Rayo, Agustin - An Account of Possibility PDF

Possibility and Content
Metaphysics without Deep Metaphysics

Agustn Rayo
February 14, 2010
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
I Main Texts 1
1 Identity 3
1.1 Identity Generalized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Varieties of Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Understanding Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Deciding Between Rival Identity-Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Logical Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 What Does the Truth of an Identity-Statement Consist In? . . . . . . . . 29
1.6.1 Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.6.2 Metaphysical Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6.3 The Upshot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2 Possibility 37
2.1 Supervenience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 Possible Worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3 The Supervenience Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3.1 The Principle of Maximality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.2 The List of Modal Truths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
i
ii CONTENTS
2.4 Modal Language and Modal Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5 Beyond First-Order Languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3 Metaphysics 61
3.1 Tractarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 Life without Tractarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Ontological Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.1 Quines Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.2 Is Quines Criterion Adequate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4 Mathematics 81
4.1 Trivialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Benacerrafs Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Neo-Fregeanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.1 Mixed Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.2 Abstraction Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4 A Semantics for Trivialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4.1 The Trivialist Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4.2 Philosophical Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5 Paraphrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.6 Beyond Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.6.1 Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5 Content 109
5.1 Folk-Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Rational Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3 Belief-Attributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4 Cognitive Accomplishment in Logic and Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . 126
CONTENTS iii
5.5 Mary and the Tomato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
II Detours 139
6 Deep Metaphysics 141
7 A-worlds and the Dot Notation 149
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.2 A Kripke-semantics for actualists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.3 Admissibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.4 Interlude: The Principle of Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.5 The dot-notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.5.1 Inference in a language with the dot-notation . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.5.2 The expressive power of the dot-notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.5.3 Limitations of the proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8 Translation 173
9 Introducing Mathematical Vocabulary 181
9.1 Linguistic Stipulation for Anti-Tractarians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
9.2 Success Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
9.3 Internal Coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
9.4 Applied Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
9.5 Compositional Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
III Appendices 199
A A Semantics for a Language with the Dot Notation 201
B If Lewis Can Say It, You Can Too 207
iv CONTENTS
C The Canonical Space of Worlds 213
D Modal Sentences and Modal Facts 219
List of Figures
2.1 Examples of Metaphysical Necessities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2 Examples of Metaphysical Necessities (Continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3 Examples of Metaphysical Necessities (Mereological Principles) . . . . . . 59
7.1 Examples of A-worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
v
vi LIST OF FIGURES
Introduction
Here is my best eort to come up with a slogan for the book: I will attempt a post-
Quinean revival of Carnap.
Dont expect any history of philosophy, though. There will be no meaningful discus-
sion of Quine or Carnap in this book. Here is what the slogan really means. Carnap
believed that true sentences can be usefully divided into those that are true in virtue
of the meaning of their constituent vocabulary, and those whose truth depends not just
on meaning but also on the way the world is. The formersentences like bachelors
are unmarriedwere thought of as consequences of meaning postulates. They were
described as analytic and said to be knowable a priori. The lattersentences like the
Suns mass is approximately 1.9891 10
30
kilogramswere described as synthetic and
said to be knowable only a posteriori.
Quine objected to Carnap by complaining that our understanding of notions like
meaning postulate or analyticity is not robust enough to do the work that Carnap de-
manded of them. I think Quine was right about this, but I also think it is easy to
overestimate the reach of his criticism. The lesson to take from Quine is that talk of
meaning postulates and analyticity is a bad way of characterizing the sort of distinction
Carnap was after, not that the the project of nding such a distinction is worthless.
What I mean when I say that I will attempt a post-Quinean revival of Carnap is that I
will try to nd a better way of characterizing a Carnap-style distinction, and use it to
do philosophical work.
vii
viii LIST OF FIGURES
The distinction I will focus on is a distinction between sentences with trivial truth-
conditionstruth-conditions whose satisfaction requires nothing of the worldand sen-
tences with non-trivial truth-conditions. The notion of triviality wont give us everything
Carnap hoped to get from the notion of analyticity. Signicantly, it wont deliver the
result that the truth of sentences with trivial truth-conditions is generally knowable a
priori. But what one gets in exchange is a notion that is better understood, and that
can be put to real philosophical use. I will argue, in particular, that it can be used to
deliver each of the following:
1. An account of the limits of metaphysical possibility.
2. An account of ontological commitment, and its relationship to reference.
3. An account of the truth-conditions of mathematical sentences.
4. An account of representational content, and of what one learns when one learns a
necessary truth.
Like Carnap and the Logical Empiricists, I am suspicious of a certain brand of meta-
physics: Deep Metaphysics, as I like to call it. Deep Metaphysics seems to have enjoyed
a resurgence in recent years, and I will be reacting against it throughout the book. Un-
like the Logical Empiricists, however, I will not be oering a quick and easy criterion
of metaphysical respectability. Nor will I be engaging with the oending views. The
only eective way of countering Deep Metaphysics, it seems to me, is by bringing out
the fact that it has no interesting role to play in our theorizing. I hope my discussion
will illustrate that dicult philosophical questions can be fruitfully addressed without
resorting to the dubious concepts of Deep Metaphysics. (It is in this sense that project
of the book may be described as Metaphysics without Deep Metaphysics.)
LIST OF FIGURES ix
Truth-Conditions
A sentences truth-conditions, as they will be understood here, consist of a requirement
on the worldthe requirement that the world would have to satisfy in order to be as the
sentence represents it to be. The truth-conditions of snow is white, for example, consist
of the requirement that snow be white, since that is how the world would have to be in
order to be as snow is white represents it to be.
Two sentences might be thought to have the same truth-conditions even if they are
thought to have dierent meanings in some pre-thoeretic sense of meaning. Consider
the Sun is hot and the Sun has high mean kinetic energy. These two sentences play
very dierent roles in our linguistic practice. So there is room for thinking that they
mean dierent things. But one should still think that the two sentences have the same
truth-conditions. For to be hot just is to have high mean kinetic energy. So there is no
dierence between what would be required of the world in order to be as the Sun is hot
represents it to be and what would be required of the world in order to be as the Sun
has high mean molecular motion represents it to be.
In this book I will focus on the notion of truth-conditions, to the exclusion of other
aspects of meaning. But this is not because I think that truth-conditions are all there
is to meaning. It is because I think truth-conditions are an especially useful aspect of
meaning, and deserve special attention.
Triviality
For a sentences truth-conditions to be trivial is for them to be satised provided only
that the world is not incoherent. (And, of course, it is trivially the case that the world
is not incoherent; soin an interesting sense of nothingfor a sentence to have trivial
truth conditions is for nothing to be required of the world in order for the truth-conditions
to be satised.)
Consider, for example, the sentence white things are white. To assume that its truth
x LIST OF FIGURES
conditions fail to be satised is to assume that there are white things that fail to be white.
This is something I regard as incoherent. So I see the truth-conditions of white things
are white as imposing no real demands on how the world is: I take them to be satised
trivially.
A sentence can have trivial truth-conditions even if its truth is not knowable a priori.
Consider, for example, things composed of water are composed of H
2
O. A scenario in
which this sentences truth-conditions fail to be satised is a scenario in which something
composed of water fails to be composed of H
2
O. But to be composed of water just is to
be composed of H
2
O. So the scenario is one in which something composed of H
2
O fails
to be composed of H
2
O. And that is something I regard as incoherent. So I take things
composed of water are composed of H
2
O to have trivial truth-conditions.
I will argue in the book that the notion of triviality draws a distinction that can be
drawn in many dierent ways, and that our grasp of the distinction can be strengthened
by combining our understanding of the dierent ways in which it might be drawn.
Here are ve dierent ways of drawing the distinction (all relativized to a subject, so
as to simplify the exposition):
1. Triviality
The distinction between sentences that the subject regards as having trivial truth-
conditionsi.e. truth-conditions whose satisfaction requires nothing of the world
and the rest.
2. De mundo Intelligibility
The distinction between sets of sentences that describe scenarios that the subject
takes to be intelligible (in a particular sense of intelligibility, to be elucidated
later), and the rest.
LIST OF FIGURES xi
3. Identity
The distinction between sentences that the subject takes to be logical consequences
of identity-statements she accepts, and the rest.
4. Why-closure
The distinction between sentences that the subject takes to be why-closedi.e. sen-
tences such that the subject is unable to make sense of the question I can see
that is the case; what I want to know is why?and the rest.
5. Necessity
The distinction between sentences whose truth-conditions that the subject takes to
be satised as a matter of metaphysical necessity, and the rest.
I will argue thatonce they have been subjected to various qualications and elucidations
these ve distinctions come to the same thing:
A sentence is taken to have trivial truth-conditions i its negation is regarded
as de mundo unintelligible i it is taken to follow logically from identity
statements one accepts i it is regarded as why-closed i it is regarded as
metaphysically necessary.
I will not be presupposing that one of these notions is fundamental and the rest are
derived. It is no part of the picture that necessity, to pick an arbitrary example, is the
fundamental notion, and that the otherstriviality, identity, why-closure and de mundo
intelligibilityshould be understood on the basis of a rm and independent grasp of the
distinction between the necessary and the contingent. Instead, I will treat each of the
ve notions as contributing to our understanding of the rest, so that even if our grasp
of any one of them is somewhat limited when considered in isolation, they are all better
understood when considered in light of the connections with their peers.
xii LIST OF FIGURES
The family of biconditionals cannot be all there is to our understanding of the ve
notions. At least some of the notions must be subject to independent constraints. To a
certain extent, the needed constraints come from our pre-theoretic usage of the relevant
terms. But there will be some regimentation as we go along, because the notions will
have to be subjected to qualications and precisications before the biconditionals turn
out to be true. So caution must be applied when appealing to pre-theoretic usage.
A more robust source of constraint on our understanding of the individual notions
comes from their role in our theorizing. Let me give you an example.
Identity and our Scientic Practice
The notions of identity and why-closure play an important role in our scientic practice.
Detailed discussion will have to wait until sections 1.3 and 1.4, but it is easy to convey
a sense of the main idea.
The sentence to be hot just is to have high mean kinetic energy is why-closed. It
would be wrong-headed to ask: I can see as clearly as can be that for something to be
hot just is for it to have high mean kinetic energy; what I want to understand is why?.
The problem is not just that we wouldnt know how to answer the question. It isnt even
clear what sort of information is being requested. One is inclined to reject the question,
and respond by reasserting the identity statement: to be hot just is to have high mean
kinetic energy. (In contrast, it would be perfectly intelligible to ask: I can see as clearly
as can be that the Sun is composed primarily of Hydrogen and Helium; what I want to
understand is why.)
The fact that we treat to be hot just is to have high mean kinetic energy as why-
closed is correlated with the fact that we close o certain lines of inquiry (conspicuously,
the project of better understanding why hot substances are made up of rapidly moving
particles). And this, in turn, is correlated with the adoption of a certain kind of scientic
outlook, according to which heat-related phenomena are better accounted for by focusing
LIST OF FIGURES xiii
on molecular motion than by, say, postulating a new kind of substance, such as caloric
uid. I will argue below that there is a general connection, via why-closure, between the
identity statements one accepts and the lines of inquiry one takes to be most fruitful in
ones theorizing about the world.
Conclusion
There are limits to our pre-theoretic understanding of the notions of triviality, de mundo
intelligibility, identity, why-closure and necessity. But some of these notions are con-
strained by their role in our theorizing about the world. And by recognizing connections
between the dierent notions, our understanding of each of them can contribute to our
understanding of the rest. The result is an improved (though somewhat regimented)
understanding of the relevant notions: an understanding which I hope will prove robust
enough to address a family of puzzles in the metaphysics of modality, the philosophy of
language, the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of mindand do so while
steering clear of Deep Metaphysics.
How to Read this Book
I have divided the book into three parts:
Part I: Main Texts (chapters 15)
Part II: Detours (chapters 69)
Part III: Appendices
All the main themes of the book are developed in Part I. If youd like to see the overall
picture while limiting your time-commitment, what I recommend is that you focus on
chapters 15.
Part II is for enthusiasts. It discusses issues arising from Part I that are important
for a detailed understanding the project, but may be skipped by casual readers. These
xiv LIST OF FIGURES
detours should not be thought of as extended footnotes, though. Each of them develops a
self-standing idea of independent interest. If you are tempted by the additional material
what I recommend is that you read it in conjunction with Part I. Youll nd plenty of
pointers in the text, but here are some natural combinations:
Read . . . in conjunction with . . .
chapter 6 section 1.6.2 (or chapter 3)
chapter 7 section 2.2
chapter 8 section 4.5
chapter 9 section 4.6.
Part III consists mostly of technical material, and is intended only for the true acionado.
Part I
Main Texts
1
Chapter 1
Identity
1.1 Identity Generalized
Statements of the form a = b, for a and b singular terms, are identity-statements. But
they are only a special case. Consider the following sentences:
Sibling
To be a sibling just is to share a parent.
[In symbols: Sibling(x)
x
yz(Parent(z, x) Parent(z, y) x ,= y)]
Marriage
For a marriage to take place just is for someone to get married.
[In symbols: a marriage takes place someone gets married]
In these three sentences the expression just is (or its formalization
x
) is functioning
as an identity-predicate of sorts.
To accept Sibling it is not enough to believe that all and only the siblings share a
parent. You must also believe that there is no dierence between being a sibling and
sharing a parent; you must believe that if someone is a sibling it is thereby the case that
3
4 CHAPTER 1. IDENTITY
she shares a parent. (More colorfully: when God created the world, and made it the case
that some of Her creatures shared a parent, there was nothing extra She had to do, or
refrain from doing, in order to ensure that there were sisters. She was already done.) If
you accept Sibling, you believe that the feature of reality that is fully and accurately
described by saying Susan is a sibling can also be fully and accurately described by
saying Susan shares a parent. What is required of the world in order for the rst of
these sentences to be true is precisely what is required of the world in order to make the
second of these sentences true.
Similarly, if you accept Marriage, you believe that there is no dierence between
a marriage taking place and someones getting married. When someone gets married
it is thereby the case that a marriage takes place. The feature of reality that is fully
and accurately described by saying A marriage took place is also fully and accurately
described by saying Someone got married.
It is useful to compare Marriage and Sibling with a regular rst-order identity
such as Hesperus is Phosphorus. If you accept Hesperus is Phosphorus, you believe
that there is no dierence between traveling to Hesperus and traveling to Phosphorus.
Someone who travels to Hesperus has thereby traveled to Phosphorus. The feature of
reality that is fully and accurately described by saying A Russian spaceship traveled to
Hesperus is also fully and accurately described by saying A Russian spaceship traveled
to Phosphorus.
The English expression just is is sometimes used asymmetrically in ordinary con-
versation. It is, for instance, more natural to say to be a sibling just is to share a
parent than to say to share a parent just is to be a sibling. (Perhaps what explains
the dierence is the presence of some sort of convention to the eect that statements of
the form to be just is to be should be used to clarify what it takes to satisfy by
using , rather than the other way around.) I will be disregarding any such asymmetries
here. I will be thinking of as an identity predicate (and therefore as an equivalence
1.2. VARIETIES OF IDENTITY 5
relation), so I will be treating and as interchangeable. If you nd that
you are unable to rid yourself of the asymmetrical reading of just is, please treat as
primitive, or nd some other paraphrase for (for instance: there is no dierence
between its being the case that and its being the case that ).
1.2 Varieties of Identity
Second-order Identity
As I did in the case of Sibling, I shall sometimes index with variables. (I might say,
for instance,
x
, or
z,x
.) This is to indicate that occurrences of the relevant variables
in the formulas that takes as arguments are to be regarded as bound by . Thus,
whereas
x is a sibling
x
x shares a parent
is read to be a sibling just is to share a parent and expresses a complete thought, its
index-free correlate
x is sibling x shares a parent
is read for it to be a sibling just is for it to share a parent, and expresses an incomplete
thought.
Whenever is indexed with rst-order variables, I shall refer to the relevant identity-
statements as second-order identities. Here are some additional examples of second-order
identities:
Composed-of-Water(x)
x
Composed-of-H
2
O(x)
(Read: To be composed of water just is to be composed of H
2
O.)
Hot(x)
x
High-Mean-Kinetic-Energy(x)
(Read: To be hot just is to have high mean kinetic energy.)
Sisters(x, y)
x,y
Female(x) Female(y) z(Parent(z, x) Parent(z, y))
(Read: For x and y to be sisters just is for x and y to be female and for them
to share a parent.)
It is natural to think of second-order identities as expressing identities amongst properties
(e.g. the property of being a sibling = the property of sharing a parent.) I have no qualms
with this description, as long as property-talk is understood in a suitably deationary
way. (To have the property of Fness just is to be F.) But it is important to be aware that
property-talk is potentially misleading. It might be taken to suggest that one should only
assert Sibling if one is prepared to countenance a nave realism about propertiesthe
view that even though it is intelligible that there be no properties, we are lucky enough
to have them. The truth of Sibling, as I understand it, is totally independent of such
a view.
Semi-Identity
Sometimes one is in a position to endorse something in the vicinity of an identity-
statement even though one has only partial information. Suppose you know that the
chemical composition of water includes oxygen but dont know what else is involved.
You can still say:
Part of what it is to be composed of water is to contain oxygen.
[In symbols: Composed-of-water(x)
x
Contains-Oxygen(x).]
I shall call this as a semi-identity statement. Think of it as a more idiomatic a way of
saying:
To be composed of water just is (to contain oxygen and to be composed of
water).
1.2. VARIETIES OF IDENTITY 7
In general, I shall treat the semi-identity statement (x)
x
(x) as a syntactic abbre-
viation of the identity-statement (x)
x
((x) (x)).
Please keep in mind that F(x)
x
G(x) should not be understood as entailing that
being G is, in some sense, metaphysical prior to being F, or as entailing that something
is G in virtue of being F.
As in the case of second-order identity-statements, it is natural to think of semi-
identity-statements in terms of properties (e.g. the property of being water has the
property of containing oxygen as a part.) Again, I have no objection to this sort of
description, as long as property-talk is taken in a suitably deationary spirit.
We have seen that can be dened in terms of . The converse is also true.
To be composed of water just is to be composed of H
2
O, for example, is equivalent
to the conjunction of part of what it is to be water is H
2
O and part of what it is to
be H
2
O is to be water. In general, F(x)
x
G(x) is equivalent to the conjunction of
F(x)
x
G(x) and G(x)
x
F(x).
First-Order Identity-Statements
There are two dierent readings of the rst-order identity predicate =. On the stronger
reading, Hesperus = Phosphorus is false at worlds in which Venus fails to exist; on
the weaker (Kripkean) reading Hesperus = Phosphorus is true at all worlds. On the
weaker reading, Hesperus = Phosphorus can be paraphrased as x = Hesperus
x
x =
Phosphorus (regardless of whether = takes the weaker reading in the paraphrase).
On the stronger reading, Hesperus = Phosphorus is equivalent to the conjunction of
x = Hesperus
x
x = Phosphorus and x(Hesperus = x).
One can think of the weaker reading as claiming only that what it takes to satisfy the
condition of being identical to Hesperus is precisely what it takes to satisfy the condition
of being identical to Phosphorus. If such a claim is true, it will be true even at worlds in
which Venus fails to exist (though, of course, the existence of Venus in the actual world
is a precondition for our being able to talk about the relevant conditions).
When = takes the weaker reading and a and b are proper names, a = b can always
be paraphrased as a = x
x
b = x. But this need not hold when we have denite
descriptions. Obama = the 44th president of the United States, for example, cannot be
paraphrased as to be Obama just is to be the 44th president of the United States. For
even though Obama and the 44th president refer to the same individual, the predicates
x = Obama and x = the 44th president have dierent satisfaction-conditions: what it
takes to satisfy the condition of being identical to Obama is dierent from what it takes
to satisfy the condition of being the 44th president.
When I speak of identities (or identity-statements) below, what I will have in mind
is always statements of the form (x)
x
(x). This means that both semi-identity
statements and weak rst-order identity-statements featuring proper names will count as
identities, but contingently true rst-order identity-statements will not.
Constitutive Properties and Conditional Semi-identity Statements
P is a constitutive property if the assumption that z has P is enough to license the
conclusion that part of what it is to be z is to be P. Being human, for example, is a
constitutive property. For the assumption that Socrates is human is enough to license:
x = Socrates
x
Human(x)
(Read: part of what it is to be Socrates is to be human.)
Being snub-nosed, on the other hand, is not a constitutive property. For the assumption
that Socrates is snub-nosed does not license:
x = Socrates
x
Snub-Nosed(x)
1.3. UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY 9
(Read: part of what it is to be Socrates is to be snub-nosed.)
The claim that P is a constitutive property can be formulated as a conditional semi-
identity statement:
P(z)
x = z
x
P(x)
(Read: assume z is P; then part of what it is to be z is to be P.)
Having w as a biological parent is a parameterized constitutive property. For the as-
sumption that z has w as a biological parent is enough to warrant the conclusion that
part of what it is to be z is to have w as a parent. Parameterized constitutive properties
can also be captured by conditional semi-identity statements. One can say, for example:
B(z, w)
x = z
x
B(x, w)
(Read: assume z has w as a biological parent; then part of what it is to be z is to have
w as a biological parent.)
Although conditional identity-statements can take other forms, here I will restrict my
attention to the reexive case: the case in which the antecedent is a rst-order formula
(z, w) and the consequent is x = z
x
(x, w).
Some notation: a predicate will be said to be constitutive just in case it expresses a
constitutive property. Also, I shall use identity-statement to cover both conditional and
unconditional identity-statements.
1.3 Understanding Identity
Identity-statements pervade our pre-theoretic, scientic and philosophical discourse. Yet
they have been given surprisingly little attention in the literature, and are in much need
of elucidation. I think it would be hopeless to attempt an explicit denition of .
This is not because true and illuminating equivalences couldnt be foundI have already
suggested some in the Introduction to Part Ibut because any potential deniens can
be expected to contain expressions that are in at least as much need of elucidation
as . The right methodology, it seems to me, is to explain how our acceptance of
identities interacts with the rest of our theorizing, and use these interconnections to
inform our understanding of . (I make no claims about conceptual priority: the
various interconnections I will discuss are as well-placed to inform our understanding of
on the basis of other notions as they are to inform our understanding of the other
notions on the basis of .)
In what follows I will show that the notion of identity is closely related to three other
notions: truth-conditionality, de mundo intelligibility and why-closure. In chapter 2 we
will discuss a connection with necessity, and later in the book we will discuss ways in
which the family of notions interacts with the other regions of our philosophical and
non-philosophical theorizing.
Truth-conditions
A sentences truth-conditions, as they will be understood here, consist of a requirement
on the worldthe requirement that the world would have to satisfy in order to be as the
sentence represents it to be. The truth-conditions of snow is white, for example, consist
of the requirement that snow be white, since that is how the world would have to be in
order to be as snow is white represents it to be.
There is a close relationship between the identities one accepts and ones views about
which sentences have the same truth-conditions. Suppose, for example, that you think
that for something to be composed of water just is for it to be composed of H
2
O. Then
you should think that A is composed of water and A is composed of H
2
O have the
same truth-conditions. For what the former requires of the world is that A be composed
of water. But to be composed of water just is to be composed of H
2
O, which is what the
latter requires of the world.
Conversely: suppose you think A is composed of water and A is composed of H
2
O
have the same truth-conditions. Then you think there is no dierence between satisfying
the requirement that A be composed of water and satisfying the requirement that A be
composed of H
2
O. And this can only be true if what it is to be composed of water is to
be composed of H
2
O.
If you accept to be composed of water just is to be composed of H
2
O, you should
also think that the sentence things composed of water are composed of H
2
O has trivial
truth-conditions. For you will take the condition that things composed of water be
composed of H
2
O to place the same demands on the world as the condition that things
composed of H
2
O be composed of H
2
Oand nothing is required of the world in order for
the condition that things composed of H
2
O be composed of H
2
O to be satised. (Wait!
Doesnt the world have to satisfy the condition of being such that things composed of
H
2
O are composed of H
2
O? Yes, butunless you are a dialetheistyou will think that
this is a condition that the world could only fail to satisfy by being incoherent, and it
is trivially the case that the world is not incoherent. It is in this sense that you will
think that nothing is required of the world. There is no particular way the world needs
to benothing God needs to have done or refrained from doingin order for things
composed of H
2
O to be composed of H
2
O. )
De mundo intelligibility
Let a story be a set of sentences in some language we understand. I shall assume that
stories are read de re: that every name used by the story is used to say of the names
actual bearer how it is according to the story, and that every predicate used by the story
is used to attribute the property actually expressed by the predicate to characters in the
story. Accordingly, in order for a story that says Hesperus is covered with water to be
true it must be the case that Venus itself is covered with H
2
O. (I shall ignore names that
are actually empty, such as Sherlock Holmes, and predicates that are actually empty,
such as . . . is composed of phlogiston or . . . is a unicorn.)
Sometimes we describe a story as unintelligible on the grounds that it is too com-
plicated for us to understand. That is not the notion of unintelligibility I will have in
mind here. I will say that a story is de mundo unintelligible for a subject if her best
eort to make sense of a scenario verifying the story would yield something she regards as
incoherent. (I use incoherent as interchangeable with absurd; you should also think of
it as interchangeable with inconsistent and trivially false, unless you are a dialetheist
or a paracompletist. For more on dialetheism and paracompletism, see Priest (2006),
Beall (2009) and Field (2008).) De mundo intelligibility is the complement of de mundo
unintelligibility.
Here is an example. Consider a story that says Hesperus is not Phosphorus. My best
eort to make sense of a scenario verifying this story ends in incoherence. For a scenario
in which the story is true would have to be a scenario in which Hesperus itself (i.e. Venus)
fails to be identical with Phosphorus itself (i.e. Venus), and the nonseldentity of Venus
is something I regard as incoherent. (Of course, it would be easy enough to make sense
of a scenario in which language is used in such a way that the expression Hesperus is
not Phosphorus is true. But that wont help with the question of whether the original
story is de mundo intelligible.)
Another example: consider a story that says there is a hot substance with low mean
kinetic energy. For something to be hot just is for it to have high mean kinetic energy. So
a scenario verifying there is a hot substance with low mean kinetic energy would have to
be a scenario in which someone hoti.e. something with high mean kinetic energyfails
to have high mean kinetic energy, which is something I regard as incoherent.
There is an intimate connection between identity and de mundo intelligibility: a
subject regards a story as de mundo unintelligible just in case she takes the story to
entail something she regards as incoherent in light of the identities she accepts.
Three clarications: (1) The notion of de mundo intelligibility is deeply non-a priori.
For whether or not one takes a story to be de mundo intelligible will depend on whether
one believes that, say, Hesperus is Phosphorusand this is not the sort of thing that
one could come to know a priori. (2) Perhaps you think there is a sense of intelligibility
(distinct from de mundo intelligibility) with respect to which it would be right to say that
Hesperus is not Phosphorus is an intelligible story. You could claim, for example, that
Hesperus is not Phosphorus is intelligible in the following sense: it would be veried (in
a special sense of verify) by a scenario in which the rst heavenly body to be visible
in the evenings is not the last heavenly body to be visible in the mornings. I myself am
skeptical that the needed notion of vericationwhich is, in eect, an implementation of
the idea that our sentences have primary intensionsis in good order. But no interesting
claims in this book depend on this skepticism. If you think you can understand a notion
of intelligibility distinct from de mundo intelligibility, thats ne. Just keep in mind
that its not the notion under discussion here. (3) So far we have talked about the
intelligibility of stories, but not the intelligibility of the scenarios that the stories depict.
When a scenario is picked out by a story, we shall say that the scenario is intelligible just
in case the story used to pick it out is de mundo intelligible.
Why-Closure
Suppose someone says: I can see as clearly as can be that Hesperus is Phosphorus;
what I want to understand is why. It is not just that one wouldnt know how to comply
with such a requestone is unable to make sense of it. The natural reaction is to either
nd a charitable reinterpretation of the question (why does one planet play both the
morning-star and the evening-star roles?) or reject it altogether (What do you mean
why? Hesperus just is Phosphorus.)
Contrast this with a case in which someone says: I can see that the window is broken;
what I want to understand is why, or I can see that the radioactive isotope decayed at
time t rather than a second later; what I want to understand is why, or even I can see
that there is something rather than nothing; what I want to understand is why. In all
three of these cases one can make sense of the request, taken at face-value. In the rst
case, one may even have a satisfying reply (e.g. The window is broken because it was
hit by soccer ball). In the second case, it is harder to think of a good reply, but one can
at least think of a bad one (e.g. because God willed it so). Potential replies are even
scarcer in the third case (even bad ones), but one can at least state that there is no good
answer to be given without refusing to make sense the question (e.g. Well, thats just
the way things turned out.). Contrast this with the initial Hesperus/Phosphorus case,
where it isnt even appropriate to say Well, thats just the way things turned out.
Say that a sentence is treated as why-closed just in case one is unable to make sense
of the question Why is it the case that ? when it is understood as follows:
I can see exactly what it would take to satisfy s truth-conditions, but I wish
to better understand why the world is such as to satisfy them.
There are various other ways of reading the question Why is it the case that ?, and
it is important to be clear that they are not relevant to why-closure. In particular:
1. I wish to to understand why s primary intension holds.
[For instance: Why is it the case that Hesperus is Phosphorus?, meaning Why is
there a single planet playing both the morning-star and the evening-star roles.]
2. I wish to better understand what it would take to satisfy s truth-conditions.
[For instance: Why is it the case that the mean score is dierent from the median
score?, meaning I dont understand mean and median well enough to know
what it would take for the mean score is dierent from the median score to be
true.]
3. I wish to better understand why has the truth-conditions that it in fact has.
[For instance: Why is it the case that (p q) (q p)?, meaning Help me
understand how it comes about that the truth-functional operations corresponding
of and conspire to make it the case that every row in a truth-table for
(p q) (q p) turns out to be be true.]
4. Convince me that is true.
[For instance: Why is it the case that Hesperus is Phosphorus?, meaning Give
me grounds for thinking that Hesperus is Phosphorus.]
When Why is it the case that ? is understood in accordance with any of these alternate
readings, I shall say that it is read as a grounding question. It is often tempting to
interpret why-questions as grounding questionsand the temptation is especially great
when the intended reading is unavailable (as it will be cases of why-closure). But, as
I noted above, grounding questions are not relevant for the purposes of assessing why-
closure.
There is an intimate connection between identity and why-closure: the sentences
one treats as why-closed are precisely those one regards as logical consequences of the
identity-statements one accepts.
1
Suppose, for example, that grounding readings have
been excluded by context and someone says: Why are things composed of water com-
posed of H
2
O? The natural reaction is to reject the question altogether, and reiterate
the identity-statement: What do you mean why? To be composed of water just is to
be composed of H
2
O!.
1
Dialetheists: please add and whose negations one takes to be incompatible with the identity-
statements one accepts.
1.4 Deciding Between Rival Identity-Statements
It will be useful to say something about the considerations that go into determining
which identity-statements to accept. (My discussion is very much indebted to Block and
Stalnaker (1999).)
Part of the story is straightforward. One will only accept F(x)
x
G(x) if one
also accepts x(F(x) G(x)). But this cannot be the end of the story, since one
might reject F(x)
x
G(x) even if one accepts x(F(x) G(x)). Our problem is
to determine what else is required.
In rough outline, the story is this. In an eort to satisfy our goals, we develop
strategies for interacting with the world. Fruitful strategies allow us to control what
the world is like and predict how it will evolve under specied circumstances. They also
allow us to direct our research in ways that lead to the development of further fruitful
strategies. In order to articulate the strategies we adopt, we do three things at once:
rstly, we develop a language within which to formulate theoretical questions; secondly
we set forth theoretical claims addressing some of these questions; nally, we endorse a
family of identity-statements. The third task is connected to the other two because the
identity-statements we endorse will help determine which theoretical questions are treated
as why-closed, and therefore which theoretical questions are treated as not requiring
answers.
It is useful to consider some examples.
Example 1: The chemistry crank
A chemistry crank believes that the chemical composition of various substances varies
with temperature. Methanol, she thinks, is normally composed of hydrogen, oxygen and
carbon; but at a temperature of precisely
2 degrees celsius, its chemical composition

changes to hydrogen and platinum. Similarly, our crank expects the chemical composition
1.4. DECIDING BETWEEN RIVAL IDENTITY-STATEMENTS 17
of water to vary with temperature. Her model predicts that at a temperature of precisely
degrees celsius, water is composed of oxygen and gold. Our crank sets out to test
her hypothesis by carrying out water-electrolysis at a range of temperatures. What she
nds, of course, is that hydrogen and oxygen bubble up, regardless of how closely the
temperature approximates degrees celsius. She concludes that every portion of water
on Earth is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. She takes this to be a remarkable fact,
in need of explanation. Perhaps Earths gravitational eld is getting in the wayshe
thinksperhaps under low-gravity conditions water is composed of oxygen and gold at
degrees celsius.
What identity-statements will our crank accept? The decision will be based on her
explanatory needs. She wishes to make sense of why is this portion of water composed of
oxygen and hydrogen?. So she had better not to accept part of what it is to be water is
to be composed of oxygen and hydrogen. Perhaps she will instead be inclined to accept
part of what it is to be water is to be a colorless, odorless, liquid. This would lead
her to think that there is sense to be made of why is this portion of water composed of
hydrogen and oxygen, but not of, e.g. why is this portion of water a liquid?.
Now consider a real chemist. She does not think it at all remarkable that every
portion of water on Earth be composed of hydrogen and oxygen, and does not think it
is in need of explanation. In fact, she believes that there is no sense to be made of why
is every portion of water on Earth composed of hydrogen and oxygen?. Accordingly,
she is inclined to accept part of what it is to be water is to be composed of hydrogen
and oxygen. She also believes that why is this portion of water a liquid? is a sensible
question to ask. (Remember that we are ignoring grounding questions!) So she had
better not accept part of what it is to be water is to be a liquid.
The crank and the chemist use dierent strategies for investigating chemical phenom-
ena. Because of these dierences, they articulate their methods of inquiry in dierent
ways: they both accept the theoretical claim every portion of water on Earth is com-
posed of hydrogen and oxygen, but only the chemist treats the claim as why-closed
because only the chemist accepts part of what it is to be water is to be composed of
hydrogen and oxygen. It is important to be clear, however, that nothing in their meth-
ods of inquiry mandates a particular selection of identity-statements. The crank could,
if she really wanted, accept part of what it is to be water is to be composed of oxygen
and hydrogen. By doing so she would be committed to thinking that there is no sense
to be made of why is every portion of water on Earth composed of oxygen and hydro-
gen?. But this neednt interfere with her ability to articulate her methods of inquiry.
For rather than asking why is every portion of water on Earth composed of hydrogen
and oxygen?, she could ask, e.g. why is every portion of colorless, odorless, liquid on
Earth with such-and-such additional properties composed of hydrogen and oxygen?.
Ones reason for preferring a particular set of identity-statements over its rivals is
not that it is somehow enforced by ones explanatory methods. Ones reason is that it
yields an articulation of ones explanatory methods that one nds especially congenial.
Accepting part of what it is to be water is to be composed of oxygen and hydrogen
is uncongenial for the crank because it forces her to reformulate some of her chemical
claims. Rather than saying, e.g. under ideal conditions, water is composed of oxygen and
gold at degrees celsius, she will now have to say, e.g. under ideal conditions, colorless,
odorless liquids with such-and-such additional properties are composed of oxygen and
gold at degrees celsius. Such reformulations are undesirable because of the extra
work, but also because it may not be obvious to the crank how a given claim is best
reformulated. There would be no problem ifbefore the changethe crank had an
exhaustive characterization of what it is to be water. For then she would be in a position
to reformulate her chemical claims by replacing every occurrence of the world water
with the relevant characterization. But suppose thatbefore the changeall the crank
has is a partial characterization of what it is to be water: she believes that part of what
it is to be water is to be a colorless, odorless liquid, but leaves open that there might be
more to being water than that. Then she wont be sure how to cash out the such-and-
such in a claim like under ideal conditions, colorless, odorless liquids with such-and-such
additional properties are composed of oxygen and gold at degrees celsius.
If our crank comes to accept part of what it is to be water is to contain hydrogen she
will change her views about the satisfaction-conditions of . . . is a portion of water. She
might start out believing that part of what it takes to satisfy . . . is a porition of water
is to be a colorless, odorless liquid. But after accepting part of what it is to be water is
to contain oxygen and hydrogen, she will come to believe that part of what it takes to
satisfy . . . is a portion of water is to be composed of oxygen and hydrogen. This is not
to say that water, as used by the crank, undergoes a change in satisfaction-conditions.
(It rigidly designates H
2
O throughout.) The point is that if the crank accepts deviant
identity-statements, she will also have deviant beliefs about the satisfaction-conditions
of the expressions of her language. (A similar point can be made with respect to the
cranks concepts: if she accepts deviant identity-statements, she will also have deviant
beliefs about the satisfaction-conditions of her concepts.)
Example 2: The zoology crank
A zoology crank believes that snails placed in a lobster environment will evolve into
lobsters after a few generations, and that lobsters placed in an elephant environment
will evolve into elephants after a few generations. He also believes that original creatures
spontaneously come into existence from time to time, and their descendants evolve into
members of various species as the generations go by. As a result, our crank believes that
it is rare for all the members of a species to share a common ancestry. They are typically
composed of the descendants of several dierent original creatures. All the same, our
crank decides to sample the DNA of extant elephants in order to determine whether they
are, in fact, related. When the results come in, he concludes that elephants do, as a
matter of fact, share a common ancestry. This conclusion strikes him as remarkable, and
in need of explanation. Perhaps it was an incredible coincidencehe thinksperhaps
it is only the descendants of a particular original creature that happened to end up in an
elephant environment.
What identity-statements will our crank accept? As before, the decision will be based
on his explanatory needs. He wishes to makes sense of why do elephants share a common
ancestry?. So he had better not to accept part of what it is to be an elephant is to have
a certain lineage. Perhaps he will instead be inclined to accept, e.g. part of what it is
to be an elephant is to have such-and-such a phenotype. This would lead him to think
that there is sense to be made of why do elephants share a common ancestry, but not
of, e.g. why do elephants have trunks?.
Unfruitful research might lead our zoology crank to change his approach. He may
alter his zoological beliefs and explanations. He might come to believe, for example, that
changes in phenotype between an individual and its ospring are much slighter (and far
more random) than he previously thought, and that the link between surviving under
environmental conditions of a given type and having a particular phenotype is much less
robust than he previously thought. Accordingly, he might come to think that the sharing
of elephant-phenotypesand the ability of elephants to interbreedis best explained by
elephants common ancestry.
What identity-statements will our crank now accept? After the change of approach,
the notion of having such-and-such a lineage can be expected to play a more central
role in his zoological thinking than the notion of having such-and-such a phenotype. So
by accepting part of what it is to be an elephant is to have a certain lineage rather
than part of what it is to be an elephant is to have such-and-such a phenotype he can
expect to articulate his methods of zoological inquiry in a relatively congenial way. He
will be committed to thinking that there is no sense to be made of why do elephants
have a common ancestry?. But he can still hold that there are intelligible questions
in the vicinity (e.g. why are elephants the only extant creatures with an elephantine
phenotype?).
One respect in which the zoology example is dierent from the chemistry example is
that the considerations that recommend accepting part of what it is to be an elephant
is to have a certain lineage over some of its rivals are not particularly decisive. There is
room for arguing, for instance, that the notion of being a member of a group of organisms
that are able to interbreed and produce fertile ospring will play a more central role in
the zoologists thinking than the notion of having such-and-such a lineage, and therefore
that his methods of zoological inquiry would be best articulated by accepting part of
what it is to be an elephant is to be a member of a certain group of organisms that
are able to interbreed and produce fertile ospring (Two groups, actually: African and
Indian elephants cant interbreed).
In general, the question of what identities to accept may turn on the purposes at
hand. The same theorist might nd it useful to accept what it is to be an elephant is to
be a member of a certain lineage for the purposes thinking about evolution by natural
selection, and nd it useful to accept what it is to be an elephant is to be a member of a
certain group of organisms that are able to interbreed and produce fertile ospring for
the purposes of studying ancient patterns of elephant-migration. Moreover, one would
expect that situations in which ones methods of inquiry can be articulated with similar
success by way of rival identity-statements would be the rule rather than the exception.
Example 3: The vixen-conspiracy crank
A conspiracy crank believes that vixens are super-intelligent creatures with magical pow-
ers who are out to dominate the Earth. She believes they are extraterrestrialsno
Earthly creature has ever been vixen-like. (Male foxes, on the other hand, are not alive
at all; they are robots created by the vixens as a cover for their operations.) Vixens
have the ability to assume any form they like, and have chosen to assume the form of
mammalian females. This is a fact in need of explanation.
What identity-statements will our crank accept? She wishes to make sense of why
are vixens female?. So she had better reject part of what it is to be a vixen is to be
female. Perhaps she will claim instead that what it is to be a vixen is to be a member of
a certain extra-terrestrial lineage. She can then be expected to have unorthodox views
about the satisfaction-conditions of vixen. In particular, she might deny that part of
what it takes to satisfy vixen is to be femaleshe might claim instead that all it takes
to satisfy vixen is to be a member of the right extra-terrestrial lineage, whether or not
one happens to assume a female form. This is not to say, however, that vixen, as used
by the crank, undergoes a change in satisfaction-conditions. Even in her mouth, what it
takes to satisfy vixen is to be a female fox.
As in previous examples, nothing in the cranks methods of inquiry mandates a partic-
ular choice of identity-statements. (She could, if she really wanted, accept part of what
it is to be a vixen is to be female. By doing so she would be committed to thinking that
there is no sense to be made of why are vixens female?. But this neednt interfere with
her ability to articulate her methods of inquiry. For rather than asking why are vixens
female? she might ask why have the extraterrestrials chosen to assume female form?.)
But the present example can be used to illustrate an important point: even if nothing
in the cranks methods of inquiry mandates a particular choice of identity-statements,
there is room for thinking that certain choices are excluded by facts about the cranks
language, together with her methods of inquiry. Suppose, for example, that one believes
that vixens are female is analytic. One might then think thaton pain of betraying the
meanings of her wordsthe crank is barred from accepting, e.g. to be a vixen just is to
be a member of a certain extraterrestrial lineage.
More generally, suppose, one believes that our words have primary intensions. (See
Chalmers (1996) and Jackson (1998).) One believes, in particular, that the meaning of
vixen determines more than just an intension for vixen (i.e. a function assigning to each
possible world the set of objects vixen applies to at that world); it also determines, for
each possible world, what the intension of vixen should be taken to be on the assumption
that that world is actual. One might then think thaton pain of betraying the meanings
of her wordsthe crank is not free to choose between rival identity-statements. Suppose
the meaning of vixen determines that, on the assumption that the cranks beliefs are
true, one should take the intension of vixen to assign each world the set of female
members of a certain terrestrail lineage. Thenon pain of betraying the meanings of her
wordsthe crank is barred from accepting to be a vixen just is to be a member of a
certain extra-terrestrial lineage.
I am myself skeptical of the notion of analyticity as traditionally understood, and I
can see no good reason for believing that the meaning of vixen determines what the
intension of vixen should be taken to be on the assumption that that the cranks beliefs
are true. But I shall remain neutral about such questions throughout the book.
Example 4: First-order Identity
The examples we have considered so far have all concerned second-order identity-statements,
and they have all had the same form. We discussed scenarios in which a statement of
the form x(F(x) G(x)) is taken for granted, and asked about the sorts of con-
siderations that would lead one to take the additional step of accepting or rejecting
F(x)
x
G(x). The rst-order analogue of these examples would be a case in which,
for each of a suitable stock of predicates (x), (a) (b) is taken for granted, and
one asks about the sorts of considerations that would lead one to take the additional step
of accepting or rejecting a = b. (On pain of making the exercise uninteresting, one had
better not allow, e.g. x = a to be one of the suitable predicates.)
Familiar examples of this kind include cases of personal identity. (This human animal
and this person are physically indistinguishable, but are they the same individual?)
They also include the puzzle of the statue and the clay. (This statue and this lump of clay
share are physically indistinguishable, but are they the same individual?) Unfortunately,
both of these examples are tied up with philosophical controversies which are best avoided
in the present context. I shall therefore use an example from science-ction.
By the dawn of the twenty-seventh century, the old theories of quantum mechanics had
been superseded by superquantum-theory. This new fundamental physics countenances
four dierent kinds of elds (numbered 1 through 4). Type-1 and type-2 elds are
generated, respectively, by particles of type-1 and type-2. These particles usually have
dierent locations, but on occasion they undergo a superquantum merger, in which they
come to occupy the same location. (Location in superquantum-theory is a messy aair:
particles occupy clouds in space rather than exact regions of space, and particles merge
when they come to share a cloud.)
There are also elds of type-3 and type-4. Everyone agrees that they are dierent.
(Type-3 elds can be blocked by a lead barrier, for example; but type-4 elds cannot.)
Everyone agrees, moreover, that type-3 elds and type-4 elds are both generated by
particles, and there is a stipulation in place to the eect that the source of a type-3 elds
is to be referred to as a type-3 particle and the source of type-4 elds is to be referred
to as a type-4 particle. There is, however, an important disagreement. As far as anyone
has been able to tell, type-3 elds and type-4 elds are always generated from the same
location. Monists suggest that this is because type-3 particles and type-4 particles are
one and the same. Dualists suggest that type-3 particles and type-4 particles are distinct,
but that they are always merged with one another, in the same sort of way that type-1
particles and type-2 particles are sometimes merged.
What sorts of considerations would lead one to embrace one of these positions over
its rival? Here the crucial observation is that monists and dualists face dierent ex-
planatory burdens. From the dualists perspective, the colocation of type-3 particles and
type-4 particles is a fact that calls for explanation. (Perhaps she has an explanation:
perhaps the theoretical model which she uses to explain the occasional merging of type-1
and type-2 particles predicts that the particles generating type-3 and type-4 elds will
1.5. LOGICAL TRUTH 25
be systematically merged, or that they will be merged in all but extraordinary circum-
stances.) From the perspective of the monist, on the other hand, there is no need to
explain the colocation of type-3 and type-4 particles. For there is no sense to be made of
I can see that this type-3 particle is identical to this type-4 particle, but why are they
colocated?.
If she really wanted to, the dualist could try to articulate her methods of inquiry in
monistic terms. Whether or not she would nd a monistic articulation congenial depends
on the details of her methods of inquiry. The change may prove to be a welcome one
if her theorizing is unable to supply a satisfying answer to the question why are type-
3 particles and type-4 particles systematically colocated?. For in that case the shift to
monism would relieve her of an unwelcome explanatory burden. But suppose instead that
she has a satisfying answer to the questionperhaps her answer involves a bit of theory
which is ripe with interesting predictions, some of which have been conrmed. Then
whether the move is congenial will depend on whether she is able to nd an attractive
way of articulating the insight captured by the extra bit of theory in a monistic setting.
What this story suggests is that the sorts of considerations that would lead one to go
from accepting suitable instances of (a) (b) (e.g. this type-3 particle is located
here this type-4 particle is located here) to accepting a = b (e.g. this type-3 particle
is this type-4 particle) are similar to the sorts of considerations that would lead one to
go from accepting x(F(x) G(x)) to accepting F(x)
x
G(x). In both cases, one
will be motivated to take the additional step to the extent that the resulting explanatory
landscape oers good prospects for a congenial articulation of ones methods of inquiry.
1.5 Logical Truth
When one treats a sentence as logically true, one does more than simply treat it as true.
One takes it to have trivial truth-conditions, and takes it therefore to be why-closed: one
thinks there is no intelligible question as to why the world is such as to satisfy its truth-
conditions. If, for example, you are a classical logician, you will think it wrong-headed to
say I can see as clearly as can be that if there are elephants, then there are elephants;
what I want to understand is why.
That sentences regarded as logically true are generally treated as why-closed is a point
that is easily obscured. The problem is that when is taken to be a logical truth, Why
is it the case that ? is most naturally read as a grounding question. And although
the relevant grounding questions do indeed make sense, they are irrelevant to assessing
why-closure. (See section 1.3.)
Suppose is a relatively complex logical truth, such as x((x) ) (x((x))
) or DP there is no largest prime (where DP abbreviates the conjunction of an
interesting subset of the rst-order Dedekind-Peano Axioms). When someone asks Why
is it the case that ?, it can be natural to read the question as follows:
I do not fully understand how the meanings of s lexical items conspire to
deliver the truth-conditions that they in fact deliver.
Thus read, the question certainly makes sense. And it can be adequately addressed by
oering a suciently illuminating proof of , and making sure that it is fully understood
by ones interlocutor. But all one has done so far is address a grounding question. It
would be hard to make sense of ones interlocutor if she went on to ask the question
that is relevant for assessing why-closure: I fully understand why it is that has the
truth-conditions that it has, and I can fully understand what it would take to satisfy such
truth-condtions. What I want to know is why the world is such as to satisfy them. For
one should think that nothing is required of the world in order for the truth-conditions
of a sentence one regards as logically true to be satised. (For further discussion, see
chapter 5.)
The claim that sentences regarded as logically true are taken to have trivial truth-
1.5. LOGICAL TRUTH 27
conditions is open to two potential sources of misunderstanding. First, one might worry
that it leads to the conclusion that logical truths all have the same meaning. But there
is no such entailment. To say that two sentences have the same truth-conditions is not
to say that they have the same meaning. It is only to say that there is no dierence
between what would be required of the world to satisfy the constraints determined by
one of the meanings and what would be required of the world to satisfy the constraints
determined by the other.
Second, one might worry that it leads to the conclusion that coming to know of a
logical truth that it is true should be a trivial matter. But the conclusion only follows on
the assumption that determining whether a sentence has trivial truth-conditions is itself
a trivial aair. And this is not generally true: it can be a highly non-trivial matter to
work out whether the truth-conditions of a logical truth are indeed trivial.
The connection between logical truth and triviality can be restated as a connection
between logical truth and identity. When one regards a sentence as a logical truth, one
is, in eect, accepting an identity-statement. Part of what it is to treat the sentence
as a logical truth is to commit oneself to the identity-statement . More
generally, part of what it is to treat the sentence as a logical truth is to commit oneself
to the identity-statement (where is a sentence one takes to have trivial truth-
conditions and is the material biconditional).
As a result, when one treats a sentence like as a logical truth, it is not
just that one takes oneself to be justied in accepting provided one feels justied in
acepting (and vice-versa). One will think that an understanding of why s
truth-conditions are satised is already an understanding of why s truth-conditions are
satised (and vice-versa). There is no need to add an explanation of why the transition
from to is valid: that s truth-conditions be satised is what it is for s
truth-conditions to be satised.
Deciding between rival logics
In the preceding section we considered examples in which the decision to accept an
identity-statement can be closely tied to empirical considerations. But when it comes to
accepting the family of identities corresponding to the adoption of a logical system, the
decision is more organizational in nature.
Generally speaking, there is a delicate balance to be struck in deciding which identities
to accept. If one accepts too many, one will be committed to treating as unintelligible
scenarios that might have been useful in theorizing about the world. If one accepts too
few, one opens the door to a larger range of intelligible scenarios, all of them candidates
for truth. In discriminating amongst these scenarios one will have to explain why one
favors the ones one favors. And although the relevant explanations could lead to fruitful
theorizing, they could also prove burdensome.
The adoption of a suitable logic plays an important role in nding the right balance
between these competing considerations. Consider, for example, the question whether to
treat as a logical truth (and therefore accept every identity-statement of the
form for p to fail to be the case just is for p to be the case). A friend of intuitionistic
logic, who denies the logicality of , thinks it might be worthwhile to ask why
it is the case that p even if you fully understand why it is not the case that p. In the
best case scenario, making room for an answer will lead to fruitful theorizing. But things
may not go that well. One might come to see the newfound conceptual space between
a sentence and its double negation as a pointless distraction, demanding explanations in
places where there is nothing fruitful to be said.
Even if none of the decisions one makes in adopting a family of identity-statements is
wholly independent of empirical considerations, some decisions are more closely tied to
empirical considerations than others. And when it comes to identity-statements corre-
sponding to logical truths, one would expect the focus to be less on particular empirical
1.6. WHAT DOES THE TRUTH OF AN IDENTITY-STATEMENT CONSIST IN?29
matters and more on the question of how to best organize ones methods of inquiry.
So there is room for a picture whereby an epistemically responsible subject can believe
identity-statements on the basis of considerations that arent grounded very directly in
any sort of empirical investigation.
1.6 What Does the Truth of an Identity-Statement
Consist In?
Throughout this chapter I have talked about about triviality, de mundo intelligibility
and why-closure according to a subject. But one can also talk about triviality, de mundo
intelligibility and why-closure simpliciter. A sentence has trivial truth-conditions just in
case it is a logical consequence of true identity-statements; a story is de mundo intelligible
just in case it is logically consistent with the set of true identity-statements; a sentence
is why-closed just in case it it is a logical consequence of true identity-statements.
The issue of what the truth or falsity of an identity-statement consists in is a delicate
one. The aim of this section is to help clarify what is going on.
1.6.1 Preliminary Remarks
True identity-statements have trivial truth-conditions; false identity-statements have im-
possible truth-conditions. Consider, for example, to be hot is to have high mean kinetic
energy. What is required of the world in order for the truth-conditions of this sentence
to be satised is that there be no dierence between having high mean kinetic energy
(i.e. being hot) and being hot. Equivalently: that there be no dierence between being
hot and being hot.
The result is that controversies surrounding the truth of an identity-statement will
never concern the question of whether the world is such as to satisfy the truth-conditions
that are actually expressed by the identity-statement: everyone agrees that the trivial
truth-conditions are satised, and that the impossible truth-conditions are not. This
is not to say, however, that controversies surrounding the truth identity-statement are
divorced from disagreements about how the world is. They typically concern two kinds
of non-linguistic issues: (1) empirical questions not expressed by the identity-statement,
and (2) dierences in the lines of inquiry that are regarded as fruitful in theorizing about
the world. Disagreements about the truth of to be hot is to have high mean kinetic
energy, for example, concerned straightforwardly factual questions (e.g the existence of
caloric), and dierences in the lines of research that were regarded as fruitful (e.g. whether
it would be fruitful to engage in the project of accounting for heat-related phenomena
by postulating a new substance).
There is also disagreement about languagespecically, about the satisfaction-con-
idiitions of the expressions involved in the identity-statement. The caloric theorist will
think that what it takes to satisfy is hot is to contain sucient quantities of caloric;
the contemporary scientist will think that what it takes is to have high mean kinetic
energy. (And, of course, the disagreement about the satisfaction-conditions of is hot is
also a disagreement about the satisfaction-conditions of to be hot is to have high mean
kinetic energy: if is hot and has high mean kinetic energy are taken to have the same
satisfaction-conditions, the identity-statements truth-conditions will be regarded as triv-
ial; otherwise, the identity-statements truth-conditions will be regarded as impossible.)
Debates about the truth-conditions of an identity-statement are a subtle aair. In
simple examples, such as the one considered above, or a disagreement about the truth
of Hesperus is Phosphorus, it is relatively straightforward to see how ones views about
whether or not the identity-statements has trivial truth-conditions turn on non-linguistic
matters. In the case of Hesperus is Phosphorus it can be agreed on all sides that the
truth-conditions are trivial if a single planet plays the morning-star and evening-star
roles, and impossible if there is a dierent planet playing each role.
Unfortunately, matters are not always that straightforward. Consider the examples
we discussed in section 1.4. The chemist and the crank can agree about the most ob-
viously relevant non-linguistic factthat every extant portion of water is composed of
H
2
Oand still disagree about whether the truth-conditions of water is H
2
O are trivial
or impossible. Likewise, the zoologist and the crank can agree about the most obviously
relevant non-linguistic factthat all elephants have a common ancestryand still dis-
agree about whether the truth-conditions of part of what it is be an elephant is to have
a certain lineage are trivial or impossible. In both cases, the disagreement comes from
a dierence in the lines of research that the subjects consider worthwhile. Earlier I mo-
tivated these dierences by ascribing the cranks false beliefs: that gold can be extracted
from water at the right temperature, and that sea-slugs, say, lack a common ancestry.
But in the general case there is no guarantee that dierences in the lines of research that
the subjects take to be fruitful will be traceable to false beliefs of this kind. They may
ultimately rest on dierences in the sorts of methodologies that the various subjects nd
useful in theorizing about the world.
Perhaps one zoologist thinks it fruitful to place considerations of lineage at the center
of his theorizing whereas another nds it more useful to emphasize the ability of individu-
als to interbreed and produce fertile ospring. Neither of them has any false beliefs about
how organisms are related to each other, or about who is able to interbreed with whom.
The dierent methodologies might be more or less fruitful relative to dierent purposes,
and it might turn out that neither of them is clearly dominant in zoology as a whole. If
so, there will be no clear empirical pressure to adopt one candidate identity-statement
instead of one of its rivals. It may well come down to a matter of deciding which way of
using language would be most convenient for the purposes at hand.
1.6.2 Metaphysical Privilege
Perhaps you believe that there is such a thing as metaphysically privileged properties
natural kinds, in the metaphysicians senseand that one of the property of sharing a
common lineage and the property of having genetic material that could be combined with
that of such-and-such individuals to produce fertile ospring enjoys greater metaphysical
privilege than the other. If so, you might think that a debate about whether to accept
to be an elephant just is to be a member of thus-and-such a lineage or to be an
elephant just is to have the sort of genetic material that could be combined with that of
such-and-such individuals to produce fertile ospring turns on more than just linguistic
preference. It is, in part, a debate about where metaphysical privilege lies. You might
think, for example, that if the property of being a member of thus-and-such a lineage is
endowed with greater metaphysical privilege, it is thereby a more eligible candidate for
the referent of elephant.
I myself am utterly unable to make sense of the requisite notion of metaphysical
privilege. As far as I can tell, it is a piece of Deep Metaphysics. (Deep Metaphysics
is my label for the sort of metaphysics that makes non-metaphysicians cringe: the kind
that outsiders see as relying on distinctions without a dierence, and that the Logical
Empiricists reacted against in the rst third of the Twentieth Century. For discussion,
see chapter 6.)
Calling metaphysically privileged properties natural kinds masks just how obscure
the notion of metaphysical privilege really is. For the use of a label from the natural sci-
ences might be taken to suggest that metaphysically privileged properties are scientically
distinguished: that they lead to more fruitful theorizing than their less metaphysically
exalted counterparts. But this is precisely not the case in the situation at hand. For
we wheeled in the notion of metaphysical privilege in an eort to buttress the idea that
one of the candidate referents for elephant could be deemed superior to its peers even
though it did not lead to better scientic theorizing.
The problem with metaphysical privilege, as I see it, is that it is not subject to
independent constraints. It is bit like saying: the reason there are facts about which
outts are objectively fashionablenot just fashionable relative to the tastes of some
community or otheris that certain outts are metaphysically privileged: they carve the
world at the joints. Be a fashion objectivist if you must, but dont pretend that talk of
metaphysical privilege makes your view any less obscure.
I am under no illusions about the ability of remarks like these to convince the uncon-
vinced. Talk of metaphysical privilege is currently in vogue, and many metaphysicians
would report having no trouble whatsoever understanding what is going on. Because I
am pessimistic about the prospects of making any meaningful progress with the initiated,
I will limit my discussion to a brief remark, aimed at people who have yet to take sides.
Conversation with my metaphysician friends has sometimes resulted in dialogue such
as the following:
What is it to carve the world at the joints? It is to describe the world in
metaphysically fundamental terms. But what is it for a term to be metaphys-
ically fundamental? It is a term that God would use when describing the
world. Yes, but what is so special about Gods description of the world? She
would only use predicates expressing perfectly natural properties. What do
you mean, perfectly natural ? Oh, perfectly natural properties are properties
that carve the world at the joints.
Perhaps there is good sense to be made of this family of interrelated terms. But it is
important to be clear that it would be no thanks to the proposed circle of denitions. As
far as the denitions go, carves at the joints, metaphysically fundamental, expression
in Gods language and perfectly natural are nothing more than labels. No light has
been shed on the underlying notions because pieces of metaphysical jargon are dened
in terms of other pieces of metaphysical jargon: none of the terms can be used by the
uninitiated to break into the circle.
Before feeling satised about understanding a notion of metaphysical privilege, I urge
you to make sure you are told what work the notion is meant to be doing. And not
any job-description will do. If you are having trouble understanding objectivism about
fashion, for example, it wont be very helpful to be told that objectively fashionable
outts carve at the joints and that joint-carving is to be understood by way of its job in
explicating objectivism about fashion.
Some metaphysicians have made a serious eort to elucidate the job that a notion
of metaphysical privilege might be use to perform. (See, for instance, Lewis (1983a)
and Sider (typescript).) While I applaud their methodology, I must report that I am
totally unconvinced. Of the many applications that have been suggested for notions of
metaphysical privilege, I have never been able to nd one that strikes me as plausible
and outside the realm of Deep Metaphysics.
2
But I may be prejudiced because I started
out as a skeptic. Perhaps you can do better. (If you are able to do better, please keep
in mind it that nothing in this book presupposes that your views about metaphysical
privilege are mistaken.)
1.6.3 The Upshot
We have identied several dierent issues that might be at stake when there is a discussion
about whether a given identity-statement is true:
1. Empirical questions not expressed by the identity-statement.
[Is there one planet or two? Is there is such a thing as caloric uid?]
2
Steve Yablos recent work on aboutness speaks of some facts being true in virtue of others. It
seems to me that Yablo has identied enough interesting work for the notion of in virtue of to do that
he has succeeded in elucidating what it means. I doubt, however, that Yablos notion is a notion of
metaphysical privilege of the kind that more metaphysically minded philosophers have been interested
in defending.
2. Dierences in the lines of research that are regarded as fruitful.
[Would it be fruitful to engage in the project of accounting for heat-related phe-
nomena by postulating a new substance?]
3. Disagreements about which way of using language is most convenient for the pur-
poses at hand.
[Is it easier to express interesting zoological claims by using elephant to mean
member of thus-and-such a lineage or has the sort of genetic material that could
be combined with that of such-and-such individuals to produce fertile ospring ?]
4. Disagreement, amongst Deep Metaphysicians, about which properties are endowed
with metaphysical privilege.
[Does the property of having thus-and-such a lineage enjoy greater metaphysical
privilegeand therefore greater eligibility as a referent for the word elephant
than other candidate properties?]
It is important to be clear, however, that none of these issues are actually expressed by
the identity-statements themselves. As we have seen, the truth-conditions of an identity-
statement are always either trivial or impossible, and there is never any disagreement
about whether the world satises either of these conditions. What goes on is, rather,
that ones views about whether a particular identity-statement should be thought of as
expressing the trivial truth-conditions or the impossible truth-conditions can be tied up
with ones views about the sorts of issues listed above.
In certain cases, it is possible to isolate the substantial questions that are actually
fueling the debate, and leave identity-statements out of the picture, to be revisited only
once substantial issues have been settled. But there is no reason to expect this to be true
in general. One might accept an identity-statement because it is part of ones overall
scientic outlook without being in a position to articulate the particular empirical claims,
methodological principles and linguistic preferences that ones outlook presupposes. In
such cases one would be unable to leave identity-statements out of the debate.
Another context in which it can be a good idea to place identity-statements at the
center of the debate is when one wishes to defend a view about the sorts of distinctions
that one is able to make using ones language. Suppose, for example, that you wish to
defend the view that is hot and has high mean kinetic energy make the same distinction.
You could perspicuously put the point by saying there is no dierence between being
hot and having high mean kinetic energy, or by saying to be hot just is to have high
mean kinetic energy.
Chapter 2
Possibility
The focus of this chapter will be on the notion that is referred to in the literature as
metaphysical possibility. The use of metaphysical is potentially misleading here be-
cause lends itself to two very dierent readings. On the rstand, in my opinion, less
interestingreading, metaphysical is to be understood as restricting the range of pos-
sibilities that are to be considered. Just like that the notion of physical possibility might
be understood as restricted to possibilities that are compatible with the physical laws,
one might think that there is a notion of possibility broader than metaphysical possibility
(conceptual possibility?), and thinking of metaphysical possibility as restricted to those
of the possibilities in the broad sense that satisfy the metaphysical laws. One might
claim, for example, that it is possible in the broad sense that there be zombies, or that
God fail to exist, but that such scenarios are to be counted as metaphysically impossible,
on the grounds that they violates the metaphysical laws. (For an example of a restric-
tive approach to metaphysical possibility, see Kment (2006); for illuminating discussion,
see Rosen (2006). I believe the term metaphysical law is due to Hartry Field.)
The second way of reading metaphysical in metaphysical possibilitythe one I
preferis as supplying a contrast class, rather than a restriction. It is meant to dis-
tinguish a notion of possibility that applies to ways for the world to be, which is what
37
38 CHAPTER 2. POSSIBILITY
we want, from a notion of possibility that applies to representations (and is sensitive
not just to the representations truth-conditions but also to how the truth-conditions are
represented), which is not what we want. Ideally, one would use a label like possibility
de mundo to refer to the former, and a label like possibility de representatione to refer
to the latter. (The notion of logical consistency, for instance, is best understood as a
form of possibility de representatione, since Hesperus ,= Phosphorus and Hesperus ,=
Hesperus dier in terms of logical consistency, even though satisfaction of their truth-
conditions imposes the same requirement on the world.) On the view we are considering,
the role of metaphysical in metaphysical possibility is to be understood as demanding
that metaphysical possibility be thought of as a form of possibility de mundo.
It seems to me that the rst way of thinking about metaphysical possibilitywhere
metaphysics is treated as a restrictor, rather than as supplying a contrast classis
doubly objectionable. Firstly, I think one should feel uncomfortable about admitting
a notion of possibility de mundo broader than metaphysical possibility. The proposal,
presumably, is that is possible-in-the-broader-sense is to be cashed out in terms of
something along the lines of is not analytic or has a non-empty primary inten-
sion. This sounds perilously like possibility de representatione, since is not analytic and
has a non-empty primary intension are properties of sentences, not properties of ways
for the world to be. Notice, moreover, that analyticity-talk and primary-intension-talk
both rely on the assumption that one can factor the requirement that a sentences truth-
conditions impose on the world into two parts: a component that is knowable a priori,
merely in virtue of ones mastery of the language, and a component that is knowable
only a posteriori. And I see no good reason for thinking that this is true in general, even
if it seems plausible when one focuses on toy examples such as Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Secondly, and more importantly, the notion of a metaphysical law strikes me as
both obscure and unhelpful. It strikes me as obscure because I have never been able
to nd a use for it outside Deep Metaphysics, in the sense of chapter 6. It strikes me
39
as unhelpful because it drives a wedge between the notion of possibility and one of its
most useful applications: the representation of content. For in stating a metaphysical
law one would presumably be saying something non-trivial about the way the world
is. But if every possible scenario is a scenario which veries the metaphysical laws, one
cannot hope to represent the non-trivial requirement that the world must meet in order
for a metaphysical law to hold by dividing up the possibilities into those that meet the
requirement and those that do not.
On the alternative way of thinking about metaphysical possibilitywhen metaphys-
ical is thought of as supplying a contrast class, rather than a restrictionmetaphysical
possibility is the most inclusive form of possibility de mundo there is. Going beyond
metaphysical possibility is not a matter of violating the metaphysical laws: it is a
matter of lapsing into incoherence.
The material developed in chapter 1 allows us to articulate this idea further. The
stories one treats as de mundo unintelligible are the stories one regards as incoherent.
So one should count a story as describing a metaphysically possible scenario just in
case one regards it as de mundo intelligible. In light of the connection between de mundo
intelligibility and identity, this allows us to establish a connection between possibility and
identity: a story describes a metaphysically possible scenario just in case it is logically
consistent with the set of true identity-statements.
Thinking of metaphysical possibility in this way has several important advantages.
First, it dispels some of the mystery surrounding modal knowledge. For if a story is
metaphysically possible just in case it is logically consistent with the set of true identities,
then our knowledge of which scenarios are possible should be no more mysterious than
our knowledge of which identities are true. And we saw in chapter 1 that there is a
substantial story to be told about our knowledge of identities.
A second advantage of this way of thinking about metaphysical possibility is that one
is able to steer clear of the analytic/synthetic distinction and its siblings. One works
with a notion which is non-a priori to begin with, rather than construing necessity as
a marriage between a priori truths and non-a priori Kripkean necessities. The result is
that one gets a distinction between necessity and contingency without having to forego
the Quinean insight that conceptual questions cannot be cleanly separated from questions
of fact.
A third advantage of this way of thinking about metaphysical possibility is that one
retains the connection between possibility and content. To see this, think of a sentences
truth-conditions as a requirement imposed on the world: a requirement that the world
be a certain way. (See introduction and section 1.3.) Knowing whether a scenario we
regard as de mundo intelligible must fail to obtain in order for the requirement to be met
is valuable because it gives us an understanding of how the world would need to be in
order for the requirement to be met. But knowing whether a scenario we dont regard
as de mundo intelligible must fail to obtain in order for the requirement to be met is not
very helpful. For when one is unable to describe a scenario in a way one nds de mundo
intelligible, the claim that the scenario must fail to obtain gives one no understanding of
how the world would need to be in order for the requirement to be satised. The result is
that one can model a sentences truth-conditions as a subset of the space of scenarios one
regards as de mundo intelligible. So the notion of possibility that is useful for modeling
truth-conditions is precisely the notion that is correlated with de mundo intelligibility.
(For further discussion, see section 5.2.)
In what follows I shall use possibility to refer metaphysical possibility in the proposed
sense: as the most inclusive kind of de mundo possibility there is.
2.1 Supervenience
In suggesting that a story describes a possible scenario just in case it is logically consistent
with the set of true identity-statements, I am thinking of a story as a set of (interpreted)
2.1. SUPERVENIENCE 41
rst-order sentences, with no boxes or diamonds. So the claim so far is that the set of
true identity statements xes the truth-value of every de dicto modal sentence. (More
specically: when contains no boxes or diamonds, is true just in case is logically
consistent with the set of true identity statements, and is true just in case is
not logically consistent with the set of true identity statements.)
The central claim of this chapter is that the connection between identity and possibil-
ity need not be limited to de dicto modal sentences. One can use the set of true identity
statements to x the truth value of every sentence in a rst-order modal language. More
precisely, let L be an arbitrary rst-order language and L
be the modal language that

results from adding to L. Then one can prove the following:
Supervenience Theorem
By xing the truth-value of every sentence in L and every identity statement
built up from vocabulary in L, one xes the truth-value of every sentence in L
.
The Supervenience Theorem turns out to have an interesting corollary. One gets the
result that the truth-conditions of arbitrary sentences in L
can be specied using only

vocabulary in L.
To see what I have in mind, it is useful to begin with an example. Ask yourself: what
is required of the world in order for the truth-conditions of the following sentence to be
satised?
Modal
x(Mammal(x) (Human(x)))
(Read: something is a mammal and might have been a human.)
It is clear that something or other is required of the world, since whether or not there
are any mammals who might have been human depends on what the world is like.
A perfectly accurate way of specifying truth-conditions for Modal is by stating that
what is required of the world in order of Modals truth-conditions to be satised is that
there be something that is a mammal and might have been a human. But suppose one is
aiming for more than mere accuracy. One wants ones specication to take the following
form:
What is required of the world in order for Modals truth-conditions to be
satised is that it be such that p.
where p is replaced by a sentence containing no modal operators. Then one might
reason as follows:
Being a non-human is constitutive property: if youre a non-human, part of
what it is to be you is to be a non-human. So the requirement that the world
be such that there is a mammal that might have been a human boils down
to the requirement that the world be such that there is a mammal that is
also a human. But part of what it is to be a human is to be a mammal. So
the requirement that the world be such that there is a mammal that is also a
human boils down to the requirement that the world be such that there are
humans.
Accordingly, all that it is required in order for Modals truth-conditions to
be satised is for the world to be such that there are humansand this gives
us what we want, since there are humans contains no modal operators.
The proof of the Supervenience Theorem can be used to show that an analogous result
holds for arbitrary modal sentences. More specically, for an arbitrary sentence of L
,
the truth-conditions of are correctly specied by some clause of the form:
What is required of the world in order for s truth-conditions to be satised
is that it be such that p.
2.1. SUPERVENIENCE 43
where p is replaced by a (possibly innite) sentence built out of the vocabulary of L.
1
It is worth emphasizing that not every sentence of L
will turn out to have truth-

conditions as interesting as Modal. Consider, for example,
(x(x is composed of water x is composed of H
2
O)).
If you accept To be composed of water just is to be composed of H
2
O, you should believe
that nothing is required of the world in order for the truth-conditions of this sentence to
be satised. For consider an arbitrary scenario , and assume that, at , some object
x is composed of water. Since there is no dierence between being composed of water
and being composed of H
2
O, x is thereby composed of H
2
O. There is no such thing as a
transition from xs being composed of water to xs being composed of H
2
O, and therefore
no requirement that would have to satisfy for the transition to be valid. (When God
made sure that x was made of water, there is nothing extra she had to do, or refrain
from doing, to get the result that x was composed of H
2
O.) So the truth-conditions of
x(x is composed of water x is composed of H
2
O) are trivially satised at . But
was arbitrarily chosen. So the truth-conditions of (x(x is composed of water x is
composed of H
2
O)) are trivially satised.
One might be tempted to describe the Supervenience Theorem as a reduction of the
modal to the non-modal. But I think that would be a tendentious way of putting the
point. It ignores the fact that a predicate such as is human might be thought to have
modal content. (You might think this, for example, if you think that part of what it is
to be human is to be essentially human.) The safe way of putting the point is by saying
that the truth-conditions of sentences in L
can be specied using only vocabulary in L.

1
Here is a proof for those familiar with the material in section 2.3. Let a complete L-theory be a
maximally consistent set of sentences of L. Let S be the set of true identity statements built from
vocabulary in L. Then a sentence guaranteed to do the job is the (possibly innite) disjunction of
(innite) sentences, each of which consists of the (innite) conjunction of sentences in a complete L-
theory T such that that is true according to the Kripke-model based on the canonical space of worlds
generated by S, and an actual world in accordance with T.
2.2 Possible Worlds
Philosophers call on possible worlds to perform dierent kinds of jobs. One of these jobs
is foundational : the job of explaining what it takes for modal truths to be true. For it
to be possible that p, a possible-worlds-foundationalist would say, just is for there to
be a possible world at which p. Possible worlds are also used as semantic machinery.
The semanticist needs entities for the quantiers of her metalanguage to range over, and
possible worldsor, more generally, possibiliacan be used to construct them.
In this section I will argue that neither of these tasks requires a specialized modal
ontology. Some philosophers might be interested in this sort of claim because of ontolog-
ical scruples. Not me. I take up the issue here because it will help set things up for our
discussion of the Supervenience Theorem.
The foundational job
In the case of the foundational jobthe job of explaining what it takes for modal truths
to be truewe have already seen why a specialized modal ontology is unnecessary. Recall
Modal. A possible-worlds-foundationalist would use possible worlds to explain what it
takes for Modal to be true: that there be a possible world at which some actual mammal
is a human. But we have seen that by making use of certain identity-statementsif
youre human, part of what it is to be you is to be human and part of what it is to be a
human is to be a mammalone can reach the conclusion that all it takes for Modal to
be true is for there to be a human. And the Supervenience Theorem shows that Modal
is not a special case. By using suitable identity statements, one can explain what it takes
for an arbitrary rst-order modal sentence to be true without indulging in possible-worlds
talk.
There is a dierent way of making what is essentially same point. Kripke taught
us how to dene a formal semantics for rst-order modal languages. One starts with
2.2. POSSIBLE WORLDS 45
a space of mathematical points (often called worlds), and uses it to give a recursive
characterization of the notion of satisfaction-at-a-point. (, for instance, is said to
be satised at point p just in case is satised at some point p
accessible from pall

of this relative to a variable assignment.) A sentence is then said to be true at a point p
just in case it is satised at p relative to every variable assignment, and the sentence is
said to be true simpliciter just in case it is true at a point labeled as actual.
Whether or not this semantics delivers the right assignment of truth-values to modal
sentencesthe assignment that captures the fact that is intended to express meta-
physical possibilitywill depend on the space of points one chooses to work with, since
dierent spaces of points yield dierent results. How is the right space to be selected?
A possible-worlds-foundationalist might address the problem by appeal to metaphysics.
She might claim that the world is endowed with a specialized modal ontologythe pos-
sible worldsand go on to suggest that the possible worlds should be used as points.
What the Supervenience Theorem shows is that there is an alternative: one can use the
set of true identity statements to x a suitable space of points.
2
The Semantic Job
Possible worlds are also used as semantic machinery. Kripke-semantics is the obvious
example, but the semantic applications of possible worlds extend far beyond that: the
most natural way of producing an intensional semanticsa semantics that assigns truth-
2
Beware: Whether or not you think this succeeds in addressing the foundational problemthe prob-
lem of explaining what it takes for modal truths to be truewill depend on your views on metaphysical
possibility. As noted earlier, if you think of metaphysical possibility as the result of restricting a more in-
clusive notion of possibility with the metaphysical laws, you will nd no reason to think that a sentences
truth conditions can be modeled by the set of metaphysical possibilities at which the sentence is true.
But suppose you think that the metaphysical possible scenarios are the de mundo intelligible scenarios,
and that a sentences truth-conditions can be modeled by the set of de mundo intelligible scenarios at
which the sentence is true. Then you will think that one can describe a sentences truth-condtions by
specifying the metaphysical possibilities at which a sentence is true. Accordingly, you will think that
when one uses the Kripkean semantic clauses to ascertain which points a modal sentence is true at, and
uses the set of true identity statements to x the relevant space of points, one succeeds in specifying
what it takes for the modal sentence to be true.
conditions, rather than simply truth-values, to sentences in the languageis by using
possible worlds (and, more generally, possibilia) in the range of ones metalinguistic
quantiers. (For instance, one might take a proposition to be a set of possible worlds,
or some complication thereof, and one might take the reference of a predicate to be a
function that assigns each world a set of objects in that world, or some complication
thereof. See Lewis (1970) and Heim and Kratzer (1998).)
Unfortunately, possibilia are philosophically controversial, and by using possibilia as
semantic machinery one runs the risk of dragging ones semantic work into the contro-
versy. A modal actualist, for example, would say that there is no such thing as a merely
possible object. But when one uses possibilia as semantic machinery in a Kripke seman-
tics, merely possible objects gure in the domains of non-actual worlds; and when one
uses possibilia as semantic machinery in an intensional semantics, merely possible objects
gure in the intensions of predicates.
The good news is that the needs of the semanticist can be satised without using
possibilia. One can use representations of possibilia instead. The variety of represen-
tationalism that I prefer is model-theoretic: the role of possible worlds is played by
a-worldsset-thereotic constructs similar to models in the logicians senseand the role
of possibilia is played by the entities in the domains of a-worlds. A thorough discus-
sion of a-worlds is supplied in chapter 7, but the main thing to know about a-worlds is
that you dont need to worry about them. You can pretend that you are working with
the possible worlds they represent and rest assured thatas far as the semantic job is
concernedyou will always get the right results. (I mean this in a very precise sense: I
prove in section 7.5.2 that anything that can be expressed by quantifying over Lewisian
possibilia can also be expressed by quantifying over objects in the domains a-worlds.)
You can also rest assured that a-worlds wont oend your philosophical sensitivities.
They are designed to be acceptable to a modal actualist (a-world is short for actualist-
world), and presuppose very little by way of ontology: they use a bit of set-theory, but
2.2. POSSIBLE WORLDS 47
do not assume a specialized modal ontology, or an ontology of properties, or anything
else that might be controversial. And they do not presuppose potentially controversial
expressive resources such as innitary languages or non-standard modal operators. Just
about everyone should be happy to use a-worlds as semantic machinery.
You may, however, be one of those philosophers who are generally squeamish about
representationalism. If so, your squeamishness may be traceable to Lewiss On the Plu-
rality of Worlds. It is surprisingly common for philosophers to have a distant but rm
recollection that Lewis showed representationalism to be untenable. I cant remember
the details one often hears but its all there in the chapter on ersatzism.
This is a misreading of Lewis. The rst thing to note is that Lewis himself was a
representationalist: Lewisian worlds represent possibilities, they are not the possibilities
themselves. Here is a passage from Plurality:
How does a world, [Lewisian] or ersatz, represent, concerning Humphrey, that
he exists?. . . A [Lewisian] world might do it by having Humphrey himself as
a part. That is how our own world represents, concerning Humphrey, that
he exists. But for other worlds to represent in the same way that Humphrey
exists, Humphrey would have to be a common part of many overlapping
worlds. . . I reject such overlap. . . There is a better way for a [Lewisian] world
to represent, concerning Humphrey, that he exists. . . it can have a Humphrey
of its own, a esh-and-blood counterpart of our Humphrey, a man very much
like Humphrey in his origins, in his intrinsic character, or in his historical role.
By having such a part, a world represents de re, concerning Humphrey
that is, the Humphrey of our world, whom we as his worldmates may call
simply Humphreythat he exists and does thus-and-so. (p. 194; where I
write [Lewisian] Lewis writes genuine.)
If you are still in any doubt that Lewis was a representationalist, note that there is
not a one-one correlation between Lewisian worlds and possibilities: the same Lewisian
world will correspond to dierent possibilities depending on ones choice of counterpart
relation. When the mustached man in a Lewisian world is taken to be my counterpart, it
represents the possibility that I have a mustache; when it is taken to be my twin brothers
counterpart, it represents the possibility that he have a mustache. (Here I am indebted
to Damien Rochford.)
Part of the reason it is easy to lose track of Lewiss representationalism is that Lewis
also subscribed to a striking foundationalist claim: he believed that what it is for it to
be possible that p is for there to be a Lewisian world at which (i.e. representing that) p.
In light of this claim, it is natural to fudge the dierence between Lewisian worlds and
possibilities. But there is a dierence nonetheless.
The second thing to note is that Lewis was clear about the fact that for the purposes
of doing Kripke-semantics there is no need for possible worlds:
For that job [the job of giving a metalogical semantical analysis of modal
logic], we need no possible worlds. We need sets of entities which, for heuristic
guidance, may be regarded as possible worlds, but which in truth may be
anything you please. We are doing mathematics, not metaphysics. (Plurality
p. 17).
When Lewis criticizes linguistic representationalism (or linguistic ersatzism, as he calls
it), his complaint is not that it wouldnt be adequate for the job of doing semantics.
His worry is that it would be inadequate in two other respects. The rst is to do with
the foundational job. He worried that modality must be taken as primitive in deciding
which linguistic representations represent genuine possibilities and which ones do not.
We can agree with Lewis that linguistic representationalism does not, by itself, solve
the foundational problem: it does not, by itself, explain what the truth of modal truths
consists in. But that is not something we were hoping representationalism would do for
2.3. THE SUPERVENIENCE THEOREM 49
us in the present context. As noted in the preceding section, the foundational problem
is to be addressed by appeal to identity statements.
The second respect in which Lewis nds linguistic representationalism wanting is the
fact that it conates possibilities that cannot be expressed by the language doing the
representing. This will be a problem for certain metaphysical applications of possibilia,
such as Lewiss analysis of properties. But it need not be an obstacle when it comes to
doing semantics: When I complain, as I shall, that there are various ways for dierent
possibilities to get conated in their linguistic descriptions, that may be harmless when
we want to use ersatz possibilia to characterize the content of thought for a subject
who has no way to distinguish the conated possibilities in his perception and conduct.
(Plurality p. 144, footnote.) Similarly, as long as the language doing the representing is
able to express every distinction that can be expressed in the object language, potential
conations wont be a problem for the purposes of doing semantics.
2.3 The Supervenience Theorem
The Supervenience Theorem states that, by xing the truth-value of every sentence in
a rst-order language L and every identity statement built up from vocabulary in L,
one xes the truth-value of every sentence in L
. Until more has been said about the

principles that govern the xing of truth-values, however, the theorem is of limited
interest. It would be no fun, for example, to x the truth-values of modal statements
by assuming that is generally equivalent to .)
What gives content to the statement of the theorem is the assumption that the xing
of truth-values is to be governed by the following two principles:
Principle of Identity
Every sentence of L
corresponding to a true identity statements should turn

out to be true.
[In other words, (x((x) (x))) should be true whenever (x)
x
(x) is
true, and (z w((z, w) (y(y = z) (z, w)))) should be true whenever
(z, w) is constitutive.]
Principle of Maximality (Informal Version)
There are no limits on possibility beyond the Principle of Identity.
I have stated the Principle of Maximality informally so as to make its intuitive content
clear. But, as we shall see, it is in need of further elucidation.
2.3.1 The Principle of Maximality
There is a procedure for making the Principle of Maximality precise that immediately
suggests itself. Start with a space of logically consistent worlds. (I nd it useful to
think of a worlds as a-worlds, as explained in section 2.2, but you may think of worlds
dierently if you like.) Go on to eliminate just enough of them to get the result that
the Principle of Identity is satised. (More precisely: take the maximal set of worlds
with the property that every sentence of L
corresponding to a true identity statement

is counted as true by a Kripke-semantics based on that set.) The worlds youre left with
are the worlds that depict genuine possibilities.
When one restricts ones attention to the special case of unconditional identity state-
ments, this procedure is well-dened. For given a space of worlds W and an arbitrary
set of unconditional identity statements S, there is a unique maximal subset of W that
satises the Principle of Identity. It is the result of eliminating from W all and only
worlds that fail to verify x(F(x) G(x)) for some F(x)
x
G(x) in S.
Unfortunately, things get messier when conditional identities are brought into the
picture. To see this, consider a conditional identity statement to the eect that F-ness
is constitutive, and suppose that the corresponding sentence of L
(i.e. (z(F(x))
(y(y = x) F(x)))) would be counted as false by a Kripke-semantics based on a
2.3. THE SUPERVENIENCE THEOREM 51
space of worlds W. Then W must contain a counterexample to the categoricity of F-
ness: there must be worlds w and w
in W such that according to w there is something

that is an F, and according to w
that very individual is not an F. The problem is that

there is more than one way to get rid of the counterexample. One could do so either by
eliminating w or by eliminating w
. So it is not immediately clear how one should go

about eliminating just enough worlds to get the result that the Principle of Identity is
satised.
Happily, there turns out to be a natural way of generating a canonical space of worlds
from the set of true identity-statements. (See Appendix C for details.) The Principle of
Maximality can then be made precise as follows:
Principle of Maximality (Formal Version)
Let I be the set of true identity-statements built from vocabulary in L. A
sentence of L
is true just in case it is counted as true by the Kripke-semantics

based on the canonical space of worlds generated from I.
So dened, the Principle of Maximality entails the Supervenience Theorem as an imme-
diate corollary.
Does this formal version of the Principle of Maximality succeed in doing justice to
the informal version that I mentioned earlier? I think it does. But it is important to
keep in mind that the principle that possibility is to be limited only by identity is pretty
rough. (It is far from obvious, for example, that we have a clear sense of which modal
statements should be counted as expressing possibilities.) We will see in section 2.3.2
that the notion of canonicity I develop in the appendix delivers sensible results. But I
would be hesitant to declare that a better notion of canonicity couldnt be found.
In any case, it would be a mistake to put too much weight on any particular way of
spelling out the notion of canonicity. It is useful to have an existence proof: it is useful to
know that there is at least one reasonable way of using the set of true sentences in L and
the set of true identity statements to x the truth-values of sentences in L
. And there
may well be value in the project of comparing the virtues of dierent such proposals.
But one shouldnt be too bent on nding the one true notion of canonicity when the
discussion turns on issues that go beyond the region with respect to which the notion of
possibility is robustly understood.
2.3.2 The List of Modal Truths
Say we adopt the proposed formalization of the Principle of Maximality. Which modal
sentences turn out to be true?
1. The actual world of the Kripke-semantics is chosen so as to ensure that every true
sentence of L turns out to be true.
2. The use of a Kripke-semantics guarantees that one gets a normal modal system,
and therefore that every sentence of L
that is theorem of classical logic will count

as true.
Also, the canonical space of worlds is based on a trivial accessibility relation. So
one every theorem of S5 will count as true.
3. One gets a sentence of L
corresponding to every true identity statement. In

other words, one gets (x((x) (x))) whenever (x)
x
(x) is true,
and one gets (z w((z, w) (y(y = z) (z, w)))) whenever (z, w) is
constitutive.
For instance, by assuming that Elephant(x)
x
Mammal(x) is true one gets
the result that (x(Elephant(x) Mammal(x))) is true, and by assuming that
Human(x) is constitutive one gets the result that (an L
rendering of) necessarily,

humans are essentially human is true.
2.4. MODAL LANGUAGE AND MODAL FACT 53
As far as I can tell, any rst-order modal sentence that constitutes a relatively
uncontroversial example of a metaphysical necessity can be recovered from suitable
identity statements in this sort of way. Fgures 2.12.3 list some examples.
4. Every possibility statement of the form
x
1
(
1
( x
1
) ( x
2
(
2
( x
1
, x
2
) x
3
(
3
( x
1
, x
2
, x
3
) . . .)))
will will turn out to be true, provided it satises a some of reasonable constraints.
(Specically: (1)
1
( x
1
) is satised by the actual world, (2) each of the
i
( x
1
, . . . , x
i
)
is consistent with the set of true identity-statements, and (3) there are no clashes
amongst the
i
about the constitutive properties demanded of the referent of a
given variable, or about which pairs of variables must be correferential. Proofs and
details are supplied in Appendix C.)
Assuming reasonable identity-statements, this ensures that one gets L
-renderings
of sentences like I might have had a sister and I might have had a sister who was
a cellist but might have been a philosopher.
There is no ocial catalogue of recognized modal truths. But I hope this section lends
some plausibility to the claim that the formal version of the Principle of Maximality
delivers a list of modal truths that is in line with the standard literature on metaphysical
possibility.
2.4 Modal Language and Modal Fact
The Supervenience Theorem is a result about language. It shows that the set of identity
statements can be used to x the truth-values of every sentence in L
. But one might

worry that not everything there is to be said about possibility can be expressed in L
, and
therefore that there is a version of the foundational problem that has been left untouched
by the present proposal.
My own view is that a non-language-based version of the proposal would be of limited
interest. I oer a detailed discussion in Appendix D. But the main idea is this. When one
focuses on the space of properties, and abstracts away from the predicates that might be
used to express these properties, possibility is a pretty boring concept: a possible assign-
ment of properties to objects is simply one that steers clear of incoherence. One might
think that there is an interesting project of ascertaining which property-assignments are
incoherent: whether, for example, it would be incoherent for an object to instantiate both
the property of being composed of water and the property of not being composed of H
2
O.
This could be construed as an interesting debate if it was thought of as a debate about
whether to accept the identity-statement to be composed of water just is to be composed
of H
2
O. For, as noted in section 1.6, ones views about whether an identity-statement
has trivial or impossible truth-conditions might be tied up with a number of interest-
ing questions. But none of these questions has anything particular to do with identity:
all there is to be said about property-identity itself is that every property is identical
to itself and nothing else. When one abstracts away from the question of whether the
identity-statement should be accepted, and focuses on identity itself, there are nothing
interesting to be discussed.
However that may be, it is important to acknowledge a limitation of the language-
based approach I have set forth in this chapter. Namely: whether the right sentences
of L
get counted as true depends essentially on whether L has a suitably rich stock of
non-logical predicates. Say you think that there might have been an essentially lonely
object:
Lonely
(x (y(y = x) (y(y = x))))
2.4. MODAL LANGUAGE AND MODAL FACT 55
Since Lonely contains no non-logical predicates, it will be statable in L
regardless of
which non-logical predicates are in L. Buton reasonable assumptionsone wont be
able to express the identity-statements necessary to ensure that Lonely gets counted as
true unless some non-logical predicate of L is available, and one is able to say something
along the following lines:
P(z)
z = x
x
P(x)
P(x)
x
y(y = x)
(Read: being P is constitutive of its bearers, and part of what it is to be a
P is to be lonely)
Similarly, one wont be able to state the identity-statements necessary to make the fol-
lowing sentence of L
true:
Nemeses
(x(y(x ,= x y ,= y)))
(Read: There might have been incompatible objects: objects each of which
might have existed but such that they couldnt have existed together.)
unless L contains non-logical predicates, and one is able to say something along the
following lines:
A(z)
z = x
x
A(x)
B(z)
z = x
x
B(x)
A(x)
x
yB(y)
(Read: being A is constitutive of its bearers, being B is constitutive of its
bearers and part of what it is to be an A is for there to be no Bs)
2.5 Beyond First-Order Languages
An interesting project, which I do not develop here, is that of proving a version of the
Supervenience Theorem for languages with higher-order variables. Identity statements of
the form (X)
X
(X), in which the identity predicate binds second-order variables,
are particularly interesting. For instance, the higher-order predicate
X
can be used to
capture the dierence between Humes Principle,
FG(#
x
(F(x)) = #
x
(G(x)) F(x)
x
G(x))
[Read: the number of the Fs equals the number of the Gs just in case the Fs
are in one-one correspondence with the Gs.]
and the identity-statement corresponding to Humes Principle,
#
x
(F(x)) = #
x
(G(x))
F,G
F(x)
x
G(x)
[Read: for the number of the Fs to equal the number of the Gs just is for the
Fs to be in one-one correspondence with the Gs.]
(For more on Neo-Fregeanism see Wright (1983) and Hale and Wright (2001).)
The higher-order predicate
X
can also be used to dene an analogue of Kit Fines
F
A (A is true in virtue of the nature of the objects which F). Namely: z(Xz
Fz)
X
A[X/F], where second-order quantication is cashed out in plural terms. (See
Fine (1995a) and Fine (2000); see also Fine (1994) and Fine (1995b).)
Unfortunately, the technique I use in Appendix C to generate a canonical space of
worlds wont automatically carry over to a higher-order setting. So one would need
a somewhat dierent set of tools to prove a higher-order version of the Supervenience
Theorem.
2.5. BEYOND FIRST-ORDER LANGUAGES 57
In order to get the result that . . . is
a true sentence of L
it is enough to count . . . as a true

identity-statement.
Analyticity
(x(V(x) F(x))) V(x)
x
F(x)
(necessarily, every vixen is female) (part of what it is to be a vixen is to be
female)
Analyticity
(xy(S(x, y) z(P(z, x) P(z, y)))) S(x, y)
x,y
z(P(z, x) P(z, y))
(necessarily, sisters share a parent) (part of what it is for objects to be sisters
is for them to share a parent)
Determinates and determinables
(x(E(x) M(x))) E(x)
x
M(x)
(necessarily, every elephant is a mammal) (part of what it is to be an elephant is to
be a mammal)
Cross-category prohibitions
(x(E(x) O(x))) E(x)
x
O(x)
(necessarily, every elephant is not an oc-
topus)
(part of what it is to be an elephant is to
not be an octopus)
Supervenience
(x((x) (x)) (x)
x
(x)
(necessarily, if you have physical property
, you have psychological property )
(part of what it is to have physical prop-
erty is to have psychological property
)
Supervenience
( M) M
(necessarily, if physical fact obtains,
moral fact M obtains)
(part of what it is for physical fact to
obtain is for moral fact M to obtain)
Identity
(y(y = h) h = p) h = p
(necessarily, if Hesperus exists, it is iden-
tical to Phosphorus)
(Hesperus is Phosphorus)
Kind identity
(x(Water(x) H
2
O(x)) Water(x)
x
H
2
O(x)
(necessarily, water is H
2
O) (what it is to be water is to be H
2
O)
Figure 2.1: Examples of Metaphysical Necessities

identity-statement.
Essentiality of kind
(z(H(z) (y(y = z) H(z)))
H(z)
x = z
x
H(x)
(necessarily, if youre human, you couldnt
have failed to be human)
(assume z is human; then part of what it
is to be z is to be human)
Essentiality of kind
(z(M(z) (y(y = z) H(z))) M(x)
x
H(x);
H(z)
x = z
x
H(x)
(necessarily, if youre a man, you couldnt
have failed to be human)
(part of what it is to be a man is to be hu-
man; moreover: assume z is human; then
part of what it is to be z is to be human)
Essentiality of origin
(z(B(c, z) (y(y = z) B(c, z)))
B(c, z)
x = z
x
B(c, x)
(necessarily, if you have Charles as a bio-
logical parent, you couldnt have failed to
have Charles as a biological parent)
(assume z has Charles as a biological par-
ent; then part of what it is to be z is to
have Charles as a biological parent)
Essentiality of origin
(xy(B(w, z) (y(y = z)
B(w, z)))
B(w, z)
x = z
x
B(w, x)
(necessarily, if z has w as a biological par-
ent, then z couldnt have failed to have w
as biological parent)
(assume z has w as a biological parent;
then part of what it is to be z is to have
w as a biological parent)
Essentiality of constitution
(z(W(z) (I(z)))
W(z)
x = z
x
W(x)
; W(x)
x
I(x)
(necessarily, if youre made of wood, you
couldnt have been made of ice)
(assume z is made of wood; then part of
what it is to be z is to be made of wood;
moreover, part of what it is to be made of
wood is to not be made of ice)
Essentiality of constitution
(xy((C(z) C(w) P(w, z))
(y(y = z) P(w, z)))
C(z) C(w) P(w, z)
x = z
x
C(x) C(w) P(w, x)
(necessarily, if z and w are portions of clay
and w is part of z, then z couldnt have
failed to have w as a part)
(assume z and w are portions of clay and
w is part of z; then part of what it is to
be z is to be made of clay, to have w as a
part and for w to be made of clay)
Figure 2.2: Examples of Metaphysical Necessities (Continued)
2.5. BEYOND FIRST-ORDER LANGUAGES 59

identity-statement.
Reexivity
(x(x < x)) x = x
x
x < x
(necessarily, anything is part of itself) (part of what it is to be self-identical is to
be be a part of oneself)
Antisymmetry
(xy((x < y y < x) x = y)) (x < y y < x)
x,y
x = y
(necessarily, if x is part of y and y is part
of x, then x is identical to y)
(part of what it is for x and y to be such
that x is part of y and y is part of x is for
x and y to be identical)
Transitivity
(xyz((x < y y < z) x < z)) (x < y y < z)
x,y,z
x < z
(necessarily, if x is part of y and y is part
of z, then x is part of z)
(part of what it is for x, y and z to be such
that x is part of y and y is part of z is for
x to be part of z)
Strong Supplementation
(xy((y < x) z(z < y
O(z, x)))
(y < x)
x,y
z(z < y O(z, x))
(necessarily, if y is not a part of x, then y
has a part that does not overlap with z)
(part of what it is for x and y to be such
that y is not a part of x is for y to have a
part that does not overlap with x)
Unrestricted Fusions
(x((x)) zx(O(x, z) y((y)
O(x, y))))
x((x)) zx(O(x, z) y((y)
O(x, y))))
(necessarily, if there are any s, then there
is a sum of the s: a z such that the things
that overlap with z are precisely the things
that overlap with some )
(part of what it is for there to be a is for
there to be a sum of the s: a z such that
the things that overlap with z are precisely
the things that overlap with some )
Figure 2.3: Examples of Metaphysical Necessities (Mereological Principles)
Chapter 3
Metaphysics
3.1 Tractarianism
Suppose you introduce the verb to tableize into your language, and accept for it to
tableize just is for there to be a table (where the it in it tableizes is assumed to play
the same dummy role as the it in it is raining). Then you will think that it tableizes
and there is a table have the same truth-conditions. In each case, what is required in
order for the truth-conditions to be satised is that there be a table (equivalently: that
it tableize). So you will think thatfor the purposes of stating that there is a table
object-talk is optional. One can state that there is a table by employing a quantier
that binds singular term positionsas in there is a tablebut also by employing an
essentially dierent syntactic structureas in it tableizes.
If object-talk is optional, what is the point of giving it a place in our language?
According to compositionalists the answer is compositionality. A language involving
object-talkthat is, a language including singular terms and quantiers binding singular
term positionsis attractive because it enables one to give a recursive specication of
truth-conditions for a class of sentences rich in expressive power. But there is not much
more to be said on its behalf. If one could construct a language that never indulged
61
62 CHAPTER 3. METAPHYSICS
in object-talk, and was able to do so without sacricing compositionality or expressive
power, there would be no immediate reason to think it inferior to our own. Whether or
not we choose to adopt it should turn entirely on matters of convenience. (For an example
of such a language, and illuminating discussion, see Burgess (2005); for an articulation
of compositionalism, see Lewis (1980).)
Compositionalists believe that it takes very little for a singular term to be in good
order. All it takes is a compositional specication of truth-conditions for whichever
sentences involving the term one wishes to make available for use. The reason there
is nothing more that needs to be done is that there was nothing special about using
singular terms to begin with. In setting forth a language, all we wanted was the ability
to express a suitably rich range of truth-conditions. If we happened to carry out this aim
by bringing in singular terms, it was because they supplied a convenient way of specifying
the right range of truth-conditions, not because they had some further virtue.
Tractarians, in contrast, believe that object-talk is subject to a further constraint:
there needs to be a certain kind of correspondence between the semantic structure of
our sentences and the metaphysical structure of reality. In particular, they presuppose
the following: (1) there is a particular carving of reality into objects which is more apt,
in some metaphysical sense, than any potential rivalthe one and only carving that
is in accord with realitys true metaphysical structure; (2) to each legitimate singular
term there must correspond an object carved out by this metaphysical structure; and
(3) satisfaction of the truth-conditions of an atomic sentence of the form P(t
1
, . . . , t
n
)
requires that the objects paired with t
1
, . . . , t
n
bear to each other the property expressed
by P. (For discussion of Tractarian conceptions of language, see Heil (2003).)
A consequence of Tractarianism is that one cannot accept an identity statement like
for Susan to instantiate the property of running just is for Susan to run. The reason is
that Susan instantiates the property of running and Susan runs are atomic sentences
with dierent semantic structures. So there cant be a single feature of reality they
3.1. TRACTARIANISM 63
are both accurate descriptions of when it is presupposed that correspondence between
semantic and metaphysical structure is a precondition for accuracy.
On natural assumptions about the connection between the truth-conditions of a com-
plex sentence and the satisfaction-conditions of its constituent subformulas, the Tractar-
ian is also barred from accepting identities such as for it to tablezie just is for there to
be a table, or for some things to be arranged tablewise just is for there to be a table,
or for a marriage to take place just is for someone to get married, or for the number of
dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs. This means that Tractarians
take themselves to be in a position to make distinctions that a proponent of the com-
positional view would be unable to understand. They might take themselves to be in
a position to make sense of a scenario in which someone gets married but no marriages
take place, or a scenario in which there are some things arranged tablewise but no table.
I am ignoring a complication. I am assuming that the semantic structure of a sentence
can be read o more or less straightforwardly from the sentences surface grammatical
structure. This is a non-trivial assumption. Say you believe that proper logical analysis
of there is a table reveals it to have the same semantic structure as some things are
arranged tablewise. Then you should think that the Tractarian could accept for there
to be a table just is for some things to be arranged tablewise after all. The problem, of
course, is that the needed claims about semantic structure would be highly implausible.
Generally speaking, the project of uncovering exotic semantic structure by logical analysis
has fallen on hard times. There was certainly a period of initial enthusiasm, fueled by
Russells analysis of denite descriptions. But it seems to have petered out. Although
contemporary linguistics does suggest that there are certain cases in which there is a real
mismatch between surface structure and semantic structure, it is not to sort of mismatch
that would oer much comfort to the Tractarian. So the assumption that semantic
structure can be read o more or less straightforwardly from grammatical structure is a
harmless simplication in the present context.
The dierence between compositionalism and Tractarianism is signicant. The rst
thing to note is that Tractarianism relies on the notion of metaphysical structure, and
compositionalism does not. To my mind, at least, the notion of metaphysical structure
is hopelessly obscure: it is a piece of Deep Metaphysics in the sense of chapter 6: the
sort of metaphysics that the Logical Empiricists reacted against in the rst third of the
Twentieth Century.
In addition to being obscure, Tractarianism is bad philosophy of language. As its
name suggests, it is a close cousin of the picture theory that Wittgenstein defended in
the Tractatus.
1
And it ought to be rejected for just the reason Wittgenstein rejected the
picture theory in his later writings. Namely: if one looks at the way language is actually
used, one sees that usage is not beholden to the constraint that an atomic sentence can
only be true if its semantic structure is in suitable correspondence with the metaphysical
structure of the world.
It is simply not the case that ordinary speakers are interested in conveying informa-
tion about metaphysical structure. The sentences a marriage took place and someone
got married, for example, are used more or less interchangeably in non-philosophical con-
texts. An ordinary speaker might choose to assert one rather than the other on the basis
stylistic considerations, or in order to achieve the right emphasis. But it would be ten-
dentious to suggest that her choice turns on her views about metaphysical structure. It
is not as if an ordinary speakers would only be prepared to assert a marriage took place
instead of someone got married if she has a certain metaphysical view about events:
that they are amongst the entities carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure.
Think about how inappropriate it would be to respond to an assertion of a marriage
took place in a non-philosophical context by saying It am certainly prepared to grant
that someone got married, but I just dont think that the world contains events amongst
1
Here I have in mind a traditionalist interpretation of the Tractatus, as in Hacker (1986) and
Pears (1987). See, however, Goldfarb (1997).
3.1. TRACTARIANISM 65
its ultimate furniture. Ones interlocutor would think that one has missed the point of
her assertion, and gone o to a dierent topic.
If ordinary assertions of a marriage took place are not intended to limn the meta-
physical structure of the world, what could be the motivation for thinking that the
truth-conditions of the sentence asserted play this role? As far as I can tell, it is nothing
over and above the idea that semantic structure ought to correspond to metaphysical
structure. Remove this idea and there is no motivation left. To buy into Tractarianism
is to start out with a preconception of the way language ought to work, and impose it on
our linguistic theorizing from the outsidefrom beyond what is motivated by the project
of making sense of our linguistic practice.
There is a moderate form of Tractarianism according to which the constraint that
there be a correspondence between semantic structure and metaphysical structure ap-
plies only to assertions made by philosophers in the ontology room. When I use the term
Tractarianism in this book, the view I have in mind is always non-moderate Tractarian-
ism. My arguments for the claim that Tractarianism is bad philosophy of language do not
apply to moderate Tractarianism. For all I know, there is a special convention governing
discourse in the ontology room, which demands correspondence between semantic and
metaphysical structure.
Special conventions or not, I think one should stay away from moderate Tractarianism.
For it still trades on the questionable notion of metaphysical structure. Of course, the
fact that a notion fails to be understood by the uninitiated doesnt entail that the notion
fails to make sense. If you are sympathetic towards moderate Tractarianism, thats ne.
Nothing in this book presupposes that your view is mistaken. Just make sure you dont
read covert claims about metaphysical structure into anything I say. I wouldnt be caught
dead in the ontology room.
A moderate Tractarian is free to accept an identity-statement such as for a marriage
to take place just is for someone to get married. All she needs to do is insist that at most
one side of the identity-statement is taken in an ontology-room spirit. To avoid confusion,
moderate Tractarians might consider introducing a syntactic marker for ontology-room
discourse, as in Fine (2001). They could then say
What it really is for a marriage to take place is for someone to get married
or
What it is, in fundamental terms, for a marriage to take place is for someone
to get married
to indicate that the feature of reality described by a marriage takes place gets carved by
the worlds metaphysical structure in a way that corresponds to the semantic structure
of someone got married. Just to be clear: this is not what I intend when I use identity
statements in this book.
Moral: If you want to indulge in talk of metaphysical structure, thats up to you.
Just make sure you keep it away from your semantics.
3.2 Life without Tractarianism
Realism
I have given several examples of eminently sensible identity-statements that a full-blooded
Tractarian would be barred from accepting:
1. For Susan to instantiate the property of running just is for Susan to run.
2. For there to be a marriage just is for someone to get married.
3. For there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged tablewise.
4. For the number of the dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs.
3.2. LIFE WITHOUT TRACTARIANISM 67
Let an anti-Tractarian be a compositionalist who believes that identity statements such
as these are true. A Tractarian might be tempted to complain that if anti-Tractarianism
were correct, there would fail to be a denite fact of the matter about how the world is.
I have often heard arguments such as the following:
Say you believe that for the number of the dinosaurs to be Zero just is for
there to be no dinosaurs. You believe, in other words, that a single fact can
be described fully and accurately by asserting the number of the dinosaurs
is Zero and by asserting there are no dinosaurs. This presupposes that a
single fact can get carved up into objects and properties in dierent ways.
When the fact is described by asserting the number of the dinosaurs is Zero,
it gets carved up into an individual (the number Zero), a rst-order property
(the property of being a dinosaur), and a second-order function (the function
taking rst-order properties to their numbers); when it is described as there
are no numbers, it gets carved out into a rst-order property (the property
of being a dinosaur) and a second-order property (non-existence).
But if this is so, there cant be an objective, language-independent fact of the
matter about whether there are numbers. It all depends on how we choose
to describe the world.
I am happy to grant everything in the rst paragraph of this argumentat least on
the assumption that the metaphor of fact-carving is spelled out properly (see below),
and that one takes a suitably deationary attitude towards property- and fact-talk. The
arguments second paragraph, on the other hand, strikes me as deeply misguided.
The anti-Tractarian is certainly committed to the view that a single feature of reality
can be fully and accurately described in dierent ways. But this does not entail that
there is no fact of the matter about how the world is. On the contrary: it is strictly
and literally true that the number of the dinosaurs is Zero, and therefore that there
are numbers. And this is so independently of which sentences are used to describe the
worldor, indeed, of whether there is anyone around to describe it. The point is simply
that the relevant feature of the world could also be fully and accurately described in
another way: by asserting there are no dinosaurs.
Moral: Dont confuse realism with Tractarianism. (More specically: if realism is the
view that there is a denite, subject-independent fact of the matter about how the world
is, then anti-Tractarianism is no less of a realist position than Tractarianism.)
The world as a structureless blob
Wait a minute!you might be tempted to replyIsnt the anti-Tractarian still com-
mitted to the view that the world is a structureless blob?
Absolutely not. The anti-Tractarian believes that it is strictly and literally true that
there are tables, that a marriage took place, that the number of the dinosaurs is Zero, and
so forth. So if the strict and literal existence of tables, marriages and numbers is enough
for the world not to be a structureless blob, then it is no part of anti-Tractarianism that
the world is a structureless blob.
Of course, there is always Deep Metaphysics. Perhaps what you mean when you say
that the world might be a structureless blob is that the world might fail to be endowed
with metaphysical structure. In that case, you should think that anti-Tractarianism is
neutral with respect to the question of whether the world is a structureless blob. Anti-
Tractarianism does not entail that there is no such thing as metaphysical structure: that
would be to treat the notion of metaphysical structure as intelligible, and use it to take
a stand on matters of Deep Metaphysics. Here we have done no such thing.
A brief aside: I dont really understand what Putnam has in mind when he talks
about Internal Realism. But perhaps one could interpret some of what he says as an
endorsement of an anti-Tractarian form of realism. (See, for instance, Putnam (1987)
pp. 1819.)
Comprehensivism
Comprehensivism is that view that it is in principle possible to give a comprehensive
description of the worlda description such that: (1) there is precisely one way for the
world to be that would satisfy the description, and (2) the world, as it actually is, satises
the description.
A critic might be tempted to think that anti-Tractarianism is incompatible with com-
prehensivism. According to anti-Tractarianismthe critic might arguethe same
fact can be described in many dierent ways. One can say that there is a table, or that
some things are arranged tablewise, or that the world tabelizes, or that tablehood is
instantiated, or that two half-tables are put together in the right sort of way, and so
forth, with no natural end. But one hasnt given a exhaustive description of the world
until one has described it in all these ways. So the anti-Tractarian could never give a
comprehensive description of the world.
To see where the critic goes wrong, it is useful to consider an example. Suppose I
ask you to go to the room next door, and bring me a comprehensive description of its
contents. You come back and say: There is a table, and nothing else. It would be
inappropriate for me to respond by complaining that your answer is incomplete on the
grounds that failed to mention at least two objects: the right-half of the table and left-
half of the table. Such a response would be guilty of double-counting. Part of what it is
for there to be a table in the room (a normal table, at least) is for there to be half-tables,
put together in the right sort of way. So when you mentioned that there was a table,
the presence of the half-tables was already included in the information you gave me. It is
true that you never mentioned half-tables explicitly. But that was not required for your
description to be comprehensive. All that comprehensiveness requires is that there be
precisely one way for the room to be that would satisfy your description.
In this case your description of the room was not fully comprehensive. It didnt specify
where in the room the table is located, or what it is made of, or how its constituent atoms
are congured. But these omissions have nothing to do with anti-Tractarianism. As far
as anti-Tractarianism is concerned, it might well be possible to specify all the missing
details.
Moral: Anti-Tractarianism does not entail that comprehensivism is false. What it en-
tails is that there could be more than one way of giving a fully comprehensive description
of the world.
Absolute Generality
Is anti-Tractarianism compatible with the view that there is an all-inclusive domain?
This question can be understood in dierent ways, depending on how one reads the
claim that there is an all-inclusive domain:
First Reading [Realism + Comprehensivism]
There is a denite fact of the matter about how the world is, and it is in principle
possible to give a fully comprehensive description of its contents.
Second Reading [Metaphysical Absolutism]
There is a fundamental domaina domain consisting of the entities that are
carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure.
Third Reading [Recarving-Absolutism]
There is a maxi-domaina domain consisting of the entities that result from every
possible way of carving of the world into objects.
We have seen that anti-Tractarianism is compatible with both Realism and Compre-
nensivism. So, on the rst of the three readings, there is no tension between anti-
Tractarianism and the existence of an all-inclusive domain.
What about the second reading? Anti-Tractarianism is neutral with respect to the
existence of a fundamental domain. To address the issue of a fundamental domain
would be to treat the notion of metaphysical structure as intelligible, and use it to take
a stand on matters of Deep Metaphysics. Anti-Tractarianism does no such thing.
Let us therefore turn our attention to the third reading. The anti-Tractarian believes
that there are tables. So a maxi-domain would have to include tables. But according
to anti-Tractarians, the fact that there are tables could also be described by saying
that there are half-tables put together in the right sort of way, or that the property of
tablehood is instantiated, or that some mereological simples are arranged tablewise, or
that the set of tables is non-empty, or that the number of tables is greater than Zero.
So the maxi-domain would also have to include half-tables and instantiated properties of
tablehood and mereological simples arranged tablewise and non-empty sets and numbers
greater than Zero and Zero itself, and so forth.
Could such a list ever be completed? It seems to me that anti-Tractarians should be
skeptical about the claim that it could. It is not that an anti-Tractarian should think
that the world is somehow incomplete. It is no part of the view that the world is open-
endedat least in any sense of open-endedness that is incompatible with there being a
denite and nal fact of the matter about how the world is. The problem is that there
is no reason to think that our concept of carving the world into objects is determinate
enough to allow for a nal answer to the question of how it might be possible to carve
the world into objects.
As I understand it, a carving of the world is nothing more than a compositional
system of representation for describing the world. In the most familiar case, a carving
is a compositional system of linguistic representation: a language in which the truth-
conditions of sentences are generated recursively from the semantic values of a restricted
set of basic lexical items. To say that a subject carves the world into objects is simply
to say that she represents the world using a language that contains singular terms, or
variables that take singular term positions. Similarly, to say that a subject carves the
world into properties is simply to say that she represents the world using a language
that contains predicates, or variables that take predicate positions. (A carving can also
be a compositional system of representation in thoughta system of mental representa-
tions with recursively generated truth-conditions. But I shall focus my attention to the
linguistic case here.)
Carving up the world is not like cutting cake. For the purposes of spelling out the
carving-metaphor, one is not to think of the world as a big objectthe mereological
fusion of everything there isand of a carving as a way of subdividing the world into
smaller parts. The world, for these purposes, is to be thought of as the totality of facts,
not of things, and a carving is to be thought of as a compositional system for describing
these facts.
When the carving-metaphor is spelled out in this way, the existence of a maxi-domain
would require a nal answer to the question of what counts as a possible system of
compositional representation. And I see no prima facie reason to think that our notion of
representation (and our notion of linguistic representation, in particular) are constrained
enough for this question to have a denite answer. From the perspective of Tractarianism,
the range of admissible compositional languages is restricted by Deep Metaphysics, since
only languages whose semantic structure is in correspondence with the metaphysical
structure of the world are potential vehicles for truth. From the perspective of anti-
Tractarianism, on the other hand, the only constraint on semantic structure is that it
deliver an assignment of truth-conditions to sentences from the semantic values of basic
lexical items. So it is hard to say in advance what would count as a possible compositional
language. Whenever we dream up a new mechanism for representing reality, the potential
for a new compositional languageand hence for a new way of carving up the worldwill
be in place.
You may be worried that my way of cashing out the carving-metaphor is too light-
weight. If the only relevant dierence between asserting there are tables and asserting
some things are arranged tablewise is to do with the system of compositional represen-
tation one chooses to employyou might be tempted to complainthen someone who
asserts there are tables hasnt really committed herself to the existence of tables. For
what she says could be true even if there are really no tables. As far as Im concerned,
all it takes for there to really [table thump!] be tables is for an English sentence like
there are tables to be strictly and literally true. And all it takes for there are tables
to be strictly and literally true is that there be some things arranged tablewise (equiva-
lently: that the property of being a table be instantiated; equivalently: that there be two
half-tables put together in the right sort of way; equivalently: that there be tables). But
presumably you mean something dierent by really. Perhaps what you have in mind is
that in order for something to really exist, it must gure in a fundamental description of
the world. It must, in other words, be carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure.
Real existence, in this sense, is a creature of Deep Metaphysics. It is a notion I am unable
to understand, and therefore not a notion we will be concerned with here.
Wait a minute!you might be tempted to replyAre you setting forth a view
according to which the existence of objects is somehow constituted by language? Ab-
solutely not. What is constituted by language is the use of singular terms. If we had
no singular terms (or variables taking singular term positions) we wouldnt be able to
describe the world in a way that made the existence of objects explicit. But there would
be objects just the same. Speakers of a language with no singular terms can say things
like Lo, tableization here!. But for it to tableize just is for there to be a table. So even
without singular terms, they would be in a position to convey information about tables.
For the anti-Tractarian, the existence of tables depends entirely on how the non-
linguistic world is. If there are things arranged tablewise (equivalently: if it tableizes;
equivalently: if there are tables), then there are indeed tables. If no things are arranged
tablewise (equivalently: if it fails to tableize; equivalently, if there are no tables), then it
is not the case that there are tables. The Tractarians mistake is to conate form and
content. Tractarians think there is a dierence in content (i.e. truth-conditions) between
there are tables and some things are arranged tablewise, when in fact there is only a
dierence in form (i.e. semantic structure).
3.3 Ontological Commitment
For a sentence to carry commitment to Fs is for satisfaction of the sentences truth-
conditions to require the existence of Fs. The sentence Susan runs, for example, carries
commitment to runners, since part of what would be required for its truth-conditions to
be satised is that there be runners.
A sentences ontological commitments are an aspect of its truth-conditions: to describe
a sentences ontological commitments is to describe those aspects of its truth-conditions
that pertain to ontology. There are other aspects of a sentences truth-conditions that
one could in principle be interested in. One could, for example, be concerned with
the megethological commitments carried by a sentence, and ask about requirements
imposed by the sentences truth-conditions that pertain to the size of the world. The
sentence some people run and some dont, for example, carries ontological commitments
to runners and non-runners, and megethological commitments to at least two objects.
Some philosophers might nd a sentences ontological commitments more interesting
than other aspects of its truth-conditions. But it is important to keep in mind that the
project of ascertaining a sentences ontological commitments is not separate from the
project of ascertaining the sentences truth-conditions.
3.3.1 Quines Criterion
Quine famously suggested a criterion of ontological commitment for rst-order sentences.
2
2
See Quine (1948) p. 32, Quine (1951a) p. 67, Quine (1951b) p. 11 and Quine (1953b) p. 103.
For discussion, see Cartwright (1954), Alston (1957), Jackson (1980), Parsons (1982), Routley (1982),
Hodes (1990), Lewis (1990), Melia (1995), Azzouni (1998), Yablo (1998) and Priest (2005).
The formulation of Quines Criterion I use here is to be thought of as a schema whose instances are
there result of substituting a count-noun for F. By the variables, I mean the variables of the language
3.3. ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT 75
Quines Criterion
A rst-order sentence carries commitment to Fs just in case Fs must be
counted amongst the values of the variables in order for the sentence to be
true.
This criterion should not be thought of as a competitor to the claim that ontological com-
mitment is an aspect of truth-conditions. It should be thought of as playing a dierent
role. Whereas the former is meant to supply an elucidation of what ontological commit-
ment consists in, Quines Criterion embodies a substantial claim about the ontological
commitments of rst-order sentences.
Consider a disagreement about the ontological commitments of x Elephant(x).
On one view, x Elephant(x) is committed to elephants and nothing else. On a
rival view, x Elephant(x) is committed also to the property of elephanthood. The
claim that ontological commitment is an aspect of truth-conditions wont decide the
issue. All it tells us is that the matter depends entirely on the truth-conditions of
x Elephant(x). But wheel in Quines Criterion and the matter is decided in favor of
the rst view. For properties neednt be counted amongst the values of the variables in
order for x Elephant(x) to be true. So x Elephant(x) carries no commitment
to properties.
Quines Criterion makes substantial claims about ontological commitment by estab-
lishing a correlation between the ontological commitments of a rst-order sentence and
the semantic machinery that must be deployed by a semantic theory if it is to count
the sentence as true. It is important to be clear that such a correlation is in no way
constitutive of the notion of ontological commitment. One should generally distinguish
between the ontological commitments carried by a sentence and the semantic machinery
employed by a semantic theory assigning truth-conditions to that sentence. Note, for
rather than the variables of the sentence, so as to ensure that, e.g. Runs(charles) carries commitment
to runners (and to Charles), even though it contains no variables.
example, that on standard semantic theories one assigns to each rst-order predicate of
the language a set as its semantic value. From this it follows that ones semantic theory
for x Elephant(x) carries commitment to sets. But it would be a mistake to conclude
on those grounds alone that x Elephant(x) itself carries commitment to sets. Just
because a semantic theory uses sets in specifying truth conditions for x Elephant(x),
it doesnt follow that the truth-conditions thereby specied demand of the world that it
contain sets. Similarly, just because a semantic theory uses elephants in specifying truth-
conditions for x Elephant(x) it doesnt immediately follow that the truth-conditions
thereby specied demand of the world that it contain elephants.
Insofar as one agrees with Quines Criterion, one will think that it is nonetheless
a feature of rst-order languages that there is an exact correspondence between the
ontological commitments carried by a sentence and the objects that must be counted
amongst the values of the variables in order for the sentence to be true. But this in itself is
not a reason for thinking that such a feature will generalize beyond rst-order languages.
On the standard (Kripkean) semantics for modal languages, for example, possibilia (or
objects representing possibilia) must be counted amongst the values of the variables in
order for (x(Elephant(x) Purple(x))) to be true. But it would be a mistake
to conclude on those grounds alone that (x(Elephant(x) Purple(x))) itself is
committed to possibilia (or objects representing possibilia). To insist: just because a
semantic theory uses possibilia (or objects representing possibilia) in specifying truth
conditions for (x(Elephant(x) Purple(x))), it doesnt follow that the truth-
conditions thereby specied demand of the world that it contain possibilia (or objects
representing possibilia). In the absence of further argumentation, all one gets is the
conclusion that ones semantic theory is committed to possibilia (or objects representing
possibilia).
3.3.2 Is Quines Criterion Adequate?
Quines Criterion can be expected to undergenerate when the language contains atomic
predicates expressing non-intrinsic properties. Here is an example. Part of what it
is to be a daughter is to have a parent. So satisfaction of the truth-conditions of
x(Daughter(x)) requires that there be parents. But parents neednt be counted
amongst the values of the variables in order for x(Daughter(x)) to be true. So
Quines Criterion delivers the mistaken result that x(Daughter(x)) carries no com-
mitment to parents. (As Gabriel Uzquiano pointed out to me, not all atomic predicates
expressing non-intrinsic properties lead to trouble: Lonely(. . . ) is an example of one
that does not.)
One could try to avoid the problem of non-intrinsicness by limiting the application of
Quines Criterion to cases in which the oending predicates are avoided. But so many of
our predicates express non-fully-intrinsic properties that one would run the risk of ending
up with a criterion with a very limited range of application. (Part of what it is to be a
human is to belong to a certain lineage; part of what it is to be a moon is to orbit around
a planet; part of what it is to be a table is to be used, or designed, as a table.) One
could, of course, embark in a project of philosophical analysis, and attempt to supply
paraphrases for ones non-intrinsic predicates in terms of intrinsic predicates. But it is
hard to feel optimistic about the prospects of such an enterprise.
Tractarians and anti-Tractarians should agree about everything so far. But their
ultimate assessments of Quines Criterion will be very dierent. A Tractarian might think
that the criterion only undergenerates in the presence of non-intrinsic atomic predicates.
She might think that when such predicates are set aside, the criterion is a sensible one
and certainly more sensible than a criterion whereby Susan runs carries commitment
to sets, or to properties. So even if Quines Criterion isnt everything one might have
hoped for, it is adequate as a rough guide to the ontological commitments of rst-order
sentences.
Anti-Tractarians will disagree. Suppose one thinks that for there to be a table just
is for there to be two half-tables put together in the right sort of way. Then one should
think that x(Table(x)) carries commitment to half-tables. To see this, recall that for
a sentence to carry commitment to Fs is for satisfaction of its truth-conditions to require
the existence of Fs. What is required in order for the truth-conditions of x(Table(x))
to be satised is that there be a table. But part of what it is for there to be a table is
for there to be half-tables. So part of what is required in order for the truth-conditions
of x(Table(x)) to be satised is that there be half-tables. So x(Table(x)) carries
commitment to half-tables.
For similar reasons, if one thinks that for the set of tables to be non-empty just is for
there to be a table, or that for the property of tablehood to be instantiated just is for
there to be a table, then one should think that x(Table(x)) carries commitment to
non-empty sets, or to instantiated properties.
The anti-Tractarian can therefore be expected to think that Quines Criterion un-
dergenerates very badly indeed. The criterion goes wrong by assuming too much of a
connection between ontological commitment and semantic structure. If Tractarianism
were correctand if every sentence of the language could be rewritten as a sentence in
which every atomic predicate is fully intrinsicthen one might hope for such a connec-
tion. For one might hope to be able to read o from a sentences semantic structure
which of the objects carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure would have to
exist in order for the sentences truth-conditions to be satised. But, as we have seen,
Tractarianism is bad philosophy of language: it is the result of doing ones linguistic
theorizing from the metaphysicians armchair.
Anti-tractarians should think that Quines Criterion is not a very good guide to
ontological commitment. But they should also think that the notion of ontological com-
mitment is of more limited interest than is usually supposed. For they will think that
discussion of ontological commitment is often based on a mistaken assumption about
the connection between ontological commitment and truth-conditions: that a sentences
ontological commitments generally make the sentences truth-conditions more dicult to
satisfy.
It is true that some ontological commitments make a sentences truth-conditions
more dicult to satisfy. A sentence that carries commitment to tables, for example,
would fail to be satised in a world without tables (equivalently: in a world in which
it doesnt tableize; equivalently: in a world in which the property of tablehood fails to
be instantiated). So its truth-conditions are more dicult to satisfy than they would
be if the commitment to tables was removedthey impose a stronger demand on the
world. The problem is that not all ontological commitments are burdensome in this way.
Suppose, for example, that for the number of Fs to be Zero just is for there to be no
numbers. Then a sentence like the number of non-self-identical things is Zero can both
have trivial truth-conditionstruth-conditions whose satisfaction requires nothing of the
worldand carry commitment to numbers. This is because commitment to numbers is
no commitment at all. It is trivially the case that there are no non-self-identical things.
But we are assuming that for the number of non-self-identical things to be Zero just is
for there to be no self-identical things. So it is trivially the case that the number of non-
self-identical things is Zero. So it is trivially the case that Zero exists. So it is trivially
the case that there are numbers.
I dont mean to suggest that the notion of ontological commitment is somehow il-
legitimate. A sentences ontological commitments are, after all, an aspect of its truth-
conditions. The point is just that ontological commitment is potentially misleading as a
method for gauging the demandingness of a sentences truth-conditions.
Moral: If you are a Tractarian you might think a sentences semantic structure is a
good guide to its ontological commitmentsat least to commitments concerning objects
carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure. But anti-Tractarians have no reason to
think that a sentences ontological commitments can be read o from its semantic struc-
ture. For ontological commitment is an aspect of truth-conditions, and anti-Tractarians
believe that the same truth-conditions can be expressed by sentences with very dierent
semantic structures.
Chapter 4
Mathematics
4.1 Trivialism
Mathematical Platonism is the view that mathematical objects exist. Mathematical Triv-
ialism is the view that the truths of pure mathematics have trivial truth-conditions, and
the falsities of pure mathematics have trivial falsity-conditions.
Platonism is compatible with both trivialism and non-trivialism. The easiest way of
getting a handle on non-trivialist Platonism is by imagining a creation myth. On the
rst day God created light; by the sixth day, She had created a large and complex world,
including black holes, planets and sea-slugs. But there was still work to be done. On the
seventh day She created mathematical objects. Only then did She rest.
On this view, it is easy to make sense of a world with no mathematical objects: it
is just like the world we are considering, except that God rested on the seventh day. In
the world we are considering, God had to do something extra in order to bring about
the existence of mathematical objectssomething that wasnt already in place when she
created black holes, planets and sea-slugs. The existence of numbers is, in this sense, a
non-trivial aair.
According to the version of Trivialist Platonism we will be considering here, in con-
81
82 CHAPTER 4. MATHEMATICS
trast, every instance of the following schema is true:
For the number of the Fs to be n just is for there to be n Fs.
[In symbols: #
x
(F(x)) = n !
n
x(F(x)).]
So when God created the planets, and made sure that there were exactly eight of them,
She thereby made it the case that the number of the planets was Eight. There was
nothing extra that needed to be done to bring about the existence of numbers.
Proponents of trivialist Platonism will think that the existence of numbers is a trivial
aair. One way to see this is by rehearsing an argument from section 3.3.2. Since it is
a truth of logic that everything is self-identical, it is trivially the case that there are no
non-self-identical things. But we are assuming that for the number of non-self-identical
things to be Zero just is for there to be no self-identical things. So it is trivially the case
that the number of non-self-identical things is Zero. So it is trivially the case that Zero
exists. So it is trivially the case that there are numbers.
Relatedly, it is a consequence of trivialist Platonism that there is no sense to be made
of a world without numbers. Suppose, for reductio, that there are no numbers. We
know that for the number of numbers to be Zero just is for there to be no numbers.
So the number Zero must exist after all, contradicting our assumption. It is de mundo
unintelligible that numbers fail to exist.
Trivialist Platonism is, of course, a form of anti-Tractarianism. It entails that a single
feature of realitythe fact that there are no dinosaurs, for examplecan be fully and
accurately described by using mathematical vocabulary (the number of the dinosaurs is
Zero), and also fully and accurately described without using mathematical vocabulary
(there are no dinosaurs).
4.2. BENACERRAFS DILEMMA 83
4.2 Benacerrafs Dilemma
A sizable portion of the debate in contemporary philosophy of mathematics has been
shaped by Paul Benacerrafs Mathematical Truth. According to Benacerraf, we face an
unhappy choice. We must either give a non-standard semantics for mathematical dis-
course, according to which mathematical statements are not really committed to mathe-
matical objects, or stick to a straightforward semantics and explain how we could come
to have knowledge about the realm of abstract objects, which is causally inert.
As directed towards a non-trivialist, Benacerrafs Dilemma has force (at least on a
suitably cleaned up version, such as Field (2005)). For if the existence of numbers is
non-trivialif God would have had to do something extra to make sure they were in
placethen there is room for asking how one could ever check whether the world does
indeed contain numberswhether God did indeed work on the seventh day. So unless
semantic analysis were somehow to reveal that mathematical sentences are not really
committed to numbers, it is not entirely clear what an epistemology for mathematics
would look like.
As directed towards a trivialist, on the other hand, the dilemma has little force.
For, according to the trivialist, nothing is required of the world in order for the truth-
conditions of a truth of pure mathematics to be satised. There is no intelligible possi-
bility that the world would need to steer clear of in order to cooperate with the demands
of mathematical truth. This means, in particular, that there is no need to go to the
world to check whether any requirements have been met in order to determine whether
the truth-conditions of a truth of pure mathematics are satised. Once one gets clear
about the sentences truth conditionsclear enough to know that they are trivialone
has done all that needs to be done to establish the sentences truth. (It is important
to keep in mind that getting clear about the truth-conditions of a given mathematical
sentence can be highly non-trivial. So determining whether the sentence is true is not,
in general, a trivial aair.)
I suspect that the prevalence of Benacerrafs Dilemma in the literature is partly
to do with a misunderstanding. Philosophers of mathematics tend to be divided into
two groups. Members of the rst group are noncommittalists (i.e. they think that a
typical mathematical statement carries no commitment to mathematical objects) and
also nominalists (i.e. they think that there are no mathematical objects); members of the
second group are committalists and Platonists. The problem, I suspect, is that members
of the two groups are sometimes talking about dierent positions when they use the
term Platonism. It is agreed on all sides that Mathematical Platonism is the view
that there are mathematical objects. But members of the rst group tend to assume
that the only available form of Platonism is non-trivialist Platonism, and therefore see
Benaccerrafs Dilemma as strong evidence for nominalism. (Since nominalism without
noncommittalism entails the falsity of standard mathematical axioms, they also see the
dilemma as evidence for noncommittalism.) Members of the second group, in contrast,
tend to have some form of trivialist Platonism in mind, and therefore fail to feel the force
Benacerrafs Dilemma. As far as I can tell, few actual Platonists would endorse the form
of Platonism that is targeted by the dilemma.
It is hard to mention particular people without failing to do justice to the subteties of
their specic views. But it seems to me that Frege (1884), Parsons (1983), Wright (1983)
and Stalnaker (1996) can all be interpreted as defending versions of trivialist Platonism.
4.3 Neo-Fregeanism
Humes Principle is the following sentence:
FG(#
x
(F(x)) = #
x
(G(x)) F(x)
x
G(x))
[Read: the number of the Fs equals the number of the Gs just in case the Fs
are in one-one correspondence with the Gs.]
4.3. NEO-FREGEANISM 85
Neo-Fregeanism is the view that when Humes Principle is set forth as an implicit deni-
tion of #
x
(F(x)), one gets the following two results: (1) the truth of Humes Principle
is knowable a priori, and (2) the referents of number-terms constitute a realm of mind-
independent objects. (Neo-Fregeanism was rst proposed in Wright (1983), and has since
been championed by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright and others. For a collection of relevant
essays, see Hale and Wright (2001).)
Just like one can distinguish between two dierent varieties of mathematical Platon-
ism, one can distinguish between two dierent varieties of neo-Fregeanism: trivialist and
non-trivialist. The two positions agree that numbersthe referents of numerical-terms
constitute a realm of mind-independent objects. But they disagree about whether the
existence of this realm of objects is a trivial aair.
Trivialist neo-Fregeans go beyond mere acceptance of Humes Principle; they accept
an identity-statement corresponding to Humes Principle:
#
x
(F(x)) = #
x
(G(x))
F,G
F(x)
x
G(x)
[Read: for the number of the Fs to equal the number of the Gs just is for the
Fs to be in one-one correspondence with the Gs.]
A consequence of this identity-statement is that it is unintelligible that there be no
numbers. For it is trivially true that, e.g. the planets are in one-one correspondence with
themselves. But for the planets to be in one-one correspondence with themselves just is
for the number of the planets to be self-identitcal. So numbers exist after all. So it is de
mundo unintelligible that there be no numbers.
Non-trivialist neo-Fregeans, in contrast, accept Humes Principle, but shy away from
accepting the corresponding identity-statement. Accordingly, they take themselves to be
able to make sense of a world with no numbers.
It seems to me that there is some confusion in the literature about which of the two
version of the neo-Freganism is being discussed. Critics of neo-Fregeanism have some-
times interpreted the program as a version of traditional neo-Fregeanismthe author
of Rayo (2003) and Rayo (2005), for example. (For a survey of neo-Fregean literature,
see MacBride (2003).) But it is not clear that this is what actual proponents of neo-
Fregeanism have had in mind. There are strong indications that trivialist neo-Fregeanism
is closer to the mark. One such indication is the use of neo-Fregeanism as a name for
the program. As I hinted above, there is good reason to think that Frege himself was a
proponent of trivialist Platonism.
When Frege claims, for example, that the sentence there is at least one square root of
4 expresses the same thought as the concept square root of 4 is realized, and adds that
a thought can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, appears
as subject or predicate (Frege (1892) p. 199), it is natural to interpret him as embracing
the identity-statement:
For the concept square root of 4 to be realized just is for there to be at least
one square root of 4.
And when he claims, in Grundlagen 64, that in treating the judgement line a is parallel
to line b as an identity, so as to obtain the direction of line a is identical to the direction
of line b, we carve up the content in a way dierent from the original way, it is natural
to interpret him as embracing the identity-statement:
For the direction of line a to equal the direction of line b just is for a and b
to be parallel.
In both instances, Frege puts the point in terms of content-recarving, rather than as an
identity-statement. But, as emphasized in section 1.3, ones views about truth-conditions
are tightly correlated with the identities one accepts.
Neo-Fregeans have been sympathetic towards Freges views on content-recarving.
(See, for instance, Wright (1997).) And even though talk of content-recarving has be-
come less prevalent in recent years, with more of the emphasis on implicit denitions, a
version of neo-Fregeanism rooted in trivialist Platonism is clearly on the cards. It seems
to me that such an interpretation of the program would be decidedly advantageous.
4.3.1 Mixed Identities
As noted above, trivialist Platonism is a form of anti-Tractarianism. (For discussion of
Tractarianism and anti-Tractarianism, see chapter 3.)
An important feature of anti-Tractarianism is that it leaves room for meaninglessness
where Tractarianism does not. Suppose it is agreed on all sides that the singular terms
t
1
and t
2
are both in good order, each of them guring meaningfully in sentences with
well-dened truth-conditions. A Tractarian is, on the face of it, committed to the claim
that it must be possible to meaningfully ask whether t
1
= t
2
is true. For she believes
that each of t
1
and t
2
is paired with one of the objects carved out by the metaphysical
structure of the world. So the question whether t
1
= t
2
is true can be cashed out as
the question whether t
1
and t
2
are paired with the same such object.
For an anti-Tractarian, in contrast, there is no tension between thinking that t
1
and t
2
gure meaningfully in sentences with well-dened truth conditions and denying that one
has asked a meaningful question when one asks whether t
1
= t
2
is true. For according
to the anti-Tractarian, all it takes for a singular term to be in good order is for there
to be a compositional specication of truth-conditions for whichever sentences involving
the term one wishes to make available for use (see section 3.1). And there is no reason
one couldnt have a compositional specication of truth-conditions for a large range of
sentences involving t
1
and t
2
without thereby specifying truth-conditions for t
1
= t
2
.
Arithmetic is a case in point. As we will see in section 4.4, trivialist Platonists have a
straightforward way of specifying a compositional assignment of truth-conditions to arith-
metical sentences. On this assignment, every arithmetical sentence a non-philosopher
would care about gets well-denied truth-conditions, as does every sentence in the non-
arithmetical fragment of the language. But no truth-conditions are supplied for mixed
identity-statements, such as Julius Caesar = 7. In fact, there is no natural way of
extending the relevant semantic clauses to cover these cases.
Tractarians will claim that something important has been left out. For in the absence
of well-dened truth-conditions for Julius Caesar = 7, it is unclear which of the objects
carved out by the metaphysical structure of reality has been paired with the number of
the planets. But anti-Tractarians will disagree: it is simply a mistake to think that such
pairings are necessary to render a singular term meaningful. In fact, one should expect
there to be mixed identity statements that lack well-dened truth-conditions. For when
a sentence has no clear role to play in communicationas is the case of Julius Caesar
= 7 in non-philosophical contextsour linguistic practice generates no pressure for it
to come to be associated with truth-conditions, even when its constituent terms gure
meaningfully in other sentences.
A Tractarian might reply that Julius Caesar = 7 doesnt need a role to play in
communication in order to have well-dened truth-conditions. Its truth-conditions will
be determined by whether Julius Caesar and 7 are paired onto a single one of the
objects that are carved out by the worlds metaphysical structurean issue which must
have a determinate answer if the terms are to gure meaningfully in other sentences. But
the anti-Tractarian would disagree. Julius Caesar and 7 are paired onto objects with
respect to dierent ways of carving up the world: they are components of dierent systems
of representation for describing the world. So the fact that they occur in sentences with
well-dened truth-conditions oers no guarantee that their occurrence in Julius Caesar
= 7 will result in well-dened truth-conditions. (For further discussion of this issue, see
chapter 9.)
Moral: from the point of view of an anti-Tractarian, there is no pressure for thinking
that a mixed identity-statement such as Julius Caesar = 7 should have well-dened
truth-conditions. So there is no reason to thinkin spite of what Frege suggests in 66
of the Grundlagen and what proponents of neo-Fregeanism have tended to presuppose
that a characterization of the concept of number will be unacceptable unless it settles the
truth-value of mixed identity-statements. If you are a trivialist neo-Fregean, you should
be resolute about your anti-Tractarianism, and stop worrying about mixed identities.
4.3.2 Abstraction Principles
I have never been able to understand why a non-trivialist neo-Fregean would think it
important to use Humes Princple to characterize the meaning of arithmetical vocabulary,
instead of using, e.g. the (second-order) Dedekind Axioms. In the case of trivialist neo-
Fregeans, on the other hand, I can see a motivation. Humes Principle, and abstraction
principles more generally, might be thought to be important because they are seen as
capturing the dierence between setting forth a quantied biconditional as an implicit
denition of mathematical terms:
(f() = f() R(, ))
and setting forth the corresponding identity-statement:
f() = f()
,
R(, ).
And this is clearly an important dierence. Only the latter delivers a trivialist form of
Platonism, and only the latter promises to deliver an account for the special epistemic
status of mathematical truths.
If the motivation for appealing to abstraction principles is simply to secure a triv-
ialist form of Platonism, it seems to me that there are better ways of doing the job.
Neo-Fregeans have found it dicult to identify abstraction principles that can do for set-
theory what Humes Principle does for arithmetic. (For a selection of relevant literature,
see Cook (2007).) But if one waives the requirement that meaning-xation work be done
by abstraction principles, the diculties vanish. As we shall see below, proponents of
trivialist Platonism have a straightforward way of specifying compositional semantic the-
ories for a large range of mathematical languages that deliver just the right results. (For
the case of arithmetic, see the next section; for the case of set-theory, see section 4.6.1.)
4.4 A Semantics for Trivialists
In this section we will see that the trivialist can give a compositional specication of
truth-conditions for arithmetical sentences which yields the result that every true sentence
of pure arithmetic is assigned trivial truth-conditions and every false sentence of pure
arithmetic is assigned trivial falsity-conditions.
The trivialists semantics is also dened for every sentence of applied arithmetic that
a non-philosopher would care about, and whenever it is dened it delivers the intu-
itively correct results. It does not, however, assign truth-conditions to mixed identity-
statements, such as the number of the planets = Julius Caesar. As we saw in sec-
tion 4.3.1, the anti-Tractarian should see no tension between thinking that the singular
terms t
1
and t
2
gure meaningfully in sentences with well-dened truth conditions and
denying that one has asked a meaningful question when one asks whether t
1
= t
2
is
true.
4.4.1 The Trivialist Semantics
I will now spell out the semantics. Readers uninterested in the details are welcome to
skip ahead to section 4.4.2. But there is really nothing to fearthe material is totally
straightforward.
We work with a two-sorted rst-order language with identity, L. Besides the identity-
symbol =, L contains arithmetical variables (n
1
, n
2
, . . .), individual-constants (0)
and function-letters (S, + and ), and non-arithmetical variables (x
1
, x
2
, . . .),
4.4. A SEMANTICS FOR TRIVIALISTS 91
constants (Caesar and Earth) and predicate-letters (Planet(. . . )). In addition, L
has been enriched with the function-letter #
v
(. . .) which takes a rst-order predicate in
its single argument-place to form a rst-order arithmetical term (as in #
x
1
(Planet(x
1
)),
which is read the number of the planets).
If is a variable assignment and w is a world, truth and denotation in L relative to
and w can be characterized as follows:
Denotation of arithmetical terms:
1.
,w
(n
i
) = (n
i
)
2.
,w
(0) = the number Zero
3.
,w
(S(t)) =
,w
(t) + 1
4.
,w
((t
1
+t
2
)) =
,w
(t
1
) +
,w
(t
2
)
5.
,w
((t
1
t
2
)) =
,w
(t
1
)
,w
(t
2
)
6.
,w
(#
x
i
((x
i
))) = the number of zs such that Sat((x
i
),
z/x
i
, w)
7.
,w
(#
n
i
((n
i
))) = the number of ms such that Sat((n
i
),
m/n
i
, w)
Denotation of non-arithmetical terms:
1.
,w
(x
i
) = (x
i
)
2.
,w
(Caesar) = Gaius Julius Caesar
3.
,w
(Earth) = the planet Earth
Satisfaction:
Where []
w
is read it is true at w that ,
1. Sat(n
i
, , w) there is a number m such that Sat(,
m/n
i
, w)
2. Sat(x
i
, , w) there is a z such that ([y(y = z)]
w
Sat(,
z/x
i
, w))
3. Sat(t
1
= t
2
, , w)
,w
(t
1
) =
,w
(t
2
)
4. Sat(Planet(t), , w) [
,w
(t) is a planet]
w
(for t a non-arithmetical term)
5. Sat( , , w) Sat(, , w) Sat(, , w)
6. Sat(, , w) Sat(, , w)
A few remarks about the semantics:
Innite numbers
I assume throughout that number includes innite numbers. This is done in order to
ensure that there are no empty terms in the language. If one wanted to restrict ones
attention to the natural numbers one could do so by working in a free logic.
Truth-Conditions and Possible Worlds
What I had promised is an assignment of truth-conditions to sentences; what the trivialist
semantics actually delivers an assignment of sets of worlds to sentences. To bridge the
gap we need the assumption that a sentences truth-conditions are adequately modeled
by a set of worlds. This is a substantial assumption. But chapters 1 and 2 of this book
can be read as an extended argument for the claim that the assumption is satised when
the space of worlds is taken to be the to be the space of metaphysically possible worlds.
(As emphasized in section 1.5, it is important to distinguish between the claim that two
sentences have the same truth-conditions and the claim that they have the same meaning.
To say that they have the same truth-conditions is only to say that there is no dierence
between what would be required of the world to satisfy the constraints determined by
one of the meanings and what would be required of the world to satisfy the constraints
determined by the other. For further discussion of these topics, see Part ??.)
Actualism
To simplify the exposition, I have made the tacit assumption that the range of the
metalinguistic quantiers includes merely possible objects. But it is worth keeping in
mind that non-actualist quantication could be avoided entirely. As advertised earlier,
we will see in chapter 7 that when it comes to doing semantics there is a very precise
sense in which everything that could be achieved by quantifying over possibilia can also
be achieved by quantifying over representatives for possibilia, while working from within a
purely actualist perspective. The trivialist semantics is no exception. (For a development
of the trivialist semantics in explicitly actualist terms, see Rayo (2008).)
4.4.2 Philosophical Commentary
Outscoping
What is distinctive about the trivialist semantics is that mathematical vocabulary always
occurs outside the scope of [. . .]
w
. Denis Bonnay once suggested a nice name for the
procedure that gives rise to semantic clauses of this kind: outscoping.
Consider, for example, the object-language sentence #
x
(Planet(x)) = 0. Straight-
forward application of the trivialist semantic clauses yields the result that this sentence
is true at a world w just in case w satises the following metalinguistic formula:
the number of zs such that [z is a planet]
w
= 0
We are assuming arithmetic in the metatheory. So all that is required of w in order for
the metalinguistic formula to be satised is that it contain no planets.
Compare this with the result of using a homophonic semantics to specify truth-
conditions for #
x
(Planet(x)) = 0. What follows from the usual semantic clauses is that
the sentence is true at w just in case w satises the following metalinguistic formula:
[the number of zs such that z is a planet = 0]
w
In this case, arithmetical vocabulary occurs within the scope of [. . .]
w
. Soregardless of
whether we help ourselves to arithmetic in the metatheorywe get the result that what
is required of w in order for the metalinguistic formula to be satised is that it contain
the number Zero, and that, at w, Zero number the planets.
Of course, if it is true that for the number of the planets to be Zero just is for there to
be no planets, then the two requirements on w utlimately come to the same thing. So it
will be true, both according to the trivialist semantics and according to the homophonic
semantics, that all that is required of w to verify #
x
(Planet(x)) = 0 is that it contain
no planets. But there is still an important dierence: only the trivialist semantics entails
the result with no appeal to the metatheoretic assumption that for the number of the
planets to be Zero just is for there to be no planets.
Because of this dierence, only the trivialist semantics can be used to give a non-trivial
proof of the object-language identity statement #
x
(Planet(x)) = 0 x Planet(x).
Forunlike the homophonic semanticsthe trivialist semantics can be used to show that
#
x
(Planet(x)) = 0 and x Planet(x) are true at precisely the same worlds without
assuming the relevant identity statement in the metatheory. One does need to use arith-
metical reasoning in the metatheory to prove the result, but one doesnt need to assume
that arithmetical truths are trivially true.
In general, the upshot of outscoping is that even though mathematics is used in the
metatheory, all one needs to know about a world w in order to determine whether a given
arithmetical sentence would be true at w is which non-mathematical predicates apply to
which objects.
In the case of #
x
(Planet(x)) = 0, we saw that what it takes for the sentence be true
at w is for w to satisfy the following metalinguistic formula:
the number of zs such that [z is a planet]
w
= 0
And in order to tell whether w satises this formula all we need to know about w is which
objects satisfy the non-mathematical predicate is a planet at w. Once we have this
information we can ask ourselveswithout collecting additional information about w
whether the number of these objects is Zero, and go on to ascertain whether the sentence
is true at w. An analogous point can be made for every sentence for which the trivialist
semantics is dened. There is therefore a precise sense in which the trivialist semantics
establishes a connection between mathematical and non-mathematical descriptions of the
world.
Attention so far has been focused on applied arithmetic. But it is useful to see how
outscoping plays out in the pure case. Consider the object-language sentence 1 + 1 =
2 (in primitive notation: S(0) + S(0) = S(S(0))). Since there is no non-mathemtical
vocabulary to remain within the scope of [. . .]
w
, application of the semantic clauses yields
the result that the sentence is true at a world w just in case w satises a metalinguistic
formula in which all the vocabulary has been outscoped:
1 + 1 = 2
What one gets, in other words, is a formula in which [. . .]
w
does not occur, and therefore
a formula with no free variables. In general, a formula with no free variables is satised
by all objects if it is true, and no objects if it is false. Since the metalinguistic formula
1 + 1 = 2 is, in fact, true, it will be satised by all objectsand in particular by w
for arbitrary w. It is, in other words, satised by w independently of what w is like.
The trivialist semantics therefore delivers the conclusion that nothing is required of w
in order for the object-language sentence 1+1 = 2 to be true at w. And, of course,
the point generalizes. The trivialist semantics (plus arithmetic) yields the result that
an arbitrary truth of pure arithmetic is true at w independently of what w is like, and
that an arbitrary falsehood of pure arithmetic is false at w independently of what w is
like. Soon the assumption that truth-conditions are adequately modeled by sets of
worldsthe trivialist semantics entails trivialism.
Using Arithmetic in the Metalanguage
The trivialist semantics makes free use of arithmetic in the metalanguage. This means
that it cannot be used to explain the truth-conditions of arithmetical sentences to some-
one who doesnt already understand arithmetical vocabulary. One would be able to
supply such an explanation if one had method for paraphrasing arbitrary arithmetical
sentences as sentences containing no mathematical vocabulary. We will see in section 4.5
that there are important limits to what can be achieved when it comes to the project of
characterizing paraphrase-methods of this kind. The thing to keep in mind for present
purposes is that supplying non-mathematical paraphrases for arithmetical sentences is
not part of what the trivialist semantics is meant to achieve.
The aim is, rather, to give a precise statement of trivialism by saying exactly what
truth-conditions a trivialist would associate with each arithmetical sentenceand doing
so in such a way that the resulting assignment of truth-conditions can be recognized as
delivering trivialism regardless of whether one happens to be a trivialist.
A homophonic semantics does not succeed in doing this. The trivialist and the non-
trivialist can both agree that the homophonic semantics is correct. They can both agree,
for example, that what it takes for 1 +1 = 2 to be true is for it to be the case that One
plus One is Two. (Though, of course, trivialist would go on to add, and the non-trivialist
would not, that nothing is required for it to be the case that One plus One is Two.) In
contrast, when one sets forth a trivialist semantics, one supplies an assignment of truth-
conditions that is unequivocally trivialist. For one gets the conclusion that 1 +1 = 2 is
4.5. PARAPHRASE 97
trivially true as a logical consequence of ones semantics (plus arithmetic).
4.5 Paraphrase
Philosophers of mathematics have often been concerned with the question of whether
mathematical statements can be paraphrased as sentences containing no mathemati-
cal vocabulary. A non-trivialist who thinks that typical mathematical assertions carry
no commitment to mathematical objects might wish to claim that what is communi-
cated by a mathematical assertion is the same as what is literally expressed by the
non-mathematical paraphrase of the asserted sentence. But a trivialist might also be
interested in the issue, since she might be hope to be in a position to claim that every
mathematical statement has the same truth-conditions as some sentence containing no
mathematical vocabulary.
For trivialists and non-trivialists alike, it seems to me that putting too much emphasis
on paraphrase is a bad idea. For the existence of suitable paraphrase-function turns
crucially on the expressive resources of ones non-mathematical vocabulary. And it would
be a mistake to burden ones philosophy of mathematics with claims about the legitimacy
of a given set of expressive resources. Notice, moreover, that a paraphrase-function is
unnecessary to characterize the desired specication of truth-conditions for mathematical
sentences, since one can instead use a compositional semantics of the sort described above.
An additional danger of focussing too much attention on paraphrase is that specifying
a non-mathematical paraphrase for a mathematical statement is not always the best way
of shedding light on the statements truth-conditions. So in setting forth a parahrase-
function one runs the risk of thinking that one has succeeded in clarifying the truth-
conditions of mathematical statements, when in fact one has not.
Chapter 8 is devoted to a detailed discussion of these issues.
4.6 Beyond Arithmetic
Our discussion of mathematical trivialism has been focused so far on the special case of
arithmetic. How does trivialism plays out when it comes to other branches of mathemat-
ics?
One issue to be addressed is the question of what it takes for a trivialist understanding
of a given branch of mathematics to be available. Could one give a trivialist account of
set-theory, for example? Could one specify truth-conditions for set-theoretic sentences
in such a way that the standard set-theoretic axioms turn out to be trivially true?
I oer a detailed discussion of the matter in Chapter 9, but the upshot can be stated
very succinctly. From the point of view of an anti-Tractarian, it doesnt take much for a
trivialist understanding of an axiomatic mathematical theory to be available. In the case
of pure mathematics, all it takes is for the theory to be internally coherent; in the case
of applied mathematics, all it takes is for the theory to be conservative over sentences of
the original language. The reason this is so is that one can introduce new mathematical
vocabulary by stipulation: one can stipulate that it is to be understood in such a way that
a suitable set of axioms turn out to be trivially true. And the anti-Tractarian can show
thatas long as it gives rise to the right sort of linguistic practicesuch a stipulation is
guaranteed to succeed on the assumption the axioms are internally coherent (in the case
of pure mathematics) or conservative (in the case of applied mathematics).
The anti-Tractarian will therefore think that a trivialist interpretation is available for
any minimally well-behaved mathematical theory. It does not follow, however, that anti-
Tracatrains will always be in a position to characterize a compositional semantics that
makes the triviality of a given axiom system explicit. A homophonic semantics will always
be available, of course, and will always be recognized as delivering an accurate assignment
of truth-conditions. The problem is that only the trivialist will take it to deliver a trivialist
specication of truth-conditionsthe non-trivialist will take it to deliver a non-trivialist
4.6. BEYOND ARITHMETIC 99
specication of truth-conditions. A homophonic semantics is therefore not a good way of
making the triviality of the relevant axiom system explicitor, indeed, of shedding any
real light on the truth-conditions of sentences of the language under consideration.
A trivialist semantics of the kind described in section 4.4.1 can be signicantly more
illuminating. But such a semantics is only guaranteed to be available in the case of pure
mathematics. One reason problems can arise in the case of applied mathematics is that
there is no general recipe for constructing trivialist semantic clauses for atomic formulas
that mix mathematical and non-mathematical vocabulary.
Things work out for the language of applied arithmetic thanks to the following equiv-
alence:
[#
x
(F(x)) = n]
w
#
x
([F(x)]
w
) = n.
Read: at w (the number of the Fs = n) just in case (the number of the xs
such that at w (x is an F)) = n.
(Or an actualist version thereofsee section 4.4.1.) It is because of this equivalence that
we are able to outscope, and go from the homophonic semantic clause for the mixed
atomic formula #
x
(F(x)) = n,
#
x
(F(x)) = n is true at w [#
x
(F(x)) = n]
w
,
to a trivialist semantic clause,
#
x
(F(x)) = n is true at w #
x
([F(x)]
w
) = n.
But such equivalences are not guaranteed to be available in general. For instance, I know
of no general way of dening a trivialist semantics for a plural language that has been
enriched with non-logical atomic plural predicates. (For discussion of such languages, see
Rayo (2002b).)
4.6.1 Set Theory
Happily, one can give a trivialist semantics for the language of set-theory with urelements.
It is an easy modication of the trivialist semantics for the language of arithmetic that
was described in section 4.4.1.
Our object-language will be the language of two-sorted set-theory with urelements:
Roman variables (x, y, . . . ) range over urelements, Greek variables (, , . . . ) range
over sets. Let be a variable assignment, let w be a metalinguistic variable ranging over
worlds and let []
w
be read it is true at w that . Then satisfaction can be dened
as follows:
1. Sat(x
i
, , w) there is a z such that ([y(y = z)]
w
Sat(,
z/x
i
, w))
2. Sat(
i
, , w) there is a set such that: (i) for any urelement z in the
transitive closure of , [y(y = z)]
w
, and (ii) Sat(,
/
i
, w)
3. Sat(F(x), , w) [(x) is an F]
w
4. Sat( , , w) () ()
5. Sat(x , , w) (x) ()
6. Sat(x = y, , w) (x) = (y)
7. Sat( , , w) Sat(, , w) Sat(, , w)
8. Sat(, , w) Sat(, , w)
As in the case of arithmetic, I simplify the exposition by making the tacit assumption
that the range of the metalinguistic quantiers includes merely possible objects. But
it is worth keeping in mind that non-actualist quantication can be avoided altogether
by appeal to the machinery developed in chapter 7. (For a rendering of the trivialist
semantics in explicitly actualist terms, see Rayo (2008).)
Our semantics delivers just the assignment of truth-conditions that a trivialist would
hope for. One gets the result that every truth of the pure fragment of set-theory is trivially
true and every falsity of the pure fragment of set-theory is trivially false. And one gets
the desired truth-conditions for sentences involving urelements. For instance, one gets
the result that all that is required of the world in order for x(x Elephant(x))
to be true is for there to be an elephant.
As in the case of arithmetic, one usually needs to prove a mathematical result in the
metatheory in order to show that a given sentence is trivially true, or to show that it is
trivially false. For instance, in order to show that an object-language sentence stating
that there is an inaccessible has trivial truth-conditions one has to show in the metatheory
that there is an inaccessible. The result is that the semantics entails very little on its own
about what an intended model for the object-language should look like. It all depends
on what one assumes about set theory in the metatheory.
The Iterative Conception of Set
A trivialist semantics for the language of set theory is a good way of making explicit the
truth-conditions of set-theoretic sentences, as understood by the trivialist. But it fails to
deliver a conception of set. As mentioned above, it doesnt oer much guidance about
what the hierarchy of sets should look like, since any substantial information about the
hierarchy is imported from the background metatheory.
There is, however, an illuminating conception of set that is available to the trivi-
alist. Early discussions include Zermelo (1930) (which builds on Zermelo (1908)) and
G odel (1944) (which was partially anticipated in G odel (1933)). More recent discus-
sions include Boolos (1971), Parsons (1974) and Potter (2004). The discussion in Lin-
nebo (forthcoming) and its technical companion Linnebo (typescript) are especially ger-
mane to the present discussion.
On the version we will consider here, the basic idea is that set-talk is to be introduced
in stages. At Stage Zero, the only quantication we have available is quantication over
urelements. At Stage One, we introduce the membership-predicate , and the set-
theoretic term-forming operator z : . . . z . . .. We then set forth the following identity
statement, where x and z range over urelements and F is a second-order variable
taking rst-order urelement-variables as arguments:
Stage One Identity Statement
x z : F(z)
x,F
F(x)
Read: for x to be a member of the set of Fs just is for x to be an F.
The result is that we have a new way of carving up the world. Because of the introduction
of additional linguistic resources, the feature of reality that was fully and accurately
described by means of a is F can now also be fully and accurately described by means
of a is a member of the set of Fs. (Does this mean that novel objects have been
brought into existence? Absolutely not. For an extended discussion of these issues, see
section 3.2.)
The Stage One Identity Statement is, of course, a close cousin of Freges Basic Law V,
which leads to inconsistency. We avoid inconsistency here because the range of x does
not include the referents of the newly introduced set-theoretic terms. A Tractarian will
grant that inconsistency has been avoided, be she will think that it is the result of an ad
hoc restriction. Why restrict the range of x to urelements? she would ask. Is there
some reason not to treat it as ranging over absolutely everything, beyond the desire to
avoid paradox?
But the anti-Tractarian has a reply. It is true that from a Tractarian point of view
it makes good sense to speak of a maximal domain: it is simply the domain of objects
that gets carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure. But from an anti-Tractarian
point of view, dierent uses of quantication presuppose dierent ways of carving up the
world, and there is no obvious reason to think that any one such carving will deliver a
maximal domain.
I grant that the anti-Tractarian neednt think of every domain as a subdomain of the
metaphysically privileged domaina skeptic might replybut she must still think of
every domain as a subdomain of the maxi-domain: the domain that results from every
possible way of carving the world into objects. So when the trivialist takes x to range
over the domain of urelements, she is still placing ad hoc restrictions on the range of the
variables. As I pointed out in section 3.2, however, the anti-Tractarian has no reason to
think that there is such a thing as a maxi-domain. For a carving of the world is just a
compositional system of representation for describing the world, and there is no obvious
reason to think that there is a nal answer to the question of what counts as a possible
system of representation.
The proper response to the skeptic is therefore this. When we introduce the Stage
One Identity Statement, the situation is not one in which a domain that includes sets
is available to us, and we choose to restrict it to urelements in order to avoid paradox.
Instead, the label urelement is applied to everything we are able to quantify over at that
point. It is only after the identity statement is introduced, and we have a way of xing
truth-conditions for set-theoretic sentences, that our representational resources are rich
enough to quantify over sets.
Once Stage One is in place, one can begin to iterate the process. At each stage one
starts by treating every object one is in a position to quantify over as a -urelement. One
then sets forth the following identity statement, where x
and z
take -urelements
as values, and F is a second-order variable taking rst-order -urelement-variables as
arguments:
Stage Identity Statement
x
: F(z
)
x,F
F(x
)
Read: for x
to be a member of the set of Fs just is for x
to be an F.
[Beware: it is potentially misleading to think of -urelements as constituting
a single domain, since nothing has been done to x the truth-conditions of
mixed identity statements relating set-theoretic and non-set-theoretic terms.
It is better to think of set-theoretic variables and non-set-theoretic variables as
falling under dierent sortsand therefore ranging over separate domains
and to treat mixed identity statements as ill-formed. I avoid doing so here to
improve the exposition, but further discussion of these matters can be found
in section 9.1.]
How far could this procedure be iterated? The rst thing to note is that no limits are
imposed by the way the world is. Pace Tractarianism, we are not operating against the
background of a xed domain, which might happen to include enough objects for the
procedure to be iterated until a particular point and no further. At each stage of the
process, we introduce a new family of set-theoretic terms by way of an axiom system
that is conservative over the second-order language of -urelements,
1
and, according to
1
The conservativeness claim is easily veried in ZFC. It is enough to show that any model of the
second-order language of -urelements can be extended to a model of the expanded language that
satises the Stage Identity Statement. If one wishes to prove syntactic conservativeness, one should
work with Henkin-models; if one wishes to prove semantic conservativeness one should work with full
models. Either way, one proceeds by letting rst-order set-theoretic variables take the same values as
second-order -urelement-variables, and letting second-order set-theoertic variables take as values sets
of values of rst-order set-theoretic variables.
Note, however, that the second-order theory of -level sets with -urelements can be used to dene
a truth-predicate for the second-order language of -urelements. And by using such a predicate to
generate new instances of the axiom-schemas governing second-order -urelement quantication one
might be able to prove sentences containing no -set-theoretic vocabulary that one couldnt prove before
(such as the Godel-sentence for the second-order language of -urelements). So although the Stage
Identity Statement is itself (syntactically and semantically) conservative, it is couched in a language
which can be used to formulate additional second-order axioms, and thereby increase the deductive
power of ones second-order theory of -urelements.
The new axioms will certainly be semantically conservative over the second-order language of -
urelements, since they are all true in every full second-order model. So if one thinks that semantic
conservativeness is enough to legitimate the introduction of new axioms, one will have no reason to worry
in the case at hand. If, on the other hand, one thinks that syntactic conservativeness is a prerequisite
for legitimacy, then there might be reasons for concern, since, as we have seen, the new axioms need not
be syntactically conservative over the second-order language of -urelements.
Notice, however, that whether or not the introduction of -level set-theoretic vocabulary generates
pressure to accept the new axioms depends on how one is thinking about -urelement second-order
quantication. One possibility is to think of such quantication open-endedly, and insist that it is part
the anti-Tractarian, conservativeness is enough to guarantee that the introduction will
be successful. (See section 9.2.) So the anti-Tractarian will think that the process is
limited only by our ability to introduce further and further identity statements.
Notice, however, that the anti-Tractarian has no obvious reason to think that it would
be helpful to insist that the process is to be iterated all the way up or as far as it could
possibly go. In order for such pronouncements to have denite content there would have
to be a nal answer to the question of what counts as a possible system of representation.
And, as emphasized above, the anti-Tractarian has no obvious reason to think that there
is such an answer. When one insists that the process be iterated all the way up, one
will only succeed in saying something with denite content to the extent that one has
managed to articulate a denite well-ordering, so that the pronouncement can understood
as signaling that the process is to be iterated so as to form a hierarchy that is isomorphic
with that well-ordering. Accordingly, someone who has succeeded in characterizing a
well-ordering isomorphic to the natural numbers will be able to iterate the process far
enough to get the hereditarily nite sets. Someone who has succeeded in characterizing
a well-ordering isomorphic to the smallest strongly inaccessible cardinal will be able to
iterate the process far enough to get enough sets for second-order ZF to have an intended
of ones original intent that one be committed not only to instances of the second-order axiom-schemas
that can be formulated in ones current language, but also to instances formulable in arbitrary extensions
of the language. (See McGee (2000), Williamson (2003) and Lavine (2006).) If so, one should think that
truth-conditions are semantically determined (in the sense of section 9.2) and hence that ones theory
of -urelements should be semantically conservative over the base non-mathematical theory. As it turns
out, semantic conservativeness of this kind is enough to guarantee the weak syntactic conservativeness
of the new axioms. (Proof: Suppose the new axioms fail to by weakly syntactically conservative over the
second-order theory of -urelements. Then there is a world w such that one can prove a contradiction
from the result of adding the new axioms to the set T
w
of second-order -urelement sentences with
well-dened truth-conditions are true at w, even though T
w
is itself consistent. Since the theory of
-urelements is semantically conservative over the base non-mantematical theory, T
w
must have a full
second-order model. But each of the new axioms holds in every full second-order model, contradicting
the assumption that the result of adding the axioms to T
w
is inconsistent.) This is signicant because,
as emphasized in section 9.2 the anti-Tractarian should think that weak conservativeness is all it takes
to guarantee successful introduction of the new axioms.
Alternatively, -urelement second-order quantication may not be thought of open-endedly. If so, our
argument for weak syntactic conservativeness breaks down. But so does the rationale for thinking that
the introduction of -level set-theoretic vocabulary generates pressure to accept the new axioms.
interpretation. And so forth.
A consequence of this picture is that the project of developing an iterative conception
of set is inextricably linked to the project of doing set-theory. For the canonical way of
identifying a large well-ordering is by describing an ordinal in set-theoretic terms, and
motivating the idea that its existence wouldnt lead to inconsistency. The result is that
it would be a mistake to think of the iterative construction described in this section as
a substitute for a theory like ZFC. It is more illuminating than ZFC in some respects,
and less illuminating in others. It is more illuminating as a way of shedding light on the
truth-conditions of a sentence like Caesar is a member of the set of Romans, or as a
method for understanding the most general constraints on our reasoning about sets. But
it does far worse than ZFC as a method for shedding light on more specic questions
about the set-theoretic landscape. The right attitude, it seems to me, is to use both
kinds of theories in tandem, as complementary descriptions of a single subject-matter.
Paraphrase
Is it possible to characterize a trivialist paraphrase function for the language of set-theory?
Is there, in other words, an algorithmic procedure for mapping each set-theoretic sentence
to a sentence whose truth-conditions are uncontroversially the truth-conditions that
the trivialist semantics associates with ?
If the paraphrase-language includes variables of suciently high transnite order
and if a trivialist understanding of higher-order quantication is assumed to be uncon-
troversialthen the answer is yes.
Let L
be a version of the language of set-theory with urelements in which each

occurrence of a quantier is restricted by some V
( < ). As mentioned above, Lin-

nebo and Rayo (typescript) shows that, for arbitrary , there is a truth-value-preserving
paraphrase-function
()
that maps every sentence of L
onto a sentence in a
language of order + 2 (or order , if is a limit ordinal). Moreover, by assuming a
suitable reection principle, one can show that there is a cardinal such that V
satises
the same L
-sentences as the universe. (See Shapiro (1987), pp. 3234.) So one can
characterize a trivialist paraphrase-function for the language of set-theory with urele-
ments by using the following procedure. First, transform every sentence of the language
of set-theory into a sentence of L
+1
by restricting the quantiers to V
. Then apply
the paraphrase-function
(+1)
. The result is a function that paraphrases every
set-theoretic sentence as a sentence of order ( +3). (Would such a paraphrase-function
count as algorithmic? Yes, assuming one can help oneself to . But, of course, is far
beyond the recursively speciable ordinals.)
Whether or not a paraphrase-function of this kind succeeds in elucidating the truth-
conditions of set-theoretic sentences will, of course, depend on ones understanding of
languages of very high order. If ones grasp of such languages were suitably independent
of set-theory, then the elucidation could be very signicant indeed. But it is hard to see
how one could acquire a clear grasp of transnite type-theory without making substantial
use of set-theory. Conspicuously, ones ability to characterize a language of order pre-
supposes that one is able to characterize a well-ordering with an th member. And, when
is suciently large, it is hard to see how much progress would be made independently
of set-theoretic reasoning.
My own view is that set-theory and transnite type-theory are best thought of as
dierent presentations of the same theory. Neither of them should be thought of as being
in some sense prior to the other, or as supplying a foundation. But one can benet
from having both because they each shed light on dierent aspects of the theoretical
landscape. For further discussion of these issues, see Linnebo and Rayo (typescript).
Chapter 5
Content
5.1 Folk-Psychology
There are a number of dierent strategies for predicting a subjects behavior. Each of
them has its own range of advantages and disadvantages.
Folk-psychology is at one end of the spectrum. It has the advantage of being well-
suited for marketplace prediction: prediction of the kind that can be easily carried out
by normal human beings, on the basis of evidence that can be easily acquired on the
basis of informal observation. But it has the disadvantage of being very limited in
its predictive power. And there is room for worrying thatregardless of whether its
behavioral predictions are indeed accurateit might not be an accurate description of
how the mind works. Neuroscience is at the other end of the spectrum. A fully developed
version would be the ultimate description of how the brain works. It would also deliver
maximally ne-grained predictions of a subjects behavior, with near-perfect accuracy.
But it would be ill-suited for the marketplace, since its predictions would rely on data
that is very dicult to come by and require computations that a normal human would
nd very dicult to carry out.
As long as one thinks of folk-psychology as a systematic description of the subjectss
109
110 CHAPTER 5. CONTENT
behavioral dispositions, and not as an account of how the mind works, it neednt be in
competition with cognitive science. Thus understood, folk-psychology could only run
into trouble by making the wrong behavioral predictions, and it doesnt take much for
there to be an instance of folk psychology that delivers accurate predications. To a rst
approximation, it is enough for there to be some assignment of beliefs and desires, some
conception of rationality and some conception of action such that, whenever the subject
is counted as rational, she acts in ways that would tend to bring about her desires in
a world compatible with her beliefs. Maybe our behavioral dispositions are too complex
to be systematized in this sort of way. But there is so much room for adjusting ones
attributions of beliefs and desires, ones conceptions of rationality and action, and the
details of ones folk-theory, that its hard not to feel optimistic.
Of course, if one thinks of folk-psychology as more than just a systematic description
of a subjects behavioral dispositionsif one thinks of it as supplying an account of how
the mind worksthen the risk of conict with cognitive science is very substantial indeed,
since there is no obvious reason to think that a fully developed cognitive science would
look anything like folk psychology. As you read this chapter, please keep in mind that I
will not be thinking of folk-psychology as an account of how the mind works. I will be
thinking of it as a systematic description of the subjects behavioral dispositions.
I will not, however, be thinking of folk-psychology instrumentally. The view is not, in
other words, that folk-psychology is to be thought of as a (potentially false) theory about
how the mind works which one should be only partially committed to: only insofar as
behavioral predictions are concerned. That would lead to the awkward conclusion that
whether or not people really have beliefs and desiresas opposed to just being such that
they are usefully described in such terms for the purposes of behavioral prediction
depends on the risky matter of whether folk-psychology turns out to be adequate as a
description of how the mind works. The suggestion, instead, is that for a subject to
have a full set of beliefs and desires just is for the subjects behavioral dispositions to
5.1. FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY 111
be such as to be describable folk-psychologically, on the basis of those beliefs and those
desires. Thus, a person can be accurately described as believing and desiring irrespective
of whether tomorrows cognitive science will look anything like folk-psychology.
What if there is more than one full assignment of beliefs and desires that accurately
systematizes a subjects behavioral dispositions? Then the successful theories will all
impose the same requirement on the world: that the subject have a certain range of
behavioral dispositions. So the subject can be accurately described in terms of the
beliefs and desires ascribed by any of the theories, provided one is careful not to mix
beliefs and desires from dierent theories in a single description of the subject.
When folk-psychology is thought of in this way, there is a lot to be said on its behalf.
The rst thing to note is that there is a certain respect in which it is the only game in
town. When it comes to the project of making market-place predicationspredictions
of the kind that can be easily carried out by normal human beings, on the basis of
evidence that can be easily acquired on the basis of informal observationit is head and
shoulders above its peers. And there is no escaping marketplace predictions. They are
indispensable, in practice, for the successful navigation of our lives. So folk-psychology
is indispensable, in practice, for the successful navigation of our lives.
The project of better understanding how we manage to navigate our lives is an in-
teresting one, but it is not of special concern to philosophers. There is, however, a
distinctly philosophical reason for being interested in folk-psychology. Intentional no-
tions are a crucial building-block of the philosophical landscape, and they all have their
origins in folk-psychology. One could think that in spite of their origin, the best strategy
for shedding light on intentional notions sidesteps folk-psychology. But it seems to me
that that would be a mistake. At the very least, getting clear on a suitably regimented
version of folk-psychology can shed light on our intentional notions. And it may well
prove advisable to go further, and characterize intentional notions wholly in terms of
their functional role in a well-regimented folk-psychology. (For a nice example of what a
regimented folk-psychology might look like, see Lewis (1974).)
Discussion of folk-psychology in what follows should be understood in this spirit. I will
develop a regimented version of our folk-psychological account of mental representation
with the aim of better understanding the family of intentional notions that gure in
the theory. I will argue, in particular, that the notion of fragmentation has a role to
play in our best folk-theoretic account of mental representation. I will then highlight the
notions importance by showing that it can be used to address puzzles in the philosophies
of mathematics and mind.
The material in this chapter borrows heavily from Bob Stalnaker. The fundamen-
tal ideas can all be found in Stalnaker (1984) (especially chapters 1 and 5) and Stal-
naker (1999) (especially chapters 13 and 14). (See also Perry (2001) and Parikh (2009).)
My own thinking about these matters has developed in large part as a result of a joint
project with Adam Elga. He has contributed to the project at least as much as I have,
but shouldnt thereby be burdened with commitment to the idiosyncrasies of the present
discussion.
5.2 Rational Action
In preceding chapters I have tried to articulate the notions of possibility, de mundo
intelligibility and truth-conditions. On the resulting picture, there is no gap between
possibility and de mundo intelligibility. This means, in particular, that one should only
regard as scenario as metaphysically impossible if one takes it to be incoherent in light of
the identity-statements one accepts. It is also a consequence of the picture I have been
defending that a representations truth-condtionsi.e. the requirement that the world
would have to satisfy in order to be as the representation represents it to becan be
modeled as a set of possible worlds: the set of worlds whereby the requirement is satised.
Accordingly, to regard a representation as having trivial truth-conditionsto think,
5.2. RATIONAL ACTION 113
in other words, that its content should be modeled by the set of all possible worldsis
to think that its truth-conditions will be satised provided only that the world is not
incoherent. And to see two representations as having the same truth-conditionsto
think, in other words, that their contents should be modeled by the same set of possible
worldsis to think that a scenario satisfying one set of truth-conditions but not the other
would be incoherent.
In this section I will articulate a regimentation of our folk-psychological account of
behavior, and argue that the contents that are required by the theory can be fruitfully
modeled as sets of possible worlds.
The Fundamental Principle
This is the fundamental principle of folk-psychological accounts of behavior:
Fundamental Principle
The intentional behavior of a rational subject is precisely the behavior that
would constitute the most sensible way of bringing about satisfaction of the
subjects desires in a world satisfying the subjects beliefs.
The reason the Fundamental Principle is so useful is that it allows one to make predictions
about the subjects behavior without knowing anything about the physical mechanisms
that are actually responsible for the behavior in question. It transforms a problem
about the output of a largely intractable neural system into a problem about the sorts
of behaviors that would count as sensible for the attainment of a given aim in a given
situation. And this is an eminently tractable problem for an ordinary human. (An
imperfect but eective strategy is for the theorist to ask herself what she would do to
satisfy the relevant aim in the relevant situation.)
Notice, moreover, that the Fundamental Principle is not just a mechanism for pre-
diction, given an assignment of beliefs and desires. It also supplies the basic method for
forming hypotheses about a subjects beliefs and desires. The theorist can proceed by
determining which combination of beliefs and desires would make it the case that the sub-
jects past behavior is, by and large, the most sensible way of bringing about satisfaction
of those desires in a world satisfying those beliefs, and go on to use (sensibly updated
versions of) those beliefs and those desires to make predictions, via the Fundamental
Principle, about the subjects future behavior.
Coarse-Grained Content
As far as the Fundamental Principle is concerned, the most natural way of modeling the
contents of beliefs and desires is by using sets of possible worlds. To see this, reect on
the work that the Fundamental Principle demands of such contents. Their one and only
job is to ll in the blanks in the following counterfactual question:
If it were the case that . . . , what would be the most sensible way of bringing
it about that . . . ?
And the only useful way of lling either of these blanks is by writing in a specication of
a way for the world to be. Since sets of metaphysically possible worlds are well-suited to
model ways for the world to be, they are also well-suited to supply such a specication.
(If W is a set of worlds, one can ll in the blanks with one of the possibilities in W was
actualized.)
Notice, moreover, that it wouldnt be helpful to consider worlds that the theorist
takes to be metaphysically impossible. For a scenario that the theorist regards as meta-
physically impossible is a scenario she regards as incoherent, and it is hard to know how
to assess counterfactual questions involving scenarios one regards as incoherent. Nor
would it be helpful to add structure to the contents of beliefs and desires. For even if
the additional structure were to somehow encode valuable information about how the
subject represents the world, it is not information that the Fundamental Principle is able
to use.
Beyond the Fundamental Principle
The Fundamental Principle can be supplemented in various ways to produce a more
powerful folk-psychological account of behavior. Here are some representative examples:
1. Rationality and Action
One could try to place independent constraints on the range of application of the
Fundamental Principle by saying something substantial about the circumstances
under which the subject should be counted as rational, and about which of her
behaviors should be counted as intentional. (One could say, for example, that
the subject gets angry under such-and-such circumstances, and that she should be
counted as irrational whenever she is angry. And one could say that the subject
is asleep under such-and-such circumstances and that whenever she is asleep her
behavior fails to be intentional.)
2. Observation
One could add an account of how the subjects observations impact her beliefs. In
the simplest case, the account is just this:
By and large, a rational subject comes to believe that p whenever she
observes that p.
(This principle can be used to help one decide what beliefs to ascribe to the subject,
given information about her observational situation. But it can also help one decide
what to say about the content of a subjects observations on the basis of independent
information about what she came to believe after being in the relevant observational
situation.)
3. Language
One could add an account of the connection between the subjects linguistic inter-
actions and the subjects beliefs. In the simplest case, the account is just this:
Truthfulness
By and large, a rational subject believes that p whenever she makes an
assertion which communicates that p.
Trust
By and large, a rational subject comes to believe that p whenever someone
she trusts makes an assertion which communicates that p.
(As usual, these principles can be used to help one decide what beliefs to ascribe
to the subject, given independent information about what was communicated by
various assertions. But they can also help one decide what correctness-conditions
to associate with assertionsand, indirectly, to decide what meanings to associate
with sentencesgiven independent information about the subjects beliefs. For
details, see Lewis (1973) and Lewis (1974).)
4. Belief Kinematics
One could add an account of how the subject would update her beliefs upon learning
that p. In the simplest case, the account is just this:
By and large, a rational subject updates her beliefs in the most sensible
way possible.
(An imperfect but eective way of implementing this principle is for the theorist
to ask herself how she would update her beliefs if she had the same beliefs as the
subject and learned that p.)
5. Probabilities
Instead of formulating the Fundamental Principle in terms of belief simpliciter and
desire simpliciter, one could formulated it by using a probability function to play
the role of belief and a value-function to play the role of desire:
Fundamental Principle (probabilistic version)
The intentional behavior of a rational subject is precisely the behavior
that would maximize expected utility (where expected utility is dened
on the basis of the subjects credences and the subjects value-function).
(If one goes probabilistic, the principles in 24 above will have to be updated
accordingly. In the case of Belief Kinematics, it would be natural to do so by
stating that, by and large, the subject updates by conditionalization.)
Coarse-Grained Content Revisited
Renements such as the ones described above are all compatible with modeling contents
as sets of metaphysically possible worlds. But once one moves to the probabilistic version
of the Fundamental Principle there is also room for working with a more ne-grained
notion of content, since one need not think of the subjects credences and value function
as dened over the space of metaphysically possible worlds. One could, for instance, use
a space of worlds each of which consists of a set of sentences from the subjects (public
or mental) language. (A set of sentences might be counted as a world just in case the
subject is not able to not rule out a priori that every sentence in the set is true, and if
no proper superset of the set has that property.)
Switching to a ner-grained notion of content would come at a cost. The rst thing
to note is that one would be be committed to elucidating the new notion. It is true
that notion of metaphysical possibility is somewhat rough around the edges. But I hope
to have shown in chapters 1 and 2 that it is constrained by its connection with the
notions of identity and why-closure, and therefore by its role in our scientic practice. So
understood, it seems to me that the notion of metaphysical possibility is robust enough
to do the job that would be demanded of it by a coarse-grained development of our
folk-psychology. But when it comes to notions of ne-grained content, we may well be
on shakier ground.
To see what I have in mind, consider the proposal I mentioned above: a world, in the
ne-grained sense, is a set of sentences in the subjects language which is such that the
subject is not able to rule out a priori that every sentence in the set is true. Any sentence
can be made true by altering its meaning, so in order for this proposal to be interesting
one has to assume that the meanings of the sentences in question remain xed. And
not any notion of meaning will do. If, for example, one were to take the meaning of a
name to be its referent, xing the meaning of Hesperus is Phosphorus would be enough
to guarantee its truth. So by xing meanings one would x more than is knowable a
priori. What one is needs in order to get the right results is a notion of meaning such
that mastery of a language is enough to know the meanings of its sentences. What one
needs, in other words, is a notion like Fregean sense or primary intension. I myself am
pessimistic about the prospects of articulating a characterization of such notions in a way
that would be robust enough for the needs of a well-regimented folk-psychology. But you
dont have to share my pessimism to agree that by moving towards ne-grained contents
one acquires an explanatory burden, and that it is not obvious that addressing such a
burden would be straightforward.
It is also worth noting that we are stuck with coarse-grained content regardless of
whether we also bring in a ner-grained notion of content. As it is understood here, the
aim of folk-psychology is to predict behavior. And we want the theory to issue predictions
of the following form:
Under such-and-such circumstances, the subject will behave in ways that
cause it to come about that thus-and-such.
[Example: After a snow-storm, the subject will behave in ways that cause it
to come about that her sidewalk gets cleared.]
In order for predictions of this kind to be useful to the theorist, it had better be the
case that the blanks are lled with statements that the theorist regards as de mundo
intelligible. Consider what would happen if ones folk-psychology delivered the following:
While eating a big meal, the subject will behave in ways that cause it to come
about that she is in the proximity of a glass containing water but no H
2
O.
To be lled with water just is to be lled with H
2
O. So the best the theorist could do
with such a predictionif it is to be taken at face valueis conclude that the subject
wont be eating a big meal.
The alternative is to work on the assumption that the prediction should not be taken
at face value. Perhaps what it really means is something like:
While eating a big meal, the subject will behave in ways that cause it to come
about that she is in the proximity of a glass containing a watery substance
but no H
2
O.
This is certainly a useful prediction, but notice that the point at which it became useful
was precisely the point at which we were able substitute a de mundo intelligible statement
for the original de mundo unintelligible statement: that there be a glass containing a
watery substance but no H
2
O.
More generally, the situation is this. Whether or not ones folk-psychology uses ne-
grained contents to come up with predictions, the predictions themselves must be stated
in terms of counterfactuals that the theorist is able to assess. And since the scenarios
that are counted by the theorist as de mundo intelligible are precisely the scenarios she
regards as metaphysically possible, this means that the theory must issue predictions in
coarse-grained terms. It must, in eect, specify a coarse-grained content (e.g. the set of
worlds whereby the subject is in the proximity of a glass containing a watery substance
but no H
2
O) and claim that under particular circumstancesalso specied in coarse-
grained termsthe subject will behave in ways that cause it to come about that that
content is satised.
There is, in other words, no escaping coarse-grained content. If one goes in for
ne-grained contents one is acquiring an additional commitment, not substituting one
commitment for another.
5.3 Belief-Attributions
An Obvious Problem?
Someone might believe that water is H
2
O, and fail to believe that
81 = 9. And yet
water is H
2
O and
81 = 9 have the same coarse-grained content, since they are both

necessarily true.
It is tempting to conclude from this that it would be obviously wrong to model
the content of a subjects belief state in coarse-grained terms. But that would be a
mistake. The belief-ascriptions in question only pose an obvious problem for coarse-
grained accounts of content in the presence of further assumptionsassumptions that a
friend of coarse-grainedness has independent reasons to reject.
Here is an example of an assumption that would lead to trouble:
The Fregean Assumption
What it takes for a belief-attribution of the form S believes that to be true
is for for the subject to have a belief whose content is the content expressed
by .
When conjoined with a coarse-grained account of belief, the Fregean Assumption allows
one to go from the uncontroversial observation that water is H
2
O and
81 = 9 have
5.3. BELIEF-ATTRIBUTIONS 121
the same coarse-grained content, to the disastrous conclusion that S believes that water
is H
2
O is equivalent to S believes that
81 = 9.
Fortunately, there are independent reasons for rejecting the Fregean Assumption.
Consider the question of what one learns about a subject when one is told that she
believes that water is H
2
O. What one learns is not that in order for the world to be as
the subjects belief-state represents it to be, it must be the case that things composed
of water (i.e. things composed of H
2
O) are composed of H
2
O. One knew that already.
(Trivially, any way for the world to be is such that things composed of H
2
O are composed
of H
2
O.) In a typical context, what one learns is something along the the lines of in
order for the world to be as the subjects belief-state represents it to be, it must be
the case that certain watery things are composed of H
2
O (though one should expect
the details to be highly sensitive to the particularities of the context.) Socontra the
Fregean Assumptionone should refrain from identifying the content of the sentence
embedded in a belief-attribution and what the belief-attribution teaches us about the
subjects belief-state.
The Plan
Say that a belief-attributoin of the form S believes that is pleaonastic if is non-
contingent. I have argued against the claim that pleonastic belief-attributions pose an
immediate problem for coarse-grained accounts of belief. But that doesnt mean that
pleonastic belief-attributions wont lead to trouble. A pleonastic belief-attribution such
as S believes that H
2
O, or S believes that
81 = 9, can be used to report signicant

cognitive accomplishments on the part of the subject. So a coarse-grained theory of belief
had better have a story to tell about how such accomplishments are to be modeled. The
chief burden of the present chapter is to outline such a story.
It is important to be clear that explaining how to model the cognitive accomplishments
that get reported by marketplace belief-ascriptions is not the same as giving a semantics
for marketplace belief-ascriptions. The project of understanding how expressions of the
form S believes that work in natural language is an interesting one. But it is a project
in philosophical linguistics, and our present focus is on developing a folk-psychological
account of behavior. Marketplace belief-attributions have played a role in our discussion.
But only because they supply information about a subjects cognitive state that can
be put to use by folk-psychology, and we want to make sure that our regimented folk-
psychology is able to accommodate the relevant information. There is no reason to
think that anything like marketplace belief-reports will gure in a well-regimented folk-
psychology. (Notice, in particular, that they are not required for successful application
of the Fundamental Principle. Application of the principle requires nothing beyond the
ascription of a content to the subjects belief-state and the ascription of a content to
the subjects desire-state. In the original version of the Fundamental Principle, each of
these contents can be modeled by a set of possible-worlds; in the probabilistic version
the content of the subjects belief-state can be modeled by a probability assignment, and
the content of the subjects desire-sate can be modeled by a value-function.)
Easy Cases and Hard Cases
I noted earlier that when one is told that a subject believes that water is H
2
O what
one learns is not that the subject represents the world as satisfying a trivial condition
(i.e. the condition that things composed of water be composed of water). What one learns
is that the subject represents the world as satisfying a certain non-trivial condition (as
it might be: the condition that certain watery things be composed of H
2
O). The result
is that, even though S believes that water is H
2
O is a pleonastic belief-attribution,
a coarse-grained account of belief would have no trouble accommodating the cognitive
accomplishment that is being reported. When coarse-grained contents are taken to be
sets of possible worlds, this can be done by ensuring that every possible world in the
content of the subjects belief-state is a world in which, as it might be, certain watery
things are composed of H
2
O.
This example is representative of a large range of cases in which what one learns
about the subjects belief-state on the basis of a pleonastic belief-attribution is simply
that the subject represents the world as satisfying a certain non-trivial condition which
is not expressed by the sentence embedded in the belief-attribution. It may not always
be easy to determine exactly which non-trivial condition is to be associated with a given
belief-attribution. But that is not something we need to worry about for present purposes
because marketplace belief-attributions are not part of our regimented folk-psychology.
What matters for present purposes is whether the sorts of cognitive accomplishments
that get reported by marketplace belief-attributions can be modeled in coarse grained
terms. And, as the example of a subjects believing that water and H
2
O illustrates,
coarse-grained contents are eminently well-suited for the job when the cognitive accom-
plishment in question consists simply of coming to represent the world as satisfying a
certain non-trivial condition. Unfortunately, not every pleonastic belief-attribution is as
straightforward as that. Consider, for example, S believes that
81 = 9. What sort of
cognitive accomplishment might such a belief-attribution be used to report?
To make things interesting, I shall assume that one is a mathematical trivialist, in
the sense of chapter 4. Accordingly, any way for the world to be is, trivially, such that
81 = 9. So one wouldnt learn anything interesting about the subject if one learned
that in order for the world to be as the subject represents it to be, it must satisfy the
condition of being such that
81 = 9. (If you are not a mathematical trivialist, please

use a logical truth in place of
81 = 9.)
What makes this case dicult is thatunlike S believes that water is H
2
Oit is not
clear than one could nd a non-trivial condition which, while not expressed by
81 = 9,
could be used to capture the sort of cognitive accomplishment the gets reported by S
believes that
81 = 9.
The sentence
81 = 9 expresses a truth expresses a contingent truth, since
81 =
9 would not have expressed a truth had its constituent terms had dierent meanings.
So one might be tempted to think that the cognitive accomplishment that gets reported
by S believes that
81 = 9 consists, at lest in part, of coming to represent the world

as satisfying the (non-trivial) condition of being such that
81 = 9 expresses a truth.
But it turns out that not even semantic ascent will do in a case like this. As stressed
in Field (1986), one will run into trouble whenever the subject is assumed to know
that the relevant mathematical axioms are true. For any world in which a suitable
axiomatization of arithmetic is true is also a world
81 = 9 expresses a truth. So one

would be left with the unpalatable conclusion that anyone who knows that the axioms
are true should thereby enjoy the cognitive accomplishment that gets reported by S
believes that
81 = 9.
It is hard cases like these that pose a real challenge to coarse-grained accounts of
belief.
Fine-Grained Content to the Rescue?
It is tempting to think that the problems would disappear if only we brought in ne-
grained contents. That would be a mistake. Bringing in ne-grained contents would only
postpone the problem. Worse: it might give the illusion of progress where there is none.
The aim, recall, is to model cognitive accomplishments of the sort that get reported by
belief-attributions like S believes that
81 = 9. And not any model will do. We want a

model that will allow us to issue predictions about the subjects behavior. How would one
proceed if one availed oneself of ner-grained contents? Suppose, for example, that one
were to claim that what one learns from the belief-attribution is that a Mentalese analogue
of the English sentence
81 = 9 is stored in the subjects belief box. (Equivalently:

one learns that every ne-grained world compatible with the objects beliefs contains
the Mentalese analogue of
81 = 9.) So far so good. But now what? How is the

theorist to use this information in issuing predictions about the subjects behavior?
One idea is to emulate the Fundamental Principle. The theory could issue predictions
by claiming that the subjects actions will constitute the most sensible way of bringing
it about that the sentences in the subjects desire box are veried in a world in which
the sentences in the subjects belief box are veried. But then we are back to where
we started. Any way for the world to be is, trivially, such as to verify
81 = 9 (or its
Mentalese analogue). So learning that the Mentalese analogue of
81 = 9 is stored in
the subjects belief box has absolutely no eect on the predictive power of the theory.
We have not yet managed to come up with a good model of the cognitive accomplishments
that get reported by belief-attributions like S believes that
81 = 9.
Another idea is to link information about the contents of the subjects belief box
to predictions about the subjects behavior by doing cognitive science rather than folk-
psychology. I have never seen a proposal of this kind developed in enough detail to allow
for adequate assessment. But it is important to be clear that by appealing to cognitive
science, proponents of ne-grained content would be changing the subject. It can be
agreed on all sides that a fully developed cognitive science would supply a much better
model of cognitive accomplishmentand much better behavioral predictionsthan our
best folk-psychology. But the point of the present exercise is not to develop the best
possible theory of cognitive accomplishment, or the best possible account of behavior.
It is to develop a well-regimented folk-psychology, and use it to shed light on some of
the intentional notions that are of interest to philosophers. What matters for present
purposes is whether ne-grained contents have a role to play in folk-psychology, not
whether they have a role to play in cognitive science.
There may well be a way developing a bridge-theory that links information about
the ne-grained contents of a subjects mental states to predictions about the subjects
behavior, and does so in a way that is broadly in keeping with folk-psychology. Perhaps
one could start with the claim that the subject will be disposed to assent to whenever
a Mentalese analogue of is in her belief-box. But then what?
In the absence of a minimally developed theory, it would be hasty to suggest that
wheeling in ne-grained content delivers an account of cognitive accomplishment in math-
ematics of the kind we are after. Even if an appeal to ne-grained contents does ultimately
set the stage for a theory of cognitive accomplishment, the real work wont get done until
the theory itself is developed.
In what follows I will argue that the most perspicuous way of developing the missing
theory makes no use of ne-grained contents.
5.4 Cognitive Accomplishment in Logic and Mathe-
matics
The Desiderata
Consider a subject who knows that
81 = 9. How might this knowledge be manifested

in behavior? Here are some examples:
1. Assent
The subject is able to give a correct answer to the question Is it the case that
81 = 9? (or to some analogue of this question in a language she understands).

2. Deduction
The subject is able to perform certain kinds of deductions. For instance, she might
be able to derive
81 is divisible by 3 from 9 is divisible by 3.

3. Application
The subject is able to use information about the natural world that was acquired
under one set of circumstances for the purposes of tasks that take place under
very dierent sets of circumstances. For instance, upon discovering that it takes
81 one-square-meter tiles to cover a plot of land which is known to be perfectly
5.4. COGNITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT IN LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS 127
square-shaped, the subject might acquire the ability to predict how many meters
of fencing would be needed to build a perimiter.
Each of abilities can be usefully modeled as an information-transfer ability. Let us begin
with Assent. Suppose that the subject has known all along that the Dedekind Axioms
are true, and that she comes to see that
81 = 9 is true by deriving it from the axioms.

It is then true to begin with that the subject possesses a certain piece of informationthe
information that arithmetical vocabulary is used in such a way that the axioms turn out
to be trueand is in a position to deploy this information for the purposes of a certain
range of tasks; for instance: answering the question Are the axioms true?. But, on
reasonable assumptions, any world in which arithmetical vocabulary is used in such a
way that the axioms are true is also a world in which arithmetical vocabulary is used in
such a way that
81 = 9 is true. So the information that the subject possess is to begin

with includes the information that
81 = 9 is true. And yet she is unable to deploy this

information for the purposes of answering the question Is it the case that
81 = 9?.
What happens after she performs the relevant deduction is that she acquires the ability
to deploy this informationinformation she already possessedin the service of new
tasks; in particular: the task of answering the question Is it the case that
81 = 9?. So
her cognitive accomplishment can be construed, at least in part, as the acquisition of an
information-transfer ability: she has broadened the range of tasks with respect to which
she is able to deploy the information that arithmetical vocabulary is used in such a way
that the axioms turn out to be true.
Next consider Deduction. How might one model the fact that a subject who learns
that
81 = 9 acquires the ability to derive
81 is divisible by 3 from 9 is divisible by

3 ? Consider a subject who knows that the axioms are true, and is able to deploy this
information not only for the purposes of answering the question are the axioms true?,
but also for the purposes of answering the question Is 9 divisible by 3?. Part of what
happens when she learns that
81 = 9 is that she is able to extend the range of tasks

with respect to which she is able to deploy this information even further. She is now able
to deploy it for the purposes of answering the question Is
81 divisible by 3.
Finally, consider Application. So far we have focused on the deployment of linguistic
informationinformation to the eect that arithmetical vocabulary is used in such a way
that the axioms turn out to be truein the service of an essentially linguistic task: the
task of answering a linguistically-posed question. But when we describe a subject as
knowing that
81 = 9 we sometimes expect this knowledge to be manifested in her

non-linguistic behavior as well. Recall our farmer and her square piece of land. She
knows that it takes 81 one-square-meter tiles to cover her land. She therefore possesses
the information that the land is 81m
2
in area, and is able to deploy it for the purposes
of tiling. Assume, for simplicity, that we may ignore worlds in which the land is not
at, or in which the geometry is not Euclidean. Then for a square piece of land to be
81m
2
in area just is for each of its sides to be 9m in length. So there is no dierence
between possessing the information that the land is 81m
2
in area and possessing the
information that each of its sides is 9m in length. But the subject might nonetheless
lack the ability to deploy such information for the purposes of, say, buying just the right
amount of fence to build a perimeter. By doing mathematics, however, she can acquire
an information-transfer ability: the ability to deploy informationinformation that was
previously available only for the purposes of tilingin the service of new tasks, such as
perimeter-building. This is a cognitive accomplishment that might be reported by saying
of the subject that she knows that
81 = 9.
Fragmentation
A subjects cognitive system is modeled as fragmented when the theorists attributions
of content to the subjects mental states are relativized to tasks that the subject might
be engaged in.
Suppose, for example, that our farmer is confused about the size of her land. When it
comes to the project of going to the store to buy tiles for covering her land, she behaves
as if she believed that her land has an area of 81m
2
(i.e. a side-length of 9m). As it might
be: she loads her truck with 81 one-square-meter tiles. But when it comes to the project
of going to the store to buy fencing to build a perimeter around her land, she behaves as
if she believed that that her land has a side-length of 10m (i.e. an area of 100m
2
). As it
might be: she loads her truck with 40m of fencing.
Such a subject can be usefully described as fragmented. We can say that relative to
the task of buying tiles the subjects-belief state represents the land as being 81m
2
in
area, and relative to the task of buying fencing the subjects belief-state represents the
land as being 100m
2
in area. Predictions about the subjects behavior can then be made
on the basis of a suitably modied version of the Fundamental Principle:
Fundamental Principle (relativized version)
When a rational subject is engaged in task , her intentional behavior is
precisely the behavior that would constitute the most sensible way of bringing
about satisfaction of the subjects desires-relative-to- in a world satisfying
the subjects beliefs-relative-to-.
An advantage of describing a subject as fragmented is that it gives us an attractive way
of modeling her information-transfer abilities. One can model an information-transfer
ability as the instantiation of a relation of accessibility amongst dierent fragments within
the subjects cognitive state.
Suppose, for example, that our farmer learns that
81 = 9. Earlier I suggested
that a cognitive accomplishment of this kind might involve a family of information-
transfer abilities, and in particular the ability to deploy information that was previously
available only for the purposes of buying tiles, in the service of new tasks, such as buying
fencing. On a fragmentation model, this can be captured by saying that the fragment
corresponding to the task of buying tiles and the fragment corresponding to the task of
buying fencing have become accessible to each other.
When dierent fragments are accessible to each other, there is pressure for them to
become synchronized. In the case of the farmer who is confused about the size of her
land, synchronizing the dierent fragments will require resolving an internal tension. By
learning that
81 = 9 she gains access to the fact that she has been proceeding on
dierent assumptions relative to dierent purposes. The tension will be resolved if she
updates the beliefs corresponding to one of the fragments so as to make them consistent
with the beliefs corresponding to the other. But she may or may not be able to resolve
it, since she may not be sure which fragment to revise.
In other cases, however, synchronization need not consist in the resolution of an
internal tension. Consider a farmer who is able to deploy the information that her piece
of land is 81m
2
in area for the purposes of buying tiles, but not for the purposes of buying
fencing: if she were to be faced with the project of building a perimeter around her land,
she would simply have no idea how much fencing to buy. When the farmer learns that
81 = 9, the fragment corresponding to the task of tile-purchase and the fragment

corresponding to the task of fencing-purchase become accessible to each other, and there
is therefore pressure for them to become synchronized. But in this case synchronization
is easy: it is a matter of having the better-informed fragment update its less-informed
counterpart. In the case at hand, the fragment corresponding to fencing purchases is
updated in accordance with the content of the fragment corresponding to tile purchases.
So the model will predictvia the updated version of the Fundamental Principlethat
as a result of learning that
81 = 9, the farmer acquires the ability to deploy the

information that her piece of land is 81m
2
in area for the purposes of fencing-purchase.
Let me explain in more general terms how a fragmented cognitive system might be
modeled. (Here I am especially indebted to Elga.) A fragmented belief-state is modeled
as an ordered-triple T, f, ). T is a domain of tasks that the subject might be engaged
in; f is a function that maps each task in T to a content (in the simplest case the content
is a set of possible worlds, but a probabilistic version of the proposal might take a belief
state to be a probability distribution over the space of possible worlds); and is an
reective and symmetric accessibility relation dened over elements of T. (A fragmented
desire-state is to be modeled analogously.)
The assignment of a particular triple T, f, ) is used to issue predictions about a
subject via the relativized version of the Fundamental Principle, and is constrained by
(suitably relativized versions of) folk-psychological principles such as those described in
section 5.2. But there is an important addition to the list:
Synchronization
By and large, the contents assigned to mutually accessible members of T will
tend to become synchronized over time, and become synchronized in the most
sensible way possible. (If, however, there is no salient way of resolving a con-
ict between mutually accessible members of T, the corresponding contents
will tend to remain unsynchronized.)
This principle can be used to make predictions about the subjects future behavior, via
the Fundamental Principle. But it also supplies the basic method for forming hypothe-
ses about which of the subjects fragments are mutually accessible, since the theorist
can select present accessibility relations by determining which assignments of mutual
accessibility are good ways of making sense of the subjects past behavior.
T should also be chosen on the basis of considerations of theoretical fruitfulness. In
particular, it should chosen so as to supply a happy medium between recognizing too
many tasks to allow for systematic theorizing and recognizing too few tasks to do
justice to the subjects behavior.
Modes of Presentation
The proposal I have been defending is certainly not incompatible with a ne-grained
account of content. In fact, it could be redescribed in terms of modes of presentation.
Rather than saying that the subject believes a certain coarse-grained content for the
purposes of a given task, one could say that the subject believes that content under a
mode of presentation that corresponds to the task in question. So one could emulate
the present proposal in a ne-grained setting by thinking of ne-grained contents as pairs
consisting of a coarse-grained content and a mode of presentation.
The problem with talk of modes of presentation is that one runs the risk of thinking
that progress has been made when in fact there is none. In order for the notion of a
mode of presentation to do any real work one needs to know how the various modes of
presentation are supposed to dier, and how dierences in mode of presentation are meant
to result in dierent predictions about the subjects behavior. On the proposal I have been
defending, these two issues are explicitly addressed. (Dierent modes of presentation
correspond to dierent tasks in the service of which the subject might deploy a certain
piece of information, and the predictive upshot of a mode of presentation is given by
the relativized version of the Fundamental Principle.) In the absence of a theory of this
kind, however, the notion of a mode of presentation is nothing more than a label. One
has supplied a place-holder for a theory of cognitive accomplishment, but no meaningful
progress has been made when it comes to developing the theory itself.
Back to Logic and Mathematics
I have been arguing that folk-psychology can accommodate cognitive accomplishment in
logic and mathematics by: (1) taking the subject to have a fragmented belief-state, and
(2) modeling logical and mathematical feats as instantiations of the accessibility relation
amongst previously unrelated fragments of her cognitive system.
It is nonetheless tempting to think that there must be more to knowing that
81 = 9
than having a given range of information-transfer abilities. I have come to understand a
mathematical fact!, one sometimes hears it said. Perhaps there is an important insight
behind such intuitionssomething that will be captured by tomorrows cognitive science.
But that is not something that needs to be decided for present purposes. Our aim is to
develop a well-regimented folk-psychology. So all that is required for present purposes
is that the fragmentation model be enough to deliver the sorts of behavioral predictions
one expects from folk-psychology. And, as far as I can tell, ascribing the subject a
suitable family of information-processing abilities is enough to deliver the right behavioral
predictions.
It is no part of the present proposal that every assertion of S believes that
81 =
9 reports a cognitive achievement that correspond to the same range of information-
transfer abilities. Belief-ascriptions of this kind should be thought of as reporting dierent
cognitive achievements in dierent contexts. When one describes a linguistically-deprived
farmer by saying S believes that
81 = 9 one may be ascribing her the ability to use

the information that it takes 81 one-square-meter tiles to cover a square piece of land
to buy the right amount of fencing, and not the ability to use the information that the
Dedekind Axioms are true to answer the question Is
81 = 9 true?. But the very

same belief-report might be used to describe the cognitive accomplishments of a student
of arithmetic who has learned to derive
81 = 9 from the axioms but knows nothing

about applied arithmetic.
If is a truth of pure mathematics devoid of application, the cognitive accomplish-
ment reported by belief ascriptions of the form S believes that will usually get
modeled as a feat of information-transfer amongst fragments corresponding to linguistic
tasks. This is appropriate because knowledge of application-free mathematics is normally
only manifested in the subjects linguistic behavior. So the only predictions one should
expect ones folk-psychology to deliver on the basis of the relevant cognitive accomplish-
ments concern the subjects linguistic behavior.
In the simplest case, the cognitive accomplishment reported by S believes that
can be modeled in two steps. First, we capture the fact that the subject takes to be
true by updating the fragment corresponding to the task of answering the question Is
true? so that the world is represented as being such that is true. When the subject
comes to believe that is true as a result of deriving it from the axioms, this can be
done by letting the fragment corresponding to the task of answering the question Is
true? become accessible to the the fragment corresponding to the task of answering the
question Are the axioms true?.
Second, we capture the fact that the subject is in a position to make inferences on
the basis of . This can be done by:
A. Identifying a family of pairs of sentences , ) such that: (i) is an easy conse-
quence of and , and (ii) the subject takes to be true; and
B. letting the fragment that corresponds to the task of answering the question Is
true? become accessible to the fragments that correspond to the tasks of answering
the question Is true? and answering the question Is true?.
When the theorists cognitive system is not too dierent from the subjects, the theorist
can count an inference as easy for the subject just in case she would nd it easy herself.
(A more sophisticated version of the theory would take a stand on how smart the subject
is, and model talented mathematicians as having more distant deductive horizons than
their less talented counterparts.) In the general case, however, the problem of deciding
when to count an inference as easy is highly non-trivial. If the theorists cognitive
system is suciently dierent from the subjects, then the fact that the theorist regards
an inference as easy supplies no real grounds for thinking that the subject should be
modeled as treating the inference as easy.
When we use folk psychology in ordinary life, our subjects are usually fellow humans,
and they are often members of our own community. So the dicult cases are less likely
to come up. This obscures the fact that the problem of determining which inferences to
count as easy is non-trivial. But when it comes to subjects with alien cognitive systems,
we may well be in uncharted waters. Ordinary folk-psychology may not supply much
guidance about how to solve the problem in such cases.
Independent Motivation
The postulation of fragmented belief-states is not an ad hoc maneuver. It can be moti-
vated independently of the project of giving a coarse-grained account of belief.
It should be agreed on all sides that a subject might possess information that she is
able to deploy in the service of some tasks but not others. Consider, for example, the
expert gymnast, who is able to perform a perfect back salto but is unable to explain how
she does it. The gymnast possesses a piece of informationinformation to the eect that
such-and-such bodily movements are required to deliver a back saltothat she is able to
deploy for certain practical purposes (i.e. the task of performing a back salto) but not
for theoretical purposes (e.g. the task of explaining how to perform a back salto). Such
dierential access to information is naturally accounted for on a fragmented model.
It should also be agreed on all sides that a subjects beliefs can be incoherent. I once
saw my friend Pedro eating an enormous breakfast while reporting that he never eats
big breakfasts. He suddenly realized the inconsistency, and we both laughed. Incoherent
belief states of this kind are naturally accounted for on a fragmented model. Before the
crucial realization, Pedro can be described by saying that for the purposes of articulating
a general description of his eating habits he represents the world as being such that his
breakfasts are always light, and for the purposes of reporting how much he is currently
eating he represents the world as being such that he is eating a very substantial break-
fast. Pedros realization can then be modeled by saying that the two fragments become
accessible to each other, and that the former is updated so as to represent the world
as being such that he has a light breakfast almost always. (For additional discussion,
see Lewis (1982).)
Moral: By modeling a cognitive system as fragmented one can give a unied treatment
of three phenomena that might have initially seemed unrelatedimperfectly accessible
information, incoherence and cognitive accomplishment in logic and mathematics.
5.5 Mary and the Tomato
In fact, there is a fourth kind of phenomenon that can be accounted for by appeal to
fragmentation. Here is Frank Jacksons Knowledge Argument:
Mary is conned to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-
white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In
this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of
the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment,
in a wide sense of physical that includes everything in completed physics,
chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal
and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional
roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose
otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact,
and that is just what physicalism denies. . . It seems, however, that Mary does
not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white
room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something
red, say. This is rightly described as learningshe will not say ho, hum.
Hence, physicalism is false. (Jackson (1986), p. 29.)
What the argument brings out is that physicalists face a challenge. They must somehow
accommodate the fact that it seems like Mary acquires information about the world
information she did not already havewhen she rst experiences the sensation of seeing
5.5. MARY AND THE TOMATO 137
red, even though physicalism appears to entail that she does not.
Suppose that, before her release, Mary is informed that she will be presented with
a red tomato at noon. Suppose, moreover, that physicalism is true, and, in particular,
that for a normal human to experience the sensation of seeing red just is for her to be
in brain-state R. Mary knows this. So any world compatible with what Mary knows is a
world in which her brain enters state R at noon. Accordingly, Marry possesses a certain
piece of informationthe information that her brain will be in state R at noonand is
able to deploy it for the purposes of certain tasks (for instance, the task of answering
the question Will your brain be in state R at noon?). She does not, however, have the
ability to deploy this information in the service of certain other tasks.
Suppose, for example, that before seeing the tomato Mary is shown a red ball, but is
not told the color of the ball. Any world in which Mary has a sensation with the same
kind of phenomenal character as the sensation she experiences when she sees the ball is
a world in which she is in brain-state R. So every world in which Mary is in brain-state
R at noon and has an experience with the relevant phenomenal character before noon is
a world in which Mary has two experiences with the same kind of phenomenal character.
It follows that two pieces of information that are already in Marys possessionthe
information that she will be in brain-state R at noon, and the information that, while
seeing the ball, she experiences a sensation with this phenomenal characterare enough
to determine that the experience of seeing the tomato at noon will have the same kind
of phenomenal character as the experience of seeing the ball. And yet Mary is unable to
deploy the information in her possession for the purposes of answering the question Is
this what it will be like to see the tomato? when she is still looking at the ball.
There is an attractive way of modeling Marys predicament in a fragmented system.
Whereas she is able to deploy the information that her brain will enter state R at noon
for the purposes of answering the question Will your brain be in state R at noon?
(or the question Will you see something red at noon), she is not able to deploy this
information for the purposes of answering the question Is this what it will be like to
see the tomato? while looking at the ball. What she lacks, in other words, is a certain
information-transfer ability.
When Mary is nally shown the tomato, she accomplishes in a cognitive feat. For she
is now able to to deploy the information that her brain enters state R at noon for the
purposes of answering the question Is this what it will be like to see the tomato? while
looking at the ball. This shouldnt be modeled as a feat of information acquisition, since
Mary had all the relevant information to begin with. It should be modeled by treating
some of the fragments in Marys cognitive system as accessible to one another.
Part II
Detours
139
Chapter 6
Deep Metaphysics
Deep Metaphysics is my label for the sort of metaphysics that makes non-metaphysicians
cringethe kind that outsiders see as relying on distinctions without a dierence, and
that the Logical Empiricists reacted against in the rst third of the Twentieth Century.
The aim of this chapter is to further articulate the notion of Deep Metaphysics, and say
something about how I think metaphysical debate ought to be constrained.
A number of classical debates in metaphysics can be thought of as revolving around
identity statements:
1. Mereology
Is it true, in general, that for the fusion of the Fs to exist just is for the Fs to exist?
2. Facts and Properties
Is it true, in general, that for the fact that to obtain just is for it to be the case
that .
Is it true, in general, that for an object to instantiate the property of running just
is for the object to run?
3. Philosophy of Mathematics
141
142 CHAPTER 6. DEEP METAPHYSICS
Is it true, in general, that for the number of the Fs to be n just is for there to be
n Fs?
4. Physicalism
Is it true, in general, that for such-and-such a mental state to obtain just is for a
certain brain-state to obtain?
5. Modality
Is it true, in general, that for there to be a possible world at which just is for it
to be the case that possibly ?
Is it true, in general, that for it to be the case that possibly just is for it to be
the case that it is de mundo intelligible that ?
6. Time
Is it true, in general, that for a time to be present just is for it to have a certain
relational property?
7. Causation
Is it true, in general, that for E to cause C just is for there to be a certain kind of
counterfactual relationship between E and C?
8. Personal Identity
Is it true, in general, that for x and y to be the same person just is for there to be
continuity of such-and-such a kind between x and y?
When one accepts an identity statement one closes a theoretical gap. So the more
identity statements one accepts when doing metaphysics, the less one will be burdened
by awkward metaphysical questions. Suppose, for example, that you answer yes to
question 3 on the list: you think it is it true, in general that for the number of the Fs to
143
be n just is for there to be n Fs. Then you should regard queries such as the following as
misguided: I can see that there are no dinosaurs. What I want to know is whether it is
also true that the number of the dinosaurs is Zero. I would like to understand, moreover,
how one could ever be justied in taking a stand on this issue, given that we have no
causal access to the purported realm of abstract objects. You should think that such
questions rest on a false presupposition. They fail to take on board the fact that for the
number of the dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs. (For an account
of mathematics along these lines, see chapter 4.)
Conversely, when one rejects an identity statement one opens a theoretical gap. Sup-
pose, for example, that one answers no to question 6: one rejects the idea that for a
time to be present just is for it to have a certain relational property. One is thereby left
with a theoretical gap that would have otherwise been avoided: that of explaining what
it takes for a time to be present simpliciter (as opposed to present relative to some time
or other). One might address the gap by saying something like to be present simpliciter
is to be at the edge of objective becoming (a piece of Deep Metaphysics, if you ask me).
By thinking of metaphysics as concerned, in part, with identity statements one can
shed light on the question of how metaphysical debate ought to be constrainedhow one
should go about deciding which of two metaphysical positions is correct.
As noted in section 1.6, the truth-conditions of an identity statement are always either
trivial or impossible. And, of course, there is never any disagreement about whether
the world satises either of these conditions. What goes on when there is controversy
surrounding an identity-statement is, rather, that ones views about whether the identity-
statement should be taken to express the trivial truth-conditions or the impossible truth-
conditions can be tied up with issues such as the following:
1. Empirical questions not expressed by the identity statement.
[Does a single planet play both the morning-star and evening star roles? Is there
is such a thing as caloric uid?]
2. Dierences in the lines of research that are regarded as fruitful.
[Would it be fruitful to engage in the project of accounting for heat-related phe-
nomena by postulating a new substance?]
3. Disagreements about which way of using language is most convenient for the pur-
poses at hand.
[Is it easier to express interesting zoological claims by using elephant to mean
member of thus-and-such a lineage or has the sort of genetic material that could
be combined with that of such-and-such individuals to produce fertile ospring ?]
4. Disagreement about which properties are endowed with metaphysical privilege.
[Does the property of having thus-and-such a lineage enjoy greater metaphysical
privilegeand therefore greater eligibility as a referent for the word elephant
than other candidate properties?]
In the special case of identity-statements pertaining to metaphysics, the rst of these
four sources of disagreementdisagreement about empirical matters not expressed by
the identity statementcan be expected to play a fairly limited role. (It isnt wholly
absent, though: Einsteins Theory of Special Relativity, for instance, could be relevant
to assessing item 6 on our list.)
Attention to the fourth source of disagreementdisagreement about which properties
are endowed with metaphysical privilegehas, on the other hand, played a substantial
role in contemporary metaphysical debate. It seems to me that this is an unfortunate
turn of events. By wheeling in metaphysical privilege, one certainly makes room for
the view that debates that might have appeared to be merely terminological turn out
to concern substantial matters. By claiming, for instance, that a debate about what a
species consists in is ultimately a debate about which of a range of candidate-properties
145
enjoys greater metaphysical privilege, one certainly succeeds in identifying a subject-
matter for ones debate. But the underlying issue remains hopelessly obscure. It is bit
like saying: the reason the debate about which outts are objectively fashionable
not just fashionable relative to the tastes of some community or otheris not merely
terminological is that certain outts are metaphysically privileged: they carve the world
at the joints. Be a fashion objectivist if you must, but dont pretend that talk of
metaphysical privilege makes your view any less obscure. As far as I can tell, the notion
of metaphysical privilege is nothing but Deep Metaphysics. (For further discussion of the
notion of metaphysical privilege, see section 1.6.2.)
When it comes to identity-statements pertaining to metaphysics, it seems to me that
the proper way of tackling the debate is by focusing on the second of the four sources
of disagreement mentioned above: disagreement about the lines of research that are
regarded as fruitful. Consider item 4 from our list as an example. Suppose we are
considering whether to accept the identity statement to experience the sensation of
seeing red just is to be in a certain brain state. What sorts of considerations might be
used to advance the issue in an interesting way?
The Knowledge Argument immediately suggests itself. (See Jackson (1982) and Jack-
son (1986); for a review of more recent literature, see Byrne (2006).)
Mary is conned to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-
white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In
this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of
the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment,
in a wide sense of physical that includes everything in completed physics,
chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal
and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional
roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose
otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact,
and that is just what physicalism denies. . . It seems, however, that Mary does
not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white
room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something
red, say. This is rightly described as learningshe will not say ho, hum.
Hence, physicalism is false. (Jackson (1986), p. 29.)
What Jacksons argument brings out is that physicalists face a challenge. They must
somehow accommodate the fact that it seems like Mary acquires information about the
worldinformation she did not already havewhen she rst experiences the sensation
of seeing red, even though physicalism appears to entail that she does not. My own
view is that the challenge can be met. (See chapter 5.5.) But someone who thinks that
the challenge cannot be met might see the argument as motivating the introduction of
possibilities that a physicalist would regard as unintelligible. According to the physicalist,
to experience the sensation of seeing red just is to be in a certain brain state. So it
makes no sense to consider a scenario in which someone is in the brain state but lacks the
sensation. If, however, one were to give up physicalism and countenance the intelligibility
of such a scenario, one might be able to relieve some of the pressure generated by Jacksons
argument. For one could claim that, even though Mary knew all along that she would be
in the relevant brain state when she was rst shown a ripe tomato, she did not yet know
if she would also experience the relevant sensation. It is only after she is actually shown
the tomato, and experiences the relevant sensation, that she is in a position to rule out a
scenario in which she is in the brain state without having the sensation. And this ruling
out of scenarios substantiates the claim that Mary does indeed acquire information about
the world when she is rst shown the tomato.
I think there are good reasons for resisting this way of addressing the puzzle. (See,
for instance, Lewis (1988).) But suppose one takes it to work. Suppose one thinks
that by creating a gap between being in the relevant brain state and experiencing the
relevant sensationand thereby making room for the possibility of being in the brain
147
state without having the sensationone can adequately account for a case like Marys.
Then one will be motivated to give up the identity statement that keeps the gap closed
(to experience the sensation of seeing red just is to be in a certain brain state). Doing
so comes at a cost because it opens up space for awkward questions. For instance: I
can see that Mary is in the relevant brain state. What I want to know is whether she
is also experiencing the relevant sensation. I would like to understand, moreover, how
one could ever be justied in taking a stand on this issue, given that we would nd
Mary completely indistinguishable from her zombie counterpart, or from someone with
inverted sensations. But one may well think that the account of Jacksons puzzle is
attractive enough to make up for the need to address such questions.
More generally, the situation is as follows. Rejecting an identity statement comes at a
cost, since it increases the number of scenarios that are treated as intelligible, and there-
fore the number of questions that are regarded as demanding answers. But having extra
scenarios to work with can also prove advantageous, since it makes room for additional
theoretical positions, some of which could deliver fruitful theorizing. Disagreement about
whether to accept an identity statement often involves disagreement about whether the
additional positions really would be fruitful enough to justify paying the price of having
to answer a new range of potentially problematic questions.
To describe a debate as Deep Metaphysics is to see it as based on a multiplication
of possibilities that is only motivated from within. Whenever one rejects an identity
statement one increases the range of scenarios that one treats as intelligible. What is
distinctive about Deep Metaphysics is that the extra theoretical space does no indepen-
dent work: the only questions it can be used to address are questions in other regions of
Deep Metaphysics, or questions that it itself generates. It consists entirely of issues that
only the initiated would understand, and only the initiated would care about.
Chapter 7
A-worlds and the Dot Notation
7.1 Introduction
Philosophers call on possible worlds to perform dierent kinds of jobs. One of these jobs
is foundational : the job of explaining what it takes for modal truths to be true. For it
to be possible that p, a possible-worlds-foundationalist would say, just is for there to
be a possible world at which p. Possible worlds are also used as semantic machinery.
The semanticist needs entities for the quantiers of her metalanguage to range over, and
possible worldsor, more generally, possibiliacan be used to construct them.
I argued in chapter 2 that the foundational project can be carried out without making
use of a specialized modal ontology: one can appeal to identity statements instead. The
purpose of this chapter is to defend the claim that the needs of the semanticist can be
satised without appealing to a specialized modal ontology.
My proposal is an instance of what David Lewis called ersatzism. I argue that the
needs of the semanticist can be satised by using representatives for possibilia in place
of possibilia. Although there are other ersatzist proposals in the literature,
1
I hope that
1
See, for instance, Plantinga (1976) and chapter 3 of Lewis (1986). A recent ersatzist proposal is
discussed in Fine (2002b) and Sider (2002) (but embraced only by Sider). The sort of proposal that Fine
and Sider discuss has a more ambitious objective than the proposal developed here, since it is intended to
capture ner-grained distinctions amongst possibilities. It also relies on more substantial expressive and
149
150 CHAPTER 7. A-WORLDS AND THE DOT NOTATION
the machinery developed here will earn its keep by delivering an attractive combination
of frugality and strength.
The proposal is frugal in two dierent respects. First, it is metaphysically frugal: it
is designed to be acceptable to a modal actualist, and presupposes very little by way of
ontology. (I help myself to set-theory, but do not assume a specialized modal ontology,
or an ontology of properties.) Second, the proposal is ideologically frugal: it does not
presuppose potentially controversial expressive resources such as innitary languages or
non-standard modal operators. The point of developing machinery that presupposes
so little is that one can put it to work without having to take a stance on dicult
philosophical issues.
As far as strength is concerned, one gets a qualied version of the following claim:
anything that can be said by quantifying over Lewisian possibilia can also be said by
using the machinery developed here. The result is that the proposal can be used quite
freely in the context of semantic theorizing, without having to worry too much about
running into expressive limitations. (An especially useful feature of the proposal is that
it allows one to enjoy the benets of quantication over sets of possibilia, which are often
appealed to in the course of semantic theorizing.)
Possible worlds theorists sometimes claim that the same individual exists according
to distinct possible worlds. (There is a world according to which I have a sister who
is a philosopher, and a world at which that very individual is a cellist rather than a
philosopher.) Ersatzist representatives for such worlds might be said to be linked. Much
of the chapter will be devoted to the phenomenon of linking.
ontological resources. (It relies, in particular, on an innitary language and an ontology of properties.)
The proposal developed here is similar in spirit to those in Roy (1995) and Melia (2001).
7.2. A KRIPKE-SEMANTICS FOR ACTUALISTS 151
7.2 A Kripke-semantics for actualists
Sadly, I dont have a sister. But I might have had a sister. In fact, I might have had a
sister who was a philosopher. And, of course, had I had sister who was a philosopher,
she wouldnt have been a philosopher essentially: she might have been a cellist instead.
The following is therefore true. (See McMichael (1983).)
Sister
(x(Sister(x, ar) Phil(x) (Cellist(x) Phil(x))))
(Read: I might have had a sister who was a philosopher and might have been
a cellist rather than a philosopher.)
On the most straightforward version of a Kripke-semantics for rst-order modal lan-
guages, Sister will only be counted as true if there are worlds w
1
and w
2
with the
following properties: according to w
1
, there is an individual who is my sister and a
philosopher; according to w
2
, that very individualas one is inclined to put itis a
cellist rather than a philosopher. It is therefore tempting to say the following:
x([Sister(x, ar) Phil(x)]
w
1
[Cellist(x) Phil(x)]
w
2
)
(Read: There is an x such that: (i) according to w
1
, x is my sister and a philosopher,
and (ii) according to w
2
, x is a cellist rather than a philosopher.)
But is there anything to make this existential quantication true? If you believe in
merely possible sisters, you might think that one of my possible sisters can do the job.
But if, like me, you are a modal actualist, then you believe there are no merely possible
sisters.
In spite of this diculty, there is a certain sense in which it is straightforward to
give an actualistically acceptable Kripke-semantics for modal sentences. The trick is to
have ones semantics quantify over representations of possibilities, rather than over the
possibilities themselves. In this this section I will describe such a semantics.
Let L be a rst-order language, and let L
be the result of enriching L with the

sentential operator . An a-world (short for actualist-world) for L
is an ordered pair
D, I) such that:
The domain D is a set of ordered pairs of the form x, actual) (for x an individual
in the domain of L), or of the form x, nonactual) (for x an arbitrary individual).
In both cases x is assumed to be an actually existing individual.
The interpretation function I assigns a subset of D
n
to each n-place predicate-letter
of L, and a function from D
n
to D to each n-place function-letter of L.
If c is an individual constant of L and x is its intended interpretation, I assigns
the pair x, actual) to c.
(The notions of truth and satisfaction at an a-world are characterized along standard
lines, with the proviso that x = x is only satised at an a-world by objects in the
domain of a-world, with the result that x = x can be used as an existence predicate.
See Appendix A for details.)
The easiest way of understanding how a-worlds are supposed to work is by com-
paring them to Lewisian worlds. Like a-worlds, Lewisian worlds can be thought of as
representing possibilities. Here is Lewis:
How does a world, [Lewisian] or ersatz, represent, concerning Humphrey, that
he exists?. . . A [Lewisian] world might do it by having Humphrey himself as
a part. That is how our own world represents, concerning Humphrey, that
he exists. But for other worlds to represent in the same way that Humphrey
exists, Humphrey would have to be a common part of many overlapping
worlds. . . I reject such overlap. . . There is a better way for a [Lewisian] world
to represent, concerning Humphrey, that he exists. . . it can have a Humphrey
of its own, a esh-and-blood counterpart of our Humphrey, a man very much
like Humphrey in his origins, in his intrinsic character, or in his historical role.
By having such a part, a world represents de re, concerning Humphreythat
is, the Humphrey of our world, whom we as his worldmates may call simply
Humphreythat he exists and does thus-and-so. (Lewis (1986), p. 194. Lewis
writes genuine where I have substituted Lewisian.)
(It is easy to lose track of Lewiss representationalism. As I mentioned in chapter 2,
part of the reason is that Lewis also subscribed to a striking foundationalist claim: he
believed that what it is for it to be possible that p is for there to be a Lewisian world at
which (i.e. representing that) p. In light of this claim, it is natural to fudge the dierence
between Lewisian worlds and possibilities. But there is a dierence nonetheless.)
Whereas Lewisian worlds represent by analogy, a-worlds represent by satisfaction. A
Lewisian world represents the possibility that I have a sister by containing a person who
is similar to me in certain respects, and has a sister. An a-world, on the other hand,
represents the possibility that I have a sister by satisfying the formula x(Sister(x, ar)),
where Sister is a predicate that expresses sisterhood on its intended interpretation and
ar is a name that refers to me on its intended interpretation. For instance, a-world
D
1
, I
1
) from gure 7.1 represents a possibility whereby I have a sister who is a philoso-
pher.
From the perspective of the Lewisian, an individual with a counterpart in the actual
world represents its actual-word counterpart, and an individual with no counterpart in
the actual world represents a merely possible object. From the present perspective,
a pair of the form x, actual) represents its rst component, and a pair of the form
x, nonactual) represents a merely possible object (even though the pair itself, and both
of its components, are actually existing objects). Thus, D
1
, I
1
) represents a possibility
whereby an actual object (i.e. me) has a sister who doesnt actually exist.
D
1
, I
1
)
D
1
= Agustn, actual) , Socrates, nonactual)
I
1
(Philosopher) = Socrates, nonactual)
I
1
(Cellist) =
I
1
(Sister) = Socrates, nonactual) , Agustn, actual))
I
1
(ar) = Agustn, actual)
D
2
, I
2
)
D
2
= Socrates, nonactual)
I
2
(Philosopher) =
I
2
(Cellist) = Socrates, nonactual)
I
2
(Sister) =
I
2
D
3
, I
3
)
D
3
= Plato, nonactual)
I
3
(Philosopher) =
I
3
(Cellist) = Plato, nonactual)
I
3
(Sister) =
I
3
D
4
, I
4
)
D
4
= Agustn, actual) , Plato, nonactual)
I
4
(Philosopher) = Plato, nonactual)
I
4
(Cellist) =
I
4
(Sister) = Plato, nonactual) , Agustn, actual))
I
4
These examples assume that the only non-logical expressions in L are Philosopher,
Cellist, Sister and ar, and that the domain of L is Agustn.
Figure 7.1: Examples of a-worlds.
Say that two representations are linked ifas one is inclined to put itthey concern
the same individual, even if the individual in question doesnt exist. In order for a Kripke
semantics based on a-worlds to verify Sister, there must be linking amongst a-worlds.
In particular, some a-world must represent a possibility whereby I have a sister who is a
philosopher and another must represent a possibility wherebyas one is inclined to put
itthat very same individual is a cellist rather than a philosopher.
Let us rst see how linking gets addressed from a Lewisian perspeective. l
1
and l
2
are
Lewisian worlds: l
1
contains an individual a
1
who bears the right sort of similarity to me
and an individual s
1
who is a
1
s sister and a philosopher; l
2
contains an individual s
2
who
is a cellist. Accordingly, l
1
represents a possibility whereby my sister is a philosopher,
and l
2
represents a possibility whereby someone is a cellist. But nothing so far guarantees
linking. Nothing so far guarantees thatas one is inclined to put itthe individual l
1
represents as my sister is the very individual that l
2
represents as a cellist. What is
needed for linking is that s
1
and s
2
be counterparts: that they be similar in the right
sorts of respects.
The same maneuver can be used when it comes to a-worlds. Like the Lewisian,
we shall use counterparthood amongst representations to capture linking. For Lewis,
representations are counterparts just in case they are similar in the right sorts of respects.
From the present perspective, we shall say that representations are counterparts just in
case they are identical (though other ways of dening the counterpart relation could be
used as well). Here is an example. We have seen that the a-world D
1
, I
1
) represents a
possibility whereby I have a sister who is a philosopher. Now consider a-worlds D
2
, I
2
)
and D
3
, I
3
) from gure 7.1. Each of them represents a possibility whereby someone is
a cellist rather than a philosopher. But only D
2
, I
2
) is linked to D
1
, I
1
). For D
1
, I
1
)
and D
2
, I
2
) both employ Socrates, nonactual) as a representation, and it is this that
guarantees thatas one is inclined to put itthe individual who D
1
, I
1
) represents as my
sister is the very individual that D
2
, I
2
) represents as a cellist. On the other hand, since
D
3
, I
3
) represents a possibility whereby someone is a cellist by using Plato, nonactual)
rather than Socratesnonactual), what one gets is thatas one is inclined to put it
the individual who D
1
, I
1
) represents as my sister is distinct from the individual that
D
2
, I
2
) represents as a cellist.
An a-worlds-semantics is not a way of improving on the informal characterization of
linking that I supplied a few paragraphs back (i.e. representations are linked ifas one
is inclined to put itthey concern the same individual, even if the individual in question
doesnt exist). In particular, it is not a way of dispensing with the qualifying phrase
as one is inclined to put it. What an a-worlds-semantics delivers is an (actualistically
acceptable) device for representing possibilities which makes clear when two representa-
tions are to be counted as linked. The reason this is helpful is that, as we shall see below,
much of the theoretical work that can be carried out by quantifying over possibilities
can be carried out by quantifying over representations of possibilities instead. So an
a-worlds-semantics puts the actualist in a position to get on with the theoretical work
without having to worry about giving a proper characterization of linking.
It is worth emphasizing that by availing oneself of an ontology of Lewisian worlds and
a Lewisian counterpart relation one does not immediately do any better. What one gets
is a way of making clear when two Lewisian worlds are to be counted as linked, not a
characterization of linking. A friend of the Lewisian ontology can, however, give a proper
characterization of linking by also subscribing to a foundationalist claim: that for it to
be possible that p just is for there to be a Lewisian world at which (i.e. representing
that) p. One could then claim for two possibilities to concern the same individual just is
for objects in the relevant Lewisian worlds to be each others counterparts.
7.3. ADMISSIBILITY 157
7.3 Admissibility
There are a-worlds according to which someone is a married bachelor, and a-worlds
according to which there might have been a human who wasnt essentially human. Such
representations need to be excluded from our semantics, on pain of getting the result that
(x(Married(x) Bachelor(x))) or (x(Human(x) (y(y = xHuman(x)))) are
true. What we need is a notion of admissibility. Armed with such a notion, one can say
that is true just in case is true at some admissible a-world, and that is true
just in case is true at every admissible a-world. (Here and throughout I assume that
the accessibility relation is trivial.)
It is important to distinguish between the semantic project of explaining what an
(actualistically acceptable) Kripke-semantics for modal languages might consist in, on
the one hand, and the foundational project of identifying grounds for admissibility, on
the other. A semantics based on a-worlds is meant to address the semantic project, but
not the foundational project. Accordingly, the notion of admissibility should be thought
of as a placeholder for whatever limits on the metaphysically possible turn out to be
uncovered by the foundational project.
My preferred answer to the foundational question is spelled out in chapter 2, and a
formal characterization of the ensuing accessibility relation is supplied in appendix C.
Buton reasonable assumptionsone can show that a suitable notion of admissibility is
guaranteed to exist however the foundational question is answered.
2
A semantics based
2
More precisely, what one can show is this: provided there is a determinate fact of the matter about
which sentences of L
are true, there is a notion of admissibility relative to which an a-worlds semantics

assigns the right truth-value to every sentence in L
. (I assume that the domain of L is a set.) Proof:

Where S is the set of true sentences in L
, use Kripkes completeness theorem for modal languages

to construct a Kripke-model for S in which the domain consists of equivalence-classes of terms. Then
transform the Kripke-model into an a-world semantics by substituting the pair x, actual) for each
equivalence class in the domain of the actual world of the Kripke-semantics containing a standard name
for x, and the pair x, nonactual) for each object x in the domain of some non-actual world of the
Kripke-semantics but not in the domain of the actual world of the Kripke-semantics. (The proof relies
on the reasonable assumption that S is consistent relative to a normal logic. To avoid talking about
accessibility relations, I have also assumed that S is consistent relative to S5. It is worth noting that the
Completeness Theorem assumes a weak version of the Axiom of Choice, so the resulting characterization
on a-words is compatible with a brutalist answer to the foundational project, according
to which: (a) for it to be possible that just is for ones specialized modal ontology to
include a possible world at which , and (b) there is no explaining why ones ontology
includes the possible worlds that it does contain. But there are other avenues available.
Ones account might appeal to a Principle of Recombination, for example, or to a set of
basic modal truths.
3
Even if ones answer to the foundational question commits one to an ontology of pos-
sible worlds, one might have good reasons for using a-worlds rather than possible worlds
for the purposes of semantic theorizing. The easiest way to see this is by distinguish-
ing between sparse and abundant conceptions of possible worlds.
4
A sparse conception
countenances worlds according to which there are objects that dont actually exist, but
not worlds according to which it is true of specic non-existent objects that they exist.
There is, for example, a possible world w
1
according to which I have a sister who is a
philosopher and might have been a cellist rather than a philosopher, but no possible
world according to which it is true of the specic individual who would have been my
sister had w
1
obtained that she exists. (Not even w
1
is such a world, for even though
w
1
is a world according to which I have a sister, it is not a world according to which it
is true of some specic individual that she is my sister.) On an abundant conception of
possible worlds, on the other hand, there are possible worlds according to which it is true
of specic non-existent objects that they exist. There is, for instance, a possible world
w
2
according to which it is true of the very individual who would have been my sister
had w
1
been actualized that she is a cellist rather than a philosopher.
On the sparse conception of possible worlds, the existence of a world is conditional
on the existence of the objects the world represents as existing, in the same sort of
of admissibility is non-constructive.)
3
On the Principle of Recombination, see Lewis (1986) 1.8. For other approaches to grounding
admissibility see Fine (1994) and Peacocke (1999), ch. 4.
4
For a sparse conception of possible worlds, see Stalnakers On what there isnt (but might have
been). Stalnaker makes clear that he does not see sparseness as an obstacle for doing Kripke-semantics.
7.3. ADMISSIBILITY 159
way that the existence of a set is conditional on the existence of its members. Had w
1
been actualized, I would have had a sister, and all manner of sets containing that very
individual would have existed. But as things stand, my sister doesnt exist, and neither
do sets having her as a member. Similarlythe story would gohad w
1
been actualized,
I would have had a sister, and a world according to which that very individual is a cellist
would have existed. But as things stand, my sister doesnt exist, and neither do possible
worlds according to which she herself exists.
The absence of w
2
does not prevent a defender of the sparse conception from using
possible worlds to determine a truth-value for Sister. For, on the assumption that
possible worlds track metaphysical possibility, the existence of w
1
is enough to guarantee
that Sister is true. But the absence of w
2
does mean that the sparse worlds do not by
themselves deliver the ontology that would be needed to give a Kripke-semantics for a
sentence like Sister. For a Kripke-semantics will only count Sister as true if the range
of ones metalinguistic quantiers contains both w
1
and w
2
.
More generally, a sparse ontology of possible worlds is enough to guarantee the ex-
istence of a notion of admissibility relative to which an a-worlds semantics assigns the
right truth-value to every sentence in the language (see footnote 2). So it is open to
the sparse theorist to use admissible a-words, rather than possible worlds, for the pur-
poses of semantic theorizing. The upshot is not, of course, that one has done away with
ones specialized modal ontology, since possible worlds may be needed to pin down the
crucial notion admissibility. But by using a-worlds as the basis of ones semantics, the
requirements on ones modal ontology are conned to needs of the foundational project.
And a far as the foundational project is concerned, an abundant conception of worlds is
unnecessary.
A related point can be made with respect to mere possibilia. By using a-worlds
rather than a specialized modal ontology as the basis of ones semantics, there is no need
to postulate mere possibilia, or specialized surrogates, such as Plantingas individual
essences. (See Plantinga (1976); for a critique of Plantinga, see Fine (1985).)
7.4 Interlude: The Principle of Representation
In previous sections I have made informal remarks about the ways in which a-worlds
represent possibilities. The purpose of this interlude is to be more precise. (Uninterested
readers may skip ahead to section 7.5.)
When D, I) is considered in isolation from other a-worlds, anything that can be said
about the possibility represented by D, I) is a consequence of the following principle:
Representation Principle (Isolated-World Version)
Let s be a sentence of L, and suppose s says that p. Then:
according to the possibility represented by D, I), p
if and only if
s is true at D, I).
Accordingly, when considered in isolation from other a-worlds, D
2
, I
2
) and D
3
, I
3
) rep-
resent the same possibility. It is the possibility that there be exactly one thing and that
it be a cellist but not a philosopher.
We shall normally assume that L (and therefore L
) contains a name for every object

in the domain of L. With this assumption is in place, the following is a consequence of
the Representation Principle:
Suppose z is in the domain of L. Then z exists according to the possibility
represented by D, I) just in case z, actual) is in D.
In particular, one gets the result that none of the objects in the domain of L exists
according to the possibility represented by D
2
, I
2
) (since x(x = c) is false at D
2
, I
2
)
7.4. INTERLUDE: THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATION 161
for any constant c in L), and that I exist according to the possibility represented by
D
1
, I
1
) (since x(x = ar) is true at D
1
, I
1
)).
So much for considering a-worlds in isolation. When they are considered in the context
of a space of a-worlds, linking plays a role. So there is slightly more to be said about
the possibilities that they represent. Let A be a space of a-worlds and let D, I) be in
A. Then anything that can be said about the possibility represented by D, I) in the
context of A is a consequence of the following principle:
Representation Principle (Ocial Version)
1. Let s be a sentence of L
, and suppose s says that p. Then:

according to the possibility represented by D, I) in the context
of A, p
if and only if
s is true at D, I) in the Kripke-model based on A.
2. Let D
, I
) be an arbitrary a-world in A. Let x(x) and x(x)

be sentences of L
which say, respectively, that the x are F and that

the x are G. Assume that x(x) is true at D, I) in A and that
x(x) is true at D
, I
) in A. Then:
as one is inclined to put it, some of the individuals that are F
according to the possibility represented by D, I) in the context
of A are the very same individuals as some of the individuals
that are G according to the possibility represented by D
, I
)
in the context of A
if and only if
one of the sequences of pairs that witnesses x(x) at D, I)
in A is identical to one of sequences of pairs that witnesses
x(x) at D
, I
) in the Kripke-model based on A.

When A includes both D
1
, I
1
) and D
2
, I
2
), the rst clause yields the result that, ac-
cording to the possibility represented by D
2
, I
2
) in the context of A, there is a cellist
who might have been my sister. And the two clauses together yield the slightly stronger
result thatas one is inclined to put itthe individual who is a cellist according to the
possibility represented by D
2
, I
2
) in the context of A is the very same object as the
individual who is my sister according to the possibility represented by D
1
, I
1
) in the
context of A.
A consequence of the Principle of Representation is that the possibilities represented
by a-worlds are not maximally specic. Suppose, for example, that the property of tallnes
is not expressible in L. Then the possibility represented by D
1
, I
1
) is compatible with a
more specic possibility whereby my sister is tall and it is compatible with a more specic
possibility whereby my sister is not tall. On the other hand, the possibilities represented
by a-worlds are maximally specic as far as the language is concerned: one can only add
specicity to the possibility represented by an a-world by employing distinctions that
cannot be expressed in L
.
The Principle of Representation can be used to determine which properties of an a-
world are essential to its representing the possibility that it represents, and which ones are
merely artifactual. It entails, for example, that D
2
, I
2
) and D
3
, I
3
) represent the same
possibility when considered in isolation, so any dierences between them are merely arti-
factual. In particular, the use of Socrates, nonactual) in D
2
, I
2
) is merely artifactual.
On the other hand, D
2
, I
2
) and D
3
, I
3
) represent dierent possibilities when considered
in the context of D
1
, I
1
), D
2
, I
2
), D
3
, I
3
). For whereas according to D
2
, I
2
) there
is a cellist who might have been my sister, according to D
3
, I
3
) there is a cellist who
couldnt have been my sister. So the use of Socrates, nonactual) in D
2
, I
2
) is essential
in the context of D
1
, I
1
), D
2
, I
2
), D
3
, I
3
). This is not to say, however, that a possi-
bility whereby there is a cellist who might have been my sister can only be represented
7.5. THE DOT-NOTATION 163
by an a-world if the a-world contains Socrates, nonactual). For the possibilities repre-
sented by D
1
, I
1
), D
2
, I
2
), and D
3
, I
3
) in the context of D
1
, I
1
), D
2
, I
2
), D
3
, I
3
)
are precisely the possibilities represented by D
4
, I
4
), D
3
, I
3
), D
2
, I
2
) in the context
of D
2
, I
2
), D
3
, I
3
),D
4
, I
4
).
When I speak of the possibility that an a-world represents what I will usually have
in mind is the possibility that is represented in the context of the space of all admissible
a-worlds.
7.5 The dot-notation
I would like to introduce a further piece of notation: the dot. Intuitively, the dot may
be thought of as a function that takes objects represented to the objects doing the
representing. Suppose I am seeing a play according to which I have a sister; applying the
dot-function is like shifting my attention from a character in the playmy sisterto the
actress who is representing my sister.
Consider the following two formulas:
[F(x)]
w
[F( x)]
w
For w a xed representation, the undotted formula is satised by all and only objects
z such that w represents a possibility whereby z is an F; the dotted formula, on the
other hand, is satised by all and only objects z such that z is used by w to represent
something as being an F. Thus, if is a performance of a play according to which I have
a sister, the actress playing my sister satises [Sister(ar, x)]
but not [Sister(ar, x)]
(since the performance uses the actress to represent someone as being my sister, but the
performance does not represent a scenario whereby I have that actress as my sister). And
I satisfy [y Sister(x, y)]
but not [y Sister( x, y)]
(since the performance represents

a scenario whereby I have a sister, butunlike the actors and propsI am not used by
the performance to represent anything).
Now consider how the dot-notation might be cashed out from the perspective of a
Lewisian. Let l
1
be a Lewisian world representing a possibility whereby I have a sister.
Accordingly, l
1
contains an individual a
1
, who is my counterpart, and an individual s
1
,
who is a
1
s sister. Now consider the following two formulas:
[Sister(ar, x)]
l
1
[Sister(ar, x)]
l
1
From the perspective of the Lewisian, no inhabitant of the actual world satises the
undotted formula. For no inhabitant of the actual world could have been my sister; so
on the assumption that Lewisian worlds track metaphysical possibilityno inhabitant of
the actual world is such that l
1
represents a possibility whereby she is my sister. The
dotted formula, on the other hand, is satised by s
1
, since she is used by l
1
to represent
something as being my sister.
Here is a second pair of examples:
[y Sister(x, y)]
l
1
[y Sister( x, y)]
l
1
The undotted formula is satised by me, since l
1
represents a possibility whereby I have
a sister. But it is not satised by a
1
. For although it is true that a
1
has a sister in l
1
, l
1
represents a possibility whereby I have a sister, not a possibility whereby my counterpart
has a sister. The dotted formula, on the other hand, is satised by a
1
, since a
1
is used
by l
1
to represent something as having a sister (i.e. me). But the dotted formula is not
satised by me, since it is only the inhabitants of l
1
that do any representing for l
1
, and
I am an inhabitant of the actual world.
Let me now illustrate how the dot-notation works from the perspective of the modal
actualist, with a-worlds in place of Lewisian worlds. (A detailed semantics is given in
Appendix A.) Here is the rst pair of examples (where w
1
is the a-world D
1
, I
1
) from
section 7.2):
[Sister(ar, x)]
w
1
[Sister(ar, x)]
w
1
Since I
1
(Sister) = Agustn, actual) , Socrates, nonactual)), w
1
represents a possi-
bility whereby I have a sister who doesnt actually exist. Accordingly, from the perspec-
tive of a modal actualist, there is no z such that w
1
represents the possibility that z is
my sister. So, from the perspective of the modal actualist, nothing satises the undotted
formula. The dotted formula, on the other hand, is satised by Socrates, nonactual),
since Socrates, nonactual) is used by w
1
to represent something as being my sister.
Now consider the second pair of examples:
[y Sister(x, y)]
w
1
[y Sister( x, y)]
w
1
Since the pair Agustn, actual) , Socrates, nonactual)) is in I
1
(Sister), w
1
represents
a possibility whereby I have a sister. The undotted formula is therefore satised by me.
But it is not satised by Agustn, actual) because w
1
does not represent a possibility
whereby any ordered-pairs have sisters. The dotted formula, on the other hand, is satis-
ed by Agustn, actual), since Agustn, actual) is used by w
1
to represent something
as having a sister (i.e. me). But it is not satised by me, since it is only ordered-pairs
that do any representing in w
1
, and I am not an ordered-pair.
7.5.1 Inference in a language with the dot-notation
The semantics for a-worlds that is supplied in Appendix A guarantees the truth of every
instance of the following schemas:
1. Validity
[]
w
(where is valid in a negative free logic)
2. Conjunction
[ ]
w
([]
w
[]
w
)
3. Negation
[]
w
[]
w
4. Identity
Where v may occur dotted or undotted,
[v = v]
w
[y(y = v)]
w
(This makes clear that identity is being used in the stronger of the two senses
mentioned in section 1.2, and therefore that self-identity may be used as an existence
predicate.)
x = y ([( x)]
w
[( y)]
w
)
[ x = y]
w
([ x = x]
w
x = y)
5. Quantication
[y((y))]
w
y([ y = y]
w
[( y)]
w
) (where y is an ordinary variable)
[w
()]
w
w
([]
w
) (where w
is a world-variable)
6. Trivial accessibility
[[]
w
]
w
[]
w
(If the accessibility relation is non-trivial, one gets the following instead: [[]
w
]
w

([]
w
Acccessible(w
, w)).)
7. Atomic Predication
[F
n
j
(v
1
, . . . , v
n
)]
w
([v
1
= v
1
]
w
. . . [v
n
= v
n
]
w
)
(where the v
i
may occur dotted or undotted)
8. Names
[(c)]
w
x(x = c [(x)]
w
) (for c a non-empty name)
Schemas 25 are enough to guarantee that any sentence in the actualists language is
equivalent to a sentence in which only atomic formulas occur within the scope of [. . .]
w
.
For instance, the actualist rendering of (x(Phil(x) (Phil(x)))):
w[x(Phil(x) w
([Phil(x)]
w
))]
w
is equivalent to
wx([Phil( x)]
w
w
([Phil( x)]
w
)).
As a result, the dot-notation allows a language containing the modal operator [. . .]
w
to
have the inferential behavior of a (non-modal) rst-order language.
7.5.2 The expressive power of the dot-notation
In this section we shall see that a suitably qualied version of the following claim is
true: anything the Lewisian can say, the modal actualist can say tooby using the
dot-notation.
Here is an example. The Lewisian can use her mighty expressive resources to capture
a version of the following thought:
Linking
There are possible worlds w
1
and w
2
with the following properties: according
to w
1
, there is an individual who is a philosopher; according to w
2
, that very
individual is a cellist.
It is done as follows:
w
1
w
2
x
1
x
2
(I(x
1
, w
1
) I(x
2
, w
2
) Phil(x
1
) Cellist(x
2
) C(x
1
, x
2
))
(Read: There are Lewisian worlds w
1
and w
2
and individuals x
1
and x
2
such
that: (a) x
1
is an inhabitant of w
1
and x
2
2
, (b) x
1
is a
philosopher and x
2
is a cellist, and (c) x
1
and x
2
are counterparts.)
How might this be emulated by a modal actualist equipped with the dot-notation? Con-
sider what happens when one treats the variables in the Lewisian rendering of Linking
as ranging over (admissible) a-worlds rather than Lewisian worlds, and carries out the
following replacements:
I(x
n
, w
n
) [ x
n
= x
n
]
wn
Phil(x
n
) [Phil( x
n
)]
wn
Cellist(x
n
) [Cellist( x
n
)]
wn
C(x
n
, x
m
) x
n
= x
m
The result is this:
w
1
w
2
x
1
x
2
([ x
1
= x
1
]
w
1
[ x
2
= x
2
]
w
2
[Phil( x
1
)]
w
1
[Cellist( x
2
)]
w
2
x
1
= x
2
)
(Read: There are admissible a-worlds w
1
and w
2
and objects x
1
and x
2
such
that: (a) x
1
is used by w
1
to represent something and x
2
is used by w
2
to
represent something, (b) x
1
is used by w
1
to represent a philosopher and x
2
is used by w
2
to represent a cellist, and (c) x
1
= x
2
.)
or equivalently:
w
1
w
2
x([Phil( x)]
w
1
[Cellist( x)]
w
2
)
(Read: There are admissible a-worlds w
1
and w
2
and an object x such that:
x is used by w
1
to represent a philosopher and x is used by w
2
to represent a
cellist.)
What gives the actualists method its punch is the fact that it generalizes: one can show
that there is a systematic transformation of arbitrary Lewisian sentences into dotted actu-
alist sentences which preserves truth-values and inferential conections.
5
(See Appendix B
for details.)
The actualists transformation-method does not preserve meaningwhere Lewisian
sentences quantify over Lewisian possibilia, their actualist transformation quantify over
a-worlds and ordered-pairs. But meaning-preservation is not what the actualist wants,
since she doesnt want to countenance Lewisian possibilia. What she wants is a way
of enjoying the theoretical benets of quantication over Lewisian possibilia within the
sober connes of an actualist framework. Here are two examples of ways in which she is
able to do so:
1. Firstorderizing Modal Sentences
By quantifying over Lewisian possibilia, the Lewisian is able to render any sentence
in the language of rst-order modal logic in (non-modal) rst-order terms. The
sentence
(x(Phil(x) (Cellist(x))))
(read: there might have been a philosopher who might have been a cel-
list),
5
When I say that the transformation preserves truth-value what I mean is that there is a notion
of a-world admissibility which guarantees that the actualist transformation of an arbitrary Lewisian
sentence is true just in case the original Lewisian sentence would count as true from the perspective
of the Lewisian. When I say that the transformation preserves inferential role, what I mean is that a
Lewisian sentence follows from a set of Lewisian sentences just in case s transformation follows
from the the transformations of sentences in .
The result assumes that atomic predicates in the Lewisians language other than I, C and = (and
any set-theoretic vocabulary) be projectable. For a monadic predicate P to be projectable is for it to
be the case that a Lewisian world represents a possibility whereby something is P by containing an
inhabitant who is P. (And similarly for many-place predicates.) Thus, Philosopher is projectable
because a Lewisian world represents a possibility whereby something is a philosopher by containing an
inhabitant who is a philosopher; but inhabits a Lewisian world which is part of a pluriverse containing
many Lewisian worlds is not projectable because a Lewisian world does not represent a possibility
whereby something inhabits a Lewisian world which is part of a pluriverse containing many Lewisian
worlds by containing an inhabitant who inhabits a Lewisian world which is part of a pluriverse containing
many Lewisian worlds.
for example, gets rendered as the (non-modal) rst-order sentence:
w
1
w
2
x
1
x
2
(I(x
1
, w
1
) I(x
2
, w
2
) Phil(x
1
) Cellist(x
2
) C(x
1
, x
2
))
And Lewis (1968) shows that it can be done in general.
6
The (non-modal) rstorderizability of modal sentences brings two immediate advan-
tages. The rst is that it allows one to think of the inferential connections amongst
modal sentences in terms of the inferential connections amongst the corresponding
non-modal sentences; the second is that it allows one to read o a semantics for
modal sentences from the semantics of the corresponding non-modal sentences.
The actualist transformation-method allows actualists equipped with the dot-notation
to enjoy both of these advantages.
2. Characterizing Intensions
On a standard way of doing intensional semantics for natural languages, charac-
terizing the semantic value of an expression calls for quantication over possibilia.
(For a representative textbook, see Heim and Kratzer (1998), ch. 12.) Oversimpli-
fying a bit, the semantic value of, e.g. philosopher might be taken to be the set
of pairs w, z) where w is a possible world and z is an (actual or merely possible)
individual who is a philosopher at w.
As emphasized in Lewis (1970), the Lewisian is able to do the job by quantifying
over Lewisian possibilia:
philosopher = w, z) : I(z, w) Phil(z)
6
As Lewis observes, a feature of the 1968 translation is that x(y(x = y)) turns out to be true.
For this reason, I prefer a modication of the translation whereby ()
is
1
(W(
1
) ()
1
), ()
is
1
(W(
1
) ()
1
) and (P(x
1
, . . . , x
n
))
is
1
. . .
n
(I(
1
, ) C(
1
, x
1
) . . . I(
n
, ) C(
n
, x
n
)
P(
1
. . . ,
n
) (for P atomic). The modied translation delivers the same truth-values as a version of
Kripke-semantics in which atomic formulas (including identity-statements) can only be satised at a
world by objects that exist at that world.
But the actualist transformation-method allows actualists armed with the dot-
notation to follow suit, by quantifying over a-worlds and ordered pairs:
philosopher = w, z) : [ z = z]
w
[Phil( z)]
w
or, equivalently,
philosopher = w, z) : [Phil( z)]
w
.
Since the actualist transformation-method preserves inferential connections, the ac-
tualist semantics is guaranteed to deliver the same theorems as its Lewisian coun-
terpart. And since the transformation-method preserves truth-value the actualists
axioms will be true just in case their Lewisian counterparts would count as true
from the perspective of the Lewisian.
In particular, one can expect the actualist semantics to deliver every instance of
the (world-relative) T-schema. For instance:
True(x Phil(x), w) ([x Phil(x)]
w
)
or, equivalently,
True(x Phil(x), w) x([Phil( x)]
w
)
(Read: The object-language sentence x Phil(x) is true at admissible a-
world w just in case there is an individual which is used by w to represent
a philosopher.)
7.5.3 Limitations of the proposal
A-worlds are subject to an important limitation. Whereas dierences between a-worlds
are no more ne-grained than is required to make distinctions expressible in ones lan-
guage, there might be dierences amongst Lewisian worlds too ne-grained to be ex-
pressed in ones language.
7
Because of this limitation, some of the metaphysical work that the Lewisian gets out
of Lewisian possibilia cannot be replicated by an actualist equipped with the dot-notion.
Here is an example. Lewis (1986) treats properties as sets of worldbound individuals. Up
to a certain point, the actualist is able to follow suit. When the Lewisian claims that the
property of being a philosopher is to be identied with the set of philosophers inhabiting
actual or non-actual Lewisian worlds, for instance, the actualist could claim that the set
z, w) : [Phil( z)]
w
is to be used as a surrogate for the property of being a philosopher.
But the strategy breaks down when it comes to properties making ner distinctions than
can be expressed in ones language.
8
In general, whether or not the actualists limitation turns out to get in the way will
depend on whether the job at hand calls for using possibilia to make ner distinctions
than can be expressed in ones language. When the job at hand is a piece of semantic
theorizing the extra resources are unnecessary: since a semantic theory is ultimately an
eort to explain how language is used, it need not be concerned with distinctions too
ne-grained to gure in our explanations. But when the job at hand is metaphysical
reduction, matters are otherwise.
7
More precisely, there might be dierent Lewisian worlds such that every inhabitant of the one world
is a counterpart of an inhabitant of the other, and every predicate in the language which is projectable
in the sense of footnote 5 is satised by inhabitants of one world just in case it is satised by the
counterparts of those individuals at the other. The distinct possibilities represented by such Lewisian
worlds would both be compatible with the less-specic possibility represented by an a-world in which
the behavior of the predicates mirrors the behavior of the predicates at the Lewisian worlds.
8
Any set of worldbound individuals containing an inhabitant of one of the Lewisian worlds described
in footnote 7 but not its counterpart at the other corresponds to a Lewisian property with no actualist
surrogate.
Chapter 8
Translation
A trivialist paraphrase-function is a mapping that takes each arithmetical sentence
to a sentence whose truth-conditions are uncontroversially the truth-conditions that the
trivialist semantics associates with uncontroversially, in the sense that whether or
not one takes s paraphrase to have the right truth-conditions doesnt depend on what
identity-statements one accepts.
We will investigate the question of whether it possible to specify a trivialist paraphrase-
function for the language of arithmetic. Attention will be restricted to paraphrase-
functions that can be characterized algorithmically. Without this restriction, it is obvi-
ously true that there is trivialist paraphrase-function for the language of pure arithmetic:
map every true sentence to a tautology and every false sentence to a contradiction.
The answer to our question will depend on the expressive resources of the language
in which paraphrases are given.
Higher-Order Languages
Suppose one takes the paraphrase-language to be an nth-order language, for some -
nite n. Then, assuming the Church-Turing Thesis, it is impossible to specify a trivi-
alist paraphrase-method for the language of arithmetic. (For a proof of this result, see
173
174 CHAPTER 8. TRANSLATION
Rayo (2008).)
There are a few paraphrase-methods that have the right avor, but dont quite give
us what were after. Consider, for example, the method of universal Ramseycation.
If is a sentence in the language of pure arithmetic, its universal Ramseycation is
the universal closure of (D )
, where D is the conjunction of the (second-order)

Dedekind-Peano Axioms and (. . .)
is the result of uniformly substituting variables for

mathematical vocabulary in (. . . ).
The method of universal Ramseycation only delivers the right results on the assump-
tion that the world is innite. To see this, consider an arithmetical falsehood, such as
0 = 1. If the world is nite, the Dedekind-Peano Axioms, D, will turn out to be false. So
0 = 1s universal Ramseycation (i.e. the universal closure of (D 0 = 1)
) will turn
out to be true, which is contrary to what we want. Of course, a trivialist will think that
nite worlds are de mundo unintelligible, and therefore that commitment to innitely
many objects is no commitment at all. So a trivialist will think that the method of
universal Ramseycation does, after all, deliver the right assignment of truth-conditions.
But such a conclusion wont count as uncontroversial, since it wont be acceptable to the
typical non-trivialist.
Other higher-order paraphrase-methods that have the right avor but depend on
innity-assumptions to deliver the right results include Hodes (1984), Fine (2002a) II.5,
and Rayo (2002a).
Languages of Very High Order
If ones paraphrase-language includes variables of transnite order, then a trivialist
paraphrase-method for the language of arithmetic is available.
For an arbitrary ordinal, let L
be a version of the language of set-theory in

which each occurrence of a quantier is restricted by some V
( < ). As it turns out,

any sentence in the language of rst-order arithmetic can be translated as a sentence
175
of L
+1
. What one does is replace arithmetical quantiers by set-theoretic quantiers

restricted to nite ordinals, and replace each occurrence of arithmetical vocabulary by
its counterpart in ordinal arithmetic. (This procedure presupposes that all the relevant
set-theoretic notions can be adequately characterized in L
+1
, but it is straightforward
to check that this is indeed the case.)
Linnebo and Rayo (typescript) shows that, for arbitrary , every sentence of L
can
be paraphrased as a sentence in a language of order + 2 (or order , if is a limit
ordinal). From this it follows that one can use the translation of rst-order arithmetical
sentences into L
+1
to characterize a trivialist paraphrase-method from the language of

rst-order arithmetic into a language of order + 3.
Innitary Languages
Another way of characterizing a trivialist paraphrase-function is by allowing for innite
conjunctions and disjunctions.
Because we will be dealing with innite sentences, our paraphrase-function wont be
algorithmic in the standard sense (i.e. it wont be computable in nite time). But it will
still count is algorithmic in a derived sense: one could write a nite computer program
that approximates the paraphrase asymptotically, and outputs it after innitely many
steps.
Our paraphrase-function will consist of a four-step transformation. We shall assume
that the input formula is a sentence of the language of pure rst-order arithmetic, exclud-
ing mixed identities. (To make life simpler, we shall also assume that the input formula
is in prenex normal form, and that only atomic formulas are in the scope of a negation
sign.)
The basic strategy is due to Yablo (2002):
Step 1
Replace each subformula n(n) by the innite disjunction (0) (1) (2) . . .,
and each subformula n(n) by the innite conjunction (0) (1) (2) . . ..
For instance, the result of applying Step 1 to nm(n+1 = m) is an innite conjunction
of innite disjunctions:
(0+1 = 00+1 = 10+1 = 2. . .) (1+1 = 01+1 = 11+1 = 2. . .) (2+1 = 02+1 = 12+1 = 2. . .) . . .
In general, the result of applying Step 1 is a (possibly innite) sentence in which ev-
ery atomic formula is an identity statement t
1
= t
2
, where t
1
and t
2
contain no free
variables.
We must now deal with atomic formulas. Yablo suggests that we do so by substituting
a suitable non-arithmetical paraphrase for each occurrence of t
1
= t
2
. An unnegated
occurrence of k +l = m, for example, gets replaced by:
[!
k
xFx !
l
xGx x(Fx Gx)] !
m
x(Fx Gx)
(Read: if there are exactly k Fs, there are exactly l Gs and nothing is an
F-and-G, then there are exactly m F-or-Gs.)
This procedure succeeds in eliminating all mathematical vocabulary from the original
arithmetical sentence. But what one gets is a formula that is only guaranteed to have
the right truth-value on the assumption that the world is innite. Consider, for example,
the arithmetical falsehood n(n + 1 = n). The result of applying Step 1 is an innite
disjunction:
(0 + 1 = 0) (1 + 1 = 1) (2 + 1 = 2) . . .
But now suppose that there are exactly k objects, and consider the (k +1)th disjunct in
the series: k + 1 = k. According to Yablos procedure, this disjunct should be replaced
by
[!
k
xFx !
1
xGx x(Fx Gx)] !
k
x(Fx Gx)
which is guaranteed to be true in a world with k objects (since its antecedent is guaranteed
177
to be false). From this it follows that the result of applying Yablos procedure is true,
even though n(n + 1 = n) is false.
Fortunately, there is a way around the problem. As Santos (typescript) points out,
one can make the following changes to the output of Step 1:
Step 2
Replace each occurrence of k +l by SS . . . S

k+l
(0), and each occurrence of
k l by SS . . . S

kl
(0). (Make sure you apply the procedure to subordinate
formulas rst.)
Step 3
Replace occurrences of SS . . . S

k
(0) = SS . . . S

l
(0) by whenever k = l;
replace them by whenever k ,= l.
(Here is a logical truth from a nitary language containing no mathematical vocabulary,
and is a logical falsity from a nitary language containing no mathematical vocabulary.)
The result is a (possibly innite) sentence that contains no arithmetical vocabulary
and can be shown to have the right truth-value regardless of the identity statements one
presupposes in the metatheory. In fact, every truth of pure arithmetic gets mapped onto
a truth of innitary logic and every falsity of pure arithmetic gets mapped onto a falsity
of innitary logic.
By adding a nal step to the process, one can get the transformation to output a
nite sentence:
Step 4
Substitute for innite conjunctions all of whose conjuncts are true and
innite disjunctions some of whose conjuncts are true; substitute for innite
disjunctions all of whose conjuncts are false and innite disjunctions some of
whose conjuncts are false. (Make sure you apply the procedure to subordinate
formulas rst.)
When the original input sentence is true, the result of applying steps 14 will be a logical
truth from a nitary language with no mathematical vocabulary; otherwise, the result
will be a logical falsehood from a nitary language with no mathematical vocabulary.
A nice feature of this procedure is that it delivers a completeness theorem for an in-
nitary version of the Dedekind-Peano Axioms, in which the Induction Axiom is replaced
by rules stating that a universal quantier is equivalent to the conjunction of its numeri-
cal instances and an existential quantier is equivalent to the disjunction of its numerical
instances. All one needs to do to prove the result is carry out the transformation, and
note that each of its four steps can be justied on the basis of our axioms. (To justify
the fourth step one needs to assume that one is working with a suitable innitary logic.)
Intensional Operators
The presence of intensional operators makes it much easier to dene a trivialist paraphrase-
function. (See Hellman (1989), Yablo (2001) and Dorr (2007).) A particularly straight-
forward strategy would be to map each sentence of pure arithmetic to the result of adding
a box in front of its universal Ramseycation. This will deliver the right results on the
assumption that there might have been innitely many objects. Perhaps it is uncontro-
versial that commitment to the possibility of innitely many objects is no commitment
at all. If so, the method of necessitated universal Ramseycation counts as a trivialist
paraphrase-function for the special case of pure arithmetic.
If one wishes to accommodate applied arithmetic, something more elaborate is needed.
Here are two familiar proposals:
Counterfactualism
Paraphrase an arbitrary arithmetical sentence as:
179
If the world contained an innity of extra objects playing the role of
numbers, it would be the case that .
Fictionalism
According to a ction whereby the world is as it actually is except for
the addition of an innity of extra objects playing the role of numbers,
.
Properly construed, both of these strategies can be made to deliver the desired assignment
of correctness-conditions. But they are both potentially misleading. For it is easy to
overestimate their ability to shed light on the truth-conditions that a trivialist would
associate with arithmetical sentences. In fact, neither of them is any more illuminating
than the following:
The No-Frills Strategy
, except for all that stu about numbers.
Any appearance of progress in the more familiar strategies comes from the fact that
we have a satisfying story to tell about what it takes for to be true at a world (or
ction): one gives a standard compositional semantics for the language in question, and
relativizes it to worlds (or ctions). But that masks the real problem. The real problem
is not to explain what it takes for a world (or ction) to verify , but to explain what
it would take for a world (or ction) to be like a world (or ction) that veries in
all non-mathematical respects. For it is the latter that is needed to understand what it
would take for s paraphrase to be true at a world (or ction). And about this the
paraphrase-strategies under consideration have nothing illuminating to say.
One could, of course, rehearse the familiar set of toy examples. One could insist, for
example, that what it takes for a world to be like a world which veries the number of the
planets is Eight in all non-mathematical respects is for it to contain exactly eight planets.
But the real challenge is to explain how the proposal is supposed to work in generaland
that task is no easier than the original task of supplying a trivialist paraphrase method
for the language of arithmetic.
Moral
Characterizing a trivialist paraphrase-method for the language of arithmetic is not as
straightforward as one might have thought. One must either avail oneself of poten-
tially controversial logical resourcessuch as variables of very high type or innitary
operationsor make use of intensional operators.
Intensional operators should be used with care. They can give the appearance of
progress where there is none. It is not clear, in particular, that they are eective as a
device for shedding light on the truth-conditions that a trivialist would associate with
arithmetical sentences. To my mind, the most illuminating way of getting clear on
the trivialists truth-conditions is by setting forth a compositional semantics of the sort
discussed in section 4.4.
Chapter 9
Introducing Mathematical
Vocabulary
9.1 Linguistic Stipulation for Anti-Tractarians
A familiar way of introducing mathematical vocabulary is by setting forth an axiom
system, and stipulating the the new vocabulary is to be understood in such a way that
the axioms turn out to be true (or in such a way that they turn out to be necessarily
true).
For a Tractarian the eect of such stipulations is relatively straightforward. One
proceeds against the background of a xed domain of objects and properties: those carved
out by the worlds metaphysical structure. So whenever there is exactly one assignment
of objects to names and properties to predicates that would make the axioms true (or
necessarily true), the eect of the stipulationassuming it gives rise to the right sort of
linguistic practiceis to pair each name with the relevant object and each predicate with
the relevant property. (If there is more than one such assignment, Tractarians might fret
about how to proceed. They might learn to live with the ensuing indeterminacy, or insist
that the stipulation has been unsuccessful.)
181
182 CHAPTER 9. INTRODUCING MATHEMATICAL VOCABULARY
For an anti-Tractarian, the situation is somewhat more nuanced. This is because
dierent ways of carving up the world yield dierent domains of objects and properties.
And although a stipulation may be intended to work within an existing carving, it might
also be intended introduce a new carving altogether, with its own range of objects and
properties.
As it is understood here, a carving of the world is a compositional system of rep-
resentation for describing the world. (See section 3.2.) So to say that a stipulation is
meant to work within an existing carving is to say that the new lexical items are to be
counted as building blocks of a compositional language that is already in placeand,
in particular, that they should yield meaningful sentences when combined with extant
vocabulary of the right semantic category. If, for instance, the new lexical items include
a singular term, the result of using it to ll the argument place of an extant predicate
should result in a meaningful atomic sentence.
Suppose one introduces the new name Muncle by stipulating that it is to be under-
stood in such a way that sentence Muncle is Marcuss favorite uncle turns out to be
true at the time of the stipulation. One would expect such a stipulation to be intended
to work within an extant way of carving the world into objects and properties. In par-
ticular, one would expect it to deliver the result that sentences like Muncle isnt much
of a conversationalist and Muncle = Julius Caesar have well-dened truth-conditions.
In contrast, when a stipulation is intended to introduce a new way of carving up the
world, there should be no general expectation that the new vocabulary will yield mean-
ingful sentences when combined with extant vocabulary of the right semantic category.
Suppose, for example, that the language of arithmetic is introduced as a new way of
carving up the world. Then there should be no expectation that 8 = Julius Caesar will
be meaningful. This is not to say that every combination of old and new vocabulary
should be counted as meaningless: the sentence 2
3
= 8 Caesar is a Roman, for exam-
ple, would be totally unproblematic, as would #
x
Planet(x) = 8. (For more on mixed
9.1. LINGUISTIC STIPULATION FOR ANTI-TRACTARIANS 183
identities, see section 4.3.1.)
Just because dierent fragments of ones discourse correspond to dierent carvings of
the world, it doesnt mean that one is barred from using a single language to formalize
ones theorizing. One can use terms and predicates of dierent sorts to talk about objects
corresponding to dierent carvings. Thus, one might use variables of one sort to range
over material objects, variables of a second sort to range over numbers, variables of a
third sort to range over sets, variables of a fourth sort to range over classes, and so forth.
An advantage of the multi-sorted strategy is that one can give a clear statement of
which sentences of the language should be expected to have well-dened truth-conditions
and which ones shouldnt. Consider a language containing vocabulary of the four sorts
just mentioned. One could impose the following restrictions on the well-formedness of
formulas:
An identity statement t = where t and are terms of dierent sorts can never
be well-formed.
Material-object-predicates and function-letters, such as Volcano(. . . ) or Father-
Of(. . . ), can only take material-object-terms as arguments.
Arithmetical predicates and function-letters can only take arithmetical terms as ar-
guments, with the exception of #
v
((v)), in which v can be either an arithmetical
variable or a material-object-variable.
The sole set-theoretic predicate
s
must take a set-theoretic term in its second
argument place, but it can take either a set-theoretic term or a material-object-term
in its rst argument-place.
The sole class-theoretic predicate
c
must take a class-theoretic term in its second
argument place, but it can take either a class-theoretic term or a material-object-
term in its rst argument-place.
If the language contains second-order variables, a second-order variable of a given
sort can only take as arguments rst-order terms of that same sort.
Such a language would allow one to express just about any arithmetical, set-theoretic
or class-theoretic statement that plays a role in non-philosophical theorizing, including
statements including vocabulary of more than one sort. One can say, for example, that
there are more primates than even primes,
nm(#
x
(n, Primate(x)) #
r
(m, EvenPrime(r)) n > m)
(Where x is a material-object-variable, and n, m and r are arithmetical
variables.)
and even that there are more primes than primates:
mn(#
r
(m, Prime(r) #
x
(n, Primate(x))) m > n)
(Where x is a material-object-variable, and n, m and r are arithmetical
variables.)
One can also state versions of the claim that there is a set of urelements,
(x(x
s
))
(Where x is a material-object-variable, and is a set-theoretic variable.)
and the claim that there is a class V of all non-proper classes:
V (x(x
c
V ) C(D(C
c
D) C
c
V ))
(Where x is a material-object-variable, and V , C and D are class-
theoretic variables.)
On the other hand, there is no way of expressing the general claim that there are more
sets than classes (or that there are more classes than sets). If one wanted to state such
9.2. SUCCESS CONDITIONS 185
claims, one would have to introduce a new sort of variable to range over collections which
can have both sets and classes as elements.
In such a language it can be strictly and literally true to sayusing fully unrestricted
set-theoretic quantiersthat there are inaccessibly many objects, and also strictly and
literally true to sayusing fully unrestricted class-theoretic quantiersthat there are
successor-of-an-inaccessible-many objects. But this is not because each sort of quantier
ranges over a dierent fragment of a single maxi-domain. (See section 3.2.) It is
because quantiers of dierent sorts presuppose dierent carvings of the world. One
of the carvings delivers inaccessibly many objects; the other delivers successor-of-an-
inaccessible many.
On the most natural way of developing this picture, the feature of reality that is fully
and accurately described by the set theoretic sentence (Socrates
s
) is also fully and
accurately described by the class theoretic sentence sentence C(Socrates
c
C) (and
by the material-object-sentence x(Socrates = x)). Similarly, a set-theoretic sentence
stating that there are inaccessibly many objects and a class-theoretic sentence stating that
there are successor-of-an-inaccessible-many objects both have trivial truth-conditions. So
the (trivial) feature of reality that is fully and accurately described by one of them is
also fully and accurately described by the other (and by any truth of logic). Cardinality
claims like these are not incompatible de mundo: it is not the case that what the truth
of them requires of the world is incompatible with what the truth of the other requires
of the world. They are only incompatible in the sense that they presuppose systems of
representation that cannot be happily combined.
9.2 Success Conditions
The goal of a linguistic stipulation is to specify an assignment of truth-conditions to
sentences involving the newly introduced vocabulary. A Tractarian will think that the
only way of producing such an assignment is by pairing each singular term with one of
the objects carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure, and pairing each predicate
with one of the properties carved out by the worlds metaphysical structure. The anti-
Tracatrian will disagree. She will claim that correspondence with metaphysical structure
is no part of what it takes for the new vocabulary to be in good order.
The anti-Tractarian will agree that a successful stipulation results in a pairing of lex-
ical items to objects and properties. But she wont see this as a substantial constraint.
For a carving of the world to be in place just is for a compositional system of repre-
sentation to be in place. So when a stipulation succeeds in specifying truth-conditions
for whichever sentences one wishes to make available for use it thereby makes available
a way of carving up the world with respect to which one could pair each of the new
lexical items with a suitable object or property. Such pairings can be made explicit by
enriching ones metalanguage with the newly introduced vocabulary and setting forth
a homophonic semantics for ones object language. (Does it follow that there isnt an
objective, language-idependent fact of the matter about which objects exist? Absolutely
not. For an extended discussion of such issues, see chapter 3.)
On the anti-Tractarian picture, what does it take for a linguistic stipulation to be
successful? Let us begin with the simplest case. Say that a pure mathematical stipulation
is a stipulation in which:
1. one introduces new vocabulary, and makes clear that it is to be regarded as falling
under a new sort;
2. one makes clear that any atomic formula that mixes vocabulary of old and new
sorts is to be counted as ill-formed;
3. one uses the new vocabulary to build an axiom system in which all the variables
and non-logical constants are of the new sort;
9.2. SUCCESS CONDITIONS 187
4. one stipulates that the new vocabulary is to be understood in such a way that the
axiom system turns out to be necessarily true.
From the perspective of an anti-Tractarian, all it takes for a pure mathematical stipu-
lation to succeedassuming it gives rise to the right sort of linguistic practiceis for the
relevant axiom system to be internally coherent (i.e. for it not to have a logical absurdity
as a logical consequence).
The reason internal coherence is sucient for success is that it is enough to guarantee
that one can construct a stable assignment of truth-conditions whereby the axioms are all
counted as necessarily true. The assignment in question can be specied as follows. Let
L
new
be the fragment of the language in which all the variables and non-logical constants
are of the new sort. Then: (1) a sentence of L
new
is taken to have trivial truth-conditions
if it is a logical consequence of the axioms; (2) a sentence of L
new
is taken to have trivially
unsatisable truth-conditions if its negation is a logical consequence of the axioms; and
(3) other sentences of L
new
are taken to lack well-dened truth-conditions.
The fact that truth-conditions are specied on the basis of logical consequence (and
therefore logical form) guarantees that syntactic structure is semantically signicant,
and that a sentences truth-conditions are determined by the inferential behavior of its
constituent parts. In this sense, the proposed specication of truth-conditions is compo-
sitional. It is also stable, in the following sense:
Since the axiom system is internally coherent, the procedure is guaranteed not to
deliver more than one assignment of truth conditions to a given sentence of L
new
.
[Here I assume that the background logic is not paraconsistent. Note, however, that if ones
background logic is paraconsistent, one need not see contradictory assignments of truth-conditions
as inherently problematic.]
Since the axiom system is internally coherent, and since atomic formulas that mix
vocabulary of old and new sorts are counted as ill-formed, the sentences of L
new
oat
free, inferentially speaking, from sentences that contain no new vocabulary. This
means, in particular, that the new axiom system is (strongly) conservative over
sentences with no new vocabulary. So the proposed assignment of truth-conditions
is guaranteed to have no eect on sentences that contain no new vocabulary.
[For axiom systemA to be strongly conservative over sentences containing no new vocabulary is for
the following condition to be satised: let O be a set of sentences containing no new vocabulary,
and let be a sentence containing no new vocabulary; then is only a logical consequence of O
and A if it is a logical consequence of O. For A to be weakly conservative is for a weaker conditions
to be satised: is only a logical consequence of O and A if it is either a logical consequence of
O or lacks well-dened truth-conditions.
These denitions can be used to dene notions of semantic conservativeness or syntactic conser-
vativeness, depending on whether logical consequence is understood syntactically or semantically.
(When the original language is governed by a logic that is syntactically completesuch as rst-
order logicsemantic conservativeness entails syntactic conservativeness.) Which of these two
kinds of conservativeness is relevant to the present discussion depends on whether one thinks that
being a semantic consequence of the newly introduced axioms is sucient for having well-dened
truth-conditions. If on thinks semantic consequence is enough, one should work with semantic
conservativeness; if one thinks that syntactic consequence is needed, one should work with syn-
tactic conservativeness. (The claims I make in this chapter are independent of whether one thinks
of logical consequence syntactically or semantically, but see footnote 1 from chapter 4.)]
The Tractarian will think that something important has been left out. She will agree
that we have found a principled way of adding the label necessary to some sentences
and the label impossible to others. But she will think that this is not enough to show
that the axioms are truelet alone necessarily true. For it ignores reference. One cannot
say true things with names unless the world contains referents for those names, and one
cannot say true things with quantiers unless the world supplies a suitable domain for
the quantiers to range over. The problem, according to the Tractarian, is that adding
9.3. INTERNAL COHERENCE 189
labels to sentenceseven when it is done in a principled waydoes nothing to show that
the world contains enough objects for such referential pairings to be possible.
The anti-Tractarian would agree that one cannot say true things with names unless
the world contains referents for those names, and that one cannot say true things with
quantiers unless the world supplies a suitable domain for the quantiers to range over.
But she would insist that the right sort of assignment of truth-conditions to sentences
shows that the world does contain enough objects for such referential pairings to be
available. For a suitable assignment of truth-conditions results in a compositional system
of representation, and for a carving of the world to be in place just is for a compositional
system of representation to be in place. So in specifying a suitable assignment of truth-
conditions one carves up the world into enough objects for the referential pairings in
question to be available.
9.3 Internal Coherence
We have seen that, from the perspective of the anti-Tractarian, all it takes for a pure
mathematical stipulation to succeed is internal coherence (assuming the stipulation gives
rise the the right sort of linguistic practice).
It would be a mistake to conclude from this, however, that it is generally a straight-
forward mater to determine whether a pure mathematical stipulation will succeed. For
it is not, in general, a straightforward matter to determine whether an axiom system
is internally coherent. Suppose, for example, that one sets forth a pure mathematical
stipulation based on Quines NF. The consistency of NF remains an open question.
1
So
it is by no means clear that knowledge that the stipulation would succeed is within our
reach.
In general, acquiring a warrant for the internal coherence of an axiom system is
1
There is, on the other hand, a consistency proof for NFU (New Foundations with Urelements). See
Jensen (1969).
a delicate matter. One can sometimes prove the consistency of one formal system in
another. But it is a consequence of Godels Second Theorem that (when the systems in
question are consistent and suciently strong) the system in which the proof is carried
out cannot be a subsystem of the system the proof is about. There is therefore reason
to expect that ones warrant for the internal coherence of a formal system will turn on
more than just consistency proofs. It might turn on whether one has a good feel for the
sorts of things that can be proved in the system, or on whether one has a good feel for
the sorts of things that can be proved in formal systems within which one has been able
to produce a consistency proof. It might also turn on whether one has a good feel for
what a model for the axiom system in question would look like.
As a result, one should expect ones warrant for the internal coherence of an axiom
system to be defeasible (whether or not it is also a priori ). And since ones warrant for
the truth of an axiom system that has been set forth as a pure mathematical stipulation
will be no better than ones warrant for the systems internal coherence, one should also
expect ones warrant for the truth of the system to be defeasible.
The picture of mathematical knowledge that we are left with is a messy one. Ones
warrant for the truth of the axioms of pure mathematics will be typically defeasible. It
will sometimes turn on informal considerations, such as whether one has a good feel for
the sorts of things that can be proved on the basis of the axioms, or for what a model
for the axioms would look like. And it will sometimes depend on ones warrant for the
truth of further mathematical theories.
This is as it should be. One wouldnt want ones account of mathematical knowledge
to yield the result that mathematical knowledge is easier to come by than the practice
of mathematicians would suggest.
9.4. APPLIED MATHEMATICS 191
9.4 Applied Mathematics
The claim that internal coherence is enough for success depends on the assumption that
the mathematical stipulation in question is pure. To see this, imagine a case in which we
introduce arithmetical vocabulary by way of a (second-order) axiom system which entails
(1) that every number is nite, (2) that any material objects can be numbered, and (3)
that the number of the Fs is n just in case there are precisely n Fs. Such an axiom
system is internally coherent. But one certainly wouldnt want to count it as necessarily
true, since it entails that there are only nitely many stars, and one shouldnt be able
to settle the question of whether there are nitely many stars on purely mathematical
grounds.
The problem with this axiom system is that it fails to be conservative. In the case
of pure mathematical stipulations conservativeness is guaranteed by the fact that mixed
atomic formulas are always counted as ill-formed. But when it comes to applied arith-
metic we have no choice but to allow for mixed atomic formulas, and therefore counte-
nance substantial inferential interactions between sentences built from new vocabulary
and sentences built from old vocabulary.
Fortunately, the role that was played by internal coherence in the case of pure math-
ematics can be played by conservativeness in the case of applied mathematics. Say that
a generalized mathematical stipulation is a stipulation in which:
1. one introduces new vocabulary, and makes clear that it is to be regarded as falling
under a new sort;
2. one makes clear which mixed atomic formulas are to be counted as ill-formed;
3. one uses the new vocabulary to build an axiom system which may or may not
include vocabulary of the old sort;
4. one stipulates that the new vocabulary is to be understood in such a way that the
axiom systems turns out to be necessarily true.
From the perspective of an anti-Tractarian, all it takes for a generalized mathematical
stipulation to succeedassuming it gives rise to the right sort of linguistic practiceis
for the relevant axiom system to be (weakly) conservative.
The reason conservativeness is sucient for success is that it is enough to guarantee
that one can construct a stable assignment of truth-conditions whereby the axioms are
all counted as necessarily true. The assignment in question can be specied as follows.
Let A be the relevant axiom system, be a sentence containing new vocabulary, w be
a world and O be the set of sentences containing no new vocabulary that are true at w.
Then: (1) is counted as true at w just in case is a logical consequence of / O; (2)
is counted as false at w just in case is a logical consequence of / O; and (3)
is otherwise counted as lacking well-dened truth-conditinons.
As in the pure case, the fact that truth-conditions are specied on the basis of logical
consequence (and therefore logical form) guarantees that syntactic structure is semanti-
cally signicant, and that a sentences truth-conditions are determined by the inferential
behavior of its constituent parts. In this sense, the proposed specication of truth-
conditions is compositional. It is also stable, in the following sense:
since the axiom system is conservative, it is guaranteed to be internally coher-
ent, and therefore guaranteed not to deliver more than one assignment of truth
conditions to sentences containing vocabulary of the new sort;
If the axiom system is strongly conservative, the procedure is guaranteed to have no
eect on sentences including no vocabulary of the new sort. If the axiom system is
weakly conservative, the procedure will only have an eect on sentences including
no vocabulary of the new sort when the sentences in question previously lacked
well-dened truth-conditions.
9.5. COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS 193
As in the pure case, the Tractarian will think that something important has been left
out, on the grounds that we have been given no guarantee that the world contains an
appropriate domain of objects for quantiers of the new sort to range over. As in the
pure case, the anti-Tractarian will reply that the right assignment of truth-conditions to
sentences shows that the world does contain the requisite domain. For in specifying a
suitable assignment of truth-conditions one carves up the world into enough to objects
for the needs of the theory to be satised.
9.5 Compositional Semantics
When a set of new mathematical vocabulary has been introduced by stipulation and
everything goes well, it is straightforward to construct a compositional semantics for
the extended language. For the success of the stipulation makes the new vocabulary
available for use. And once the vocabulary is available it can be incorporated into the
metalanguage, and used to give a homophonic semantics for the object-language.
A homophonic semantics is guaranteed to give an accurate statement of truth-conditions
for every sentence in the object-language. But it wont shed any light on the question
of what the world would have to be like in order for those truth-conditions to be sat-
ised. Suppose, for example, that one is uent with arithmetical vocabulary, but isnt
sure whether 2 + 2 = 4 has trivial truth-conditions. Being told that 2 + 2 = 4 is true
at a world just in case the world is such that 2 + 2 = 4 wont help. One will regard the
statement as intelligible, and recognize it as true. But it wont deliver an elucidation of
the sort one was after.
In contrast, a trivialist semantics of the sort described in section 4.4.1 can supply a
non-trivial elucidation of what the world would have to be like in order for the truth-
conditions of an object-language sentence to be satised. In the special case of a pure
mathematical stipulation, it is straightforward to construct such a semantics. All one
needs to do is outscope mathematical vocabulary from the homophonic semantic clauses.
Just how illuminating the result turns out to be, however, will depend on how much
mathematics one is able to prove in the metatheory. All the semantics delivers on its
own is the result that the truth-conditions of, say, 2+2=4 are either trivial or trivially
unsatisable depending on whether 2 + 2 = 4. This is more than one gets from a
homophonic semantics, but its not much. In order to get more specic results, one
would have to add the axioms that were used in the stipulation to the metatheory, and
use them to prove metalinguistic versions of the object-language sentences whose truth-
conditions one is hoping to shed light on.
A trivialist semantics can be more illuminating in the case of a generalized mathe-
matical stipulation. When one is told, for example, that #
x
(Planet(x)) = 8 is true at a
world w just in case w satises the following metalinguistic formula:
The number of the zs such that [z is a planet]
w
= 8
one immediately gets a non-trivial elucidation of the sentences truth-conditions. For
one immediately learns that whether or not they are satised depends entirely on how
matters stand with the planets. If, in addition, one has access to the relevant axioms in
the metatheory, and is able to prove that the number of the planets is Eight if and only
if there are exactly eight planets, then one will also have learned that what it takes for
#
x
(Planet(x)) = 8s truth-conditions to be satised is for there to be eight planets.
In the case of generalized mathematical stipulations, however, it is not always straight-
forward to give a trivialist semantics. One reason problems can arise in the case of applied
mathematics is that there is no general recipe for constructing trivialist semantic clauses
for atomic formulas that mix mathematical and non-mathematical vocabulary.
Things work out for the language of applied arithmetic because we have the following
equivalence:
[#
x
(F(x)) = n]
w
#
x
([F(x)]
w
) = n.
Read: at w (the number of the Fs = n) just in case (the number of the xs
such that at w (x is an F)) = n.
(Or an actualist version thereofsee section 4.4.1.) It is because of this equivalence that
we are able to outscope, and go from the homophonic semantic clause for the mixed
atomic formula #
x
(F(x)) = n,
#
x
(F(x)) = n is true at w [#
x
(F(x)) = n]
w
,
to a trivialist semantic clause,
#
x
(F(x)) = n is true at w #
x
([F(x)]
w
) = n.
But such equivalences are not guaranteed to be available in general. For instance, I know
of no general way of dening a trivialist semantics for a plural language that has been
enriched with non-logical atomic plural predicates. (For discussion of PFO+ languages,
see Rayo (2002b).) Happily, one can give a trivialist semantics for the language of set-
theory with urelements. (See section 4.6.1.)
Moral: There is no free lunch. If you want an illuminating account of truth-conditions,
youll have to do work to get it.
Intended Interpretations
Up to now we have been focusing on the project of giving a compositional semantics for a
language whose component parts have been rendered meaningful by linguistic stipulation.
We have seen that a homophonic semantics is always available, and that it some cases
it may be possible to modify a homophonic semantics to get a trivialist semantics. We
have also seen that the ability of the trivialist semantics to deliver useful information
about a sentences truth conditions will depend, in part, on our ability to prove results
in the metatheory, by using the axiom system on which the stipulation was based.
There is, however, an alternate method for arriving at a trivialist semantics for math-
ematical discourse. On the alternate method, one neednt presuppose that the object
language has been previously rendered meaningful by stipulating that a given axiom sys-
tem is to count as necessarily true. One neednt even have access to an axiom system
on which such a stipulation might have been based. Instead, one relies on the ability to
identify an intended interpretation for the new vocabulary.
One could, for example, construct a trivialist assignment of truth-conditions to arith-
metical sentences by working on the assumption that number-terms should be interpreted
as standing for nite ordinals. On the most natural way of spelling out the details, a
trivialist semantics would yield the result that #
x
(Planet(x)) = 8 is true at a world w
just in case w satises the following metalinguistic formula:
The ordinal in one-one correspondence with the set of zs such that [z is a
planet]
w
= 8
ord
The thing to note is that even though the semantic values of arithmetical terms are based
on ordinals rather than numbers, one gets the very same assignment of truth-conditions
that are delivered by the number-based semantics of section 4.4.1. In both cases, one
gets the result that #
x
(Planet(x)) = 8 is true at w just in case there are eight planets
at w. And the point generalizes: assuming restrictions on the well-formedness of mixed
atomic formulas, one gets identical assignments of truth-conditions for every sentence in
the language.
A Tractarian would insist that an assignment of truth-conditions to arithmetical
sentences can only be accurate if it uses numbers rather than sets to build the semantic
values of arithmetical terms. But, from the point of view of an anti-Tractarian, the
only legitimate constraint on an assignment of semantic values is that it deliver the right
specication of truth-conditions.
According to the anti-Tractarian, the real dierence between a trivialist semantics
based on numbers and a trivialist semantics based on ordinals is that dierent metathe-
oretical resources need to be deployed before one can use the semantics to make illumi-
nating statements about the truth-conditions of object-language sentences. When one
uses numbers to build the semantic values of arithmetical terms, one needs to derive the
formula e
i
= 1 in the metatheory in order to ascertain whether the object-language
formula e
i
= 1 has trivial (rather than trivially unsatisable) truth-conditions; when
one uses ordinals, one needs to derive a set-theoretic formula instead.
Part III
Appendices
199
Appendix A
A Semantics for a Language with
the Dot Notation
I give a formal semantics for a language L
w
which allows for empty names and contains
both the intensional operator [. . .]
w
(read according to w, . . . ) and the dot-notation.
L
w
consists of the following symbols:
1. for n > 0, the n-place (non-modal) predicate letters: F
n
1
, F
n
2
, . . . (each with an
intended interpretation);
2. for n > 0, the one-place modal predicate letters: B
1
, B
2
, . . . (each with an
intended interpretation);
3. the identity symbol =;
4. for n > 0, the individual non-empty constant-letter c
n
(each with an intended
referent);
5. for n > 0, the individual empty constant-letter e
n
;
6. the individual constant
201
202APPENDIXA. ASEMANTICS FOR ALANGUAGE WITHTHE DOT NOTATION
7. the dot ;
8. the monadic sentential operator [. . .];
9. the monadic sentential operator ;
10. the dyadic sentential operators ,
11. the quantier-symbol ;
12. the modal variables: w, v u with or without numerical subscripts;
13. the non-modal variables: x, y, z with or without numerical subscripts;
14. the auxiliaries ( and ).
Undotted terms and formulas are dened as follows:
1. any modal variable is an undotted modal term;
2. is an undotted modal term;
3. any non-modal variable or individual constant-letter is an undotted non-modal
term;
4. if
1
, . . . ,
n
are undotted non-modal terms, then F
n
i
(
1
, . . . ,
n
) is an undotted
formula;
5. if
1
and
2
are either both undotted non-modal terms or both undotted modal
terms, then
1
=
2
is an undotted formula;
6. if w is an undotted modal term, then B
i
(w) is an undotted formula;
7. if is an undotted formula and w is an undotted modal term, then []
w
is an
undotted formula;
203
8. if v is an undotted (modal or non-modal) variable and is an undotted formula,
then v() is an undotted formula;
9. if and are undotted formulas, then , ( ), ( ) and ( )
are undotted formulas;
10. nothing else is an undotted term or formula.
A non-modal term is either an undotted non-modal term or the result of dotting a
non-modal variable; a modal term is an undotted modal term; a formula is the result of
dotting any free or externally bounded occurrences of non-modal variables in an undotted
formula.
1
Next, we characterize the notion of an a-world and of a variable assignment. An
a-world is a pair D, I) with the following features:
1. D is a set of individuals in the range of the non-modal variables, each of which is
either of the form x, actual) or of the form x, nonactual).
2
2. I is a function assigning a subset of D to each 1-place predicate-letter, and a subset
of D
n
to each n-place predicate letter (for n < 1). In addition, if e is an empty
name, I may or may not assign a referent to e (and if a referent is assigned, it may
or may not be in D).
The actualized a-world D
, I
) will be singled out for special attention. D
is the set of
pairs z, actual) for z an individual in the range of the non-modal variables; and I
(F
n
j
)
is the set of sequences z
1
, actual) , . . . z
n
, actual)) such tha z
1
. . . z
n
are in the range
of the non-modal variables and satisfy F.
A variable assignment is a function with the following features:
1
An occurrence of a non-modal variable in an undotted formula is free i it is not bound by a
quantier; an occurrence of a non-modal variable in an undotted formula is externally bounded i it is
bound by a quantier which is not within the scope of [. . .].
2
I assume that D is a set for the sake of simplicity. The assumption can be avoided by characterizing
the notion of an a-world in second-order terms. This can be done by employing the technique in Rayo
and Uzquiano (1999).
1. assigns an a-world to each modal variable.
2. assigns an individual to each non-modal variable.
This puts us in a position to characterize notions of quasi-denotation and quasi-satisfaction.
(Denotation and satisfaction proper will be characterized later). For v a non-modal vari-
able, a variable assignment, a formula and w an a-world, we characterize the quasi-
denotation function
,w
(v) and the quasi-satisfaction predicate Sat(, ). In addition,
we characterize an auxiliary (a-world-relative) quasi-satisfaction predicate Sat(, , w).
We proceed axiomatically, by way of the following clauses:
If v is a (modal or non-modal) variable,
,w
(v) is (v);
If v is a non-modal variable, w is an a-world and (v) is an ordered pair of the
form z, actual), then
,w
( v) is the rst member of (v); otherwise
,w
( v) is
undened;
if c is a non-empty constant-letter and w is an a-world,
,w
(c) is the intended
referent of c.
if e is an empty constant-letter and w is an a-world,
,w
(e) is the w-referent of e if
there is one, and is otherwise undened;

,w
() is D
, I
);
if
1
and
2
are terms (both of them modal or both of them non-modal) and neither
of them is an empty constant-letter, then Sat(
1
=,
2
), ) if and only if
,w
(
1
) =
,w
(
2
) for arbitrary w;
if
1
and
2
are non-modal terms at least one of which is an empty constant-letter,
then not-Sat(
1
=,
2
), );
205
if
1
, . . .
n
are non-modal terms none of which is an empty constant-letter, then
Sat(F
n
i
(
1
, . . . ,
n
), ) if and only if F
n
i
(
,w
(
1
), . . . ,
,w
(
n
)), where w is arbi-
trary and F
n
i
is intended to express F
n
i
-ness;
if
1
, . . .
n
are non-modal terms at least one of which is an empty constant-letter,
then not-Sat(F
n
i
(
1
, . . . ,
n
), );
if v is a modal variable, Sat(B
i
(v), ) if and only if B
i
(
,w
(v)) for arbitrary w,
where B
i
is intended to express B
i
-ness;
if v is a non-modal variable, Sat(v(), ) if and only if there is an individual z
in the range of the non-modal variables such that Sat(,
v/z
), where
v/z
is just
like except that it assigns z to v;
if v is a modal variable, Sat(v(), ) if and only if there is an a-world z such
that Sat(,
v/z
), where
v/z
is just like except that it assigns z to v;
Sat(, ) if and only if it is not the case that Sat(, );
Sat( , ) if and only if Sat(, ) and Sat(, );
Sat([]
w
, ) if and only if Sat(,
, (w)), where
(x) = (x) for x a modal

variable and
(x) = (x), actual) for x a non-modal variable;

if
1
and
2
are non-modal terms neither of which is an empty constant-letter
without a w-reference, then Sat(
1
=,
2
), , w) if and only if
,w
(
1
) is in the
domain of w and is identical to
,w
(
2
);
if
1
and
2
are non-modal terms at least one of which is a constant-letter without
a w-reference, then not-Sat(
1
=,
2
), , w);
if
1
and
2
are modal terms, then Sat(
1
=,
2
,w
(
1
) =
,w
(
2
) for arbitrary w;
if
1
, . . .
n
are non-modal terms none of which is a constant-letter without a w-
reference, then Sat(F
n
i
(
1
, . . . ,
n
,w
(
1
), . . . ,
,w
(
n
)) is in
the w-extension of F
n
i
;
if
1
, . . .
n
are non-modal terms at least one of which is a constant-letter without
a w-reference, then not-Sat(F
n
i
(
1
, . . . ,
n
), , w);
if v is a modal term, Sat(B
i
(v), , w) if and only if B
i
(
,w
(v)), where B
i
is
intended to express B
i
-ness;
if v is a non-modal variable, Sat(v(), , w) if and only if there is an individual
z in the domain of w such that Sat(,
v/z
, w), where
v/z
is just like except
that it assigns z to v;
if v is a modal variable, Sat(v(), , w) if and only if there is an a-world z such
that (a) any empty constant-letter which is assigned a referent by w is assigned the
same referent by z, and (b) Sat(,
v/z
, w), where
v/z
is just like except that
it assigns z to v;
Sat(, , w) if and only if it is not the case that Sat(, , w);
Sat( , , w) if and only if Sat(, , w) and Sat(, , w);
Sat([]
u
, , w) if and only if Sat(, , (u)).
Finally, we say that a formula is quasi-true if and only if Sat(, ) for any variable
assignment .
With a suitable notion of admissibility is on board, one can characterize truth and
satisfaction for L
w
. Satisfaction is the special case of quasi-satisfaction in which attention
is restricted to admissible a-worlds, and truth is the special case of quasi-truth in which
attention is restricted to admissible a-worlds.
Appendix B
If Lewis Can Say It, You Can Too
In section 7.5.2 I described a transformation from Lewisian sentences to dotted actualist
sentences. The purpose of this appendix is to explain how the transformation works in
general. I shall assume that the Lewisian language is a two-sorted rst-order languages,
with world-variables w
1
, w
2
, etc. ranging over Lewisian worlds, and individual-variables
x
1
, x
2
, etc. ranging over world-bound individuals in the Lewisian pluriverse. The lan-
guage contains no function-letters; there is a world-constant referring to the actual
Lewisian world and individual-constants c
1
, c
2
, etc. referring to world-bound indi-
viduals. The only atomic predicates are I (which takes an individual-variable and
a world-variable), C (which takes two individual-variables), = (which takes (i) two
world-variables, (ii) two individual-variables, (iii) a world-constant and a world-variable,
or (iv) an individual-constant and an individual-variable) and, for each j, P
n
j
(which
takes n individual-variables). (If one likes, one can also take the language to contain
set-theoretic vocabulary.) Finally, I shall assume that universal quantiers are dened in
terms of existential quantiers in the usual way, and that logical connectives other than
and are dened in terms of and in the usual way.
The plan is to proceed in two steps. The rst is to get the Lewisian sentence into
a certain kind of normal form; the second is to convert the normal-form sentence into
207
208 APPENDIX B. IF LEWIS CAN SAY IT, YOU CAN TOO
a dotted actualist sentence. Here is a recipe for getting an arbitrary Lewisian sentence
into normal form:
1. Start by relabeling variables in such a way that no world-variable in has the same
index as an individual-variable;
2. next, replace each occurrence of I(x
j
, w
k
) by w
j
= w
k
;
3. then replace each occurrence of the atomic formula P
n
j
(x
k
1
, . . . , x
kn
) by
(P
n
j
(x
k
1
, . . . , x
kn
) w
k
1
= w
k
2
. . . w
k
1
= w
kn
),
each occurrence of c
j
= x
k
by (c
j
= x
k
= w
k
), and each occurrence of
x
j
= x
k
by (x
j
= x
k
w
j
= w
k
).
1
4. nally, replace each occurrence of x
j
(. . .) by x
j
w
j
(I(x
j
, w
j
) . . .).
On the assumption that P
n
j
is projectable (and, hence, that P
n
j
(x
k
1
, . . . , x
kn
) can only
be true if x
k
1
, . . . , x
kn
are world-mates), it is easy to verify that this procedure respects
truth-value. (For a characterization of projectability, see footnote 5 of chapter 7.)
Here is an example. The Lewisian sentence
w
17
x
2
x
5
(I(x
2
, w
17
) Sister(x
2
, x
5
))
(Read: There is a Lewisian world w
17
an individual x
2
and an individual w
5
such that x
2
17
and x
2
has x
5
as a sister.)
gets rewritten as:
w
17
x
2
w
2
(I(x
2
, w
2
)x
5
w
5
(I(x
5
, w
5
)w
2
= w
17
Sister(x
2
, x
5
)w
2
= w
5
))
(Read: There is a Lewisian world w
17
, an individual x
2
inhabiting Lewisian
world w
2
, and an individual x
5
inhabiting Lewisian world w
5
such that w
2
is
identical to w
17
, x
2
has x
5
as a sister and w
2
is identical to w
5
.)
1
These three replacements are needed to secure the base clause in the induction below.
209
Once one has a Lewisian sentence in normal form, it can be transformed into a dotted
actualist sentence by carrying out the following replacements:
I(x
j
, w
j
) [y(y = x
j
)]
w
j
P
n
j
(x
k
1
, . . . , x
kn
) [P
n
j
( x
k
1
, . . . , x
kn
)]
w
k
1
C(x
j
, x
k
) x
j
= x
k
c
j
= x
k
[c
j
= x
k
]
w
k
Here is an example. The Lewisian rendering of (x
1
x
2
Sister(x
1
, x
2
)) is
w
3
x
1
x
2
(I(x
1
, w
3
) I(x
2
, w
3
) Sister(x
1
, x
2
))
whose normal form
w
3
x
1
w
1
(I(x
1
, w
1
) x
2
w
2
(I(x
2
, w
2
) w
1
= w
3
w
1
= w
3
Sister(x
1
, x
2
) w
1
= w
2
))
gets transformed by the actualist into
w
3
x
1
w
1
([y(y = x
1
)]
w
1
x
2
w
2
([y(y = x
2
)]
w
2
w
1
= w
3
w
1
= w
3
[Sister( x
1
, x
2
)]
w
1
w
1
= w
2
))
which boils down to:
w
3
x
1
x
2
([Sister( x
1
, x
2
)]
w
3
)
(Read: There is are objects x
1
and x
2
and an admissible a-world w such that
x
1
and x
2
are used by w to represent someones having a sister.)
and is guaranteed by the Appendix A semantics to be equivalent to
w
3
([x
1
x
2
Sister(x
1
, x
2
)]
w
3
)
(Read: There is an admissible a-world w according to which there are indi-
viduals x
1
and x
2
such that x
1
has x
2
as a sister.)
which is the actualists rendering of (x
1
x
2
Sister(x
1
, x
2
)).
Here is a slightly more complex example. The actualists rendering of
There are possible worlds w
1
and w
2
with the following properties: according
to w
1
, there is an individual who is my sister and a philosopher; according to
w
2
, that very individual is a cellist rather than a philosopher.
is
w
4
w
5
x
1
x
2
x
3
(
I(x
1
, w
4
)I(x
2
, w
4
) I(x
3
, w
5
)
x
6
(ar = x
6
C(x
6
, x
1
)) C(x
2
, x
3
)
Sister(x
1
, x
2
) Phil(x
2
) Cellist(x
3
) Phil(x
3
))
whose normal form
w
4
w
5
x
1
w
1
(I(x
1
, w
1
) x
2
w
2
(I(x
2
, w
2
)x
3
w
3
(I(x
3
, w
4
)
w
1
= w
4
w
2
= w
4
w
3
= w
5
x
6
w
6
(I(x
6
, w
6
) ar = x
6
= w
6
C(x
6
, x
1
)) C(x
2
, x
3
)
Sister(x
1
, x
2
) Phil(x
2
) Cellist(x
3
) Phil(x
3
))))
211
gets transformed by the actualist into
w
4
w
5
x
1
w
1
([y(y = x
1
)]
w
1
x
2
w
2
([y(y = x
2
)]
w
2
x
3
w
3
([y(y = x
3
)]
w
3
w
1
= w
4
w
2
= w
4
w
3
= w
5
x
6
w
6
([y(y = x
6
)]
w
6
[ar = x
6
]
w
6
= w
6
x
6
= x
1
) x
2
= x
3
[Sister( x
1
, x
2
)]
w
1
w
1
= w
2
[Phil( x
2
)]
w
2
[Cellist( x
3
)]
w
3
[Phil( x
3
)]
w
3
)))
which boils down to
w
4
w
5
x
2
([Sister(ar, x
2
)]
w
4
[Phil( x
2
)]
w
4
[Cellist( x
2
)]
w
5
[Phil( x
2
)]
w
5
)
(Read: there are admissible a-worlds w
4
and w
5
and an individual x
2
such that: (i) x
2
is
used by w
4
to represent my sister and a philosopher, and (ii) x
2
is used by w
5
to represent
a cellist rather than a philosopher.)
Finally, we show that there is a notion of a-world admissibility which guarantees that
the actualist transformation of an arbitrary Lewisian sentence has the truth-value that
the Lewisian sentence would receive on its intended interpretation. (The proof relies on
the assumption that the Lewisian language is rich enoughand the space of Lewisian
worlds varied enough with respect to predicates occurring in the languagethat the set of
true sentences has a model in which any two worlds are such that some atomic predicate
satised by a sequence of objects inhabiting one of the worlds, but not by the result of
replacing each object in the sequence by its counterpart in the other world.) Start by
enriching the Lewisian language with a standard name for each inhabitant of the actual
world, and let S be the set of true sentences in the extended language. One can use
the Completeness Theorem to generate a model M of S in which the domain consists of
=-equivalence classes of terms and in which the assumption above is satised. If a
1
is
an object in the individual-variable domain of M, let a
1
be the set of individuals a
2
such
that C(x
1
, x
2
) is satised by a
1
and a
2
. (I assume that C is an equivalence relation, and
therefore that partitions the individual-variable domain of M into equivalence classes.)
If a
1
is an object in the individual-variable domain of M, let a
be z, actual) if the
standard name of z is in the transitive closure of a
, and a
, nonactual) otherwise.
For each c in the world-variable domain of M, we construct an a-world w
c
, as follows:
the domain of w
c
is the set of a
such that I(x

1
, w
1
) is satised by a and c in M; the
w
c
extension of P
n
j
is the set of sequences
1
, . . . , a
such that I(x

1
, w
1
) . . .
I(x
n
, w
1
) P
n
j
(x
1
. . . , x
n
) is satised by a
1
, . . . , a
n
, c in M. In addition we let individual
constants receive their intended interpretations, and let be w
c
, where c is the M-
referent of . Say that an a-world is admissible just in case it is a w
c
for some c in
the world-variable domain of M. If is a variable-assignment function in M, let
be
such that
(x
j
) is (x
j
)
(w
j
) is w
c
if x
j
occurs in (where c is such that
I(x
1
, w
1
) is satised by (x
j
) and c in M), and
(w
j
) is w
(w
j
)
if x
j
does not
occur in . An induction on the complexity of formulas shows that a Lewisian formula
is satised by an assignment function in M just in case the actualist transformation of
its normal form is satised by
when the world-variables range over admissible a-worlds

and the individual-variables range over the union of the domains of admissible a-worlds.
Appendix C
The Canonical Space of Worlds
The Construction
I shall assume that L has a set-sized vocabulary and a set-sized domain. An essence is
a set of constitutive predicates of L such that possession of every predicate in the set is
consistent with the set of true identity-statements. Since the vocabulary of L is set-sized,
the essences must form a set. Let the cardinality of this set be .
We construct the canonical space of worlds in stages. At each stage, we do two things:
(1) we introduce a set of objects and assign each of them an essence, and (2) we introduce
a set of a-worlds for L
.
At stage 0 we introduce the set of objects x, actual) for x in the domain of L. For
each x, we let the essence of x, actual) be the set of constitutive predicates x actually
satises. The only world we introduce at stage 0 is the actualized a-world for L
(i.e. the
a-world whose domain consists of pairs x, actual) for x in the domain of L, and in
which every predicate receives its intended interpretation, corrected for the fact that the
domain consists of ordered pairs x, actual) instead of their rst components).
For k a natural number, stage k +1 is constructed as follows. First, we introduce an
object
k+1
, non-actual) for each 2
. The newly introduced objects are assigned

essences in such a way that every essence gets represented innitely many times. Finally,
213
214 APPENDIX C. THE CANONICAL SPACE OF WORLDS
we introduce an a-world w just in case it meets the following conditions:
C1 Every object in the domain of w was introduced at some stage k + 1.
C2 If (x
1
, . . . , x
n
)
x
1
,...,xn
(x
1
, . . . , x
n
) is a true identity-statement,
x
1
. . . x
n
((x
1
, . . . , x
n
) (x
1
, . . . , x
n
)) is true at w.
C3 If z is in the domain of w, every predicate in the essence of z is satised by z at w.
We let the cannonical space of worlds, M, be the set of a-worlds introduced at some stage
of this process, and designate the actualized a-world as Ms center. It is straightforward
to verify that the Principle of Identity is satised in M.
Possibility
Let a possibility statement be a sentence of L
of the following form:

x
1
(
1
( x
1
) ( x
2
(
2
( x
1
, x
2
) x
3
(
3
( x
1
, x
2
, x
3
) . . .)))
where none of the
i
contain boxes or diamonds. A possibility statement will be said to
be good just in case there is a way of assigning an essence to each variable, and of deciding
which variables will be treated as correferential, such that the following condition is met:
Modify the possibility statement so as to get the following:
x
1
(E
1
( x
1
) I
1
( x
1
)
1
( x
1
) ( x
2
(E
2
( x
2
) I
2
( x
1
, x
2
)
2
( x
1
, x
2
) . . .))
where E
i
(. . .) applies every predicate in the essence assigned to a given vari-
able to that variable, and I
i
(. . .) is the conjunction consisting of a conjunct
yz(x
i
= y x
j
= z) x
i
= x
j
whenever x
i
and x
j
are treated as coref-
erential and a conjunct yz(x
i
= y x
j
= z) x
i
,= x
j
whenever x
i
and
215
x
j
are treated as referring to dierent objects. Then each of the following
conditions is satised:
1. x
1
(E
1
( x
1
) I
1
( x
1
)
1
( x
1
)) is true.
2. For each i > 1, there is an a-world w and a family of interpreted con-
stants c
(which may or may not refer to objects in the domain of w)

such that: (1) w satises C2, and (2) x
i
(E
i
( x
i
) I
i
( c
1
, . . . , c
i1
, x
i
)
i
( c
1
, . . . , c
i1
, x
i
)) is true at w.
One can then prove the following:
Theorem 1 Every good possibility statement is true in M.
Proof: Let be a good possibility statement containing n diamonds. We know that
there are assignments of essences and coreferentiality such that a version of modied
as above satises conditions 1 and 2 above. Since modied- entails , it will suce to
show that modied- is true in M.
We proceed by reductio. For k n + 1, let the k-truncation of modied- be the
result of eliminating from modied- the subformula beginning with the kth diamond
and the conjunction sign that precedes it (or doing nothing, if k = n +1). Suppose that
modied- is false in M. It follows from condition 1 of the denition of goodness, and the
fact that the Ms center is the actualized a-world, that the 1-truncation of modied- is
true in M. So there must be some k n such that the kth-truncation of modied- is
true in M and the k + 1th truncation is false in M.
Since the kth-truncation of modied- is true, there must be a sequence of a-worlds
w
1
, . . . w
k
in M and a sequence of objects a
1
, . . . , a
k
such that: (1) w
1
is the actualized
a-world, (2) each of the a
i
is in the domain of w
i
, and (3) w
i
veries the subformula of the
kth-truncation of modied- that follows the string of existential quantiers that binds x
i
when each variable in x
j
is assigned the corresponding a
j
as a value (j i). By condition
2 of the denition of goodness, there is an a-world w verifying every identity-statement
and such that the subformula x
k+1
(E
k+1
( x
k+1
) I
k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
)
k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
))
of is true when the x
j
(j < k +1) are replaced by suitable new constants. Where m is
the maximum of the stages at which w
1
, . . . w
k
were introduced to M, it is easy to verify
that there is a world w
which is isomorphic to w and is introduced to M at stage m+1.

To see this, we assume with no loss of generality that w has a countable domain, and
replace each object z in the domain of w by z
, where (. . .)
is dened as follows:
1. If c
i
j
is the new constant introduced to take the place of the ith member of x
j
, and
if the referent z of c
i
j
is in the domain of w, then z
is ith member of a
j
.
(This assignment is guaranteed to be one-one because we know that the result of
substituting new constants for variables in I
k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
) is true at w.)
2. To each remaining object z in the domain of w, (. . .)
assigns a distinct m+1-stage

object whose essence matches the distribution of constitutive predicates that are
satised by z in w.
The construction of M guarantees that some a-world introduced to M at stage m+1 is
isomorphic to w under (. . .)
.
This can be used to show that the k + 1th truncation of modied- is true in
M, and therefore to complete our reductio. It suces to check that the subformula
x
k+1
(E
k+1
( x
k+1
)I
k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
)
k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
)) of modied- is true in w
when
the values of the x
1
, . . . , x
k
are taken to be a
1
, . . . , a
k
. Start by xing referents

b
k+1
for
x
k+1
in the domain of w that witness the truth of x
k+1
(E
k+1
( x
k+1
)I
k+1
( c
1
, . . . c
k
, x
k+1
)
k+1
( c
1
, . . . c
k
, x
k+1
)) in w. Let be an assignment function for L
that assigns the refer-

ent of a new constant replacing a given variable to that variable and assigns

b
k+1
to x
k+1
;
let
be an assignment function for L
that assigns a
1
, . . . , a
k
to x
1
, . . . , x
k
, assigns z
to a variable v whenever (v) = z and z is in the domain of w, and assigns an object

outside the domain of w
to v whenever (v) is an object outside the domain of w.

217
To prove the result, it suces to show that
k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
) is true in w relative to
just in case it is true in w
relative to
. We proceed by induction on the complexity

of
k+1
:

k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
) is P( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
) for P atomic.
I am assuming that atomic formulas (including formulas of the form y = z) are
false at an a-world whenever they involve empty terms. So the empty-term case
follows from the observation that the result of applying to x
1
, . . . , x
k+1
is outside
the domain of w just in case the result of applying
to x
1
, . . . , x
k+1
is outside the
domain of w
.
When there are no empty terms, the result follows from the observation that w and
w
are isomorphic under (. . .)
.

k+1
( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
) is z(( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
, z)). Suppose z(( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
, z)) is true in
w relative to , then there is some y in the domain of w such that ( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
, z)
is true in w relative to [y/z]. By inductive hypothesis, ( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
, z) is true in
w
relative to [y
/z]. So z(( x
1
, . . . x
k+1
, z)) is true in w
relative to
. The
converse is analogous.
The remaining cases are trivial.
Appendix D
Modal Sentences and Modal Facts
As described in section 2.2, the foundational problem is the problem of explaining what
it takes for modal truths to be true. I have argued that it can be addressed by appeal to
identity statements, on the grounds that the set of true identity statements can be used
to state the truth-conditions of sentences in L
without appealing to vocabulary outside

L. But perhaps you think that this is not enough: to fully address the foundational
problem one would have to explain what it takes for an arbitrary modal fact to obtain,
regardless of whether the fact happens to be expressible in L
.
It is not clear to me that one can make sense of this more ambitious project without
committing oneself to potentially controversial assumptions. But let me suggest a way
of spelling it out. Suppose that one is a realist about properties, and takes them to
form a Boolean Algebra. One believes, in particular, that properties are closed under
complements and intersections: if the property of being F exists and the property of
being G exists, then so do the property of being not-F and the property of being F-and-
G. It follows that one can talk about one propertys being a part of another: F-ness is
a part of G-ness just in case G-ness = F-and-G-ness. (Thus, the property of containing
hydrogen is a part of the property of being composed of water.) And since the space of
properties forms a Boolean Algebra there must an impossible property, which is identical
219
220 APPENDIX D. MODAL SENTENCES AND MODAL FACTS
to the intersection of any property and its complement. (Thus, the impossible property
= the property of containing hydrogen and not containing hydrogen = the property of
having a mustache and not having a mustache.)
Within this framework, one can ask a version of the foundational question: what
grounds the dierence between property-instantiations that are (metaphysically) possible
and those that are not? And the answer is as simple as can be: for an instantiation to be
possible just is for it to not to include an instantiation of the impossible property when
one assumes closure under intersections.
The reason the answer is so straightforward is that one can use identities amongst
properties to play the same sort of role that identity statements have been playing in
our discussion so far. Consider, for example, an assignment of two properties to a given
object x: the property of being composed of water and the property of not containing
hydrogen. Is this assignment possible? The property of being composed of water = the
property of being composed of H
2
O, and the property of containing hydrogen is part
of the property of being composed of H
2
O. So the property of containing hydrogen is
part of the property of being composed of water. It follows that the intersection of the
property of being composed of water and the property of not containing hydrogen is the
impossible property. So when one assumes that the property-assignment is closed under
intersections, one gets the result that x instantiates the impossible property. From this
we may conclude that the property-assignment in question is not possible, and therefore
that it is not possible for something to be composed of water and not contain hydrogen.
Similar arguments could be given even if the properties in question were described
using explicitly modal vocabulary. For instance, by assuming that the property of being
human = the property of being a mammal that might have been human, one can show
that property-assignments whereby the same object instantiates both the property of
not being human and the property of being a mammal that might have been human are
impossible. A more extreme case is the property of, e.g. being such that there might have
221
been a purple elephant. If you take the truth-conditions of There might have been a
purple elephant to be trivial, you will think this property is the trivial property (i.e. the
Boolean Algebras ), and therefore think that an assignment of the property would
be possible. If, on the other hand, you take the truth-conditions to be impossible, you
will think the property is the impossible property (i.e. the Boolean Algebras ), and
therefore think that an assignment would be impossible.
This underlines the generality of the proposal, but also the fact that the proposal
is of limited interest. When one focuses on the space of properties, and abstracts away
from the predicates that might be used to express these properties, possibility is a pretty
boring concept: a possible assignment of properties to objects is simply one that steers
clear from the impossible property. The real action comes from the project of ascertaining
identities amongst properties (e.g. ascertaining whether the property of being composed
of water is identical to the property of being composed H
2
O). But this is only interesting
insofar as language enters into the pictureotherwise all there is to be said about identity
is that every property is identical to itself and nothing else. The interest comes from
ascertaining whether the satisfaction conditions of is composed of water are any dierent
from the satisfaction conditions of is composed of H
2
O or, equivalently, whether one
should accept To be composed of water just is to be composed of H
2
O. (If you believe
in concepts, you might wish to make the point at the level of thought, rather than
language. You might wish to claim that the interest comes from ascertaining whether
the satisfaction conditions of the concept composed of water are any dierent from the
satisfaction conditions of the concept composed of H
2
O.)
Metaphysically minded philosophers may nonetheless think it important to develop
a language-independent answer to the foundational problem. (They might claim, for
example, that a metaphysics of modality is needed to supply truth-makers for modal
truths.) Postulating a space of properties such as the one we have been discussing
could be the rst step in such a project. But it is worth emphasizing that were not
222 APPENDIX D. MODAL SENTENCES AND MODAL FACTS
there yet. Up to now, attention has been restricted to monadic properties, and there
is no reason to think that every modal fact can be cashed out as an assignment of
monadic properties. A successful proposal would presumably have to encompass polyadic
properties (e.g. the relation of being a sister of), zero-place properties (e.g. that a marriage
take place) and higher-level properties (e.g. being innite in number), and this gives rise
to a complication. One needs it to turn out to be impossible for the relation of being
a sister of to be instantiated without there also being instantiations of the monadic
property of being a sister. My guess, for what its worth, is that one would be be able
to solve the problem by claiming that some properties have others as constituents, and
postulating the right sort of connections between the instantiation of a property and the
instantiation of its constituents.
For the purposes of this book, however, the language-dependent version of the pro-
posal is all we need. We will always be able to pick a rst-order language L expressive
enough for the task at hand.
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Possibility and Content

Metaphysics without Deep Metaphysics

2 degrees celsius, its chemical composition

be the modal language that

can be specied using only

will turn out to have truth-

can be specied using only vocabulary in L.

accessible from pall

. Until more has been said about the

corresponding to a true identity statements should turn

corresponding to a true identity statement

in W such that according to w there is something

that very individual is not an F. The problem is that

. So it is not immediately clear how one should go

is true just in case it is counted as true by the Kripke-semantics

that is theorem of classical logic will count

corresponding to every true identity statement. In

rendering of) necessarily,

. But one might

it is enough to count . . . as a true

it is enough to count . . . as a true

it is enough to count . . . as a true

to be a member of the set of Fs just is for x

be a version of the language of set-theory with urelements in which each

( < ). As mentioned above, Lin-

by restricting the quantiers to V

81 = 9 have the same coarse-grained content, since they are both

81 = 9, can be used to report signicant

81 = 9. (If you are not a mathematical trivialist, please

81 = 9 expresses a truth expresses a contingent truth, since

81 = 9 consists, at lest in part, of coming to represent the world

81 = 9 expresses a truth. So one

81 = 9. And not any model will do. We want a

81 = 9 is stored in the subjects belief box. (Equivalently:

81 = 9.) So far so good. But now what? How is the

81 = 9. How might this knowledge be manifested

81 = 9? (or to some analogue of this question in a language she understands).

81 is divisible by 3 from 9 is divisible by 3.

81 = 9 is true by deriving it from the axioms.

81 = 9 is true. So the information that the subject possess is to begin

81 = 9 is true. And yet she is unable to deploy this

81 = 9 acquires the ability to derive

81 is divisible by 3 from 9 is divisible by

81 = 9 is that she is able to extend the range of tasks

81 = 9 we sometimes expect this knowledge to be manifested in her

81 = 9, the fragment corresponding to the task of tile-purchase and the fragment

81 = 9, the farmer acquires the ability to deploy the

81 = 9 one may be ascribing her the ability to use

81 = 9 true?. But the very

81 = 9 from the axioms but knows nothing

be the result of enriching L with the

are true, there is a notion of admissibility relative to which an a-worlds semantics

. (I assume that the domain of L is a set.) Proof:

, use Kripkes completeness theorem for modal languages

) contains a name for every object

, and suppose s says that p. Then:

) be an arbitrary a-world in A. Let x(x) and x(x)

which say, respectively, that the x are F and that

) in the Kripke-model based on A.

but not [Sister(ar, x)]

but not [y Sister( x, y)]

(since the performance represents

, where D is the conjunction of the (second-order)