CONSTITIONAL LAW I& II ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968 Facts: A question novel in character, the answer

to which has far-reaching implications, is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United tates Air !orce in the "hilippines. #e would dispute the payment of the income ta$ assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of %nternal Revenue on an amount reali&ed by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United tates 'arine Corps, the transaction having ta(en place at the Clar( !ield Air )ase at "ampanga. %t is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside "hilippine territory and therefore beyond our *urisdictional power to ta$. Issue+ Whether or not the sale was made outside the "hilippine territory and therefore beyond our *urisdictional function to ta$. Hel : ,he Court held that nothing is better settled than that the "hilippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be e$ercised over its entire domain. ,here is no portion there of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. %ts laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. ,hat is the e$tent of its *urisdiction, both territorial and personal. -ecessarily, li(ewise, it has to be e$clusive. %f it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

%t is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, e$press or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. ,here may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. ,hat is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of .elline(, /is the property of a state-force due to which it has the e$clusive capacity of legal self-determination and selfrestriction./ A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the e$ercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. %ts laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. -or does the matter end there. %t is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the e$ercise of *urisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. %f it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. ,hey retain their status as native soil. ,hey are still sub*ect to its authority. %ts *urisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. o it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 0123. ,hey are not and cannot be foreign territory. FUNDAMENTAL !OLICI"S !RINCI!L" AN# STAT"

$IAA v% C&u't &( A))eals 4.R. -o. 055657, .uly 87, 8776 FACTS: ,he 'anila %nternational Airport Authority 9'%AA: operates the -inoy Aquino %nternational Airport 9-A%A: Comple$ in "ara;aque City under <$ecutive =rder -o. 17> 9'%AA Charter:, as amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within the -A%A Comple$. %n 'arch 0113, the =ffice of the 4overnment Corporate Counsel 9=4CC: issued =pinion -o. 760 to the effect that the ?ocal 4overnment Code of 0110 9?4C: withdrew the e$emption from real estate ta$ granted to '%AA under ection 80 of its Charter. ,hus, '%AA paid some of the real estate ta$ already due. %n .une 8770, it received !inal -otices of Real <state ,a$ @elinquency from the City of "ara;aque for the ta$able years 0118 to 8770. ,he City ,reasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and buildings.

At the instance of '%AA, the =4CC issued =pinion -o. 023 clarifying =pinion -o. 760, pointing out that ec. 876 of the ?4C requires persons e$empt from real estate ta$ to show proof of e$emption. According to the =4CC, ec. 80 of the '%AA Charter is the proof that '%AA is e$empt from real estate ta$. '%AA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals see(ing to restrain the City of "ara;aque from imposing real estate ta$ on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time. #ence, '%AA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is e$empt from real estate ta$ under ec. 80 of its charter and ec. 8>2 of the ?4C. %t invo(es the principle that the government cannot ta$ itself as a *ustification for e$emption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the Republic of the "hilippines. =n the other hand, the City of "ara;aque invo(es ec. 01> of the ?4C, which e$pressly withdrew the ta$ e$emption privileges of government-owned and controlled corporations 94=CC: upon the effectivity of the ?4C. %t asserts that an international airport is not among the e$ceptions mentioned in the said law. 'eanwhile, the City of "ara;aque posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. %n the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, '%AA applied with the Court for the issuance of a ,R= to restrain the auction sale. ,he Court issued a ,R= on the day of the auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of "ara;aque three hours after the sale. Issue: Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of '%AA are e$empt from real estate ta$A Hel : ,he "etition is 4RA-,<@. ,he airport lands and buildings of '%AA are e$empt from real estate ta$ imposed by local governments. ec. 82>9a: of the ?4C e$empts from real estate ta$ any real property owned by the Republic of the "hilippines. ,his e$emption should be read in relation with ec. 0>>9o: of the ?4C, which provides that the

e$ercise of the ta$ing powers of local governments shall not e$tend to the levy of ta$es, fees or charges of any (ind on the -ational 4overnment, its agencies and instrumentalities. ,hese provisions recogni&e the basic principle that local governments cannot ta$ the national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to ta$. ,he rule is that a ta$ is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the ta$. ,his rule applies with greater force when local governments see( to ta$ national government instrumentalities. 'oreover, a ta$ e$emption is construed liberally in favor of national government instrumentalities. '%AA is not a 4=CC, but an instrumentality of the government. ,he Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. '%AA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the "resident can transfer bac( to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying '%AA any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the tate. Unless the "resident issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not sub*ect to levy on e$ecution or foreclosure sale, and they are e$empt from real estate ta$. #owever, portions of the airport lands and buildings that '%AA leases to private entities are not e$empt from real estate ta$. %n such a case, '%AA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a ta$able person. EXECTUIVE PRIVILEGE Ne'* vs% Senate 4.R. -o. 0B762>, 'arch 85, 877B ?egislative %nquiry in Aid of ?egislation vs. ?egislative %nquiry during Cuestion #our <lements of "residential Communications "rivilege

<$ception to <$ecutive "rivilege FACTS: ,his is regarding the contract entered into by @=,C with D,< for the supply of equipment and services for the -)- "ro*ect. %n connection with this -)- "ro*ect, enate passed various Resolutions and pending bills, which it then used as basis for initiating an investigation. =ne of the cabinet officials invited to appear before the enate during the investigation was "etitioner, who was @irector 4eneral of -<@A at the time. @uring the 00-hour questioning, "etitioner invo(ed e$ecutive privilege and refused to answer the questions on 9a: whether or not "resident Arroyo followed up the -)"ro*ect, 9b: whether or not she directed him to prioriti&e it, and 9c: whether or not she directed him to approve. %n view of his refusal, the enate )lue Ribbon Committee issued a subpoena ad testificandum, to which "etitioner replied that he was willing to testify to other matters besides those three questions covered by Ee$ecutive privilegeF and that he wanted to be furnished beforehand matters to be ta(en up during the inquiry so that he may adequately prepare therefor. <$ecutive ecretary <rmita also sent a letter to the )lue Ribbon, affirming that indeed those three questions mentioned were covered by Ee$ecutive privilegeF because such information if disclosed might impair diplomatic as well as economic relations with the "eopleGs Republic of China. As such, the =ffice of the "resident has ordered "etitioner not to answer those questions. -evertheless, the )lue Ribbon issued a show cause ?etter and a contempt =rder against "etitioner. ,hus, this case. ISS+": Are the communications elicited by the sub*ect three 9>: questions covered by e$ecutive privilegeA R+LIN,: %- A%@ =! ?<4% ?A,%=-+ -cope and ?imitations

information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. %nevitably, ad*unct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. )ut, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. ,o be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the enate or #ouse duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. ,he power e$tends even to e$ecutive officials and the only way for them to be e$empted is through a valid claim of e$ecutive privilege. %s there recogni&ed claim of e$ecutive privilege despite revocation of <.=. 262A At this *uncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of <.=. 262 does not in any way diminish our concept of e$ecutive privilege. ,his is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. "L"$"NTS OF !R"SI#"NTIAL CO$$+NICATIONS !RI-IL",": 0: ,he protected communication must relate to a Equintessential and non-delegable presidential power.F 8: ,he communication must be authored or Esolicited and receivedF by a close advisor of the "resident or the "resident himself. ,he *udicial test is that an advisor must be in Eoperational pro$imityF with the "resident. >: ,he presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought Eli(ely contains important evidenceF and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three 9>: questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. !irst, the communications relate to a Equintessential and non-delegable powerF of the "resident, i.e. the power to enter into an e$ecutive agreement with other countries. ,his authority of the "resident to enter into e$ecutive agreements without the concurrence of the ?egislature has traditionally been recogni&ed in "hilippine *urisprudence. econd, the communications are EreceivedF by a close advisor of the "resident. Under the Eoperational

,he power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. ,his is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of

pro$imityF test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of "resident ArroyoGs cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would *ustify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need+ $$$ presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch see(ing access to conversations $$$$ #ere, the record is bereft of any categorical e$planation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three 9>: questions in the enactment of a law. %nstead, the questions veer more towards the e$ercise of the legislative oversight function under ection 88 of Article H% rather than ection 80 of the same Article. enate v. <rmita ruled that Ethe oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the e$tent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.F %t is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the e$ercise of oversight function of Congress. %n this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner of inquiry is conducted. ".C"!TION TO "."C+TI-" !RI-IL",": E@emonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trialF 9U v. -i$on: does not apply -%n -i$on, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal *ustice that the information be disclosed. ,his is the reason why the U Court was quic( to Elimit the scope of its decision.F %t stressed that it is Enot concerned here with the balance between the "residentGs generali&ed interest in confidentiality $$$ and congressional demands for information.F Unli(e in -i$on, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. %n this regard, enate v. <rmita stressed that the validity of the claim of e$ecutive privilege depends not only on the ground invo(ed but, also, on the procedural setting or the conte$t in

which the claim is made. !urthermore, in -i$on, the "resident did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. %n the present case, <$ecutive ecretary <rmita categorically claims e$ecutive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her e$ecutive and policy decisionma(ing process and diplomatic secrets. <$ecutive "rivilege vis-a-vis Right of the "eople to %nformation on 'atters of "ublic Concern ,he right to public information, li(e any other right, is sub*ect to limitation. ,he provision 9 ection 3, Article %%%: itself provides the limitations, i.e. as may be provided by law. ome of these laws are ec. 3, RA 630>, Art. 881, R"C, ec. >9(:, RA >701, and ec. 829e:, Rule 0>7, R=C. ,hese are in addition to what our body of *urisprudence clarifies as confidential and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of e$ecutive privilege. Clearly, there is a recogni&ed public interest in the confidentiality of certain information. We find the information sub*ect of this case belonging to such (ind. ?egislative %nquiry in Aid of ?egislation vis-a-vis Right of the "eople to %nformation on 'atters of "ublic Concern+ 'ore than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peopleGs right to public information. ,he former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an e$ercise of the peopleGs right to information. $$$ ,he members of respondent Committees should not invo(e as *ustification in their e$ercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. ,his is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. )e that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of e$ecutive-legislative powers and privileges which is the sub*ect of careful review by numerous decided cases. NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER A/A0A#A ,+RO -% "R$ITA

4.R. -o. 06B756, .uly 5, 8775 FACTS: 'otions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, A)AIA@A 4uro party ?ist =fficer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between #ouse )ill -os. >375 and >555 on the one hand, and enate )ill -o. 0157 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the enate and the #ouse were in agreement that the HA, burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the #ouse version and the absence thereof in the enate )ill means there is no conflict because Ea #ouse provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not e$ist.F <scudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act -o. 1>>3 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on e$clusive origination of revenue bills under ection 82 of Article H% of the Constitution when the enate introduced amendments not connected with HA,. "etitioners <scudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. -o. 1>>3Gs stand- by authority to the <$ecutive to increase the HA, rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the ecretary of !inance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. ,hey submit that the recommendatory power given to the ecretary of !inance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the 4ross @omestic "roduct 94@": as a benchmar( necessarily and inherently required e$tended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy ma(ing. "etitioners also reiterate their argument that the input ta$ is a property or a property right. "etitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input HA, is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the tate cannot remove. ISS+": Whether or not the R.A. -o. 1>>3 or the Hat Reform Act is constitutionalA

R+LIN,: ,he Court is not persuaded. Article H%, ection 82 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authori&ing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate e$clusively in the #ouse of Representatives, but the enate may propose or concur with amendments. ,he Court reiterates that in ma(ing his recommendation to the "resident on the e$istence of either of the two conditions, the ecretary of !inance is not acting as the alter ego of the "resident or even her subordinate. #e is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its e$pressed will is to ta(e effect. ,he ecretary of !inance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. #is function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. %n the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a HA,-registered personGs entitlement to the creditable input ta$ is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its @ecision, the right to credit the input ta$ is a mere creation of law. 'ore importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. -o. 1>>3 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. o long as there is a public end for which R.A. -o. 1>>3 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. ,he 'otions for Reconsideration are hereby @<-%<@ W%,# !%-A?%,J. ,he temporary restraining order issued by the Court is ?%!,<@. DELEGATION OF POWERS SO+TH"RN CROSS C"$"NT COR!% -% C"$"NT $AN+FACT+R"RS ASSOCIATION OF TH" !HILS%, ,%R% NO% 128230, A+,% 3, 4002 9#=?J CRA", C#<CI =U, ,#< %-,R=KKKK L.L:

ECement is hardly an e$citing sub*ect for litigation. till, the parties in this case have done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their respective positions, throwing in everything including the proverbial (itchen sin(. At present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has shifted to public respondents @epartment of ,rade and %ndustry 9@,%: and private respondent "hilippine Cement 'anufacturers Corporation 9"hilcemcor:,M0N who now see( reconsideration of our @ecision dated B .uly 8772 9@ecision:, which granted the petition of petitioner outhern Cross Cement Corporation 9 outhern Cross:. ,his case, of course, is ultimately not *ust about cement. !or respondents, it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. !or this Court, it is about elementary statutory construction, constitutional limitations on the e$ecutive power to impose tariffs and similar measures, and obedience to the law. .ust as much was asserted in the @ecision, and the same holds true with this present Resolution.F !OW"R OF !R"SI#"NT TO I$!OS" TARIFF RAT"S: Without ection 8B98:, Article H%, the e$ecutive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar ta$ levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that ection 8B98: Article H% did not e$ist, the enactment of the 'A by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to ta$. ,he constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recogni&ed as an e$ceptional grant of legislative power to the "resident, rather than the affirmation of an inherent e$ecutive power. CUA?%!%<R + ,his being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial consideration+ 90: there must be a lawO 98: there must be specified limitsO and 9>: Congress may impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. "=W<R <P<RC% <@ )J A?,<R <4= =! "R< + ,he Court recogni&es that the authority delegated to the "resident under ection 8B98:, Article H% may be e$ercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the

"resident, such as department secretaries. %ndeed, for purposes of the "residentGs e$ercise of power to impose tariffs under Article H%, ection 8B98:, it is generally the ecretary of !inance who acts as alter ego of the "resident. ,he 'A provides an e$ceptional instance wherein it is the @,% or Agriculture ecretary who is tas(ed by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the "resident, to impose such measures. Certainly, the @,% ecretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the "resident, to levy tariffs and imports. ,AR%!! C=''% %=- A-@ @,% <C AR< A4<-, + Concurrently, the tas(ing of the ,ariff Commission under the 'A should be li(ewise construed within the same conte$t as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the e$ecutive branch, sub*ect to limitations and restrictions. %n that regard, both the ,ariff Commission and the @,% ecretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the 'A, in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of ta$ation. %ndeed, even the "resident may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. %t is Congress, not the "resident, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authori&ation through statute, the "resident has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because ta$ation is inherently legislative, not e$ecutive. When Congress tas(s the "resident or hisQher alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the "resident or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. %t is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. %n short, Congress may establish the procedural framewor( under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tas(s pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the tas( assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions e$ists to warrant such impositions. Under the 'A, Congress assigned the @,% ecretary and the

,ariff Commission their respective functions in the legislatureGs scheme of things. ,here is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under ection 8B98: Article H%, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. ,hus, no matter how distasteful or no$ious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated. What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present caseA ,he entire 'A provides for a limited framewor( under which the "resident, through the @,% and Agriculture ecretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. "=W<R )<?=-4 ,= C=-4R< + Rthe cited passage from !r. )ernas actually states, E ince the Constitution has given the "resident the power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power.F @oes the "resident have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first place which may be curtailed by the e$ecutive power of controlA At the ris( of redundancy, we quote ection 8B98:, Article H%+ E,he Congress may, by law, authori&e the "resident to fi$ within specified limits, and sub*ect to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and e$port quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framewor( of the national development program of the 4overnment.F Clearly the power to impose tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the "resident. CA$I# -% OFFIC" OF TH" !R"SI#"NT, "T,AL% FACTS: S ,his is a petition for Certiorari arguing the e$istence of 'unicipality of Andong in ?anao @el ur S ,his decision have noted the earlier decision of "elae& where the <$ecutive orders of !ormer "resident 'acapagal creating >> 'unicipalities of ?anao @el ur was considerd null and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers.

S Among the annulled e$ecutive orders is <=073 creating Andong. S ,he petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong 9as a private citi&en and ta$payer: S Camid contendsQargues the following+ o 'unicipality of Andong evolved into a full blown municipality 9since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tas(s and sevices, it has ist own high school, )ureau of "ost, @<C office etc. and 03 baranggays with chairman: o #e noted agencies and private grous recogni&ing Andong and also the C<-R= and @<-R Certification of land area and population of Andong S %n the Certification of @%?4, there is an enumeration of e$isting municipalties including 0B 7f the >> 'unicipalities invalidated in "elae& Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong. S ?i(ewise, Camid insists the continuing of <=073 arguing that in 'unicipality of an -arciso v. #on.'ende&, the court affirmed in ma(ing an Andres a de facto municipal corporation. an Andres was created through an e$ecutive order. S ,hus this petition. ISS+": 'ay the 'unicipality of Andong be recogni&ed as a de facto municipal corporationA R+LIN,: -=. 'unicipal corporations may e$ist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and e$ercised corporate functions, with the (nowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or ob*ection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. - Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the continuous e$ercise by the municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence by the other instrumentalities of the state li(e charters or the legislatureGs action. 'ay the any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to CamidGs prayerA - -=. ,he Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality. hould the case of Andong be treated same as the case of an AndresA - -o. for the following reasons+ o ,here are facts found in the an Andres case that are not present in the case at bar+ 90: ,he

<$ecutive =rder creating an Andres was not invalidated in "elae& Case, 98: ,he municipality e$isted for >7 years before it was questioned and 9>: ,he municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the #ouse of Representatives apportionment. o Andong did not meet the requisites set by ?4C of 0110 ec.2289d: regarding municipalities created by e$ecutive orders. %t says+ 'unicipalities e$isting as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to e$ist and operate as such. <$isting municipal districts organi&ed pursuant to presidential issuances or e$ecutive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. o ,he failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia 9indicators: that the tate does not recogni&e the e$istence of the municipality. o ,he =rdinance appended in the 01B3 Constitution 9which apportioned seats for the #ouse of Reps to the different legislative districts in the "hilippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed in the various districts: did not include Andong. %s there an unequal treatment since 0B of the >> invalidated municipalities are now considered e$istingA - -o there was none. ,he @%?4 Certification and the =rdinance in the 01B3 Constitution validates them. ,he fact that there e$isting organic statutes passed by the legislation recreating these municipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong. C @<C% %=-+ @% '% <@ for lac( of 'erit. R<?<HA-C<+ -ote the following ections with regards to *uridical personality of corporations in relation to the reasons why an Andres have a different treatment with Andong+ )atas "ambansa )lg. B+ ection 8. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties e$pressly authori&ed by law or incident to its e$istence ection 2. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special

laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. 'oreover, under Art.22 of the -ew Civil Code with relation to Art. 25 of the -ew Civil Code, those considered as *uridical person includes the tate and its political subdivisions and =ther corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by lawO their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. ,hese two are governed by the law creating them. ince Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not a recogni&ed political subdivision, it is not also considered a *uridical person. -ote+ What happened with the people from AndongA ,he constituent barrios of the voided town returns to its original municipalities 9?umbatan, ,ubig and ,ubaran: which are recogni&ed and still e$isting. ,he solution to have Andong recogni&ed is through legislation and not *udicial confirmation of void title. !"LA"5 -S A+#ITOR ,"N"RAL ,%R% N&% L643842: !rom ept 72 to =ct 81, 0162, the "resident 9'arcos: issued e$ecutive orders creating >> municipalities T this is purportedly in pursuant to ec 6B of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the "resident of the "hilippines may by e$ecutive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, MtownshipN municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesR,he H" <mmanuel "elae& and a ta$payer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. "elae& claims that the <=s are unconstitutional. #e said that ec 6B of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by ec > of RA 8>37 which provides that barrios may /not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed/ e$cept by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board /upon petition of a ma*ority of the voters in the areas affected/ and the /recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated./ "elae&

argues, accordingly+ /%f the "resident, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalitiesA/ ,he Auditor 4eneral countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the "resident. 'unicipalities are e$empt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. <$isting barrios can *ust be placed into the new municipality. ,his theory overloo(s, however, the main import of "elae&G argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISS+"+ Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the "resident by virtue of ec 6B of the RAC. H"L#: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the e$ecution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law+ 9a: be complete in itself U it must set forth therein the policy to be e$ecuted, carried out or implemented by the delegate U and 9b: fi$ a standard U the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable U to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. %ndeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, ma(e or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every lawO and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. %n the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative. TWO TEST OF A VALID DELEGATION SANTIA,O v% CO$"L"C 4.R -o. 083>85, 'arch 01, 0113 Constitutional ?aw, "eopleVs %nitiative, "olitical ?aw FACTS:

=n @ecember 6, 0116, Atty. .esus . @elfin, founding member of the 'ovement for "eopleVs %nitiative, filed with the C='<?<C a /"etition to Amend the Constitution, to ?ift ,erm ?imits of <lective =fficials, by "eopleVs %nitiative/ citing ection 8, Article PH%% of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the C='<?<C set the case for hearing and directed @elfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the C='<?<C directed @elfin and the oppositors to file their /memoranda andQor oppositionsQmemoranda/ within five days. =n @ecember 0B, 0116, enator 'iriam @efensor antiago, Ale$ander "adilla, and 'aria %sabel =ngpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others+ 0.: ,hat the Constitution can only be amended by peopleGs initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passedO and 8.: ,hat R.A. 63>5 does not suffice as an enabling law on peopleGs initiative on the Constitution, unli(e in the other modes of initiative. ISS+": %s R.A. -o. 63>5 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peopleGs initiativeA H"L#: -=. R.A. 63>5 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to A'<-@. ,he people are not accorded the power to /directly propose, enact, approve, or re*ect, in whole or in part, the Constitution/ through the system of initiative. ,hey can only do so with respect to /laws, ordinances, or resolutions./ ,he use of the clause /proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or re*ected, amended or repealed/ denotes that R.A. -o. 63>5 e$cludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for -ational %nitiative and Referendum and for ?ocal %nitiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. ,his means that the main thrust of the law is

initiative and referendum on national and local laws. %f R.A. -o. 63>5 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. -o. 63>5 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. W#<R<!=R<, petition is 4RA-,<@. "eopleVs %nitiative ,his is probable the best case there is on the question of the peopleVs right to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative. SANTIA,O -S CO$"L"C -ature+ "etition for prohibitionO the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative. 'iriam @efensor antiago, Ale$ander "adilla, 'a. %sabel =ngpin T petitioners .esus @elfin, Alberto W Carmen "edrosa 9"%R'A:, C='<?<C T respondents Raul Roco, @%I, 'A)%-%, %)", ?A)A- T petitionersQintervenors FACTS: Atty. @elfin filed with the C='<?<C a petition to amend the constitution by "eopleGs initiative. #is proposal is to lift the term limits of elective officials and thus amending ections 2 and 3 of Art H%, ection 2 of Art H%% and ection B of Art P of the 01B3 "hilippine Constitution. %n his petition, @elfin as(ed the C='<?<C to issue an order 90: fi$ing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the countryO 98: cause the publication of such order in newspaper of general and local circulationO and 9>: instructing municipal election registrars in all regions of the "hilippines to assist him and his volunteers in establishing signing stations. ,he C='<?<C then issued an order directing @elfin to cause the publication of the petition and set the case for hearing.

At the hearing, enator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the @elfin "etition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cogni&able by the C='<?<C. ,hereafter, enator antiago, et al., filed a special civil action for prohibition before the upreme Court. ISS+"S: ,he issues in the instant petition are the following+ 90: Whether it is proper for the upreme Court to ta(e cogni&ance of the petition when there is a pending case before the C='<?<C. 98: Whether R.A. -o. 63>5, entitled An Act "roviding for a ystem of %nitiative and Referendum and Appropriating !unds ,herefore, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the ConstitutionO and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. 9>: Whether that portion of C='<?<C Resolution -o. 8>77 9%n re+ Rules and Regulations 4overning the Conduct of %nitiative on the Constitution, and %nitiative and Referendum on -ational and ?ocal ?aws: regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. 92: Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft /"etition for %nitiative on the 01B3 Constitution,/ would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution. 95: Whether the C='<?<C can ta(e cogni&ance of, or has *urisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order 9a: fi$ing the time and dates for signature gatheringO 9b: instructing municipal election officers to assist @elfinVs movement and volunteers in establishing signature stationsO and 9c: directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed "etition for %nitiative on the 01B3 Constitution. R+LIN,: ,he upreme Court held that+ 90: ,he instant petition is viable despite the pendency in the C='<?<C of the @elfin "etition. ,he C='<?<C has no *urisdiction to ta(e cogni&ance of the petition filed by @elfin

and that it becomes imperative to stop the C='<?<C from proceeding any further. ,he C said that despite the pendency of the @elfin "etition in the C='<?<C, the C had *urisdiction over the @efensor- antiago petition because the petition may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, given the Roco motion filed with the C='<?<C see(ing dismissal of the @elfin petition on the ground of lac( of *urisdiction. 98: RA 63>5 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative to amend the constitution because while ec > mentions initiative on the Constitution and ec 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of registered voters needed for a proposal, the law does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the ConstitutionO while there are subtitles for national and local initiatives, there is no subtitle for the initiative on the ConstitutionO thus, the law is incomplete, and this inadequacy cannot be cured by empowering the C='<?<C to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. 9>: %t logically follows that the C='<?<C cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the e$ercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. %t does not have that power under R.A. -o. 63>5. Reliance on the C='<?<CVs power under ection 890: of Article %P-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the C='<?<C under 9a: ection > of Article %P-C of the Constitution, or 9b: a law where subordinate legislation is authori&ed and which satisfies the /completeness/ and the /sufficient standard/ tests. 92: antiagoGs petition contend that the peopleVs initiative is limited to amendments to the constitution, not to revision thereof. <$tending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the peopleVs initiative. @elfin in his memoranda contend that the lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under the 01B3 constitution is not a /revision/ of the constitution. %t is only an amendment. /Amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the constitution. Revision contemplates a re-e$amination of the

entire document to determine how and to what e$tent it should be altered. ,he =ffice of the olicitor 4eneral opined that e$tension of term of elected officials constitute a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof. %n its amended petition in intervention @%I and 'A)%-% contend that the @elfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of !r. .oaquin )ernas it would involve a change from a political philosophy that re*ects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenureO and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchroni&ation of elections and on the tate policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by e$press provision of ection 8 of Article PH%% of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. 95: C='<?<C acted without *urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the @elfin "etition. %t was held that C='<?<C is without *urisdiction to entertain the @elfin "etition because it did not contain the signatures of the required number of voters as required by the Constitution. ,he petition therefore is grantedO R. A. -o. 63>5 is declared inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and for failure to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislationO ,hose parts of Resolution -o. 8>77 of the Commission on <lections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution is declared voidO and the Commission on <lections is ordered to dismiss the @<?!%- petition. Word of the @ay+ %nitiative is a form of direct legislation by the people consisting of two parts+ petition and election. %t does not become effective until passed by voters and its availability does not remedy the denial of the right to referendum. SANTIA,O v% CO$"L"C 4.R. -o. 083>85, 'arch 01, 0113 Constitutional provision on "eopleVs %nitiative is not self-e$ecutory "rinciple of -on-delegation of "owers, <$ceptions

FACTS: "etitioners in this case sought to amend certain provisions of the Constitution, specifically lifting the limit of terms of elective officials, through peopleGs initiative. antiago et al. opposed on the ground that the constitutional provision on peopleGs initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. ,here is no law passed yet and RA 63>5, which provides for initiative on statues and local legislation but not initiative on the Constitution. ISS+": Whether or not RA 63>5 adequately provided for peopleGs initiative on Constitution R+LIN,+ Constitutional provision on peopleGs initiative is not self-e$ecutory ec. 8 of Art. PH%% of the Constitution...is not self-e$ecutory. $$$ )luntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. tated otherwise, while the Constitution has recogni&ed or granted that right, the people cannot e$ercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. #as Congress EprovidedF for the implementation of the e$ercise of this rightA ,here is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the e$ercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. $$$ We agree that RA 63>5 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. )ut is RA 63>5 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to Eprovide for the implementation of the e$ercise of the rightAF A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. !irst. Contrary to the assertion of public respondents C='<?<C, ec. 8 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. ,he said section reads+

<C,%=- 8. tatement and "olicy. T ,he power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or re*ect, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recogni&ed and guaranteed. ,he inclusion of the word EConstitutionF therein was a delayed afterthought. ,hat word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which e$clusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. ,hat section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to A'<-@. ,he people are not accorded the power to Edirectly propose, enact, approve, or re*ect, in whole or in part, the ConstitutionF through the system of initiative. ,hey can only do so with respect to Elaws, ordinances, or resolutions.F econd. %t is true that ec. > 9@efinition of ,erms: of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that ec. 5 9Requirements: restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. )ut unli(e in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. ec. 5, paragraph 9c: requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or re*ected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. %t does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. ,hird. While the Act provides subtitles for -ational %nitiative and Referendum 9 ubtitle %%: and for ?ocal %nitiative and Referendum 9 ubtitle %%%:, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. ,his conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. %f Congress intended RA 63>5 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order

of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. ,he foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 63>5 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. %ts lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by EempoweringF the C='<?<C Eto promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.F !'*nc*)le &( n&n6 elegat*&n &( )&7e' ,he rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as e$pressed in a ?atin ma$im+ potestas delegata non delegari potest. ,he recogni&ed e$ceptions to the rule are as follows+ @elegation of tariff powers to the "resident under ec. 8B98:, Art. H%O @elegation of emergency powers to the "resident under ec. 8>98:, Art. H%O @elegation to the people at largeO @elegation to local governmentsO and @elegation to administrative bodies. <mpowering the C='<?<C, an administrative body e$ercising quasi-*udicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. #owever, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. %t is valid only if the law 9a: is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be e$ecuted, carried out, or implemented by the delegateO and 9b: fi$es a standard T the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable T to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, mar(s its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. %t indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. %nsofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, RA 63>5 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in

subordinate legislation. ,he delegation of the power to the C='<?<C is then invalid. INCORPORATION CLAUSE TA8A#A -% AN,ARA 9199:; FACTS: "etition for certiorari+ tate action to enter into W,= April 05 0112 T @,% ec signed in 'orocco the final act embodying the results of multilateral negotiations regarding the W,= o Aug 08 T enate receives letter from "resident submitting the Uruguay !inal Act o Aug 0> T presidentG letter submitting the Agreement establishing the W,=, 'inisterial @eclarations, etc o @ec 1 T " 07B>, immediate adoption of the Agreement <stablishing the W,= o @ec 02 T enate Resolution -o. 13, senate concurring in the ratification by the president of the agreement establishing the W,= o @ec 81 T present petition was filed "etitioner argues for the unconstitutionality of the W,=+ o W,= requires the "hilippines to place nationals and products of membercountries at par with each other o W,= limits, intrudes, impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the C o W,= violates the constitutional mandate+ to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by !ilipinos, to give preference to qualified !ilipinos and to promote preferential use of !ilipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods "etitioner specifically see(s+ o !or the nullification of the concurrence of the enate with the "residentGs agreement to *oin the W,= o !or the prohibition of the enforcement and implementation of the W,= ISS+"<s: W=- the petition presents a political question

 W=- the members of the enate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the enate Reso -o. 13 are estopped from impugning the validity of the same, or the Agreement W=the provisions of the Agreeement violate the provisions of ec01, Art 8, and ecs 07 and 08, Art 08 of the 01B3 Consti W=- the provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict, and impair the sovereignty of the "hil ?egislature W=- provisions of the Agreement impair the e$ercise of *udicial power W=enate acted with a grave abuse of discretion in concurring only in the agreement establishing the W,= SC R+LIN,+ % U< X 0+ 'A,,<R =! .UR% @%C,%=-+ political or *usticiable o .U ,%C%A)?< because it see(s the nullity of a senate resolution on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution o An act of legislature is alleged to have infringed the Constitution+ *udicial review not *ust a matter of right but a duty 9within the courtGs e$panded *urisdiction: o Application of a constitutional provision o .udiciary as final arbiter on 4A@?<. o .udicial review for 4A@?<., not review of the wisdom of a legislative or e$ecutive policy, not upon the merits nor propriety of govt policies, =-?J to determine W=- there has been 4A@?<. W,= A4R<<'<-, A-@ <C=-='%C -A,%=-A?% ' o <conomic nationalism+ violated by the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the W,= Agreement o <conomic nationalism in ec 01, Art 8, ecs 07 and 08, Art 08 of the Consti o W,=+ places nationals and foreign products on the same footing as !ilipino and domestic products in contravention of the !%?%"%-= !%R , "=?%CJ Render meaningless Eeffectively controlled by !ilipinosF W,=+ ensures conformity of national economic laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its anne$ed agreements and imposed obligations

o -egate the preferential treatment accorded to !ilipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods R< "=-@<-, + o Constitutional provisions are not selfe$ecuting, merely policies o uch nationalistic provisions must be read in relation to+ Art 08, ec 0 and 0>. o Read properly, the cited W,= provisions do not violate the Consti o W,= agreement contains sufficient safeguards for developing countries @eclaration of "rinciples -=, <?!<P<CU,%-4 o Article 8 is a mere declaration of principles and state policies T basic political creed of the nation o -ot intended to be self-e$ecuting o Used as aids by the *udiciary in ad*udication, or legislature in lawma(ing o -ot self-e$ecuting provisions, a disregard of which cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts o Iilosbayan, %nc v. 'orato+ @o not embody *udicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation o )asco v. "agcor+ broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement them W#JA )ecause of basic considerations of due process and the lac( of *udicial authority to wade into the unchartered ocean of social and economic policy ma(ing 9R<A@ ="= A- !elicianoGs concurring: % U< X 8+ <C=-='%C -A,%=-A?% ' #=U?@ -=, )< R<A@ W%,# =,#<R C=- ,%,U,%=-A? 'A-@A,< ,= A,,A%)A?A-C<@ @<H<?="'<-, =! <C=-='J o ec 07 and 08 of Article 08 should be read with relation to ec 0 and 0> of the same Article+ ideals of economic nationalism does not espouse an isolationist economy but a self-reliant and competent economy, able to compete in foreign mar(ets, and trade policies that uphold equality and reciprocity, protection of !ilipino enterprises from unfair trade practices and overbearing foreign competitions o A-@ !UR,#<R, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution that allow the enate to ratify the concurrence with the W,= agreement -eed fore business e$change on the bases of equality and reciprocity

 "rotectionist policy only against unfair trade practices @oes not encourage entry of foreign goods services, but does not prohibit them either W,= R<C=4-%D< -<<@ ,= "R=,<C, W<AI <C=-='%< o W,= has some built-in advantages to protect wea( and developing countries o <ach vote by a member is equal to one, equal to any otherGs vote, unli(e in the ecurity Council where ma*or states have permanent seats and veto powers o "oor countries can protect their economies through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries o -ot mere practical alliances, but real negotiations rooted in law "<C%!%C "R=H% = ,= "R=,<C, @<H<?="%-4 C=U-,R%< o Amount of tariff reduction, period within which the reduction is to be spread out 9page 60: o <$port subsidy for agricultural production 94A,,: o Anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges C=- ,%,U,%=- @=< -=, RU?< =U, !=R<%4- C='"<,%,%=o "olicy of self-reliance does not necessarily mean no foreign e$change allowed o -ot economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community o %ndependence refers to freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy o W,= rules on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination T rules of equality and reciprocity applying to all members C=- %,U,%=- !AH=R C=- U'<R -=, %-@U ,R%< =R <-,<R"R% < o W=- the W,=Q4A,, will favor consumers is a political questionO wisdom of legislative policy C=- %,U,%=- @< %4-<@ ,= '<<, !U,UR< <H<-, A-@ C=-,%-4<-C%< % U< X >+ W,= A4R<<'<-, A-@ ?<4% ?A,%H< "=W<R o "etitioners+ because each member-country is required to conform to

the laws and regulations of the W,=, the lawma(ing body of Congress is limited to this conformity o <specially as W,= infringes on the ta$ation power of Congress+ when W,= fi$es tariff rates =H<R<%4-,J ?%'%,<@ )J %-,<R-A,%=-A? ?AW A-@ ,R<A,% < o All government authority is inherently limited by the fact that it is a member of a family of nations o @octrine of incorporation+ the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of the countryGs laws o Authority limited by principles of international law and treaty stipulations U- C#AR,<R A-@ =,#<R ,R<A,%< ?%'%, =H<R<%4-,J % U< X 2+ W,= A-@ .U@%C%A? "=W<R+ o %n question+ W,= ,R%" T ,rade Related Aspects of %ntellectual "roperty Rights intrudes on the power of the C to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures o )urden of proof on proving the authenticity of a patent similar to something else by another country C upholds said ,R%" , similar to RA 065, "atent ?aw % U<X5+ C=-CURR<-C< =-?J %,#< W,= A4R<<'<-, A-@ -=, %- =,#<R @=CU'<-, C=-,A%-<@ %- ,#< !%-A? AC, o Assailed enate Resolution e$pressed concurrence in what the !inal Act required, concurrence of the enate in the W,= agreement o 'inisterial @eclarations were deemed accepted without being ratified, by virtue of Article 85+ ec 0 of 4A,, .U@4'<-,+ ,he validity of the assailed resolution is upheld. LI$ - "."C+TI-" S"CR"TAR=, ,R NO% 121332, A!RIL 11, 4004 Facts: ,his case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petitionin-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called /)ali(atan 78-0/ and that after due notice and hearing, that *udgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of in*unction andQor prohibition

against the deployment of U. . troops in )asilan and 'indanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. )eginning .anuary of this year 8778, personnel from the armed forces of the United tates of America started arriving in 'indanao to ta(e part, in con*unction with the "hilippine military, in /)ali(atan 78-0./ ,hese so-called /)ali(atan/ e$ercises are the largest combined training operations involving !ilipino and American troops. %n theory, they are a simulation of *oint military maneuvers pursuant to the 'utual @efense ,reaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the "hilippines and the United tates in 0150. ,he entry of American troops into "hilippine soil is pro$imately rooted in the international antiterrorism campaign declared by "resident 4eorge W. )ush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on eptember 00, 8770. =n !ebruary 0, 8778, petitioners Arthur @. ?im and "aulino ". <rsando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attac(ing the constitutionality of the *oint e$ercise. ,hey were *oined subsequently by A-?AIA and "AR,%@= -4 'A-44A4AWA, both party-%ist organi&ations, who filed a petition-inintervention on !ebruary 00, 8778. Hel : ,he Court held that no doubt that the U forces are prohibited Q from engaging in an offensive war on "hilippine territory. Jet a nagging question remains+ are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside !ilipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance e$erciseA ,he Court cannot ta(e *udicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not ta(e cogni&ance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. %t cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitionersV allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in /doublespea(/ in trying to pass off as a mere training e$ercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. ,he petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in 'indanao. Wherefore, the petition and the petition-inintervention were dismissed.

LI$ vs% "."C+TI-" S"CR"TAR= Facts: )eginning .anuary of year 8778, personnel from the armed forces of the United tates of America started arriving in 'indanao to ta(e part, in con*unction with the "hilippine military, in E)ali(atan 78-0.F ,hey are a simulation of *oint military maneuvers pursuant to the 'utual @efense ,reaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the "hilippines and the United tates in 0150. %ts aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through *oint training with its American counterpartsO the E)ali(atanF is the largest such training e$ercise directly supporting the '@,Gs ob*ectives. %t is this treaty to which the H!A adverts and the obligations thereunder which it see(s to reaffirm. =n !ebruary 0, 8778, petitioners Arthur @. ?im and "aulino ". <rsando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attac(ing the constitutionality of the *oint e$ercise. Issue: Whether E)ali(atan 78-0F activities covered by the Hisiting !orces AgreementA Rul*ng: ,o resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the H!A itself. ,he H!A permits United tates personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in Eactivities,F the e$act meaning of which was left undefined. ,he sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United tates personnel must Eabstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. ,he Hienna Convention on the ?aw of ,reaties, Articles >0 and >8 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. %t clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an e$amination of the te$t, which is presumed to verbali&e the partiesG intentions. ,he Convention li(ewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the conte$t of the treaty, as well as other elements may be ta(en into account alongside the aforesaid conte$t. %t appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .GactivitiesF arose from accident. %t was

deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. %n this manner, visiting U forces may so*ourn in "hilippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the *oint e$ercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nationGs marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action pro*ects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the li(e. Under these auspices, the H!A gives legitimacy to the current )ali(atan e$ercises. %t is only logical to assume that .G)ali(atan 78-0,F a Emutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training e$ercise,F falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the conte$t of the agreement. LAO ICHON, -S >AI$" H"RNAN#"5 ,reaties 'ay )e uperseded by 'unicipal ?aws in the <$ercise of "olice "ower ?ao %chong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to ta(e advantage of business opportunities herein abound 9then: T particularly in the retail business. !or some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen en*oyed a EmonopolyF in the local mar(et in "asay. Until in .une 0152 when Congress passed the RA 00B7 or the Retail ,rade -ationali&ation Act the purpose of which is to reserve to !ilipinos the right to engage in the retail business. %chong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the R" which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause 9pacta sund servanda:. #e said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISS+": Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. H"L#: Jes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. %n this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 00B7. ,he equal protection of the law clause Edoes not demand absolute equality amongst residentsO it merely requires that all persons shall be treated ali(e,

under li(e circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforcedFO and, that the equal protection clause Eis not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies ali(e to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds e$ist for ma(ing a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.F !or the sa(e of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an e$ercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. #ence, %chong can no longer assert his right to operate his mar(et stalls in the "asay city mar(et. ICHON, - H"RNAN#"5, 101 !HIL% 112 Facts: "etitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act -o. 00B7, brought this action to obtain a *udicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to en*oin the ecretary of !inance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. "etitioner attac(s the constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that+ it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of lawO it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the "hilippinesO and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 077Y !ilipino capitali&ation for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of ections 0 and 5, Article P%%% and ection B of Article P%H of the Constitution. Republic Act -o. 00B7 is entitled /An Act to Regulate the Retail )usiness./ %n effect it nationali&es the retail trade business. ,he main provisions of the Act are+ 90: a prohibition against persons, not citi&ens of the "hilippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citi&ens of the "hilippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail tradeO 98: an e$ception from the above

prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on 'ay 05, 0152, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the e$piration of term in case of *uridical personsO 9>: an e$ception therefrom in favor of citi&ens and *uridical entities of the United tatesO 92: a provision for the forfeiture of licenses 9to engage in the retail business: for violation of the laws on nationali&ation, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industryO 95: a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, 96: a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of *uridical entitiesO and 93: a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of si$ months for purposes of liquidation. Hel : ,he Court held that the Act was approved in the e$ercise of the police power. %t has been said that police power is so farreaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its e$istence from the very e$istence of the tate itself, it does not need to be e$pressed or defined in its scopeO it is said to be coe$tensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. <specially is it so under a modern democratic framewor( where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportionsO the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, *ust as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight. =therwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the e$tent or scope of police power by which and through which the

tate see(s to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. o it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or e$tent of the police power of the tateO what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. ,he most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. ,he equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. %t is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the ob*ect to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. %t does not demand absolute equality among residentsO it merely requires that all persons shall be treated ali(e, under li(e circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. ,he equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies ali(e to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds e$ists for ma(ing a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. ,he due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power, %s there public interest, a public purposeO is public welfare involvedA %s the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatureVs purposeO is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressiveA %s there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involvedO or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative powerA Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an un*ustified interference with private interestA ,hese are the questions that we as( when the due process test is applied. ,he conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. "roperly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coe$ist. ,he balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. ,here can be no absolute power, whoever e$ercise it, for that would be tyranny. Jet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. o the tate can deprive persons of life, liberty and

property, provided there is due process of lawO and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. ,he test or standard, as always, is reason. ,he police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must e$ist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. ,he disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citi&ens and country from such dominance and controlO that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the tate, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and futureO that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds e$ist for the distinction between alien and citi&en in the e$ercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recogni&es the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilegeO that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its ob*ectives appear to us to be plainly evident U as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary U and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the ?egislature, with whose power and discretion the .udicial department of the 4overnment may not interfereO that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affectedO and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the sub*ect and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. ,he ,reaty of Amity between the Republic of the "hilippines and the Republic of China of April 0B, 0123 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals /upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country./ )ut the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, e$cept

those of the United tates, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. )ut even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always sub*ect to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law , and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the tate. ICHON, -S% H"RNAN#"5 ?101 !HIL 1122@ L6:992@ 31 $A= 192:A unday, !ebruary 70, 8771 "osted by Coffeeholic Writes ?abels+ Case @igests, "olitical ?aw FACTS: Republic Act 00B7 or commonly (nown as EAn Act to Regulate the Retail )usinessF was passed. ,he said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. ,his was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the "hilippines therefore it is unconstitutional. pecifically, the ,reaty of Amity between the "hilippines and China was violated according to him. ISS+": Whether or -ot Republic Act 00B7 is a valid e$ercise of police power. H"L#: According to the Court, RA 00B7 is a valid e$ercise of police power. %t was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. ,he Court also provided that RA 00B7 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. %f ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always sub*ect to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. STATE IMMUNITY R"!+/LIC vs% LI$ 4R no. 060656, .une 81, 8775 FACTS: %n 01>B, the Republic instituted a special civil action for e$propriation of a land in ?ahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the "hilippine Army. ,he said lots were registered in the name of 4ervasia and <ulalia @en&on.

,he Republic deposited "1,577 in the "-) then too( possession of the lots. ,hereafter, on 'ay 0127, the C!% rendered its @ecision ordering the Republic to pay the @en&ons the sum of "2,768.07 as *ust compensation. ,he @en&ons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on 'arch 00, 012B. An entry of *udgment was made on April 5, 012B. %n 0157, one of the heirs of the @en&ons, filed with the -ational Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it /denied (nowledge of the matter./ =n eptember 6, 0160, ?t. Cabal re*ected the claim but e$pressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. !or failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on eptember 87, 0160, the @en&onsG successors-in-interest, Haldehue&a and "anerio, filed with the same C!% an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and A!" officers in possession of the property. =n -ovember 0160, ,itles of the said lots were issued in the names of Haldehue&a and "anerio with the annotation /sub*ect to the priority of the -ational Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, ?ots 1>8 and 1>1 upon previous payment of a reasonable mar(et value/. =n .uly 0168, the C!% promulgated its @ecision in favor of Haldehue&a and "anerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the RepublicGs failure to pay the amount of "2,768.07, ad*udged in the e$propriation proceedings. #owever, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to e$ecute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. ,hey appealed the C!%Gs decision to the C. ,he latter held that Haldehue&a and "anerio are still the registered owners of ?ots 1>8 and 1>1, there having been no payment of *ust compensation by the Republic. C still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair mar(et value. 'eanwhile, in 0162, Haldehue&a and "anerio mortgaged ?ot 1>8 to -*cente L*B, herein respondent, as security for their loans. !or their failure to pay ?im despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 0136. ,he lot title was issued in his name. =n 0118, respondent ?im filed a complaint for Cu*et*ng &( t*tle with the R,C against the petitioners herein. =n 8770, the

R,C rendered a decision in favor of ?im, declaring that he is the absolute and e$clusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. "etitioners elevated the case to the CA. %n its @ecision dated eptember 0B, 877>, it sustained the R,C @ecision saying+ E...,his is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of *ust compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its ta(ing. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered /*ust/...F "etitioner, through the = 4, filed with the C a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of ?ot 1>8. ISS+": Whether the Republic has retained ownership of ?ot 1>8 despite its failure to pay respondentGs predecessors-ininterest the *ust compensation therefor pursuant to the *udgment of the C!% rendered as early as 'ay 02, 0127. H"L#: =ne of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of lawO and in e$propriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be *ust compensation whenever private property is ta(en for public use.3 Accordingly, ection 1, Article %%%, of our Constitution mandates+ /Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation./ ,he Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondentGs predecessors-in-interest the *ust compensation for ?ots 1>8 and 1>1. ,he Court of Appeals is correct in saying that RepublicGs delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. %n *urisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the e$propriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a 'eas&naDle t*Be, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio. As early as 'ay 01, 0166, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondentGs predecessors-in-interest the sum of "06,82B.27 as /reasonable mar(et value of the two lots in question./ Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this CourtGs mandate. %t is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are

sub*ect to the need of government, and the government may ta(e them whenever the necessity or the e$igency of the occasion demands, however from the ta(ing of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. ,here is a recogni&ed rule that title to the property e$propriated shall pass from the owner to the e$propriator only upon full payment of the *ust compensation. o, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 9 ! when it has not paid its owner the just compensation" required by law" for more than #$ years% Clearly, without full payment of *ust compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the e$propriator. C ruled in earlier cases that e$propriation of lands consists of two stages. &irst is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to e$ercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its e$ercise. ,he second is concerned with the determination by the court of /the *ust compensation for the property sought to be ta(en./ %t is only upon the completion of these two stages that e$propriation is said to have been completed %n Republic v. 'alem (nvestment )orporation" we ruled that, /the process is not completed until payment of *ust compensation./ ,hus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 53 years rendered the e$propriation process incomplete. ,hus, C ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the e$propriated lot from the Republic. While the prevailing doctrine is that /the non-payment of *ust compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the e$propriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay *ust compensation 7*tE*n (*ve 92; Fea's ('&B tEe (*nal*tF &( tEe Gu gBent *n tEe eH)'&)'*at*&n )'&cee *ngs, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it ta(es property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of *ust compensation. %n )osculluela v. )ourt of *ppeals, we defined *ust compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the

property owner but also the payment of the property within a 'eas&naDle t*Be. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered /*ust./ CIVILIAN SUPREMACY SANLA0AS -S% "."C+TI-" S"CR"TAR= R"="S M4R 0517B5, > !ebruary 8772NO also 'ocial +ustice 'ociety ,'+'- .fficers/0ember 12R 3#93$ 4" 'uplico" et al." vs. 0acapa5al6*rroyo" et al. 12R 3#937#48 Pimentel et al. vs. Romulo et al. 12R 3#93994 <n )anc, ,inga 9.:+ > concur, > concur in result, 0 concurs in separate opinion to which 8 *oin, 8 file own separate opinions, 0 dissents in separate opinion, 0 on leave FACTS: ,hey came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions and e$plosives, some three hundred *unior officers and enlisted men of the Armed !orces of the "hilippines 9A!": stormed into the =a(wood "remiere apartments in 'a(ati City in the wee hours of 83 .uly 877>. )ewailing the corruption in the A!", the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the "resident, the ecretary of @efense and the Chief of the "hilippine -ational "olice 9"-":. %n the wa(e of the =a(wood occupation, the "resident issued later in the day "roclamation 283 and 4eneral =rder 2, both declaring Ea state of rebellionF and calling out the Armed !orces to suppress the rebellion. )y the evening of 83 .uly 877>, the =a(wood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barrac(s. ,he "resident, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on 0 August 877>, through "roclamation 2>5. %n the interim, several petitions were filed before the upreme Court challenging the validity of "roclamation 283 and 4eneral =rder 2. ISS+": Whether the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration. H"L#:

-=. ,he Court agrees with the olicitor 4eneral that the issuance of "roclamation 2>5, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to e$ist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not ad*udicate moot cases, *udicial power being limited to the determination of Eactual controversies.F -evertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is Ecapable of repetition yet evading review.F ,he present case is one such case. =nce before, the "resident on 0 'ay 8770 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the A!" and the "-" to suppress the rebellion through "roclamation >B and 4eneral =rder 0. =n that occasion, EZan angry and violent mob armed with e$plosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weaponsG assaulted and attempted to brea( into 'alaca;ang.F "etitions were filed before the upreme Court assailing the validity of the "residentGs declaration. !ive days after such declaration, however, the "resident lifted the same. ,he mootness of the petitions in ?acson v. "ere& and accompanying cases precluded the Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. ,o prevent similar questions from reemerging, the upreme Court sei&ed the opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the e$ercise of the "residentGs calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding RA$ON ,ON5AL"S -S "."C S"C R+FINO H"CHANO-A 4.R. -o. ?-80B13 ,reaty vs <$ecutive Agreements T tatutes Can Repeal <$ecutive Agreements ,hen "resident @iosdado 'acapagal entered into two e$ecutive agreements with Hietnam and )urma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the -atGl <conomic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. #ence, #echanova authori&ed the importation of 63777 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. 4on&ales, then president of the %loilo "alay and Corn "lanters Association assailed the e$ecutive agreements. 4on&ales averred that #echanova is without *urisdiction or in e$cess of *urisdiction/, because RA >258 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by /the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISS+": Whether or not RA >258 prevails over the 8 e$ecutive agreements entered into by 'acapagal. H"L#: Under the Constitution, the main function of the <$ecutive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. ,he former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, e$cept in the e$ercise of his veto power. #e may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an e$ecutive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. %n the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, #echanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. -o such *ustification can be given as regards e$ecutive agreements not authori&ed by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of chec(s and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an e$ecutive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the "hilippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the C may not be deprived /of its *urisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final *udgments and decrees of inferior courts in EAll cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or e$ecutive order or regulation is in question/. %n other words, our Constitution authori&es the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. ,ON5AL"S -S% H"CHANO-A 9 SCRA 430 FACTS: Respondent e$ecutive secretary authori&ed importation of 63,777 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Ramon A. 4on&ales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters asso., filed and averring that in ma(ing or attempting to ma(e importation of foreign rice are acting without *urisdiction or in e$cess of *urisdiction because RA 8873, e$plicitly prohibits the importation of

rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency. ISS+": Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. H"L#: ,he power of *udicial review is vested with the supreme court in consonace to section 8 art. H%%% of the constitution. the alleged consummation of the contracts with vietnam and burma does not render this case academic. RA 8873, en*oins our government not from entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, e$cept under conditions prescribed in said act. A *udicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our government to default in the performance of such obligations as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the phils., the proposed importation may still be legali&ed by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned law. I/! -S% 5A$ORA ,%R% NO%131483, A+,+ST 12, 4000 unday, .anuary 85, 8771 "osted by Coffeeholic Writes ?abels+ Case @igests, "olitical ?aw Facts: %nvo(ing his powers as Commander-inChief under ec. 0B, Art. H%% of the Constitution, the "resident directed the A!" Chief of taff and "-" Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utili&ation of the 'arines to assist the "-" in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. ,he "resident declared that the services of the 'arines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. ,he %)" filed a petition see(ing to declare the deployment of the "hilippine 'arines null and void and unconstitutional. Issues: 90: Whether or not the "residentGs factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is sub*ect to *udicial review

98: Whether or not the calling of the forces to assist the "-" in *oint visibility violates the constitutional provisions on supremacy over the military and the character of the "-"

armed patrols civilian civilian

Hel + When the "resident calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily e$ercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under ec. 0B, Art. H%% of the Constitution, Congress may revo(e such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. #owever, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the "residentGs action to call out the armed forces. ,he distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the > powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. ,he reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the "resident the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. %n view of the constitutional intent to give the "resident full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the "residentGs decision is totally bereft of factual basis. ,he present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there e$ists no *ustification for calling out the armed forces. ,he Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the 'arines, the civilian tas( of law enforcement is Emilitari&edF in violation

of ec. >, Art. %% of the Constitution. ,he deployment of the 'arines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. ,he calling of the 'arines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. ,he local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the "-" 'oreover, the deployment of the 'arines to assist the "-" does not unma(e the civilian character of the police force. ,he real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the "-", and not with the military. ince none of the 'arines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the "-", there can be no appointment to civilian position to spea( of. #ence, the deployment of the 'arines in the *oint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the "-". I/! -S% 5A$ORA, ,%R% NO% 131483 ,%R% NO% 131483% A+,+ST 12, 4000% Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order see(ing to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of "resident .oseph <*ercito <strada commanding the deployment of the "hilippine 'arines 9the 'arines: to *oin the "hilippine -ational "olice 9the /"-"/: in visibility patrols around the metropolis. !ormulated ?etter of %nstruction 78Q8777 0 9the /?=%/: which detailed the manner by which the *oint visibility patrols, called ,as( !orce ,ulungan, would be conducted. 8 ,as( !orce ,ulungan was placed under the leadership of the "olice Chief of 'etro 'anila through a sustained street patrolling to minimi&e or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organi&ed crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former "-"Q'ilitary personnel. Issue: 0. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 8, ection > of the ConstitutionO 8. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcementO >. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to

perform civilian functions of the government 2. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under the Constitution. ,he issues raised in the present petition are+ 90: Whether or not petitioner has legal standingO 98: Whether or not the "residentVs factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is sub*ect to *udicial review, and, 9>: Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the "-" in *oint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the "-". Hel : W#<R<!=R<, premises considered, the petition is hereby @% '% <@. = =R@<R<@. Rat*&: ,he question of deployment of the 'arines is not proper for *udicial scrutiny since the same involves a political questionO that the organi&ation and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one "hilippine 'arine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. In v*e7 &( stan *ng Apart from this declaration, however, the %)" asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi ,he mere invocation by the %)" of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. -ational "resident of the %)" who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authori&ing him to file the present action. %ndeed, none of its members, whom the %)" purportedly represents, has sustained any form of in*ury as a result of the operation of the *oint visibility patrols. -evertheless, the Court does not automatically assume *urisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. =ne class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are VVpolitical questions./ ,he reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. 'oreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the wor(ings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows

a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. In v*e7 &( aDuse &( *sc'et*&n ,he "resident did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the 'arines. "resident as stated in ection 0B, Article H%% of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling the armed forces is not proper for *udicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court. )y grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical e$ercise of *udgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty en*oined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is e$ercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the "resident calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily e$ercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. In v*e7 &( Du' en &( )'&&( &n (actual Das*s %t is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the "residentVs decision is totally bereft of factual basis. ,he present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there e$ist no *ustification for calling out the armed forces. ,here is, li(ewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was e$ercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. ,he present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. %ndeed, whether it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law 9in case of invasion or rebellion:, the e$ercise of the "residentVs powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof U not mere assertion. 2 As has been pointed out, / tanding is not Van ingenious academic e$ercise in the conceivableV . . . but

requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible harm./ )ecause of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on these questions. ,hus, at one point, the ma*ority opinion says that what is involved here is not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement. We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the "residentVs power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is sub*ect to the limitation that the e$ercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety. 'oreover, under ection 0B, Article H%% of the Constitution, in the e$ercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur+ 90: there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, 98: public safety must require it. ,hese conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. ,he only criterion is that /whenever it becomes necessary,/ the "resident may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion./ ,he implication is that the "resident is given full discretion and wide latitude in the e$ercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. In v*e7 &( tEe C&u'ts c&ncu''ence We do not doubt the veracity of the "residentVs assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. ,he Court ta(es *udicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. ,hese are among the areas of deployment described in the ?=% 8777. ,he deployment of the 'arines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. ,he calling of the 'arines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. Under the ?=%, the police forces are tas(ed to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. >B %t is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the 'arines. Considering the above circumstances, the 'arines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no /insidious incursion/ of the

military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. "olitical questions are defined as /those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or e$ecutive branch of government./ 8 ,hey have two aspects+ 90: those matters that are to be e$ercised by the people in their primary political capacity and 98: matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act. > ,he e$ercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or e$ecutive branch of government was often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine. ,ON5AL"S et% al v% ,"N% A/A=A 4.R. -o. 062773, Aug. 07, 8776 ,he nature of the military *ustice system Coup dVetat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War FACTS: =n .uly 83, 877> at around 0+77 a.m., more than >77 heavily armed *unior officers and enlisted men of the A!" entered the premises of the =a(wood "remier ?u$ury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, 'a(ati City, where they disarmed the security guards and planted e$plosive devices around the building. ,hey then declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as "resident of the Republic. After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. ubsequently, an %nformation for coup dGetat was filed against them with the R,C, at the same time that they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. ,hey question the *urisdiction of the court martial, contending that the R,C ordered that their act was not service-connected and that their violation of Art. 16 of the Articles of War 9RA 3755: was absorbed by the crime of coup dGetat. ISS+": Whether the act complained of was serviceconnected and therefore cogni&able by court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup dVetat cogni&able by regular courts

R+LIN,: ,he military *ustice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 'ilitary law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the tate in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the tate in time of peaceO for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. ,he administration of military *ustice has been universally practiced. ince time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world loo( upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. !or this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organi&ed armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. ,he Court held that the offense is serviceconnected. $$$ %t bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. uch violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. %n short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. <qually indicative of the Eservice-connectedF nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same T dismissal from the service T imposable only by the military court. uch penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. ,+#ANI v% S"N,A 4.R. -o. 037065, Aug. 05, 8776 ,he ability of the "resident to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on e$ecutive privilege, but on the Chief <$ecutiveGs power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. ,he "residentGs prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in e$ecutive privilege.

FACTS: =n ept. 88, 8775, en. )ia&on invited several senior officers of the A!", including 4en. 4udani, to appear at a public hearing before the enate Committee on -ational @efense and ecurity concerning the conduct of the 8772 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the E#ello 4arciF tapes emerged. A!" Chief of taff 4en. enga issued a 'emorandum, prohibiting 4en. 4udani, Col. )alutan and company from appearing before the enate Committee without "residential approval. -evertheless, 4en. 4udani and Col. )alutan testified before said Committee, prompting 4en. enga to order them sub*ected to 4eneral Court 'artial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer. %n the meantime, "resident Arroyo issued <= 262, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. ISS+": Whether or not the "resident can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry R+LIN,: We hold that the "resident has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such in*unction is liable under military *ustice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which see(s the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the "resident has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the "resident. %f the "resident is not so inclined, the "resident may be commanded by *udicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. !inal *udicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the "resident has the duty to faithfully e$ecute. Ability of "resident to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress is based on Commander-in-chief powers As earlier noted, we ruled in enate that the "resident may not issue a blan(et requirement of prior consent on e$ecutive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. %n doing so, the Court recogni&ed the considerable limitations on e$ecutive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invo(ed on specified

grounds. #owever, the ability of the "resident to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on e$ecutive privilege, but on the Chief <$ecutiveGs power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. ,he "residentGs prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in e$ecutive privilege. RATIONAL": =ur ruling that the "resident could, as a general rule, require military officers to see( presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the "resident as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-ran( promotions, yet it is on the "resident that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the e$igencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the "residentGs ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the "resident and obeying the enate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the "resident. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the "resident, and not the enate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Remedy is *udicial relief At the same time, the refusal of the "resident to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still sub*ect to *udicial relief. ,he Constitution itself recogni&es as one of the legislatureGs functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. %nasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the "residentGs power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the "resident to unduly interfere with CongressGs right to conduct legislative inquiries. ,he impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Jet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the "resident has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actuali&e. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which

members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the "resident desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief <$ecutiveGs prerogatives as commander-in-chief. ,he remedy lies with the courts. ,he fact that the e$ecutive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrin(le to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. ,here is considerable interplay between the legislative and e$ecutive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy ideali&es this relationshipO hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch see(s to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. ,he *udiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not en*oy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or e$ecutive branches. Whatever wea(ness inheres on *udicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.

WHO EXERCISES THESE GOVT POWER cases: "R$ITA6$ALAT" HOT"L & $OT"L O!"RATORS ASSOC%, INC -S $A=OR OF $ANILA 4.R. -o. ?-8261> "olice "ower T @ue "rocess Clause =n 0> .une 016>, the 'anila 'unicipal )oard enacted =rd 2367 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. =rd 2367 sought to regulate hotels and motels. %t classified them into 0st class 9ta$ed at 6(Qyr: and 8nd class 9ta$ed at 2.5(Qyr:. %t also compelled hotelsQmotels to get the demographics of anyone who chec(s in to their rooms. %t compelled hotelsQmotels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. <rmita-'alate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. ,he lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of <rmita-'alate. %SS+"+ Whether or not =rd 2367 is against the due process clause. H"L#: ,he C ruled in favor of Astorga. ,here is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress 9in this case 'un )oard: is valid. WQo a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. !urther, the ordinance is a valid e$ercise of "olice "ower. ,here is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimi&e certain practices hurtful to public morals. ,his is to minimi&e prostitution. ,he increase in ta$es not only discourages hotelsQmotels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And ta$ation is a valid e$ercise of police power as well. ,he due process contention is li(ewise untenable, due process has no e$act definition but has reason as a standard. %n this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.

CONSTIT+TIONAL LAW II CA <

"=?%C< "=W<R =n the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily rest the e$ercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasi&ed, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. "olice power is based upon the concept of necessity of the tate and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.2> "olice power has been used as *ustification for numerous and varied actions by the tate. ,hese range from the regulation of dance halls,22 movie theaters,25 gas stations26 and coc(pits.23 ,he awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nationGs legal system, its use has rarely been denied. 'ay Courts %nquire Upon the <$ercise of "olice "owerA %n view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the e$ercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is sub*ect to *udicial inquiry. Where such e$ercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, un*ust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. T7& tF)es &( #ue !'&cess "rocedural @ue "rocess+ "rocedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.21 "rocedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it ma(es an intrusion into the private sphere. <$amples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. ubstantive @ue "rocess+ ubstantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. %t inquires whether the government has sufficient *ustification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. CH+RCHILL vs% RAFF"RT=, 4.R. -=. ?-07538, @ecember 80, 0105 9 >8 "hil 5B7:

!AC, + ,he case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of %nternal Revenue, would li(e to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. ,he plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid e$ercise of police power in this caseA #<?@+ Jes. ,here can be no doubt that the e$ercise of the police power of the "hilippine 4overnment belongs to the ?egislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the ?egislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary en*oyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. )ut where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. /,he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to ma(e, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall *udge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the sub*ects of the same./ /,he police power of the tate, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. %t may be said, however, to be the right of the tate, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law./ /%t Mthe police powerN has for its ob*ect the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about /he greatest good of the greatest number./Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fi$ed limitations upon sub*ects calling for the e$ercise of this power. %t is elastic and is e$ercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction./ /%t may be said in a general way that the police power e$tends to all the great public needs. %t may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by

usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare./ /%t is much easier to perceive and reali&e the e$istence and sources of this police power than to mar( its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its e$ercise./ AC"/"#O O!TICAL C&% v% CA 4.R. -o. 077058, 'arch >0, 8777 "olice "ower as e$ercised by ?4Us, restrictions and qualifications "ower of city mayor to grantQcancelQrevo(e business permits 4ranting of business permits vs. granting of permit to practice profession FACTS: "etitioner applied with the =ffice of the City 'ayor of %ligan for a business permit. "ermit was therefor issued, sub*ect to certain conditions li(e prohibition of putting up an optical clinic, e$amining andQor prescribing reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When it was found that petitioner violated these conditions, its business permit was cancelled. ISS+": Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra vires R+LIN,: "olice "ower e$ercised by ?4Us "olice power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. ,he tate, through the legislature, has delegated the e$ercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the tate, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared ob*ects of their creation. ,his delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the ?ocal 4overnment Code $$$ ,he scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the

community. "olice power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if e$ercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. "ower of city mayor to grant business permits ,he authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. %t is provided for by law. #owever, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be e$ercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law. )ut can city mayor cancel business permits or impose special conditionsA As aptly discussed by the olicitor 4eneral in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revo(e, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revo(e or cancel, li(ewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. @id the conditions or restrictions imposed amount to a confiscation of the businessA @istinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. ,he first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the )oard or Commission tas(ed to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authori&es the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or e$ercise of his or her profession. %n the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City 'ayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. %t does not purport to see( a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the )oard of <$aminers in =ptometry. $$#A -S /"L AIR -ILLA," ASSOCIATION

@ate+ 'arch 83, 8777 "etitioner+ 'etropolitan 'anila @evelopment Authority Respondent+ )el Air Hillage Association %nc !AC, + ''@A is a government agency tas(ed with the delivery of basic services in 'etro 'anila. )elAir Hillage Association, %nc. is a non-stoc(, nonprofit corporation whose members are homeowners in )el-Air Hillage, a private subdivision in 'a(ati City. )AHA is the registered owner of -eptune treet, a road inside )el-Air Hillage. =n @ecember >7, 0115, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated @ecember 88, 0115 requesting respondent to open -eptune treet to public vehicular traffic starting .anuary 8, 0116. )AHA was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the ad*acent Ialayaan Avenue would be demolished. =n .anuary 8, 0116, )AHA instituted against petitioner before the R,C a civil case for in*unction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a ,R= and preliminary in*unction en*oining the opening of -eptune treet and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. ,he trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day. After due hearing, the trial court denied the issuance of preliminary in*unction. =n appeal, the CA rendered a @ecision on the merits of the case finding that the ''@A has no authority to order the opening of -eptune treet, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. %t held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of 'a(ati by ordinance. ISS+": W=- the ''@A has authority to open -eptune Road to the public H"L#+ -o Ratio+ ''@A claims that it has the authority to open -eptune treet to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in 'etro 'anila. =ne of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. %t is alleged that the police power of ''@A was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of angalang v. %AC. !rom the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is

no need for the City of 'a(ati to enact an ordinance opening -eptune street to the public. "olice power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. %t has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to ma(e, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall *udge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the sub*ects of the same. ,he power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and *ustifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. %t bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the -ational ?egislature. %t cannot be e$ercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. ,he -ational ?egislature, however, may delegate this power to the "resident and administrative boards as well as the lawma(ing bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. =nce delegated, the agents can e$ercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawma(ing body. 'etropolitan or 'etro 'anila is a body composed of several local government units i.e., twelve 908: cities and five 95: municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, 'anila, 'andaluyong, 'a(ati, "asay, "asig, Cue&on, 'untinlupa, ?as "inas, 'ari(ina, "aranaque and Halen&uela, and the municipalities of 'alabon, , -avotas, , "ateros, an .uan and ,aguig. With the passage of RA 3182 in 0115, 'etropolitan 'anila was declared as a /special development and administrative region/ and the Administration of /metro-wide/ basic services affecting the region placed under /a development authority/ referred to as the ''@A. ,he implementation of the ''@AGs plans, programs and pro*ects is underta(en by the local government units, national government agencies, accredited peopleGs organi&ations, non-governmental organi&ations, and the private sector as well as by the ''@A itself. !or this purpose, the ''@A has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services within 'etro 'anila. Clearly, the scope of the ''@AGs function is limited to the delivery of the seven 93: basic services. =ne of these is transport and traffic

management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and pro*ects to rationali&e the e$isting transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. %t also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single tic(eting system in 'etro 'anila for traffic violations. Under this service, the ''@A is e$pressly authori&ed /to set the policies concerning traffic/ and /coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs./ %n addition, the ''@A may /install and administer a single tic(eting system,/ fi$, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. %t will be noted that the powers of the ''@A are limited to the following acts+ formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. ,here is no syllable in R. A. -o. 3182 that grants the ''@A police power, let alone legislative power. <ven the 'etro 'anila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unli(e the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. -o. 3182 that empowers the ''@A or its Council to /enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare/ of the inhabitants of 'etro 'anila. ,he ''@A is, as termed in the charter itself, a /development authority./ %t is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peopleGs organi&ations, non-governmental organi&ations and the private sector for the efficient and e$peditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself "etitioner cannot see( refuge in the cases of angalang v. %ntermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a &oning ordinance issued by the 'etro 'anila Commission 9''C:, the predecessor of the ''@A, as an e$ercise of police power. ,he first angalang decision was on the merits of the petition, while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Jabut v. Court of Appeals.

Contrary to petitionerGs claim, the two angalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. !irstly, both involved &oning ordinances passed by the municipal council of 'a(ati and the ''C. %n the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of -eptune treet is contained in the notice of @ecember 88, 0115 sent by petitioner to respondent )AHA, through its president. ,he notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the angguniang "anlungsod of 'a(ati City or by the ''@A, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of -eptune treet. "etitioner ''@A simply relied on its authority under its charter /to rationali&e the use of roads andQor thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons./ Rationali&ing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. )y no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an e$press or implied grant of ordinance-ma(ing power, much less police power. 'is*uris econdly, the ''@A is not the same entity as the ''C in angalang. Although the ''C is the forerunner of the present ''@A, an e$amination of "residential @ecree 9". @.: -o. B82, the charter of the ''C, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present ''@A. .*le$ %n 0117, "resident Aquino issued <$ecutive =rder 9<. =.: -o. >18 and constituted the 'etropolitan 'anila Authority 9''A:. ,he powers and functions of the ''C were devolved to the ''A. %t ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the ''C were passed to the ''A. ,he ''AGs power was limited to the /delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in 'etropolitan 'anila./ ,he ''AGs governing body, the 'etropolitan 'anila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of+ 90: formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidationO and 98: promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the e$ercise of its rule-ma(ing power. Under the 01B3 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. ,he ''AGs *urisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. %t did not have legislative power.

%ts power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a /review MofN legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of 'etro 'anila,/ and to /advise the local governments accordingly./ When R.A. -o. 3182 too( effect, 'etropolitan 'anila became a /special development and administrative region/ and the ''@A a /special development authority/ whose functions were /without pre*udice to the autonomy of the affected local government units./ ,he character of the ''@A was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter. %t is thus beyond doubt that the ''@A is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. %t is not even a /special metropolitan political subdivision/ as contemplated in ection 00, Article P of the Constitution. ,he creation of a /special metropolitan political subdivision/ requires the approval by a ma*ority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. -o. 3182 was not submitted to the inhabitants of 'etro 'anila in a plebiscite. ,he Chairman of the ''@A is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the "resident with the ran( and privileges of a cabinet member. %n fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the "resident, whereas in local government units, the "resident merely e$ercises supervisory authority. ,his emphasi&es the administrative character of the ''@A. Clearly then, the ''C under ". @. -o. B82 is not the same entity as the ''@A under R. A. -o. 3182. Unli(e the ''C, the ''@A has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. %t is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. %n the case at bar, the angguniang "anlungsod of 'a(ati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of -eptune treet, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner ''@A is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. <smso We stress that this decision does not ma(e light of the ''@AGs noble efforts to solve the chaotic

traffic condition in 'etro 'anila. <veryday, traffic *ams and traffic bottlenec(s plague the metropolis. <ven our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. ,raffic has become a social malaise affecting our peopleGs productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. ,he ''@A was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. %ts good intentions cannot *ustify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. ,he promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. ART. 3 Sec. 1 SCOPE OF PROTECTED LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY cases: #+NCAN ASSOC% OF #"TAIL$AN6!T,WO -S% ,LA.O W"LLCO$" !HILS%, INC% 338 SCRA 333 FACTS: ,ecson was hired by 4la$o as a medical representative on =ct. 82, 0115. Contract of employment signed by ,ecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the e$isting company rulesO to disclose to management any e$isting future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. CompanyVs Code of <mployee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchec(ing position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months. ,ecson was initially assigned to mar(et 4la$oVs products in the Camarines ur-Camarines -orte area and entered into a romantic relationship with )etsy, an employee of Astra, 4la$oVs competition. )efore getting married, ,ecsonVs @istrict 'anager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage too( place in ept. 011B. %n .an. 0111, ,ecsonVs superiors

informed him of conflict of intrest. ,ecson as(ed for time to comply with the condition 9that either he or )etsy resign from their respective positions:. Unable to comply with condition, 4la$o transferred ,ecson to the )utuan- urigao City-Agusan del ur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, ,ecson brought the matter to 4la$oVs 4rievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines ur-Camarines -orte sales area. =n -ov. 05, 8777, the -ational Conciliation and 'ediation )oard ruled that 4la$oVs policy was valid... ISS+"+ Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid R+LIN,: =n <qual "rotection 4la$o has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, mar(eting strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. ,he prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon 4la$oVs employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. ,hat 4la$o possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied. %t is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U upreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. ,he company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. %ndeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and evenhanded manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee. =n Constructive @ismissal Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when

continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unli(elyO when there is demotion in ran(, or diminution in payO or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. -one of these conditions are present in the instant case. H"L#: ,he challenged policy has been implemented by 4la$o impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. %n the case at bar, the record shows that 4la$o gave ,ecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with )etsy, but he never availed of any of them. /W#<R<!=R<, the petition is @<-%<@ for lac( of merit./ TWO cases: /ANCO "S!ANOL FILI!INO v% !ALANCA 4.R. -o. ?-00>17, 'arch 86, 010B .UR% @%C,%=-, #=W ACCU%R<@+ .urisdiction over the property which is the sub*ect of the litigation may result either from a sei&ure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recogni&ed and made effective. ,he action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is e$pressed the idea that while it is not strictly spea(ing an action in rem yet it parta(es of that nature and is substantially such. #+" !ROC"SS IN FOR"CLOS+R" !ROC""#IN,S: "roperty is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agentO and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with (nowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. !AC, + <ngracio "alanca ,anquinyeng y ?imquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in 'anila to <l )anco <spanol-!ilipino. Afterwards, <ngracio returned to China and there he died on .anuary 81, 0B07 without returning again to the "hilippines. ,he mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a INDS OF DUE PROCESS

non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. ,he Cler( of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendantGs last (nown address, which is in Amoy, China. %t is not shown whether the Cler( complied with this requirement. -evertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of 'anila, the cause proceeded and *udgment by default was rendered. ,he decision was li(ewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the ban( as the highest bidder. =n August 3, 017B, this sale was confirmed by the court. #owever, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Hicente "alanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the *udgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. ,he basis of this application was that the order of default and the *udgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired *urisdiction over the defendant or over the sub*ect of the action. ISS+": Whether or not the lower court acquired *urisdiction over the defendant and the sub*ect matter of the action Whether or not due process of law was observed R+LIN,+ =n .urisdiction ,he word E*urisdictionF is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference 90: to the authority of the court to entertain a particular (ind of action or to administer a particular (ind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or 98: over the property which is the sub*ect to the litigation. ,he sovereign authority which organi&es a court determines the nature and e$tent of its powers in general and thus fi$es its competency or *urisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant. #ow .urisdiction is Acquired .urisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and

his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process e$erted over the person. .urisdiction over the property which is the sub*ect of the litigation may result either from a sei&ure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recogni&ed and made effective. %n the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be ta(en into actual custody at all. An illustration of the *urisdiction acquired by actual sei&ure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is sei&ed at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential *urisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. #ere the court, without ta(ing actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to e$ercise a *urisdiction in rem over the property and to ad*udicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world. %n the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is e$pressed the idea that while it is not strictly spea(ing an action in rem yet it parta(es of that nature and is substantially such. ,he e$pression /action in rem/ is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. ,he action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to sub*ect his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole ob*ect the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. ,he *udgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

$$$ %t is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. ,his, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in remO and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem. =n @ue "rocess $$$ As applied to a *udicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namelyO 90: ,here must be a court or tribunal clothed with *udicial power to hear and determine the matter before itO 98: *urisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the sub*ect of the proceedingO 9>: the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heardO and 92: *udgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. "assing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recogni&ed as essential. ,o answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is (nown. ,hough commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. %t is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the sub*ect of *udicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to ta(e such steps as he sees fit to protect it. %t will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. ,he periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. <ven where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is

dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. %t will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendantVs residence is (nown. %n the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this (ind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. ,he idea upon which the law proceeds in recogni&ing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this+ "roperty is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agentO and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with (nowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. @id the failure of the cler( to send notice to defendantGs last (nown address constitute denial of due processA ,he observations which have *ust been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the cler( to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of lawO and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the *udgment in this case. -otice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. ,his in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. %t will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it ma(es a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving *urisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. %n the matter of *urisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. ,he court either has *urisdiction or it has notO and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of *urisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to ta(e that step was fatal to the validity of the *udgment. %n the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. ,he *urisdiction being once

established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heardO and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We thin( that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the e$ercise of *udicial power in these proceedings. .udge in the light of these conceptions, we thin( that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed. S"C OF >+STIC" -S >+#," RAL!H LANTION @ue "rocess 'ar( .imene& was charged of multiple crimes ranging from ta$ evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the U A. .imene& was then wanted in the U . ,he U government, pursuant to the R"-U e$tradition treaty requested to have .imene& be e$tradited there. .imene& requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the e$tradition request by the U A. ,he @=. sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. .imene& sued the @=. ec and the lower court ruled in favor of .imene&. ISS+": Whether or not .imene& is deprived of due process. H"L#: ,he C affirmed the ruling of the lower court. ,he case against .imene& refer to an impending threat of deprivation of oneGs property or property right. -o less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and en*oys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. S"CR"TAR= OF >+STIC" v% LANTION >88 CRA 067 98777:

-ature+ "etition for review of a decision of the 'anila R,C FACTS: =n .une 0B, 0111 the @epartment of .ustice received from the @epartment of !oreign Affairs a request for the e$tradition of private respondent 'ar( .imene& to the U. . ,he 4rand .ury %ndictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said e$tradition were attached along with the request. Charges include+ 0. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the U 8. Attempt to evade or defeat ta$ >. !raud by wire, radio, or television 2. !alse statement or entries 5. <lection contribution in name of another ,he @epartment of .ustice 9@=.:, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the e$tradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the e$tradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. ,he ecretary of .ustice denied request on the ff. grounds+ 0. #e found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the @=. is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law 9"@ 0761 U"hilippine <$tradition ?aw: and treaty 9R"-U <$tradition ,reaty: have been complied with by the Requesting 4overnment. <valuation by the @=. of the documents is not a preliminary investigation li(e in criminal cases ma(ing the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 8. ,he U. . requested for the prevention of unauthori&ed disclosure of the information in the documents. >. !inally, country is bound to Hienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. ,he respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. ,he R,C of -CR ruled in favor of the respondent. ecretary of .ustice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

ISS+"S: 0. W=- private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing Jes. [89a: of "@ 07B6 defines e$tradition as Ethe removal of an accused from the "hilippines with the ob*ect of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the e$ecution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.F Although the inquisitorial power e$ercised by the @=. as an administrative agency due to the failure of the @!A to comply lac(s any *udicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the e$tradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective e$tradite. ,his deprivation can be effected at two stages+ ,he provisional arrest of the prospective e$tradite pending the submission of the request W the temporary arrest of the prospective e$tradite during the pendency of the e$tradition petition in court. Clearly, thereGs an impending threat to a prospective e$traditeeGs liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. )ecause of such consequences, the evaluation process is a(in to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for W ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective e$tradite. %n essence, therefore, the evaluation process parta(es of the nature of a criminal investigation. ,here are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. )ut the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, W such forfeiture parta(es the nature of a penalty. %n the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the e$tradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, W to the deprivation of his liberty. ,hus, the e$traditee must be accorded due process rights of notice W hearing according to A> [0290: W 98:, as well as A> [3Uthe right of the people to information on matters of public

concern W the corollary right to access to official records W documents ,he court held that the evaluation process parta(es of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective e$tradite. A favorable action in an e$tradition request e$poses a person to eventual e$tradition to a foreign country, thus e$hibiting the penal aspect of the process. ,he evaluation process itself is li(e a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result T the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. ,he basic rights of notice W hearing are applicable in criminal, civil W administrative proceedings. -on-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. %ndividuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, W upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein W present their side. Rights to notice and hearing+ @ispensable in > cases+ a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action 9preventive suspension in administrative charges, padloc(ing filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport:. b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, W the respondent isnGt prevented from en*oying the right to notice W hearing at a later time 9summary distraint W levy of the property of a delinquent ta$payer, replacement of an appointee: c. ,win rights have been offered, but the right to e$ercise them had not been claimed. 8. W=- this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the "hilippine 4overnment under the R"-U ,reatyA -o. ,he U. . and the "hilippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective *urisdictions. )oth states accord common due process protection to their respective citi&ens. ,he administrative investigation doesnGt fall under the three e$ceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the ec. > Rules 008 of the Rules of Court. >. W=- thereGs any conflict between private respondentGs basic due process rights W provisions of R"-U <$tradition treaty

R+LIN,: -o. @octrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. ,reaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. -o conflict. Heil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage. .udgment+ "etition dismissed for lac( of merit. Iapunan, separate concurring opinion+ While the evaluation process conducted by the @=. is not e$actly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is a(in to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be e$tradited. A person ordered e$tradited is arrested, forcibly ta(en from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. #is rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are ta(en away from himUa fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. !or this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. "uno, dissenting+ Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an e$tradition treaty where at sta(e is our governmentGs international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citi&en of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that *urisdiction. ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS! cases: S"RRANO -S NLRC FACTS: errano was a regular employee of %setann @epartment tore as the head of ecurity Chec(er. %n 0110, as a cost-cutting measure, %setann phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security agency. "etitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. ?abor arbiter ruled in his favor as %setann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimi&e losses to its businessO that private respondent failed to accord due process

to petitionerO that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would be terminated. -?RC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay. ISS+": Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to replace its current security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter. R+LIN,: An employerGs good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the e$ercise of *udgment by an employer. %f termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid bac(wages. ,o contend that even if the termination is for a *ust cause, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid bac(wages would be to amend Art 831 by adding another ground for considering dismissal illegal. %f it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in Art 8B8, the in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid bac(wages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a *ust cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without legal effect. AN, TI/A= -S CO+RT OF IN#+STRIAL R"LATIONS @ue "rocess T Admin )odies T C%R ,eodoro,oribio owns and operates Ang ,ibay a leather company which supplies the "hilippine Army. @ue to alleged shortage of leather, ,oribio caused the lay off of members of -ational ?abor Union %nc. -?U averred that ,oribioGs act is not valid as it is not within the C)A. ,hat there are two labor unions in Ang ,ibayO -?U and -ational Wor(erGs )rotherhood. ,hat -W) is dominated by ,oribio hence he

favors it over -?U. ,hat -?U wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidenceQdocuments that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the C%R. ISS+": Whether or not there has been a due process of law. H"L#: ,he C ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of -?U. ,he C ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. ,hey areO 90: ,he right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 98: -ot only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. 9>: While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. 92: -ot only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be Esubstantial.F ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla %t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 95: ,he decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. 96: ,he Court of %ndustrial Relations or any of its *udges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. 93: ,he Court of %ndustrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its

decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can (now the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. ,he performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. $ACIAS -% CO$"L"C FACTS: "etitioners are four members of the #ouse of Representatives from -egros =riental, 'isamis =riental and )ulacan, and the provincial 4overnor of -egros =riental. ,hey are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA >727, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. ,hey alleged that their respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation. !urthermore, they allege that RA >727 is unconstitutional and void because+ 0. %t was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the #=R at least > calendar days prior to passage 8. %t was approved more than > years after the return of the last census of the population >. %t apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents Comelec and Hicente 4ella 9-ational ,reasurer: contend that they 0. were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and allege to be constitutional 8. petitioners have no personality to bring such action ISS+"S: 0. Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring such action. 8. Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and > day requirement. >. Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the > year requirement. 2. Whether or not the apportionment of members of the #=R is valid. H"L#: ,he petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved provinces have the personality to sue. ,he passage of the act did not conform to the printed-form and the > day requirement, and that there is no certificate of urgency from the "resident was received by the #=. ,he requirement that the

apportionment must be done within > year following the last census is complied with. ,he apportionment of members of the #=R is not valid because it is not based on the number of inhabitants a province has. ome provinces were given more representation despite the inferior in number of inhabitants. ,he Court held that RA >727 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS cases: +NIT"# STAT"S -S% L+IS TORI/IO "olice "ower ometime in the 0177s, ,oribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. #is request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for wor(. #e nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. #e was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. #is counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid e$ercise of police power. ISS+"+ Whether or not the said law is valid. H"L#: ,he C ruled against ,oribio. ,he C e$plained that it Eis not a ta(ing of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a *ust and legitimate e$ercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or in*urious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to in*ure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.F CIT= OF $ANILA $A=OR ALFR"#O LI$ v% >+#," LA,+IO & $T#C FACTS: ,he petitioners see( to reverse the ruling of the ruling of the R,C regarding the unconstitutionality of =rdinance -o. 33B> which is entitled- A- =R@%-A-C< "R=#%)%,%-4 ,#< < ,A)?% #'<-, =R ="<RA,%=- =! )U %-< < "R=H%@%-4 C<R,A%- !=R' =! A'U <'<-,, <-,<R,A%-'<-,, <RH%C< A-@

!AC%?%,%< %- ,#< <R'%,A-'A?A,< AR<A, "R< CR%)%-4 "<-A?,%< !=R H%=?A,%=,#<R<=!, A-@ !=R =,#<R "UR"= < . "rivate respondent, 'alate ,ourist @evelopment Corporation 9',@C:, contends that the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels and that the =rdinance does not constitute a proper e$ercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected. ,he petitioners, on the other hand, argues that the City Council had the power to /prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community/ M ection 25B 9a: 2 9vii: of the ?ocal 4overnment CodeN and that the =rdinance was enacted by the City Council of 'anila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in con*unction with its police powers MArticle %%%, ection 0B9((: of Republic Act -o. 271N. .udge ?aguio issued an e$-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the =rdinance. #e also granted the writ of preliminary in*unction prayed for by ',@C. #ence, the appeal by the petitioners. ISS+": Whether or not the =rdinance -o. 33B> is constitutional H"L#: -= ,here is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patroni&ing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. %f the City of 'anila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permitsO it may e$ercise its authority to suspend or revo(e their licenses for these violationsO and it may even impose increased license fees. %n other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. "olice power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of we reiterate our support for it. )ut inspite of itsthe *udiciary virtuous aims, the enactment of the

=rdinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. ?ocal legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees not even under the guiseof due process and equal protection of laws of police power. ,he petition is @<-%<@ and the decision of the Regional ,rial Court declaring the ordinance void is A!!%R'<@. =NOT -S% IAC 4.R. -o. 32253, 'arch 87, 01B3 '%-%'U' R<CU%R<'<-, =! "R=C<@URA? @U< "R=C< + 90: noticeO 98: hearingO e$ceptions U) ,A-,%H< @U< "R=C< + 90: public interest requires government interferenceO 98: reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose FACTS: "etitionerGs 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from 'asbate to %loilo in violation of <= 686-A. #e brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said <=. ,he trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lac(ed authority to do so. %ts decision was affirmed by the %AC. #ence this petition for review. ISS+": Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property without due process of law R+LIN,: 'inimum Requirements of @ue "rocess+ -otice and #earing ,he minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally spea(ing, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. %t is a gratifying commentary on our *udicial system that the *urisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person,

faced by the awesome power of the tate, is entitled to /the law of the land,/ which @aniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous @artmouth College Case, as /the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders *udgment only after trial./ %t has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mista(en &eal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. <$ceptions to -otice and #earing ,his is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted e$ceptions. ,he conclusive presumption, for e$ample, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human e$perience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. ,here are instances when the need for e$peditions action will *ustify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, li(e a mad dog on the loose, which may be (illed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. "ornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. ,he passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. !ilthy restaurants may be summarily padloc(ed in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. %n such instances, previous *udicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. @ue "rocess is a Restraint on "olice "ower ,he protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. ,he police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the tate to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. )y reason of its function, it e$tends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three

inherent powers of the tate, far outpacing ta$ation and eminent domain. ,he individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. %ts reach is virtually limitless. %t is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. <ven so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the *ustification is found in the venerable ?atin ma$ims, alus populi est suprema le$ and ic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. !irst Requisite of ubstantive @ue "rocess+ %nterests of the "ublic 4enerally Require %nterference $$$ we hold with the ,oribio Case that the carabao, as the poor manVs tractor, so to spea(, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful sub*ect of <$ecutive =rder -o. 686. ,he method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. ,here is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals e$cept where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the e$ecutive order will be conserving those still fit for farm wor( or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. Sec&n ReCu*s*te &( SuDstant*ve #ue !'&cess+ Reasonable 'eans -ecessary for the Accomplishment of "urpose, not Unduly =ppressive Upon %ndividuals )ut while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful sub*ect as the original e$ecutive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, vi&., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, <$ecutive =rder -o. 686-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that /no carabao regardless of age, se$, physical condition or purpose 9sic: and no carabeef shall be transported from one

province to another./ ,he ob*ect of the prohibition escapes us. ,he reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be (illed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. =bviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will ma(e it easier to (ill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says e$ecutive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply (illing the animal. "erhaps so. #owever, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. <ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to rec(on with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. ,he penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the e$ecutive authorities, usually the police only. %n the ,oribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. "O 6466A *s unc&nst*tut*&nal %n the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of "08,777.77, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. ,he e$ecutive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. ,he measure struc( at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying

him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. %t has already been remar(ed that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. %t is also conceded that summary action may be validly ta(en in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily *udicial only. %n the e$ceptional cases accepted, however, there is a *ustification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. %n the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitionerVs peremptory treatment. ,he properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. ,here certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the e$ecutive order should not have been proved first in a court of *ustice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in "esigan v. Angeles, <$ecutive =rder -o. 686-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of *ustice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. We also mar(, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned e$ecutive order. %t is there authori&ed that the sei&ed property shall /be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the -ational 'eat %nspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the @irector of Animal %ndustry may see fit, in the case of carabaos./ 9<mphasis supplied.: ,he phrase /may see fit/ is an e$tremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. %t is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. =ne searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they ma(e their distribution. ,here is none. ,heir options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the

fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosenA =nly the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own e$clusive discretion. @efinitely, there is here a /roving commission,/ a wide and sweeping authority that is not /canali&ed within ban(s that (eep it from overflowing,/ in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. ,o sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid e$ercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. @ue process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. ,he conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to ad*udge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on *udicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. ,here is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily ta(en. !or these reasons, we hereby declare <$ecutive =rder -o. 686-A unconstitutional. =NOT v% IAC "olice "ower T -ot Halidly <$ercised ,here had been an e$isting law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos 9<= 686:. ,o strengthen the law, 'arcos issued <= 686-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. =n 0> .an 01B2, Jnot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from 'asbate to %loilo. #e was then charged in violation of <= 686-A. Jnot averred <= 686-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. #e said that the authority provided by <= 686-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. ,he lower court ruled against Jnot ruling that the <= is a valid e$ercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISS+": Whether or not the law is valid. H"L#: ,he C ruled that the <= is not valid as it indeed violates due process. <= 686-A ctreated a presumption based on the *udgment of the e$ecutive. ,he movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Jnot should be given to defend himself and e$plain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. ,he C found that the challenged measure is an invalid e$ercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. @ue process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. ,he conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to ad*udge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on *udicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. ,here is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily ta(en. L+!AN,O v% CA FACTS: "RC issued a resolution directing that no e$aminee for the C"A )oard <$am shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the li(e conducted by, or shall receive any handout, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the li(e or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the > days immediately proceeding every e$amination day including e$amination day. H"L#: uch resolution is unreasonable. ,he unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from ta(ing future e$aminations conducted by the respondent "RC. !urthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and

every e$aminee during the three days before the e$amination period. Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. ,o be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. %f shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authori&ed to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. "RC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure e$aminations, as this will infringe n the e$amineesG right to libery. uch resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. ,he enforcement of Resolution -o. 075 is not a guarantee that the alleged lea(ages in the licensure e$aminations will be eradicated or at least minimi&ed. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such lea(ages and stop it right there. /ALAC+IT v% CFI FACTS: At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of =rdinance -o. 627 passed by the 'unicipal )oard of the City of )utuan on April 80, 0161, the title and te$t of which are reproduced below =R@%-A-C< "<-A?%D%-4 A-J "<R =-, 4R=U" =! "<R =- , <-,%,J =R C=R"=RA,%=<-4A4<@ %- ,#< )U %-< =! <??%-4 A@'% %=- ,%CI<, ,= A-J '=H%< =R =,#<R "U)?%C <P#%)%,%=- , 4A'< , C=-,< , =R =,#<R "<R!=R'A-C< ,= R<CU%R< C#%?@R<)<,W<<- <H<- 93: A-@ ,W<?H< 908: J<AR =! A4< ,= "AJ !U?? "AJ'<-, !=R ,%CI<, %-,<-@<@ !=R A@U?, )U, #=U?@ C#AR4< =-?J =-<-#A?! =! ,#< A%@ ,%CI<, "etitioners are Carlos )alacuit ?amberto ,an, and ergio Ju Carcel managers of the theaters and they attac( the validity and constitutionality of =rdinance -o. 627 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid e$ercise of police power. ISS+": @oes this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fi$ing of prices of admission to these places of e$hibition and amusement whether under its general grant of

power or under the general welfare clause as invo(ed by the CityA R+LIN,: -o, the power to regulate and fi$ the amount of license fees for theaters and other places of amusement has been e$pressly granted to the City of )utuan under its charter. #owever, the ordinance is not *ustified by any necessity for the public interest. ,he police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must e$ist between purposes and means. ,he evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parentsO however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. ,he ordinance does not only ma(e the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it li(ewise penali&es them for failure to comply with it. ,he ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of )utuan now suggests that birth certificates be e$hibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. ,his is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. !urther, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. !urthermore, there is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. ,he petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. ,he ob*ect of every business entrepreneur is to ma(e a profit out of his venture. %n fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a tic(et. %t is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a tic(et to such performances =rdinance -o. 627 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners W#<R<!=R<, a new *udgment is hereby rendered declaring =rdinance -o. 627 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. E"UAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

cases: INTIL% SCHOOL ALLIANC" -S% J+IS+$/IN, ?333 SCRA 13@ ,%R% NO% 148832@ 1 >+N 4000A FACTS: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent chool, mostly !ilipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. ,hat the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. ,he point is that employees should be given equal pay for wor( of equal value. "rivate respondent %nternational chool, %nc. 9the chool, for short:, pursuant to "residential @ecree 3>8, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. ,o enable the chool to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, ection 89c: of the same decree authori&es the chool to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from "hilippine or other nationalities, such personnel being e$empt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, e$cept laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the chool hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two+ 90: foreign-hires and 98: local-hires. ,he chool grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. ,hese include housing, transportation, shipping costs, ta$es, and home leave travel allowance. !oreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent 985Y: more than local-hires. ,he chool *ustifies the difference on two /significant economic disadvantages/ foreign-hires have to endure, namely+ 9a: the /dislocation factor/ and 9b: limited tenure. ISS+": Whether or -ot the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. R+LIN,:

,he foregoing provisions impregnably institutionali&e in this *urisdiction the long honored legal truism of /equal pay for equal wor(./ "ersons who wor( with substantially equal qualifications, s(ill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. ,his rule applies to the chool, its /international character/ notwithstanding. ,he chool contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform wor( equal to that of foreign-hires. ,he Court finds this argument a little cavalier. %f an employer accords employees the same position and ran(, the presumption is that these employees perform equal wor(. ,his presumption is borne by logic and human e$perience. %f the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to e$plain why he receives less or why the others receive more. ,hat would be adding insult to in*ury. ,he employer has discriminated against that employeeO it is for the employer to e$plain why the employee is treated unfairly. While we recogni&e the need of the chool to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the pre*udice of localhires. ,he local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. !or the same reason, the /dislocation factor/ and the foreign-hiresV limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. ,he Constitution en*oins the tate to /protect the rights of wor(ers and promote their welfare,/ /to afford labor full protection./ ,he tate, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. ,hese relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. hould such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to stri(e down these stipulations. %n this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent chool to *ustify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. ,here is no reasonable distinction

between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Wherefore, the petition is given due course. ,he petition is hereby granted in part. ,he orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated .une 07, 0116 and march 01, 0113, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. FARINAS -S "."C+TI-" S"CR"TAR= 4R -o.023>B3 @ecember 07,877> FACTS: )efore the court is a petition to declare as unconstitutional ec.02 of RA 1776 9,he fair election act: insofar as it e$pressly repeals ec.63 of )" BB0 9,he =mnibus <lection Code: filed by !arinas et al, minority members of the minority bloc in the #R. %mpleaded as respondents are the <$ecutive sec, pea(er of the #ouse etal. ISS+": 0. W=- the effectivity clause which states E,his Act shall ta(e effect upon its approvalF 9 ec.06: is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution R+LIN,: 0. An effectivity clause which provides that the law Eshall ta(e immediately upon its approvalF is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid, the law shall ta(e effect fiftten days after its publication in the =4 or newspaper of general circulation. %n ,anada vs ,uvera, the court laid down the rule+ E,he clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itselfFR "ublication is indispensable in every case.. !"O!L" -S% >ALOS>OS 4.R. -=. 0>8B35-36, !<)RUARJ >, 8777 FACTS: ,he accused-appellant, Romeo .alos*os, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. ,he accused-appellant filed a motion as(ing that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,

including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. ISS+": Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of #ouse of Representatives R+LIN,: <lection is the e$pression of the sovereign power of the people. #owever, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. ,he immunity from arrest or detention of enators and members of the #ouse of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. ,he privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. ,he provision granting an e$emption as a special privilege cannot be e$tended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. %t may not be e$tended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. ,he accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be e$empted from the operation of ec. 00, Art. H% of the Constitution. ,he members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. ,he confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than si$ years is not merely authori&ed by law, it has constitutional foundations. ,o allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a wee( will virtually ma(e him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. uch an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellantGs status to that of a special class, it also would be a moc(ery of the purposes of the correction system. OR$OC S+,AR CO$!AN= INC% -S OR$OC CIT= "T AL E<qual "rotectionF FACTS: %n 0162, =rmoc City passed a bill which read+ E,here shall be paid to the City ,reasurer on

any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the =rmoc ugar Company %ncorporated, in =rmoc City a municipal ta$ equivalent to one per centum 90Y: per e$port sale to the United tates of America and other foreign countries.F ,hough referred to as a Eproduction ta$F, the imposition actually amounts to a ta$ on the e$port of centrifugal sugar produced at =rmoc ugar Company, %nc. !or production of sugar alone is not ta$ableO the only time the ta$ applies is when the sugar produced is e$ported. =rmoc ugar paid the ta$ 9"3,7B3.57: in protest averring that the same is violative of ec 88B3 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides+ E%t shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a ta$ in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or e$port ta$ upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void.F And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out =rmoc ugar As being liable for such ta$ impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISS+": Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. H"L#: ,he C held in favor of =rmoc ugar. ,he C noted that even if ec 88B3 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute 9 ec 8 RA 8862: which effectively authori&ed ?4Us to ta$ goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of =rmoc City is still violative of equal protection. ,he ordinance is discriminatory for it ta$es only centrifugal sugar produced and e$ported by the =rmoc ugar Company, %nc. and none other. At the time of the ta$ing ordinanceGs enactment, =rmoc ugar Company, %nc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of =rmoc. till, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. ,he ta$ing ordinance should not be singular and e$clusive as to e$clude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the ta$. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be sub*ect to the ta$ because the ordinance e$pressly points only to =rmoc ugar Company, %nc. as the entity to be levied upon.

TRILLAN"S I- -S% !I$"NT"L 4.R. -o. 031B03, .une 83, 877B <lection to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. .ustification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners li(e petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants li(e .alos*os. FACTS: "etitioner ,rillanes %H is on trial for coup dGetat in relation to the E=a(wood %ncident.F %n the 8773 elections, he won a seat in the enate with a si$-year term commencing at noon on .une >7, 8773. "etitioner now as(s the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the enate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of .alos*os as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the .alos*os case, there was already conviction. ISS+": Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and .alos*os e$ists R+LIN,: ,he petition is bereft of merit. %n attempting to stri(e a distinction between his case and that of .alos*os, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo .alos*os 9.alos*os: was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitionerVs =mnibus 'otion, whereas he 9petitioner: is a mere detention prisoner. #e asserts that he continues to en*oy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. !urther, petitioner illustrates that .alos*os was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and si$ counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup dVetat which is regarded as a /political offense./ !urthermore, petitioner *ustifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in e$pressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and

institutionali&ed practice of graft and corruption in the A!". A plain reading of .alos*os suggests otherwise, however. ,he distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in .alos*os that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. %t cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is ta(en into custody for purposes of the administration of *ustice. -o less than the Constitution provides+ All persons, e$cept those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recogni&ance as may be provided by law. ,he right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. <$cessive bail shall not be required. 9Underscoring supplied: ,he Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. ,hat the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup dVetat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political comple$ion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. %n the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitionerVs application for bail and for release on recogni&ance was denied. ,he determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial courtVs *udgment of conviction, *ustifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. ,his accentuates the proviso that the denial of the

right to bail in such cases is /regardless of the stage of the criminal action./ uch *ustification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners li(e petitioner or convicted prisonersappellants li(e .alos*os. "etitioner goes on to allege that unli(e .alos*os who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight ris( since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention. ubsequent events reveal the contrary, however. ,he assailed =rders augured well when on -ovember 81, 8773 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. ,he account, dubbed this time as the /'anila "en %ncident,/ proves that petitionerVs argument bites the dust. ,he ris( that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real. 'oreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. %n cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. =nce it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. ART. 3 Sec. # RIGHTS OF UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEI$URE cases: -AL$ONT" -S% #" -ILLA FACTS: =n 87 .anuary 01B3, the -ational Capital Region @istrict Command 9-CR@C: was activated pursuant to ?etter of %nstruction 78QB3 of the "hilippine 4eneral #eadquarters, A!", with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the -ational Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain

peace and order, the -CR@C installed chec(points in various parts of Halen&uela, 'etro 'anila. "etitioners aver that, because of the installation of said chec(points, the residents of Halen&uela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the chec(points, considering that their cars and vehicles are being sub*ected to regular searches and chec(-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant andQor court order. ,heir alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 1 .uly 01BB, )en*amin "arpon, a supply officer of the 'unicipality of Halen&uela, )ulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the -CR@C manning the chec(point along 'cArthur #ighway at 'alinta, Halen&uela, for ignoring andQor refusing to submit himself to the chec(point and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. ISS+": W=- the installation of chec(points violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and sei&ures R+LIN,: "etitionerVs concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the chec(points are not sufficient grounds to declare the chec(points per se, illegal. -o proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine chec(s, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitionersVV rights against unlawful search and sei&ure of other rights. ,he constitutional right against unreasonable searches and sei&ures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. -ot all searches and sei&ures are prohibited. ,hose which are reasonable are not forbidden. ,he setting up of the questioned chec(points may be considered as a security measure to enable the -CR@C to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Chec(points may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabili&e the govt, in the interest of public security. )etween the inherent right of the state to protect its e$istence and promote public welfare and an individualGs right against

a warrantless search wQc is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. ,rue, the manning of chec(points by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. )ut, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citi&en, the chec(points during these abnormal times, when conducted wQin reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. PROBABLE CAUSE! %&e'()(*(+), cases: H+/"RT >% !% W"//, -S% HONORA/L" RA+L "% #" L"ON 4.R. -o. 0808>2, August 8>, 0115 FACTS: =n .une 01, 0112, the -ational )ureau of %nvestigation 9-)%: filed with the @epartment of .ustice a letter-complaint charging petitioners #ubert Webb, 'ichael 4atchalian, Antonio .. ?e*ano and si$ 96: other persons with the crime of Rape and #omicide of Carmela -. Hi&conde, her mother <strellita -icolas-Hi&conde, and her sister Anne 'arie .ennifer in their home at -umber B7 W. Hin&ons, t., )! #omes "aranaque, 'etro 'anila on .une >7, 0110. !orthwith, the @epartment of .ustice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief tate "rosecutor .ovencio R. Duno to conduct the preliminary investigation. AR,+$"NTS: "etitioners fault the @=. "anel for its finding of probable cause. ,hey assail the credibility of .essica Alfaro as inherently wea( and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 8B, 0115 and 'ay 88, 0115 sworn statements. ,hey critici&e the procedure followed by the @=. "anel when it did not e$amine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. "etitioners charge that respondent .udge Raul de ?eon and, later, respondent .udge Amelita ,olentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary e$amination. "etitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation

of their right to an impartial investigation. ,hey also assail the pre*udicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. ISS+"S: 0. Whether or not the @=. "anel li(ewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide 8. Whether or not respondent .udges de ?eon and ,olentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary e$amination before issuing warrants of arrest against them >. Whether or not the @=. "anel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation 2. Whether or not the @=. "anel unlawfully intruded into *udicial prerogative when it failed to charge .essica Alfaro in the information as an accused. R+LIN,: 0. -=. 8. -=. >. -=. ,here is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. 2. -=. R<A =- + 0. ,he Court ruled that the @=. "anel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more li(ely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. "robable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 8. ,he Court ruled that respondent *udges did not gravely abuse their discretion. %n arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. ection 6 of Rule 008 simply provides that Eupon filing of an information, the Regional ,rial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent *udges should have conducted Esearching e$amination of witnessesF before issuing warrants of arrest against them. >. ,he @=. "anel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for

the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. 2. "etitionerGs argument lac(s appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a *udicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond e$ecutive and legislative interference. %n truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the e$ecutive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully e$ecuted. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators 9 ee R.A. -o. 61B0 and section 1 of Rule 001 for legal basis:. With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of .essica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently e$plained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. With regard to the petitionersG complaint about the pre*udicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the @=. "anel. "etitioners cannot *ust rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the @=. "anel, for these are basically unbe(nown and beyond (nowing. LI$, SR% -S >+#," F"LI. 4R -= . 15152-3 9!<)RUARJ 01, 0110: FACTS: -=n 'arch 03, 01B1, at about 3+>7 oVcloc( in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the 'asbate @omestic Airport, located at the municipality of 'asbate province of 'asbate, Congressman 'oises <spinosa, r. and his security escorts, namely "rovincial 4uards Antonio Cortes, 4aspar Amaro, and Artemio !uentes were attac(ed and (illed by a lone assassin. @ante iblante another security escort of Congressman <spinosa, r. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. -An investigation of the incident then followed. -,hereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, #arry =. ,antiado, , g, of the "C Criminal %nvestigation ervice at Camp )agong %balon ?ega&pi City filed an amended complaint with the 'unicipal ,rial Court of 'asbate accusing, among others, Hicente ?im, r., 'ayor usana ?im of 'asbate, .olly ,. !ernande&, !lorencio ,.

!ernande&, .r., -onilon A. )agalihog, 'ayor -estor C. ?im and 'ayor Antonio Iho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. ,he case was doc(eted as Criminal Case -o. 1800. -After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated .uly >0, 01B1 stating therein that+ E. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary e$amination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, .immy Cabarles, Ronnie !ernande&, -onilon )agalihog, .olly !ernande&, !lorencio !ernande&, .r., Hicente ?im, r., usana ?im, -estor ?im, Antonio Iho, .aime ?iwanag, Daldy @umalag and Rene ,ualla alias ,idoy.F - "etitioners Hicente ?im, r. and usana ?im filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the 'unicipal .udge )arsaga of 'asbate for the best enlightenment regarding the e$istence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the e$istence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. - %n another manifestation, the ?ims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really e$ists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. - %t should also be noted that the ?ims also presented to the respondent .udge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. -=n .uly 5, 0117, the respondent court issued an order denying for lac( of merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. ,he *udge wrote, E%n the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the 'unicipal ,rial Court of 'asbate, 'asbate which found the e$istence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused

are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the "rovincial "rosecutor who properly filed with the Regional ,rial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the e$istence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it *ust and proper to rely on the prosecutorVs certification in each informationRF -"etitioners question the *udgment of .udge !eli$ 9statement immediately preceding this paragraph, italici&ed:. ISS+": W=- a *udge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutionVs certification and recommendation that a probable cause e$ists. R+LIN,: ,he questioned =rder of respondent .udge -emesio . !eli$ of )ranch 56, Regional ,rial Court of 'a(ati dated .uly 5, 0117 is declared -U?? and H=%@ and <, A %@<. As held in oliven v. 'a(asiar, the .udge does not have to personally e$amine the complainant and his witnesses. ,he "rosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the ta(ing of the evidence. #owever, there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the !iscalVs bare certification. All of these should be before the .udge. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or e$haustive the .udgeVs e$amination should be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each case. ,he .udge has to e$ercise sound discretionO after all, the personal determination is vested in the .udge by the Constitution. #owever, to be sure, the .udge must go beyond the "rosecutorVs certification and investigation report whenever necessary. As mentioned in the facts 9stated above:, the ?ims presented documents of recantations of the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent .udge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the preliminary e$amination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the /political undertones/ prevailing in the cases.

%n ma(ing the required personal determination, a .udge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. ,he e$tent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is sub*ect to the .udgeVs sound discretion. #owever, the .udge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. %ndubitably, the respondent .udge 9!eli$: committed a grave error when he relied solely on the "rosecutorVs certification and issued the questioned =rder dated .uly 5, 0117 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the e$istence of a probable cause. CONDUCT OF CHEC cases: -AL$ONT" -S% #" -ILLA FACTS: =n 87 .anuary 01B3, the -ational Capital Region @istrict Command 9-CR@C: was activated pursuant to ?etter of %nstruction 78QB3 of the "hilippine 4eneral #eadquarters, A!", with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the -ational Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the -CR@C installed chec(points in various parts of Halen&uela, 'etro 'anila. "etitioners aver that, because of the installation of said chec(points, the residents of Halen&uela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the chec(points, considering that their cars and vehicles are being sub*ected to regular searches and chec(-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant andQor court order. ,heir alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 1 .uly 01BB, )en*amin "arpon, a supply officer of the 'unicipality of Halen&uela, )ulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the -CR@C manning the chec(point along 'cArthur #ighway at 'alinta, Halen&uela, for ignoring andQor refusing to POINTS!

submit himself to the chec(point and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. ISS+": W=- the installation of chec(points violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and sei&ures R+LIN,: "etitionerVs concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the chec(points are not sufficient grounds to declare the chec(points per se, illegal. -o proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine chec(s, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitionersVV rights against unlawful search and sei&ure of other rights. ,he constitutional right against unreasonable searches and sei&ures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. -ot all searches and sei&ures are prohibited. ,hose which are reasonable are not forbidden. ,he setting up of the questioned chec(points may be considered as a security measure to enable the -CR@C to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Chec(points may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabili&e the govt, in the interest of public security. )etween the inherent right of the state to protect its e$istence and promote public welfare and an individualGs right against a warrantless search wQc is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. ,rue, the manning of chec(points by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. )ut, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citi&en, the chec(points during these abnormal times, when conducted wQin reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. !"O!L" -S% #"L ROSARIO 8>2 CRA 826O 4.R. -=. 0716>>O 87 .U? 0112 FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly

methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authori&ed the search and sei&ure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernaliaGs, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the sei&ure of the shabu, its paraphernaliaGs and of a .88 caliber pistol with > live ammunition. ISS+"+ Whether or -ot the sei&ure of the firearms was proper. H"L#: -o. ec 8 art. %%% of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be sei&ed. %n herein case, the only ob*ects to be sei&ed that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernaliaGs therein. ,he sei&ure of the firearms was unconstitutional. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. $ANALILI -% CO+RT OF A!!"ALS 8B7 CRA 277 FACTS: -arcotics officers were doing surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a cemetery who seemed to be high on drugs. #e tried to resist the police officers and upon inquiry, found that the accused was possessing what seemed to be crushed mari*uana leaves. H"L#: A stop-and-fris( was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citi&en on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. %t has been held as one of the e$ceptions to the general rule against searches without warrant. !"O!L" -S% AR+TA 8BB CRA 686 4.R. -=. 087505O 0> A"R 011B FACTS: =n @ec. 0>, 01BB, "Q?t. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain EAling RosaF will be arriving from )aguio City with a large volume of mari*uana and assembled a team. ,he ne$t day, at the Hictory ?iner )us terminal they waited for the bus coming from )aguio, when

the informer pointed out who EAling RosaF was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as -ARC=' agents. When Abello as(ed Ealing RosaF about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. ,hey found dried mari*uana leaves pac(ed in a plastic bag mar(ed Ecash (atuta(F. %nstead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and sei&ure of the items. %n her testimony, the accused claimed that she had *ust come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie E)alwegF. While about to cross the road an old woman as(ed her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. he has no (nowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented. ,he trial court convicted the accused violation of the dangerous drugs of 0138 in

3. <$igent and <mergency Circumstances. ,he essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and sei&ure can be lawfully conducted. ,he accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the -arcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. ,here was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accusedGs bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. ,he police had more than 82 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. ,he sei&ed mari*uana was illegal and inadmissible evidence. R+L" 113, R+L"S OF CO+RT ection 5. Arrest without warrantO when lawful. U A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person+ 9a: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offenseO 9b: When an offense has *ust been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal (nowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed itO and 9c: When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final *udgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. %n cases falling under paragraph 9a: and 9b: above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or *ail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 3 of Rule 008. R+L" 146, R+L"S OF CO+RT ection 8. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. U An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following+ a: Any court within whose territorial *urisdiction a crime was committed.

ISS+": Whether or -ot the police correctly searched and sei&ed the drugs from the accused. R+LIN,: ,he following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law+ 0. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recogni&ed under ection 08, Rule 086 of the Rules of Court B and by prevailing *urisprudence 8. ei&ure of evidence in /plain view,/ the elements of which are+ 9a: a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official dutiesO 9b: the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they areO 9c: the evidence must be immediately apparent, and 9d: /plain view/ *ustified mere sei&ure of evidence without further searchO >. earch of a moving vehicle. #ighly regulated by the government, the vehicleVs inherent mobility reduces e$pectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activityO 2. Consented warrantless searchO 5. Customs searchO 6. top and !ris(O

b: !or compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the *udicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is (nown, or any court within the *udicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. #owever, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. ection 3. Right to brea( door or window to effect search. U ,he officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may brea( open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to e$ecute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. ection 08. @elivery of property and inventory thereof to courtO return and proceedings thereon. 9a: ,he officer must forthwith deliver the property sei&ed to the *udge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. 9b: ,en 907: days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing *udge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to e$plain why no return was made. %f the return has been made, the *udge shall ascertain whether section 00 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property sei&ed be delivered to him. ,he *udge shall see to it that subsection 9a: hereof has been complied with. 9c: ,he return on the search warrant shall be filed and (ept by the custodian of the log boo( on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the *udge. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court SILAHIS INT"RNATIONAL HOT"L, INC% vs% SOL+TA FACTS: ?oida omacera 9?oida:, a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female loc(er room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn,

she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recogni&e but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. %n the morning, as union officer oluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, ?oida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. oluta immediately lodged a complaint before the ecurity =fficer. And he fetched a loc(smith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting oluta and his companions. "anlilio thereupon instructed Hillanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. =nce inside, "anlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the ob*ection of )abay who even as(ed them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing mari*uana flowering tops. As a result of the discovery of the presence of mari*uana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 0> union officers was filed before the !iscalGs =ffice of 'anila. R,C acquitted the accused. =n appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. ISS+": Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. R+LIN,: Article >8, in relation to Article 880196: and 907: of the Civil Code, allows so. AR,. >8. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages+ %n the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 01B3 of illegal activities and 'aniego conducted surveillance. Jet, in the morning of .anuary 00, 01BB, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one. ,he course ta(en by petitioners and company stin(s in illegality. "etitionersG violation of individual respondentsG constitutional right

against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article >8 of the Civil Code. !or respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and sei&ure. Article >8 spea(s of an officer or employee or person /directly or indirectly/ responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. #ence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article >8O the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or in*ury caused to the aggrieved party. uch being the case, petitioners, together with 'aniego and Hillanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are *ointly and severally liable for actual, moral and e$emplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article >8, in relation to Article 880196: and 907: of the Civil Code which provides+ Art. 8801. 'oral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, 96: %llegal search and 907: Acts and action referred to in Articles 80, 86, 83, 8B, 81, >7, >8, >2 and >5. @<C% %=-+ @enied. !ACIS -S% !A$ARAN 4.R. -o. ?-8>116 'arch 05, 0132 #&ct'*ne: %t is a well-settled principle that for violations of customs laws, a warrant issued by the Collector of Customs is conceded. %t is not necessary, in these cases, that the warrants be issued by a *udge, as what is required in the Constitution. FACTS: Respondent Ricardo antos is the owner of a 'ercury automobile, model 0153. %t was brought into this country without the payment of customs duty and ta$es, its original owner @onald .ames #atch being ta$-e$empt. =n .une 85, 0162, respondent paid ">00.77 for customs duty and ta$es. "etitioner "acis, on .uly 88, 0162 received from the Administrator, 4eneral Affairs Administration of the @epartment of -ational @efense, a letter to the effect that the ?and ,ransportation Commission reported that such

automobile was a /hot car./ )y virtue thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates, loo(ed into the records of his office and ascertained that the amount collectible on said car should be "8,577.77, more or less. )ased on such discrepancy, petitioner instituted sei&ure proceedings and issued a warrant of sei&ure and detention and thus the sub*ect automobile was ta(en. Respondent requested for the withdrawal or dissolution of the warrant of sei&ure but petitioner denied it. ,hereafter, respondent antos filed a criminal complaint for usurpation of *udicial functions with the City !iscal of 'anila. As the respondent !iscal "amaran was bent on proceeding with the charge against petitioner, an action for prohibition was filed with the upreme Court. ISS+": Whether or not the Constitutional provision which states that only a *udge could issue a search warrant applies to warrants issued in lieu of violations of customs laws. H"L#: %n a recent decision of this Court, "apa v. 'ago, where the sei&ure of alleged smuggled goods was effected by a police officer without a search warrant, this Court, through .ustice Daldivar, stated+ /"etitioner 'artin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the sei&ure without any search warrant issued by a component court. ,he ,ariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. ,he Code authori&es persons having police authority under ection 887> of the ,ariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search and e$amine any vessel or aircraft and any trun(, pac(age, bo$ or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and e$amine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the "hilippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. )ut in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said /dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a *udge or *ustice of the peace ... ./ %t is our considered view, therefore, that e$cept in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons e$ercising police

authority under the customs law may effect search and sei&ure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws./ ,he plenitude of the competence vested in customs officials is thus undeniable. -o such constitutional question then can possibly arise. o much is implicit from the very language of ection 8875 of the ,ariff and Customs Code. %t spea(s for itself. %t is not susceptible of any misinterpretation. ,he power of petitioner is thus manifest. %t being undeniable then that the sole basis for an alleged criminal act performed by him was the performance of a duty according to law, there is not the slightest *ustification for respondent Assistant City !iscal to continue with the preliminary investigation after his attention was duly called to the plain and e$plicit legal provision that did not suffer at all from any constitutional infirmity. W#<R<!=R<, the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted and the successor of respondent 'anuel R. "amaran, now a criminal circuit court *udge, or any one in the City !iscalVs =ffice of the City of 'anila to whom the complaint against petitioner for usurpation of *udicial functions arising out of the issuance of the warrant of sei&ure and detention, sub*ectmatter of this litigation, has been assigned, is perpetually restrained from acting thereon e$cept to dismiss the same. -o costs. STO! AN# FRIS0 R+L": cases: $ALACAT -S% CO+RT OF A!!"ALS 4R 08>515, 08 @ecember 0113 FACTS: =n 83 August 0117, at about 6+>7 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Ju of the Western "olice @istrict, 'etropolitan "olice !orce of the %ntegrated -ational "olice, "olice tation -o. >, Cuiapo, 'anila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers 9all of them in uniform: along Cue&on )oulevard, Cuiapo, 'anila, near the 'ercury @rug store at "la&a 'iranda. ,hey chanced upon two groups of 'uslim-loo(ing men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Cue&on )oulevard near the 'ercury @rug tore. ,hese men were acting suspiciously with Etheir eyes moving very fast.F

Ju and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about >7 minutes. ,he police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Ju caught up with and apprehended ammy 'alacat y 'andar 9who Ju recogni&ed, inasmuch as allegedly the previous aturday, 85 August 0117, li(ewise at "la&a 'iranda, Ju saw 'alacat and 8 others attempt to detonate a grenade:. Upon searching 'alacat, Ju found a fragmentation grenade tuc(ed inside the latterGs Efront waist line.F JuGs companion, police officer Rogelio 'alibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .>B caliber revolver was recovered. 'alacat and Casan were then brought to "olice tation > where Ju placed an EPF mar( at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Ju did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from 'alacat. =n >7 August 0117, 'alacat was charged with violating ection > of "residential @ecree 0B66. At arraignment on 1 =ctober 0117, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. 'alacat denied the charges and e$plained that he only recently arrived in 'anila. #owever, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. "etitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. #e saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. %n its decision dated 07 !ebruary 0112 but promulgated on 05 !ebruary 0112, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and sei&ure of 'alacat was a(in to a Estop and fris(,F where a Ewarrant and sei&ure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrestF and Ewhose ob*ect is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer see(s to obtain more informationFO and that the sei&ure of the grenade from 'alacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. ,he trial court thus found 'alacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of e$plosives under ection > of "@ 0B66, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 03 years, 2 months and 0 day of Reclusion ,emporal, as minimum, and not more than >7 years of Reclusion "erpetua, as ma$imum. =n 0B !ebruary 0112, 'alacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the upreme Court. #owever, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals 9CA-4R CR 051BB:. %n its decision of 82 .anuary 0116, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court. 'analili filed a petition for review with the upreme Court. ISS+": Whether the search made on 'alacat is valid, pursuant to the e$ception of Estop and fris(.F H"L#: ,he general rule as regards arrests, searches and sei&ures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. ,he Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and sei&ures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, sub*ect to certain e$ceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in ection 5, Rule 00> of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under ection 59a: has been denominated as one Ein flagrante delicto,F while that under ection 59b: has been described as a Ehot pursuitF arrest. ,urning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following+ 90: customs searchesO 98: search of moving vehiclesO 9>: sei&ure of evidence in plain viewO 92: consent searchesO 95: a search incidental to a lawful arrestO and 96: a Estop and fris(.F ,he concepts of a Estop-and-fris(F and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. ,hese two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. %n a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. #ere, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lac( of personal (nowledge on the part of Ju, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of 'alacat, indicating that a crime had *ust been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. "lainly, the search conducted on 'alacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. =n the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a Estop and fris(,F it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a Estop and fris(.F A genuine reason must e$ist, in light of the police officerGs e$perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. !inally, a Estop-and-fris(F serves a two-fold interest+ 90: the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that

a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable causeO and 98: the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to ta(e steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could une$pectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. #ere, there are at least three 9>: reasons why the Estop-and-fris(F was invalid+ !irst, there is grave doubts as to JuGs claim that 'alacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb "la&a 'iranda 8 days earlier. ,his claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. econd, there was nothing in 'alacatGs behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were Emoving very fastF U an observation which leaves us incredulous since Ju and his teammates were nowhere near 'alacat and it was already 6+>7 p.m., thus presumably dus(. 'alacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. ,hird, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that 'alacat was armed with a deadly weapon. -one was visible to Ju, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was EdiscoveredF Einside the front waistlineF of 'alacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Ju and 'alacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that 'alacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Ju. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of 'alacatGs rights solemnly guaranteed in ections 8 and 0890: of Article %%% of the Constitution. WARRANTLESS ARREST cases: !"O!L" OF TH" !HILI!!IN"S -S% SAN#I,AN/A=AN 9 U).<C,+ @<?<4A,%=- =! CUA % .U@%C%A? "=W<RO < ,=""<?. FACTS: =- 0B 'ARC# 01B6, A,,J. RA'%R<D A-@ A,,J. A)<??A, "C44 A4<-, , % U<@ A

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he CourtGs Ruling Under ection 86, Article PH%%% of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue upon a showing Eof a prima facie caseF that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under <$ecutive =rders 0 and 8.M8NM00N When a court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been issued without a prima facie case, the Court does not substitute its *udgment for that of the "C44 but simply applies the law.M>N M08N %n )ataan hipyard W <ngineering Co, %nc. v. "C44,M2NM0>N the Court held that a prima facie factual foundation that the properties sequestered are Eill-gotten wealthF is required. ,he power to determine the e$istence of a

prima facie case has been vested in the "C44 as an incident to its investigatory powers. ,he two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact.M5N M02N #ere, it is clear that the "C44 did not ma(e a prior determination of the e$istence of a prima facie case that would warrant the sequestration of the =lot Resthouse. ,he Republic presented no evidence before the andiganbayan that shows differently. -or did the Republic demonstrate that the two "C44 representatives were given the quasi-*udicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant such a prima facie finding. "arenthetically, the RepublicGs supposed evidence does not show how the 'arcoses acquired the sequestered property, what ma(es it Eill-gotten wealth,F and how former "resident 'arcos intervened in its acquisition. ,a(ing the foregoing view, the resolution of the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered T whether or not it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten T should be necessary. ,he issue in this case is not new. ,he facts are substantially identical to those in the case of Republic v. andiganbayan 9@io %sland Resort, %nc.:.M6NM05N ,here, the same Atty. Ramire& issued a sequestration order on April 02, 01B6 against @io %sland Resort, %nc. and all its assets and properties which were thought to be part of the 'arcosesG ill-gotten wealth. Alerted by a challenge to his action, the "C44 passed a resolution Eto confirm, ratify and adopt as its own all the Writs of equestrationF that Attys. Ramire& and Abella issued Eto remove any doubt as to the validity and enforceabilityF of their writs. till, the Court struc( them down as void+ %t is indubitable that under no circumstances can a sequestration or free&e order be validly issued by one not a Commissioner of the "C44. ,he invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. Ramire& did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at the time he issued the said sequestration order. $ $ $ <ven assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramire& had been given prior authority by the "C44 to place @io %sland Resort under sequestration, nevertheless, the sequestration order he issued is still void since "C44 may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives

and subordinates, and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective. Under <$ecutive =rder -os. 0 and 8, "C44 is the sole entity primarily charged with the responsibility of recovering ill-gotten wealth. $ $ $ ,he power to sequester, therefore, carries with it the corollary duty to ma(e a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for sequestering a property alleged to be ill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced, the "C44 clearly has to use its own *udgment in determining the e$istence of a prima facie case. ,he absence of a prior determination by the "C44 of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its properties void ab initio. )eing void ab initio, it is deemed none$istent, as though it had never been issued, ,he Court is maintaining its above ruling in this case. Although the two "C44 lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on 'arch 0B, 01B6, before the passage of ec. > of the "C44 Rules, such consideration is immaterial following our above ruling. %n "C44 v. .udge "e;a,MBNM03N the Court held that the powers, functions and duties of the "C44 amount to the e$ercise of quasi-*udicial functions, and the e$ercise of such functions cannot be delegated by the Commission to its representatives or subordinates or tas( forces because of the well established principle that *udicial or quasi-*udicial powers may not be delegated. %t is the RepublicGs theory of course that Commissioner @a&aGs letter, directing Attys. Ramire& and Abella to search and sequester all properties, documents, money and other assets of respondents, should be considered as the writ of sequestration while the order issued by Attys. Ramire& and Abella should be treated merely as an implementing order. )ut the letter did not have the tenor of a sequestration order covering specific properties that the lawyers were ordered to sei&e and hold for the "C44. Actually, that letter is of the same (ind issued to Attys. Ramire& and Abella in @io %sland Resort. Consequently, there is no reason to depart from the CourtGs ruling in the latter case where it said+ ,he invalidity of the sequestration order was made more apparent by the fact that Atty. Ramire& did not even have any specific authority to act on behalf of the Commission at

the time he issued the said sequestration order. ,hus, the respondent Court noted+ Contrary to plaintiffGs representation, nothing e$ists to support its contention that the ,as( !orce had been given prior authority to place @%= under "C44 control. =n the contrary, as the te$t of the above letters clearly show, Attys. .ose ,an Ramire& and )en Abella, had acted on broad and non-specific powers+ Z)y authority of the commission and the powers vested in it. $ $ $.GFM1NM0BN "etitioner Republic argues that 'rs. 'arcos should be deemed estopped from questioning the sequestration of her =lot Resthouse by her actions in regard to the same. )ut a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel. !or the same reason, the Court cannot accept petitionerGs view that 'rs. 'arcos should have first sought the lifting of the sequestration order through a motion to quash filed with the "C44. )eing void, the andiganbayan has the power to stri(e it down on sight. )esides, the lifting of the sequestration order will not necessarily be fatal to the main case since it does not follow from such lifting that the sequestered properties are not ill-gotten wealth. uch lifting simply means that the government may not act as conservator or may not e$ercise administrative or house(eeping powers over the property.M07NM01N %ndeed, the Republic can be protected by a notice of lis pendens. W#<R<!=R<, the Court @% '% < the petition for lac( of merit and A!!%R' the challenged resolutions of the !ourth @ivision of the andiganbayan dated !ebruary 8B, 8778 and August 8B, 8778 in Civil Case 7778, which granted respondent %melda R. 'arcosG 'otion to Cuash the 'arch 0B, 01B6 equestration =rder covering the =lot Resthouse. !urther, the Court @%R<C, the Register of @eeds of ?eyte to immediately annotate a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title of the =lot Resthouse with respect to the Republic of the "hilippinesG claim over the same in Civil Case 7778 of the andiganbayan. -o pronouncement as to costs. = =R@<R<@. !A#ILLA -% CA 081 55B 90117: Where in the complaint for 4rave Coercion against the mayor and policemen, they were acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not

been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of petition]erVs mar(et stalls. ,he acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasona]ble doubt refers to the element of 4rave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished. Under the Rules of Court, the e$tinction of penal action carries with it the e$tinction of civil only if there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not e$ist. Also, Art. 81 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a separate civil action. ,he civil liability can be recovered either in the same or a separate action. ,he purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing of another civil action where the same evidence is to be presented, and the unsettling implications of permitting reinsti]tuttion of a separate civil action. #owever, a separate civil action is warranted when 90: addition]al facts are to be establishedO 98: there is more evidence to be adducedO 9>: there is full termina]tion of the criminal case and a separate complaint would be more efficacious than a remand. #ence, CA did not err in awarding damages despite the acquittal. !"O!L" -S% #"L ROSARIO 8>2 CRA 826O 4.R. -=. 0716>>O 87 .U? 0112 FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authori&ed the search and sei&ure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernaliaGs, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the sei&ure of the shabu, its paraphernaliaGs and of a .88 caliber pistol with > live ammunition. ISS+": Whether or -ot the sei&ure of the firearms was proper. H"L#: -o. ec 8 art. %%% of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be sei&ed. %n herein case, the only ob*ects to be sei&ed that the warrant determined was the

methamphetamine and the paraphernaliaGs therein. ,he sei&ure of the firearms was unconstitutional. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. VALIDITY OF A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE -UDGE cases: !"O!L" v% T"" /rights of the accused to speedy trial/ FACTS: ,he case involves an automatic review of *udgment made against ,ee who was convicted for illegal possession of mari*uana and sentenced to death. ,he defense assailed the decision of the court for ta(ing admissible as evidence the mari*uana sei&ed from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. ,hey further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 87 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure. ISS+": Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial pre*udiced during the hearing of the case. R+LIN,: ,he court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. %t held that the peedy ,rial Act of 011B provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 0B7 days. #owever, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.,he right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when+ 90: the proceedings are attended by ve$atious, capricious, and oppressive delaysO or 98: when un*ustified postponements are as(ed for and securedO or 9>: when without cause or *ustifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

%t was shown by the records that the prosecution e$erted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. ,he concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the pre*udice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. ,he court did not find the 87 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always sub*ected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. %n the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the tate must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused. !AN,AN#A$AN -% CASAR FACTS: ,he case originated in ?anao. ,he offended party was ambushed in ?anao, but he survived. )ased on his description, there were around 57 persons who staged the ambush from both sides of the hill. #owever, he could not recogni&e anyone of the 57. )ut he filed a case against all 57 ambushers, all E.=#- @=< F. o the court issued a warrant of arrest against the 57 .ohn @oes. ISS+": WQ- the warrant of arrest is validA Can a court issue a warrant of arrest against an un(nown accusedA H"L#: -= it is not valid. %t is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a call of writs long prescribed as unconstitutional and once anathemati&ed as totally subversive of the liberty of the sub*ect. Clearly violative of the constitutional in*unction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be sei&ed. ,he warrant as against unidentified sub*ects will be considered as null and void. EXAMINATION DEPOSITS cases: !N/ -S% ,ANCA=CO 4.R. -o. ?-0B>2> eptember >7, 0165 OF BAN ACCOUNTS.

!AC, + @efendants <milio 4ancayco and !lorentino !lor, as special prosecutors of the @epartment of .ustice, required the plaintiff "hilippine -ational )an( to produce at a hearing the records of the ban( deposits of <rnesto .imene&, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for une$plained wealth. %n declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff ban( invo(ed ection 8 of Republic Act -o. 0275. =n the other hand, the defendants cited ection B of the Anti-4raft and Corrupt "ractices Act 9Republic Act -o. >701: in support of their claim of authority,which allegedly provides an additional ground for the e$amination of ban( deposits. ISS+": Whether ection B of Republic Act -o. >701 provides an additional ground for the e$amination of ban( deposits. H"L#: Jes. ,he truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. $ $ $. ,he only conclusion possible is that section B of the Anti-4raft ?aw is intended to amend section 8 of Republic Act -o. 0275 by providing additional e$ception to the rule against the disclosure of ban( deposits. WNhile section 8 of Republic Act 0275 declares ban( deposits to be /absolutely confidential,/ it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances+ 90: Upon written permission of the depositorO 98: %n cases of impeachmentO 9>: Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officialsO 92: %n cases where the money deposited is the sub*ect matter of the litigation. Cases of une$plained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty. $ARJ+"5 -S% #ISI"RTO 4.R. -o. 0>5BB8 .une 83, 8770 FACTS: Respondent =mbudsman @esierto ordered petitioner 'arque& to produce several ban( documents for purposes of inspection in

camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union )an( of the "hilippines, .ulia Hargas )ranch, where petitioner is the branch manager. ,he order is based on a pending investigation at the =ffice of the =mbudsman against Amado ?agdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. -o. >701, ec. > 9e: and 9g: relative to the .oint Henture Agreement between the "ublic <states Authority and A'AR%. "etitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her brea(ing any law, particularly RA. -o. 0275. ISS+": Whether the order of the =mbudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an e$ception to the law on secrecy of ban( deposits 9R.A. -o.0275:. H"L#: -o. We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent *urisdiction. !urther, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the sub*ect matter of the pending case before the court of competent *urisdiction. ,he ban( personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case