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International Studies 4803 December 3, 2013 On March 11, 1978 eleven members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization infiltrated Israel via sea and seized a bus, taking its occupants hostage. They directed the driver to drive toward Tel Aviv, and along the way they fired upon and threw grenades at passing vehicles. When intercepted by Israeli security forces, a shootout ensued and the terrorists shot at the hostages and then blew up the bus as they fled. Upwards of forty people died from the attack and seventy-one were injured (Gil, Ynet, JVL). Three days later, as a direct result of the attack, Israeli launched Operation Litani. The operation involved the Israel Defense Force (IDF) invading and occupying southern Lebanon up to the Litani river (Tucker, pg. 636; Gad pg43) in order to strike at Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) staging areas and bases (IJS, Gabrie 58). The Lebanese government, disconcerted and angry, submitted a strong protest to the United Nations Security Council. The Lebanese government stated that they werent responsible for the PLO presence in their territory, and that they were convinced that Israel only invaded so that they could control the water-rich areas of southern Lebanon (Goksel and Hauck pg. 14; UNIFIL Background). United States president Jimmy Carter feared that the invasion would upset the peace talks that were supposed to happen between Egypt and Israel, so, the U.S. more than any other, pushed for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and for a U.N. peacekeeping mission to be sent to southern Lebanon (Goksel pg. 2, Meisler pg. 199). On March 19, 1978, the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 and 426 (Tucker pg. 636; United Nations 1978). In resolution 425, the Security Council called for a ceasefire and for Israel to withdraw all of its forces from Lebanese territory, additionally, they established that an

interim force would be sent to Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security, and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area (United Nations 1978). The Secretary-General of the U.N., in report S/12611 (U.N. S/12611), established the responsibilities and guidelines of the interim force and, finally, in resolution 426 the Security Council approved the report. The mandate of the mission was originally 6 months and allowed for 4,000 troops (making it then, the largest U.N. mission in existence) and given a sixty-eight million dollar budget (IPS, U.N. S-12611; Powell pg. 36). On March 21 IDF ceased offensive operations and began to withdraw from the area (Rabinovich pg. 374). The first UNIFIL troops arrived in southern Lebanon on March 23; they were lightly armed with defensive weapons, and told to act with complete impartiality (U.N. S/12611). The intention of the Security Council was for the troops to first confirm the withdrawal of the Israelis from southern Lebanon, then monitor the cessation of hostilities and promote peace in the area, and finally they were to ensure that the area was returned to the control of the Lebanese government (U.N. S/12611; James pg. 619). All of this, in addition to the mandate, was expected to happen with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned as outlined in the Secretary-Generals report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425. However, it would become quite clear that the expected cooperation was not to be had; this more than any other factor, is what would cause the ultimate failure of UNIFIL as a peacekeeping force. A foreshadowing of what was to come can be seen in the withdrawal of the Israel forces. Though they ceased fire on March 21, 1978, they didnt fully withdraw for another three months, on June 13, 1978 (Goksel and Hauck pg. 14; Tucker pg. 636). And, instead of handing over

positions near the southern border to UNIFIL, as was expected, Israel retained a ten-kilometer security belt (Steadman 569, Diehl 57) and turned control over that area to the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA), also known as de facto forces, led by Major Saad Haddad (James pg. 620; Goksel and Hauck pg. 14). The SLA was funded and controlled by the IDF (James, 620; Cordesma pg. 408), and they gave no pretense at cooperation with UNIFIL officers. In fact, attacks from the SLA counted for the bulk of the attacks against UNIFIL members (Goksel and Hauck pg. 14; James pg. 623). Throughout the years, tensions remained causing the Security Council to pass several resolutions increasing the number of troops assigned to the UNIFIL mission and extending the mandate. In the biography of Sergio Viera De Mello, a UN diplomat who served as an aide to General William Callaghan, the second UN commander to UNIFIL, it tells how shocked he was at the degree of disrespect accorded to the UN by all parties, ( Powell 37). Indeed, since UNIFIL set up check points and observation points throughout southern Lebanon, PLO fighters would merely use dirt trails and avoid the main roads to smuggle arms. As previously stated, the Israeli forces would not only threaten the peacekeepers (Powell 37), they would also attack them. Since the two sides had so little respect for the force sent to try to establish peace between them, it only makes sense that their little squabbles would continue. The PLO would continue to fire into Israel and the Israelis would raid PLO bases in south Lebanon. Having no firepower or force to back them up, UNIFIL troops could only threaten to tell the Security Council about the infractions (Powell 38). The Lebanese government, on the other hand, was quite cooperative, they, however, were weak and couldnt control the forces within their territory (Diehl 80). On July 21 1981, the UN adopted Security Council resolution 490, yet again calling for a cease-fire in Lebanon (IMFA), both the Israelis and the PLO agreed to it three days later (JTA,

Shipler 7/25). However, according to an Israeli military spokesperson, later on that day, the Palestinian guerillas fired rockets on a northern Israeli city and into a city in south Lebanon controlled by the SLA, then, again, on July 26 the UN reported that guerillas fired some 130 rockets and artillery shells into Israel (Shipler 7/26). Israel did not respond, and violations of the cease-fire continued. In 1982, when De Mello warned Yassir Arafat to remove the PLO fighters, else Israel might do so itself, Arafats chief of staff, Abu Walid, gave his word of honor that not one single violation of the cease-fire was the fault of the PLO (Powell 42). With Lebanon either unwilling or unable to control the spoilers within their borders, it is of little surprise that peacekeeping would be a failure and conflict would escalate. On June 3, 1982, a gunman affiliated with the Abu Nidal organization shot the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Sholomo Argov, in the head (Joffe, Powell 43). Argov survived, however, the assassination attempt nonetheless set off the First Lebanon War, because the Israelis believed that Abu Nidal group was linked with the PLO (Powell 43). Three days later on June 6, the Israelis invaded southern Lebanon in what was named Operation Peace in Galilee (Powell 43, ADL). They easily pushed through UNIFIL lines, and in days decimated Syrian air defense, who was aiding the PLO (Grant, IMFA). After the initial three months where the Israelis succeeded in pushing the PLO out of Beirut and Lebanon, the Israeli forces occupied the state for 3 long years, suffering casualties all the way. During the three years that they were behind Israeli lines, UNIFIL peacekeepers were told not to intervene militarily and to only provide humanitarian aid (Goksel and Hauck pg. 14, Powell 47). Also, during this period the terrorist organization Hezbollah was created in direct response to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon (START, Hezbollah). In 1985 Israel partially withdrew from southern Lebanon and Operation Peace for Galilee was considered a failure. Though the Israelis managed to drive the

PLO from the area, the operation was considered a failure due to the fact that the Israeli government not only failed to sign a peace agreement with Lebanon, they took no serious steps to stop a massacre that ended in the death of a disputed 800-3500 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians (Princeton, Samaha), and finally, for directly defying cease-fire agreements and invading Lebanon against the express wishes of the U.N.. Israel withdrew the rest of its forces in 2000 (ADL, Unifil Background) . The next event of the greatest gravity was the thirty-four day war between Hezbollah and Israel. In response to the conflict, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1701, which reiterated the need for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations, additionally, in October of 2006, for the first time a maritime task force was deployed (U.N. 1701, U.N. Missions; U.N. 1559) . However, to this day Hezbollah rejects all calls of disarmament, saying that maintaining arms is the only way to defend Lebanon and maintain any balance of power with the IDF (Aljazeera, SaadGhorayeb). As a result of the on-going conflict and the U.N.s determination to have Lebanons territorial sovereignty maintained, UNIFILs mandate has continuously been extended and the troops have been mostly regulated to performing humanitarian aid and clearing landmines from the buffer zone (UNOPS, UNIFIL Background. Evaluating the mission as a whole, it is and has been the presence of third party spoilers that have prevented any success at true peacekeeping. On the other hand, when General Callaghan was addressing De Mello, who, during the 1982 invasion thought that UNIFIL presence was useless, he (Callaghan) pointed out all the good the peacekeepers had been doing

on the humanitarian front. Since 1978, when the troops first arrived nearly 250,000 civilians returned to the area. The blue helmets repaired many public edifices and roads, in addition to donating used offices supplies to schools instead of allowing them to be thrown out. Theyve cleared the area of mines and other explosive devices and even escorted Lebanese civilians whose farms were along the main lines of action (Powell 46). So, it can definitely be said that the peacekeepers have had some positive in impact in the area, but, even with that being so, the mission still is a failure in every way. Just last month Israeli military forces Russian missiles heading from Syria to Hezbollah (Kube and Miklaszweski), so there has been no and it does not seem as though there will be a cessation in violence, there has been no resolution of the underlying conflict, and absolutely none of the mandates have been fulfilled. Finally, the spoilers in the area seem to be like the mythical hydra beast, one head is removed and another two appear. With the PLO, Syria and Hezbollah all at some point instigating conflict from within Lebanese borders, and the Lebanese government being too weak to drive out the spoilers, there can be no real chance for peace, especially considering the following statement, issued by Hezbollah in 1988 With special vehemence we reject UNIFIL as they were sent by world arrogance to occupy areas evacuated by Israel and serve for the latter as a buffer zone, (CFR).

Aljazeera (2012 January 15). Hezbollah Chief Rejects Call by UN to Disarm. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/01/20121154542742500.html Arab Defamation League (ADL)(1991). The Lebanon War. Retrieved from http://archive.adl.org/israel/record/lebanon.html Cordesma, Anthony (2002). Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Print. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=Ol-udLj5zEC&pg=PA408&lpg=PA408&dq=link+between+the+sla+and+idf&source=bl&ots=dcLcI H4w2&sig=eZA8dmKe63SO66WDVovyT6XJpCM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=tfuUUoyZPOX8yQHcqYH 4Cg&ved=0CDsQ6AEwAjgK#v=onepage&q&f=false Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (1988 January 1). An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967 Diehl, Paul (1994). International Peacekeeping. Baltimore, M.D.: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Print. Gabrie, Brigitte (2008). Because They Hate: A Survivor of Islamic Terror Warns America. New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Griffin. Electronic. Retrieved from Gad, Yitschak Bed (1991). Politics, Lies, and Videotape: 3,000 Questions and Answers on the Mideast Crisis (Google Books). Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=zRyAT5qNtjQC&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=march+15+19

78+litani&source=bl&ots=mb9ZTD-ibx&sig=Q_PylBTLrHK0MPwMjOf1H88nls&hl=en&sa=X&ei=MlmUUtKNJcmosQS9tYGwDg&ved=0CFEQ6AEwBA#v=one page&q=march%2015%201978%20litani&f=false Gil, Ronen (2010, March 11). 32nd Anniversary of the Coastal Road Massacre. Arutz Sheva. Retrieved from http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/136475#.UpRMusSshQY Goksel, Timur (2007). UNIFIL- Peacekeepers in the Line of Fire. Heinrich Boll Stuffing: Middle East [PDF]. Retrieved from http://www.lb.boell.org/downloads/Goeksel-UNIFIL__Peacekeepers_in_the_Line_of_Fire.pdf Goksel, Timur and Hauck, H (2009 January). UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engage in Lebanon and the Middle East. Euromeso Paper. Retrieved from http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/images/paper76eng.pdf Grant, Rebecca (2002 June). The Bekaa Valley War. Air Force Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2002/June%202002/0602bekaa.aspx Hezbollah. (n.d.). In Encyclopedia Britannica online. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/264741/Hezbollah IJS: Israel and Judaism Studies. Reasons For the Israeli Invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982; and the Significance of the War For Israel and the Palestinians. Israel and Judaism Studies (2013). Retrieved from http://www.ijs.org.au/Israel-and-Lebanon-1978-2006/default.aspx Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS) (2007). Mr. UNIFIL Reflects on a Quarter Century of Peacekeeping in South Lebanon w/Timur Gksel; Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 36, no. 3 p.

50, Interview. Retrieved from http://www.palestinestudies.org/journals.aspx?id=7390&jid=1&href=fulltext Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA). 40 Security Council Resolutions 490 -1981- on Cease Fire in Lebanon- 21 July 1981. Retrieved from http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook5/Pages/40%20Security%20C ouncil%20Resolution%20490%20-1981-%20on%20Cease.aspx Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA). The Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982). Retrieved from http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/History/Pages/Operation%20Peace%20for%20Galilee%20%201982.aspx James, Alan. Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982. International Journal , Vol. 38, No. 4, The Middle East after Lebanon (Autumn, 1983), pp. 613-634 Published by: Canadian International Council Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40202203 Jewish Virtual Library (JVL)(2013). First Lebanon War: Background & Overview. Jewish Virtual Library. Retrieved from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Lebanon_War.html Joffe, Lawrence (2003, February 24). Shlomo Argov. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/25/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon JTA (1981, July 27). Evron, Arafat Deny the Cease-fire Meant Israel and the PLO Negotiated with or Recognized Each Other. Retrieved from http://www.jta.org/1981/07/27/archive/evronarafat-deny-the-cease-fire-meant-israel-and-the-plo-negotiated-with-or-recognized-each-other

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Kube, Courtney and Miklaszweski, J (2013, October 31). Israeli Attack Destroys Russian Missiles Headed from Syria to Hezbollah, US Officials Say. NBC News. Retrieved from http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/31/21266851-israeli-attack-destroys-russianmissiles-headed-from-syria-to-hezbollah-us-officials-say Meisler, Stanley (1995). United Nations: A History. New York, N.Y.: Grove Press. Print National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism (START). Terrorist Organization Profile: Hezbollah. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3101 Powell, Samantha (2008). Chasing The Flame. New York, N.Y.: The Penguin Press. Print. Princeton. Sabra and Shatila Massacre. Retrieved from http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Sabra_and_Shatila_massacre.html Rabinovich, Itamar and Reinharz, J (2008). Israel in the Middle East : Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present. Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University Press Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal (2006 August). Hizbollahss Outlook in the Current Conflict [PDF]. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ghorayeb_part2_final.pdf Samaha, Nour (2012 September 16). Survivors Recalls Sabra-Shatila Massacre. Aljazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/2012915163152213255.html

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Shipler, David K. (1981, July 26). U.N. Reports Truce Violations By Palestinians. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/26/world/un-reports-truceviolations-by-palestinians.html Shipler, David K.(1981, July 25). Cease-Fire in Border Fighting declared by Israel and P.L.O.; U.S. Sees Hope For Wider Peace. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/25/world/cease-fire-border-fighting-declared-israel-plo-ussees-hope-for-wider-peace.html Stedman, Stephen (2002). Ending Civil Wars. Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Print Tucker, Spencer (2008). The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History (Google Books). Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=YAd8efHdVzIC&pg=PA636&lpg=PA636&dq=idf+invaded +up+to+the+litani+river+in+1978&source=bl&ots=OS_o9Era8M&sig=7P2eN7MLfd4lzSM_cJ jeBLwCDJk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=yL2UUqyPEOemygHkw4HIDQ&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAg#v=on epage&q=idf%20in,. 9vaded%20up%20to%20the%20litani%20river%20in%201978&f=falseUN Missions. UNIFIL Background. Retrieved from Unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11554 UN Missions. UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. Retrieved from http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11584&language=en-US United Nations (1978). Security Council Resolutions 425, 426 and 427. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/425(1978)

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United Nations 1559. Security Council Declares Support For Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm United Nations- S/12611. Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (l978). Retrieved from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/00ECA24D7952AD83852568BA0070C4B9 United Nations. Security Council Calls For End To Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701 (2006). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm UNOPS. Lebanon: Landmine Clearing Programme. Retrieved at http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/focus-areas/public-order-security/mine-action/countryprofiles/Pages/Lebanon.aspx