2. G.R. No. 79347 January 26, 1989 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (SEPTEMBER CONVENTION), petitioner, vs.

DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation and Hundred Island Chemical Corporation, respondents. Apolinar Sevilla for petitioner. The Solicitor General for public respondent. Dominguez, Armamento, Cabana & Associates for respondent Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corp., Inc. Isidro D. Amoroso for respondent Hundred Island Chemical Corp.

PARAS, J.: Before Us is a special civil action for certiorari, questioning the order of respondent Director dated 27, July 1987,.which in part states: xxx Without going into the merits of the above-entitled case this office finds that the best forum to determine once and for all whether or not herein appellantintervenor commands support of the rank-and-file in the unit is through the process of a certification election. WHEREFORE, in view thereof, Appellant-Intervenor, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino is hereby included as one of the contending unions. Let, therefore, a certification election proceed without any further delay, with the following choices: 1. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation; 2. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention) and 3. Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 26-27, Rollo) The basic facts of this case are undisputed: A petition for certification election among the rank-and-file workers of the Hundred Island Chemical Corporation was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) by respondent Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hundred Island Chemical Corporation (Samahan, for short) and was docketed as BLR Case No. A-6-201-87. A motion to intervene, accompanied by the written consent of twenty percent (20%) of the rank-and-file employees of the said corporation was filed by petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (September Convention), or PAFLU, on 27 April 1987, Likewise the Katipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI, for brevity) flied its motion to intervene on 1 June 1987 but unaccompanied by a similar written consent of the employer's workers. Due to such want of a written consent, PAFLU moved for the striking out of KAMAPI's motion for intervention. Acting on said motion, Med-Arbiter Renato D. Parungo issued an order dated 8 June 1987 denying KAMAPI's motion for intervention and allowing PAFLU's inclusion in the certification election. On 17 June 1987, KAMAPI appealed the said Med-Arbiter's order to the respondent Director of the BLR, who issued the afore-quoted order. Thus, on 17 August 1987, this petition was filed. And as prayed for in the said petition, We issued a temporary restraining order dated 24, August 1987. Respondent Samahan has contested the issuance of said restraining order and has prayed that it be lifted since the delay of the certification election only defeats the constitutional right of labor to organize. The main issue in this petition was aptly deposited by the Solicitor General in his consolidated comment; Whether or not KAMAPI should be allowed to participate in a certification election thru a motion for intervention without a prior showing that it has the required support expressed in the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all employees in the collective bargaining unit. In taking the negative stance, petitioner cites Section 6, Rule V of the Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 111, which reads: SEC. 6. PROCEDURE. Upon receipt of a petition, the Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter shall have twenty (20) working days within which to grant or dismiss the petition. In a petition filed by a legitimate organization involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-Arbiter shall grant the petition upon verification that the same is supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) of all the

employees in the collective bargaining unit, the twenty (20%) support shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition for certification election, otherwise, the petition shall be dismissed. In either case, he shall cite the ground. Pertinent to the above rule is Section 7 of E.O. 111 to which the former relates, and which provides: SEC. 7. Articles 257 and 258 of the Labor Code of the Philippines are hereby amended to read as follows: xxx Art. 258. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order the conduct of a certification election. Considering the above provisions of law, We rule to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari. The respondent Director did not abuse her discretion in issuing the contested order. It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only, and not to motions for intervention. Nowhere in the aforesaid legal provisions does it appear that a motion for intervention in a certification election must be accompanied by a similar written consent. Not even in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code (see Rule V, Rules Implementing the Labor Code). Obviously, the percentage requirement pertains only to the petition for certification election, and nothing else. This leads Us to the question of purpose. the reason behind the 20% requirement is to ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial interest in the representation proceedings ** and, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, that a considerable number of workers desire their representation by the said petitioning union for collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that 20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the petition by their written consent, it becomes mandatory on the part of the MedArbiter to order the holding of a certification election in an unorganized establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134

SCRA 152). The 20% requirement, thereof, is peculiar to petitions for certification election. In the light of the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in the certification election since the essence of such proceeding is to settle once and for all which union is preferred by the workers to represent them (PAFLU vs. BLR, 69 SCRA 132; PAFLU vs. BLR, 72 SCRA 396). As long as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the motion for intervention is to participate in the certification election. After all the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order dated 24 August 1987 LIFTED. With costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 97622 October 19, 1994 CATALINO ALGIRE and OTHER OFFICERS OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA TEXTILE MONTHLY SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (URTMSEU), petitioners, vs. REGALADO DE MESA, et al., and HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents. C.A. Montano Law Office for petitioner. Cabio and Ravanes Law Offices and Jaime D. Lauron for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.: This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated January 31, 1991 of the Secretary of Labor which reversed on appeal the Order dated December 20, 1990 issued by Med-arbiter Rolando S. dela Cruz declaring petitioners as the duly-elected officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees union (URTMSEU) as well as the order dated March 5, 1991 denying petitioner Catalino Algire's motion for reconsideration.

The case arose out of the election of the rightful officers to represent the union in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the management of Universal Robina Textile at its plant in Km. 50, Bo. San Cristobal, Calamba, Laguna. Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union, (URTMSEU), through private respondent Regalado de Mesa, filed on September 4, 1990 a petition for the holding of an election of union officers with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Acting thereon, DOLE's medarbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990 directing that such an election be held. In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be conducted on November 15, 1990 between petitioners (Catalino Algire, et al.) and private respondents (Regalado de Mesa, et al.) under the supervision of DOLE through its duly appointed representation officer. The official ballot contained the following pertinent instructions: Nais kong pakatawan sa grupo ni: LINO and his officers ALGIRE DE officers and REGALADO MESA his

1. Mark Check (/) or cross (x) inside the box specified above who among the two contending parties you desire to be represented for the purpose of collecting bargaining. 2. This is a secret ballot. Don't write any other markings. 1 The result of the election were as follows: Lino Regalado Spoiled 6 Total votes cast 272 On November 19, 1990, Catalino Algire filed a Petition and/or Motion (RO 4009009-AU-002), which DOLE's Med Arbitration unit treated as a protest, to the Algire de group Mesa 133 133

effect that one of the ballots wherein one voter placed two checks inside the box opposite the phrase "Lino Algire and his officers," hereinafter referred to as the "questioned ballot," should not have been declared spoiled, as the same was a valid vote in their favor. The group argued that the two checks made even clearer the intention of the voter to exercise his political franchise in favor of Algire's group. During the schedules hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the envelope containing the spoiled ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one ballot contained two (2) checks in the box opposite petitioner Algire's name and his officers. On December 20, 1990, med-arbiter de la Cruz issued an order declaring the questioned ballot valid, thereby counting the same in Algire's favor and accordingly certified petitioner's group as the union's elected officers. 2 Regalado de Mesa, et al. appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the Secretary of Labor in Case No. OS-A-1-37-91 (RO 400-9009-AU-002). On January 31, 1991, the latter's office granted the appeal and reversed the aforesaid Order. In its stead, it entered a new one ordering "the calling of another election of officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU), with the same choices as in the election of 15 November, 1990, after the usual pre-election conference." 3 Director Maximo B. Lim of the Industrial Relations Division, Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE set the hearing for another pre-election conference on March 22, 1991, reset to April 2, 1991, and finally reset to April 5, 1991. Catalino Algire's group filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. It was denied for lack of merit and the decision sought to be reconsidered was sustained. Algire, et al. filed this petition on the following issues: (1) the Secretary of Labor erred in applying Sections 1 and 8 (6), Rule VI, Book V of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code to the herein case, considering that the case is an intra-union activity, which act constitutes a grave abuse in the exercise of authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction. (2) the assailed decision and order are not supported by law and evidence.

with an ex-parte motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order, alleging that the assailed decision of the office of the Secretary of Labor as public respondent is by nature immediately executory and the holding of an election at any time after April 5, 1991, would render the petition moot and academic unless restrained by this Court. On April 5, 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of another election of union officers pursuant to the January 31, 1991 decision. There is no merit in the petition. The contention of the petitioner is that a representation officer (referring to a person duly authorized to conduct and supervise certification elections in accordance with Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on on-the-spot questions arising from the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned ballot is not within his competence. Therefore, any ruling made by the representation officer concerning the validity of the ballot is deemed an absolute nullity because such is the allegation it was done without or in excess of his functions amounting to lack of jurisdiction. To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant, what was agreed to be held at the company's premises and which became the root of this controversy, was a consent election, not a certification election. It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election. 5 The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is spoiled is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action by such officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed in the written instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit unauthorized markings thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the votes in order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the contending parties. If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably

during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election. Moreover, petitioners even question at this stage the clear instruction to mark a check or cross opposite the same of the candidate's group, arguing that such instruction was not clear, as two checks "may be interpreted that a voter may vote for Lino Algire but not with (sic) his officers or 6 vice-versa," notwithstanding the fact that a pre-election conference had already been held where no such question was raised. In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that should best represent them in the forthcoming collective bargaining negotiations should be achieved through the democratic process of an election, the proper forum where the true will of the majority may not be circumvented but clearly defined. The workers must be allowed to freely express their choice once and for all in a determination where anything is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation is minimized, if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or maneuvering. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 76185 March 30, 1988 WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION (WMWU), petitioner, vs. THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS UNION (PACIWU); and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA WARREN MANUFACTURING CORP.-ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (SMWMC-ANGLO), respondents.

PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for a preliminary injunction and/or the issuance of a restraining order seeking to set aside: (1) Order of the Med-Arbiter dated August 18,1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election is hereby ordered conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of Warren Manufacturing Corporation, within 20 days from receipt of this Order, with the following choices: 1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industry Workers Union (PACIWU); 2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union; 3. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren Mfg. Corporation petition-ANGLO; and 4. No Union. The representation Officer is hereby directed to call the parties to a pre- election conference to thresh out the mechanics for the conduct of the actual election. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15). and (2) the Resolution dated October 7, 1986 of the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor dismissing the appeals of Warren Manufacturing Corporation and herein petitioner (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 16-18). This certification case had its inception in an intra-union rivalry between the petitioner and the respondent Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985. The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor Relations are as follows: On June 13,1985, PACIWU filed a petition for certification election, alleging compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. On July 7, 1985, respondent thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that there exist a C.BA between the respondent and the Warren Mfg. Union which took effect upon its signing on July 16, 1985 and to expire on July 31, 1986. While the petition was under hearing, PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and on conciliation meeting, a Return-to-Work Agreement was signed on July 25,1985, stipulating, among others, as follows:

To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg- Corp. parties have agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file on August 25, 1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by MOLE. ... It is cleanly understood that the certified union in the said projected election shall respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its expiry date on July 31, 1986. On 12 August 1985, an Order was issued by this Office, directing that a consent election be held among the rank and file workers of the company, with the following contending unions: 1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU) 2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union; 3. No Union. On August 25, 1985, said consent election was held, and yielded the following results: PACIWU----------------------------94 WMWU----------------------------193 Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU filed an Election Protest. In December, 1985 a Notice of Strike was again filed by the union this time with the Valenzuela branch office of this Ministry, and after conciliation, the parties finally agreed, among others, to wit: In consideration of this payment, ... individual complaints and PACIWU hereby agree and covenant that the following labor complaints/disputes are considered amicably settled and withdrawn/dismissed, to wit: ... On the basis of a Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties, the Election Protest filed by the PACIWU was ordered dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 12-13). On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for certification election followed by the filing of a petition for the same purposes by the Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for short) which petitions were both opposed by Warren Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither

petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the one-year no certification election law and the existence of a duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent, therefore, prayed that the petitions for certification election be dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 11-12). As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, ordered on August 8, 't 986 the holding of a certification election within twenty 20) days from receipt to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of the Warren se Manufacturing Corporation, with the above-mentioned choices. Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner herein filed separate motions, treated as appeals by the Bureau of Labor Relations, which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. This petition was filed solely by the Warren Manufacturing Workers Union, with the company itself opting not to appeal. The Second Division of this Court in the resolution of November 3, 1986 without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment and issued the temporary, restraining order prayed for (Rollo, pp. 18-20). The comment of the respondent PACIWU was filed on November 27, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 29-32). The public respondent through the Hon. Solicitor General filed its Comment to the petition on December 10, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 34-43) and private respondent ANGLO, filed its comment on December 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 45- 51). The petitioner with leave of court filed its reply to comment entitled a rejoinder on January 6,1987 (Ibid., pp. 52-62). In the resolution of January 26, 1987, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 76). Memorandum for public respondent was filed on February 20,1987 (Ibid., p. 8288). Respondent PACIWU's memorandum was filed on March 18, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 95-99). SMWMCANGLO'S Memorandum was filed on March 23,1987 (Ibid., pp. 100-1 09) and the petitioner's memorandum was filed on March 31,1987 (Ibid., pp. 110-120). In its memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues:

A. The holding of a certification election at the bargaining unit is patently premature and illegal. B. The petition filed by private respondents do not have the statutory 30% support requirement. C. Petitioner was denied administrative due process when excluded from medarbitration proceedings. The petition is devoid of merit. A. Petitioner's contention is anchored on the following grounds: Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code provides, among others: ... however no certification election may be held within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the declaration of a final certification result. and Article 257, Title VII, Book V of the Labor Code provides: No certification election issue shall be entertained by the Bureau in any Collective Bargaining Agreement existing between the employer and a legitimate labor organization. Otherwise stated, petitioner invoked the one-year no certification election rule and the principle of the Contract Bar Rule. This contention is untenable. The records show that petitioner admitted that what was held on August 25,1985 at the Company's premises and which became the root of this controversy, was a consent election and not a certification election (Emphasis supplied). As correctly distinguished by private respondent, a consent election is an agreed one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a certification election is aimed at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a separate

and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effect of a certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants thereof to immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day freedom period. In fact the Med-Arbiter in the Return to Work Agreement signed by the parties emphasized the following: To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren Mfg. Corp., parties have agreed to the holding of a consent election among the rank and file on August 25,1985 at the premises of the company to be supervised by the Ministry of Labor and Employment ..... It is clearly understood that the certified union in the said projected election shall respect and administer the existing CBA at the company until its expiry date on July 31, 1986. (Rollo, pp. 46, 48-49). It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was not for the purpose of determining which labor union should be the bargaining representative in the negotiation for a collective contract, there being an existing collective bargaining agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only to determine which labor union shag administer the said existing contract. Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor Code apply: ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Corollary to the above, Article 257 of the New Labor Code expressly states that No certification election issue shall be entertained if a collective agreement which has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of this Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified collective bargaining agreement." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)

Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied Workers Association v. the Director of the Bureau of labor Relations (84 SCRA 430 [19781) "there should be no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a certification election at the proper time. that is, within 60 days prior to the expiration of the three year period ... Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the petitioner and the Company on June 2, 1986 does not adversely affect the petition for certification election filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85). Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code clearly provides: Section 4. Effect of Early Agreement.There representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the last sixty days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case. Apart from the fact that the above Rule is clear and explicit, leaving no room for construction or interpretation, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985)). As aforestated, the existing collective bargaining agreement was due to expire on July 31, 1 986. The Med-Arbiter found that a sufficient number of employees signified their consent to the filing of the petition and 107 employees authorized intervenor to file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he found that the petition and intervention were supported by more than 30% of the members of the bargaining unit. In the light of these facts, Article 258 of the Labor Code makes it mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel, et al., 134 SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa UTEX v. Noriel etc., et al., 86 SCRA 132 [1978]), this Court was even more specific when it stated "No administrative agency can ignore the imperative tone of the above article. The language used is one of command. Once it has been verified that the petition for certification election has the support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be

granted, The specific word used can yield no other meaning. It becomes under the circumstances, "mandatory"..." The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter that the petition and intervention filed in the case at bar were supported by 30% of the members of the workers is clear and definite. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED, SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. L-51602 January 17, 1985 GEORGE & PETER LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) HON. CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF LABOR, respondents. Manuel B. Pastrana for petitioner. Gerardo E. Gestopa Jr. for private respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Petitioner George and Peter Lines, Incorporated, is a domestic corporation engaged in shipping, while respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor. On July 6, 1978, a Petition for Direct Certification was filed by respondent ALU with Region VII, Cebu City, of the Ministry of Labor, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation there being no labor union organized thereat. Petitioner corporation OPPOSED the petition stating that respondent Union does not represent the majority of the employees concerned; and that more than 80% of the licensed and unlicensed crew of its vessels claim that they are not members of any union and have no desire to join any. It then filed on August 17, 1978, a Petition for Certification Election to determine once and for all whether

the employees concerned wanted respondent ALU to be their sole bargaining representative. On August 25, 1978, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying respondent ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the licensed and unlicensed employees of petitioner corporation, opining that the majority membership status of any union is determined before or at the time of filing of the petition and not thereafter, otherwise, the union can be ousted anytime. Petitioner corporation moved for reconsideration alleging that the employees concerned, consisting of about 80%, denied their membership with respondent Union, and that a certification election should be called in the interest of fairness and justice. The entire records of the case were forwarded to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. On February 5, 1979, the BLR Director modified the Order of August 25, 1978 by directing a certification election among the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation. Reconsideration sought by respondent Union was denied by the BLR Director on May 31, 1979, on the ground that there exists a doubt regarding the majority status of respondent ALU because of the withdrawal of membership by the workers, and directing the Labor Relations Division of the Regional Office of origin to hold a pre-election conference, and to conduct the certification election. Respondent Union, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration, argued that public respondent erred in finding its majority status doubtful as the same was proven during the hearing of the case before the Med-Arbiter. The BLR Director, in its questioned Decision of August 13, 1979, reconsidered its Resolution of May 31, 1979, and directly certified respondent ALU as the sole bargaining age it of all the rank and file employees of petitioner corporation Thus, this Petition for certiorari wherein petitioner seeks to set aside the said Decision, posing the following issues. (1) Did the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Ministry of Labor commit grave abuse of discretion by abruptly reversing his two previous resolutions for the holding of a certification election? (2) Are petitioner's employees entitled to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative with petitioner thru a certification election? and

(3) Is petitioner entitled to file the petition for certification election? It is not disputed that after the filing of the petition for direct certification by respondent Union, a written manifestation duly signed by about 80% of the employees concerned, retracting their membership from said union, was submitted by them to the MOLE. Respondent Union submits, however, that the employees were merely pressured by management into withdrawing their membership. On the other hand, petitioner corporation argues that the retraction by the employees cast a serious doubt on the alleged majority representation of the Union. In ultimately resolving the issue in the Union's favor, public respondent held that the withdrawal of membership from the Union subsequent to the filing of the petition for direct certification did not affect the same nor did it divest it of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition. We find for petitioner. The employees have the constitutional right to choose the labor organization which it desires to join. 1 The exercise of such right would be rendered nugatory and ineffectual if they would be denied the opportunity to choose in a certification election, which is not a litigation, but a mere investigation of a nonadversary character, 2 the bargaining unit to represent them. 3 The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. 4 As the right of respondent Union to represent the employees is seriously put in doubt by the withdrawal of 80% of the membership, which the Union claims to be involuntary, the best forum to determine if there was, indeed, undue pressure exerted upon the employees to retract their membership is in the certification election itself, wherein they can freely express their choice in a secret ballot. 5 Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive bargaining representative. 6 That there are no competing Unions involved should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the employees being the primordial consideration besides the fact that the employees can still choose between ALU and No Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employees concerned were submitted after the Petition for direct certification had been filed, the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen and it is best to determine the true sentiment of the employees through a certification election. If respondent Union is confident that it commands the majority of the workers, there is no reason why it should object to the holding of a certification election.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of August 17, 1979 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Office concerned of the Ministry of Labor and Employment is hereby directed to cause the holding of a certification election within thirty (30) days from notice. SO ORDERED 8. G.R. No. 75037 April 30, 1987 TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO ESTERAL, ROMAN CHICO, JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO ARGUELLES, RICARDO CAJOLES, and JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents. No. 75055 April 30, 1987 TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO ESTERAL, ROMAN CHICO, JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO ARGUELLES, RICARDO CAJOLES, and JOSEFINO PAGUYO, respondents. Jaime G. de Leon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75037. Pacifico de Ocampo and Benjamin C. Gascon for petitioner in G.R. No. 75055.

GUTIERREZ, JR.: These consolidated petitions for certiorari seek the review and setting aside of respondent National Labor Relations Commission's decision in NLRC Case No. AB-6-11685-81 dated May 26, 1986, affirming the October 12, 1984 decision of the Labor Arbiter, and of the NLRC resolution dated June 28, 1986, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners. The facts of the case are as follows: Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner company.

On March 11, 1980, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein private respondents, and a copy was filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) on October 29, 1980 for certification. The CBA had a term of three (3) years from July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1982. It also contained a union security clause. which provides: All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this Contract, become members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement. On or about the early part of October 1980, while the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI, with private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberts Santos being elected President and Vice-President, respectively. On November 7, 1980, KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which development compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU on November 7, 1980 pursuant to Article XV of the CBA. Acting on the grievance of TDI, TDLU wrote the private respondents on December 23, 1980 requiring them to explain why TDLU should not take disciplinary action against them for, among other things Disloyalty to the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (T.D.L.U.) by forming and joining another union with a complete takeover intent as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank and file employees at TDI. (p. 16, Rollo) TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance with its by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents. Except for Josefino Paguyo who, despite due notice, was absent during the investigation conducted on January 2, 1981, all the private respondents were present and given a chance to explain their side. Thereafter, in a resolution dated January 9, 1981, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union effective January 16, 1981. By letter dated January 10, 1981, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that

TDI terminate the employment of private, respondents because they had lost their membership with TDLU. Acting on the demand of TDLU, TDI, in a Memorandum dated January 13, 1981, notified "that effective January 16, 1981, we shall file the usual application for clearance (with preventive suspension to take effect on the same day) to terminate your services on the basis of the union security clause of our CBA. Accordingly, TDI filed with the MOLE on January 14, 1981 its application for clearance to terminate the employment of private respondents. This application docketed as Case No. NCR-AC-1-435-81 specifically stated that the action applied for was preventive suspension which will result in termination of employment, ... due to (T)hreat to (P)roduction traceable to rival (U)nion activity. The private respondents then filed with the MOLE a complaint for illegal dismissal against TDI and Benjamin Agaloos, in his capacity as President of TDLU, which complaint was docketed as Case No. STF-1-333-91. The cases were jointly heard and tried by Labor Arbiter Teodorico Dogelio. However, on January 26, 1981, the Med-Arbiter granted the private respondents' petition calling for a certification election among the rank and file employees of TDI. The Med-Arbiter's Order stated, inter-alia that the existence of an uncertified CBA cannot be availed of as a bar to the holding of a certification election (Emphasis supplied). On appeal of TDI and TDLU to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), the order for the holding of a certification election was reversed and set aside by the BLR on July 8,1982, thus: A careful perusal of the records of the case will reveal that the uncertified CBA was duly filed and submitted on 29 October 1980, to last until June 30, 1982. Indeed, said CBA is certifiable for havingcomplied with all the necessary requirements for certification. Consistent with the intent and spirit of P.D. 1391 and its implementing rules, the contract bar rule should have been applied in this case. The representation issue cannot be entertained except within the last sixty (60) days of the collective agreement. (Emphasis supplied) (p. 243, Rollo) The last 60 days in a collective bargaining agreement is referred to as the "freedom period" when rival union representation can be entertained during the existence of a valid CBA. In this case, the "freedom period" was May 1 to June 30, 1982. After the term of the CBA lapsed, KAMPIL moved for a reconsideration of the July 8, 1982 decision of the BLR on July 23, 1982 on the same ground that since the CBA then in question was uncertified, the contract bar rule could not

be made to apply. On December 3, 1982, the BLR reversed itself, but for a different reason and held that: Movant union (Kampil) now seeks for the reconsideration of that Order on the ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence, the contract bar rule cannot properly apply in this case. After a more careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that the instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the arguments raised by herein movant. It should be noted that the alleged CBA has now expired. Its expiry date being 30 June 1982. Consequently; there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent. The contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the expiration of the contract. (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 244-245, Rollo) TDLU filed a petition for review of the BLR decision with the Supreme Court, docketed as Case No. G.R. No. 63995 TDI argued that KAMPIL did not have a cause of action when the petition for certification was filed on November 7, 1980 because the freedom period was not yet in effect. The fact that the BLR issued its order when the 60-day freedom period had supervened, did not cure this defect. Moreover, the BLR decision completely overlooked or ignored the fact that on September 21, 1982, a new CBA had been executed between the TDLU and TDI so that when the BLR allowed a certification election in its order dated December 3, 1982, the contract bar rule was applicable again. This Court denied TDLU's petition in a minute resolution on November 14,1983. Using the foregoing as relevant and applicable to the consolidated cases for the clearance application for termination filed by TDI and the illegal dismissal case filed by the private respondents on October 12, 1984, Labor Arbiter Teodorico Dogelio rendered a decision denying TDI's application to terminate the private respondents and ordering TDI to reinstate the complainants with backwages. It should be noted that the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision even before the petitioner company could file its memorandum, formal offer of exhibits and its manifestation and motion to correct tentative markings of exhibits. This decision of the arbiter was upheld by the respondent NLRC in NLRC Case No. AB-6-11685-81 in its decision dated May 20,1986.

TDI and TDLU moved for reconsideration of the questioned decision, In its motion, TDI alleged, inter alia, that respondent NLRC did not rule on the validity of the CBA as a contract, neither did it resolve squarely the validity of the enforcement of the union security clause of the CBA. TDI stated further that respondent NLRC failed to consider the fact that at the time the private respondents were expelled by TDLU and consequently terminated by TDI, the union security clause of the CBA was in full force and effect, binding TDI and TDLU. For its part, TDLU said that the decision of the Supreme Court in the certification case could not be used by respondent NLRC to justify its decision in the dismissal case because the issues on the cases are entirely different and miles apart. It is for this reason that there are two (2) cases that are involved. TDLU explained that the Supreme Court decided to dismiss the petition for certiorari of TDI and TDLU in the certification case because the original CBA existing at the time the private respondents formed and joined KAMPIL had already expired. However, TDLU made it clear that when the private respondents organized KAMPIL in TDI, the same CBA was still in force and the disaffiliation did not take place within the freedom period. Hence, at that point in time, the private respondents committed disloyalty against the union. On June 26, 1986, respondent NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by TDI and TDLU for lack of merit. In its petition, TDI alleged that: I RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION AND IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW IN RENDERING ITS DECISION EN BANC OF MAY 20, 1986 AND IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THEREOF IN ITS RESOLUTION SOLUTION DATED JUNE 26, 1986 BECAUSE 1. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAS IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE EXPELLED BY TDLU FROM ITS MEMBERSHIP ON JANUARY 16, 1981 AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TDLU HAD DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA, THE SAID CBA WAS AN EXISTING AND A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND TDLU, AND EFFECTIVE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;

2. IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT A UNION SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS BINDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE CBA UNDER THE LAWS; 3. THE EXPULSION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM TDLU WAS THE UNION'S OWN DECISION. HENCE, WHEN TDLU DEMANDED OF THE PETITIONER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITY CLAUSE PROVISION OF THE CBA BY SEPARATING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THEIR EMPLOYMENT, FOR HAVING LOST THEIR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNION, THE PETITIONER WAS DUTY BOUND TO DO SO; 4. THE ALLUSION THAT THE CBA WAS NOT CERTIFIED BY THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS (BLR) HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A VALID CONTRACT BETWEEN ALL PARTIES THERETO. II RESPONDENT COMMISSION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DID NOT COMMIT ACTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PETITIONER'S PRODUCTION EFFORTS TO BE SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AND EVENTUAL REMOVAL. On the other hand, petitioner TDLU in essence contends that: THE CBA IS VALID AND BINDING NOT ONLY ON TDI AND TDLU BUT LIKEWISE ON PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE RATIFIED THE SAME IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF TDLU; HENCE, THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE IS VALID AND BINDING ON THEM; THE ACTION OF TDLU IN REQUESTING FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE OF THE CBA BETWEEN TDI AND TDLU IS PART OF THE INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF- ORGANIZATION; TDLU CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES BECAUSE ALL THAT IT DID WAS ASK FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF A CBA, WHICH CBA HAS NEVER BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED WAS NOT ALSO DECLARED NULL AND VOID; PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISAFFILIATED THEMSELVES FROM TDLU BY ORGANIZING THE LOCAL CHAPTER OF KAMPIL IN TDI IN OCTOBER 1980, BUT THE ACT OF DISAFFILIATION WAS COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE FREEDOM PERIOD PROVIDED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1391 WHICH LIMIT ALL PETITIONS FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION, DISAFFILIATION AND INTERVENTION TO THE 60 DAY

FREEDOM PERIOD PRECEDING THE EXPIRATION OF THE CBA. HENCE, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COULD BE EXPELLED FROM MEMBERSHIP FOR DISLOYALTY AND OTHER INIMICAL ACTS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF TDLU. The private respondents admit that the root of the whole controversy in the instant case is the organization of a Local Union Chapter of KAMPIL at TDI and the subsequent filing of a petition for certification election with the MOLE by said local chapter. This local chapter of KAMPIL was organized with the help of, among others, the private respondents some of whom were elected union officers of said chapter. They contend that their act of organizing a local chapter of KAMPIL and eventual filing of a petition for certification election was pursuant to their constitutional right to self-organization. The issues to be resolved are the following: (a) whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private respondents' employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and TDLU; and (b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor practice in complying with TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private respondents. We enforce basic principles essential to a strong and dynamic labor movement. An established postulate in labor relations firmly rooted in this jurisdiction is that the dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in accordance with a union security agreement following the loss of seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the union shop, the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union security and strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the Constitution. (See Pascual, Labor Relations Law, 1986 Edition, pp. 221-225 and cases cited therein.) There is no showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting union security arrangements brought to us for review. In this light, the petitioner points out that embedded at the very core and as raison d'etre for the doctrine which enforces the closed-shop, the union shop, and other forms of union security clauses in the collective bargaining

agreement is the principle of sanctity and inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution. This Court speaking thru Mr. Justice Labrador, in Victorias Milling Co., Inc., v. Victorias-Manapia Workers Organization (9 SCRA 154), ruled: Another reason for enforcing the closed-shop agreement is the principle of sanctity or inviolability of contracts guaranteed by the Constitution. As a matter of principle the provision of the Industrial Peace Act relating freedom to employees to organize themselves and set their representative for entering into bargaining agreements, should be subordinate to the constitutional provision protecting the sanctity of contracts. We can not conceive how freedom to contract, which should be allowed to be exercised without limitation may be subordinated to the freedom of laborers to choose the organization they desire to represent them. And even if the legislature had intended to do so and made such freedom of the laborer paramount to the sanctity of obligation of contracts, such attempt to override the constitutional provision would necessarily and ipso facto be null and void. xxx xxx xxx [T]he action of the respondent company in enforcing the terms of the closedshop agreement is a valid exercise of its rights and obligations under the contract. The dismissal by virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor practice, as it was in pursuance of an agreement that has been found to be regular and of a closed-shop agreement which under our laws is valid and binding. In the instant case, the CBA in question provides for a Union Security Clause requiring: (c) All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this contract become members of the union in accordance with its constitution and by-laws shall as a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in the union for the duration of the agreement. (Emphasis supplied) Having ratified that CBA and being then members of the TDLU, the private respondents owe fealty and are required under the Union Security Clause to maintain their membership in good standing with it during the term thereof, a requirement which ceases to be binding only during the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. When the private

respondents organized and joined the KAMPIL Chapter in TDI and filed the corresponding petition for certification election in November 1980, there was no freedom period to speak of yet. For under Presidential Decree No. 1391, promulgated May 29, 1978, the law applicable in this instance provides: No petition for certification election for intervention disaffiliation shall be entertained or given due course except within the 60 day freedom period immediately preceding the execution of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. and under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules Implementing PD 1391 "... pending certification of a duly filed collective bargaining agreement no petition for certification election in the same bargaining unit shall be entertained or processed." (promulgated September 19, 1978). The Labor Code further mandates that "no certification election shall be entertained if a Collective Bargaining Agreement which has been submitted in accordance with Article 231 of the Code exists between the employer and a legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of such collective agreement (Art. 257). The fact, therefore, that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) failed to certify or act on TDLU's request for certification of the CBA in question is of no moment to the resolution of the issues presented in this case. The BLR itself found in its order of July 8, 1982 that "the certified CBA was duly filed and submitted on October 29, 1980, to last until June 30, 1982 is certifiable for having complied with all the requirements for certification. The validity of the CBA is not here assailed by private respondents. They admitted having organized the local chapter of KAMPIL at TDI, although it is claimed that this was done when there was no certified CBA between TDI and TDLU that would constitute a bar to the certification election. Of significance is the ruling in Manalang v. Artex Development Co., Inc., (21 SCRA 561, 569) decided on a factual setting where the petitioners had affiliated themselves with another labor union, Artex Free Workers, without first terminating their membership with Bagong Buhay Labor Union (BBLU) and without the knowledge of the officers of the latter union, for which reason the petitioners were expelled from the BBLU for acts of disloyalty; and the company, upon the behest of BBLU dismissed them from employment pursuant to the closed-shop stipulation in a Collective Bargaining Agreement. This Court ruled:

The validity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement of March 4, 1960 is not assailed by the petitioners. Nor do they deny that they were members of the BBLU prior to March 4, 1960 and until they were expelled from the union. ... The petitioners further contention that the closed-shop provision in the collective Bargaining Agreement is illegal because it is unreasonable,restrictive of right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution is a futile exercise in argumentation of this Court has in a number of cases sustained closed-shop as valid union security. Finally, even if we assume, in gratia argumenti,that the petition were unaware of the stipulation set forth in the collective bargaining agreement since their membership in the BBLU prior to t the expulsion thereform is undenied there can be no question that as long as the agreement with closed-shop provision was in force they were bound by it. Neither their ignorance of,nor their dissatisfaction with, its terms and condition would justify breach thereof or the formation by them of a union of their own.As has been aptly said the collective bargaining agreement entered into by officers of a union as agent of the member,and an employer,gives rise to valid inforcible contractual relation against the individual union members in matters that affect the entire membership or large classes of its member who employed under an agreement between the union and his employer is bound by the provision thereof,since it is a joint and several contract of the members of the union and entered into by the union as their agent. In an earlier case, this Court held: Nor can it be said that the stipulation providing that the employer may dismiss an employee whenever the union recommends his expulsion either for disloyalty or for any violation of its by-laws and constitution is illegal or constitute of unfair labor practice, for such is one of the matters on which management and labor can agree in order to bring about harmonious relations between them and the union, and cohesion and integrity of their organization And as an act of loyalty a union may certainly require its members not to affiliate with any other labor union and to consider its infringement as a reasonable cause for separation. This is what was done by respondent union. And the respondent employer did nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated the herein complainants upon the recommendation of said union. Such a stipulation is not only necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union but is allowed by the Magna Charta of Labor when it provided that while it is recognized that an employee shall have the right to self-organization, it is at the

same time postulated that such right shall not injure the right of the labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein (Section 41(b) par. 1, Republic Act 875). This provision is significant. It is an indirect restriction on the right of an employee to selforganization. It is a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while an employee is given the right to join a labor organization, such right should only be asserted in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the same organization The law requires loyalty to the union on the part of its members in order to obtain to the full extent its cohesion and integrity. We therefore, see nothing improper in the disputed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the parties. (Ang Malayang Manggagawa ng Ang Tibay Enterprises, et al. v. Ang Tibay, et al. 102 Phil. 669) (Emphasis supplied) We agree with petitioner TDLU that the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 63995 entitled TDLU v. Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipina could not be construed as to extinguish the right of TDLU to expel private respondents for acts of disloyalty when they organized a local chapter of KAMPIL in October 1980 in TDI. The subject matter brought to this Court in G.R. No. 63995 was the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated December 3, 1982 requiring the holding of certification election in TDI within twenty (20) days from receipt of said BLR's decision which reads: Movant union (KAMPIL) now seeks for the reconsideration of that order on the ground, among others, that the CBA in question is not certifiable and, hence, the contract bar rule cannot properly apply to this case. After a careful examination of the records, this Bureau is of the view that the instant motion should be given due course, not necessarily for the arguments raised by herein movant. It should be noted that alleged CBA has now expired, its expiry date being 30 June 1982. Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file of respondent. The contract bar rule will no longer apply in view of the supervening even that is, the expiration of the contract. (ANNEX C, TDI's Memorandum dated November 28,1986; Emphasis supplied). It is clearly apparent that the BLR aforesaid Order which this Court upheld in G.R. No. 63995 when it dismissed TDLU's petition in a minute resolution, did not pass upon the question of legality or illegality of the dismissal of private respondents

from TDI by reason of their expulsion from TDLU for disloyalty. That question was neither raised nor passed upon in the certification case, and was not a proper issue therein because a petition for certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character to determine the bargaining unit to represent the employees (George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82). Hence, no inference could be derived from the dismissal of said petition that either the BLR or this Court has decided in favor of private respondents insofar as the question of union disloyalty and their suspension and termination from employment of TDI is concerned. Simply put, the BLR ordered the holding of a certification election because the CBA in question had already expired, its expiry date being June 30, 1982. Consequently, there appears to be no more obstacle in allowing a certification election. "... [T]he contract bar rule will not apply in view of the supervening event, that is, the expiration of the CBA." But the fact that the CBA had expired on June 30, 1982 and the BLR, because of such supervening event, ordered the holding of a certification election could not and did not wipe out or cleanse private respondents from the acts of disloyalty committed in October 1980 when they organized KAMPIL's local chapter in TDI while still members of TDLU. The ineluctable fact is that private respondents committed acts of disloyalty against TDLU while the CBA was in force and existing for which they have to face the necessary sanctions lawfully imposed by TDLU. In Villar v. Inciong (121 SCRA 444), we held that "petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliation from their union and to form a new organization of their own must however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA: " Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence and equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling mandate the adoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial measures, in keeping with its laws and regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lest by its folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall. (Idem., p. 458)

The private respondents cannot, therefore, escape the effects of the security clause of their own applicable collective bargaining agreement. WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 26, 1986 and the resolution dated June 26, 1986 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. AB11685-81 are hereby SET ASIDE. The expulsion of private respondents from TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION and their consequent suspension and termination from employment with TANDUAY DISTILLERY, INC., without reinstatement and backwages, are hereby SUSTAINED. No cost. SO ORDERED.

9. G.R. No. 94716 November 15, 1991 ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES (ACAE), petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, and UNION OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (UCECA), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p We are asked in this petition to ascertain the power, if any, of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), more specifically the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), to supervise the activities of government employees; in this case, unions of judiciary personnel who serve in the Court of Appeals. The question of power is quite significant. Hitherto, the BLR has concentrated on labor relations in the private sector. Its enforcement machinery and the mass of law and jurisprudence governing its functions are entirely geared to the handling of the peculiar problems arising in private employment. In this case, the BLR has tasked itself to intervene not only in a quarrel between two groups of government employees but more important, in a quarrel between employees working for an independent branch of government, the Judiciary. The two issues raised in this petition are: (1) whether or not the respondent Bureau of Labor Relations acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the petition for certification election to determine the certified bargaining agent

to represent the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether or not a petition for cancellation of registration of the union requesting for a certification election is a bar to the resolution of a prior petition for certification election. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of Appeals (UCECA), a registered union filed a petition for accreditation and/or certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations (docketed as BLR Case No. 4-11-90) alleging that the petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) which is the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees. The UCECA alleged that there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989. On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It stated that the listing by the ACAE of its membership at three hundred three (303) employees was a product of fraud. It charged the UCECA with misrepresentation, forgery and perjury in attaching to its (UCECA) petition, a copy of the names of members some of which were twice listed, written without consent or unsigned, and some of the signatures of which were forged. In addition, the petitioner alleged that some of the UCECA members, upon learning of the fraudulent act, resigned from the union. In its reply, the UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with fraud and claimed that any mistakes were only clerical errors. On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the UCECA in BLR Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration Certificate No. 159 and in preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved for deferment of the resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of BLR 6-19-90. On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for being dilatory, to which ACAE replied that the maxim of res ipsa loquitur should be applied as the "fraudulent documents submitted by UCECA speak for themselves." On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relationsruled that BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to the holding of a certification election.

It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found that UCECA was supported by three hundred three (303) or forty (40%) percent of the seven hundred sixty two (762) rank-and-file employees of the court. ACAE's motion for reconsideration was denied. On August 21, 1990, the respondent Bureau conducted a pre-election conference. Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification election, ACAE filed this petition forcertiorari and prohibition. We issued a temporary restraining order effective August 29, 1990. The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations to handle disputes among associations of employees working for the judiciary. There is no question that government employees may organize provided the purposes behind such organization are legitimate. No less than the Bill of Rights specifically identifies government employees as having the right of self-organization. It provides: xxx xxx xxx Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. (Article III, 1987 Constitution) In the provisions governing the Civil Service Commission, we find: Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. xxx xxx xxx (Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) and (5), Constitution) The article on Social Justice and Human Rights adds:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (Article XIII, Section 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs) xxx xxx xxx The issue of what governs and who supervises unions of government employees is of more than passing concern especially when those who organize and hope to engage in certain forms of concerted action are court employees. Government personnel find themselves in an equivocal and ambivalent position. They have a right but it is not clear to what extent they may exercise it. Congress has not legislated as yet on the complicated problems arising from unionism in government as distinguished from unionism in the private sector. Obviously, the same rules do not and cannot apply under the present state of the law. A major re-ordering of government, notably its civil service laws and budgetary and fiscal procedures would result if Congress, in enacting the laws required by the constitutional provisions, gives exactly the same rights and privileges to all workers in the public and private sectors. At present, the terms and conditions of employment in the government service are governed by law, not by the relative strengths of management and labor as they hammer out mutually acceptable terms across the collective bargaining table. Paradoxically, all the representatives of "labor" and "management" in government areemployees. At the same time, everybody forms part of the "owner" of the enterprise, the sovereign people. The qualifications and eligibilities of civil servants, their appointment and promotion, standardization of salaries, disciplinary actions, fringe benefits, and retirement gratuities, among others, are governed by statutes, rules, and established principles which are the products of decades of experience, not to mention borrowings from civil service systems abroad.

The provisions of civil service law on the terms and conditions of employment including the regulation of labor-management relations in the government sector, unless Congress decides to amend or repeal them, form part of the response to any requests or demands of organized groups of government personnel. Any understanding between the top officials of a government agency and the union which represents the rank-and-file is subordinate to the law governing the particular issue or situation. We emphasize the above because in ascertaining what agency should supervise certification elections in the public sector, we limit the determination strictly to the question before us the holding of certification elections. Jurisdiction over questions which may arise after the certified bargaining representative flexes its muscles and engages in concerted action will have to await the filing of more appropriate cases and, hopefully, the enactment of applicable legislation. The Constitution provides that the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike, are guaranteed provided these are in accordance with law. There is reference to the need for a law governing the procedures incident to selforganization. What is the law which governs certification elections in the Court of Appeals? The Solicitor General argues that the applicable law is Executive Order No. 180 issued on June 1, 1987 entitled "Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees; Creating a Public Sector LaborManagement Council; and for Other Purposes." The pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 180 are: SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from receipt thereof. xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration certification shall be issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization with the right to represent its members and undertake activities to further and defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary of Labor and Employment. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit shall be designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the employees. SECTION 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees' organization is registered or is seeking registration, based on records of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and that the said organization has the majority support of the rankand-file employees in the organizational unit. SECTION 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organization unit. (Rollo, pp. 235-237) It is obvious that Executive Order No. 180 is at best a stop gap measure for a limited purpose. Certain provisions and procedures in the Labor Code were engrafted into a decree governing the entirely novel situation of unionism in the governmental sector. Enacted a little over one month and a half before Congress reconvened after the revolutionary government was replaced by the present government, it unfortunately lacks a legislative record, parliamentary debates, and the insights that only the elected representatives of all the people can bring to bear in the regulation of a complicated and sensitive relationship. The petitioner questions the validity of Executive Order No. 180 but limits its challenge to an alleged violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The argument is self-defeating because, followed to its logical conclusion, only this Court would have the power to supervise certification elections in the Court of Appeals. The task is not for us and we certainly have no intention to undertake it.

It is the function of this Court, and we will not hesitate to exercise the power, to regulate all activities of Judges and court personnel, the Supreme Court included, to the end that the independence, effectiveness, and integrity of the judiciary as mandated by the Constitution are not impaired or compromised. It is axiomatic, for example, that any demands of court employees for higher compensation or improved facilities must be viewed in the context of the fiscal autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to the Judiciary. (Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3). Neither DOLE, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), nor any other agency would have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. And since unresolved legal questions commenced elsewhere are ultimately decided by us, the final decision on all such questions would still be with this Court. All this does not mean that the separation of powers doctrine requires us to supervise the details of self-organization activities in the courts. In the same way that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant requisite eligibilities to court employees, we see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the certification process in the Court of Appeals, considering its expertise, machinery, and experience in this particular activity. Executive Order No. 180 requires organizations of government employees to register with both CSC and DOLE. This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do the job. Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in determining whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different conclusions. At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner. One final point on the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of the BLR. ACAE cannot persuasively challenge the validity of Executive Order No. 180 because its very personality to bring this suit is premised on its having organized under the same executive order. The first paragraph of the petition reads: 1. Petitioner ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES, ACAE for brevity, is an association of government employees duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Executive Order No. 180, duly accredited as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals, with

office address at the Court of Appeals Compound, M. Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila. (Rollo, p. 2) The petitioner argues that the respondent UCECA failed to prove that it no longer enjoys the support of the rank-and-file employees. ACAE claims that it has 395 members. It states that if the fraudulently entered names numbering 88 are all deducted from the 303 listed names for UCECA, there would actually be 215 members only left. Even assuming, therefore, that the petitioning union has satisfied the required percentage of signatures (20%) according to section of Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, no election can be had if the incumbent bargaining representative still has the clear majority. It is precisely because the respondent union has been questioning the majority status of the petitioner that a petition for certification election was filed. Nowhere in the rules is there a further requirement for a petitioning union to prove the lack of a majority status of the incumbent representative or who among its listed members are not actually affiliated with it. What is merely required for a petition for certification election to be granted is the filing of a verified petition which is supported by the signatures of at least twenty (20%) percent of the covered employees. It is also essential that it is not filed within one (1) year from the date a declaration of a previous final certification election result was issued. The BLR has satisfied itself that the private respondent has faithfully complied with the bare requirements for the petition. It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact finding character." (Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451 [1990]) Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant it proceeds from an examination of the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents. The public respondent has found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance there being compliance with the twenty (20%) percent support signatures. The factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations on this matter appear to be supported by substantial evidence and we, accordingly, accord them great weight and respect. They shall not be disturbed by the Court in the

absence of proof of reversible error. (See Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 426 [1988]; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989]) On the basis of its findings, it was only proper for the public respondent to order the holding of a certification election which is mandatorily required by Section 12, Executive Order No.180: Section 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit." (Underscoring Supplied) Even assuming there were fraudulently included names or signatures, respondent UCECA would still have complied with the twenty (20%) percent requirement. The remaining membership, i.e. 215, alleged by petitioner ACAE constitutes twenty eight (28%) percent of the rank-and-file court employees. The result of the certification election shall determine who between the petitioner and the private respondent is telling the truth. As we have ruled in Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, (supra): Whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank-and-file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most dramatic method of determining the employee's choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. (At page 431) The petitioner likewise argues that the certification proceedings should be suspended pending its petition for the cancellation of union registration of the UCECA. The records show that UCECA was registered with the Civil Service Commission on March 16, 1990. (Rollo, p. 45) When the said union was organized, some of its members allegedly used to be members of the ACAE who tendered mass resignations on August 14, 1989 and on September 29, 1989. (Rollo, pp. 27-35) On January 30, 1990, the officers of ACAE, in Board Resolution No. 8 resolved that the resignations tendered were irregular and must be accomplished individually. (Rollo, p. 55) Thereafter, for some reasons, some of the listed members in the Registry Book of the UCECA wrote individual letters to UCECA in

April, 1990 either questioning the inclusion of their names or tendering their resignations. On June 18, 1990, the petitioner herein filed its petition to cancel the union registration of UCECA. The act of the petitioner in charging commissions of fraud and misrepresentation against UCECA only after realizing the rising membership of the latter and the subsequent petition for certification election raises grave suspicions as to whether or not it wants to subvert the right of the employees to determine the proper exclusive representative or agent now that they are given two unions from which to choose. Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner ACAE had lawful grounds to challenge the existence of the UCECA, it should have done so, soon after the date it had notice or knowledge of the registration of the latter to protect its own interests and not at a later time when its bargaining position was already at the risk of being lost. At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing a cancellation. It is the policy of the State in protecting the rights of labor to ensure and maintain industrial peace. For this reason, all employees of an appropriate bargaining unit shall be given an opportunity to organize and to determine which labor organization should be their exclusive bargaining representative. Hence, a petition for certification election filed by an interested labor organization shall be dealt with accordingly, with a view to attaining this objective. This is especially true when it involves the ultimate respect for and protection of the rights of government employees. In granting to employees in the civil service the right to organize, a procedure has been enacted to allow them to select what union shall be the recognized representative for all those in one agency, i.e., a certification election. (Sections 5, 6 and 12; Executive Order No. 180; Sections 3 and 4, Rule V and Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Government Employees to Self-Organization) The freedom of choice given to workers is a constitutional right. Therefore, the holding of a certification election, being a statutory policy, should not be circumvented. (Associated Trade Unions-ATU v. Noriel, 89 SCRA 264 [1979];

Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra) WHEREFORE, the petitioner having failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the public respondent are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 29, 1990 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

13. G.R. No. L-11963

June 20, 1958

MANILA PAPER MILLS EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, NOVALICHES INDUSTRIAL WORKERS UNION (PLUM), and MANILA PAPER MILLS, INC., respondents. Antonio C. Garcia Angel D. Calayag for Vicente A. Rafael for Ernesto C. Estrella for respondent Company. MONTEMAYOR, J.: The Manila Paper Mills, Inc., later referred to as the Company, is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of paper, with office at Sangandaan, Novaliches, Quezon City. The 95 odd employees working in said factory belong to two labor unions, namely, the Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers Association, later referred to as the Association, and the Novaliches Industrial Workers Union, later referred to as the Union. It would appear that there was rivalry between these two labor organizations that caused and motivated the controversy that led to the petition for certification election filed by the Union, and the issuance of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), dated January 9, 1957 (Annex E of the Petition), which order the Association now seeks to be reversed and set aside in its present petition for certiorari. For a better understanding of the origin of this case and to serve as background, the following undisputed facts may be stated. The Union filed a petition for certification election with the CIR, dated October 4, 1956, docketed as Case No. 401-MC, alleging therein that pursuant to the provisions of Section 12(c) of for respondent respondent petitioner. CIR. Union.

Republic Act No. 875, its members constituted at least 10% of the approximate total of 95 workers in the factory, permanent and temporary; that some of the workers belonged to another labor organization, known as the Manila Paper Mills Workers Association, and that the petitioning Union would have no objection that said Association members participate in the election; that there had been no election for about a year, nor was there any existing agreement which would serve as a bar to the election. It was subsequently claimed by this petitioning Union that at least 72 of the 95 employees and workers were members of said Union. The petition was opposed by the Association (designated as the intervenor) by a written pleading, dated October 25, 1956, for the reason that the petitioning Union had committed unfair labor practices by reason of which, the intervenor had filed a complaint, copy of which was attached to the opposition, which complaint, dated October 25, 1956, was filed with the CIR as Case No. 1099 ULP. This complaint was later supplemented by a regular complaint in the same case, filed by Antonio T. Tirona, acting prosecutor, charging the Company and the Union with unfair labor practice, to the effect that the Company had threatened members of the Association with dismissal if they remained members of said Association; that it had refused to bargain collectively with the Association, although it had received a written set of demands from it; that on the other hand, after receiving said demands, the Company instigated and hastened the preparation of and the service of the demand of the rival Union; and that the officers and members of the Union threatened the families of the members of the Association with bodily harm if the said members did not severe their connection and membership with the Association. The complaint ended with a prayer for an order by the CIR, finding the Company and the Union guilty of unfair labor practice, and directing the dissolution of the Union (Novaliches Industrial Workers Union). It would also appear that Edilberto J. Pangan, another acting prosecutor, had filed a complaint with the CIR, apparently on behalf of the Union (Novaliches Industrial Workers Union) against the same Company and its manager and also against the Association, dated November 13, 1956, docketed as Case No. 1089ULP, charging the Company and the Association with interfering with the free union activities of the Union, and threatening, coercing, intimidating, and restraining them in continuing their membership in the Union, and in assisting and giving support to the organization and administration of the newly formed labor

organization, called Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers Association, in other words, charging company domination. On January 23, 1957, Amando Gonzales, President of the Association, filed a complaint against the Company and the Union for unfair labor practice, docketed as Case No. 1179ULP, formally charging the Company with instigating and fostering the formation and organization of the Union and thereafter giving favor and aid to said Union and its members, and threatening members of the Association with dismissal if they did not severe their connection with said Association and join the Union. Included in the prayer was the dissolution and cancellation of the permit of the Union. After hearing of the petition for certification election, the CIR, through its Presiding Judge, Jose S. Bautista, granted the petition through the order of January 9, 1957, now sought to be reversed and set aside in the present petition. The order, in our opinion, well and correctly states the issues and the reasons for granting the petition for certification election, and we quote it with favor and make it our own: On October 5, 1956, a petition for certification election was filed by the Novaliches Industrial Workers Union (PLUM), alleging among others the following: (a) That petitioner's members constitute at least ten (10%) per cent of the approximate total of ninety-five (95) workers, permanent and temporary, in said appropriate unit for collective bargaining; (b) That petitioner believes that some workers at said unit are affiliated with an allegedly legitimate union, "Manila Paper Mills Workers' Association", which participation in this election qualified, the herein petitioner would offer no objection; and that the same may be served with summons at Sangandaan, Novaliches, Quezon City; and (c) That there is no known legal impediment against the holding of this "certification election", there having no election in said unit the last twelve (12) months nor any agreement exists as a bar to this election. The Manila Paper Mills, Inc. by way of answer stated that they would deal with any union so chosen by the employees as their sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative in accordance with law.

The Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers' Union filed its opposition and alleged that the petitioning union in order to increase its membership employed illegitimate means, as threats of death, intimidation and coercion on the members of the intervening union, so that they might secede from the other union. They (intervenor) further argued that there is a pending case in Court whereby the intervenor charges the petitioner of unfair labor practice and docketed as Case No. 1099ULP, and by virtue thereof, sought the suspension of the hearing of the instant petition. On the other hand, the petitioner claimed that the existence of a charge of company domination on the petitioning union is the only instance which could be the basis of suspending the petition for certification election. Petitioner advanced the arguments that authorities are unanimous to that effect, that the Court had ruled en banc in a line of decisions suspending the hearing of certification election cases only where there is a charge of company domination on the part of the petitioning Union. The Court is of the opinion that certification election would be in keeping with the objective of the Magna Carta of Labor, because it will pave a way to a collective bargaining agreement which will advance the settlement of issues between employers and employees, maintain agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment and settle their differences by mutual agreement. The employer will not enter into such agreement without determining which of the two unions is the sole representative of the employees, and therefore, to hold an election is the logical solution in this situation, to promote industrial peace. The contention of the intervenor that the petitioner is company-dominated, is untenable, because nothing is said that petitioner is dominated, initiated and assisted by the employer to warrant a charge of company-domination, but only charge the petitioner of threats, coercions, and, intimidations, which are not impediments to the instant petition. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court deemed it proper and logical to hold an election, and the payroll of the last week of September, 1956 shall determine who are eligible to vote. Pursuant to Section 12 (e) of Republic Act No. 875, the Department of Labor is hereby requested to conduct an election in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Court. We agree with the CIR on the reasons given in its order that only a formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a certification election, the reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the workers belong, an election among the workers and

employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees from the standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to the members of the company dominated union, the vote of the said members in the election would not be free. It is equally true, however, that the opposition to the holding of certification election due to a charge of company domination can only be filed and maintained by the labor organization which made the charge of company domination, because it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification election, the reason being that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other members controlled and dominated by the Company. In the present case, the facts already narrated show that the labor organization that filed the charge of company domination in Case No. 1089ULP, is the same labor entity that asked for certification election, at the same time praying that the investigation of the charge of company domination be in the meantime suspended. In other words, it was willing and prepared to have a certification election, confident that the majority of the workers and laborers in the Company would vote freely and have said petitioner declared the bargaining unit. As found by the CIR, the complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the Association in Case No. 1099ULP did not charge any company domination, but only accused the Company and the Union with alleged threats and coercion. True, the Association later filed a formal charge of company domination in Case No. 1179ULP, but this was on January 23, 1957, after the CIR, through Judge Bautista, had rendered the order complained of, dated January 9, 1957. We agree with the respondent CIR that we should give discretion to the Court of Industrial Relations in deciding whether or not to grant a petition for certification election, considering the facts and circumstances of which it has intimate knowledge. Recently, we had occasion to consider and decide a case (The Standard Cigarette Workers Union (PLUM) vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 101 Phil., 126, decided by this Tribunal on April 22, 1957), wherein through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, this Court commented, even stated a rule about the holding of certification election, pending determination of charges of unfair labor practice by the same labor organization which asked for the certification election, which comments and ruling may shed more light on our reason for upholding the order of the CIR:

"It is noteworthy, too, as observed by Judge Lanting, that it was not the petitioner union, but the company, the Standard Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc., which had asked for the suspension of the proceedings on the certification election pending final determination of the unfair labor practice complaint. In the usual course of things, the complainant union would have been the one interested in the deferment of the certification election, since the unfair labor practices of the employer could result in the substantial reduction of its membership and its failure to get elected as the employees' bargaining representative. But the complainant union did not ask for the suspension; instead, it had strongly opposed the same in the court below and has even come to this Court on certiorari against such suspension. If the complainant union itself believes that it would not suffer prejudice in the election because of the employer's alleged unfair labor practices, or is willing to take the risks in said election, then we see no further reason for the respondent court to suspend the holding of the election by the employees of their collective bargaining agent. Upon the other hand, we can only agree with Judge Lanting that the move of the company to suspend the certification election proceedings pending resolution of the unfair labor practice complaint against it, can be taken only as a maneuver to further delay such election and thereby favor the intervenorunion, with whom it had already concluded a collective bargaining agreement." In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied, with costs.

12. G.R. No. L-40810 October 3, 1975 UNITED EMPLOYEES UNION OF GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILIPPINES (UEUGIP), petitioner, vs. HON. CARMELO NORIEL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; GEORGE A. EDUVALA, REPRESENTATION OFFICER, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; and NATIONAL UNION OF GARMENTS, TEXTILE, CORDAGE AND ALLIED WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (GATCORD), respondents. Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.

Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondents Carmelo Noriel, etc., et al. Hermon C. Lagman for respondents Unions.

FERNANDO, J.: The plea for setting aside a certification election earnestly and vigorously pressed by petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding is predicated on the proposition that it was held under circumstances that manifested lack of fairness, thus raising a procedural due process question. There was an equally firm and vehement denial in a comprehensive comment filed on behalf of private respondent, National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the Philippines. The stress in the comment of respondent Director Carmelo Noriel 1 was on the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. As will be more fully discussed, a careful scrutiny of what transpired as revealed not only in the pleadings but in the oral argument will disclose that the attack on the certification election cannot succeed. The petition lacks merit. The petition sought to have the certification election declared null and void ab initio and thus unenforceable, alleging that the contending parties in a preelection conference conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations agreed that petitioner would be listed in the ballot as United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines (UEUGIP). 2 In the notice of the certification election, however, it was wilfully deleted and replaced by "a non-contending party, namely, Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU), which, although an existing labor federation ... has nothing to do and has no interest or right of participation [therein]." 3 So it did appear likewise in the sample ballot. 4 As a result, there was confusion in the minds of independent voters and demoralization in the ranks of those inclined to favor petitioner. 5There was a protest but it was not based on this ground; instead the grievance complained of referred to the alleged electioneering of nuns and a priest as observers or inspectors on behalf of private respondent. 6 The above notwithstanding, the certification election took place "on the scheduled date, May 24, 1975 and respondent GATCORD garnered the highest number of votes ...." 7 It was then set forth that despite such defect in the mode of conducting the election which for petitioner sufficed to cause "the nullity of the election in question," respondent

Director Carmelo Noriel of the Bureau of Labor Relations "[was] about to certify respondent GATCORD as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees [and] workers of Gelmart Industries Philippines, Inc." 8 Hence this petition with its overtones as indicated of an alleged violation of procedural due process. The comment to the petition filed on behalf of private respondent National Union of Garments, Textile, Cordage and Allied Workers of the Philippines (GATCORD) denied the imputation of irregularity and sought to clarify matters by a factual presentation of what did transpire. At the outset, however, it made clear that the petitioner, which garnered only 291 votes or 4.5% of the total number of votes cast as against the 3,970 or 63% of the votes in its favor, certainly could not be heard to challenge the validity of the certification election. Thus: "1. Pursuant to an order of the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor, a certification election was conducted on 24 May 1975 in Gelmart Industries Philippines, Inc., South Superhighway, Paraaque, Rizal, to choose the collective bargaining agent of the company's rank and file employees; 2. The certification election was conducted and supervised by the Bureau of Labor Relations; it took almost the entire personnel of the Bureau, including the Director himself, to man the election, there were 11 precincts, each of which was presided over by a med-arbiter of the Bureau, as chairman, and another representation officer of the Bureau; there was also created a central election committee composed of four top personnel of the Bureau for optimum supervision; 3. There were some 8,900 eligible voters out of about 10,000 employees of the company; out of the 8,900 eligible voters, duly agreed upon by all the parties and approved by the Bureau, 6,309 or 79.7% voted; out of the 6,309 eligible voters cast,3970 or 63% went to GATCORD, [with UEUGIP placing] only fifth with a measly 291 votes or barely 4.5% of the total number of votes cast. It may be noted that even if the votes of all seven losing unions[were added], their total would only be 2,057, which is still 1,823 votes short of GATCORD's 2,970 votes. It is thus clear that GATCORD won by an overwhelming majority:" 9 It characterized such votes as an "unassailable majority." 10 On the question of the alleged irregularity, the comment set forth the following: "Petitioner UEUGIP did not lodge any protest concerning the alleged misprinting or omission of its name in the Notice of Certification Election in the Sample Ballot ... before the election, during the election or shortly after the election, [but merely questioned] the presence of the priests and nuns, over which it filed a protest with the BLR, [not

the alleged misprinting] or omission of its name in the election notice and the sample ballot; 10. The fact is, when GATCORD petitioned for the certification election (NLRC Case No. LR-4891, later numbered as BLR Case No. 256) in July, 1974, the United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines(UEUGIP) intervened, as represented by Ruben Escreza, the union's duly elected president, [with] Antonio Diaz, herein alleged representative of UEUGIP, [intervening] then not for UEUGIP but for UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 11. Since Mr. Diaz was representing only a faction of UEUGIP, which faction had no legal personality separate from UEUGIP which was duly represented by Mr. Escreza, the order of the Bureau dated 15 January 1975 included only UEUGIP as one of the contending unions, without including UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; 12. Subsequently, the Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO) intervened and, claiming that UEUGIP had affiliated with PTGWO, moved for a correction of the name UEUGIP in the order, making it UEUGIPPTGWO, ...;13. During the first two pre-election conferences in connection with the certification election held on February 14 and 17, 1975, Mr. Diaz appeared, but he was no longer representing UEUGIP-Workers' Faction; he entered a new union - the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU); ... 14. In the succeeding pre-election conferences, however, Mr. Diaz, apparently out to create trouble, began claiming to represent UEUGIP and abandoned representation of PSSLU [with the result that] UEUGIP had two representatives often clashing with each other; Mr. Escreza and Mr. Diaz; 15. On 19 May 1975 the Bureau of Labor Relations caused the posting of 'Notice of Certification Election' with a 'Sample Ballot', [with said posting being made at a time when] the parties had not yet agreed as to how their names should appear in the ballot, ... 16. It was only on 20 May 1974, after the election notice was already posted with the original sample ballot, that the parties came to discuss how their respective names should appear in the ballot,[at which time] the parties had agreed that the names of the contending unions should be printed in the ballots as they were printed, that is, with UNITED EMPLOYEES UNION OF GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILIPPINES (UEUGIP) there and without PSSLU." 11 Private respondent then considered the following as the pertinent questions: "If Mr. Diaz felt that the posting of the election notice and the original sample ballot was erroneous and it was prejudicial to his group, why did he not raise this question early enough? He could have raised it soon after the posting was made, especially considering that two more pre-election conferences, on May 20, 22 and 23 were held. Or he could have raised the question during the election day. But he did not. Is it because he did not really care then, is it because his people inside the

company did not really care, or is it because he had really no people inside to bother at all about said 'error?' If they were that disinterested in correcting the 'error' at least during the last four days before the election, how could Mr. Diaz claim now that his group was adversely affected by the alleged 'error' and that if said 'error' was not made, his group could have won the election?" 12 The comment ended on a statement rather rhetorical in character: "The truth is, Mr. Diaz had but a droplet of support, which, dream as he would, could never match, much less overcome, the raging torrents of GATCORD." 13 The comment on behalf of respondent Director Noriel and the respondent Representation Officer Eduvala stressed a grave abuse of discretion to certify an action forcertiorari. Petitioner sought permission to reply and was granted. There was, as could be expected, a stout denial of the recital of facts of private respondent, but it cannot be said that it is impressed with a high degree of persuasiveness.. At any rate, after the Court considered the comments as answers and set the case for hearing, with arguments coming from both counsel Benito Fabie for petitioner and Jose W. Diokno for private respondent, and with the labor leader Antonio Diaz referred to in the comment of private respondent being questioned and presenting petitioner's side of the controversy, a much clearer picture emerged. It was none too favorable for petitioner. As noted at the outset, we find for respondents. The petition lacks merit. 1. The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a certification election. So our decisions from the earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free Telephone Workers Union 14 to the latest, Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, 15 have made clear. Thus is one of the earliest cases, The Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, 16 it was made clear in the opinion of Justice J. B. L. Reyes that "a complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer.

The reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees' bargaining representative, and when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be decertified and the whole election proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory." 17 For it is easily understandable how essential it is, in the language of former Chief Justice Concepcion, in the leading case of LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild 18 "to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees." 19 There must be such an opportunity to determine which labor organization shall act on their behalf. 20 It is precisely because respect must be accorded to the will of labor thus ascertained that a general allegation of duress is not sufficient to invalidate a certification election; it must be shown by competent and credible proof.21 That is to give substance to the principle of majority rule, one of the basic concepts of a democratic polity. 22 The matter is summarized thus in one of the latest decisions of this Court, Federation of the United Workers Organization v. Court of Industrial Relations: 23 "The slightest doubt cannot therefore be entertained that what possesses significance in a petition for certification is that through such a device the employees are given the opportunity to make known who shall have the right to represent them. What is equally important is that not only some but all of them should have the right to do so." 24 If hed be paid to the above well-settled principle and applied to the facts disclosed in the present petition, it would be apparent that the grievance spoken of is more fancied than real, the assertion of confusion and demoralization based on conjecture rather than reality. The mode and manner in which Antonio Diaz demonstrated how militant and articulate he could be in presenting his side of the controversy could hardly argue for the accuracy of his claim that his men did lose heart by what appeared at the most to be an honest mistake, if it could be characterized as one. Certainly then, the accusation that there was abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, falls to the ground. 2. Nor need this Court pass upon the ground of protest based on the alleged participation by nuns and a priest who presumably aided the cause of private respondent. Petitioner did not choose to press this point. It is understandable why. In the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 25 this Court, through Justice Zaldivar, left no doubt as to the privacy of religious freedom, to which contractual rights, even on labor matters, must yield, thus removing any taint of nullity from the amendment to the Industrial Peace

Act, 26 which would allow exemption from a closed shop on the part of employees, members of a given religious sect prohibiting its devotees from affiliating with any labor organization. Subsequently, in Basa v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera, 27 such doctrine was reaffirmed, thus emphasizing that one's religious convictions may be the basis for an employee joining or refusing to join a labor union. Certainly, the wide latitude accorded religious groups in the exercise of their constitutional freedom would caution against reliance on such aground to invalidate a certification election. It thus appears that such an approach is reflected in the attitude adopted by petitioner, which in effect amounts to an abandonment of such a possible ground of protest, not at all lodged with this Court but merely mentioned in its recital of background facts. 3. During the hearing of this case, reference was made to the registration of private respondent allegedly having been revoked. As the pleadings do not touch upon the matter at all, this Court is not in a position to rule on such a question. The decision therefore leaves that particular aspect of the litigation open. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit. The restraining order issued by this Court is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

7. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRONICS & ELECTRICITY WORKERS' FEDERATION

(PCWF) and ELIGIO GALVEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE RAMON O. NOLASCO, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, AVEGON, INCORPORATED, and JOAQUIN L. GONZALES, President and General Manager, respondents.

Manuel C. Gonzales for Salonga, Ordoez, Sicat and Associates for respondents. SANCHEZ, J.:

petitioners.

The legal issue herein involved, essentially jurisdictional, stems from facts that follow: Respondent company, Avegon, Incorporated (Avegon), is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of television sets and transistorized radios. Two (2) labor unions are actively operating said company: (1) the Avegon Employees Association, and (2) the Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF), herein petitioner union. On March 17, 1965, petitioner union applied for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR).1 It alleged, inter alia, that a majority of Avegon's rank and file employees around 202 in number are its members; that there has been no certification election during the past twelve months; and that the appropriate bargaining unit should consist of the rank and file workers to the exclusion of supervisors, security guards, and other highly confidential employees. In the main, it is prayed that petitioner union be directly certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the rank and file group. Respondent company's answer sought dismissal of the case, grounded on the existence of a three-year collective bargaining agreement the other union, Avegon Employees Association which has been in force only for over a year. CIR's order of March 24, 1965 directed Avegon's president and/or manager to furnish CIR with a copy of the company's payrolls for the month of February, 1965 together with an alphabetical list of employees appearing therein. On or about April 28, 1965, Avegon laid off seventy of its employees effective as of the close of business hours on April 30, 1965. Of these, twenty-seven are members of petitioner union. Reason given for dismissal was depression in business opportunities. Of the seventy dismissed employees, sixty-three have received their separation pay. Amongst the sixty-three so paid are twenty of the twenty-seven union members whose dismissal is now being questioned. On April 27, 1965, an unfair labor practice charge was filed in CIR against Avegon (CIR 519-ULP). Complainants were Francisco Bernardo2 and/or petitioner union. Averment is there made that respondent company dismiss Bernardo from his job "in violation of Section 4 (a), sub-paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Republic Act 875". This was followed on May 4, 1965 with a second unfair labor practice charge (Case 532-ULP). Complainant therein is herein petitioner union.

Subject thereof is the dismissal of twenty-seven (27) members of said union. On the same day (May 4), Avegon received a letter from petitioner union protesting the dismissal just adverted to. On May 5, 1965, petitioner union struck, picketed Avegon's premises. Came respondent company's verified complaint of May 10, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Manila against herein petitioners for damages, with a prayer for preliminary injunction.3 It was there averred that "on May 5, 1965, at around 3 o'clock in the morning, without notice, without justifiable cause, in gross bad faith, and merely for the purpose of harassing plaintiff's already faltering business, defendants declared a strike, immediately proceeded to picket the company's premises, further inducing, enticing, and cajoling plaintiffs' other employees into joining them in the same"; that "defendants prevented through a show of force, intimidation, veiled threats, and by barring with their picket lines the company's gates, the other retained and non-striking employees from entering the compound and performing their work therein"; that "plaintiff has not committed any act constituting unfair labor practice against defendant union or its members because the dismissal effected by plaintiff was justified, lawful, and without regard to union affiliations"; and that the strike staged by petitioner union "is illegal, malicious and unjustified because there not only exists no unfair labor practice which might create a labor dispute, but also it was without proper notice". Avegon prayed for damages and attorneys' fees. It asked for preliminary injunction. On May 24, 1965, this complaint was amended to include the assertion "that greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of the relief sought"; "that the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable to furnish adequate protection"; and "that plaintiff has no other available adequate remedy at law". On May 13, 1965, the then vacation judge4 issued ex parte a restraining order, thus: 1wph1.t In the meantime and until further orders from this Court, herein defendants, their agents or representatives, are hereby restrained from preventing plaintiff's employees from entering to and going out from the company premises and performing their appointed labors therein. and setting for hearing Avegon's petition for preliminary injunction for May 18, 1965 at 8:30 in the morning.5

On said date (May 18), petitioners filed an urgent motion to dismiss and to dissolve the injunction (should be restraining order) alleging that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that even if it had, the injunction so issued is null and void for want of compliance with the indispensable requisites set forth in Section 9 of the Industrial Peace Act. Upon the motion and opposition thereto, and the arguments adduced by the parties, respondent judge on July 30, 1965 directed that a writ of preliminary injunction issue upon a P1,000-bond. This was followed on August 14, 1965 with the corresponding writ directing "the said Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) and all your attorneys, representatives, agents, and any other person assisting you, [to] refrain from preventing plaintiff's employees from entering to and going out from the company premises and performing their appointed labors therein". Charging violation both of the restraining order and injunctive writ, respondent company moved to have petitioners cited for contempt.6 Petitioners now seek redress through this present original petition for certiorari and prohibition. They assert (1) that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case; and (2) that the writ of preliminary injunction issued is void for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act 875. This Court issued a cease-and-desist order upon a P1,000-bond. 1. Petitioners press upon us the view that the court of first instance is without jurisdiction to entertain Avegon's complaint and to issue the preliminary injunction writ. And this, because the allegations in the complaint that a duly registered labor union went on strike and that "through a show of force, intimidation, veiled threats and by barring with their picket lines the company's gates, the said pickets have prevented non-striking employees from entering the compound and performing their work therein" show the existence of a labor dispute. The prevention of these acts which may be termed as unfair labor practices, so petitioners aver, is CIR's exclusive concern. Respondents maintain differently. Their position is that while CIR has jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases yet no unfair labor practice was committed by private respondents, as specifically averred in the complaint. From this, respondents postulate that since jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the complaint avers that no unfair labor practices were

committed, and since the instant case does not fall under any of the class of cases exclusively within CIR's jurisdiction,7 then an ordinary court Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction. Stripped of inconsequential details, averments there are in the complaint sufficient to bear out the existence of a labor dispute. For, alleged therein is that petitioner union protested the dismissal from Avegon's employ of twenty-seven (27) of its members; that thereafter, it staged a strike, picketed the company's premises "inducing, enticing, and cajoling other employees to join the strike in the process. A question regarding tenure of employment is thus clearly tendered. There is a labor dispute.8 And, that labor dispute came about because of alleged unfair labor practices. Of record is that on May 4, 1965, or a day before petitioner union struck, said union not only protested to Avegon, but also went to CIR, to voice out its grievance concerning the dismissal of twenty-seven of its members. In CIR they charged violation of Sec. 4(a), sub-paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Not that the trial court was unaware of the filing of this unfair labor practice charge, Case 532-ULP, and of the other, Case 519-ULP. These facts were made known to the trial court, offered precisely to deter its hand from granting preliminary injunction to Avegon. We have laid down the rule that "[t]he criterion, to bring the case under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, is whether the acts complained of in the petition for injunction arose out of, or are connected or interwoven with, the unfair labor practice case (PAFLU vs. Caluag, G.R. L-9104, Sept. 10, 1956), a question of fact that should be brought to the attention of the court a quo to entitle it to pass upon the issue whether it has jurisdiction or not over the case".9 Readily to be seen then is that the acts complained of by Avegon in the court of first instance "arose out of, or are connected or interwoven with" the unfair labor practice charge of herein petitioners previously filed with CIR. This interrelation was clearly presented to the trial court thru petitioners' "Urgent Motion To Dismiss and to Dissolve Injunction". The case, therefore, is well within the jurisdictional area allocated to CIR and not within the cognizance of the Court of First Instance of Manila.10 And more, CIR's jurisdiction stays even if no unfair labor practice case has been filed with CIR. It is enough that unfair labor practice is involved.11 This renders

irrelevant the distinction respondents would wish to make between an unfair labor practice charge and an unfair labor practice complaint. In sum, unfair labor practice is the root cause of the whole controversy now before us. The subject matter of Avegon's complaint herein, involves acts emanating from unfair labor practice. It has been held that "[f]rom PAFLU vs. Tan to Bay View Hotel, Inc. vs. Manila Hotel Workers Union, there has been unwavering adherence to the principle that under the Industrial Peace Act, unfair labor practice cases fall within the exclusive competence of the Court of Industrial Relations".12 It thus results that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 60864, and cannot issue therein the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction.13 2. Neither would the claim for damages suffice to keep the case within the jurisdictional boundaries of the court of first instance. That claim is interwoven with unfair labor practice. The legality or illegality of the strike must necessarily be litigated in the unfair labor practice case. And "the right to damages "would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor practice case" in the CIR". To allow Civil Case No. 60864 to prosper would be to bring about "split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.14 3. Assuming that the Court of First Instance of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the case, was the writ of preliminary injunction validly issued by said court? . Directing our attention first to the restraining order of May 13, 1965, we say that its defects may no longer be inquired into. Reason: With the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on August 14, 1965, the May 13 restraining order has become functus officio.15 Our inquiry then will be narrowed down to the validity of the injunctive writ. The controlling statute is Section 9 of the Industrial Peace Act. It says . SEC. 9. Injunctions in Labor Disputes. xxx xxx xxx

(d) No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a

complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after finding of fact by the Court, to the effect: (1) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary, restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons association, or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after, actual knowledge thereof; (2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow; (3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than upon defendants by the granting of relief; (4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and. (5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been given, in such manner as the Court shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed, charged with the duty to protect complainant's property: ... Where a case involves a labor dispute, "the provisions of the Magna Charta of Labor (R.A. 875) should be strictly followed".16 The court here issued the disputed writ of preliminary injunction "upon considering said complaint and affidavit by plaintiff, Avegon, Incorporated and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that this is a case where a writ of injunction should issue, sufficient reasons having been alleged". Grounds there are sufficient to overturn this writ. For one, there is the absence of a showing that the court heard the testimony of witnesses required in Section 9 (d) to support the allegations of the complaint and testimony in opposition thereto.17 Then, the court did not make any "finding of fact" as to the existence or non-existence of the facts required to be shown under the afore-quoted Section 9(d) and also under Section 9(f) of the Industrial Peace Act. Nor was notice given "to the chief of those public officials of the ... city ... charged with

the duty to protect complainant's property", also a prerequisite in said Section 9(d) heretofore mentioned. And finally, the record is barren as to whether or not complainant exerted "every reasonable effort to settle such dispute by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or by voluntary arbitration," another condition exacted by law this time Section 9(e) of the Industrial Peace Act before a restraining order or injunction may be granted. Failure to comply with even one of these requirements will suffice to deny the issuance of the writ.Having failed to establish any one of these conditions, Avegon is forbidden relief.18 We thus reach the conclusion that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent judge was in excess of his jurisdiction and null and void.19 For the reasons given, (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for herein is hereby granted; and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued by the court is hereby made permanent; and (2) the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 60864 of said court entitled "Avegon, Incorporated, Plaintiff, vs. Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) and Eligio Galvez Defendants". Costs against private respondents. So ordered. 1wph1.t