including 24,065 prisoners. [show] v t e Battle of Passchendaele [show] v t e Western Front The Battle of Passchendaele (or Third Battle of Ypres or "Passchendaele") [Note 2] was a campaign of the First World War, fought by the British and their allies against the German Empire. The battle took place on the Western Front, between July and November 1917, for control of the ridges south and east of the Belgian city of Ypres in West Flanders, as part of a strategy decided by the Allies at c onferences in November 1916 and May 1917.[3] Passchendaele lay on the last ridge east of Ypres, five miles from a railway junction at Roeselare, which was a vit al part of the supply system of the German Fourth Army.[4][Note 3] The next stag e of the Allied strategy was an advance to Torhout Couckelaere, to close the Germa

n-controlled railway running through Roeselare and Torhout, which did not take p lace until 1918. Further operations and a British supporting attack along the Be lgian coast from Nieuwpoort, combined with an amphibious landing, were to have r eached Bruges and then the Dutch frontier.[6] The resistance of the German Fourt h Army, unusually wet weather, the onset of winter and the diversion of British and French resources to Italy, following the Austro-German victory at the Battle of Caporetto (24 October 19 November) allowed the Germans to avoid a general wi thdrawal, which had seemed inevitable to them in October.[7] The campaign ended in November when the Canadian Corps captured Passchendaele.[8] In 1918 the Battl e of the Lys[9] and the Fifth Battle of Ypres,[10] were fought before the Allies occupied the Belgian coast and reached the Dutch frontier.[11] A campaign in Flanders was controversial in 1917 and has remained so. British Pr ime Minister Lloyd George opposed the offensive[12] as did General Foch the Fren ch Chief of the General Staff.[13] The British commander Field Marshal Sir Dougl as Haig did not receive approval for the Flanders operation from the War Cabinet until 25 July.[14] Matters of dispute by the participants and writers and histo rians since the war have included the wisdom of pursuing an offensive strategy i n the wake of the failed Nivelle Offensive, rather than waiting for the arrival of the American armies in France; the choice of Flanders over areas further sout h or the Italian front; the climate and weather in Flanders; Haig's selection of General Hubert Gough and the Fifth Army to conduct the offensive; debates over the nature of the opening attack between advocates of shallow and deeper objecti ves; the passage of time between the Battle of Messines and the opening attack o f the Battles of Ypres; the extent to which the internal troubles of the French armies motivated British persistence in the offensive; the effect of mud on oper ations; the decision to continue the offensive in October once the weather had b roken and the human cost of the campaign on the soldiers of the German and Briti sh armies.[15][16] Contents [hide] 1 Background 1.1 Flanders 1914 1917 1.2 Strategic background 2 Prelude 2.1 Geography and climate 2.2 British plans for a Flanders campaign 2.3 German defences in Flanders 2.4 Messines Ridge: 7 17 June 2.5 Kerensky offensive 3 Battles of the Third Ypres campaign 3.1 First phase, Gough's command: May August 3.1.1 Battle of Pilckem Ridge: 31 July 2 August 3.1.2 Capture of Westhoek: 10 August 3.1.3 Battle of Hill 70 3.1.4 Battle of Langemarck: 16 18 August 3.1.5 Subsidiary operations: 19 27 August 3.1.6 Second offensive battle of Verdun 3.2 Second phase, Plumer takes over: 25 August 10 November 3.2.1 German defensive changes 3.2.2 Battle of the Menin Road Ridge: 20 25 September 3.2.3 Battle of Polygon Wood: 26 September 3.3 Third phase, the rains return: 4 October 10 November 3.3.1 Battle of Broodseinde: 4 October 3.3.2 German defensive changes 3.3.3 Battle of Poelcappelle: 9 October 3.3.4 First Battle of Passchendaele: 12 October 3.3.5 Battle of Malmaison: 23 October 2 November 3.3.6 Second Battle of Passchendaele: 26 October 10 November 4 Aftermath 4.1 Analysis 4.2 Casualties

4.3 Commemoration 5 Notes 6 Footnotes 7 References 8 External links Background[edit] Flanders 1914 1917[edit] The Treaty of London (1839) recognized Belgium as an independent and neutral sta te.[17] The German invasion of Belgium on 4 August 1914, in violation of Article VII of the treaty, was the reason given by the British government for declaring war.[18] British military operations in Belgium began with the arrival of the B ritish Expeditionary Force (BEF) at Mons on 22 August. On 16 October the Belgian s, with some French reinforcements, began the defence of the French channel port s and what remained of unoccupied Belgium at the Battle of the Yser. Operations further south in Flanders commenced, after attempts by the French and German arm ies to turn their opponents' northern flank through Picardy, Artois and Flanders , (the 'Race to the Sea') reached Ypres. On 10 October, Lieutenant-General Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff ordered an attack towards Dunkirk an d Calais followed by a turn south to gain a decisive victory.[19] When the offen sive failed, Falkenhayn ordered the capture of Ypres to gain a local advantage. By 12 November, the First Battle of Ypres had failed (at a cost of 160,000 Germa n casualties), and was stopped on 18 November.[20] In December 1914, the Admiralty began discussions with the War Office for a comb ined operation to occupy the Belgian coast to the Dutch frontier, by an attack a long the coast combined with a landing at Ostend. Eventually the British were ob liged to participate in the French offensives further south.[21] Thus large Brit ish offensive operations in Flanders were not possible in 1915, due to the conse quent lack of resources.[22] The Germans conducted their own Flanders offensive 15 May 1915), making the Ypres salient more costly to def at the Ypres (22 April end.[23] Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF on 19 December 1915.[24] A week after his appointment Haig met Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, who emphasised the importance of obtaining control of the B elgian coast, to end the threat from there by German naval forces. Haig was scep tical of a coast operation, believing that a landing from the sea would be far m ore difficult than anticipated and that an advance along the coast would require so much preparation that the Germans would have ample warning. Haig preferred a n advance from Ypres, to bypass the flooded area around the Yser and the coast, before a coastal attack was attempted, to clear the coast to the Dutch border.[2 1] In January 1916, Haig ordered General Plumer to plan offensives against Messines Ridge, Lille and Houthoulst Forest.[25] General Rawlinson was also ordered to p lan an attack from the Ypres Salient on 4 February. Planning by Plumer continued but the demands of the Battles of Verdun and the Somme absorbed the offensive c apacity of the British Expeditionary Force.[26] On 15 and 29 November 1916, as t he Battle of the Somme paused, Haig met Gnral d'Arme Joffre and the other Allies at Chantilly. An offensive strategy to overwhelm the Central Powers was agreed, wi th attacks planned on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts, by the first fort night in February 1917.[27] A meeting in London of the Admiralty and General Sta ff urged that the Flanders operation be undertaken in 1917, and Joffre replied o n 8 December agreeing to the proposal for a Flanders campaign after the spring o ffensive.[28] The plan for a year of steady attrition on the Western Front, with the main effort in the summer being made by the British Expeditionary Force, wa s scrapped by Nivelle and the French government for a decisive battle, to be con ducted in February by the French army, with the British army's contribution beco ming a preliminary operation, the Battles of Arras.[29] Nivelle planned an operation in three parts, preliminary offensives to pin Germa n reserves by the British at Arras and the French between the Somme and the Oise , a French breakthrough offensive on the Aisne, then pursuit and exploitation. T he plan was welcomed by Haig with reservations, which he addressed on 6 January.

After repeated insistence on Haig's part, Nivelle agreed to a proviso that if t he first two parts of the operation failed to lead to part three, they would be stopped so that the British could move their main forces north for the Flanders offensive, which Haig argued was of great importance to the British government.[ 30] Haig wrote on 23 January that it would take six weeks to move British troops and equipment from the Arras front to Flanders and on 14 March he noted that th e attack on Messines Ridge could be made in May. On 21 March he wrote to Nivelle that it would take two months to prepare the attacks from Messines to Steenstra at but that the Messines attack could be ready in 5 6 weeks. On 16 May Haig wrote that he had divided the Flanders operation into two phases, one to take Messines Ridge and the main attack several weeks later.[31] British determination to cle ar the Belgian coast took on more urgency after the Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917.[32] Small operations took place in the Ypres salient in 1916, some being German init iatives to distract the Allies from the preparations for the offensive at Verdun and later to try to divert Allied attention from the Battle of the Somme. Other operations were begun by the British, to regain territory or to evict the Germa ns from ground overlooking their positions. Engagements took place on 12 Februar y at Boesinge and on 14 February at Hooge and Sanctuary Wood. There were actions on 14 15 February and 1 4 March at The Bluff, 27 March 16 April at the St Eloi Crat ers and the battle of Mount Sorrel 2 13 June.[33] In January 1917, the Second Army (II Anzac, IX, X and VIII corps) held the line in Flanders from Laventie to Boesinghe, with 11 divisions and up to two in reser ve. There was much trench mortaring, mining and raiding by both sides, and from January to May the Second Army had 20,000 casualties. In May, reinforcements beg an moving to Flanders from the south, II Corps and 17 divisions had arrived by t he end of the month.[34] Strategic background[edit] Main article: Western Front Several British and French operations took place beyond Flanders during the 3rd Ypres campaign, intended to assist Allied operations at Ypres, by obstructing th e flow of munitions and reinforcements to the German Fourth Army in Belgium and to exploit opportunities created by the German need to economise elsewhere. Germ an offensives in Russia and against Italy were postponed several times as the de mand for men and munitions in Flanders left little available for other operation s and the French army was able to continue its recuperation after the Nivelle Of fensive.[35] Prelude[edit] Geography and climate[edit] The progression of the battle and the general disposition of troops The front line around Ypres had changed relatively little since the end of the S econd Battle of Ypres (22 April 25 May 1915).[36] The British held the city, whi le the Germans held the high ground of the Messines Wytschaete ridge to the south, the lower ridges to the east and the flat ground to the north.[37][Note 4] The Ypres front was a salient bulging into German positions, overlooked by German ar tillery on the higher ground. It was difficult for the British forces to gain gr ound observation of the German rear areas east of the ridges.[39] In Flanders, sands, gravels and marls predominate, in places covered by silts. T he coastal strip is sand but a short way inland, the ground rises to the vale of Ypres, which before 1914 was a flourishing market garden.[40] Ypres is 20 metre s (66 ft) above sea level; Bixshoote 4 miles (6.4 km) to the north is at 8.5 met res (28 ft). To the east the land is at 20 25 metres (66 82 ft) for several miles, w ith the Steenbeek river at 15 metres (49 ft) near St Julien. There is a low ridg e from Messines, 80 metres (260 ft) at its highest point, running north-east pas t "Clapham Junction" at the west end of Gheluvelt plateau (2 miles from Ypres at 65 metres (213 ft) and Gheluvelt (above 50 metres (160 ft)) to Passchendaele, (5 miles from Ypres at 50 metres (160 ft)) declining from there to a plain further

north. Gradients vary from negligible, to 1 in 60 at Hooge and 1 in 33 at Zonneb eke.[41] Underneath the soil is London clay, sand and silt; according to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission categories of sand, sandy soils and well-balanced soils, Messines ridge is "well-balanced soil" and the ground around Ypres is "sandy soi l".[42] The ground is drained by many streams, canals and ditches which need reg ular maintenance. Since 1914 much of the drainage had been destroyed, although s ome parts had been restored by Land Drainage Companies brought from England. The area was considered by the British to be drier than Loos, Givenchy and Plugstre et Wood further south.[43] A 1989 study of weather data recorded at Lille, 16 mi les (26 km) from Ypres between 1867 and 1916, showed that August was more often dry than wet, that there was a trend towards dry autumns (September November) an d that average rainfall in October had decreased over the previous 50 years.[44] [Note 5] British plans for a Flanders campaign[edit] Preparations for operations in Flanders began in 1915, with the doubling of the Hazebrouck Ypres rail line and the building of a new line Bergues Proven which was d oubled in early 1917. Progress on roads, rail lines, railheads and spurs in the Second Army zone was continuous and by mid-1917 gave the area the most efficient supply system of the British Expeditionary Force in France.[55] Several plans a nd memoranda for a Flanders offensive were produced between January 1916 and May 1917, in which the writers tried to relate the offensive resources available to the terrain and the likely German defence. In early 1916 the importance of the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau for an advance further north was emphasised by Haig and the army commanders. On 14 February 1917 Colonel Macmullen of the GHQ staff, proposed that the platea u be taken by a mass tank attack, reducing the need for artillery; in April a re connaissance by Captain G. le Q Martel found that the area was unsuitable for ta nks.[56] On 9 February General Rawlinson, commander of the Fourth Army suggested that Messines Ridge could be taken in one day and that the capture of the Ghelu velt plateau should be fundamental to the attack further north. He suggested tha t the southern attack from St Yves to Mount Sorrel should be first and that Moun t Sorrel to Steenstraat be attacked within 48 72 hours. After discussions with Raw linson and Plumer and the incorporation of Haig's changes, Macmullen submitted h is memorandum on 14 February. With amendments the memorandum became the GHQ 1917 plan.[57] On 1 May 1917, Haig wrote that the Arras and Nivelle Offensives had weakened the German army but that a decisive blow would be premature.[58] An offensive at Yp res would continue the wearing-out process, on a front where the Germans could n ot refuse to fight. Even a partial success would improve the tactical situation in the Ypres salient, reducing the exceptional "wastage" which occurred even in quiet periods.[59] In early May Haig set the timetable for his Flanders offensiv e, with 7 June the date for the preliminary attack on Messines Ridge.[60] A week after the Battle of Messines Ridge, Haig gave his objectives to his Army comman ders: wearing out the enemy, securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier by the capture of Passchendaele ridge, followed by an advance on Roeselare and Operation Hush, an attack along the coast with an amphibious landi ng. If manpower and artillery were insufficient, only the first part of the plan might be fulfilled. Haig told General Gough of the Fifth Army that he would com mand the "Northern Operation" and the coastal force on 30 April 1917, although C abinet approval for the offensive was not granted until 21 June.[61] German defences in Flanders[edit] Main article: German defensive preparations: June July 1917 German defensive system, Flanders, mid-1917 The Fourth Army had 25 miles (40 km) of front to defend with three "Groups", (co rps headquarters and a varying complement of divisions) Dixmude (XIV Corps), Ypr es (III Bavarian Corps) and Wytschaete (IX Reserve Corps); Group Staden (Guards Reserve Corps) was added later. Group Dixmude held 12 miles (19 km) with four fr

ont divisions and two Eingreif divisions; Group Ypres held 6 miles (9.7 km) from Pilckem to Menin Road with three front divisions and two Eingreif divisions and Group Wijtschate held a similar length of front south of Menin Road with three front divisions and three Eingreif divisions. The Eingreif divisions were placed behind the Menin and Passchendaele ridges. 5 miles (8.0 km) further back were f our more Eingreif divisions and 7 miles (11 km) beyond them another two in Obers te Heeresleitung reserve.[62] German anxiety that the British would exploit their victory at Messines by advan cing to the Bassevillebeek (Tower Hamlets) spur beyond the north end of Messines ridge, led Crown Prince Rupprecht on 9 June to propose a withdrawal to the Flan dern line in the area east of Messines; construction of defences in the area beg an but on 13 June Colonel von Lossberg arrived as the new Chief of Staff of Four th Army.[63] Lossberg rejected the proposed withdrawal to the Flandern line and ordered that the current front line east of the Sehnen line ("Oosttaverne" Line to the British) be held rigidly, as the front of a deepened Flandern Stellung (p osition), in front of the Flandern line which was to become Flandern I, with a n ew Flandern II line built west of Menin, north to Terhand and Passchendaele, at the back of a new Flandern II Stellung. Construction of Flandern III was begun e ast of Menin north to Moorslede.[64] On 25 June Ludendorff suggested to Rupprecht that Group Ypres should withdraw to the Wilhelm (third) line, leaving only outposts in the Albrecht (second) line. On 30 June Rupprecht's Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl suggested a withdrawal t o Flandern I along Passchendaele ridge, meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck and close to Armentieres in the south. Such a withdrawal would a void a hasty retreat from Pilckem ridge and also force the British into a time-c onsuming redeployment. Lossberg disagreed, believing that the British would laun ch a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Sehnen line was easy to defend, that the Menin road ridge could be held if it was made the schwerpunkt ( point of main effort) of the German defensive system and that Pilckem ridge depr ived the British of ground observation over the Steenbeek Valley, while the Germ ans could see the area from Passchendaele Ridge, allowing German infantry to be supported by observed artillery fire. Lossberg's judgement was accepted and no w ithdrawal was made.[65] Messines Ridge: 7 17 June[edit] Main article: Battle of Messines (1917) German trench destroyed by a mine explosion The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German posit ions south of Ypres at Messines ridge. These German positions dominated Ypres an d unless neutralised, would be able to enfilade any British attack eastwards fro m the salient.[66] The British advance began on 7 June and was preceded by a uni que display of military pyrotechnics. Since mid-1915, the British had been cover tly digging mines under the German positions on the Messines Ridge. By June 1917 21 mines had been dug, filled with nearly 1,000,000 lb (450,000 kg) of explosiv es.[67] The Germans knew the British were mining and had taken some countermeasu res but they were surprised by the extent of the mining.[68] Two of the British mines failed to detonate but the remaining 19 were fired on 7 June at 3:10 a.m. British Summer Time. The final objectives were largely gained before dark. Briti sh losses in the morning were light, although the plan had expected casualties o f up to 50% in the initial attack. As the infantry advanced over the back edge o f the ridge, giving targets to German artillery and machine-guns, British artill ery was less able to provide covering fire.[69] Fighting continued on the lower slopes, on the east side of the ridge until 14 June.[70] The attack prepared the way for the main attack later in the summer, by removing the Germans from the d ominating ground on the southern face of the Ypres salient, that they had held f or two years.[71] Kerensky offensive[edit] Main articles: Eastern Front (World War I) and Kerensky Offensive The Russian army launched the Kerensky Offensive in an attempt to honour the agr

eement struck with its allies at the Chantilly meeting of 15 16 November 1916. Aft er the brief success of the Kerensky Offensive 1 19 July and its disastrous sequel , when Ludendorff's general reserve of six divisions captured Riga, 1 5 September 1917 and then in Operation Albion September October 1917 took the islands at the m outh of the Gulf of Riga, British and French commanders on the Western Front had to reckon on the German western army being strengthened by reinforcements from the Eastern Front in late 1917.[72] Haig wished to exploit the diversion of Germ an forces in Russia for as long as it continued and urged that the maximum amoun t of manpower and munitions be committed to the battle in Flanders.[73] Battles of the Third Ypres campaign[edit] First phase, Gough's command: May August[edit] Main article: The British set-piece attack in mid-1917 British 18 pounder battery taking up new positions near Boesinghe, 31 July Haig selected Gough to command the offensive on 30 April and on 10 June Gough to ok over the Ypres salient north of Messines Ridge. Gough planned an offensive ba sed on the GHQ 1917 plan and the instructions he had received from Sir Douglas H aig.[74] On the understanding that Haig wanted a more ambitious version, Gough h eld meetings with his Corps commanders on 6 and 16 June where the third objectiv e, which included the German Wilhelm (third) line, was added to the first and se cond objectives due to be taken on the first day. A fourth objective was also gi ven for the first day but was only to be attempted opportunistically, in places where the German defence had collapsed.[75] An attack of this nature was not a b reakthrough operation; the German defensive position Flandern I lay 10,000 12,000 yards (9,100 11,000 m) behind the front line and would not be attacked on the firs t day,[76] nonetheless it was more ambitious than Plumer's earlier plan, which h ad involved an advance of 1,000 1,750 yards (910 1,600 m). Major-General J. Davidson , Director of Operations at GHQ wrote in a memorandum that there was "ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives"[77] and s uggested reverting to a 1,750 yards (1,600 m) advance to increase the concentrat ion of British artillery. Gough's reply stressed the need to plan for opportunit ies to take ground left temporarily undefended and that this was more likely in the first attack which would have the benefit of long preparation. After discuss ions at the end of June, Haig endorsed Gough's plan, as did Plumer the Second Ar my commander.[78] Battle of Pilckem Ridge: 31 July 2 August[edit] Main article: Battle of Pilckem Ridge The British attack began at 3.50 am on 31 July. The attack was meant to commence at dawn but low cloud meant that it was still dark.[79] The main attack of the offensive by II Corps across the Ghelveult Plateau to the south, confronted the principal German defensive concentration of artillery, ground-holding and Eingre if divisions. The attack had most success on the left (north), in front of XIV C orps and the French First Army. In this section of the front, the Entente forces advanced 2,500 3,000 yards (2,300 2,700 m), up to the line of the Steenbeek river. In the centre of the British attack, XVIII Corps and XIX Corps pushed forward to the line of the Steenbeek to consolidate and sent reserve troops towards the Gr een and Red lines, (on XIX Corps's front) an advance of some 4,000 yards (3,700 m). Group Ypres counter-attacked the flanks of the British break-in, supported b y all available artillery and aircraft at about midday. The German counter-attac k was able to drive the British back to the 'black line' with 70% losses, then t he German counter-attack was stopped by mud, artillery and machine-gun fire.[80] Capture of Westhoek: 10 August[edit] II Corps attacked on 10 August to capture the rest of the black line on the Ghel uvelt plateau not held on 31 July. The advance succeeded but German artillery fi re and infantry counter-attacks isolated the British infantry of 18th Division, which had captured Glencorse Wood. At about 7:00 p.m., German infantry attacked behind a smokescreen and recaptured all but the north-west corner of the wood, o nly 25th Division's gains on Westhoek Ridge being held.[81] Albrecht von Thaer,

Staff Officer at Group Wytshchate noted that casualties after 14 days in the lin e averaged 1,500 2,000 men compared to the Somme 1916 average of 4,000 men and tha t German troop morale was higher than in 1916.[82] Battle of Hill 70[edit] Main article: Battle of Hill 70 The Battle of Hill 70 was a subsidiary operation between the Canadian Corps and five divisions of the German Sixth Army. The battle took place on the outskirts of Lens in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region of France, 15 25 August. General Von Kuhl wrote later that it was a costly defeat and "wrecked" the plan for relieving di visions which had been "fought-out" in Flanders.[83] Battle of Langemarck: 16 18 August[edit] Main article: Battle of Langemarck (1917) Fifth Army headquarters was influenced by the effect that delay would have on th e coastal operation, which needed the high tides at the end of August or it woul d have to be postponed for a month. Gough intended the rest of the green line (j ust beyond the German Wilhelm (third) line from Polygon Wood to Langemarck) to b e taken and the Steenbeek crossed further north.[84] In the II Corps area the di sappointment of 10 August was repeated, with the infantry managing to advance, b eing isolated by German artillery and then (except in the 25th Division area nea r Westhoek) forced back to their start line by German infantry counter-attacks. Attempts by the German infantry to advance further were stopped by British artil lery fire with heavy losses.[85] The advance further north in the XVIII Corps ar ea retook and held the north end of St Julien and the area south-east of Langema rck, while XIV Corps captured Langemarck and the Wilhelm (third) line north of t he Ypres Staden railway near the Kortebeek. The French First Army conformed, pushi ng up to the Kortebeek and St Jansbeck stream west of the northern stretch of th e Wilhelm (third) line, where it crossed to the east side of the Kortebeek.[86] Subsidiary operations: 19 27 August[edit] Most of the smaller attacks failed to hold ground, although a XVIII Corps attack on 19 August succeeded. Exploiting observation from higher ground to the east, the Germans were able to inflict heavy losses on the British divisions holding t he new line beyond Langemarck. After two fine dry days 17 18 August, XIX and XVIII Corps began pushing closer to the Wilhelm (third) line. On 20 August an operati on by British tanks, artillery and infantry captured strong points along the St Julien Poelkappelle road and two days later more ground was gained by XVIII and XI X Corps, which left them still overlooked by the Germans in the uncaptured part of the Wilhelm (third) line.[87] II Corps resumed operations to capture Nonne Bo sschen, Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse around the Menin Road on 22 24 August, which failed with many losses on both sides.[88] Gough laid down a new infantry formation of skirmish lines followed by "worms" o n 24 August. Cavan noted that pill-box defences required broad front attacks so as to engage them simultaneously.[89] The British general offensive intended for 25 August was delayed because of the failure of previous attacks to hold ground , following the Battle of Langemarck and then postponed due to more bad weather. [90] Attacks on 27 August were minor operations which were costly and inconclusi ve. Haig called a halt to these operations amidst tempestuous weather.[91] Second offensive battle of Verdun[edit] Main article: Verdun, August 1917 Petain had committed the French Second Army to an attack at Verdun in mid-July i n support of the operations in Flanders. The Second Offensive Battle of Verdun w as delayed, partly due to the mutinies which had affected the French army after the failure of the Nivelle Offensive and also because a German attack at Verdun from 28 29 June, captured part of the ground intended as a jumping-off point for t he French attack. A French counter-attack on 17 July captured the ground, then t he Germans regained it on 1 August, then took ground on the east bank on 16 Augu st.[92] The Second Offensive Battle of Verdun finally began on 20 August and by 9 September had taken 10,000 prisoners. Fighting continued sporadically into Oct ober, adding to the German army's difficulties on the Western Front and elsewher e. Ludendorff wrote, "On the left bank, close to the Meuse, one division had fai led ... and yet both here and in Flanders everything possible had been done to a

void failure ... The French army was once more capable of the offensive. It had quickly overcome its depression." (Ludendorff, memoirs).[93] There was no counte r-stroke or counter-offensive as the local Eingreif divisions were in Flanders.[ 94] Second phase, Plumer takes over: 25 August 10 November[edit] Main article: The British set-piece attack in late 1917 The German Fourth Army had defeated the British advance to all of the objectives of 31 July during August but the high casualties and sickness caused by the gro und conditions, endless bombardments and air attacks intensified the manpower sh ortage, that the German defensive strategy for 1917 was intended to alleviate.[9 5] Haig transferred authority for the offensive to General Plumer, the Second Ar my commander on 25 August and moved the northern boundary of the Second Army clo ser to the Ypres Roulers railway. More heavy artillery was sent to Flanders from t he armies further south and placed opposite the Gheluvelt plateau.[96] Plumer's plans continued the development of British attacking methods, which had also taken place in the Fifth Army, during the slow progress in August against the German defence-in-depth and the unusually wet weather. After a pause of abou t three weeks, Plumer intended to capture Gheluvelt plateau in four steps, with six days between each step to allow time to bring forward artillery and supplies .[97] Each attack was to have limited geographical objectives like the attacks i n August, with infantry brigades re-organised to attack the first objective with one battalion each and the final one with two battalions. Plumer arranged for m uch more medium and heavy artillery to be added to the creeping bombardment, whi ch had been impossible with the amount of artillery available to Gough.[98] The revised attack organisation was intended to have more infantry attacking on narr ower fronts, to a shallower depth than the attack of 31 July. The quicker and sh orter advances were intended to be consolidated on tactically advantageous groun d (particularly on reverse slopes) with the infantry in contact with their artil lery and air support, before they received counter-attacks.[96] The tempo of the se operations was intended to add to German difficulties, in replacing tired div isions through the transport bottlenecks behind the German front.[99] The pause in British operations while Plumer moved even more artillery into the area of the Gheluvelt plateau helped to mislead the Germans. Albrecht von Thaer, Staff Officer at Group Wijtschate wrote that it was "almost boring".[82] At fir st General von Kuhl (Chief of Staff, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht) doubted that the offensive had ended but by 13 September had changed his mind. Despite V on Kuhl's caution, two divisions, thirteen heavy batteries and twelve field batt eries of artillery, three fighter squadrons and four other air force units were transferred from the Fourth Army.[100] German defensive changes[edit] Main article: German defensive changes: late 1917 Instead of being one to two miles distant, as on 31 July, on 20 September the Br itish objectives were approximately 1,500 yards (1,400 m) away, without the disa dvantage of rain soaked ground and poor visibility encountered in August. The ad vances were much quicker and the final objective was reached a few hours after d awn, which confounded the German counter-attack divisions. Having crossed two mi les of mud, the Eingreif divisions found the British already established along a new defence line, with the forward battle zone and its weak garrison gone beyon d recapture.[101] After the Battle of Menin Road the German defensive system was changed, beginning a search for expedients, which lasted for the rest of the ba ttle. In August German front-line divisions had two regiments of three battalion s deployed forward, with the third regiment in reserve. The front battalions had needed to be relieved much more frequently than expected, due to the power of B ritish attacks, constant artillery fire and the weather, which caused units to b ecome mixed up. The reserve regiments had not been able to intervene early enoug h, leaving the front battalions unsupported, until the Eingreif divisions arrive d, some hours after the commencement of the attack.[102] After another severe defeat on 26 September, the German commanders made more cha nges to the defensive deployment of their troops and altered their counter-attac k tactics, which had been negated by Plumer's more conservative form of limited

attacks. In July and August, German counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions had enga ged in a manner analogous to an advance to contact during mobile operations[103] which had given the Germans several costly defensive successes. The counter-att acks in September had been assaults on reinforced field positions, due to the re strained nature of British infantry advances. The fine weather in early Septembe r had greatly eased British supply difficulties, especially in the delivery of h uge amounts of artillery ammunition. Immediately after their attacks, the Britis h had made time to establish a defence in depth, behind standing barrages, in dr y clear weather, with increased air support over the battlefield for counter-att ack reconnaissance, contact patrols and ground-attack operations. Systematic def ensive artillery support was forfeited by the Germans, due to uncertainty over t he position of their infantry, just when the British infantry benefitted from th e opposite. German counter-attacks were defeated with heavy casualties[104] and on 28 September Albrecht von Thaer, Staff Officer at Group Wytschaete wrote that the experience was "awful" and that he did not know what to do.[82] Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of forward garrisons by the ground-holding di visions. All available machine-guns, including those of the support and reserve battalions of the front line regiments, were sent into the forward zone to form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yards (230 m).[105] The ground holding divisions were reinforced by the Stoss regiment of the Eingreif division being m oved up behind each front division, into the artillery protective line behind th e forward battle zone, to launch earlier counter-attacks while the British were consolidating. The bulk of the Eingreif divisions were to be held back and used for a methodical counter-stroke on the next day or the one after[106] and for co unter-attacks and spoiling attacks between British offensives.[107][Note 6] Furt her changes of the Fourth Army's defensive methods were ordered on 30 September. Operations to increase British infantry losses in line with the instructions of 22 September were to continue. Gas bombardment of forward British infantry posi tions and artillery emplacements, was to be increased whenever the winds allowed . Every effort was to be made to induce the British to reinforce their forward p ositions, where the German artillery could engage them.[109] Between 26 Septembe r and 3 October the Germans attacked at least 24 times.[35] Operation Hohensturm , a bigger German methodical counter-attack, intended to recapture the area arou nd Zonnebeke was planned for 4 October.[110] Battle of the Menin Road Ridge: 20 25 September[edit] Main article: Battle of the Menin Road Ridge Wounded men at the side of a road after the Battle of Menin Road The plan included more emphasis on the use of heavy and medium artillery to dest roy German concrete pill-boxes and machine gun nests which were more numerous in the battle zones being attacked and to engage in more counter-battery fire. 575 heavy and medium and 720 field guns and howitzers, more than doubled the propor tion available at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge.[111] Aircraft were to be used for systematic air observation of German troop movements to and on the battlefield, to avoid the failures of previous battles where too few aircraft had been burde ned with too many duties in bad weather.[112] On 20 September the Allies attacked on a 14,500 yards (13,300 m) front and captu red most their objectives to a depth of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) by mid-morni ng.[113] The Germans made many counter-attacks, beginning around 3.00 p.m. until early evening, all of which failed to gain ground or made only a temporary pene tration of the new British positions on the Second Army front. The attack was a great success and showed that the German defences could no longer stop well-prep ared attacks made in good weather.[114] Minor attacks took place after 20 Septem ber as both sides jockeyed for position and reorganised their defences. A larger attack by the Germans on 25 September recaptured pillboxes at the south western end of Polygon Wood at the cost of heavy casualties. Not long after, the German positions near Polygon Wood were swept away by Plumer's attack of 26 September (the Battle of Polygon Wood).[115] Battle of Polygon Wood: 26 September[edit]

Main article: Battle of Polygon Wood Australian infantry with gas masks, Ypres, September 1917 The Second Army altered its Corps frontages soon after the attack of 20 Septembe r, so that each attacking division could be concentrated on a 1,000 yards (910 m ) front. Roads and light railways were extended to the new front line to allow a rtillery and ammunition to be moved forward. Artillery from VIII and IX Corps in the south acted to threaten attacks on Zandvoorde and Warneton. At 5.50 a.m. on 26 September the five layers of barrage fired by the British artillery and mach ine-guns began. Dust and smoke added to the morning mist so the infantry advance d using compass bearings.[116] Each of the three German ground-holding divisions attacked on 26 September had an Eingreif division in support, twice the ratio o f 20 September. No ground captured by the British was lost and German counter-at tacks managed only to reach ground to which survivors of the front-line division s had retired.[117] Third phase, the rains return: 4 October 10 November[edit] Battle of Broodseinde: 4 October[edit] Main article: Battle of Broodseinde The Battle of Broodseinde was the last assault launched by Plumer in good weathe r.[118] The operation aimed to complete the capture of the Gheluvelt Plateau and occupy Broodseinde Ridge. The Germans sought to recapture their defences around Zonnebeke with a methodical counter-attack also on 4 October.[110] On 4 October the British attacked along a 14,000 yards (13,000 m) front.[119] By coincidence , Australian troops from I Anzac Corps met attacking troops from the German 45th Reserve Division in no man's land when Operation Hohensturm commenced simultane ously.[120] The Germans had reinforced their front line to delay the British cap ture of their forward positions until the Eingreif divisions could intervene, wh ich brought more German troops into the area most vulnerable to the British arti llery.[121] The success of the British advance varied but the losses inflicted o n the Germans were devastating.[122] German defensive changes[edit] Main article: German defensive changes: late 1917 British soldiers moving forward during the Battle of Broodseinde. Photo by Ernes t Brooks. On 7 October the German Fourth Army again dispersed its troops in the front defe nce zone. Reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line and the Eingreif divisions were organised to intervene as swiftly as possible once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artille ry. Counter-battery fire to reduce British artillery fire were to be increased t o protect the Eingreif divisions as they advanced.[123] All of the German divisi ons holding front zones were relieved and an extra division brought forward as t he British advances had lengthened the front line.[Note 7] Without the forces ne cessary for a counter-offensive south of the Gheluvelt plateau towards Kemmel Hi ll, Rupprecht began to plan for a slow withdrawal from the Ypres salient, even a t the risk of uncovering German positions further north and the Belgian coast.[1 24] Battle of Poelcappelle: 9 October[edit] Main article: Battle of Poelcappelle The French First Army and British 2nd and 5th Armies attacked on 9 October on a 13,500 yards (12,300 m) front, from south of Broodseinde to St Jansbeek, to adva nce half of the distance from Broodseinde ridge to Passchendaele on the main fro nt, led to heavy casualties on both sides, with advances in the north of the att ack being retained by British and French troops and most of the ground taken in front of Passchendaele and on the Becelaere and Gheluvelt spurs being lost to Ge rman counter-attacks.[125] Birdwood later wrote that the return of heavy rain an d mud sloughs was the main cause of the failure to hold captured ground. General von Kuhl concluded that the fighting strained German fighting power to the limi

t but that the German forces prevented a breakthrough although it was becoming m uch harder to replace losses.[126] First Battle of Passchendaele: 12 October[edit] Main article: First Battle of Passchendaele Aerial view of Passchendaele village before and after the battle The First Battle of Passchendaele, on 12 October was another Allied attempt to g ain ground around Passchendaele. The heavy rain and mud again made movement diff icult and little artillery could be brought closer to the front. Allied troops w ere exhausted and morale had fallen. After a modest British advance, German coun ter-attacks recovered most of the ground lost opposite Passchendaele.[127] There were 13,000 Allied casualties, including 2,735 New Zealanders, 845 of whom were either dead or wounded and stranded in the mud of no-man's-land. In lives lost in a day, this is the blackest day in New Zealand history.[128] At a conference on 13 October, Haig and the army commanders agreed that attacks would stop until the weather improved and roads would be extended, to carry more artillery and a mmunition forward for better fire support.[129] Battle of Malmaison: 23 October 2 November[edit] Main article: Second Battle of the Aisne After numerous requests from Haig, Petain launched the Battle of La Malmaison, a long-delayed French attack on the Chemin des Dames, by Maistre's Sixth Army. Th e artillery preparation started on 17 October, four months late. The Germans wer e swiftly defeated, losing 11,157 prisoners and 180 guns as the French advanced up to 3.7 miles (6.0 km), capturing the town of La Malmaison and gaining control of the Chemin des Dames ridge. The Germans had to withdraw to the north of the Ailette Valley. Haig was pleased with the French success but regretted the delay s which had lessened its effect on the Flanders operations.[130] Second Battle of Passchendaele: 26 October 10 November[edit] Main article: Second Battle of Passchendaele Terrain through which the Canadian Corps advanced at Passchendaele in late 1917 The British Fifth Army undertook minor operations 20 22 October[131] to maintain p ressure on the Germans while the Canadian Corps prepared for their assault, as w ell as supporting the French attack at Malmaison.[132] The four divisions of the Canadian Corps had been transferred to the Ypres Salient to capture Passchendae le and the ridge.[133] The Canadian Corps relieved II Anzac Corps on 18 October from their positions along the valley between Gravenstafel Ridge and the heights at Passchendaele. The front line was mostly the same as the one occupied by the 1st Canadian Division in April 1915.[134] The Canadian Corps operation was to b e executed in a series of three attacks each with limited objectives, delivered at intervals of three or more days. The dates of the phases were tentatively giv en as 26 October, 30 October and 6 November.[135] The first stage began on the m orning of 26 October.[136] The 3rd Canadian Division captured Wolf Copse and sec ured its objective line and then swung back its northern flank to link up with t he adjacent division of the British Fifth Army. The 4th Canadian Division captur ed its objectives but gradually retreated from Decline Copse due to German count er-attacks and communication failures between the Canadian and Australian units to the south.[137] The second stage began on 30 October and was intended to complete the previous s tage and gain a base for the final assault on Passchendaele.[137] The southern f lank quickly captured Crest Farm and sent patrols beyond its objective line and into Passchendaele. The northern flank again met with exceptional German resista nce. The 3rd Canadian Division captured Vapour Farm on the Corps boundary, Furst Farm to the west of Meetcheele and the crossroads at Meetcheele but remained sh ort of its objective.[138] During a seven-day pause, the British Second Army too k over a section of the British Fifth Army front adjoining the Canadian Corps.[1 39] Three rainless days from 3 5 November eased preparation for the next stage, wh ich began on the morning of 6 November with the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions.

In fewer than three hours, many units had reached their final objectives and the village of Passchendaele had been captured. The Canadian Corps launched a final action on 10 November to gain control of the remaining high ground north of the village, in the vicinity of Hill 52. The attack on 10 November brought an end t o the campaign.[140][Note 8] Aftermath[edit] Analysis[edit] Third Battle of Ypres German casualties [Note 9] Date Total casualties Missing 21 31 July 30,000 9,000 1 10 August 16,000 2,000 11 21 August 24,000 5,000 21 31 August 12,500 1,000 1 10 September 4,000 unknown 11 20 September 25,000 6,500 21 30 September 13,500 3,500 1 10 October 35,000 13,000 11 20 October 12,000 2,000 21 31 October 20,500 3,000 1 10 November 9,500 3,000 11 20 November 4,000 * 21 30 November 4,500 500 1 10 December 4,000 * 11 31 December 2,500 500 Total 217,000 49,000 Casualty data from Der Weltkrieg Vol XIII (1942) [141] In a German General Staff publication it was written that "Germany had been brou ght near to certain destruction (sicheren Untergang) by the Flanders battle of 1 917".[142] In his memoirs (1938) Lloyd George wrote, "Passchendaele was indeed o ne of the greatest disasters of the war ... No soldier of any intelligence now d efends this senseless campaign ...".[143] G. C. Wynne wrote that the British had eventually reached Passchendaele Ridge and captured Flandern I; beyond them was Flandern II and also Flandern III which was nearly complete. The German submari ne bases on the coast remained but the objective of diverting the Germans from t he French further south, while they recovered from the failure of the Nivelle Of fensive in April had succeeded.[144] Paddy Griffith wrote that the bite and hold system kept moving until November; the BEF had developed a workable system of o ffensive tactics against which the Germans ultimately had no answer.[145] In 200 7 Jack Sheldon concluded that relative casualty figures were irrelevant, because the German army could not afford heavy losses or lose the initiative, by being compelled to fight another defensive battle on ground of the Allies' choosing. T he Third Battle of Ypres pinned the German army to Flanders and cost unsustainab le casualties.[146] At an army commanders' conference on 13 October a scheme of Byng's British Third Army for mid-November was discussed. Byng wanted the operat ions at Ypres to continue so as to hold German troops in Flanders.[147] The Batt le of Cambrai began on 20 November when the British breached the first two parts of the Hindenburg Line in the first successful mass use of tanks in a combined arms operation.[148] The experience of the failure to contain the British attack s at Ypres and the drastic reduction in areas of the western front which could b e considered "quiet", after the tank and artillery surprise at Cambrai, left the German Oberste Heeresleitung with little choice but to return to a strategy of decisive victory in 1918.[149] On 24 October, The Austro-German 14th Army, under General der Infanterie Otto von Below, attacked the Italian Second Army on the

Isonzo at the Battle of Caporetto; in 18 days Italy lost 650,000 men and 3,000 g uns.[150] In fear that Italy might be put out of the war, the French and British Governments offered reinforcements.[151] British and French troops were swiftly moved between 10 November and 12 December. The diversion of resources from the British Expeditionary Force forced Haig to conclude the 3rd Battle of Ypres shor t of Westrozebeke, the last substantial attack being made on 10 November.[152] Casualties[edit] Various casualty figures have been published, sometimes with much acrimony, alth ough the highest estimates for British and German casualties appear to be discre dited.[153] In the British Official History, Brigadier-General J. E. Edmonds put British wounded and killed at 244,897 and claimed that equivalent German figure s were not available, estimating German losses at 400,000. Edmonds considered th at 30% needed to be added to German statistics to make them comparable with Brit ish casualty criteria.[154][Note 10] In 2007 Jack Sheldon rejected the calculati ons in the Official History and that although German casualties from 1 June 10 N ovember were 217,194, a figure available in Volume III of the Sanittsbericht (193 4, Medical Report Concerning the German Army 1914 1918) Edmonds may not have inclu ded them as they did not fit his case. Sheldon recorded 182,396 slightly wounded and sick soldiers not struck off unit strength, which if included would make 39 9,590 German losses.[164] The British claim to have captured 24,065 prisoners ha s not been disputed.[165] Two poets, Irishman Francis Ledwidge, 25, of 1st Batta lion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, in 29th Division, and Hedd Wyn, a Welsh-lang uage poet serving with the Royal Welsh Fusiliers at Pilckem Ridge, were both kil led in action on 31 July.[166] Commemoration[edit] Tyne Cot Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery and Memorial to the Missing The Menin Gate Memorial to the Missing. commemorates those of all Commonwealth n ations, except New Zealand, who died in the Ypres Salient and have no known grav e. In the case of the United Kingdom only casualties before 16 August 1917 are c ommemorated on the memorial. United Kingdom and New Zealand servicemen who died after that date are named on the memorial at Tyne Cot Cemetery. There are numero us tributes and memorials all over Australia and New Zealand to ANZAC soldiers w ho died in the battle, including plaques at the Christchurch and Dunedin railway stations. The Canadian Corps participation in the Second Battle of Passchendael e is commemorated with the Passchendaele Memorial located at the former site of the Crest Farm on the south-west fringe of Passchendaele village.[167] One of th e newest monuments to be dedicated to the fighting contribution of a group is th e Celtic Cross memorial commemorating the Scottish contributions and efforts in the fighting in Flanders during the Great War. This memorial is located on the F rezenberg Ridge where the Scottish 9th and 15th Divisions, as part of the Britis h Army, fought during the Battle of Passchendaele. The monument was dedicated by the Scottish Parliament's Minister for Europe Linda Fabiani during the late sum mer of 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle. Notes[edit] Jump up ^ During World War I, and subsequently at the battle of Paschendaele, th e Allies prominently supported the produced war effort by their respective colon ial empires, whether at military or economic points of view. Jump up ^ Passchendaele /'p??nde?l/ is the common English title. The British Batt le Nomenclature Committee called the Flanders offensives of 1917 The Battle of M essines 1917 (from 7 14 June) and The Battles of Ypres 1917 (from 31 July 10 Novem ber).[1] The German Official History used the term Third Flanders Battle (German : 'Dritte Flandernschlacht')[2] and the French the Second Battle of Flanders (Fr ench: '2me Bataille des Flandres'). Jump up ^ The series of battles are known to the British as, The Battle of Messi nes 1917 (7 14 June); Pilckem Ridge (31 July 2 August); Langemarck (16 18 August); M enin Road Ridge (20 25 September); Polygon Wood (26 September 3 October); Broodsei nde (4 October); Poelcappelle (9 October); First Passchendaele (12 October); and

Second Passchendaele (26 October 10 November)[1] and referred to in German work s as (German: Kampf um den Wijtschatebogen) (The Battle of the Wijtschate Salien t) and the (German: Flandernschlacht) (Battle of Flanders) in five approximate p eriods, First Battle of Flanders (31 July 9 August); Second Battle of Flanders ( 9 25 August); Third Battle of Flanders (20 September 8 October); Fourth Battle of Flanders (9 21 October) and Fifth Battle of Flanders (22 October 5 December).[5] Jump up ^ "High ground" is a relative term. Passchendaele is on a ridge about 70 feet (21 m) above the surrounding plains. The Gheluvelt plateau is about 100 fe et (30 m) above surrounding area. Wytschaete is about 150 feet (46 m) above the ground before it; these terrain features were vital for artillery observation.[3 8] Jump up ^ Brigadier-General John Charteris, Chief of British Army Intelligence i n France, wrote in 1929 that "... in Flanders the weather broke early with the r egularity of the Indian monsoon ...", a claim that has influenced several histor ians. The rest of the sentence is rarely quoted, "... once the autumn rains set in difficulties would be greatly enhanced." On the following page Charteris wrot e, "Unfortunately there now set in the wettest August recorded for thirty years. " whch contradicts his first statement.[45] The Official Historian wrote that fi ve times the average August rainfall of 1915 and 1916 fell in 1917.[46] Winter t ook the view that Haig had conclusive evidence that should have led him to expec t heavy rainfall and hence mud.[47] Cruttwell,[48] Hart and Steel[49] and Steven son,[50] wrote that Haig was unlucky with the weather. Sheffield wrote that the "predictable" rain in August "... has no foundation in fact. The rain in Flander s during the battle was abnormally heavy.", [51] concurring with Terraine.[52] I n 1958 Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Gold, Commandant of the Meteorological Section at GHQ British Expeditionary Force contradicted the first part the claim made by Charteris, "It is quite contrary to the evidence of the records which show that the weather in August 1917 was exceptionally bad ...".[53] Rainfall in August 1 917 was 127 millimetres (5.0 in), of which 84 millimetres (3.3 in) fell on 1, 8, 14, 26 and 27 August, a month so dull and windless that the water on the ground dried slowly. September had 40 millimetres (1.6 in) of rain and was much sunnie r so the ground dried quickly, becoming hard enough in places for shells to rico chet and for dust to blow in the breeze. In October 107 millimetres (4.2 in) of rain fell, compared to the 1914 1916 average of 44 millimetres (1.7 in) and from 1 9 November there was 7.5 millimetres (0.30 in) of rain but only 9 hours of sunshi ne so little of the water dried; 13.4 millimetres (0.53 in) of rain fell on 10 N ovember.[54] Jump up ^ Ten German Divisions (the 4th Guards Division, 4th Bavarian Division, 6th Bavarian Division, 10th Ersatz Division, 16th Division, 19th Reserve Divisio n, 20th Division, 187th Division, 195th Division and 45th Reserve Division took part in the battle.[108] Jump up ^ 195th, 16th, 4th Bavarian, 18th, 227th, 240th, 187th and 22nd Reserve divisions).[108] Jump up ^ German troops engaged were from 239th, 39th, 4th, 44th Reserve, 7th, 1 1th, 11th Bavarian, 238th, 199th, 27th, 185th, 111th and 40th divisions.[108] Jump up ^ German casualties were counted in ten-day periods. A discrepancy of 27 ,000 fewer casualties recorded in the Sanittsbericht could not be explained by th e Reichsarchiv historians. * Missing totals for 11 30 November and 1 31 December are combined[141] Jump up ^ C.R.M.F Cruttwell in A History of the Great War, 1914 1918 (1940) record ed 300,000 British casualties and 400,000 German.[155] Leon Wolff (1958) in In F landers Fields: The 1917 Campaign, wrote that German casualties were 270,713 and British 448,688.[156] In The Great War 1914 1918 (1959), Cyril Falls estimated 24 0,000 British, 8,525 French and 260,000 German casualties.[157] John Terraine fo llowed Falls (1959) in Haig, the Educated Soldier (1963) but did not accept that German losses were as high as 400,000.[158] A. J. P. Taylor (1972) wrote that t he Official History had performed a "conjuring trick" on these figures and that no one believed these "farcical calculations". Taylor put British wounded and ki lled at 300,000 and German losses at 200,000.[159] In Road to Paschendaele (1977 ) Terraine argued that 20% needed to be added to the German figures to include s

ome lightly wounded men, who would have been included under British definitions of casualties, making German casualties c. 260,400. Terraine refuted Wolff (1958 ) who despite writing that 448,614 British casualties was the total for the Brit ish Expeditionary Force in the second half of 1917, neglected to deduct 75,681 B ritish casualties for the Battle of Cambrai given in the Official Statistics fro m which he was quoting or "normal wastage", averaging 35,000 per month in "quiet " periods.[160] Prior and Wilson in Passchendaele: The Untold Story (1997) gave British losses as 275,000 and German casualties just under 200,000.[161] Heinz H agenlcke (1997) gave c.?217,000 German casualties.[82] In Forgotten Victory (2002 ) Gary Sheffield wrote that Richard Holmes's 260,000 casualties on both sides se emed about right.[162] In his biography of Haig (2011) Sheffield did not offer f igures for either side, leaving the verdict to General von Kuhl, "The sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully justified.", noted by Sheldon (2007).[163] Footnotes[edit] ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ to: a b Edmonds 1948, p. iii. Terraine 1977, p. 301. Edmonds 1948, pp. 22 25. Terraine 1977, p. 336. Sheldon 2007, p. xiv. Edmonds 1948, pp. 124 125. Terraine 1977, p. 299. Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 179. Davies, Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 1937, pp. 138 452. Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 1947, pp. 57 93. Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 1947, pp. 269 293 & 426 453. Terraine 1977, pp. 159 163 & 198 199. Terraine 1977, p. 111. Edmonds 1948, p. 106. Sheldon 2007, p. 315. Prior & Wilson 1996, pp. 194 200. Albertini iii 1952, p. 414. Albertini iii 1952, p. 504. Foley 2007, p. 102. Foley 2007, p. 104 & fn 1. to: a b Edmonds 1932, p. 2. Doughty 2005, p. 137. Edmonds 1932, p. 1. Terraine 1977, pp. 12 13. Edmonds 1932, p. 31. Terraine 1977, pp. 14 15. Hart & Steel 2001, p. 30. Falls 1940, p. 21. Falls 1940, pp. 38 39. Edmonds & Wynne 1940, p. 14. Terraine 1977, pp. 31, 55, 94. Terraine 1999, p. 15. Edmonds 1932, pp. 163 245. Falls 1940, pp. 533 534. to: a b Terraine 1977, p. 278. Edmonds 1927, p. 353. Hart & Steel 2001, pp. 18 19. Terraine 1977, p. 2. Hart & Steel 2001, p. 42. Liddle 1997, pp. 140 158. Liddle 1997, p. 141. Liddle 1997, p. 142. Edmonds 1948, p. 125. Liddle 1997, pp. 147 148.

Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^

Charteris 1929, pp. 272 273. Edmonds 1948, pp. 205 206. Winter 1991, pp. 91 92. Cruttwell 1940, p. 440. Hart & Steel 2001, pp. 140 141. Stevenson 2005, p. 335. Sheffield 2011, p. 233. Terraine 1977, pp. 205 206. Liddle 1997, pp. 153 154. Liddle 1997, pp. 149 151. Henniker 1937, p. 273. Edmonds 1948, p. 25 & fn 1. Edmonds 1948, pp. 17 19. Powell 1993, p. 169. Terraine 1977, p. 84. Edmonds 1948, p. 24. Sheffield 2011, pp. 227 231. Wynne 1939, pp. 297 298. Wynne 1939, pp. 282 283. Wynne 1939, p. 284. Wynne 1939, pp. 286 287. Sheldon 2007, p. 1. Hart & Steel 2001, pp. 41 44. Sheldon 2007, p. 23. Hart & Steel 2001, p. 55. Sheldon 2007, p. 28. Edmonds 1948, p. 87. Edmonds 1948, p. 234. Terraine 1977, pp. 290 297. Edmonds 1948, p. 127 & fn 2. Edmonds 1948, pp. 126 127 & 431 432. Prior & Wilson 1996, pp. 72 75. Davidson 1953, p. 29. Edmonds 1948, p. 440. Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 89. Prior & Wilson 1996, pp. 90 95. Edmonds 1948, pp. 185 187. to: a b c d Liddle 1997, pp. 45 58. Terraine 1977, p. 234. Edmonds 1948, pp. 189 202. Edmonds 1948, p. 194. Edmonds 1948, p. 201. Edmonds 1948, p. 203 & sketch 20. Edmonds 1948, pp. 202 205. Simpson 2001, pp. 130 134. Rogers 2010, pp. 162 167. Edmonds 1948, p. 208. Doughty 2005, pp. 380 383. Terraine 1977, p. 235. Edmonds 1948, p. 231 & fn 3. Sheldon 2007, pp. 119 120. to: a b Nicholson 1962, p. 308. Edmonds 1948, p. 237. Marble 1998, App 22. Edmonds 1948, pp. 236 242. Terraine 1977, p. 257. Wynne 1939, p. 303. Rogers 2010, p. 168. Sheldon 2007, p. 184. Edmonds 1948, pp. 294 295.

Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ ^ Jump up Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^ Jump up ^

Wynne 1939, pp. 307 308. Wynne 1939, p. 307. Sheldon 2007, pp. 190 191. to: a b c US WD 1920. Sheldon 2007, pp. 184 186. to: a b Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 135. Edmonds 1948, pp. 238 239. Jones 1934, p. 181. Terraine 1977, p. 261. Harris 2008, p. 366. Sheldon 2007, p. 165. Edmonds 1948, p. 284 & fn 2. Edmonds 1948, p. 293. Robbins 2005, p. 128. Bean 1941, p. 837. Bean 1941, p. 847. Malkasian 2002, p. 42. Edmonds 1948, pp. 316 317. Wynne 1939, p. 309. Sheldon 2007, pp. 228 229. Bean 1941, p. 887. Terraine 1977, pp. 287 288. Edmonds 1948, pp. 341 342. Liddle 1997, p. 285. Edmonds 1948, p. 345. Terraine 1977, p. 307. Bean 1941, p. 930. Edmonds 1948, p. 347. Bean 1941, p. 929. Nicholson 1962, p. 312. Nicholson 1962, p. 314. Wolff 1958, p. 246. to: a b Nicholson 1962, p. 320. Nicholson 1962, p. 321. Nicholson 1962, p. 323. Nicholson 1962, p. 325. to: a b Reichsarchiv 1942, p. 96. Edmonds 1948, p. xiii. Terraine 1977, pp. xix xx. Wynne 1939, pp. 214 215. Liddle 1997, p. 71. Sheldon 2007, pp. 313 317. Edmonds 1948, pp. 345 346. Harris 1995, pp. 124 125. Sheldon 2009, p. 312. Miles 1948, p. 15. Bean 1941, pp. 935 936. Bean 1941, p. 936. McRandle & Quirk 2006, pp. 667 701. Edmonds 1948, p. 363. Cruttwell 1940, p. 442. Wolff 1958, p. 259. Falls 1959, p. 303. Terraine 1963, p. 372. Taylor 1972, pp. 181 182. Terraine 1977, pp. 344 345. Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 195. Sheffield 2001, p. 216. Sheffield 2011, pp. 248 & 439. Sheldon 2007, pp. 313 315.

Jump up ^ Boraston 1919, p. 133. Jump up ^ Kershaw 1999, pp. 96 97. Jump up ^ Vance 1997, p. 66. References[edit] Albertini, L. (1952). The Origins of the War of 1914 Vol III (2005 ed.). New Yor k: Enigma Books. ISBN 1-929631-33-2. Bean, C.E.W. (1941). The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914 1918: Vo l IV: The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1917 (1982 ed.). Canberra: Austra lian War Memorial. ISBN 0-7022-1710-7. Boraston, J. H. (1919). Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (1920 ed.). London: Dent. OCLC 633614212. Charteris, J. (1929). Field Marshal Earl Haig. London: Cassell. ISBN 1-135-10031 -4. Cruttwell, C.R.M.F. (1940). A History of the Great War 1914 1918 (1982 ed.). Londo n: Granada. ISBN 0-586-08398-7. Davidson, Sir J. (1953). Haig : Master of the Field (Pen & Sword 2010 ed.). Lond on: Peter Nevill. ISBN 1-84884-362-3. Davies, C. B.; Edmonds, J. E.; Maxwell-Hyslop, R. G. B. (1937). Military Operati ons France and Belgium, 1918 March April: Continuation of the German Offensives (IWM & Battery Press 1995 ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-223-3. Doughty, R. A. (2005). Pyrrhic Victory : French Strategy and Operations in the G reat War. Cambridge Mass: Belknap Harvard. ISBN 0-674-01880-X. Edmonds, J. E.; Wynne, G. C. (1927). Military Operations France and Belgium 1915 Vol I (Winter 1915 : Battle of Neuve Chapelle : Battle of Ypres) (IWM & Battery Press 1995 ed.). London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-89839-218-7. Edmonds, J. (1932). Military Operations France and Belgium, 1916 Vol I (Sir Doug las Haig's Command to the 1st July : Battle of the Somme) (IWM & Battery Press 1 993 ed.). London: Macmillan. ISBN 0-89839-185-7. Edmonds, J, (1948). Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Vol II 7 June 10 November. Messines and Third Ypres (Passchendaele) (IWM & Battery Press 1991 ed .). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-166-0. Edmonds, J. E.; Wynne, G. C. (1940). Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Vol I Appendices (N & M Press 2010 ed.). London: Macmillan. ISBN 1-84574-733-X. Edmonds, J. E.; Maxwell-Hyslop, R. G. B. (1947). Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918 Vol V 26th September 11th November The Advance to Victory (IWM & Bat tery Press 1993 ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-192-X. Falls, C. (1940). Military Operations France and Belgium, 1917 Vol I The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras (IWM & Battery Press 199 2 ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-180-6. Falls, C. (1959). The Great War 1914 1918. London: Perigee. ISBN 0-399-50100-2. Foley, R. T. (2007). German Strategy and the Path to Verdun : Erich von Falkenha yn and the Development of Attrition, 1870 1916. Cambridge: CUP. ISBN 978-0-521-044 36-3. Harris, J. P. (1995). Men, ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armour ed Forces, 1903 1939. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 0-7190-4814-1. Harris, J. P. (2008). Douglas Haig and the First World War. Cambridge: CUP. ISBN 978-0-521-89802-7. Hart, P.; Steel, N. (2001). Passchendaele: the Sacrificial Ground. London: Casse ll & Co. ISBN 0-304-35975-0. Henniker, A. M. (1937). Transportation on the Western Front 1914 1918 (N & M Press 2009 ed.). Uckfield: HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-765-7. Jones, H. A. (1934). The War in the Air : Being the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force Vol IV (N & M Press 2002 ed.). London: Clarendon Press. ISBN 1-84342-415-0. Kershaw, I. (1999). Hitler: 1889 1936: Hubris (2000 ed.). New York: Norton. ISBN 0-393-04671-0. Liddle, P. H. (1997). Passchendaele in Perspective : The Third Battle of Ypres. London: Pen & Sword. ISBN 0-85052-588-8. Malkasian, C. (2002). A History of Modern Wars of Attrition. Westport: Praeger.

ISBN 0-275-97379-4. Marble, S. (2003). The Infantry Cannot do with a Gun Less : The Place of the Art illery in the BEF, 1914 1918. (PhD 1998 ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-50219-2. McRandle, J. H.; Quirk, J. (2006). The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at Germa n Casualty Counts in World War I (Volume 70, issue 3, July 2006, pp. 667 701 ed.). The Journal of Military History. ISSN 0899-3718. Miles, W. (1948). Military Operations France and Belgium 1917 Vol III : The Batt le of Cambrai (IWM & Battery Press 1991 ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-162-8. Nicholson, G. W. L. (1962). "Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914 1919". Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Co ntroller of Stationary. OCLC 557523890. Retrieved 27 December 2012. Powell, G. (1993). Plumer: The Soldier's General (Leo Cooper 2004 ed.). Barnsley : Pen & Sword. ISBN 1-84415-039-9. Prior, R.; Wilson, T. (1996). Passchendaele: The Untold Story. Cumberland: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-07227-9. Reichsarchiv (1942). Der Weltkrieg: Vol XIII, Die Kriegfhrung im Sommer und Herbs t 1917. Die Ereignisse auerhalb der Westfront bis November 1918 (Die digitale lan desbibliotek Obersterreich 2012 ed.). Berlin: Mittler. OCLC 257129831. Retrieved 17 November 2012. Robbins, S. (2005). British Generalship on the Western Front 1914 18: Defeat into Victory. Abingdon: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-415-35006-9. Rogers (ed.), Duncan (2010). Landrecies to Cambrai : Case Studies of German Offe nsive and Defensive Operations on the Western Front 1914 17. Solihull: Helion. ISB N 978-1-906033-76-7. Sheffield, G. (2001). Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realitie s (2002 ed.). London: Headline Book Publishing. ISBN 0-7472-7157-7. Sheffield, G. (2011). The Chief : Douglas Haig and the British Army. London: Aur um Press. ISBN 978-1-84513-691-8. Sheldon, J. (2007). The German Army at Passchendaele. Barnsley: Pen and Sword Bo oks. ISBN 1-84415-564-1. Sheldon, J. (2009). The German Army at Cambrai. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books. ISB N 978-1-84415-944-4. Simpson, A. (2001). The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914 18 (Spellmount 2005 ed.). London: London University. ISBN 1-86227-2921. Stevenson, D. (2005). 1914 1918 The History of the First World War. London: Pengui n. ISBN 0-14-026817-0. Taylor, A. J. P. (1972). The First World War. An Illustrated History. New York: Perigee Trade. ISBN 0-399-50260-2. Terraine, J. (1977). The Road to Passchendaele: The Flanders Offensive 1917, A S tudy in Inevitability. London: Leo Cooper. ISBN 0-436-51732-9. Terraine, J. (1999). Business in Great Waters. Ware: Wordsworth Editions. ISBN 1 -84022-201-8. Terraine, J. (1963). Douglas Haig : The Educated Soldier (2005 ed.). London: Cas sell. ISBN 0-304-35319-1. United States Army, American Expeditionary Forces, Intelligence Section (1920). Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army which Partic ipated in the War (1914 1918). Washington: Government Print Office. ISBN 5-87296 -917-1. Retrieved 13 September 2013. Vance, J. F. (1997). Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War. V ancouver: UBC Press. ISBN 0-7748-0600-1. Winter, D. (1991). Haig's Command: A Reassessment (Penguin 1992 ed.). New York: Viking. ISBN 0-14-007144-X. Wolff, L. (1958). In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign. New York: Viking. ISBN 978-0-14-014662-2. Wynne, G. C. (1939). If Germany Attacks : The Battle in Depth in the West (1976 ed.). Connecticut: Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-8371-5029-9. External links[edit]

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