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sovereign sikh state through an armed struggle, its beginning may be traced to the rise of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in Sikh Politics; his distinct emphasis on Sikhism in danger, & hi s advocacy of violence against the other. Formal declaration of khalistan was made by his ardent followers from the Damdami Taksal on April 1986. 22 months after Bhindranwales death its collapse was evident by the end of 1992. By then over 25,000 people had been killed in Punjab in the terrorist & counter terrorist violence, and over & thank god for that observed Jagjit Singh Chauhan, president of the National Council of Khalistan at the end of 1993. He accused Pakistan of cynically exploiting the Sikhs. Leaders of Akali Dal & SGPC now devoted serious attention to correcting the image of the Sikhs which had been tarnished during the proceeding dacade or more. They underlined the commitment of the Sikh community to communal harmony, integrity of India, & democracy. The massive electoral Mandate given to the Akali Dal (Badal) heralded a definitive reversal to pre Bhindranwale concerns in Sikh politics what were the objectives of the movements & the reasons of its rise & failure. The present study explores & analysis the context & the logic of separatist violence in Punjab.

CHAPTER - I OPENING THE ISSUE The emergence of Nationalism in India since the last quarter of the Nineteenth century has been closely associated with religious identification Michael Ignatief has pointed to the relational aspect in the construction of national identity; that it is defined in terms of the other. He found the connection of nationalism with what freud described as Narcissism of minor differences. Peter van der veer made a study of Hindu & Muslim religious antagonism. One of the direct consequences of the process was the demand for Pakistan which led to the partition of India in 1947. When a demand for Khalistan or a separate sikh state was raised by some people during the 1940s it was clearly designed to counter the move for the creation of Pakistan. The partition of India along religious lines established a sinister precedent. Its logic created space for narcissistic imagination. The national leadership on the other hand was evidently scared the threat to the integrity & unity of the country were palpable. The centralization of power national unity were bound to create reaction. Master Tara Singh quoted questioning: the hindu got Hindustan & the Muslim got Pakistan, what did the Sikhs get? expressed an undercurrent of an imagined sikh Nationalist grouse. However, the political struggle of the sikh political leadership in post-independent India centerd round the formation of Punjabi Buba (a Sikh majority state, in essence) & greater autonomy for the state in the Indian federation. The Shiromani Akali Dal which claimed to be the sole spokesman of the sikh community did not at any time support the idea of the separate sikh state. Nor did it favor recourse to a violent struggle for the achievements of its political objectives. Its political rhetoric however was grounded in social separatism & grouses of the sikh community. State autonomy was conceptualized in terms

of political domination of the community in Punjab state. Therefore for the dissident factional leadership & danger to the panth from the Hindu domination remained a patent instrument for gaining ascendence in sikh politics. Its impact depended on the overall political context, the actual motives of the factional leaders & the balanced of forces. Two developments in the mid 1960s augmented for reaching changes in the world of sikh politics one was the formation of sikh majority state. It unleashed in the akali leadership exclusive claims to rule in the secular domain of the state politics. Earlier it was confined mainly to the religious domain of Shiromani gurudwara prabandhak committee (SGPC) competing interests developed variant imaginations of becoming Masters in Punjab state. One of these was for example, reflected in the concept of the Khalsaji ka bole bale (domination of the Khalsa). The second development related to the prosperity of the green revolution the new entrepreneurial rich agricultural class which it created, aspired for a share of political power commensurate with their economic doubt these 2 development also altered the terms of trade in politics. The legislateive leadership of Akali Dal gained greater importance than religious/SGPC leadership its bid for wider support base & aaliance favoured secularization of its political agenda. The sikh community was not homogeneous. It was divided by cast and class, as also religious sects, the Akali Dal required to win support from sections outside the traditional support base. Its election maiinifestos dropped the exclusively sikh religious or sectarian issues. So much so that even in the SGPC elections in 1979- the domain of the religion- the Akali Dals agenda centerd on financial autonomy for the state and it won 95% of the seats. The religious leadership was losing its influence. On the other hand the emergence of Indira Gandhi at the national scene posed a formidable challenge to the Sikh ruling class in its aspiration for political domination in Punjab.

The early experience of the fall of three collision governments during 1967 70, the centralizing nation building agenda of the congress and programs like that of land reforms, increase the threat perceptions of the landlords and facilitated the construction of the other. Both indira Gandhi & the Indian Government became the symbols of the anti sikh Brahminical forces. Meanwhile, the contradictions of the green revolution made the social cost prominent. The consumer culture, corruption, seen to be playing havoc with religion & morality. The sikh youth found to be ignoring sikh norms and falling into the ways of the others. By the mid 1970s the gains of the green revolution reached a plateau and there after followed gradual decline in the cost-output ratio on the other hand, widening class differences in the agricultural population increased social tensions and a threat perception among the socially and economically marginalized sections. The slogan of threat to religion, and assertion of identity appeared in such a context, to be a useful instrument to the competing political interest. More significant in its reach, tradition, Robin Jeffrey expressed his, Continual astonishment at the new version of Rhetorical history which include the fanciful and the undocumentable. Such as stupid Sikhs Sardar Kapur Singh, SGPCs national professor of Sikhism, introduced imaginary constructions of recent history for scapegoating the other. The mergence of the Khalistan movement may be placed in the above socio-historical and cultural context. In september 1988, the government released 138 prisoners ,lodged in Jodhpur jail of rajasthan without trail since june 1984, the decision was surprising because he government had said that there will be no concession to and discussions with the sikh leaders untill the millitancy and secessionism are completely wiped out. Rode himself had been sacked

from his position by the SGPC, controlled by Gurcharan singh tohra, who blammed him and his colleages for all that happened from the time of their released down to the operation back back thunder 2 . The Punjab Government tried brazenly to intervene by taking members of the SGPC executive committee into custody and threatening them to reverse the decision. But the executive committee members remained adamant the government decided to place Badal, Tohra and Sukhjinder singh in detention without trail under the national security act. It was around this time than than Bhan singh, secratary of the SGPC whom I met in Amritsar in the second week of July 1988, and the head priest of the golden temple gyani sohan singh, were assassinated on the 25th of July by unknown gunmen. Rode had been throughly exposed after chaman lal, Inspector - general of punjab police (border) resigned from his position accusing the government of backing the terrorists alligned with Rode and of sanctioning human rights atrocities committed an innocent villagers by officers choosen by K.P.S Gill. In August, Darshan singh returned as the head priest of the akal takht on insistance from the SGPC, but he vowed to limit his functioning to religious responsibilities and humanitarian concerns in consonance with the dignity of the akal takht. Simaranjit Singh maan, former police officer who had written a long letter to President Zial Singh upbraiding him for not resigning from his position even after the operation Blue Star, had been in jail since his arrest in November 1984. He was charged of attemping to cross the border over to Nepal, ostensibly to organize the sikh resistance from abroad. Later, He was charged of consipiring to assissinate Indira Gandhi. His defiance of the government made him very popular with the sikhs. mann had already been nominated as the president of the united Akali Dal, an outfit launched by bhindranwale's old father and talwandi. Simranjit Singh mann

had appointed a five members presidium, including Prakash Singh Badal,

Surjan Singh

Thekedar, a Tohra protegee, Jagdev Singh Talwandi, Baba Joginder Singh and Gejja Singh, a representative of the dam dami taksal, to run the affairs of the party in his absence. Joginder singh and the AISSF leaders inculdings Manjit Singh and the Harminder Singh Sandhu, refused to acknowledged the appointment of Darshan singh and proffessed loyalty towards Rode ostensibly on the ground that he had been appointed by the Sarpat Khalsa. Gurjit Singh, Joginder singh's ferocious son-in-law who commanded a faction of the AISSF and had joined Rode initiative mysteriously dissapeared. Some reports said that he was in the protective custody of senior police officials. Simranjits Singh Mann, tried to counter the moves of Bhindranwale's family by instructing the inclusion of two additional members, Charanjit Singh Walia, known to have been close to Amrinder Singh of Patiala royalty and Sucha Singh Chottepur, a Punjab politician of dubious back ground who had begun to profess loyalty to Mann. Harvinder Singh Kahlon, the convener of the AISSF, Sukhdev Singh Sakhira, The Head of an armed group associated with Kalon and Joginder Singh, symbolic figurehead of the United Akali Dal, were all opposed to the constitution of the panthik committee, for the simple reason that it challenged their authority and acted as a tool of dam dami taksal , Gurdev Singh Kaunke, acting head priest of the Akal Takht himself was opposed to the idea of khalistan, Jasbir Singh Rode, despite being a nephew of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, was far from transparent or even trusted some years before militancy was far from transparent or the operation Blue Star, Jasbir Singh had set himself up as emirates (UAE) at Dubai before going over to England to Establish the International Sikh Youth Federation to raise his voice for khalistan. He also went to pakistan and openly went to Pakistan and openly met with general Zia-ul-Haq to loudly ask for Pakistan's support for the sikh struggle for

independence from India. The Sarbat Khalsa that convented at Anandpur Sahib, at the call of the Akali Dal (longowal) on 16 Feb,1986, was notably larger and had endorsed the efforts of the akali government to obtain concession from the Union of India. The Union of India with Arun Nehru leading the newly created ministry of Internal security choose to work on a different strategy to justify its failures in inplementing the Rajiv - Longowal accord. It also wanted to vindicate the operation Blue Star restropectively by contraving a cause to order a second raid of the golden temple under the Akali Dal government.


The demand of khalistan or a sovereign sikh state was first made through a paid half-page adverstisement in the New York times in USA on 12th oct, 1971 in the name of Jagjit Singh Chauhan. Chauhan had been a minister in Lachhman Singh gillss short-lived government in Punjab during 1967-68. The event passed off without notice. In 1978, a pamphlet on Khalistan circulated by a Newly established outfit Dal Khalsa was also regarded as a gimmick. Observers had noticed former Punjab Chief Minister Gyani zail Singhs had in the establishment of Dal Khalsa after the Congress parties total ruled in North India the 1977 elections. In other dramatic announcement of Khalistan was made in 1980 by Balbir Singh Sandhu, Secretary of the National Council of Khalistan, fonded by Jagjit Singh Chauhan in London. The release of Khalistani passport and Khalistani currency note by him to some Journalist in the Golden Temple, Amritsar made a sensational story in the media. All such instances were viewed by the people as the handiwork by some opportunistic individuals apprehensions were however, raised regarding the hidden forces and their hidden agendas. Passionate commitment & rationale for struggle for khalistan, however were provided by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrwale. He did not overtly advocate khalistan as the goal of struggle: I am neither in favor of it nor against it. If they give it to us, we wont reject it yet his message & the method of struggle constituted both the spirit and the dynamics of the movement. Bhindranwale took over in 1977, as a head of the sikh seminary Damdami Taksal of Chowk Mehta about 25 Km from Amritsar following the death of his mentor and Predecessor Sant Kartar Singh. He was brought up and grown in the enclosed world of the seminary. It was a life of ritual piety, Austere living, regular reading & listening to the scripture and legendary tales of the glory of the heroism and martyrdom of the Khalsa in bloody battles. He viewed the sikh as a divinely created figure of exceptional commitment & courage the existing state of Moral

degeneration in the sikh community concerned him as deeply as the corruption & self centredness of the religious & political leadership. Bhindranwala seems to have fancied for himself the role of a religious crusader. A battle launched by his predecessor related to stopping the heretical Sant Nirankari Sect from following the Un-Sikh practices. Bhinderanwala came to public notice after the armed the armed clash between the angry Sikhs sent bu him & the Nirankaris gathered at their Samagam (religious conference) at Amritsar on 13th was the first indication of Bhindranwales role in insighting violence. Then followed the Murders of the Nirankari chief Baba Gur Charan Singh in april 1980 & Lala Jagat Narain, Chief Editor of Hind Samachar in august 1981. Bhindranwale who was believed to be chiefly responsible to abetting these Murders liked to give a loud message to the adversary. The emergence of Bhindranwale to quick eminence needs to be explained in terms of the predisposing circumstances in the socio-historical situation. Yet his coming to the center stage of sikh politics may not have been possible without the allegedly Sinistes design of the congress party. Some lements in the congress saw in him a potential force for dividing the Akalis one part of design consisted of a series of rebuffs to the Akali leaders. The Nabar Roka Morcha launched by them related to regional issue of the share of river waters & other. Every time they were near to a settlement with the government of india, it was allegedly scuttled by the rulling party. The other related to along Bhindranwale to call the Shots and appear as an invincible Khalsa Hero. The failure to arrest him in Hrayana as attributed to Chief Minister Bhajan Lals Manipulation on the alleged direction from Gyani Zail Singh, the Home minister of India. Later, when the Punjab government was able to arrest him , Zail singh declared in the parliament that ther was no evidence of Bhindranwales involvement in the murder of Lala Jagat Narain. Bhindranwale himself acknowledged after his release: the government has done more for me in

one week than I could have achieved in years. Perhaps, the grater service to his cause was done by the manner in which the Sikhs were humiliated and targeted by the communalized Haryana Policemen in order to kill Akali protest march at the time of Asiad in Delhi in 1982. Soon after he entrenched himself in the golden temple complex to pursue his agenda of a violent struggle, the akali & the SGPC leaders extended grudging support to his program and actions. Bhindranwale and his followers were allowed not only to preached violence, organized collection and supple of weapons inside the sacred temple but also to the true tha Akal Takht into a fort. Some of the leaders were believed to have thought that they could fulfill their power asprations by riding on the back of Bhindranwala. Important to us here, however is the logic & method of Bhindranwales Programme which become the basis for the Khalistan movement. ]bhindranwales first concern related apparently to Moral degeneration among the Sikhs for a good life of Purity as he viwed its it was necessary to make them conform to the khlasa sikh identity. A true sikh to him was one who was amritdhari (baptized according to Khalsa ritual) & observed the Khalsa code of cnduct. He made a sharp distinction between amritdhari, Keshadhari & Sahajdhari Sikhs. My responsibilities he insisted, is to see that your beards remain uncut & that you do not after the evil things of life, like alcohol & drugs. He viewed Khalsa identity as the source of Masculine vigour. The construction of Masculinity as the defining feature of the sikh community was therefore the key to self-respect and the fighting spirit of the sikh quam (nation). Preaching & organizing mass baptism ceremonies was a religious campaign with the a political intent. santji, as one of his devout followers observed, was bot a strategist & a saint, a saintly person & apolitician. The chief concern in his mind was related to an anxiety that the Sikhs were under siege in the Hindu dominant India. the hindu, as he told his close aids wants the Sikhs to surrender their

identity & dignity to his overlordship. The hindu was a threat to the sikh religi on in the sense of a wily character robbing the sikh of their overwhelmingly Masculine charater Obnan di nazar Tuhadi talwar te hai, obnan di nazar. Tuhadi darbi te hai (they are targeting your sword; they are targeting your beard). Alerting the Sikhs about the design of the conspiring & the hateful other appeared to be a part of the religious mission. For that purpose, the use of rigorous dualism to define self & other became a prominate part of the discourse. Further, veena das analyzed, the artful linking of contemporary incidents of alleged injustice & betrayal with believed incidents of Hindu betrayal of Sikhs during the distant past- the creation of contemporentity between non-contemporaneous events formed another element in the discourse. The well being of the community lay in liberating the Sikhs from the stranglehold of Hindu domination. This was believed to be in consonance with Raj Karega Khalsa (the Khalsa should rule), the destiny of the sikh as sung in the daily religious prayer. That the leadership of the Akali Dal & the SGPC were too power obsessed & corrupt to protect the interests of the panth constituted a third element. It was a anathema to him that the Akali Dals government should have, instead of punishing the against the power & wealth hungry politicians, the austere religious saint had come to save the sikh religion from moral corruption. It was deeply disturbing to him that the sikh electorate in the SGPC election in 1979 voted against his protg Amrik Singh in his own area of influence, the Beas constituency winning the Sikhs to established the dominance of the selfness champions of sikh glory was, therefore, a part of his mission.

Another significant element consisted of recourse to violence, killing of the nemy as a religious duty. The tenth guru had laid down that recourse to arms was legitimate when all other means failed. To bhinderanwale, that time had come because all the means used by the constituted religious & political leadership of the SGPC & Akali Dal had failed to ensure a place of dignity & autonomy to the Sikhs. Democracy, secularism & constitutional methods appeared to be a subterfuge to keep the Siks enslaved. Therefore, his call to them was Shastradhari bano (take up weapons). Every village must have youngmen with motorcycles & revolvers. Not to use the weapons against the enemies of the faith was a sin, you are not the son of your father if you do not take revenge for the wrong doing to your nation, he would tell the youngmen who came to him for Sewa (service). The enemies were the government & its officials & the Hindus the 2 being one & the same. Reportedly incensed by Indira Gandhis remark at Calcutta that the Sikhs outside Punjab were an insignificant minority Bhindranwale reacted sharply: Bibi, we want to tell you that every sikh has a share of 35 Hindus in the Country. In other words, if things do come to such a pass one sikh can kill thirty five Hindus and would balance things. The preaching went along with action & preparation for a bigger battle. Killing of Hindus, Nirankaris & government officials by armed groups operating from the sanctuary of the golden temple accelerated with organized recruitment & training in arms, collection of arms & military fortification of the Akali Takht in the golden temple. Observers noted the existence of a parallel centres of power made possible by political connivance of the ruling party at the centre & the oppotunustics factional support by the SGPC & Akali leaders. Commenting upon the silence of the Indian government on the large-scale killings, majority of whom were Hindus, Justice Tarkund stated that it looked as if the centre had given a carte balance to extremists. just five days before the launching of operation blue star Rajiv Gandhi brushed aside the allegations of

Bhinderanwales design by saying that he was a religious saint, the akalis had a running feud with Bhinderanwale the armed militants of Babbar Khlasa, fierdly hostile to Bhinderanwale, acted as security guards of sant Harchand Singh Longowal, frequently clashed with Bhinderanwales Millitants inside the temple. Yet it seemed Bhinderanwales suited them because as longowal put it, he served as their Lathi (stick) in dealing with the Congress government. The Indian govts perception of the threat led to military action to flush out bhinderanwales his armed followers. Dr. V.S. Bhatti belonging to ludhiana issued a pamphlet demanding khalistan, which was to be a buyer state between India and Pakistan and according to his conception, khalistan was to indude sikh majority districts of Punjab, sikh princely states of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot and Kalsia as well as the non - sikh princely states likes Shimla Hill State and Malerkotla. so far the punjab districts were concernd, he wanted Ludhiana, Ferozpur, Jallandhar, Ambala, Lahore, Amritsar, Lyallpur, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura, Montgomery, Hissar, Rohtak, and Karnal. Maharaja Patiala, according to his veiws, was to be the head while the cabinet was to include the representatives of the federating units. S.Sandhu Swarup Singh wrote a popular booklet 'the sikhs demand their homeland' in which he addressed to the top - ranking representatives of his britainic majesty in the following words :" You have been telling us all along and rightly too that India is the homeland of many peoples and Indian unity is a fiction in the face of striking sharp and deep divisions and differences. Your description of India being faithful and not distorted by personal motives was accepted as corrected. But could you

or would you make a volte - face and say you are a recent convert to the gandhian doctrine of Indian unity. If you do not evolve a solution reconciting the contests of all the peoples you will be instrumental in making room far another imperialism viz. The Hindu hemegony. Again a seperate muslim state without giving a political home to the sikhs in the Punjab, would mean selling the owners and makers of the province to the Muslim Tenant. The Sikhs whose culture, manliness, valour and industry you so often praised and admire, will suffer slow extinction unless granted political existence. In fact in asking for the return of our homeland, our holyland. The last power that felt to your predatory mission of the 19th century in India was our Independent Kingdom in the Punjab. If you have decided to unwrite the black pages of Anglo - Indian History, why, not begin with the return of the punjab to the hands from which you snatched, not with superior might but with superior guile; to the hands who were not only its ownwers but also its snapers. How are you going to return your gratitude for our blood split against the political gangsters of europe as well as of Japan? certainly not by condemning us to political slavery of the muslims. The Authors of the Akalis 'Past and Present' reffered to the stated in response to an invitation by sikh leaders like Baba Gurdit Singh, Ranjodh Singh Tarsika, Jagjit Singh, Editor of Khalsa Sewak, and several others, about 120 representatives of sikh

organisations of Amritsar. Districts assembled at Amritsar on 19 may, 1940, to discuss the khalistan to include the territory from Jammu to Jamrud which the late Maharaja Dalip


had given as amanat (trust) to the British. A 21- member sub- committee with

power to co- opten more was formed to launch a propaganda compaign for Guru Khalsa Raj. Another conference was called on 24 may, at jagraon where the sikhs of the Malwa region reterated the demand for khalistan in case Pakistan was accepted by the British government. The arguments which were used by Mr. Jinnah for establishing Pakistan were pressed into services by the sikhs for their Azad Punjab Demand. The sikhs considered the crispps proposal as the most undesirable, therefore, the Azad Punjab scheme was expounded as an alternative to the above proposals and the scheme aimed at re- adjusting the boundaries in such a way that neither Hindus, Muslims nor Sikhs constituted an absolute majority for doing so, the questions of populations, property, land revenue and historical traditions of each of the communities were to be kept into consideration. Azad Punjab was to comprise " Amabala, Jalandhar, Lahore divisions and out of Multan

districts." According, the districts of Rawalpindi and Multan" divisions, nameley attock, Mainwali, saharanpur, Jhelum, Gujrat, Multan, Dehra ghazi khan, Muzaffargarh, and Jhang, besides the territory now comprising Baluchistan, were to form a muslim majority province to be enlarge, if necessary, by the inclusion of the North- West frontier

provience which had a 90% Muslim majority. This gave the Muslims a state of their own in the North- West through a considerably smaller one than the one outline by iqbal in his celebrated presidential the All India Muslim League in 1930. The other Punjab districts were to comprise a new province by the name of the Azad Punjab. A glaring snag in the scheme lay in the inclusion in the proposed Azad Punjab of the three predominantely Muslim districts of Sheikhpura, Guranwala, and Sialkot of

Lahore divisions besides lyallpur, in which the Muslim majority ranged from 60 to 70 percent. Even in montgomery, Firazpur, Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, and Jalandhar districts the muslim population, according to the 1931 census, the last census of the undivided punjab, varied from 40 to 59 percent. Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, Kangra, and the districts of Ambala division alone were preponderantly non- muslim areas. It was on them that the authors of "Azad Punjab" rested their hope and aspiration for redessing the balance in favour of the Sikhs."


State responses to insurgency & Human rights that assault described as operation Blue star highlights the tremendous mismanagement of the affairs of the state by the government. Bhinderanwale Amrik Singh & Shahbeg singh, the architects of the bloody war inside the holy temple, were killed. But the destruction of the Akali Takhat also delivered a grevious hurt to the Sikhs all over the world. Not the ghost of Bhindranwale, but the collective humiliation of a whole community had ominus implications. As a revenge, prime minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her sikh security guards 3 months later the orgy of violence in which thousands of Sikhs were massacred in delhi & other places soon after smacked not only of the breakdown of order but also complicity of men from the ruling party. Rajiv Gandhi & his party, however crash on the hatred & the slogan of threat to the nation in the parliamentary elections in December 1984. The Rajiv Longowal accord in July 1985, However, came like a sudden burst of light after a long period of darkness. Longowal called it an end to the era of confrontation. In the state assembly elections held soon after the massive voter turn-out & the Mandat given to the Akali Dal symbolized the peoples resolve to more into the future with hope. The path, however, was not goin to be smooth Surjit Singh Barnalas Akali Governmet was threatening by factional strife in the party. But there was a more formidablr challenge from the widely scattered militants who had managed to sneak out during the assault on the golden temple. There was also a crop of bitter & angry youngmen produced by th operation woodrose. The assassination of sant Longowal a month after the accord was an early warning. The leaders of the damdami Taksal, its rival Babbar Khalsa, the All india Sika students federation (AISSF) & those who had forged a militant outfit, Khalistan commando force (KCF) were restrive for vengeful action. The head priest of the Akal Takht expressed deep anguish over the insulting

behavior of the boys described as handlums & ruffins, when they occupied temple in January 1986 by brute force & hurled direct village variety of abuses at the Priests. More significant, however, were the series of pronouncement cast in the mould of an armed coup in the religious life & politics of the community. Prominent among these related to the dismissal of all the priest of the golden temple & the Akal Takht, dissolution of the SGPC & the Akali dal & the appointment of a five member panthic committee as the supreme commanding body for the Sikhs. New given the power to remove them from office. The immediate pretext of damdami taksalis takeover was to gain exclusive control over the stipulated demolition of the government built structure of the Akal Takht & the construction of New store, abrogating the agreement made earlier by the SGPC & the sant samaj with the Taksal. The demolition work was started soon after. On 26th January, 1986, the happening in front of the Akal Takht started a new phase of conflict & violence. At the sarbat Khals congregation called by Damdami Taksal, the young extremists gave vent to their feelings against the existing leaders of the SGPC admist shouts for Khalistan. It created a chaotic situation. The leaders of the SGPC & the Priests who failed to act in time now complained about the frightening conditions created in the sacred temple by the enemies of the Panth. A sarbat Khalsa meeting was organized by the akal takht head priest the assembly condemned the armed accupation of the temple by the ruffians & the collection of arms there. By a gurmata adopted there the whole sikh world was directed not to recognize these brother killing enemies of the panth. On the other habd, the extremists themselves appeared to have conflicting enthusiasms they shred a passion for armed resistemce or struggle for khalistan but were divided on leadership of the movement & strategy for action. Some of their prominent leaders were surprised when

Makkham singh of damdami taksal read out the names of the members of the panthic committee. A bitter dispute reportedly erupted between the taksal & Bhinderanwales father Baba Joginder Singh wassa Singh Zaffarwal, a member of the Panthic Committee stated that when the baba saw our weapons, he left the temple. The five members of the members committee------ Gurbachan Singh Manochchal, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal a member of the Panthic committee stated that the five members of the committee gurbachan Singh Manochachal, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, Dhanna Singh, Aroor Singh & Gurdev Singh were little Known Men gifted neither with religious Piety nor political sense. They are not the kind of men who would command moral authority. On April 29, this Panthic committee announced the formation of Khalistan. This, it was claimed, was done as per the blessings of Raj Karega Khalsa given by Guru Gobind Singh on the Baisakhi of 1699. It, therefore, Fulfilled the dream of the Sikhs to create their own homeland. All the government of the world & the UN were asked to grant recognition to the new state. The government of India was directed to complete all religious & Military formalities consequents upon the creation of Khalistan. The document of the declaration of Khalistan was a loosely worded broadsheet unlike several other documents & memoranda prepared by the supporting sikh intellectuals. The description of the objectives of the new state of Khalistan included Sarbat da Bhala (good of mankind) & service of society. This would establish the control of political power by those who produced wealth by honest hard labour, such conditions were to be created in Khalistan whereby basics needs all are met; where feudal & capitalist practices are not allowed & where division on the basis of color, caste, untouchability, rural urban & high low differences will be removed.

The form of government was to remain the same for the Tme being, only the seals & stamps of government of India would be replaced by those of Khalistan. The work of government formation was handed over to the Prime minister or the head of the state. The document also announced the formation of Khalistan commando force (KCF) whose commander in chief is general Hari Singh. This force will form the nucleus of the future defence organization of Khalistan. Sikh religion was to be the official religion of Khalistan. The Sikhs living in parts of India outside Punjab were invited to settled in Punjab so that they dont have to meet the same fate as they did in Nov, 1984. A directive was given to all the political organizations to announce their agreement with and loyalty to Khalistan. The declaration issued a warning to the opportunist Sikhs, described as Keshdhari Hindus , against any obstruction of the Khalistan programme of Khalsa panth. What may appear to be a little odd in such a document was that the Sikh were particularly instructed Not to snatch or steal arms & other things from the houses of the Sikhs. All the leaders of Khalistan left the Golden Temple soon after the declaration. Some of them such as Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, member of the Panthic committee, & Gurjit Singh, Chief of a faction of AISSF, crissed over to Pakistan. The day after the declaration when the Police force was sent into the temple with a view to flush out the Militants, there was nobody for a catch. The political fall out of Barnalas police action in the temple on the other hand created condition which were favourable to the militants. The detractors of Barnala such as the SGPC chief & the senior Akali leader who had failed to protect the sacred temple & had been sulking over their humiliation during the 4 month long occupation of Darbar Sahib by the Khalistani Militants now found a new panthic cause to fight for a vigorous campaign was launched that

Chief Minister Barnala must by punished for the Sarilege of the holy temple. As 27 of the Akali MLAs broke away from Barnala, it reduced the government support to a minority in the legislative assembly. Barnala was now forced into ognoming of sseeking support from the same congress party which had embarrassed & weakend his government through non implementation of the Rajiv Longowal accord. A further humiliation followed when the chief minister had to undergo religious Punishment for the sacrilege. Little attention was however, paid to a plan of action or coordination among diverse gangs of militants that seemed for more difficult in the context of conflictual, power interests of the key players. The pathic committee had recognized Khalistan commando force (KCF) led by self born general Hari Singh as the Exclusive Guerilla organization. But there were many other such as the formidable Babbar Khalsa which had been virulently hostile to Bhindranwale & did not recognize the Panthic Committee which declared the formation of Khalistan. Its leaders in Canada called Babbar Khalsa International had earned it a notoriety for blowing up of Air India flight 182 from Toronto to London in which 329 people were killed. One of the prominent actions by the KCF was the daring rescue of Sukhdev Singh Sukha (Later general Labh Singh) from police custody at Jalandhar. The robbery of eight lakh rupees at Punjab National Bank in Ludhiana in October 1987 & another of about five crores in February 1987 became highly sensational sources of funds for the struggle. The assassination in Pune (Maharahstra) of general vaidya who had led Indian armed forces in glden temple under operation Blue star was another powerful actions. Its heroes Sukhjinder Singh (Sukha) & Harjinder Singh (Jinda) infiltrated into the Golf Club of which vaidya was a member. The letter written to president of India in their execution became a prominent part of Militant discourse in Punab & in gurdwaras in Foreign countries.

A more significant related feature of the struggle for Khalistan was the Fierce Factional leading to Factionalisation & proliferation of organizations & gangs. Gurbachan Singh Manochahal, Chairman of the Panthic committee, gave the first powerful signal of a split by forming his own Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTKF) in 1987. More serious splintering followed the release of Jasbir Singh Rode, acting Jathedar of Akal Takht, from Jait. His statements in favour of Puran Azadi (complete Independence) or a Khalsa Raj within India & uniting all the militants for negotiations with governments created among the others apprehensions about his motives. Kanwarjit Singh, who was inducted as a members of the Panthic committee formed his own break away faction of KCF. Avtar Singh Brahma, a prominent Robin Hood type fighter, founded along with Aroor Singh, another Militant organization Khalistan Liberation force.


INSURGENTS DISCOURSE, ACTION & HUMAN RIGHTS The use of TADA & the notion of criminality our data challenges the Punjab States claims that the majority of the people on the CBI lists were criminals. In 100 of the 513 cases were personally investigated, the victims families disclosed criminals & preventative detention proceedings. Fifty eight of the victims were charged under TADA & related provisions, two faced detention under the arms act alone, & 30 faced other criminal charged. Strikingly, the court acquitted or released on bail 86 of the 100 people out of the remaining 14 who were not released on bail or acquitted, 10 were killed in Police custody after Magistrates remanded them for further investigation. The CCDPs compilation of data gives a disturbing picture of now police officers TADA as an additional tool in their computer insurgency armory. The majority of the cases show that the police illegally detained the victims, tortured them & then implicated them under TADA or other criminal provisions. The data also shows that the polica after charged people with terrorist crimes if they did not fulfill officers demands for money. Also, the majority of people released on bail or acquitted by the court suffered subsequent repeated detentions & tortures by the police, leading to their ultimate disappearance or extra judicial execution. Even the constitutional principle against double Ieopardy & a finding by the designated court that an individual from these repeated detentions. The police killed many of the victims within a year of their release from jail. The case of Ram Singh provides a sober illustration of the use of TADA. The police had repeatedly arrested 32 years old Ram Singh, who was married and had five children, because they suspected him of sheltering and feeding militants. His fathers Gura Singh had also

disappearing after DSP Paramjit singh took him into custody in march 1990. In October 1990, DSP Paramjit Singh arrested Ram Singh & other men from his village & took them to the CIA staff interrogation center at Tarn Taran. SSP Ajit Singh Sandhu & SP (operations) Khudi Ram brutally tortured Ram Singh to Jhabbal police station & register a case against him under the Arms act & TADA. Ram singh spent one year at the high security prison in Amritsar on 28 December 1992, Jhabbal police obtained a production warrant for Ram Singh & brought him for interrogation to the station even before obtaining his remand to police custody. The police alleged that Ram Singh died in an encounter that evening around 6.30 p.m. near dode village. The Magistrate rubber stamped his remand order after his actual death. Custodial Torture Article 1.1 of the unconvention against torture & other cruel, Inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 1984 defines torture as : any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or a third person, or for any reasons based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. Article 2 of the UN convention against torture (1984) obligates the state parties to the convention to take effective legislative, administrative, Judicial or other measures to prevent acts to torture in any territory under their Jurisdiction. The state may not invoke any exceptional circumstances whatsoever, wether a state of war or a threat of war, international political instability or any other

public emergency, in order to justify to use of torture. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be used as a justification for torture. The torture commissions reports published in 1855, concluded: what wonder is it that the people are said to dread the police & to do all they can do avoid any connection with a police investigation. Deliberate association with the criminals in their gains, deliberately framing false charges against innocent persons on the ground of private spite or village faction, deliberate torture of suspected person and other host flagrant abuses occure occasional.

Point and counterpoint: Supreme court upholds TADA

Even this cursory examination of the provisions TADA shows that they were not only excessively harsh with ample scope for misuse and abuse for the fundamental rights guaranteed by chapter 3 of the constitution, they demolished the buffer of procedural safeguards erected by the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and the Indian Evidence Act. Many writ petitions, criminal appeals and special leave petitions were filed before the supreme court challenge appeals and special leave petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of various provisions in the terrorist Affected Areas (special courts) Act ( No. 51 of 1984 ), and the TADA, which the court finally disposed of through the common judgement of Kartar Singh v. The State of Punjab pronounced on 11 march 1994. The judgement can be scutinized in two parts: first in relation to the main arguments that challenged the legality of TADA for destroying the traditionally established safeguards of the criminal procedural regulation; then with reference to the arguments that challenged the legality of TADA for destroying the traditionally established safeguards of the criminal procedural

regulation; then with reference to the arguments around the larger issue of legislative competence of parlaiment to enact the law. For the sake of convenience and brevity, we shall examine the judgement only in the first part of arguments by assembling them under three main principles of procedure destoyed by TADA: (1) The burden of proof; (2) Judicial independence; and (3) Fair trial. Below , we first present the arguments in Kartar Singh v. the State of Punjab.

(1) The burden of Proof

Arguments Under traditionally established rules of the criminal trial system in India, no offence is proven nor any charge formulated unless warranted by legal evidence. It is the prosecution's burden to furnish this evidence. According to section 111 of the Evidence Act, the accused are presumed to be innocent untill the prosecution, on its onus, establishes the contrary. Section 21 of TADA, as far as it commands the presumption of guilt against the accused, inverted this principle. This aberration from the established legal tradition recieved a permanent place in the evidence act through the insertion of section 111(a), which attended the passing of the terrorist Affected Areas (special courts) Acts, 1984. The definition of the word "abetment" in section 2(1)(a) of TADA eliminated proof of criminal intention or the principle of "mens rea". It repudiated the explanations in sections 107 and 108 of the IPC that presuppose wrongful intention as an essential ingredient to the offence of "abetment". thus, TADA destoyed the essential condition of penal liabilities in the old maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea", meaning "the

act alone does not amount to guilt, it must be accumpained by a guilty mind". section 2(1)(a) also overturned several decisions of the supreme court requiring the concurrence of intent and act to constitute an offence of "abetment". this part of TADA was unconstitutional and contrary to the principles of fairness and reasonableness. Section 15 of TADA allowed a police officer of the superintendent's rank to record confessions of the accused in custody, and its section 22 accorded to photographic identification of a proclaimed offender the value of evidence that is normally assigned to physical identification. these provisions voilated the "procedure established by law " as they removed the armour of the evidence Act under sections 24, 25, 26, and 27, which have prohibited the admission of such evidence in trial since the Act came into operation in 1872. Section 164(a) of the CrPC also conferred with magisterial powers. the TADA also violated the clear command of Article 20(3) of the constitution that " no person accused of any

offence shall be compelled to be witness against himself suspects in their custody, and for compelling them under physical torture to make self incriminating avowals. The National Judicial Commission's fourth report notes with concern " The Inclination of even some of the supervisory ranks to countenance the practice in a bid to achieve quick results..... Even well - meaning officers are sometimes drawn towards third degree methods..." Also, the Law commission's working paper on "Custodial Crimes", states that abuses of police power against detainees has become a conern for the international community. Thus, the conclusive evidence of custodial crimes that exists against the Indian Police and the expert findings on the psychology and consequences of custodial interrogation

categorically prohibit the powers that section 15 of TADA also defined the unanimous judicial verdict, not only from America and Britain but also of the supreme court of India, that custodial disclosure are anathema as evidence in criminal trial. Sections 20(7), 20(4)(b), and 20(8) of TADA were tarnished by the same insuperable presumption of guilt at impreachment. Preclusion of anticipatory bail by 20(7) destroyed the protection offered by sectioned 438 of the CrPC to the innocent against the manifest abuse of police power. The protection under section 438 does not offer an unequivocal right; it only empowers the judiciary to exercise the discretion of bail, conditional to the satisfaction that the availing person is neither likely to abscond nor obstruct the investigatons pending against him. Section 20(4)(b) of TADA allowed 60 days of police custody of an accused under interrogation, and for 90 days in judicial remand without bail. The prosecution was given this period to complete its investigations, and file the charge - sheet against the accused for the trial before the designated courts. In contrast, section 167(2) of the CrPC permitts an accused to be held in police custody for a maximum period of 15 days, and for 90 days in judicial custody, to allow the prosecution to complete its investigations. The extended period of remand under TADA, which also unplugged bail, vitiated the doctrine of "speedy trail", recited as the main objectives justifying the legislation. At the end of this period, even when the prosecution was unable to submit the charge - sheet, the accused was still effectively barred from the benifit of bail under section 20(8) TADA. this section required that "no person accused of an offence under TADA" would be released on bail unless the designated court was staisfied on "reasonable grounds" that " he is not guilty of such offences and that he is not

likely to commit any offence while on bail." In the absence of a charge - sheet, neither could the accused adduce the evidence of his innocence, nor could the designated court authenticate his guiltilessness ahead of the actual trial, let alone certify that he would not "commit any offence while on bail". thus, section 20(8) ensured that he would not "commit any offence while on bail". Thus, section 20(8) ensured that no one accused under TADA, irrespective of the span of time he may already have spent in custody as an undertrail, could secure bail unless the prosecution was gratified to allow it.

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION The village view of violence turned out to be very different from that of the ideologies of the movements. The operations & objectives of the fighters, as a field study concluded in the villages of Amritsar & gurdaspur districts revealed, had no relation with ideology, or religious interest. Among a total of 323 Kharkus (militants) identifieds & listed by the people in 28 villages, the motives of a vast majority were found to be related to a lust for adventures, weapons, making quick money & kith and kin interests. Most of the recruits belonged to

families of poor small or marginal farmers; were illiterate or school dropout & weighed down by a low self esteem & uncertain future. They ended up joining a militant group more by accidents that political design. Access to weapon such as AK-47 assault rifle according to the militants a sense of empowerment. However, their activities & violence centred on vendetta, family disputes, mercenary interests & assertion of power in their villages situations. In the end the individual & collective resistance put up by the people, some of these of extraordinary courage, according to the village view, enabled the desperate & ruthless police force to quickly suppress the violent movement. Joyce Pettigrew who know more in depth about the working o the militants, reached a conclusion different from that of the villagers. According to her, the Khalistan movement was defeated, nor by the massive array of state force, but , by the features of traditional rural society such as family feeds vendettas & allegiences based on friendship or on shared hatreds The present study underlines the needs to connect the reasons of its collapse with the reasons of its rise. It may also suggest some what of the lines of an observation made by Paul Bross in a different context of the politics of religions in the sikh community, that when hatred & violence tend to become a fundamental basis of a religio political movement the movement takes a life of its own to such an extent that organizations & actions may be as much shaped by interests, as interests by them.