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Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying Author(s): Michael Mann Source: Daedalus, Vol.

122, No. 3, Reconstructing Nations and States (Summer, 1993), pp. 115140 Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027185 . Accessed: 27/11/2013 05:54
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Michael Mann

Nation-States

inEurope and Other

Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not

Dying
MANY BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW REACHED the old nation-state. been Since outreached 1945, they say, transnational by age of the its sovereignty has

power networks, and postmodern Some those of global capitalism culture.1 take the that this argument further, asserting postmodernists one of the and modern civilization, certainty rationality jeopardizes especially of whose main props sovereignty political of modern society, seems to lend is a secure, unidimensional notion of absolute In in nation-state. the the historic heartland lodged the

(EC) European Community supranational to the argument credence that national especial is fragmenting. the actual death of the Here, sovereignty political a nation-state has sometimes been announced?though perhaps more retirement would the be for apt life-cycle metaphor graceful

such a view. The political scientist Philippe Schmitter has argued


situation is unique, the European that, though since the nation-state has more general relevance, context the favors transformation systematically or federatii in a variety condominii confederatii, current writers Nonetheless, believe that signals It is true a more probably most?and do not have almost all of its progress beyond "the contemporary of states into either of settings."2 Most views as these. I later cite? and that this

such decided

those whom in Europe

the nation-state

general to which I devote most that the EC, is attention, new reminiscent somewhat of much forms, developing political older political Latin tags imply. These force us forms, as Schmitter's to revise our notions of what contemporary
at the University

is declining retirement.

states

and

their

Michael

Mann

is Professor

of Sociology

of California

at Los Angeles.

115

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116

Michael Mann
must be. But of advanced that Western also briefly examine the other two and the less world. capitalism developed Iwill

interrelations major I will state regions conclude

of the nation European weakenings In ad and uneven, hoc, parts of the less slight, unique. are would-be nation-states also but for world, developed faltering, reasons. most Across of the globe, different, essentially "premodern" are still maturing, or they are at least trying to do so. nation-states are of the world structures are many and in terms are not

is not the world's future. The states Europe remain and they varied, both in their present of old their but trajectories. life-cycle are still in their cots. The few

that are near

death

THE EUROPEAN HISTORICAL The sovereign, theorists and "unidimensional" seventeenth attention international powers over to the territorial international territorial claims This

BACKGROUND young. Most political date the birth of specialists is very

nation-state relations

centuries.3 relations

state sovereignty or to the sixteenth too is because the theorists much pay of monarchical and because ideologists are interested earlier arrived in sovereign only than most other

foreign But aspects of modern sovereignty. was state sovereignty born more recently. There the has been had an enormous Before

specialists policy, which

in real sociological terms, territorial even more and matured recently

last three

centuries.

call "states" lords, social

churches, life were

shared political and other corporate not penetrated and by small

in state size and scope over growth the eighteenth entities we century, functions with other agencies?local bodies. or Whole swathes of states indeed by any political they erratically

agency.
conducted Monarchs very

States prior to the eighteenth century did very little. They


diplomacy foreign wars;

administered only the highest level of internal justice and repression.


little. might have proclaimed It was only when much of social between the ambitious entwined thirteenth projects but they achieved with churches that they "Home Counties." and

penetrated European of military function

life outside

of their

Nonetheless, states

centuries, eighteenth came to monopolize the single function gradually In the eighteenth this military violence. century, however, states 5 percent absorbed Around 1700, perhaps exploded.

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Nation-States

in Europe and Other Continents

117

of the GNP in peacetime, 10 percent inwartime.4 By 1760, this had risen to between 15 and 25 percent; by 1810, to between 25 and 35
of about 5 percent percent. At this point, the armies were comprised rates are identical to 1810 extraction These of the total population. and to the of the twentieth those of the two world wars century rates in the world today, those of Israel and Iraq. highest the scale of enable us to appreciate Such figures and comparisons From being fairly insignificant, transformation. the eighteenth-century states suddenly loomed taxing large in the lives of their subjects, to mobilize their enthusiasm them, attempting them, conscripting for its goals. States were were Masses their bars. indifference. of a capitalist Japan cages, trapping subjects within becoming out of their historic thus aroused political the contemporary by empowered development which the rise in Europe, North America, state. of the modern and They

They were civil society, accompanied

always

demanded changes in the conditions of their cages. They demanded political citizenship and exhibited new nationalist ideologies?first
and dominant and ethnic groups, the bourgeoisie, males, religious the working the peasantry, then females, class, and minorities. wars in eased the nineteenth then century, but citizenship Foreign

combined with
whole

industrial capitalism to produce demands for a

state services for burgeoning civil societies. range communication States first sponsored then mass systems, major to Both contributed the consolidation of a series education systems. societies organized welfare states of states. Next, by the territories partly bounded health followed systems, by the first stirrings of The national of the United systems. integration

of new

of civil modern States

that of most European since itwent countries, lagged behind a was a a Civil and had rather weak War, large continent, through this period. Massive Federal government during twentieth-century a deepening wars then expanded further and encouraged nationalism of national welfare and a widening systems. planning of the class became social compromise struggle, citizenship Through as well as political, to use T. H. Marshall's famous terms. Citizens? of economic true zoo animals, dependent often led by labor movements?became on and emotionally to their national attached cages. The widening

of political citizenship and the emergence of social citizenship occupied


on the early twentieth a period is when centered the century. This were in first true nation-states, born. Others Europe, mostly emerged

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118
more

Michael Mann

in a sudden great wave affecting all continents recently, especially after 1945. To date, even the oldest have enjoyed only a normal life span; most are much younger, and many are still struggling human to be born. In other have the last transnational powers we seen have years, twenty-five reversals of some nation-state powers. are still growing. Over this same neoliberal Yet and some of its

recent

the intimate private increasingly regulated of relations between men and and the State family. regulation cycle care the of and personal women, children, abortion, family violence, as such is still habits that used to be considered private, smoking, State policies for consumer and the environment protection to proliferate, and "green" activists demand and feminists state intervention. the twentieth central still more century, Through more far than local has also been government. government increasing Catalonias and Quebecs? from a few "subnations"?the Apart growing. continue local National are still and regional education barriers systems, localism have mass declined media, inside and the nation-state. consumer markets cultural When

states period, spheres of the life

subverting life into units which

watching

displays that the nation-state The nation-state

are, Games the Olympic nationalist of emotional is thus not

and homogenizing social and at their smallest national. extent, or other events pageantry, in any general it is difficult

into transformed to believe

is finished. In decline, anywhere. even if it were declining

some ways, it is still maturing. However, it in the face of the supranational forces that Iwill shortly analyze, and especially is still gaining at the expense of the local, the regional, a uniquely remains nation-state forces. The modern the private communications Militarism, sovereignty. and intense familial and economic, social, infrastructures, regulation, into a have been fused attachment national of community feelings intense conception of

single caging institution. There is a reality lying behind the facile


in the recent past that social scientists made by so many assumption was nation-state. the that they were the "society" studying never our It has also been national. been merely But "society" has relations that freely cross national boundaries. transnational?involving And national between the relations also been geopolitical?involving relations are not merely units. Transnational "postmodern": of all states. Geopolitical the sovereignty they have always undercut it has

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Nation-States
relations binding restrict the

in Europe and Other Continents


of sovereignty more and they states. states which are persistently parties undercut

119
to the

agreements, of weaker sovereignty Neither the capitalist constrained

greatly transnational border

nor modern culture has ever been economy was national boundaries. by Capitalism especially in its early industrial phase, with virtually free mobility areas, industry like the Low went Countries, a more through and Bohemia, national phase

of capital and labor and with most of its growth zones located in
or crossborder Though Catalonia.

between about 1880 and 1945, finance capital usually remained


The cultural highly transnational. identity of this "civil society" was even primarily?"Britain," or "Spain." not just?or It "France," was also "Christendom," "the West," and "the white "Europe," as "the Romantic artifacts also diffused transnationally "the realist the "Victorian" furniture Movement," novel," style, the in art and and ballet, "modernism" opera orchestra, symphony and now and postmodern soap operas, jeans, rock music, design, race." Cultural architecture. capitalist But since and National cultural 1945 was sovereignty transnationalism. economic Capitalism its funds and always cultural undercut by both

both

transnationalism in Susan Strange's the rapidly through

have undeniably "casino words,

increased. capitalism,"

has become, slushing

world
economic

in a complex web of institutions which partially elude the

"internationalize" capacities of states and partially planning and media them.5 Mass electronic have almost transportation a McLuhan's confirmed Marshall of prophecy "global village"?at least Coca-Cola, and Charles and Di are momentarily Benetton, universal. cultural diffused Capitalism critic Frederic without a small into what the Marxist merge has termed Jameson "postmodern hyperspace,"6 or territory, but regard to nationality fragmented, and culture

united by the logic of capitalist profit taking. As we


Europe, has been densely geopolitical settled especially penetrated transformation area of essentially and homogenized. similar

shall see,
countries,

The postwar

has also been momentous,

coming in two sudden spurts at the beginning and end of the Cold War. Itwas knife-edged: the Cold War might have destroyed us all, but did not. But war exhaustion in 1945, followed by the Cold
War, made the West extraordinarily pacific in its internal relations,

while

the collapse of the enemy in 1989-1991

has resulted in a

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120

Michael Mann

absence of any threat from outside. War between the Great unique seems between the major and especially Powers, Powers, European a long way off. This has reduced that aggressive mass-mobilized so destructive of the twentieth nationalism century, though it remains around the fringes of the West few commitments requiring reducing regimes,
nation-state.

and from

in a more citizens, and

symbolic aggression, directed hate against former communist of the

figures in the less developed world.


the military an important this geopolitical that Europe indeed size of Western and hopeful transformation may show

The absence of a threat is also


some reduction has in the strength to quite of a more

But lengths world, Great

in Europe. should Power

gone us the future Eurocentric

unique

transpire. Since

events,

pacific such as two

"world" wars and the Cold War, finished off the region's traditional
aspirations. 1945, West European sovereignties

have been undercut geopolitically

by their voluntary dependence


were sovereignties the Soviet Union.

the United upon States, and Eastern European on undercut by their involuntary dependence

Since 1945, Europe has not defended


major great economic swathes power, of its territory has had

itself. West

Germany,

its

350,000 foreign troops occupying for forty-five have years. Few Germans the troops get drunk. But other minded; they complain only when in its NATO do not have much members representation European on an American All defense of Command. Europe depend High over which control. Thus, Western Europeans they lack ultimate could levels the main a military peculiarity run military and very expenditures small averaging terms. approximately Their states 3 percent hunkered

of the GNP?half

of both the United States' and the whole world's


in historical and the main

down together inpacific harmony, livingwithout what was historically


state function power greatly adequate their drive assisted source of aggressive nationalism? to defend themselves. This regional toward cooperation.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY The with EC occupies a much smaller area than the United Its numerous States, but countries

a substantially bigger population. soon to increase to perhaps at (twelve present, being advanced capitalist, Christian,

similar,

twenty) are essentially and liberal democratic,

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Nation-States
virtually center-right all

in Europe and Other Continents


democratic parties. The

121

social center-left ranging or Christian conservative much closer

against parties transnational

and geopolitical

forces noted above ripped unhindered


cooperation than has occurred

through
in any

them, enabling other part of the globe. Cooperation West Germany, Community remained industrial sector began and

geopolitical countries. the Benelux to become to liberalize It was the European

in the new

core of Europe, France, Iron and Steel Their Economic Community

widened economic: production.

(EEC), gradually expanding

its membership
successful

and scope. Its task

trade and permit more integrated in this endeavor, though

partly through bribing the protectionist, unintegrated agricultural


every step of the way. an extreme of the peaceful example merely that have characterized the capitalist world negotiations 1945. Under the representatives such arrangements, of It was governments sit in committees and work out agreements

Until the 1980s, the EC was almost entirely compatible with the
nation-state. geopolitical order after constituent

which
national

are taken back to be ratified or rejected by the sovereign


In fact, EC history has been something of a governments. initiative. As the English writer Perry Anderson emphasizes, between Germany and France essentially provided agreements surges.7 resources, most were still Since France and especially countries following state willingly accepted interests, What were Germany their leadership. sacrificing were these

two-Power bilateral all

its forward

offering Nation-states cut more subverting The

sovereign

nothing. But, through the 1980s, EC political regulation began to


directly political into member functions? of the European Community 1991, gives a simple areas. A all policy and French voters sovereignties.

Political

Functions

The Treaty of Maastricht, answer: it declares EC This text was

signed in December over virtually control aired before the Danish

cursory reading might give the impression that the EC is indeed a


superstate.

in 1992, and they did not like it.Most of its clauses are mere rhetoric. It is an oddity of the EC that most of its staff become
committed documents whom Federalist which Europeans. They write Federalist-sounding are then signed by national of many politicians, we share their values. To assess real EC functions,

do not

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122
must

Michael Mann
look at those Maastricht sizable institutions. sovereignties.8 Most EC law is known as "secondary law," since originally These clauses which reveal are actually implemented three main of undercuttings

by national Law. member laws them?a that needs

it largely supplemented national

legislation. But,

in the 1980s,

governments passed beyond merely and and administrative regulations

each other's recognizing to "standardize" began

process laws. Governments a particular revision. The this does somewhat

considerable revisions of the national involving now announce to their routinely parliaments law and national law contravenes Community EC also denounces violations lead to changed always state sovereignty, undercut states, by member behavior. Secondary almost always

though law has

not

though

through its technical details rather than through sweeping legal


declarations. More Court social law rests in the rulings of the European general Community in scope, These have of Justice. again largely expanded life and culture in the member countries

through detail, and they will probably continue to expand since


are gradually becoming more of the similar. But these rulings binding only because are and the commitment of states, administered, they voluntary states. rather variably, by the individual of the secondary of European The content law, law, especially are overwhelmingly liberalization concerns and the EEC's two integration production and sold detail the nature of commodities bought as a to include labor this extending gradually trade purposes: original It and standardization.

in great regulates in the Community, commodity, core thus

Its qualifications. occupational regulating especially as initially limited economic remains expanding policy, over more into economic life. activities economic broadly spilled consumer more as into differentiated This resulted expanded capitalism markets advanced and with a more capitalist the EC became labor force. The differentiated occupationally more turns into of life commodities, economy to regulate them. this region's way to the flow

The Single Market.9 The Single European Act of 1986 laid out a
timetable for the removal of all impediments of persons,

goods, and services throughout the EC. Itwas to be fully implemented by December 31, 1992. Although implementation has lagged a

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Nation-States
little, it is largely

in Europe and Other Continents


the free flow of persons

123
and

complete?though

animals has been delayed by the British, Irish, andDanish governments


is currently also advising The (the new French government delay). Act virtually internal borders. Reinforced Maastricht eliminates by a common it supposedly It confers clauses, European citizenship. a new a no to state When Police Authority. may also lead European its sovereignty has longer has arbitrary power over its own borders, indeed eroded. Again, the core of the erosion was economic policy, across the lives of Europeans as producers and consumers. expanding

The European Monetary

System (EMS). The drive toward a

in a single currency, system, culminating represents single monetary an important over state sovereignty loss of the key traditional the kind of macroeconomic It also undercuts coinage. planning which to have exercised during most of the twentieth is this undercut also century, though being by transnational capitalism. a Its rules for the convergence of currencies have also implied claimed contrary to the social Keynesianism espoused by many twentieth-century resulted from near unanimity partially states and partially from geopolitical relations states

economic strategy deflationary and/or competitive devaluations This governments. the member between of influence between was drive

notes them. Wayne Sandholtz that its path the earlier decisions of all the states separate paved by virtually to abandon traditional in countries like Indeed, Keynesianism.10 to and union allows blame currency governments Spain, Italy on the exigencies monetarist of membership in a unpopular policies desired "modern" system, however, union. Europe. has also led the Geopolitically, Germany to own it be in its national interests. believing some states are wavering in their commitment to Germans Britain have and come Italy have to predict been a loss of to

monetary Now, monetary lessens

Many

national sovereignty if the EMS goes further, and this significantly


their commitment. permitted

bolt out of the EMS, Denmark has been allowed that privilege in the future, and Spain and Ireland have stretched its rules by decisions
that resemble Monetary believe disaster, The European devaluations. competitive old-style Union's to be reached in the (EMU) single currency was

period from 1997 to 1999.


it will never be there probably must

This is not now possible, and many


Before it can economic happen without plus be a general recovery

reached.

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124
far more

Michael Mann
standardization of economies over and this there are also "monetarists" substantial than policies between disagreements issue. Of course, eroded the the economic

yet exists?though "economists" and core of

the progress actually made activities these three Overall,

is again economic. have undoubtedly state. This change. has been The

of the individual member sovereignty constitutional Maastricht's major by extended the scope of "the qualified of unanimity. expense are required to make than ten votes. ones A smaller always power

reinforced greatly at the votes

Treaty

Fifty-four a new ruling, now

system majority" voting of the seventy-six member with three no

ruling a country's votes are to block Of course, legislation. cast as a single national bloc, leading toward stable geopolitical relations between states, not toward a single "transnational" fundamentally the broadening of and consumer its intricate an economic of Europe's planning agency.

needs

country having more countries and more big

superstate. The EC thus remains It has range, expanded its complex with

web

occupational institutions

structure,

product-market its diversified regulations, set of financial instruments.

All of this regulation

is highly technical and capitalistic. Euro

are arcane, of and they are dominated by the lobbying and associations. Union trade and business professional enterprises are much and and weaker, by churches lobbying organizations other nonexistent. The direct institutions is virtually secondary on in countries member EC the of everyday politics impact policies and products about markets is rather limited. Regulations rarely a mass for of French farmers except for the rampaging audience, can over sell who labeled with the EC's products jokes or ice cream. The most like sherry, champagne, important free movement become was have great and currencies, cause dissension. apparent, they the states erosions found as "loss"? implications. While the unanimity economic

reach and words Acts, When

about these

European relatively

economy easy. They

booming, rarely defined

near

growth was

the whole

point of the EEC, and is still the central


in recessions, dependent their negotiations on growth, the trade for far

of the EC. Yet, objective policy seems tend to stall. Future progress of sovereignty. off for the erosion The managing state as a whole the collective is not, affairs

as Marx

an organization asserted, the state does of the bourgeoisie;

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Nation-States
more than this. The

in Europe and Other Continents


EC, however, and national is. Throughout states, aided the

125
twentieth

century, parties political to institutionalize two world wars, have managed as capitalism remained more the social classes. What problematic were across the world to expand the relations between continued the national and the transnational. Since The to regulate these relations. emerged institutions?the of these equivalent 1945, EC

by the result of relations between

a group of institutions is a stronger regional corporation, the

global

International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Europe is the
biggest market It in the smallest into many area of the three main states. regions. became more functions. There interest. traditional state are several It provides where areas, however, few communications a relatively comes out the EC shows little one is divided similar, pacific capitalist The EC

sovereignty-constraining-by-consent

than its comparable

global institutions. But it has largely extended the same types of

infrastructures,

(and usually If Europe activity. in nationalized It interferes expanded.

of uncontentious) mainstay of recession, these might be industries only when they are

subsidized monopolies
countries' The bulk

offering goods

in competition with other

countries)

in southern Europe. i.e., a few state enterprises enterprises, size varies of the state sector between (whose greatly EC is unaffected. is important expenditure only for the state expenditure. by national or other group relations, such as or the of labor relations, order, public religion, meet where welfare and the in labor market though is dwarfed into class policy, or gender it is active. relations?this It does not would There there regulate moral be impossibly been

sector and agricultural The EC has not moved the regulation welfare state, national educational issues, when the family,

divisive if attempted. Regional policies began to be scaled down


they appeared no attempt at social government have refused to be redistributive. redistribution. to sign even True, this and has otherwise is the fairly vacuous

"Social" Chapter 8 of the Treaty of Maastricht,

but the Thatcher


compel it.

the EC did not

Britain is not bound by it, a sign of the low priority social issues
for the EC. Indeed, for fiscal convergence the deflationary are overwhelming rigor of the EC's requirements any real social objectives.

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126
The EC

Michael Mann
can hardly not The of point really to Britain cultivate alone as the home of "social

dumping." The EC does or citizenship. rate attendance

and little salience for percent, seat that the of executive is Brussels, power, Europeans. seen as a bureaucratic is unfair in one sense, since Leviathan. This the administration is small, only 17,000?less than Madrid's municipal are translators. and one-quarter But it is accurate in government, Polls show another sentiments sense: it is a technicist apparatus uninterested from Europeans. There sense of being "European" across the member iswidespread which in everyday countries is reinforced and which "town life by myriad student and scientific conferences, twinnings," exchanges, professional or affections in commanding a is diffuse cultural

Strasbourg less than 50

Parliament

a real sense of European identity an has few powers,

and vacationing This cultural arrangements. identity exists alongside national whose and strong enduring loyalties, only major "weakening" to be a substantial in aggressive reduction To appears xenophobia. means to be "European" be nice, gentle, and civilized. Such a today

European identity could be mobilizable


and social concern foreign province national Even purposes. income taxes, These the EC. of But these policy, are not Thus welfare

for "pan-European" politics


Most national

crises.

politics moral issues, and policies, to be, and are not, the perceived are the political still parties entirely

are absent.

in organization in orientation. and almost entirely national about referenda have tended to turn into Europe supposedly votes there the national of governments. performance are two functions, to the modern state central all other states today, which the EC has not acquired. on

confidence

Moreover, and to almost economic collective Maastricht German in bilateral

As a Belgian minister remarked during the Gulf War,

the EC is an

is no There dwarf, and a military worm. giant, a political and not much defense Under foreign policy-making. and it is rules, there is intergovernmental policy-making governments are developing The American force, but joint defense has creature, NATO, different, to the EC. The Western European agency, Ireland but its members but the two are not members. a small

decided by unanimity, not by a qualified majority. The French and


negotiations. members overlapping, though a Union house defense European might and differ yet again?Denmark, Greece, Some Europeans favor broader defense

commitments,

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Nation-States
nuclear Powers, France

in Europe and Other Continents


and Britain, states fiscal refuse to share control

127
of these

weapons and jealously preserve their individual UN Security Council


seats. The individual Yet policies. foreign to reduce European threat continue Militaries, somewhat tech, professional, in conscription. he largely maintain and pressures militarism. will from the their own military and lack of an external The English become civil sociologist

Martin Shaw predicts the end of popular militarism, institutionalized


argues, removed society.11 a defense smaller, high Yet the remains states on

of coordinating agency capable only geopolitical most States. At little cost to themselves, the United

European

tagged along in the Gulf War.


United States has (so far) been

But where is their response when the


less interested, to the convulsions

their own border, in Yugoslavia? Things have certainly changed since the assassination in 1914 of a single Archduke! Defense
arrangements of a mess. Thus a federal of state are not only outside of EC scope, they are also state or even for three main a bit

is not moving toward a single Europe state. Different arrangements political be distinguished. may is divided between sovereignty to clear, "federal" not according Second, though not anywhere. in other entirely, Overall civilian function

toward

policy, though largely, located

types economic First, for most the EC and the nation-states, constitutional remains Third,

or "confederal"

principles.

policy areas, sovereignty in the hands of the nation-state. is now divided

in defense and foreign policy, very little effective sovereignty is


sovereignty and messy.

The EC is diplomatically
accredited The does EC

recognized by many

states and is an

at the United Nations, observer but so is the Vatican. itself has no single seat or place of sovereignty for what it In democracies, control. this resides in an elected executive and

in a sovereign is far short of either. Europe does Europe parliament. a constitution, not in effect possess these complex clearly regulating on national institutional relations. The major encroachments sovereignty sovereignty of one really constitutional?the replacement Instead, they are the practical, by another. surreptitious, are not

and delayed implementations of decisions taken by the Council of


whose reflect partly consensus Ministers, processes decision-making and partly the geopolitical influence of the various member Powers. are routinized, The encroachments like the constraining practices or narrow dense web of product the band of currency regulations

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128

Michael Mann

fluctuations permitted by the EMU. These Powers do not add up


to a single, organized In controversial state-like whole. areas, the to supranational not according EC works but principles, according to geopolitical and alliances between Powers. ones?agreements Recently, themselves Britain, and Denmark, the and France have claimed a damaging

right. They have identified amajor EC policy as "of vital interest" to


so claim government the French declares The British right not to conform. to it is in principle monetary opposed is at odds over agricultural tariff government that

union;

policy. We
December sanction

do not know where


of 1992, the Danish to the majority

these disputes will


was allowed

end. But in
disassociation

government against

from monetary policy and formal citizenship. There is a formidable


available the dissident state: expulsion.

It has not yet been wielded.

If it is,we will know that the EC is a

narrow new political sovereign entity, over its admittedly powerful the EC regulates only the capitalist range of policy. Largely toothless, a genuinely It provides activity of a region. "European" regulation? It is not yet but only for areas agreed on by traditional geopolitics. a state, nor is it replacing states.

The Future of the European Community What will happen in the future? The EC might weaken or itmight
strengthen. economic member seems unlikely, as the collapse, No all would be disastrous. consequences present now can sensibly withdraw is toward and the momentum Contraction, for or worse

At the other extreme, the nation-states and gaining more members. a are But where form the EC could eventually single federal whole. economic EC was for for this? The the pressures developed harmonization. limited. Even Its "spillovers" in the economic into other sphere, state the functions of have core been and existence

periphery regions and the difficulty in reaching monetary union is producing a Europe of "different speeds." Europe has been led since the 1950s by the core Franco-German alliance, loyally backed by
Benelux countries whose economies are inseparable from theirs. But

the British are still puzzled when they examine the map. Are we in
Europe, a dual in the Atlantic? Italy remains they ask, or are we a and South, with system of government quite distinctive entity, North are and bring future other Southerners it The poorer (to put mildly). of integration with the North; the Scandinavian neighbors

problems

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Nation-States
with EC.

in Europe and Other Continents


will soon enter and foreign

129
the

are as rich as Germany, and they Austria domestic Yet many favor more progressive than most of its present members. Europe has a It has no clear Eastern boundary, periphery. clear vision or policy are Europe state, an for this area. insignificant Germany. Its activities when

policies Eastern problematic and the EC has no in the countries with those of of a

Eastern single united, Union's,

compared

member with with

now has another Europe, seems to play the Great It Power. that German unlikely option: EC. choose this rather than But present would the governments resist erosion that further of its indications Germany might imply in Eastern sovereignty. Without German leadership, there would have

economy massive influence

And, finally, Germany, recently size of former Soviet the the nearing

national

been no EC; without German leadership, the EC will not deepen. As Felipe Gonz?lez, the President of the Spanish government, has stated, "if Germany fails we will all fail as well."12
Thus, and it is more likely that for the members, arrangements and but within will ad hoc not a and

either stall or there will be a Europe of differential convergencies


speeds, associations encouraged with other Ad hoc by the entry of new members a widening proliferate Environmental neighbors creating may

deepening. across its new

cooperative agencies A pan-European borders.

Agency

will hopefully appear stretching at least to the Urals


a very broad lesson). geography unified alternatives functionally political federalism. taught Europe Indeed, though is not headed toward

(Chernobyl
and than

Less territorially seem more likely

Europe institutions

arrangements. singular political itmay be headed back to political arrangements resembling, in far denser forms, those of earlier feudal times. Like then, has no single locus of sovereignty. It has different political

in its EC core, and it different functions regulating contains Powers of greatly differing has ad hoc strengths. Europe as to particular solutions institutional such defense and problems, the environment, combinations of

to present stronger agencies devising according are functional and geographical need. There But dilemmas Federalists. of defense, currency, and Eastern committed are these down and increasing pragmatism Federalists Europe slowing and ad hoc solutions.

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130

Michael Mann

seem sensible, but it has raised the may Proliferating pragmatism in EC institutions. issue of a "democratic deficit" These tend to be bureaucratic rather than democratic. Can arose itself not, since democracy Clearly was state. Democracy the achievement version representative place. The Federal clear US control them? democracy as the sovereign nation of

division of sovereignty between the states and the federal government, between Constitution, and between the President, the two houses, and the Supreme Court. some specialized EC the democratic without Making transferring formal sovereignties is unlikely. to it is impossible. Such an act of transference

the state as a single, a of democracy requires in the institutions?as plural

Do we need to bother? We only need bother if states remain the


in the eighteenth, nineteenth, they became own if their citizens and threaten centuries, they as many of those states did. cages and early twentieth or their neighbors,

to nation-state has lost some economic functions The European while the EC and some defense functions functions gaining altogether, inwhat had previously been more private and local spheres. Overall, the bars of the cage may accountable rather sovereignty But Euro-institutions indirect, not have changed very much. Citizens still

need to deploy most of their vigilance at the national level and most
remain there. should in a do exploit. They are only responsible a EC And since is the cumbersome way. essentially overwhelmingly organized not nineteenth Twentieth-century, on all their activities concentrated virtually it in the process. and threatened, federations Now their their social other classes

capitalist club, it is part of the growing postwar ability of the


class capitalist at the level of to outflank the nation-state.

have socialists century, the nation-state, strengthening greatly are achievements social Keynesian democratic to resist governments the economic and union logic socialists

Clearly, capitalism. more in Euro-institutions.

are simply unable a more organized by globally imposed should organize and other dissidents as long as they can only mobilize

But,

their forces on policy

issues which
it is also

remain overwhelmingly
a reason for them

the

to be wary province to EC. socialists the transferred of more European sovereign powers to in conservatism of the fiscal the feeble have been response of the nation-state,

Bundesbank-led

EC. But their humbling

by fiscal conservatism

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Nation-States
occurred need to first within renew their international

in Europe and Other Continents


their sense individual of nation-states. and this purpose, European can only

131
leftists occur

European cooperation. provide of which of cooperation, take full advantage. they must But it is not the only locus, since they have been outflanked by not European capitalism. global, states no longer threaten each other. Europeans had European on evaluations of each other. been I, for negative long nurtured through one locus example, resenting were was brought up in postwar the French, mildly despising Britain as deeply Italians, Greeks, anti-German, and Spaniards,

institutions

and making malicious

Irish jokes. The Swiss, Iwas

led to believe,

the Belgians and fat, and the messy tidy and repressed, Scandinavians and Dutch were nice because they were totally harmless. I hope they reciprocated But the polls anti-British sentiments. with show that negative national stereotypes have almost vanished. National rivalries

now Football Song Contests, largely consist of Eurovision to contests attract in and Western servility global corporations. Cups, no authoritarian and virtually governments Europe has no military The greatest transformation of twentieth-century Right. political Europe of both is not the decline of socialism but the defeat of authoritarianism the Right and the Left. Center-right Christian conservatives, and Centrist Social Democrats dominate European politics. some carelessly call resurgent fascism is nothing of the focused on

Democrats, And what sort:

(as fascism immigration, appealing to the working class on the material did) almost exclusively and schools. of jobs, housing, The new Europe It is also unthreatened. is harmless. Europe has as as it the geopolitical has well client states security always wanted, and even supplicant between itself and any threat coming out states, of the East. And the Americans remain to defend it. Europe has rarely issues little need can do for efficient little harm. Pacific muddling geopolitical decision-making. Its sins are the lesser ones of omission. If this to being States a utopia than a crisis. is

it is racism

postmodernity, trilateralists:

it is closer the United

The EC also enjoys fairly amiable relations with


and Japan.

the other two


they have automobile

It is true that

trade disputes about protectionism unending regarding and rice, but they also show a capacity spare parts, semiconductors, on these. Capitalism for finally compromising is not so transnational that it can dispense with political regulation, and trilateralism

fits

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132
the bill.

Michael Mann
Cultural are that also blurs strong, both

across solidarities the Atlantic a a and consumerism reinforced by capitalism national and continental Americans may identity. cars are now American. But do know Winchells German stores Dutch, Spanish, programs Donuts and Pryca are British and more are British?

supermarkets and not American, Duti Catalan.13

know that Jaguar that they Burger King or Seat cars are Spaniards may know French, but not that Texas Homecare that half their are not clothes Italian are but fashion clothes

that Massimo

Perhaps countries from European originate are Do but dubbed. Clint America, Eastwood, Sylvester Stallone, they casts remain American and the "Dallas" and "Beverly Hills 90210" or German when slang? Do the cartoon characters speaking Portuguese of "Dragonball" American and from Iceland even remain Japanese? Europeans identities. Japanese Baltic seem capable of ingesting

precisely in mainland shown

one-half

of the television

The EC must also be viewed favorably by its neighbors since?


to the entire and Mediterranean littorals?they

want

in. The EC has had a benign effect on some of its neighbors


democracy have cause a condition to be grateful Greeks and of membership. for this, and East Europeans

by making Spaniards

and Turks might

in the future.

the threat to its neighbors: But there is a potential European a potential Euro-racism. for strengthening issue, with immigration is linked to the broader issue of "fortress Europe," This especially whether countries will show much Europeans to their east and south. The interest fortress would less developed revive Europe's Slavs would be members the exact nature of in the

and "white." Whether identity as Christendom or aliens remains unclear, affect and this would

the European racial and religious identity. The fact that some Slav
adds to the potentially groups have their own ethnic conflicts heady brew. In fact, all three of the trilateral regional hegemonies, Europe, the developing the United States, and Japan, now have relations with

world on their doorsteps and within


ethnic

their thresholds which have

no longer be "the American dilemma" implications. Racism may in this area. Racial and achievements has experience since America and the Japanese the European be more conflict may geopolitical this and even war what Who knows dilemma. terrorism, riots,

might bring to global geopolitics


brought much violence, then

in the twenty-first century?


surely be a resurgence

If it
of

there would

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Nation-States
European nation-state state

in Europe and Other Continents


this States be a move back to

133
the

Would sovereignty. or forward to the United

state, reinforced seems policies, political neither

by European-wide the more likely outcome, I charted earlier. developments nor

of Europe? The nation and counterterrorism immigration in line with the pragmatic are nation-states functions, and

dying continue they may

European have shifted retiring; they merely to do so in the future.

THE AMERICAN What

AND two

JAPANESE STATES trilateralists? In contrast to Europe, they are no have given hint of

of the other

still dominated who by single nation-states, are dominated let alone of death. The Americas retirement, by the States. The continent's United other states are varied and most live from neighbors and dissidents from security are in within. this with respect nation-states, They typical emerging scope, fairly stable, large state administrations fairly secure territorial as dependent but contested and volatile political regimes. However, economies, they also lack the degree of economic sovereignty possessed most states of the nineteenth Now the US European by century. to the continent. hegemony helps police never The United States is itself a nation-state, such a though with threats to their

right little, tight little nation-state as the European type. The United
States has had more ethnic national diversity government, reducing Yet, it is a virtual continent. isolation have ensured that sufficient greatly and that than exceeded is not its rivals. that of true of a weaker, more federal and centralization. homogenization and and historic variety, remained more self trade has always in the United

Its size, ecological its economy has value of national trade

The

States, Its capitalism ismore competitors. owned than is the capitalism of any European nationally country. the of the largest single foreign Despite investment, growth Japanese as it has investor offshore remains, been, Europe's always island, its major

international

Britain.We can find a faint echo of the European Common Market


in the free-trade between agreements and Canada, but none of the parties is the dominant who partner. maturing more recently. In the 1930s, the United are under any States, Mexico, as to illusions

Indeed, the life cycle of the American nation-state has differed,


the federal government took

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134
major

Michael Mann
welfare functions Its military away from the individual dates state and municipal from World War II; this

governments. finally enabled and

the federal

local governments. in Chief. used

only to exceed the size of the state government Unlike most civilian state functions, military symbols

might

power iswielded by the federal government and by the President as


Commander and institutions is constantly mid-century has media been resonates its militarism amid Thus, The phrase "the American of the nation-state. people" policies. Across as immigration such as mass great seems

to legitimate foreign and military there was also social homogenization but it is still in areas continuing is now going through But overall relative

slowed and the South ended its isolation. Regional homogenization


laggard or banking. and Asian Immigration cultures. another States Of

burst and this may bring a distinctive role within


for Latino as a nation-state, still to be maturing as an economic it is declining power

the United States

the United

and not declining. to Europe

loss of national and I suspect that the consequent for much of postmodern relativism of the popularity circles. intellectual The second region, East Asia and much of

course, and Japan, accounts confidence in American is also a

the Pacific,

varied region dominated economically,

though not yet politically,

is the least economically self Japan Japan. by a single Power, most is and the isolated sufficient of the three regional Superpowers Its state, though formally from the others. small, tightly coordinates the its national relations through especially patron-client capitalism, of its single ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and through its dominant (MITI). Japanese. The of International Trade and Industry Ministry remains of its capitalism ownership overwhelmingly found takeovers and subsequent raiders have Foreign economic

management extremely difficult to accomplish. All of this is reinforced by dense and cohesive social and familial relations of a type unique
in the advanced control capitalist world. But the size of the American

Like Europe, Japan has not been a "full state" since 1945, lacking
of its defense restricts that GNP armed and and foreign policy.

army stationed in Japan, just over 50,000,


Constitution the size of fourth remain

is small. Though
of now the

the

to 2 percent military spending so large that Japan has become forces cautious in the world. about their Though rising power,

the GNP, has the

largest divided

Japanese and though

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Nation-States
Japanese foreign policy Power once again. Most a racial myth physiognomies "internationalism" of derive

in Europe and Other Continents


remains

135

a Great weak, Japan is objectively are and share Japanese quite nationalistic common their varied descent?though actually from many East Asian stocks. Abroad, Japanese a is tinged with economic with imperialism, in the labor relations particularly exploitative of its own Asian-Pacific nation-state, and receiver region.14 a very despite playing of capitalist and cultural

to impose tendency countries less developed Japan large role as both transnationalism. militaristic with odd very recent remains

a cohesive a transmitter As

adolescent. talk of

a nation-state, Its maturation the death

intimations two main

an unruly and Japan was has now resumed?though of relative economic decline. of the nation-state should sound The new Euro-institutions It is difficult to see why into major sovereignty states or political agencies.

So European in the other

are probably the United pooling Europe

capitalist regions. a pattern for the future. or enter States should Japan not with other

or sovereignty-shedding

They will

continue

to negotiate with
Powers.

their neighbors and with

as single Great

STATES IN THE LESS DEVELOPED WORLD

The less developed world presents different and more varied state problems. Most states date their birth or rebirth from after 1945,
when an ostensibly decolonization similar nation-state imposed on form all countries, in the real massive differences despite states of infrastructural civil and UN societies. The Charter capacities

and the Cold War


arrangements. their own, sometimes infrastructures this "outer But

tended to freeze these often artificial political


this short era is now power over. States must depend on Few possess the capacities. true of In nation-states. capacities an states confront "Hobbesian" essentially states in the "Lockeian heartland."15 Along

limited, and mobilization

rim," many of order, unlike problem with the former communist sometimes national combined security.

face severe internal dissidence, states, many threats from their neighbors to their Nowhere else is there a region the enjoying with

tranquillity of Western

Europe.

As the sociologist Charles Tilly

states in less for several decades most countries notes, developed have not been following the European of path military development.16

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136
Their

Michael Mann
militaries did not a certain they reached in Europe. They have happened development?as are and and modern, likely to remain so expensive, decline may spend another citizenship, regional century struggling and ethnic autonomies, in size once

level of economic remained for some

large, time. Such countries and social

over political political

and boundary disputes with neighbors. These are very different


or Japan, and of Europe, North America, them. rather than weaken nation-states strengthen they may are also very in the less developed world But state scenarios inAfrica, we find collapsing Hobbesian varied. At one extreme, mostly agendas to those states provide development gratification. whose even to to penetrate their territories to pursue the order?let alone of instant culture by the new global required goals In their ineffectual the warlords of Somalia, violence, regimes minimal are unable social

Liberia or Zaire

resemble the vast majority

of political regimes

but reflections history. They throughout premodern and automatic armed with of our own past?though weapons is not postmodernism, but the Their problem Swiss safe deposits. in their civil societies. diffused modernism of a genuinely absence This the and the rest of Africa lessens as we proceed through problem to Latin then South Asian less developed American, countries, South Asian advanced Soviet and the more the former countries, East European and East Asian to the most successful and finally the Czech countries. lands, South By the time we reach Hungary,

are not monsters

we encounter or Taiwan, solid civil societies with Korea, Singapore, state of effective economic and cultural infrastructures, penetration over and social battles and political territories, citizenship political in the sense that they resemble the that are undeniably "modern," recent history East battles). multitude of Western countries European In between Europe, North America, also have their own the Somalian and and Japan (though distinctive political a South Korean poles,

of semieffective

unevenly developed sometimes dividing, and oppressing, order keeping development such regimes consumer

states are coping with uneven modernity? or enclave capitalisms, religious or ethnic identities sometimes them, bulging militaries strengthening

sponsoring bulging state administrations of Some of the and dispensing problems corruption. are subverted are indeed distinctively postmodern?they But their basic political problem is that

by the global reach of capitalism and the global culture of instant


gratification.

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Nation-States
formally weakness modern

in Europe and Other Continents

137

cannot for the institutions compensate political an diffused of the other modernizing prerequisite: evenly not of postmodernity. civil society. They confront a crisis of modernity, This is their own crisis, and their diverse solutions will not reproduce the histories of Western these histories, they will and nation-states. or Japan. But like Europe, North America, center on the struggle to create civil societies

CONCLUSION

States became important in the modern world for providing five services of varying utility to humanity: 1) they became capable of
waging massive, routinized war; 2) they provided communications

infrastructures for both militarism and capitalism; 3) they became the site of political democracy; 4) they guaranteed social citizenship
into the private rights encroaching All five macroeconomic planning. with the rise of modern entwined sphere; functions and were 5) they invented and connected

In the twentieth civil society. on have fused tremendous the powers century, they sovereign nation are now state. Some of these powers but others are still declining,

reason why is no necessary all these functions should be same most the located within of history, agency. For political they were not. States shared some political functions with with lords, associations. and with private Other functions corporate churches, were were not pursued at but considered all, collectively essentially such Europe, a is This undoubtedly separated. partially an it since stemmed world historical change, apparently unstoppable institutions Europe has created new political growth of the nation-state. to some of divided, and this confused may sovereignty, spread was But since this development adjacent countries. largely a response again to a particular world. The regional Twentieth-century sources of contemporary more from which global change, some have also predicted the death of the nation-state, actually and varied political implications. Military bring more mixed changes, the advent of nuclear and biological have made weapons, especially war between the Great Powers irrational, and this logic may situation, states it may not seem highly be a blueprint varied. for the private activities. have functions In one part of the world, in Western

growing. There

major

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138
also

Michael Mann

to lesser Powers. Since the modern state, and spread downward was in war, of the nation-state, much conceived this might be as its eventual death. its after the Yet, birth, interpreted signaling nation-state modern found other things to do and is still finding them. In any case, societies are not governed by rationality. Modern

wars have been intensified by ferocious ideologies purporting to solve social conflicts. Ethnicity and religion entwined with "First World" versus "ThirdWorld" social conflict might be a fertile new
states violent. of keeping It is thus capable that the United and States, important Europe, particularly Japan cope humanely with their immigration, border, and regional problems. If, instead, they invoke racist-religious identities, they too will suffer of ideologies the consequences, counterterrorism. easier to see what in violence As should far as war in expenditures, of terrorism are and violence concerned, be done than what will be done. and do not merely and it is source

Capitalist states. The geopolitical are already other issue

and cultural

transnationalism

undermine

states new of global society increasing density gives and environmental issues roles. Tariffs, communications, of between notable generators negotiations geopolitical areas. We might unlike "Social see, for example, more global theMaastricht one, with teeth) regulating common or of public standards health qualifications. like agencies In the recent the United past, Nations such or

states and these may be expected to grow and be joined by many


Chapters" (hopefully, or setting labor relations and professional educational in or out of negotiations, GATT, United

led by two great nation-states, the have been typically for representing States and Japan, by more ad hoc arrangements of all the above are replaced (sometimes by the Group "Europe," a more erratic Soviet/Russian and and seems an the

Twelve states), and by ad hoc representation of "the Third World"


states, with by one or more Chinese occasional presence. And EC have near so we reach a curious so far been

paradox.

Transnationalism Yet

capitalism largely capitalist. has resulted its state-subverting limits. Capitalist profit-taking in not quite Frederic Jameson's hyperspace." Though "postmodern of nation the social reduced the has powers citizenship capitalism and geopolitical of most states, states sovereign trends

to be

with military state, and in association the military also reduced sovereignty on continuous between negotiations

it has

it still depends in a variety of

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Nation-States
ad hoc agencies.

in Europe and Other Continents


reduce

139

Yet, if socialism, has to take up this very task. When is being undermined by transnational should from become inside

will not further Capitalism of the democratic Western

the nation-state.

it is to survive, variety, even Swedish Social Democracy fiscal conservatism, the message exercise lift their gaze at the power little to offer the voters. socialists

unless transparent: totally to nation-states their own

level, they will have precious its life cycle, the nation-state has been entwined with Throughout most But the class movement which class conflict. historically should now begin to subvert it. the nation-state Whether strengthened international

it will

recognize this destiny and whether

it has the capacity to


of the

it are open questions. achieve For now and for the foreseeable capitalism world, world, Where like and nation-states stride advanced the most especially states are varied. Some are countries to have either one. lack an effective The as a reality

future, ad hoc associations across most dominant of ones. in crisis, In the and a few

less developed are near

death. Their crisis isnot of postmodernity but of insufficientmodernity.


nation-state nation-state, they would dearly nor is not hegemonic, is it or as an ideal.

obsolete,

ENDNOTES

earlier

versions

of this essay were

given

as lectures

under

the titles:

"The End

of the

in Instituto Juan March, Madrid, 11 December 1992, and "The Nation-State?" End of theNation-State? Prospects for Europe and for the World," in the Wendy
and Emery Re ves Lecture Series, "Beyond the Nation-State," at The College of

William
2Philippe

andMary,
Schmitter,

15 February 1993.
"The European Community as an emergent and novel form of

political domination,"

Instituto Juan March, Working

Paper No. 26,1991,15.

3For example, John G. Ruggie, "Territonality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," International Organization 47 (1) (1993).
4A11 figures activities history on state finances state and manpower, and all generalizations about are drawn to 1914, on the I have from the research conducted prior of five states?Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Prussia/Germany,

in and the United States?reported Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chaps. 11-14. 5Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in theMaking of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

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140
6Frederic

Michael Mann
Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism," New

Left Review 146 (1984) and Frederic Jameson, "Marxism and postmodernism," New Left Review 176 (1989). 7PerryAnderson, "The development of the European Community," unpublished paper, Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, University of California at Los Angeles, 1992.
8Two of the major EC activities?agriculture and regional policy?do not undercut

national sovereignties. The labyrinthine agricultural policies (still absorbing 65 percent of the EC budget) have resulted from intergovernmental agreements, In the 1970s, regional policy especially between France and West Germany.
seemed southern pit to be moving toward states European northern against undercutting sovereignties, as members reversed this. Most states rather than richer but the entry of poorer now conflicts regional poorer regions

southern

against

regardless of state boundaries (though German unification has provided an exception to this, since the regions of the former GDR qualify for regional funds). And the geopolitically dominant northerners were successful in late 1992 in keeping development funds down to 1.25 percent of the European Community's
GNP 9The rather literature than on the 5 percent the single market discussions earlier and envisaged for them. is vast. System are available in the European Monetary recent developments

Informative,

provocative

of

articles in Otto Holman, ed., European Unification in the 1990s: Myths and Reality, special issue of the International Journal of Political Economy 22 (1) (Spring 1992).
10Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht,"

International Organization

47 (1) (1993).

nMartin Shaw, Post-Military Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 12Interviewwith Felipe Gonz?lez, El Pais, 23 February 1992.
13Nor can I guarantee with that this zeal information and will remain accurate even to the time of

the publication of this article?since


enterprises 14Anthony great Woodiwiss, "Human rights,

global corporations buy and sell individual


labour law and transnational sociality

rapidity.

the Pacific Rim (with special reference to Japan and Malaysia)," unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of Essex, 1992. around
15K. van der Pijl, "Ruling classes, hegemony and the state system: theoretical and

historical considerations,"

International Journal of Political Economy

19 (1989).

16CharlesTilly, Coercion, Capital and European States (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

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