Maloto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

76464 February 29, 1988 Facts: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina MalotoCasiano and C o n s t a n c i o , M a l o t o , a n d t h e p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s P a n f i l o M a l o t o a n d Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. However, while the case was still in progress t h e parties - Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino - executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did approve. Three years later Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel discovered a document e n t i t l e d " K A T A P U S A N N G A PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties. Subsequently, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings in the intestate proceedings of Adriana and for the allowance of the will. Trial court denied their motion, The petitioner came to SC by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the t r i a l c o u r t . S C d i s m i s s e d t h a t p e t i t i o n a n d a d v i s e d t o f i l e a s e p a r a t e p r o c e e d i n g f o r t h e p r o b a t e o f t h e alleged will. By that petitioner file a separate proceeding for probate of the will. Significantly, during the investigation the appellate court found out that the will was allegedly burned by the house help of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, and found that the will had been revoked. The CA stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven Issue: Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana Ruling: Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:Xxx(3) B y b u r n i n g , t e a r i n g , c a n c e l l i n g , o r o b l i t e r a t i n g t h e w i l l w i t h the intention of revoking i t , b y t h e testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court . It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute a n e f f e c t i v e r e v o c a t i o n , u n l e s s t h e d e s t r u c t i o n i s c o u p l e d w i t h animus revocandi o n t h e p a r t o f t h e t e s t a t o r . I t i s not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It m a y b e p e r f o r m e d b y a n o t h e r p e r s o n b u t u n d e r t h e express direction a n d i n t h e presence o f t h e t e s t a t o r . O f course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself." Animus revocandi i s o n l y o n e o f t h e n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t s f o r t h e eff ective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied b y the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his p r e s e n c e a n d under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Elatio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place w h e r e t h e s t o v e ( p r e s u m a b l y i n t h e k i t c h e n ) w a s l o c a t e d i n w h i c h t h e p a p e r s p r o f f e r e d a s a w i l l w e r e burned.SC approved the allowance of Adriana Maloto's last will and testament.

Orendain vs. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Rodriquez Facts: In her will, Doa Margarita Rodriguez provided for the creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties. She prohibited the mortgage or sale of certain of these properties, so that the income from these properties can be used for the benefit of the specified beneficiaries. She wrote: At the time of her death in 1960, Margarita left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will. Almost four decades after her death, petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. (who was mentioned in Clause 24 of Margaritas will), moved to dissolve the trust on Margaritas estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than 20 years , in violation of Article 870 of the Civil Code, which provides, The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void. In 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that while the testamentary disposition prohibiting the mortagage or sale of the property is void after the lapse of the 20 year period, the trust does not become void after the 20 year period. Accordingly the RTC rules that: (1) only the perpetual prohibition to alienate or mortgage is void; (2) the trust over her properties stipulated in Clauses 12, 13 and 24 of the will remains valid; and (3) the trustees may dispose of these properties in order to carry out the latters testamentary disposition. Issue: Can a testator use a trust to prevent the sale of his properties in saecula saeculorum after his death? Ruling: The Supreme Court disagreed with the RTCs ruling. According to the Supreme Court, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners motion to dissolve the trust and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause 10 according to Margaritas wishes. As regards these properties, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not institute an heir therefor (citing Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil Code). The Supreme Court ruled that the trust on Margaritas properties must be dissolved and remanded the case to the RTC to determine the following: (1) the properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and (2) the intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties. Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the socialization of the ownership of property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles. The trust herein involved covers only two lots, which have not been shown to be a large landholding. And the income derived there from is being devoted to a public and social purpose the education of the youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a sense socialized. There is no hint in the record that the trust has spawned agrarian conflicts. The Supreme Court explained the difference as follows: In this case, however, we reach a different conclusion as the testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties in the aforecited case. The herein testatrixs large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.