PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA v RIGOR 89 SCRA 493 AQUINO, April 30, 1979 NATURE APPEAL from the decision

of the CA. FACTS - Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died in 1935, leaving a will which was probated by the CFI of Tarlac. Named as devisees in the will were the testator's nearest relatives: his 3 sisters and a cousin. - In addition, the will contained a controversial bequest: a devise of rice lands with a total area of around 44 hectares in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. The parish priest of Victoria would administer the rice lands during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood. - Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the rice lands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending. - In 1957 the parish priest filed a petition for the delivery of the rice lands to the church as trustee. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition praying that the bequest he declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said rice lands since no nearest male relative of the testator has ever studied for the priesthood. The lower court declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the rice lands to the testator's legal's heirs. The parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration. The second MR was granted on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo Cunanan (his cousins grandson who appears to have been born after his death) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in QC. The administrator was directed to deliver the rice lands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee. (While the case was pending, in 1961, Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian.) - The CA reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for 20 years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities". It ruled that since no legatee claimed the rice lands within 20 after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing Arts 888 and 912(2) of the old CC and Art 870 of the new CC. ISSUE WON the testator contemplated only his nearest male relative at the time of his death and not any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his death? HELD YES. Only his nearest male relative at the time of his death. Ratio In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper. Reasoning The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention. - Had the testator intended to include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death he could have so specified in his will. He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest. The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the Seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the rice lands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the rice lands and receive the fruits. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated. - Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions. He unequivocally alleged therein that no n earest male relative of the late Father Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood. - Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise inoperative. - This case is covered by Art 912(2) of the old CC, now Art 960(2), which provides that legal succession takes piece when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution or accretion as to the said rice lands, it should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said rice lands.

Cayetano v. Leonidas Summary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executed a will in US which did not leave anything to her father, who was her sole compulsory heir. Court held that since the decedent was already a US Citizen at the time she made her will, US laws would apply as to intrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father would not have aything) Facts Decedent: Adoracion Campos Surviving heirs: Father: Hermogenes - only compulsory heir Sisters: Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina -Hermogenes executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion -11 months after, Nenita Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion , which was allegedly executed in the US and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. - An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes: will in question is a forgery intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him - Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests): confirms validity of will -TC: admitted last will and testament, allowed probate inRP - Hermogenes filed a petition for relief: withdrawal of his opposition was secured through fraud + motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. -TC: dismissed: failed to present evidence in support of it WILL: Adoracion was a US citizen, a permanent resident of Pennsylvania at the time she made the will She died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister Made in accordance with Pennsylvania law, probated and registered in Penn. after her death WON the intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of the will? YES HERE. GR: probate court's authority is limited only to: the extrinsic validity of the will due execution testatrix's testamentary capacity Compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law X: where practical considerations demand intrinsic validity to be passed upon WON the will is valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime? YES 1. It was sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. 2. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent: law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. [Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code] 3. Pennsylvania law: no legitimes, testator could give away entire estate to strangers! WON the will (which completely deprived compulsory heir of share) is against public policy? NO -used Bellis v. Bellis: whatever public policy or good customs may be involved, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals UV Interpretation of Wills -governed by rules of interpretation of decedent's NATIONAL LAW

Reyes v. Barretto-Datu 19 SCRA 85 | Ventura FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered. Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well. ISSUE: W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it. HELD: NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.

Aznar v. Duncan 17 SCRA 590 | Villarica FACTS: Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate. ISSUE: Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire estate. HELD: The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia. Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

Acain v. IAC GR No. 72706, October 27, 1987

Facts: In 1960, Nemesio Acain wrote a will giving all his properties to his brother Segundo, or, in case Segundo predeceases Nemesio, to Segundos children. Segundo died before Nemesio. Petitioner Constantino is one of Segundos children. In 1984, after the death of Nemesio, Constantino petitioned the court to have the will probated. This was opposed by Rosa Diongson, Nemesios wife, and Virginia F ernandez, a legally adopted child of Nemesio and Rosa. The opposition was denied by the trial court, hence Diongson and Fernandez went to the SC, which transferred the case to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate petition since Diongson and Fernandez were preterited. Constantino went to the SC on certiorari, contending that the CA could not rule on the intrinsic validity of the will before it is admitted for probate. Diongson and Fernandez opposed, contending that certiorari is not a proper remedy.

Issues:Whether or not Diongson was preterited.

Whether or not Fernandez was preterited.

Rulings: No. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. Yes. Her legal adoption by the Nemesio has not been questioned by Constantino. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966 Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar. Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs. Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.