Mendoza vs Comelec

For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Melanio L.

Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside the resolution of the Commission
on Elections, dated August 15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondent
Leonardo B. Roman’s election as governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and
void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution, which provides
that:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition:
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition. He
contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the
Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full terms
before the proscription applies. Therefore, not being a full term, a recall term
should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether served
prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full
three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss the
petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC,
295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.);
Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a local elective office takes
place or a recall election is held should not be counted in determining whether an
elective local official has served more than three consecutive terms. He argued
that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more
than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due
to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from
June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman
served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not
be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor
of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election
on that day was actually only his third term for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He
argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a
contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less
than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly
of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious
preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes
cast. He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the
electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally possible,
be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible elections. He concluded
that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal positions are of almost equal
weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the people’s overwhelming
choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is
clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the
terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous. Hence, service for less
than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to
disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position. This case is
different from Socrates, where the full three consecutive terms had been
continuously served so that disqualification had clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the view
that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the period June 28,
1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term. Since he thereafter
served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his
election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, §8 of
the Constitution. For this reason, she voted to grant the petition and to declare
respondent’s election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant
the petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally
ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local officials to
serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of the
framers of the Constitution. He contended that respondent Roman’s election in
2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.