PNB vs Office of the President

May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by. the Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, by authority of the President. Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question. Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots. Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB -- without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, -- Inc. may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court. Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the x x x Office of the President x x x may be taken to the Court of Appeals x x x. However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice. Petitioner bank raised the following issues: 1 .The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and

2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagorsubdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment thereof. Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, (1)aws shall have no retroact ive effect, unless the contrary is provided. However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved: WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life; WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers; WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and f raudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value; (Italics supplied). While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the, unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law -- as an instrument of social justice -- must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual due diligence checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over

helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.1 The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory Construction (quoted with approval by this Court in an old case of consequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa2), says: The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to h ave effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away- from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and, objects of the legislature.3 Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. As the Solicitor General, in his comment, argues: Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the vigorous regulation which PD. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because PD. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a loophole which all along works to the prejudice of subdivision lot buyers (private respondents).4 Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of PD. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to PD. 9575 enactment:

SEC. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority. SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof. Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree. SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. -No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (Italics supplied) As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following statements of Justice Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench: Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be lega lly modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order. This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals6:

The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment clause. The argument does not impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact, there are many who now believe it is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in general. They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any interference with them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could properly struck down. But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then must the police power be asserted, and prevail, over the impairment clausq. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al.7, penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the. factual circumstances therein being of great similarity to the antecedent facts of the case at bench: Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on installment a tiny home lot they can call their own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals are taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities, including the most essential such as water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case, after almost completing the payments for the property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the stark reality, contrived or otherwise, in which another person would now appear to be owner. xxx xxx xxx

We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision where there were already houses constructed. Did it not enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be subdivision residents who have almost completed their installment payments? (Id., pp. 7 & 9).

By the foregoing citation, this Court thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this Decision. The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee banks right to foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void. As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 13 11 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a total stranger to the land purchase agreement, cannot be made to take the developers place. We disagree. P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents. SEC. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. (Italics supplied) Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without prejudice to petitioner Banks seeking relief against the subdivision developer. Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up-building of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These

consideration are obviously far more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of any specific property. Thus, as the country strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of NIC-hood and social well-being for the majority of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country, which has in recent years made record earnings and acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and subsidiaries in key financial centers around the world, should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private respondents, who were almost deprived and dispossessed of their very homes purchased through their hard work and with their meager savings. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioner having failed to show any REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs.

Manila Lodge 761 vs CA

FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a public nature. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.

United States v. Fisher - 6 U.S. 358 (1805)

U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 2 Cranch 358 358 (1805) United States v. Fisher 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 Syllabus Priority of the United States, in cases of insolvency. In all cases of insolvency or bankruptcy of a debtor of the United States, it is entitled to priority of payment out of his effects. The United States was the holder of a foreign bill of exchange drawn by the bankrupt, negotiated in the regular course of trade and returned protested for nonpayment, and is entitled to a preference out of the estate of the bankrupt to the whole amount of the claim. It is undoubtedly a well established principle in the exposition of statutes that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be extracted from the whole. It is also true that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided unless the meaning of the legislature be plain, in which case it must be obeyed. That the consequences are to be considered in expounding laws, where the intent is doubtful is a principle not to be contradicted, but it is also true that it is a principle which must be applied with caution and which has a degree of influence dependent on the nature of the case to which it is applied when rights are infringed. Where fundamental principles are overthrown, when the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects. But when only a political regulation is made which is inconvenient, if the intention of the legislature be expressed in terms which are sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind when the words are taken in their ordinary sense, it would be going a great way to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them to avoid an inconvenience which ought to have been contemplated in the legislature when the act was passed, and which in its opinion was probably overbalanced by the particular advantages it was calculated to produce. Of the priority to which the United States is entitled it is to be remarked that no lien is created. No bona fide transfer of property in the ordinary course of business is overreached. It is only a priority in payment, which, under different modifications, is a regulation in common use, and this priority is limited

to a particular state of things when the debtor is living, though it takes effect generally if he be dead. As the Court can never be unmindful of the solemn duty imposed on the judicial department when a claim is supported by an act which conflicts with the Constitution, so the Court can never be unmindful of its duty to obey laws which are authorized by that instrument. It has been truly said that under a Constitution conferring specific powers, the power contended for must be granted or it cannot be exerted. The power of Congress to give the priority to debts due to the United States is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof. Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution. Page 6 U. S. 359 This writ of error was prosecuted by the United States, who was plaintiff in the court below. The questions submitted to the Court, in the argument upon the writ of error were: 1. Whether an attachment laid by the United States, on property of the bankrupt in the hands of the Collector of Newport in Rhode Island after the commission of bankruptcy had issued is available against the assignees? 2. Whether the United States is entitled to be first paid and satisfied, in preference to the private creditors, a debt due to the United States by Peter Blight as endorser of a foreign bill of exchange out of the estate of the bankrupt in the hands of his assignees? Page 6 U. S. 385 Official Supreme Court caselaw is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia caselaw is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.

FCC vs. NEXTWAVE Comm., Inc.

Term: 2000-20092002 Facts of the Case In January 2003, the Supreme Court in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 1 held that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") could not revoke the licenses of a licensee that had sought bankruptcy protection. 2 The decision ended legal battles spanning more than five years between the FCC and the corporation. 3 The decision promises to have a significant impact, both on the way the FCC

meets its obligations to serve the public interest, 4 and on the wider arena of how the government interacts with debtor firms in the private sector. 5 At its core, this controversy stems from the tension between two important governmental interests in bankruptcy. On one side is the government's interest in protecting debtors from having licenses revoked upon filing for bankruptcy within the bankruptcy system's goal of providing debtors a fresh start. 6 On the other is the government's interest in efficient airwave usage and wide access to spectrum, as expressed in the Communications Act and manifested in the FCC's decisions. 7

This note argues that the NextWave decision frustrates the FCC's purpose under the Communications Act, 8 and is based upon flawed reasoning. This note will also demonstrate that even if the Court's interpretation is correct, Congress should create an exception granting the FCC power to revoke the licenses of licensees in bankruptcy. After the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctioned off certain broadband personal communications services licenses to NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., Nextwave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, including the FCC. The FCC asserted that NextWave's licenses had been canceled automatically when the company missed its first payment-deadline and announced that NextWave's licenses were available for auction. Ultimately, when the FCC denied NextWave's petition for reconsideration of the license cancellation, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit held that the cancellation violated 11 USC section 525(a), which provides that a "governmental unit may not...revoke...a license...to...a debtor...solely because such...debtor...has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case." (Together with No. 01-657, Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.) Question Does section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibit the Federal Communications Commission from revoking licenses held by a debtor in bankruptcy upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments owed to the FCC for purchase of the licenses? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Nextwave Communications, Inc., 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the FCC's cancellations of the licenses violated section 525(a) as revocations of government licenses solely for nonpayment of the debtors' dischargeable debts. The Court rejected the FCC's argument that it did not revoke NextWave's licenses solely because of nonpayment and noted that the fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its action was irrelevant. Justice Scalia reasoned that, because the statute refers to failure to pay a debt as the sole cause of cancellation, it cannot reasonably be understood to include the

governmental unit's motive in effecting the cancellation, since such a reading would deprive section 525 of force. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer authored a dissenting opinion.

In January 2003, the Supreme Court in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 1 held that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") could not revoke the licenses of a licensee that had sought bankruptcy protection. 2 The decision ended legal battles spanning more than five years between the FCC and the corporation. 3 The decision promises to have a significant impact, both on the way the FCC meets its obligations to serve the public interest, 4 and on the wider arena of how the government interacts with debtor firms in the private sector. 5 At its core, this controversy stems from the tension between two important governmental interests in bankruptcy. On one side is the government's interest in protecting debtors from having licenses revoked upon filing for bankruptcy within the bankruptcy system's goal of providing debtors a fresh start. 6 On the other is the government's interest in efficient airwave usage and wide access to spectrum, as expressed in the Communications Act and manifested in the FCC's decisions. 7

This note argues that the NextWave decision frustrates the FCC's purpose under the Communications Act, 8 and is based upon flawed reasoning. This note will also demonstrate that even if the Court's interpretation is correct, Congress should create an exception granting the FCC power to revoke the licenses of licensees in bankruptcy.

Ursua vs Court of Appeals

256 scra 149 Statutory Construction Purpose of a Law

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases by the RTC of Davao City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name Oscar Perez when he was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was charged under the wrong law.

HELD: The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO

FACTS: For resolution is the problem of whether RA No. 6126 may be held applicable to the case at bar. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question: Section 1 no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which anothers dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed 300php a month. Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval. Approved June 17, 1970

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bar. Held: It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected.

Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may. Therefore given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4 of the civil code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it has limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that no lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act. Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March 1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect. We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., vs.JaniolaG.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

Facts: This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filedby the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question withrespectto the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent. The petitioner appealed to RTC but deniedDreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit againstJaniola forviolation of BP 22 at theOffice of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Correspondingly, the former alsofiled a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC, entitledPeople of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.On September 20, 2006, Janiola, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of analleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter respondentfiled a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondentclaimthat the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case.Petitioner opposed theRespondents Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the followinggrounds; (1) there is no prejudicial question in thiscase as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncingchecks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question isthat the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issueraised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal casehaving preceded the civil case.

TheMTC granted theRespondentsMotion to Suspend Proceedings.Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition.Hence, this petition raised. ISSUE Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspendproceedings in Criminal Case onthe basis of Prejudicial Question , with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed. Held This petition must be granted, pursuanttoSEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of aprejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issuedetermines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law asthat which must precede thecriminal action and which requires a decisionbefore a final judgment can be rendered in the criminalaction.The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution ofthe criminal action.In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filedby the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares thatthe construction agreement between the parties is void forlack of consideration, this would not affect theprosecution of private respondent in the criminal case.The fact of the matter is that private respondent issued checks which were subsequently dishonored forinsufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it isclear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question is absent, thus, no prejudicial question extists.