Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
122, No. 3, Reconstructing Nations and States (Summer, 1993), pp. 115140 Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027185 . Accessed: 27/11/2013 05:54
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press and American Academy of Arts & Sciences are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Daedalus.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Michael Mann
Nation-States
Dying
MANY BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW REACHED the old nation-state. been Since outreached 1945, they say, transnational by age of the its sovereignty has
power networks, and postmodern Some those of global capitalism culture.1 take the that this argument further, asserting postmodernists one of the and modern civilization, certainty rationality jeopardizes especially of whose main props sovereignty political of modern society, seems to lend is a secure, unidimensional notion of absolute In in nation-state. the the historic heartland lodged the
(EC) European Community supranational to the argument credence that national especial is fragmenting. the actual death of the Here, sovereignty political a nation-state has sometimes been announced?though perhaps more retirement would the be for apt life-cycle metaphor graceful
such decided
the nation-state
general to which I devote most that the EC, is attention, new reminiscent somewhat of much forms, developing political older political Latin tags imply. These force us forms, as Schmitter's to revise our notions of what contemporary
at the University
is declining retirement.
states
and
their
Michael
Mann
is Professor
of Sociology
of California
at Los Angeles.
115
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
116
Michael Mann
must be. But of advanced that Western also briefly examine the other two and the less world. capitalism developed Iwill
of the nation European weakenings In ad and uneven, hoc, parts of the less slight, unique. are would-be nation-states also but for world, developed faltering, reasons. most Across of the globe, different, essentially "premodern" are still maturing, or they are at least trying to do so. nation-states are of the world structures are many and in terms are not
is not the world's future. The states Europe remain and they varied, both in their present of old their but trajectories. life-cycle are still in their cots. The few
death
THE EUROPEAN HISTORICAL The sovereign, theorists and "unidimensional" seventeenth attention international powers over to the territorial international territorial claims This
nation-state relations
centuries.3 relations
state sovereignty or to the sixteenth too is because the theorists much pay of monarchical and because ideologists are interested earlier arrived in sovereign only than most other
foreign But aspects of modern sovereignty. was state sovereignty born more recently. There the has been had an enormous Before
last three
centuries.
in state size and scope over growth the eighteenth entities we century, functions with other agencies?local bodies. or Whole swathes of states indeed by any political they erratically
agency.
conducted Monarchs very
life outside
of their
Nonetheless, states
centuries, eighteenth came to monopolize the single function gradually In the eighteenth this military violence. century, however, states 5 percent absorbed Around 1700, perhaps exploded.
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
117
of the GNP in peacetime, 10 percent inwartime.4 By 1760, this had risen to between 15 and 25 percent; by 1810, to between 25 and 35
of about 5 percent percent. At this point, the armies were comprised rates are identical to 1810 extraction These of the total population. and to the of the twentieth those of the two world wars century rates in the world today, those of Israel and Iraq. highest the scale of enable us to appreciate Such figures and comparisons From being fairly insignificant, transformation. the eighteenth-century states suddenly loomed taxing large in the lives of their subjects, to mobilize their enthusiasm them, attempting them, conscripting for its goals. States were were Masses their bars. indifference. of a capitalist Japan cages, trapping subjects within becoming out of their historic thus aroused political the contemporary by empowered development which the rise in Europe, North America, state. of the modern and They
always
demanded changes in the conditions of their cages. They demanded political citizenship and exhibited new nationalist ideologies?first
and dominant and ethnic groups, the bourgeoisie, males, religious the working the peasantry, then females, class, and minorities. wars in eased the nineteenth then century, but citizenship Foreign
combined with
whole
state services for burgeoning civil societies. range communication States first sponsored then mass systems, major to Both contributed the consolidation of a series education systems. societies organized welfare states of states. Next, by the territories partly bounded health followed systems, by the first stirrings of The national of the United systems. integration
of new
that of most European since itwent countries, lagged behind a was a a Civil and had rather weak War, large continent, through this period. Massive Federal government during twentieth-century a deepening wars then expanded further and encouraged nationalism of national welfare and a widening systems. planning of the class became social compromise struggle, citizenship Through as well as political, to use T. H. Marshall's famous terms. Citizens? of economic true zoo animals, dependent often led by labor movements?became on and emotionally to their national attached cages. The widening
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
118
more
Michael Mann
in a sudden great wave affecting all continents recently, especially after 1945. To date, even the oldest have enjoyed only a normal life span; most are much younger, and many are still struggling human to be born. In other have the last transnational powers we seen have years, twenty-five reversals of some nation-state powers. are still growing. Over this same neoliberal Yet and some of its
recent
the intimate private increasingly regulated of relations between men and and the State family. regulation cycle care the of and personal women, children, abortion, family violence, as such is still habits that used to be considered private, smoking, State policies for consumer and the environment protection to proliferate, and "green" activists demand and feminists state intervention. the twentieth central still more century, Through more far than local has also been government. government increasing Catalonias and Quebecs? from a few "subnations"?the Apart growing. continue local National are still and regional education barriers systems, localism have mass declined media, inside and the nation-state. consumer markets cultural When
watching
and homogenizing social and at their smallest national. extent, or other events pageantry, in any general it is difficult
some ways, it is still maturing. However, it in the face of the supranational forces that Iwill shortly analyze, and especially is still gaining at the expense of the local, the regional, a uniquely remains nation-state forces. The modern the private communications Militarism, sovereignty. and intense familial and economic, social, infrastructures, regulation, into a have been fused attachment national of community feelings intense conception of
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
relations binding restrict the
119
to the
nor modern culture has ever been economy was national boundaries. by Capitalism especially in its early industrial phase, with virtually free mobility areas, industry like the Low went Countries, a more through and Bohemia, national phase
of capital and labor and with most of its growth zones located in
or crossborder Though Catalonia.
both
increased. capitalism,"
world
economic
"internationalize" capacities of states and partially planning and media them.5 Mass electronic have almost transportation a McLuhan's confirmed Marshall of prophecy "global village"?at least Coca-Cola, and Charles and Di are momentarily Benetton, universal. cultural diffused Capitalism critic Frederic without a small into what the Marxist merge has termed Jameson "postmodern hyperspace,"6 or territory, but regard to nationality fragmented, and culture
shall see,
countries,
The postwar
coming in two sudden spurts at the beginning and end of the Cold War. Itwas knife-edged: the Cold War might have destroyed us all, but did not. But war exhaustion in 1945, followed by the Cold
War, made the West extraordinarily pacific in its internal relations,
while
has resulted in a
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
120
Michael Mann
absence of any threat from outside. War between the Great unique seems between the major and especially Powers, Powers, European a long way off. This has reduced that aggressive mass-mobilized so destructive of the twentieth nationalism century, though it remains around the fringes of the West few commitments requiring reducing regimes,
nation-state.
and from
unique
transpire. Since
events,
"world" wars and the Cold War, finished off the region's traditional
aspirations. 1945, West European sovereignties
the United upon States, and Eastern European on undercut by their involuntary dependence
itself. West
Germany,
its
350,000 foreign troops occupying for forty-five have years. Few Germans the troops get drunk. But other minded; they complain only when in its NATO do not have much members representation European on an American All defense of Command. Europe depend High over which control. Thus, Western Europeans they lack ultimate could levels the main a military peculiarity run military and very expenditures small averaging terms. approximately Their states 3 percent hunkered
of the GNP?half
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY The with EC occupies a much smaller area than the United Its numerous States, but countries
a substantially bigger population. soon to increase to perhaps at (twelve present, being advanced capitalist, Christian,
similar,
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
virtually center-right all
121
and geopolitical
through
in any
them, enabling other part of the globe. Cooperation West Germany, Community remained industrial sector began and
in the new
its membership
successful
Until the 1980s, the EC was almost entirely compatible with the
nation-state. geopolitical order after constituent
which
national
its forward
sovereign
Political
Functions
in 1992, and they did not like it.Most of its clauses are mere rhetoric. It is an oddity of the EC that most of its staff become
committed documents whom Federalist which Europeans. They write Federalist-sounding are then signed by national of many politicians, we share their values. To assess real EC functions,
do not
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
122
must
Michael Mann
look at those Maastricht sizable institutions. sovereignties.8 Most EC law is known as "secondary law," since originally These clauses which reveal are actually implemented three main of undercuttings
legislation. But,
in the 1980s,
considerable revisions of the national involving now announce to their routinely parliaments law and national law contravenes Community EC also denounces violations lead to changed always state sovereignty, undercut states, by member behavior. Secondary almost always
not
though
Its qualifications. occupational regulating especially as initially limited economic remains expanding policy, over more into economic life. activities economic broadly spilled consumer more as into differentiated This resulted expanded capitalism markets advanced and with a more capitalist the EC became labor force. The differentiated occupationally more turns into of life commodities, economy to regulate them. this region's way to the flow
The Single Market.9 The Single European Act of 1986 laid out a
timetable for the removal of all impediments of persons,
goods, and services throughout the EC. Itwas to be fully implemented by December 31, 1992. Although implementation has lagged a
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
little, it is largely
123
and
complete?though
in a single currency, system, culminating represents single monetary an important over state sovereignty loss of the key traditional the kind of macroeconomic It also undercuts coinage. planning which to have exercised during most of the twentieth is this undercut also century, though being by transnational capitalism. a Its rules for the convergence of currencies have also implied claimed contrary to the social Keynesianism espoused by many twentieth-century resulted from near unanimity partially states and partially from geopolitical relations states
economic strategy deflationary and/or competitive devaluations This governments. the member between of influence between was drive
notes them. Wayne Sandholtz that its path the earlier decisions of all the states separate paved by virtually to abandon traditional in countries like Indeed, Keynesianism.10 to and union allows blame currency governments Spain, Italy on the exigencies monetarist of membership in a unpopular policies desired "modern" system, however, union. Europe. has also led the Geopolitically, Germany to own it be in its national interests. believing some states are wavering in their commitment to Germans Britain have and come Italy have to predict been a loss of to
Many
bolt out of the EMS, Denmark has been allowed that privilege in the future, and Spain and Ireland have stretched its rules by decisions
that resemble Monetary believe disaster, The European devaluations. competitive old-style Union's to be reached in the (EMU) single currency was
reached.
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
124
far more
Michael Mann
standardization of economies over and this there are also "monetarists" substantial than policies between disagreements issue. Of course, eroded the the economic
is again economic. have undoubtedly state. This change. has been The
of the individual member sovereignty constitutional Maastricht's major by extended the scope of "the qualified of unanimity. expense are required to make than ten votes. ones A smaller always power
Treaty
ruling a country's votes are to block Of course, legislation. cast as a single national bloc, leading toward stable geopolitical relations between states, not toward a single "transnational" fundamentally the broadening of and consumer its intricate an economic of Europe's planning agency.
needs
superstate. The EC thus remains It has range, expanded its complex with
web
occupational institutions
structure,
are arcane, of and they are dominated by the lobbying and associations. Union trade and business professional enterprises are much and and weaker, by churches lobbying organizations other nonexistent. The direct institutions is virtually secondary on in countries member EC the of everyday politics impact policies and products about markets is rather limited. Regulations rarely a mass for of French farmers except for the rampaging audience, can over sell who labeled with the EC's products jokes or ice cream. The most like sherry, champagne, important free movement become was have great and currencies, cause dissension. apparent, they the states erosions found as "loss"? implications. While the unanimity economic
about these
European relatively
near
growth was
the whole
of the EC. Yet, objective policy seems tend to stall. Future progress of sovereignty. off for the erosion The managing state as a whole the collective is not, affairs
as Marx
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
more than this. The
125
twentieth
century, parties political to institutionalize two world wars, have managed as capitalism remained more the social classes. What problematic were across the world to expand the relations between continued the national and the transnational. Since The to regulate these relations. emerged institutions?the of these equivalent 1945, EC
global
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Europe is the
biggest market It in the smallest into many area of the three main states. regions. became more functions. There interest. traditional state are several It provides where areas, however, few communications a relatively comes out the EC shows little one is divided similar, pacific capitalist The EC
sovereignty-constraining-by-consent
infrastructures,
of uncontentious) mainstay of recession, these might be industries only when they are
subsidized monopolies
countries' The bulk
offering goods
countries)
in southern Europe. i.e., a few state enterprises enterprises, size varies of the state sector between (whose greatly EC is unaffected. is important expenditure only for the state expenditure. by national or other group relations, such as or the of labor relations, order, public religion, meet where welfare and the in labor market though is dwarfed into class policy, or gender it is active. relations?this It does not would There there regulate moral be impossibly been
sector and agricultural The EC has not moved the regulation welfare state, national educational issues, when the family,
Britain is not bound by it, a sign of the low priority social issues
for the EC. Indeed, for fiscal convergence the deflationary are overwhelming rigor of the EC's requirements any real social objectives.
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
126
The EC
Michael Mann
can hardly not The of point really to Britain cultivate alone as the home of "social
and little salience for percent, seat that the of executive is Brussels, power, Europeans. seen as a bureaucratic is unfair in one sense, since Leviathan. This the administration is small, only 17,000?less than Madrid's municipal are translators. and one-quarter But it is accurate in government, Polls show another sentiments sense: it is a technicist apparatus uninterested from Europeans. There sense of being "European" across the member iswidespread which in everyday countries is reinforced and which "town life by myriad student and scientific conferences, twinnings," exchanges, professional or affections in commanding a is diffuse cultural
Parliament
and vacationing This cultural arrangements. identity exists alongside national whose and strong enduring loyalties, only major "weakening" to be a substantial in aggressive reduction To appears xenophobia. means to be "European" be nice, gentle, and civilized. Such a today
crises.
politics moral issues, and policies, to be, and are not, the perceived are the political still parties entirely
are absent.
in organization in orientation. and almost entirely national about referenda have tended to turn into Europe supposedly votes there the national of governments. performance are two functions, to the modern state central all other states today, which the EC has not acquired. on
confidence
the EC is an
is no There dwarf, and a military worm. giant, a political and not much defense Under foreign policy-making. and it is rules, there is intergovernmental policy-making governments are developing The American force, but joint defense has creature, NATO, different, to the EC. The Western European agency, Ireland but its members but the two are not members. a small
commitments,
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
nuclear Powers, France
127
of these
of coordinating agency capable only geopolitical most States. At little cost to themselves, the United
European
their own border, in Yugoslavia? Things have certainly changed since the assassination in 1914 of a single Archduke! Defense
arrangements of a mess. Thus a federal of state are not only outside of EC scope, they are also state or even for three main a bit
is not moving toward a single Europe state. Different arrangements political be distinguished. may is divided between sovereignty to clear, "federal" not according Second, though not anywhere. in other entirely, Overall civilian function
toward
types economic First, for most the EC and the nation-states, constitutional remains Third,
or "confederal"
principles.
The EC is diplomatically
accredited The does EC
recognized by many
states and is an
at the United Nations, observer but so is the Vatican. itself has no single seat or place of sovereignty for what it In democracies, control. this resides in an elected executive and
in a sovereign is far short of either. Europe does Europe parliament. a constitution, not in effect possess these complex clearly regulating on national institutional relations. The major encroachments sovereignty sovereignty of one really constitutional?the replacement Instead, they are the practical, by another. surreptitious, are not
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
128
Michael Mann
union;
policy. We
December sanction
end. But in
disassociation
government against
narrow new political sovereign entity, over its admittedly powerful the EC regulates only the capitalist range of policy. Largely toothless, a genuinely It provides activity of a region. "European" regulation? It is not yet but only for areas agreed on by traditional geopolitics. a state, nor is it replacing states.
The Future of the European Community What will happen in the future? The EC might weaken or itmight
strengthen. economic member seems unlikely, as the collapse, No all would be disastrous. consequences present now can sensibly withdraw is toward and the momentum Contraction, for or worse
At the other extreme, the nation-states and gaining more members. a are But where form the EC could eventually single federal whole. economic EC was for for this? The the pressures developed harmonization. limited. Even Its "spillovers" in the economic into other sphere, state the functions of have core been and existence
periphery regions and the difficulty in reaching monetary union is producing a Europe of "different speeds." Europe has been led since the 1950s by the core Franco-German alliance, loyally backed by
Benelux countries whose economies are inseparable from theirs. But
the British are still puzzled when they examine the map. Are we in
Europe, a dual in the Atlantic? Italy remains they ask, or are we a and South, with system of government quite distinctive entity, North are and bring future other Southerners it The poorer (to put mildly). of integration with the North; the Scandinavian neighbors
problems
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
with EC.
129
the
are as rich as Germany, and they Austria domestic Yet many favor more progressive than most of its present members. Europe has a It has no clear Eastern boundary, periphery. clear vision or policy are Europe state, an for this area. insignificant Germany. Its activities when
policies Eastern problematic and the EC has no in the countries with those of of a
compared
now has another Europe, seems to play the Great It Power. that German unlikely option: EC. choose this rather than But present would the governments resist erosion that further of its indications Germany might imply in Eastern sovereignty. Without German leadership, there would have
And, finally, Germany, recently size of former Soviet the the nearing
national
been no EC; without German leadership, the EC will not deepen. As Felipe Gonz?lez, the President of the Spanish government, has stated, "if Germany fails we will all fail as well."12
Thus, and it is more likely that for the members, arrangements and but within will ad hoc not a and
Agency
(Chernobyl
and than
Europe institutions
arrangements. singular political itmay be headed back to political arrangements resembling, in far denser forms, those of earlier feudal times. Like then, has no single locus of sovereignty. It has different political
in its EC core, and it different functions regulating contains Powers of greatly differing has ad hoc strengths. Europe as to particular solutions institutional such defense and problems, the environment, combinations of
to present stronger agencies devising according are functional and geographical need. There But dilemmas Federalists. of defense, currency, and Eastern committed are these down and increasing pragmatism Federalists Europe slowing and ad hoc solutions.
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
130
Michael Mann
seem sensible, but it has raised the may Proliferating pragmatism in EC institutions. issue of a "democratic deficit" These tend to be bureaucratic rather than democratic. Can arose itself not, since democracy Clearly was state. Democracy the achievement version representative place. The Federal clear US control them? democracy as the sovereign nation of
division of sovereignty between the states and the federal government, between Constitution, and between the President, the two houses, and the Supreme Court. some specialized EC the democratic without Making transferring formal sovereignties is unlikely. to it is impossible. Such an act of transference
to nation-state has lost some economic functions The European while the EC and some defense functions functions gaining altogether, inwhat had previously been more private and local spheres. Overall, the bars of the cage may accountable rather sovereignty But Euro-institutions indirect, not have changed very much. Citizens still
need to deploy most of their vigilance at the national level and most
remain there. should in a do exploit. They are only responsible a EC And since is the cumbersome way. essentially overwhelmingly organized not nineteenth Twentieth-century, on all their activities concentrated virtually it in the process. and threatened, federations Now their their social other classes
have socialists century, the nation-state, strengthening greatly are achievements social Keynesian democratic to resist governments the economic and union logic socialists
are simply unable a more organized by globally imposed should organize and other dissidents as long as they can only mobilize
But,
issues which
it is also
remain overwhelmingly
a reason for them
the
to be wary province to EC. socialists the transferred of more European sovereign powers to in conservatism of the fiscal the feeble have been response of the nation-state,
Bundesbank-led
by fiscal conservatism
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
occurred need to first within renew their international
131
leftists occur
European cooperation. provide of which of cooperation, take full advantage. they must But it is not the only locus, since they have been outflanked by not European capitalism. global, states no longer threaten each other. Europeans had European on evaluations of each other. been I, for negative long nurtured through one locus example, resenting were was brought up in postwar the French, mildly despising Britain as deeply Italians, Greeks, anti-German, and Spaniards,
institutions
led to believe,
the Belgians and fat, and the messy tidy and repressed, Scandinavians and Dutch were nice because they were totally harmless. I hope they reciprocated But the polls anti-British sentiments. with show that negative national stereotypes have almost vanished. National rivalries
now Football Song Contests, largely consist of Eurovision to contests attract in and Western servility global corporations. Cups, no authoritarian and virtually governments Europe has no military The greatest transformation of twentieth-century Right. political Europe of both is not the decline of socialism but the defeat of authoritarianism the Right and the Left. Center-right Christian conservatives, and Centrist Social Democrats dominate European politics. some carelessly call resurgent fascism is nothing of the focused on
(as fascism immigration, appealing to the working class on the material did) almost exclusively and schools. of jobs, housing, The new Europe It is also unthreatened. is harmless. Europe has as as it the geopolitical has well client states security always wanted, and even supplicant between itself and any threat coming out states, of the East. And the Americans remain to defend it. Europe has rarely issues little need can do for efficient little harm. Pacific muddling geopolitical decision-making. Its sins are the lesser ones of omission. If this to being States a utopia than a crisis. is
it is racism
postmodernity, trilateralists:
It is true that
trade disputes about protectionism unending regarding and rice, but they also show a capacity spare parts, semiconductors, on these. Capitalism for finally compromising is not so transnational that it can dispense with political regulation, and trilateralism
fits
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
132
the bill.
Michael Mann
Cultural are that also blurs strong, both
across solidarities the Atlantic a a and consumerism reinforced by capitalism national and continental Americans may identity. cars are now American. But do know Winchells German stores Dutch, Spanish, programs Donuts and Pryca are British and more are British?
know that Jaguar that they Burger King or Seat cars are Spaniards may know French, but not that Texas Homecare that half their are not clothes Italian are but fashion clothes
that Massimo
Perhaps countries from European originate are Do but dubbed. Clint America, Eastwood, Sylvester Stallone, they casts remain American and the "Dallas" and "Beverly Hills 90210" or German when slang? Do the cartoon characters speaking Portuguese of "Dragonball" American and from Iceland even remain Japanese? Europeans identities. Japanese Baltic seem capable of ingesting
one-half
of the television
want
by making Spaniards
in the future.
the threat to its neighbors: But there is a potential European a potential Euro-racism. for strengthening issue, with immigration is linked to the broader issue of "fortress Europe," This especially whether countries will show much Europeans to their east and south. The interest fortress would less developed revive Europe's Slavs would be members the exact nature of in the
and "white." Whether identity as Christendom or aliens remains unclear, affect and this would
the European racial and religious identity. The fact that some Slav
adds to the potentially groups have their own ethnic conflicts heady brew. In fact, all three of the trilateral regional hegemonies, Europe, the developing the United States, and Japan, now have relations with
no longer be "the American dilemma" implications. Racism may in this area. Racial and achievements has experience since America and the Japanese the European be more conflict may geopolitical this and even war what Who knows dilemma. terrorism, riots,
If it
of
there would
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
European nation-state state
133
the
of Europe? The nation and counterterrorism immigration in line with the pragmatic are nation-states functions, and
AND two
JAPANESE STATES trilateralists? In contrast to Europe, they are no have given hint of
of the other
still dominated who by single nation-states, are dominated let alone of death. The Americas retirement, by the States. The continent's United other states are varied and most live from neighbors and dissidents from security are in within. this with respect nation-states, They typical emerging scope, fairly stable, large state administrations fairly secure territorial as dependent but contested and volatile political regimes. However, economies, they also lack the degree of economic sovereignty possessed most states of the nineteenth Now the US European by century. to the continent. hegemony helps police never The United States is itself a nation-state, such a though with threats to their
right little, tight little nation-state as the European type. The United
States has had more ethnic national diversity government, reducing Yet, it is a virtual continent. isolation have ensured that sufficient greatly and that than exceeded is not its rivals. that of true of a weaker, more federal and centralization. homogenization and and historic variety, remained more self trade has always in the United
The
States, Its capitalism ismore competitors. owned than is the capitalism of any European nationally country. the of the largest single foreign Despite investment, growth Japanese as it has investor offshore remains, been, Europe's always island, its major
international
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
134
major
Michael Mann
welfare functions Its military away from the individual dates state and municipal from World War II; this
the federal
only to exceed the size of the state government Unlike most civilian state functions, military symbols
might
to legitimate foreign and military there was also social homogenization but it is still in areas continuing is now going through But overall relative
the United
loss of national and I suspect that the consequent for much of postmodern relativism of the popularity circles. intellectual The second region, East Asia and much of
the Pacific,
is the least economically self Japan Japan. by a single Power, most is and the isolated sufficient of the three regional Superpowers Its state, though formally from the others. small, tightly coordinates the its national relations through especially patron-client capitalism, of its single ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and through its dominant (MITI). Japanese. The of International Trade and Industry Ministry remains of its capitalism ownership overwhelmingly found takeovers and subsequent raiders have Foreign economic
management extremely difficult to accomplish. All of this is reinforced by dense and cohesive social and familial relations of a type unique
in the advanced control capitalist world. But the size of the American
Like Europe, Japan has not been a "full state" since 1945, lacking
of its defense restricts that GNP armed and and foreign policy.
is small. Though
of now the
the
to 2 percent military spending so large that Japan has become forces cautious in the world. about their Though rising power,
largest divided
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
Japanese foreign policy Power once again. Most a racial myth physiognomies "internationalism" of derive
135
a Great weak, Japan is objectively are and share Japanese quite nationalistic common their varied descent?though actually from many East Asian stocks. Abroad, Japanese a is tinged with economic with imperialism, in the labor relations particularly exploitative of its own Asian-Pacific nation-state, and receiver region.14 a very despite playing of capitalist and cultural
to impose tendency countries less developed Japan large role as both transnationalism. militaristic with odd very recent remains
a cohesive a transmitter As
adolescent. talk of
an unruly and Japan was has now resumed?though of relative economic decline. of the nation-state should sound The new Euro-institutions It is difficult to see why into major sovereignty states or political agencies.
capitalist regions. a pattern for the future. or enter States should Japan not with other
or sovereignty-shedding
They will
continue
to negotiate with
Powers.
as single Great
The less developed world presents different and more varied state problems. Most states date their birth or rebirth from after 1945,
when an ostensibly decolonization similar nation-state imposed on form all countries, in the real massive differences despite states of infrastructural civil and UN societies. The Charter capacities
rim," many of order, unlike problem with the former communist sometimes national combined security.
face severe internal dissidence, states, many threats from their neighbors to their Nowhere else is there a region the enjoying with
tranquillity of Western
Europe.
states in less for several decades most countries notes, developed have not been following the European of path military development.16
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
136
Their
Michael Mann
militaries did not a certain they reached in Europe. They have happened development?as are and and modern, likely to remain so expensive, decline may spend another citizenship, regional century struggling and ethnic autonomies, in size once
Liberia or Zaire
of political regimes
but reflections history. They throughout premodern and automatic armed with of our own past?though weapons is not postmodernism, but the Their problem Swiss safe deposits. in their civil societies. diffused modernism of a genuinely absence This the and the rest of Africa lessens as we proceed through problem to Latin then South Asian less developed American, countries, South Asian advanced Soviet and the more the former countries, East European and East Asian to the most successful and finally the Czech countries. lands, South By the time we reach Hungary,
we encounter or Taiwan, solid civil societies with Korea, Singapore, state of effective economic and cultural infrastructures, penetration over and social battles and political territories, citizenship political in the sense that they resemble the that are undeniably "modern," recent history East battles). multitude of Western countries European In between Europe, North America, also have their own the Somalian and and Japan (though distinctive political a South Korean poles,
of semieffective
unevenly developed sometimes dividing, and oppressing, order keeping development such regimes consumer
states are coping with uneven modernity? or enclave capitalisms, religious or ethnic identities sometimes them, bulging militaries strengthening
sponsoring bulging state administrations of Some of the and dispensing problems corruption. are subverted are indeed distinctively postmodern?they But their basic political problem is that
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
formally weakness modern
137
cannot for the institutions compensate political an diffused of the other modernizing prerequisite: evenly not of postmodernity. civil society. They confront a crisis of modernity, This is their own crisis, and their diverse solutions will not reproduce the histories of Western these histories, they will and nation-states. or Japan. But like Europe, North America, center on the struggle to create civil societies
CONCLUSION
States became important in the modern world for providing five services of varying utility to humanity: 1) they became capable of
waging massive, routinized war; 2) they provided communications
infrastructures for both militarism and capitalism; 3) they became the site of political democracy; 4) they guaranteed social citizenship
into the private rights encroaching All five macroeconomic planning. with the rise of modern entwined sphere; functions and were 5) they invented and connected
In the twentieth civil society. on have fused tremendous the powers century, they sovereign nation are now state. Some of these powers but others are still declining,
reason why is no necessary all these functions should be same most the located within of history, agency. For political they were not. States shared some political functions with with lords, associations. and with private Other functions corporate churches, were were not pursued at but considered all, collectively essentially such Europe, a is This undoubtedly separated. partially an it since stemmed world historical change, apparently unstoppable institutions Europe has created new political growth of the nation-state. to some of divided, and this confused may sovereignty, spread was But since this development adjacent countries. largely a response again to a particular world. The regional Twentieth-century sources of contemporary more from which global change, some have also predicted the death of the nation-state, actually and varied political implications. Military bring more mixed changes, the advent of nuclear and biological have made weapons, especially war between the Great Powers irrational, and this logic may situation, states it may not seem highly be a blueprint varied. for the private activities. have functions In one part of the world, in Western
growing. There
major
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
138
also
Michael Mann
to lesser Powers. Since the modern state, and spread downward was in war, of the nation-state, much conceived this might be as its eventual death. its after the Yet, birth, interpreted signaling nation-state modern found other things to do and is still finding them. In any case, societies are not governed by rationality. Modern
wars have been intensified by ferocious ideologies purporting to solve social conflicts. Ethnicity and religion entwined with "First World" versus "ThirdWorld" social conflict might be a fertile new
states violent. of keeping It is thus capable that the United and States, important Europe, particularly Japan cope humanely with their immigration, border, and regional problems. If, instead, they invoke racist-religious identities, they too will suffer of ideologies the consequences, counterterrorism. easier to see what in violence As should far as war in expenditures, of terrorism are and violence concerned, be done than what will be done. and do not merely and it is source
and cultural
transnationalism
undermine
states new of global society increasing density gives and environmental issues roles. Tariffs, communications, of between notable generators negotiations geopolitical areas. We might unlike "Social see, for example, more global theMaastricht one, with teeth) regulating common or of public standards health qualifications. like agencies In the recent the United past, Nations such or
led by two great nation-states, the have been typically for representing States and Japan, by more ad hoc arrangements of all the above are replaced (sometimes by the Group "Europe," a more erratic Soviet/Russian and and seems an the
paradox.
Transnationalism Yet
capitalism largely capitalist. has resulted its state-subverting limits. Capitalist profit-taking in not quite Frederic Jameson's hyperspace." Though "postmodern of nation the social reduced the has powers citizenship capitalism and geopolitical of most states, states sovereign trends
to be
with military state, and in association the military also reduced sovereignty on continuous between negotiations
it has
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nation-States
ad hoc agencies.
139
Yet, if socialism, has to take up this very task. When is being undermined by transnational should from become inside
the nation-state.
it is to survive, variety, even Swedish Social Democracy fiscal conservatism, the message exercise lift their gaze at the power little to offer the voters. socialists
level, they will have precious its life cycle, the nation-state has been entwined with Throughout most But the class movement which class conflict. historically should now begin to subvert it. the nation-state Whether strengthened international
it will
it are open questions. achieve For now and for the foreseeable capitalism world, world, Where like and nation-states stride advanced the most especially states are varied. Some are countries to have either one. lack an effective The as a reality
future, ad hoc associations across most dominant of ones. in crisis, In the and a few
obsolete,
ENDNOTES
earlier
versions
given
as lectures
under
the titles:
"The End
of the
in Instituto Juan March, Madrid, 11 December 1992, and "The Nation-State?" End of theNation-State? Prospects for Europe and for the World," in the Wendy
and Emery Re ves Lecture Series, "Beyond the Nation-State," at The College of
William
2Philippe
andMary,
Schmitter,
15 February 1993.
"The European Community as an emergent and novel form of
political domination,"
3For example, John G. Ruggie, "Territonality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," International Organization 47 (1) (1993).
4A11 figures activities history on state finances state and manpower, and all generalizations about are drawn to 1914, on the I have from the research conducted prior of five states?Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Prussia/Germany,
in and the United States?reported Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chaps. 11-14. 5Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in theMaking of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
140
6Frederic
Michael Mann
Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism," New
Left Review 146 (1984) and Frederic Jameson, "Marxism and postmodernism," New Left Review 176 (1989). 7PerryAnderson, "The development of the European Community," unpublished paper, Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, University of California at Los Angeles, 1992.
8Two of the major EC activities?agriculture and regional policy?do not undercut
national sovereignties. The labyrinthine agricultural policies (still absorbing 65 percent of the EC budget) have resulted from intergovernmental agreements, In the 1970s, regional policy especially between France and West Germany.
seemed southern pit to be moving toward states European northern against undercutting sovereignties, as members reversed this. Most states rather than richer but the entry of poorer now conflicts regional poorer regions
southern
against
regardless of state boundaries (though German unification has provided an exception to this, since the regions of the former GDR qualify for regional funds). And the geopolitically dominant northerners were successful in late 1992 in keeping development funds down to 1.25 percent of the European Community's
GNP 9The rather literature than on the 5 percent the single market discussions earlier and envisaged for them. is vast. System are available in the European Monetary recent developments
Informative,
provocative
of
articles in Otto Holman, ed., European Unification in the 1990s: Myths and Reality, special issue of the International Journal of Political Economy 22 (1) (Spring 1992).
10Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht,"
International Organization
47 (1) (1993).
nMartin Shaw, Post-Military Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 12Interviewwith Felipe Gonz?lez, El Pais, 23 February 1992.
13Nor can I guarantee with that this zeal information and will remain accurate even to the time of
rapidity.
the Pacific Rim (with special reference to Japan and Malaysia)," unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of Essex, 1992. around
15K. van der Pijl, "Ruling classes, hegemony and the state system: theoretical and
historical considerations,"
19 (1989).
This content downloaded from 202.41.10.30 on Wed, 27 Nov 2013 05:54:28 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions