Heriot-Watt University School of Engineering and Physical Sciences Chemical Engineering

Hazard and Operability Studies

Introduction
A Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) will normally be performed when a plant is first designed, after a fairly detailed flowsheet has been drawn up. HAZOP is a systematic technique for identifying potential accident scenarios but does not in itself provide any quantitative measure of the probability of an accident occurring. A HAZOP will, therefore, frequently be carried out in conjunction with quantitative risk assessment procedures such as reliability studies and determination of the Dow Fire and Explosion Index; these quantitative techniques will usually be applied to a sub-set of accident scenarios selected for further study. Other risk assessment methods, including checklists of specific points, may also be employed. Quantitative methods are sometimes described as Hazard Analysis (HAZAN). The development of the HAZOP technique is usually attributed to ICI, although there is evidence that similar systems were developed in parallel by a number of organisations including the US Military. The concept dates from the 1960s and by 1977 the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) were encouraging its development and use. Today a HAZOP is a standard element of process plant design procedure and is usually carried out under a companys Safety Management System. A HAZOP study will be carried out by a team of individuals, ideally with different skills so that potential problems can be examined from a variety of viewpoints. It is a matter of judgement over whether problems require action or not, as the assessment is by its nature subjective. The results of HAZOP studies should be recorded for future reference and to ensure that any actions identified as necessary are completed. A follow-up study may be useful if any technical details change during the design process. A HAZOP can certainly be valuable as part of the risk assessment procedure for plant modification, as poorly considered modifications can compromise plant safety seriously. HAZOP is essentially a brainstorming technique designed to identify sequences of events that could lead to an accident. It is useful because it is a structured approach to accident scenario identification that is reasonably easy to use and is effective in prompting thought about less obvious accident causation mechanisms. However, it relies heavily on the judgement and expertise of the persons performing the analysis and can be time consuming.

HAZOP Procedure
Continuous Process A HAZOP analysis is performed for each line and piece of equipment on a flowsheet in turn by defining the intention of the line or equipment and then trying to identify ways in which deviations from that intention could occur. The general procedure for continuous processes is outlined below: 1. Define intentions. These are the original design intentions, which should be stated as precisely as possible with details of flow rates, temperature, pressure etc. Determine deviations. Possible deviations from the design parameters are identified by the systematic application of seven guide words, explained later. Deviations which are clearly impossible may be disregarded. Determine causes. Possible causes of any feasible deviations are arrived at by lateral thinking/brainstorming. It will often be necessary to consider the relationship of the line or vessel under examination to other plant items. As before, causes which are clearly impossible may be disregarded. Determine consequences. Possible consequences of any meaningful deviations are deduced by careful examination of the flowsheet, although lateral thinking may also play a part. Determine hazards. Any consequences which may present a hazard are identified. Consequences may be hazardous in terms of injury to personnel, environmental damage and/or financial loss. Formulate actions. Decide on any actions needed to guard against possible hazardous occurrences identified during the study. Actions could range from minor modifications to the control system (e.g. installation of alarms) to a re-design of the section of plant concerned. They are pre-emptive actions performed before an incident occurs rather than reactions to deviations.

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The seven guide words (or phrases) applied to find deviations from the design intentions are: 1. No or Not. No design intentions are achieved but nothing else happens, e.g. there is no flow in a pipe. More. A parameter increases to above the intended design value, e.g. increased flow, temperature, pressure, level or concentration. Less. A parameter decreases to below the intended design value, e.g. decreased flow, temperature, pressure, level or concentration. As well as. Design intentions are achieved but something else happens as well, e.g. a contaminant enters a stream. Part of. Some of the design intentions are achieved but others are not, e.g. temperature, pressure and flow are as intended but a stream component is missing. Reverse. The opposite of the design intentions happens, e.g. flow is reversed in a pipe, a chemical reaction runs in the opposite direction to that intended. Other than. No design intentions are achieved but something else entirely happens, e.g. an intended chemical reaction does not occur, but a different reaction occurs instead. This guide word/phrase can be rather vague but is intended to cover the unexpected as far as possible.

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The procedure described above is a guide word first HAZOP technique, in which each guide word is considered in turn together with relevant process parameters before moving to the next guide word; the alternative is the parameter first HAZOP in which each process parameter (e.g. flow rate, temperature) is considered in turn together with relevant guide words. The guide words used are those specified in the original ICI method, although different organisations may use slightly different guide words (HAZOP is an approach rather than an official method). HAZOP may be also be used in non-process industries, in which case different guide words may be appropriate. It has been suggested that the normal set of seven guide words should be supplemented with time-dependent variations such as sooner or later for certain operations. The use of the term hazard is potentially misleading in a modern context as many of the things described as hazards in HAZOP analyses are actually hazardous or undesirable outcomes rather than hazards in themselves. Use of the term hazard in this manner derives from historical precedent. As a hazardous outcome is a consequence of a deviation from design intention, some HAZOP teams combine identification of consequences and hazards into a single step.

Guide Word/Parameter Combinations Some guide word/parameter combinations can almost always be used to describe meaningful deviations, while others are rarely if ever appropriate. Comments on individual guide words: 1. No or not. Works with flow for lines, but not really meaningful with temperature or pressure (implies absolute zero or hard vacuum); the latter two combinations can be covered more precisely by less temperature or less pressure. May work with reaction or similar for process vessels. More/Less. Usually work with flow, temperature and pressure, could work with reaction and concentration. As well as. Works with contaminant/composition. The nature of this contaminant will depend on what is possible in the system concerned, but consider such things as rust flakes from corroded pipes. Could also be used with reaction to cover unexpected side reactions in a process vessel. Part of. Works with composition to describe a missing stream component. Could also be used with phase to describe a single phase when two are expected, or with reaction to cover the absence of a particular reaction when two or more are expected. Reverse. Works with flow, could work with reaction if it runs in opposite direction to that intended. Not really meaningful with temperature or pressure, although reverse heating could be a possibility. Other than. Difficult to say what might be appropriate here, since it is intended to cover the unexpected! Consider potential deviations during start-up and shut-down as well as during normal operation.

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It will soon become evident that some deviations could be described by different guide word/parameter combinations; the most suitable should be chosen.

Batch Process By their nature, batch and semi-batch processes are non-steady state and parameters such as temperature, pressure, composition and quantity of material can change over time. The sequence and timing of events can be particularly important for batch processes so the HAZOP needs to be adapted to account for this. The guide words should be applied to the instructions for the process as well as the lines entering and leaving a process vessel (Kletz, 1999). For example, if a certain amount of reagent A has to be charged to a batch reactor over a defined time interval, starting at a particular time, then the following deviations can be considered: A not charged More A charged Less A charged As well as A charged Part of A charged Reverse A charged Other than A charged A charged early A charged late A charged too quickly A charged too slowly

if another component added at the same time this would work for a mixture; otherwise it is covered by less A charged could be unlikely, but can A flow back from the vessel along the feed line? something else entirely is charged

High Level and Low Level HAZOP The approaches described above consist of a detailed examination of each line and piece of process equipment in turn, and can be thought of as low level HAZOP. A high level HAZOP looks at the plant as a whole and is intended to prompt thinking about major accident scenarios. Guide words used may include: Fire Explosion Toxic release Loss of containment This gives an overview of vulnerable areas of the plant, but will not necessarily identify root causes as effectively as a more detailed study.

HAZOP Example
Problem The diagram below shows a pH balancing tank which forms part of the wastewater treatment system at a process plant: Alkali Reservoir

Raw Wastewater

LC Centrifugal Pump pHC

Treated Wastewater

The plant operators Consent to Discharge specifies that wastewater leaving the plant will have a pH in the range 6-8. The raw wastewater has a pH of 3, so it is mixed with NaOH solution in the balancing tank to achieve a pH in the required range. The liquid volume in the tank is maintained at a constant value by a level controller, which adjusts a valve on the line leaving the tank. The pH in the tank is kept in the required range by a pH controller, which adjusts a valve on the alkali supply line. The alkali reservoir contains 2M aqueous NaOH solution, which is pumped to the tank by a continuouslyrunning centrifugal pump. Perform a HAZOP analysis for the treated wastewater line.

Solution The intention is to carry treated wastewater at pH 6-8 from the tank to a discharge point, at a flow rate that maintains a constant level of liquid in the tank.

A HAZOP table is drawn up and filled in by following the procedure described previously. Results are given in Table 1. If a HAZOP is performed for every line on a flowsheet, there will inevitably be some repetition because the same root cause could cause deviation from design intention in more than one line. The HAZOP table may be kept manageable by referring to previous sets of consequences, hazards and actions, or by allocating a code letter or number to each meaningful deviation which is then cited later in the table whenever the same situation arises. The results of the analysis show that there is a danger of environmental damage and possible prosecution if certain failures occur. The protective measures recommended in the analysis should reduce the risk of this to an acceptable level.

Problems and Pitfalls

HAZOP is a widely used and valuable technique for identifying hazardous scenarios and possible preventative and mitigating measures. However, it does have limitations and should thus be used in conjunction with other risk assessment methods in case anything is missed. Potential problems include: 1. It is a brainstorming technique which relies upon the knowledge and imagination of the HAZOP team to identify possible deviations and hazardous consequences arising from them. It is possible that some scenarios may be overlooked. It is a time consuming technique and this may cause its value to be questioned. HAZOP studies cost money and may delay the design process. However, if a serious incident is averted, a HAZOP study is time well spent. There may be a temptation to add all manner of protective devices, with increasing levels of redundancy, because particular accident scenarios are identified. Many of these devices may be quite unnecessary a quantitative evaluation of risk will help to set priorities and decide whether remedial actions are justified. There may be a tendency to concentrate on hardware problems while overlooking the role of human factors and human error in accident causation (IChemE, 1999), particularly if the HAZOP team is dominated by engineers. HAZOP based on a P & I diagram will not pick up additional risks caused by the proximity of plant items arising from layout. The additional guide words Passing through or Nearby may be applied to address this (Kletz, 1999), but will only be useful if layout is known when the analysis is carried out.

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It should also be remembered that protective devices often need maintenance and testing, increasing operational expenditure, and may reduce risk in some respects while increasing it in others. For example, installing a flame arrester on a storage tank vent line may reduce the risk of flashback but increase the risk of overpressure, since flame arresters tend to become clogged under certain operating conditions. These factors should be considered when deciding on actions arising from HAZOP.

References
IChemE (1999). HAZOP and Multistage Hazard Study, Safety Training Package 034, Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), Rugby, United Kingdom. F. Crawley, M. Preston and B. Tyler (2008). HAZOP: Guide to Best Practice, 2nd Edn., Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), Rugby, United Kingdom. T. A. Kletz (1999). HAZOP and HAZAN, 4th Edn., Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), Rugby, United Kingdom.

J. A. S. GOODWIN August 2003 (Revised October 2013)