Meralco vs La Campana food products, inc.

& Judge Dayaw

Aug 4, 1995

Facts: A complaint filed by la campana against meralco for recovery of money w/ prelim injunction after it receive a notice of disconnection and for alleged non payment of the following: differential billing of 65k as value of electric energy used but it was not registered in the meter due to alleged tampering discovered on sept 22 1986 and the underbilling of 169k (w/ balance of 28k) due to meter multiplier failure. Summons and copy of complaint was received by meralco on aug 23 1990. RTC judge QC Lopez inhibited and was reraffled to Judge Dayaw. Meralco filed a motion for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an answer at the clerk, allegedly refused the same. And the motion not acted upon bec it did not contain a notice of hearing as req at sec 4 &5 Rule 15. Meralcos Answer w/ counterclaim was received on Sept 21 1990.(beyond the period to answer. La campana filed exparte motion to declare meralco in default, (granted) Instead of appealing to CA, Meralco filed on dec 3 1990 a motion to set aside judgement by default and/or for new trial that it filed it answer and the judgement by default was obtained by fraud. Denied by Judge Dayaw, that the motion for extention did not containany notice of date and place of hearing, also stated that the motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial was a pro forma motion because it did not set forth the facts and circumstances which allegedly constituted the fraud upon which the motion was grounded. Meralco filed a notice of appeal, but opposed by la campana on gorund of out of time and since the motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial did not stop the running of the period to appeal, which expired on Dec 14, 1990, or 15 days from the time Meralco received the decision on Nov 29, 1990. TC denied notice of appeal and granted the execution of la campana. Meralco filed the instant petition for certiorari and profibitionclaming judge commited grave abuse of discretion. Issue: W/N judge dayawcommited grave abuse of discretion in its order. Held: Negative. The case of Gozon, et al.vs CA: It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon. Meralco was aware of the importance of such a notice since it insisted in its motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial that it should have received notice of hearing of the motion to declare it in default which La Campana filed ex parte. When it filed in Branch 78 its answer with counterclaim on Sep 21, 1990, fourteen days after the expiration of the period within which to file an answer, Meralco was already in default and, naturally, it had to bear all the legal consequences of being in default. It chose to play it safe. Under the Rules, what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is the order of default, an interlocutory order which is, therefore, not appealable, and not the judgment by default, which is a final disposition of the case and appealable to the CA. Notice that in the following pertinent provisions, the Rules expressly state that what may be set aside is the order of default, while the judgment itself may be appealed to a higher court: sec 3 relief from order of default, Sec 9 Service upon party in default and Sec 2 judgement or orders subject to appeal. While a motion for new trial grounded on fraud, thisMeralco's motion likewise fails to convince. Meralco claims that the reason for the ex-parte motion was "to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to oppose it, knowing that defendant actually filed its answer." But how could La Campana have known about the answer with counterclaim when it was actually received only on Oct, 1990, as evidenced by the registry return receipt attached to Meralco's Annex "H,"while the ex-parte motion to declare Meralco in default was filed much earlier on Sep 27, 1990? "Fraud, as a ground for new trial, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy."Meralco's failure to go to trial in this case is solely attributable to its failure to comply with the Rules of Court. Judge correct a pro forma motion, it did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. Accordingly, having received the decision on Nov 29, 1990, Meralco had until Dec 14, 1990, within which to file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal which it filed on Jan 28, 1991, was clearly filed out of time. Hence, Dismissed.