erhandelingen

van
ie Koninklijke
~ c d e m i e voor
etenschappen,
Letteren en
hone Kunsten Klasse der Letteren
van Belgie Jaargang 6o, 1998, Nr. 163
In Search of the Truth
Academic Tendencies
in Middle Platonism
Jan Opsomer
Fund for Scientific Research- Flanders (F.vV.O.-Vl.)
1998
Paleis der Academien
Hertogsstraat I
Brussel
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKI'OWLEDGEME:-.'TS
EDITIO:-lS OF CLASSICAL TEXTS- ABBREVIATIONS
Chapter 1 : ACADntiC PHILOSOPHY 1:--J POST-ACADEl\IIC TIMES ............................. 9
I . Academic "scepticism" ........... .... ..... .. .......... ......... .... .. ............. .... ... ... ................. . .
11. Aim and structure of the present study .. ....... .......... ..... ...... ..... ... ...................... 13
I I I. The Academy in Plutarch's day ..... ... .. ........ .. ............... .............. .... .... ..... .... .. .... .
Chapter 2 : lNTERPRETATio:-,;s OF THE TIIEAETETUS ...... ....................... ... .. ... .. ... ... L.t
I. The characterisation of Platonic dialogues ......... .......... .... ...... ........... .. .......... ..
I!. Anonymus in Theactctum
A. Knowledge as the suhject proper of the Theaeteltts ............ ....................... )
B. Academic interpretations of the Theal!tetus .. ...... ...... .............. ... .............. ..
C. "Those from the Academy" ........ ; .. ............. ........ .. ................ ...... ...... .. .... .... .
D. t-.1aicutics ...................... .. ......... ......... ... .. ........................................................ .
E. Pyrrhonism .. ............. .. ...... .... ..... .. ... .. ...... ........ ... ............................ .................. ).)
I. "As it now appears to me" (ol,6-41) ................... ............................... ... 54
2. "Man is the measure of all things" (63, 1-40) ........................................ 56
3. Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism ........................................................................... 5
F. Philosophical allegiances
-Towards a better understanding of Academic "scepticism" .............. ... 58
Ill. Prolegomena in Platonis Philosophiam ................ .......................... ...... ........ .. ..
IV. Plutarch and the Theaetl!fl/S .. .... ............ ....... ...... .. .. ........ .. ............................ .... ..
Chapter 3 : SOCRATES ACADEMICUS ........ .. .... ...................... .. ...................... .... ...... ..
I. Plutarch's defence of Socrates and the Academy in Adl'crsus Colotem ...... S-l
A. Three charges against Socrates related to anti-Academic polemic ......... 84
B. Sensation
C. Colotes' slanderous attack on the "Academic" Socrates ....................... 101
I I.Eigwvcia 105
A. 'Socratic irony'' in Plato?
B. Irony and deception, a theoretical digression .......................................... 11 0
C. Socrates accused of dQwvda ..................................................................... 113
D. Plutarch on "irony" .. - ! ...... .......... .. ........ .... .. .............................. ...... .... .... .. .. 122
Chapter 4 : THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN AND PLATONIC
IN PLUTARCH ................. .. ...................................................................... 127
I. Socratic elenctics: a divine mission? (999C-F) .............................................. 127
A. ou yag yE xat ....................................................... 127
B. Blasphemy? .................................................................................................. 133
C. An internal or external stimulus? Socrates' daimonion ......................... 140
D. Elenctics and catharsis ................................................................................ 145
II. "What loves is blinded about the thing it loves" (1000A-C) .. .................... . 150
A. f('LAaUTta and ;t:aQQl]OLa in De adu!atorc et mfzico ................................. .. 151
B. ln1partiality .. ........... ............ .......................................... ..................... ......... .. 155
C. Serenity .................................................................................. ... ............. ....... 157
Ill. XCH<lAlJ'I'li; or azmaAlPI'ia? ( IOOOCD) .......................................................... 161
A. Second and Third Academic epistemology ....................... ....................... 162
B. Plutarch on the Academic tradition: "scepticism" and religion ............ 171
C. Academic strategies .............................................................. ... ... .. .............. 186
D. xut<'tbpjtu; and Fourth Academic epistemology .............................. .. ..... 190
IV. Anamnesis (IOOODE) ...................... ................................................................. 193
Chapter 5 : FAVORINUS, EPICTETUS AND TilE PLUTARCIIEAN LEGACY .. .......... 213
I. Favorinus and Plutarch: De primo frigidv ............................................. ........
11 . Favorinus Academicus ................................................................... .. ............... .
Ill. Galcn against Favorinus ..... .. .. .. .................................................. .. .................... !..!..!..
IV. A reliable \vitness? ....................................... .. .. ....... .......................................... 226
V. Epictetus against the Academics .................... .. ................................... .. ........ .. 229
VI. Favorinus and "scepticism" .............................................................................. 235
Chapter 6 : MINUCiliS FEJ.IX ACADEMIC: ...... .. ........... ... ....... 2-H
I. l 'he Octaritls ..... .. .... ........................................................................ .. .. .. .............
11. Minucius as a polemicist ....... .. .. .. ................................................... ...................
Ill. A moderated debate- Caecilius' conversion ........................................ .. ...... 246
IV. Traces of Academic "scepticism" ............... ..................................... .... .. ....... .. . 249
V. (Academic) "scepticism" and belief ............................... .. .................... .......... 259
Chapter 7 : AFrER\VORD ...................... .. ........................................... ........................ ..:::oJ
BIULIOGRAPHY ............... ...... .......... .. .. ...... .... .... ... .. .. .. .................... ... ... ............... .. ........ .t..
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVA TTING .... ...................................... ................ ...................... 3vJ
INDICES ........ .......... ............................... .. ..... ........................................ ... ... .................... 3
j
J
- -----
ACKNOWLEDGEl\IENTS
First of all I like to thank my successive supervisors over the years under
whom my research on the present subject has been conducted: Prof. Dr. M.
Pinnoy, Prof. Dr. L. Van der Stockt and Prof. Dr. C. Steel. I have always
considered it a great privilege and a great joy to work with them and to profit
from their generous and kind advice. I feel greatly obliged to Prof. Steel, who
has carefully read my manuscript and made extremely valuable suggestions
to improve it. I have also benefited tremendously from discussions with
colleagues at the De \Vulf-Mansion Centre of the Leuven Institute of
Philosophy, the Leuven Department of Classical Studies, and especially its
Section of Greek Philology, the Institute of Classical Studies London and
King's College London (and in particular Prof. Dr. R. Sorabji). I also thank
these institutions for their hospitality. My gratitude goes to all my friends in
Belgium and abroad, who encouraged me through their moral support and
their stimulating and helpful comments. For shortcomings that may remain
I am sokly responsible.
Two scholarships awarded successively by the K. U.Leuven
Onder::.oeksraad and the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (F. W. 0.-
V/aanderen) have enabled me to complete this monograph. I gratefully
acknowledge their confidence and financial support. I am deeply indebted to
the Krminklijke Academie \'Oor Wetensclzappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten
\'all Belgii_; for undertaking the task of publishing the present volume.
It is also a pleasant duty to extend thanks to Peter Van Dessel for having
meticulously and expertly checked the English of my running text, and
Marvin Dubois and Tania Gcrgel for additional help with the English. I
thank iv1ichicl Van den Bosch en Anne Braem for the copy-editing and
technical assistance.
Finally I wish to dedicate this book to my parents, sister and grandmother.
Leuven, De \Vulf-Mansion Centre
October 1996, March 1998 J.O.
, ..
.llrli.
EDITIONS OF CLASSICAL TEXTS- ABBREVIAT!OL'tS
The editions of Greek texts which I use are- unless indicated otherwise- those
included in: Luci Berkowitz - Karl A. Squitier, Thesaurus Linguae Graccae.
Cmwn of Greek Authors allll Works, Second Edition, New York - Oxford,
1986. References usually follow the system used for the CD R0,\1 #D
Thesaurus Linguae Graecae of the Packard Humanitks Institute, Irvine,
California. For Albinus' Pro/ogus the edition of NUsser ( 1991) has been used,
for Maxim us of Tyre the edition of Trapp ( 1994). Favorinus has been quoted
from the collection of fragments euited by Barigazzi (1966) . The same edition
has also been used for Galen's De optima doctrina. The line numbers for
(Aicinous) Didaskalikos are those of Whittaker - Louis 1990; Stobaeus is
quoteu accoruing to the volume, page and line numbers of the Wachsmuth-
Hense edition. Plutarch's Li\es are referred to accoruing to the chapter and
section inuications in the Teubner edition.
Titles of periodicals arc abbreviateu as in L 'annee philo/ogiqw:; other abbrevi-
ations can be founu in my bibliography. "L" followed by a number stands for
items of the Lamprias-cataloguc, an ancient list of works attributeu to Plutarch
(ed. SanJbach llJ69a): e.g. L7 = 'EmtflELvtim)u; xui :Lxl:t:t(J)V.
--------
CHAPTER 1
ACADE:\llC PHILOSOPHY IN POST-ACADEl\llC TI;\IES
I. ACADEMIC ' ' SCEPTICIS7\!''
The Hellenistic New Academy was characterised by its particular interest in
epistemology. It questioned the reliability of sensory perception, stressed the ,
limits of human knowledge in general, and particularly in religious and
metaphysical matters .. For this reason the so-called New Academy is
commonly labelled sceptic. In the traditional and still widely accepted
interpretation of the history of Platonic philosophy these sceptical
tendencies came to an end with Antiochus of Ascalon, who- returning to the
Old-Academic spiritbut also mixing Platonic with extraneous, mainly Stoic,
elements- inaugurated Middle Platonism
1
By the time of Plutarch the New
Academic, i.e. sceptical, tendencies are supposed to have disappeared
almost completely from the philosophical scene as far as Platonism is
concerned. No more than a fev ..', negligible traces of this sceptical tendency
arc said to have survived. According to the same historiographical tradition
New Academism was replaced by a philosophy as deeply religious as
Platonism was meant to be from the beginning. The Delphic priest Plutarch
came to be considered the incarnation of this new religious elan. This view
implies that the New Academy lacked this religious spirit entirely, that it was
in fact anti-religious.
The traditional interpretation of the history of the Hellenistic Academy
and of the Platonism of the Early Empire has, to a large extent, been
determined by E. ZELLER's monumental history of Greek philosophy: Die
Philosoplzie der Griechen in ihrer geschicllllichcn Entwicklwzg (the first
edition of the volume(s) dealing with Nacharistotelische Plzilosophie was
1
See e.g. ZINTZE)'; 1981; D! STEFANO 198-l; but also DILLON 1977 (p. 43: "( .. . ]the sceptical
tradition has no place in Middle Platonism"). It should be noted that DILLON considerably
modified his view in later publications, esp. since his article Self-Definition in Later Platonism
(1982. see esp. p. 60-69) . Sec also DILL0:"-11985. His 1977 monograph on the Middle Platonists,
where the dominating idea is Antiochus' doctrinal restoration of Platonism, remains the
standard work, In his afterward to the second, revised edition (London, 1996)
D!LLO:-.t reassesses the question (esp. p. 422-423). but does not elaborate a positive account of
Academic influences. As this new edition was not yet available at the time that I was
writing the bulk of the present monograph. I have been unable to discuss all modifications to
earlier views made by the author. _...
11\,
10 CHAPTER 1
published as early as 1852). This German scholar, inspired by HEGEL's
speculative method, developed- or rather canonised
2
- the schemes through
which the history of Hellenistic and early Imperial Platonism were to be
interpreted for generations of scholars to come. ZELLER was the first to
claim a scientific status for the study of ancient philosophy. and it was this
claim together with the erudite elaboration of his work that contributed a
great deal to its success and far-reaching innuence. His ideal of Philosophie-
gcsclzichte consisted in a combination of the scientific and the philosophicaP.
The latter supplied the a priori by means of which the source-
material (the result of the scientific exploration of the sources) could be
interpreted. In retrospect it now seems that through these schemes many
elements and presuppositions from the philosophical debates of ZELLER's
own time have been projected onto the history of Greek philosophy
5
. At any
rate, ZELLER and his disciples treated the terms dogmatism and scepticism
as universal categories, whereas, in fact, their usage was to a large extent
determined by the nineteenth-century context
0

Since the early seventies, scholars of ancient philosophy have shown an
increasing interest in ancient scepticism, Pyrrhonist and Academic alike
7

On closer analysis Hellenistic scepticism turned out to be much richer, more
complex and less homogeneous than had been presumed: between the
different generations in the so-called New or sceptical Academy (Arccsilaus,
Carneades, Philo of Larissar<. significant differences could be found. As
1
for the "prehistory" of the schemes am] conceptions useu by ZELLER see SCII:"EIDER 19{_}0,
who cnueavours to establish "cinc Arch;iologic uer l'hilosophiegcschichtc", n:fcrring to
fouc,\ULT's conception of archt;ologic.
1
Cf. ZI'! .LER I 1'\4-t, p. So; I XXX. p. 415.
CL ZFLL.ER 1X44, p. X7-<JO; IX99, p. 572. Sec also SCIIOLTZ 1979. p. 2XIJ-311.
Cf. Lo;-.:c; 1995, p. IJ3S; ALBRECHT 1<JIJ5. esp. p. 957-963.
h One may compare , e.g., HIRZEL l \) 12. p. X-10; 192: I IJ5; DE f-A YE I 1923. p. H6-S7 : "Plus de
vcritc ahsolue. L'assaut fut si rude que k uogmatisme en fut fortemcnt cbranlc. mais il ne fut
ruinc. [ ... J L'csprit hurnain all fond rcpugne a l'incertain. done au sccpticisme. Tot ou tard
il en n:vient. reaction eta it ir,cvitabk." In this contt:xt DE fA YE refers to ZELLER (p. 88).
7
One may compare WEISCHE's complaint (1961. p. 11 note 8) about the relative lack of
interest in ancient scepticism with the bibliography compiled by MISURI (1990) for the years
Indeed. this bibliography is approximately equal in length to that compiled by
f-ERRARIA and SANTESE (19H1) for the years 1880-1978. As is apparent from the tatters'
chronological survey (p. 846-848). there was already a considerable increase in the number of
publications from the sixties onwards. This scholarly interest is paralleled by a "sceptical''
renoll\'t:att in contcmporary philosophy: cf. STRIKER 1981. p. 153.
x For a succinct but accurate survey of the "Protagonists" of the Hellenistic polemic, and for
the main themes and positions, cf. SEDLEY 1980: Lo;o.;G - SEDLEY I/11 1987. For a critical
survey of the various views concerning the philosophical sources of Academic scepticism. see
KRAI\IER 1971. p. 5-13. KRAli.IER's own hypothesis (p. 14-58), howcver, focusing on the
dialectical tradition within the Academy, is too rigorous in its rejection of other views- he
excludes, in particular, the influence of Platonic dialogues on the development of the New
Academy. Sec also GLUCKER 1978, p. 33-35 note 79.
ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY IN POST-ACADEMIC TIMES 11
soon as more attention was paid to the polemical context of the Hellenistic
debates, and scholars focused on the way Platonists defined their own
position in a polemical confrontation with other schools and against the
background of the history of Platonism, it became clear that it might be
rather unfortunate and misleading to label Academic philosophy as
.. scepticism" without further qualification. According to recent insights, the
New Academics attacked the technicalities of the Stoic and Epicurean
systems, rather than the possibility of cognition and knowledge as such'l. The
Stoic notion of xm:a/.lp!JL, "apprehension", was met by the Academic
a%etTet).tppia, .. inapprehensibility"; the Academic n:ozti. "suspension of
judgment" (or: suspension of assent"), was in fact the reversal of the Stoic
OU'{%ctTc'n1wt;, "assent''. The Academics actually borrowed the
concept from their opponents in order to destroy the Stoics' own episte-
mology. The dialectical positions taken up by the Academics in the course of
the debate should therefore not he regarded as their own views, but were
often meant to be merely ad hominem
10

Scholars argued that the terms ''dogmatism" and "scepticism" are not the
most appropriate terms to characterise the opposition between the Stoics
and Epicureans on the one hand, and the (New) Academics on the other. In
any case. they were most probably not the terms in which the participants in
the Hellenistic epistemological debate defined their own position. Neither
Acadcmic
11
nor Pyrrhonian scepticism ever doubted the existence of an
objective reality or truth
12
Moreover, their philosophy did not have the
moral overtones the moderns believed it to have: it was not directed against
morality or religion, but merely questioned excessive Stoic claims to a
rational and systematic knowledge in these domains.
Cf. l<JS), p. 7.
1
'
1
Cf. COUISSI:"i 1929a; 192%: STRIKER p. 57; 62. Recently IOPPOLO (1986, p. 57-60;
65) and (198X, p. 101-103) have argued that this aspect has been overemphasised in
the new- already orthodox"- interpretation. However, their interprt:tation has in turn
challenged by- among others- LEVY (1990; l<J93a; 1993b). Cf. infra (eh. 4. Ill. A) for this
discussion.
11
As explicitly by Cicero !\cad. 1173: "nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus. percipi
posse negamus."
t: Cf. BtJR;o.;YEAT 1980. esp. p. 22; SEDLEY 19S3, esp. p. 10; FREDE 1984. esp. p. 255;
WILLIA:"-.IS 1988, p. 547; 583-56. Howcvcr. not all scholars are abreast of recent developments
in this domain; e.g. CHATZILYSA:"'DROS (1970, p. 9): "Die Skepsis ist ein Ausdruck des
Zweifcls Uber die Existenz dcr objektiven Welt". The author treats "'scepticism" as a universal
concept (ibic/.): "Die ersten skeptischcn Aul3erungcn wurzeln in den ersten Werken des
griechischcn Geistes". Also BRUNSCHWIG (1988, p. 145-147) and LAURSEN (1992, p. 16; p.
27) preservc the universal antithetical relation between scepticism and dogmatism. LAURSEN
does not take into account the terms in which the ancient sceptics defined their own position,
which allows him to make the misleading generalisation (p. 8) "'[ ... ] ancient skepticism was
more of an anti-philosophy than a philosophy." One may also compare LACHENAUD 1993. p.
31.
12 CHAPTER 1
In Hellenistic times was not a technical term denoting the New
Academic or Pyrrhonist school. The Academics definitely did not view their
own position as sceptic:
[ .. . ] before the first century BC philosophers did not view themselves, or their
objectives, in the light of the familiar "sceptic-dogmatic" dichotomy, simply
because the terms "sceptic" and "dogmatic" had not yet acquired the deter-
minate senses we find in later writers such as Sextus Empiricus.
(STOUGH 1987, p. 222)
Indeed, so-called scepticism did not object to as such, nor did the
latter term initially refer to the infallibility or unquestionability of
knowledge. One could assent perfectly to even a '' sceptic" could
give a weak, moderate, or non-epistemic assent - without therefore being
"dogmatic" in the sense the word has in modern languages
13
A more
appropriate way to characterise the philosophy of the Ne\v Academy- and
more in tune with its self-image - is to call it "aporetic" or even better
"zctctic" L': never satisfied with the obvious answers. the Academics
undertook a continuing and open-minded search for trllllz.
Only later, with authors as Sextus Empiricus, did terms like and
receive their technical meaning
10
For later "sceptics", Platonists
and Pyrrhonists alike, it became extremely important to determine whether
or not the different members of the Academy did subscribe to and
whether they could be rightfully called sceptics
17
It may further be noted
that none of our main sources is unbiased in this respect: for Cicero
1
s, as well
as for Sextus Empiricus or Numenius, the question who was to be considered
a "sceptic" or "aporetic" was related to the legitimation of their own
philosophical position
1
'
1
Sextus Empiricus projected the antithesis sceptic-
dogmatic onto the past. His interpretation - though basically anachronistic
and

profoundly inOuenced virtually all subsequent historio-

graphy of ancient scepticism.
For convenience I shall continue to make use of the established labels for
ancient philosophical schools and movements, but simply as purely
13
Cf. TARRAi'IT 1985. p. 29-33 ; 62-65. In this respect REALE - RADICE V 1980, p. 79 is
misleading.

As suggested by KRA\IER 1971, p. 52.

Cf. Gellius 11,5,6; Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1,7. Compare, e.g., Cic. l/ortell5ius frg. 107 Grilli
( = August. Contra A cad. 1,7).

Cf. STRIKER 1980, p. 5-l note 1; BARNES 1982, p. 6-12 (with the notes p. 22-27); T ARRA"-'T
1985, p. 25.
17
Cf. STOUGH 1987. p. 224.

Cf. LO:"G- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 449.

IY See also DOTY 1992. p. 4-5; LONG 1995, p. 946-947.
Cf. 1988, p. 107.
_ _... ;?--:}'
ACADD.IIC PHILOSOPHY IN POST-ACADHIIC TIMES 13
denotative terms, without the connotations of appreciation or reproof many
of them might evoke. This applies to: Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth
Academy (for the "schools" of Arcesilaus, Carneades, Philo of Larissa, and
Antiochus, respectively), New Academy (Second, Third and Fourth
Academy taken together), Middle Platonism (the Platonism of the Early
Empire, between Antiochus and Plotinus)
21
. In using the term "scepticism"
to designate the philosophy of both Pyrrhonism and the New Academy, I am
only following scholarly conventions, without claiming by this very term any
essential similarity with modern forms of scepticism. In accordance with
ancient usage, "Academic" can refer to the philosophy of the New Academy.
11. AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The new approach to Hellenistic scepticism focuses on its polemical context,
and pays special attention to the argumentative schemes, the dialectical
tools, and the strategies used by philosophers in order to legitimise their own
position by claiming the authority of predecessors, in particular that of
Socrates and

while neutralising similar claims of others. This new

scholarly approach has resulted in numerous new insights: it has remarkably
improved our knowledge of the Hellenistic Academy and fundamentally
altered our perception of Academic scepticism. But the repercussions of
these new interpretations on our view of Platonism in the early Empire are
still insufficntly elaborated. Traditionally Middle Platonism, i.e. the
Platonism between Antiochus and Plotinus, is supposed to be free of any
profound New Academic influence. Recently H.

has suggested
that the inOuence of Philo's Fourth Academy may have been far more
:
1
Forth..: ancients the very fact of subdividing the history of the Academy already implied
criticism: cf. Numcnius (?) ap. Euseh. Praep. e1. 14.4,13-16 (not included in DES PLACES'
collection of fragments; but compare frg. 24 DES PLACES 1973); Cic. Acad. I 13; 46 (cf.
GL!.JCKER 19&'{, p. 50 nolc 53); sec also LEVY 1992, p. 11 note 8; GLUCKER 1978, p. 345;
DbRRIE 1987. p. 391.
22
The question whether the New Academic interpretation of Socrates and Plato is justified
is treated bv WOODRUFF 1986; LESHER 1987; ANNAS 1992; LEVY 1993b, p. 256. See also
FREDE 1992 (esp. p. 211; 215-216). It appears to be the cnse thnt the scepticism-dogmatism
dichotomy does not allow of an appropriate characterisntion of Plato's own position either;
see ANi' AS 1981, p. 193 ("knowledge is not opposed to scepticism"); 200 ("'Here again we see
how different are Plato's requirements on knowledge from our post-Cartesian ones. He finds
it natural to think of knowledge as coming in degrees which vary with the intelligibility of its
object; and this is because he is not thinking of knowledge as the result of excluding sceptical
doubt"); 212 ("We have already seen that Plato's search for knowledge is not the post-
Cartesian search for a state immune to sceptical doubt. Rather it is a search for
understanding").
23
On the overall value of TARRAl"T's work see RIST 1986; STOUGH 1987; !OPPOLO 1989
{critical): GLUCKER 1989 (a r"eply toT ARRANT's criticism of GLUCKER's 1978 monograph).
, ..
12
CHAPTER I
In Hellenistic times was not a technical term denoting the New
Academic or Pyrrhonist school. The Academics definitely did not view their
own position as sceptic:
[ ... ]before the first century BC philosophers did not view themselves, or their
objectives, in the light of the familiar "sceptic-dogmatic" dichotomy, simply
because the terms "sceptic" and "dogmatic" had not yet acquired the deter-
minate senses we find in later writers such as Sextus Empiricus.
(STOUGH 1987, p. 222)
Indeed, so-called scepticism did not object to as such, nor did the
latter term initially refer to the infallibility or unquestionability of
knowledge. One could assent perfectly to even a ' 'sceptic" could
give a weak, moderate, or non-epistemic assent - \Vithout therefore being
"dogmatic" in the sense the word has in modern languages
13
A more
appropriate way to characterise the philosophy of the New Academy- and
more in tunc with its self-image - is to call it "aporetic"
1
-l or even better
"zetetic" l:"i : never satisfied with the obvious answers, the Academics
undertook a continuing and open-minded search for trlllh.
Only later, with authors as Sextus Empiricus, did terms like ar..Ercnzo[ and
receive their technical meaning
111
For later "sceptics", Platonists
and Pyrrhonists alike, it became extremely important to determine whether
or not the different members of the Academy did subscribe to and
whether they could be rightfully called sceptics
17
It may further be noted
that none of our main sources is unbiased in this respect: for Ciccro
1
\ as well
as for Sextus Empiricus or Numenius, the question who was to be considered
a "sceptic" or "aporctic" was related to the legitimation of their own
philosophical position
1
'
1
Sextus Empiricus projected the antithesis sceptic-
dogmatic onto the past. His interpretation - though basically anachronistic
and tendentious
211
- profoundly inOuenced virtually all subsequent historio-
graphy of ancient scepticism.
For convenience I shall continue to make use of the established labels for
ancient philosophical schools and movements, but simply as purely
13
Cf. TARRANT 1985. p. 29-33: 62-65. In this respect REALE - RADICE V 1980, p. 79 is
misleading.

As suggested by KRA\!ER 1971, p. 52.

Cf. Gcllius 11,5,6 : Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. 1/yp. 1.7. Compar..:, e.g., Cic./lortl'mius frg. 107 Grilli
(==August. Contra Amd. 1,7).
In Cf. STRIKER 1980, p. 5-l note 1: BARNES 1982, p. 6-12 (with the notes p. 22-27);
1985, p. 25.
1
7
Cf. STOUG!-1 1987, p. 22-l.
1x Cf. Lo:-.:G- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 4.t9.

See also DOTY 1992. p. 4-5; LONG 1995, p. 946-9.t7.

Cf. AN:'<AS 1988, p. 107.
ACAOE\I!C PHILOSOPHY IN POST-ACADEMIC TI1-.IES 13
denotative terms, without the connotations of appreciation or reproof many
of them might evoke. This applies to: Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth
Academy (for the .. schools" of Arcesilaus, Carneades, Philo of Larissa, and
Antiochus, respectively), New Academy (Second, Third and Fourth
Academy taken together), Middle Platonism (the Platonism of the Early
Empire, between Antiochus and Plotinus)
21
In using the term "scepticism"
to designate the philosophy of both Pyrrhonism and the New Academy, I am
only following scholarly conventions, without claiming by this very term any
essential similarity with modern forms of scepticism. In accordance with
ancient usage, Academic" can refer to the philosophy of the New Academy.
11. AND STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The new approach to Hellenistic scepticism focuses on its polemical context,
and pays special attention to the argumentative schemes, the dialectical
tools, and the strategies used by philosophers in order to legitimise their own
position by claiming the authority of predecessors, in particular that of
Socrates and

while neutralising similar claims of others. This new

scholarly approach has resulted in numerous new insights: it has remarkably
improved our knowledge of the Hellenistic Academy and fundamentally
altered our perception of Academic scepticism. But the repercussions of
these new interpretations on our view of Platonism in the early Empire arc
still insufficntly elaborated. Traditionally tv1iddle Platonism, i.e. the
Platonism between Antiochus and Plotinus, is supposed to be free of any
profound New Academic influence. Recently H. TARRAN(!
3
has suggested
that the inOucncc of Philo's Fourth Academy may have been far more

For the ancients the very fact of subdividing th..: history of the Academy already implied
criticism: cf. Numo.:nius ('?) ap. Eusch. Praep. e1. 14,4,13-16 (not included in DES PLACES'
collection of fragments: hut compare frg. 24 DES PLACES 1973): Cic. Acad. I 13: 4o (cf.
GLUCKER 1988. p. 50 note 53): sec also LEVY 1992, p. 11 note 8: GLUCKER 1978, p. 3-t5:
DbRRIE 1987, p. 391.
22
The question whether the New Academic interpretation of Socrates and Plato is justified
is treated by WOODRUFF 1986; LESHER 1987: ANNAS 1992: LEVY 1993b, p. 256. See also
FREDE 1992 (esp. p. 211 ; 215-216). It appears to be th..: cnse that the scepticism-dogmatism
dichotomy does not allow of an approprinte characterisation of Pinto' s own position either;
see AN:-; As 1981, p. 193 ("knowledge is not opposed to scepticism"): 200 ("Here ngain we see
how different are Plato's requirements on knowledge from our post-Cartesian ones. He finds
it naturn1 to think of knowledge as coming in degrees which vary with the intelligibility of its
object; and this is because he is not thinking of knowledge as the result of excluding sceptical
doubt"): 212 ("We have already seen that Plato's search for knowledge is not the post-
Cartesian search for a state immune to sceptical doubt. Rather it is a search for
understanding") .
23
On the overall value of TARRANT"s work see RIST 1986: STOUGH 1987; IOPPOLO 1989
(critical): GLUCKER 1989 (a r'eply to TARRANT"s crit icism of GLUCKER's 1978 monograph).
,
14 CHAfYTER 1
important than has hitherto been supposed. His surmise is that it was even
more important for Middle Platonism than Antiochus' .. Stoicising"
Platonism
2
-t. According to the commonly held view, however, Middle
Platonism, as a theological philosophy, remains fundamentally different
from New Academic attitudes and activities. This vie\v will be challenged in
the present study.
As long as Academic philosophy is equated with .. sceptic'' and this is
taken to imply uncompromising hostility to metaphysics and religion. one is
not likely to go and look for Academic tendencies in Middle Platonism. If
Middle Platonists have one thing in common, then it may well be the
endeavour to develop a systematic interpretation of the whole of Platonic
philosophy with full emphasis on its metaphysical and religious character.
But since scholars have come to acknowledge that (Hellenistic) Academism
does not necessarily imply an anti-metaphysical nor an anti-religious
attitude, the possibility of an Academic influence on Middle Platonism, or
rather on some strands of this heterogeneous and variegated complex, is no
longer ruled out a priori.
I shall not proceed by isolating New Academic thcmes in ordcr to oppose
thcm to dogmatic or metaphysical Platonism, for thc simplc reason that
doing so would mcan the imposing of dichotomies which are too rigid and
hardly suitable for the kind of Platonism that I want to study. Nor shall I
restrict the scope of the present monograph to problcms that arc purely
epistemological: such a research would not yield a rich harvest , I fear;
morcovcr it is bound to miss essential aspects of thc Acadcmic awareness in
Platonism.
It is my purpose to show that the New Academic spirit continued to exert
some influencc over Platonism after Antiochus. There was at least an
important current in Middle Platonism that refused to postulate a
discrepancy bet\vecn Academic philosophy and religion. In the self-image of
thcir tradition, these Platonists did consider the history of the Academy as
T ARRAST 1985 (Scepticism or Platoni.un? Tlte Philosophy of the Fourth Academy) p. 5-6;
13; 135 et passim; sec also GLUCKER 1978. p. 379; 1980, p. 57-58. Antiochus ddense of
sensory perception is hardly reconcilable with the Platonic antithesis between the Platonic
Forms and the sensible world, to which the Heraclitean flux-theory applies (cf. Plut. De E
392A-E). Moreover. Antiochus denial of the transcendence of the active principle (n'>
;roto0v) over the material. passive principle (to rdwxov) would be unacceptable to Middle
Platonists. Cf. LEVY 1992, p. 553-554; see also 00RRIE 1987, p. 477-482; FLADERER 1996, p.
80; 87; 94-100. But perhaps TARRANT has exaggerated Philo of Larissas significance. Cf.
GORLER 1994, p. 932-934. LEVY ( 1992, 51; 1993b. p. 155 note 64) rightly points out that
neither Philo nor Antiochus - taken separately - can be held to have established the
philosophical foundations for the whole of Middle Platonism. Therefore I think that any
"rcductionist" interpretation should be dismissed in this matter. One may also compare the
views of RUNIA 1986, p. 46-49.
. "'.V+ . . !P',.L..Si gwc. :1
- --- __.
ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY IN POST-ACADEMIC TII\IES 15
fundamentally unitarian and not in the least anti-religious. It is my hunch
that the latter view may not have been that far from the truth. C. LEVY
( 1993b) has recently argued that Platonism never- not even during its so-
called sceptical phase- renounced its Platonist religious aspirations. At any
rate, the reconstruction of the history of their "school" appears to belong
inextricably to the core of the Academics' philosophical activity.
Can New Academic themes be shown to be also present in the Platonism
of the Early Empire, and if so, how did Platonists sympathetic to this
tradition deal with the Academic legacy? Did they display an Academic
awareness in their own philosophy? And how did they interpret the history
of Platonism, and more in particular the relation between the New Academy
and the philosophy of Plato as they themselves interpreted it? In order to
find answers to these questions I shall examine a cluster of texts related to
this issue: the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus; the testimonies
concerning the classific'ation systems developed to divide and subdivide the
Corpus Platonicum; the Ncoplatonic Prolegomena in Platonis philosophiam,
which appears to reflect important aspects of Middle Platonic issues; Galen's
account of the polemic between Favorinus of Arelate and Epictetus; and the
anti-Academic polemic of the Christian Minucius Felix. The single most
important author in this respect, however, is undoubtedly Plutarch of
Chaeronca. Not only is he a distinguished representative of Middle
Platonism, of whom a considerable body of writings has survived; above all,
in his works may be discerned a constant preoccupation with the history of
Platonic philosophy, and a concern to define his own position and his
interpretations of Plato in relation to it. Plutarch makes an honest effort to
combine harmoniously Platonic with "Academic" themes. This is most
obvious in his anti-Stoic and anti-Epicurean tracts, in his treatises on Delphic
religion. in his works dealing with natural science", and also in his exegesis
of Plato, as will be shown. The text I have chosen as a kind of Leitmotiv of
the present study is his first Quaestio Platonica, which is a complex of various
themes all in some way related to issues raised by the New Academics. I will
take this text as a starting point for the study of other Plutarchean texts, and
as a point of reference, in order to elucidate the polemic on the philosophical
legacy of Socrates, his divine sign, the interpretation of the Theaetellts,
"elenctics", aporetics", the search for truth ("zetetics"), and anamnesis.
Through the latter concept Plutarch seeks to link Academic epistemological
views to Platonist metaphysics, psychology and epistemology, as I shall
endeavour to show. Starting from the first Quaestio Platonica and following
its themes through the rest of Plutarch's corpus, I shall examine the texts
which are most relevant to our purpose.
16 CHAPTER 1
In the second chapter I shall examine the philosophical significance of
Plato's Theaetellls in the polemic raised by the New Academy, dealing first
(eh. 2, I) with the general way in which Platonists applied labels to the
dialogues of Plato (which can only be understood from the perspective of the
issues raised by the New Academy), and then with the divergent Middle
Platonic Theaetellls interpretations, as evidenced (eh. 2, 11) in the
anonymous commentary, (eh. 2, Ill) in the anonymous Prolegomena in
P/atonis philosophiam, and (eh. 2, IV) in the work of Plutarch. The third
chapter is devoted to the attacks levelled at the most important of the New
Academics' alleged predecessors, viz. Socrates, and to the way in which the
Academic interpretation of Socrates was defended in Middle Platonism.
This is evidenced by Plutarch's defence of Socrates and the Academy,
especially in the anti-Epicurean treatise Adrerstts Colotem (eh. 3, 1). Special
attention will be devoted to some notions that were crucial to these contro-
versies, viz. and Eigwvdn (eh. 3, I. C and 11).
The issues examined in the second and third chapters are essential to a
good understanding of the first Quaestio Platonica, which is analysed in the
fourth and central chapter. There I shall deal successively with the themes of
the four sections of the Quaestio, focused on the themes of Socrates'
elcnctics (eh. 4, 1), f(-lt.autta as an obstruction to the search for truth (eh. 4,
11), the debate on the possibility of "apprehension" (eh. 4, Ill), and the
Platonic doctrine of recollection (eh. 4, IV), respectively. The third of the
aforesaid sections (eh. 4, Ill) will allow us a closer look at Plutarch's
allegiance to the Academic tradition in general. The fifth chapter is devoted
to some post-Piutarchean traces of the same polemic. First I shall examine
the way in which Favorinus, Plutarch' s friend and probably at some time his
pupil
2
\ defined his own position as an Academic, in confrontation with the
Stoic Epictetus. Presumably Favorinus is defending Plutarch, whom he
clearly considered an Academic as well, against Stoic attacks. The final
chapter deals with the anti-Academic polemic in the dialogue Ocrmius by
the Christian author l\linucius Felix, in which the Socratic and "zetetic"
character of Academic philosophy is emphasised. It is plausible that
Minucius was alluding to issues of his day.
To recapitulate, I shall argue my thesis that the questions raised by the
New Academics had not yet completely lost their interest in Middle Platonic
times and that some Middle Platonists were rather sympathetic to the New
Academy, by referring mainly to
the works of Plutarch (including some texts of dubious authenticity in
the Corpus Plwarcheum ),
25
This chapter will also contain a discussion of Plutarch's De prima frigido , which he
dedicated to Favorinus (eh. 5. I) .
'


r.:.:
,
ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY 1:--.1 POST-ACADEMIC TIMES
the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus,
the evidence on Favorinus,
17
some evidence from the anonymous Prolegomena in Platonis philo-
sophiam and from several other Neoplatonic works insofar as they con-
tain Middle Platonic material,
the various sources on the development of the diaeretic classification
system for the Corpus Platonicwn (Diogenes Laertius, Albinus' Pro/o-
gus and other sources),
the evidence on Middle Platonic devotion to the Socratic ideal of philo-
sophy and support for its Academic interpretation,
and finally Minucius Felix's Octmius.
A quick glance at this list already reveals that not all Middle Platonists figure
in it. It is not my intention to present a systematic, comprehensive and
complete survey of Middle Platonism - but then it is not my claim that
Aca-demic tendencies pervade the whok of Middle Platonism, and still less
that !\-fiddle Platonism as such would be essentially "Academic" in nature.
Middle Platonism was not a unified philosophical movement; it is merely a
term coined by scholars to cover various philosophers and texts which can
more or kss be dated to the same period. Most of the Middle Platonists arc
merely names to us. About their philosophical practice and doctrines we do
not know much. The little we do know we owe mainly to later authors who
were only interested in specific doctrinal aspects.
What about the authors and texts that will not receive separate treatment
in the present monograph? Let us first turn to a major Middle Platonic text ,
the Didaska/ikos (also known as Epirume), by Alcinous. J. FREUDENTHAL' s
thesis ( 1879) that this handbook is to be attributed to Albinus has been
convincingly refuted by J. Most scholars now agree that the
author of the Didaskalikos is not to be identified with

Although it
is perhaps not rurally implausible that he was the author of this handbook of .
Platonic doctrine, I think it is safer to keep both texts separated and to cite
the Didaskalikos under the name which figures in our manuscripts: that of
the otherwise unknown Alcinous. In the notes I refer many times to the
Didaskalikos, but I have nonetheless decided not to give it any extensive
16
Cf. WHITTAKER 1974: WHITTAKER- LOUIS 1990, p. VII -XIII.
17
Cf. Do:-;n ..a 1990, p. 80; 88: DILLON 1993. The omts probandi li es indisputably with those
who want to sec! the ascription 'A).xtvom. in Parisinus gr. 1962 and Vindobonensis gr. 314 (our
earliest manuscripts) , both at the beginning and at the end of the text, changed into 'AA.Bivou.
It is therefore methodologically incorrect to require "posit ive Beweise gegen die Verfasser-
identitat"' , as NOSSER (1991, p. 218) does. NOSSER (p. 210-223) has tried to breathe new life
into FREUDENTHAL's thesis, but see 1995. p. 615; MANSFELD 1994, p. 82 note 136:
p. 84 note 137.
18 CHAPTER 1
treatment. The reason for this is simply that its philosophical style is
definitely un-Academic. Of course it was a a collection of
doctrines that has a complex scholastic tradition behind it, and perhaps one
should not expect to find an aporctic approach here. On the other hand. had
the author been interested in Academic themes, he could easily have added
a treatment of New Academic strategies or tenets or even have interspersed
his survey of doctrines with critical and "sceptical" qualifications. He has
done nothing of that. Nonetheless, here and there the text bears traces of
controversies raised by the New Academy. I will, for instance, refer to the
use the author makes of the Tlzeaetetus when explaining Platonist episte-

In any event, the mere existence of texts of this type should warn us not
to exaggerate claims regarding New Academic tendencies in Middk
Platonism. Surely not all the Platonists of those times would agree to being
called Academics or even concede having New Academic sympathies, rather
to the contrary. On the other hand, one should not be tempted to rule out
too rashly the possibility of such sympathies when evidence is lacking. The
nature of our sources - their scholastic or doxographic character, for
instance, or the different interests of Neoplatonists- may in some cases have
been responsible for this lack of evidence.
Let us take the example of Taurus: we simply do not know enough of his
work to infer that the nature of his philosophy was utterly ''dogmatic" (or
even "eclectic", for that matter), or at kast not more so than Plutarch's. It
would be fairly easy to select a number of excerpts from the Corpus
Plutarchcum- compile a sort of anthology, as it were- in order to create the
impression of a similar scholasticism- which in the case of Plutarch would be
a false perception. From the scanty evidence on Taurus we get the
impression that he was quite close to Plutarch in several

But it is
impossible to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty whether the
New Academic tradition was of any significance to him, or to rule out that he
endorsed an Academically fashioned epistemology.
Another reasonably well-known Middle Platonist is Atticus. Our view of
his philosophical position is limited by our sources: what we possess are
mainly fragments of a polemical tract against Aristotelian strands in
Platonism and some information, provided by Proclus, on his allegedly
heretic interpretation of the Timaeus (in this context he is cited together with
Plutarch). There are no signs that Atticus inclined towards an Academic
ex Perhaps an instructional manual for teachers: cf. DILLON 1993, p. xiii-xiv.

Cf. infra p. 39.

><J Evidenced are his criticism of Stoic doctrines (Gellius 12,5,5) and the application of the
concept of dual causality (Gellius 19,6). See my review of LAK\IANN 1995 (OPSO\IER 1997c).


,_, l


ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY IN POST-ACADEMIC TIMES
19
position. His pupil Harpocration is a very shadowy figure. We know that he
composed at least two compendia of Middle Platonic doctrines and
scholarship. None of our information on this philosopher is very illuminating
for the determination of his philosophical position. Severus too is barely
more than a name to us. There is some plausibility that he was anti-Aristo-
telian and pro-Stoic
31
, which renders the likelihood of Academic leanings
rather remote.
Gaius was definitely a famous philosopher, but "unfortunately" nothing
of his work survives. And since it can no longer be taken for granted that the
author of the Didaskalikos was his pupiP
2
Albinus, the whole reconstruction
of his school falls to pieces: presumably it existed only in the imagination of
modern scholars
33
Albinus allegedly belonged to this school, but the only
surviving work that can be safely ascribed to him is the Prologus. This
introduction offers some bits of precious information on the Platonic
curriculum and contains superficial and mutilated traces of debates
concerning Academic interpretations of Platonic dialogues and philosophy.
Apulcius is another alleged member of the fictitious school of Gaius. His
tracts on Platonic philosophy arc disappointingly dry, technical and
elementary handbooks, that draw heavily upon scholastic traditions. It now
seems unlikely that his De ?/atone depends on exactly the same sources as
the Didaskalikos, for in many places the two authors plainly follow different
traditions:4. Therefore, even if one assumes Albinus to be the author of the
Didaskalikos, the hypothesis that Gaius' teaching is the common source for
both philosophers is extremely weak. The author of the Didaska!ikos and
Apuleius do not "represent a definite sect within Platonism, but arc simply
both writing handbooks. at approximately the same time, based on approxi-
mately similar sources"
35
What is important to our purpose is that neither
author appears to have been partisan to the New Academic perception of
Platonism.
31
Cf. DILLO:'-i 1977, p. 262.
32
Cf. PRAECHTER 1916, p. 510 note 1; p. 513.
33
Cf. TARRA;\1 1983b, p. 161-162; DONINI 1990, p. 88-89; 1994 p. 5057; BASTIANINI -
SEDLEY 1995, p. 251. For the traditional view see DES PLACES 1974, p. 351-352: DORRIE
197Ib, p. 188-189; DI STEFANO 1984, p. 50. INVERNIZZI 1976, p. 233 wants to keep the name
'Circolo di Gaio", but takes it not in its full institutional sense, but rather as "un modo tipico
di interprctare il platonismo, che non rifiuta I'apporto di dottrine di altre scuole, mane tenta
una sintesi, ponendo a! centra l'aspetto metafisico-teologico della filosofia di Platonc, un
modo di interpretare che avra la sua compiuta espressione nella filosofia di Plotino."
l:\VERNIZZI's definition is hardly satisfactory as it is not sufficiently specific. Nor is it clear
why the name of Gaius should designate this brand of Platonism.
-'-' Cf. DILLON 1977, p. 311-338.
35
DILL0:--1 1977, p. 340.
, !
.....
20 CHAPTER 1
Arius Didymus, the doxographer, is an interesting case. Scholars usually
assume that he was a Stoic and one of the major sources of the Didaskalikos.
But if one refuses, with GbRANSSON ( 1995), to identify Arius Didymus with
Arius, the Stoic court-philosopher and friend of August, nothing rules out
the fact that Arius Didymus the doxographer, who could then have been
active at any time between the middle of the first century B.C. and the end
of the second century A.D. (p. 216), was a person with Academic
sympathies, rather than a "dogmatic" philosopher (GbRANSSON 1995, p.
218).
Of the Alexandrian branch of Platonism, Philo Judaeus, despite his
occasional but isolated use of the Aenesidemean Ten Poims agaimr
Dogmatism
30
, was not much of a sceptic himself, as he apparently accepted
the Stoic criterion. He clearly does not belong to the "Academic" tradition.
Eudorus is an enigmatic figure (we provisionally brackett TARRANT's
hypothesis that Eudorus is the author of the anonymous commentary on the
Theaetettls- a thesis apparently not shared by anyone clse
37
). From what we
know about Eudorus' philosophy- not much -one would tend to think it
bore a closer resemblance to the (genuine) Old Academy and to Pythago-
reanism than to any of the New Academics' thought. Noncthdess he was
called an Academic philosopher by Stohaeus (2,42,7-8 Wachsmuth-Hense)
The Pythagorean current in Middle Platonism was quite considerable, as
may he inferred from the various Pythagorean characters appearing in
Plutarch's dialogues and Tahle Talks, from the evidence of the activities of
Pythagorean-fashioncd philosophers such as Modcratus, from the works of
Nicomachus of Gerasa and Theon of Smyrna, and from the fragments of
Numenius. The latter, moreover, was pronouncedly anti-Academic. and
even wrote a hook On the Academics' defection from Plato, in which he
contends that the Academy had distorted the true meaning of Plato's

Numenius' work proves the existence of considerable anti-Academic
tendencies in Middle Platonic times, and it would indeed be foolish to dcnv.
or even to minimalisc them. What I want to do is merely to oppose the
extremist but still commonly held thesis that New Academism \vas totally
extinct
3
'> after Antiochus, and show the existence of Academic sympathies in
some traditions within Middle Platonism.
31i De ebr. 162-205.
37
Cf. infra, p. 35.
3
H Cf. frg. 24-28; infra, p. 171.

This view attaches too much value to Cicero's statement (De nat. dear. 1,1 1): "ut haec in
philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte iudicandi profecta a Socrate
repetita ab Arcesila confirmata a Carneade usque ad nos tram viguit aetatem; quam nunc
prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intelkgo."
- --:-ll"""""-_;,. t .'t\. "" - o;: "C'"
. 1
ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY 1:--J POST-ACADEMIC TIMES
21
But before bringing this first, introductory, chapter to a close, I must
broach the issue of the instruction Plutarch repeatedly claims to have
received in the Academy. His claim may seem a little surprising, for the
scholarly world has come to acknowledge that by Plutarch's time the
Academy had disappeared as an organised institution.
Ill. THE ACADEMY IN PLUTARCH'S DAY
The renewed study of ancient scepticism has entailed the questioning of a
number of long-standing quasi-certainties. In his epoch-making book
Alllioclws and the Late Academ_v (1978) J. GLLJCKER challenged many deep-
rooted convictions which in fact often prove to be based on amazingly weak
grounds. \Vhile investigating the institutional aspects of the Academic
tradition he dealt also with the presumed sceptical tendencies in Plutarch's
work. GLUCKER (1978, p. 260-262; 270) points out that Plutarch's c:ruvre
exhibits conspicuous traces of sceptical arguments and argumentation
strategies, most notably so in the polemical treatises against Stoicism and
Epicureanism (yet Plutarch, remaining essentially a Platonist, cannot be
considered a "real sceptic" according to GLUCKER). But then one is faced
with the inescapable question where Plutarch underwent this sceptical
influence. The most obvious answer seems to be that Plutarch, after having
attended the courses of Ammonius for some time, joined the (still sceptical)
Academy, where he would soon learn the principles of caution and healthy
sccpsis.;
0
This at least is the picture suggested by texts such as De E 387F, De
def or. 431 A and De sera num. 549E.
Howcvcr, this explanation is unacceptable in GLLJCKER's opinion: it is
precisely the main thesis of his book that by the time of Plutarch the
Academy had ceased to exist as a philosophical institution, i.e. an organised
philosophical community that could legitimately claim to be the contin-
uation of Plato's Old Academy. This view, which is in fact the elaboration of
John LYNCH's thesis (1972, p. 54-67; 177-189), is now in its essence
commonlyH accepted by those who are familiar-1
2
with it.
If one accepts that Ammonius was not a scholarch. that is: cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 263. If he
had been a scholarch, then of course Plutarch would have learned his scepsis from Ammonius,
i.e. in the Academy (this is HIRZEL's view: !I 1895, p. 124). But at this stage of his book
GLUCKER is convinced to have presented conclusive evidence that Ammonius was not a
scholarch and that he was not even related to the Academy (cf. p. 124-134).

E.g. DILLON 1982, p. 66; 1988b, p. 358 ("what we are dealing with in the period after about
SO B.C. is no more than a series of individual teachers, in various centres"); 1982, p.
45; T 1985, p. 4 ("It must be noted that I do not postulate survival of any continuous
Academic school during this period, or even of any continuous oral tradition, certainly not a
highly developed one."): LEVY 1993b, p. 139-140; BABUT 1991, p. 4: 1994c, p. 554.
Surprisingly, a number of scho!ars who may be supposed to be specialists in the field of
ancient philosophy, do not seem to have ever heard of it or prefer to ignore it.
24
CHAPTER l
became prominent only many years later
51
DONINI, refusing to accept
GLUCKER's interpretation, argues that the text of De E does not imply that
Plutarch was already Ammonius' pupil before his entry in the Academy. The
dramatic date of De E according to is the moment at which
Ammonius visited Delphi and met the young Plutarch. Only later did the
latter go to Athens in order to become Ammonius' pupil, or, in other words,
to "join the Academy", i.e. the private school of Ammonius, who took pride
in so naming his private seminars
52

But DONINI's interpretation is not quite satisfactory either. It has been
challenged by D. BABUT, who rightly remarks that Ammonius everywhere
else in Plutarch's large ccuvre is unambiguously described as the author's
teacher and that it would be rather unlikely that De E formed an exception 5
3
:
both Plutarch and Lamprias were therefore Ammonius' pupils at the time of
the dramatic date of De E. But, according to BABUT, Plutarch's words do not
necessarily imply that his entry in the Academy chronologically followed the
phase during which he applied himself to mathematics: they could also mean
that Plutarch, once admitted to the Academy, gradually tempered his
enthusiasm for mathematics. BABUT goes on to explain that P\utarch at De
E 3X7F does not describe two succeeding phases of his philosophical
development, but distinct moments within the same mathematics
being part of his education, Plutarch at first did not know how to deal with it
properly. i.e. to assign to this fascinating science its proper place - and
nothing more - in his whole conception of reality. According to B:\BUT,
Plutarch received his education in Ammonius' school in

a school
which he called "Academy", although it could not kgitimatcly claim to be
the institutional heir to Plato's school in a continuous line of descent.
GLUCKER 197X. p. 2(]0; 2o3; 271270.
':: Do:--<1:-.;1 19S(Jb, p. lOS-110 ; sec also I3ATITGAZZORE 1992. note 13 p. 51.
I3MIUT llJIJ.k, p. 559. I shall not here go into I3.\13UT's more fundamental criticism of
interpretation of Plutarch. which is based on BABlJT's suspicion that plays
down the sceptical character of his philosophy. By stressing the Platonic character of
Plutarch's epistemological reflections. DONINI may indeed give this impression, although he
does not deny that much of Plutarch's vocabulary, concepts and reasonings in this respl.!ct
stem from the Nl.!w Academy. Cf. infra: p. 216-221.
BA BUT 1991. p. 6-9; 199-k, p. 556-557; 561. One may also compare DILLON 1988b, p. 359:
"Piutarch. as a new member of 'the Acadl.!my'. has not at this stagl.! (66-67 A.D.) yet
moderated his vouthful enthusiasm for it."
55 One may DILLON 1979. p. 66: "Piutarch refers to himself once as 'joining the
Acadl.!my' [ .. . ]. but since this is the only possible reference to the Academy as a living
institution in this whole period I am inclined to interpret the phrase mdaphorically, as
meaning simply 'became a Platonist' - or a more orthodox Platonist - as opposed to an
enthusiast for Pythagorean number-mysticism. as he portrays himself at this time. If he joined
a material Acadl.!my, than [sic] I suggest it was no more than Ammonius' school, which seems
to have been a fairly simple foundation."

ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY IN POST-ACADEMIC TIMES 25
However, Plutarch from the outset considered himself a follower of Plato
and of the Academy56.
I am prepared to endorse BABUT's interpretation, though it is not yet
ckar whether other Platonists as well chose to apply the name "Academics"
to themselves, nor whether the designation '"Academy" was universally
accepted in Plutarch's time. To these questions I will later return, but already
nO\v I would like to mention an interesting suggestion by H. TARRANT,
notably that there was an obvious choice available to these Platonists: they
might claim to be Academic or they might prefer to be called Pythagorean.
[ ... ] it is reasonable to suppose that Platonic scholars devoted to the Socratic
element in Plato, even though they may have seen much probability in the
Pythagorizing elements, would naturally have tendend to describe themselves
as .. Academics ... while those who were opposed to the New Academicism in
any form (particularly -if they had seen Pythagorean influence on Socrates as
well as Plato) would have regarded themselves as "Pythagoreans".
19S5, p. 130)57
It was thus possible to invoke the authority connected with the name of the
Academy as part of the legitimation of one's own philosophical position. But
TARRA:-;T's assumption (1985, p. 134) that Plutarch and Ammonius are not
to be counted among those who took pride in the title .of ''Academics",
because of the negative ring supposedly associated with the term by their
time. is not supported by the evidence; on the contrary, it is inconsistent with
-among other De E 387F.
At any rate. Ammonius' "school" appears to have been a fairly small-
scale enterprise; he probably ran the school in his own house. From
Plutarch's account
5
'
1
we get the impression of about a dozen students, at

Its activity was probably much similar to that of Plutarch's ''school"

in Chacronca, about which we know somewhat more owing to his dialogues,
which present a lively and perhaps slightly idealised picture of the
discussions that went on in his group of pupils (including his sons) and
friends. Plutarch used to refer to this group he presided over as a It
I3ABt.rr 1991. p. 9-10; 1994c, p. 555; 562.
57
One may also compare ISNARDI PARENTE 1992. note 1 p. 141.
Cf. Ant. 80.3; De de[ or. 431A; De sera num. 549E; De facie 922EF; Ack Col. l107EF;
L63: L64; L71; Ll31; Ll34 (:Lzol.ui 'Ar.u6tutciixui).
;y Cf. De ad. er am. 70E.
lil Cf. 1979, p. 67 with note 12; OONINI 1986b. p. 109.
61
Cf. RUSSELL 1972, p. 13; DILLON 1979, p. 67; De aud. 42A; De E 385A: JioAf..axt; ouv
i'tij.o<E Tov ).6-rov f:v nj o-t.ot.lj ;rgoBetiJ.OftEvov hx/.[vu; <'nQEflCt xcti JIUQEA{hov f.vu11.or; {;ro
ni)v dGJV El.1jrp'h]v srv01; noi Ol'fllfl).onflOl'ftEVlUV, o[; Etn'h)::; Ex <'mu[gnv [tf!J.ovm;
otz Et;rgctf:; :rugtt'(ELV otbf .mtgunEiol'JmJic'tvrw; <'txouou[ n See also
9.uaesr. ,coli\'. 655F ([6 1ICL'ti]Q) TOT; q'L).OOOifOl'Ol flElQUXLOlS [lEft' lHIWV JIQouBut,EV
J.Orov. w; XTL).
__ _ ___.
26
CHAPTER 1
is furthermore quite possible that he called his school "Academy". At Adv.
Col. 1107E Plutarch speaks of Aristodemus of Aegium, presumably a
regular of his school, as "no mere thyrsus-bearer among the Academics, but
a most fervent devotee of Plato" ('tov av6ga l:WV f:s ou
vag0tpwcp6gov a'A'A' OQ(WOtllV n'Aatwvo;)ti:::!. These words
are remarkably parallel to the description of Carneades at Quaest. conv.
7170 as av6ga nls; EUXAEEOTUtOV ogywon'lv. The opposition is
not between the Academic and the Platonist aspect
63
, but between the mere
"thyrsus-bearer" and the true devotee, as according to Plato's saying there
are "many thyrsus-bearers, but only few bacchants", meaning that there are
but few true philosophers/H. It was moreover Plutarch 's claim that the
Academy had had an unbroken, unitarian tradition, and that it started with
Platoti
5
We may safely conclude that Plutarch saw no contradiction bdwcen
hi s adherence to the Academy and his being a Platonist. It is indeed more
than likely that he was proud of being called an Academic Platonist.
'c Cf. BA13 UT I 99-lc, p. 562 note 74.
This interpretation is suggested by the translation of EtNARSO:" and DE LACY ( 1967. p.
191) , strongly approved by GLUCKER (1978, p. 266): "Prokssors Einarson and De Lacy arc
surely right in translating the sentence : 'no mere thyrsus-bearer of Academic doctrine , but a
most fe rvent devotee of Plato' ." But I take niJv to be masculine and a gcnitil'us partiti\'11s ; to
interpret it as neuter and as a geniti\'lls objectii'IIS seems awkward to me : the reader may very
well expect a geniti\'lls partiti\'lls after tov uv6gn, whereas one does not expect a complement
to vnQ{hpw(rooov, even less so given the allusion to Plato's saying. EtNARSO:"' ' s and DE
LACY' s translation does support GLUCKER' s claim that "Academic" and " Piatonist " were
irreconcilable characterisations, whereas my interpretation contradicts it.
Plwedo 69CD: vag{}tjr.oq:6gm rro/../.oi, 6 TE riai:QOL. OUTOL 6' doiv r.ma tijv
Ol1'l. u}).OL lj ol :rtHpt.oooq:tj'l.O"[f(; og\toJ<;
65
L63 : nroi roii piav rtl'W TIJV cL-ro rov Cf. BABUT 199-lc, p. 550
note 9.
CHAPTER 2
1:'\TERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
I. THE CHARACTERISATION OF PLATONIC DIALOGUES
Ancient Platonism had developed a number of ways to divide and subdivide
the dialogues of the Corpus Plaronicwn into (sub-)groups. One important
content-based scheme
1
is the diaeretic classification of dialogues, also known
as the character classification, of which several versions arc known to have
The reconstruction of the different classification systems on the
basis of lacunar and corrupted evidence is a hazardous business, the
conclusions of which must necessarily remain highly hypothetical. This is
strikingly illustrated by a comparison of two recent studies that have
ventured into this treacherous field: 0. NOSSER (A/bins Pro!og wzd die
Dia!ogtheorie des P!atonismtts, 1991) and H. T ARRANT ( Thrasyllan
P!atonism, 1993) often reach opposite conclusions on the basis of the same
evidence'.
Diogcncs Lacrtius provides us with the most complete exposition of the
diacretic classification:
1
Other arc the trilogies (Diog. Lacrt. 3,61 -62 : Aristophanes of
Byzantium) and ktralogies (Diog. 3,56-61 : Thrasyllus; Albinus Prof. eh. 4, 149,13 :
D.:rcyllid.:s and Thrasyllus; may have been pre-Thrasyllan tdralogical arrangements :
cf. 199-1, p. 66): the dramatic classification is based on the literary form and distin-
guishes between dramatic. dicgcmatic and mixed dialogues (Diog. Lacrt. 3,50) .
In his study of Platonic dialogue theory (1991) NOSSER deals with the diaerctic scheme of
Diogcnes Laertius 4,49-51 ("die urspriingl iche Fassung"), the adapted system by Thcon
Smvrnacus as reconstructed from the Arabic authors lbn an-Nadim and lbn al-Qifti, the
of Albinus (Prof. 3 ), and the Neoplatonic version in the anonymous
ad Pfatonis phifvsophiam (eh. 17).
3
Sec 1995 ( esp. p. 611-612) , i.e. my review of NOSSER 1991 (it should be noted that
I no longer approve of NOSSER's treatment of the logical character as an intermediate species,
since 199-1, p. 85-86 note 138, has come to my notice; see also T ARRAl'.'T 1993, p.
42 note 22 : GORANSSON 1995, p. 10-1 ). The dangers inherent in these reconstructions become
particularly clear if one compares NOSSER's treatment of the Arabic evidence concerning
The on with that of T ARRAl'<'T. On this point their respective explanations are completely
irreconcilable. While NOSSER ( 1991, p. 144-159) is convinced that these texts reflect a stage in
the evolution of the diaeretic classification, TARRANT believes that what we have there is a
tetralogicallist (1993, p. 58-68). See also MANSFELD 199-1, p. 75 note 128. Due to a shortage
of time I havt! not been able to incltide a full discussion of GbRANSSON' s views relevant to this
section.
!
I
,\
'f
I

. i

m
28 CHAPTER 2
Of the Platonic dialogues there are two most general types, the one adapted for
instruction and the other for inquiry. And the former is further divided into
two types, the theoretical and the practical. And of these the theoretical is
divided into the physical and logical, and the practical into the ethical and
political. The dialogue of inquiry has two main divisions, the one of which aims
at training the mind and the other at victory in controversy. Again the part
which aims at training the mind has two subdivisions, the one akin to the
midwife's art, the other more tentative. And that suited to controversy is also
subdivided into one part which raises critical objections, and another which is
subversive of the main position.
(transl. HICKS 1<)25)
4
This can he represented in the following scheme:

U<IIJ'{l)TLX<'); st)tljtLX.o;
{}nrJ(ll][tctTLX.<); :l(lctX.n%(); '{l'ft VWJtlX.(); lt'((IJ\'LOtLXO;
i.O' (I%<,1; :wt.ITI%<'1; :trt\.)WlTI%<'1; <'tV<tT\.)I':tTI%<l;
If I'<JIZ<'l; i)fll%<'1; p<UI'l'TIZ<l;
What interests us here, however, is the context in which the character classi-
fication originated and in which the characterisations. as tags attached to the
dialogues. made sense. The labels attached to various dialogues arc also
present in Diogenes' account of Thrasyllus tctralogic classification (3.58-
61) . Since Thrasyllus appears to have been familiar with it. the diaeretic
classification as we find it here may be presumed to be the oldest preserved
.j 3,49: 100 bi) <i:>ta>hi'{OU TOO n/. attt)VlZOt' bt' ElOl\' CtVO)'((.(T[I) ZCtQCtXTljQE;, 0 lE V<f l]'(l)TlZO;
zui 6 bLULQELHll bi: 0 1\p!]'(l)TlXb; d; l'tij.ot; buo zugur.njgu:;. On1lQIHIUTl%0V tE
zC!i rrguxnzov. xni ni)v 6 OE(t)QIJ!lCmzo; d; Tov <fUOtxov zui /.ortz6v. 6 M ngur.nzo; d;
tov t'Jihzov zcti noi.mzov. toO bi: zni nttot i:>l.o doiv ot :tgt"<:nm o tE
zui U"{oJvLOnzos;. xni ToO YL'ftvuonzoO TE xcti nnguanzo;. toii
bE U"{wvwnzoi:O [vbnznxo; zui uvaTQE;rnz6;.
Il"TERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS 29
version of the system. Indeed, it probably is to be dated to the time of
Thrasyllus or earlier. since Thrasyllus seems to have put the characters to use
when developing his tetralogic arrangement
5
.
The division into the main groups, viz. the zetetic" and the "hyphegetic"
character, seems to coincide with the distinction between positive doctrine
and the aport:tic mode of philosophy. It is harder to find the rationale behind
the division into subspecies: why are particular dialogues subsumed under a
specific category, or, to put it differently, what do the names of the
subspecies exactly mean? Both NOSSER and TARRANT have tried to bring
some elucidation to this matter, but their solutions diverge considerably and
fail to convince". However. TARRANT's (1993, p. 53-54; 57) contention that
all the subspecies of "zetetic'' dialogue may have originally been discerned
within the Theatetus is interesting. He points to Theaetetus 167E as the key
Cf.l"CSSER 1991, p. 123: 139-1-B; 174 note 17: p. 243; TARRA:-.lT 1993, p. 47: 56; 89; 94-97.
Sec also GORLER I !)9-t. p. 8..t3. MA!'o:SFELD (I !)9-t. p. 89-97) argues in favour of the priority of
the tetralot!iC :uran!!ement to the character classification: thc characlt:r classification should
be dated t; the perioJ. between Thrasyllus and Albinus (assuming that the characters were
added to the tetralogics hy Diogcnes' r..tA;o.;srELD takes the distribution of charac-
t<.:ristic attributes over the tctralogics to he t!rratie and haphazard (p. !JO: 94). hut TARRA:--<T
has shown that the distribution of charactl:rs follows a clear pattern, structurally similar to the
Jramatic tetralogies. wh<.:r<.: the satyr play is "the oJJ man out"(see also Diog. Laert. 3.5o:
0Qt.uJtij.o; bi: er l)IH zui r.m(t ti]V tQClj'tXi]v tETQUt.ori((v xboi:vut UUtllV toi.; bt((t.oyou;.
oiov fXfl\'01 bvt'qtUlJIV t\l)Y(ttOl;. nuvut'hp((tOL;. Xttt.)QL;
- <71\' tO Ti-t<t\_HO\' lJV tc't bi: tCtt<tQ<t bg(tp<tt(( fZtt).ri:tO trt(Ht).Oj'l((.) . f fowevcr.
MA:--;SFEl.D argues that the diaer<:tic sysll:m of Diog. 3.49 anJ the mutilate<.! system of Albinus
I'm/. eh. 3 presuppose the tctralogic orJering. The system as sketcheJ hy Diogenes indeed
Jepends on the tetra logic canon of 31) ( =!) x 4 = x works. Another argument is that the
orJer in which Diogen..:s and Alhinus enumerate Jialogues of catain subspecies corresponJs
to th..: orJcr. with interruptions however. of th<.:s<.: dialogu..:s in the tctralogies : this is the case
for Albinus' s..:t of four logical works and his set of four political works. and for Diogenes'
anatreptic Also th<.: corresponJences of sub-sets of Jialogues in Albinus and Diogenes
with sets of Jialoguc:s in Aristophanes' earlier trilogic arrangement cou!J he explaineJ as
having meJiated by the tctralogic arrangemcnl. It is possible, however. to explain th<.:se
various serial corn.:spondences hy assuming that Albinus (twice) anJ Diogenes or his source
(once) add<:J the names of the dialogues to the atomic spt!cies of the classification from the
tctralogic list. The Thrasyllan arrangt!ment and its canon of 36 genuine works appears to have
be<:n authoritative already in its early history. I do not think it is obligatory to assum<: that the
character classification as a system dt!pended upon the tetralogies nor that it was posterior to
it. hut I am reaJv to grant to that Thrasvllan inOuence can be detectt!d in the
(canonical) st:lection the Jialogues and the order which they are presented. Mort!over.
MA:--;SFELD (p. 93) correctly remarks that "the tetra logic ordering and the systematic division
are originally independent from one another, because the order of study adrocated is quire
difft'n:nt in each case"( his italics) . See also TARRA:"'T 1995. p. 156; NUSSER 1991. p. 139: "Oaf3
die Zuwcisung Jt:r 36 Dialogc in di<.: dih;iretisch<: Dialogordnung erst aufgrund der Tetralo-
gienorJnung gescheh<:n sein kann (nur sie ist ja fi.ir die Zahl 36 vcrantwortlich). bedeutet
allerdings nicht. daB die Dihtiresen ji.inger sein mi.issen als die Tetralogien"(pace MANSFELD
199-t. p. 91 note l..t7). Weighing the pro's and con's as to the question of anteriority, I
provisionally givt! the precedence to the character classification.
6
See 1995. p. 612. '
,.'
- ------ - ._ ..
30 CHAPTER 2
passage, which is likely to have suggested both the term for the '"agonistic"
species and that for the "endeictic" subspecies
7
It is hard to see, however,
why specific dialogues are classified under one rather than another category.
One may presume that originally the labels were not meant to be mutually
exclusive and that various labels could apply to the same dialogue, or to its
different sections. Only by the time of Thrasyllus, then, did a rigid
application of character labels to all dialogues emerge, which resulted in a
systematic classification, such as the diaereric classification at Diog. 3,58-61 s.
In order to understand the significance of the character classification one
has to take into account
9
the paragraphs which in Diogenes immediately
follow the first exposition of the character classification, and broach the -
much debated- question of how the whole of Plato's philosophy should be
"characterised": is he a dogmatic philosopher or not? (3,51: i:rrEi bE: rroUi]
m:c!m; i:a1L xaL oi. cpamv atm)v oi. b' ou, <fEQE zed :rt::gi
1ouwu Diogenes looks for a solution by discussing the various
kinds of syllogisms and the \vay in which Plato uses them, before returning
to the classification of the Corpus. Diogenes holds that Plato did have
dogmata, but that he did not always write for the purpose of handing them
down
10
Some works are intended to refute the false, others arc meant for
instruction and demonstration. Plato is also said to dogmatise about the
things he has apprehended, to refute what is false, and to suspend judgment
about what is unclear (3,52: 6 1oivuv nl.aTu)V m:gi [tEv zm:dt.l]C(EV
urro<raivnat, n1 b t1Jt.:ubf] ?nc:Hyzn, m:gi bE ni)v ubt']A(l)V EJtfX,El).
From the larger section in Diogenes Laertius it thus appears that
the diacrcric classification of dialogues originated in the context of the episte-
mological debate. The question as to the epistemological position of Plato
constitutes an integrant component of Diogencs' account of the diacrcric
classicification and appears to be inextricably linked to the system. This is
confirmed by a passage in Sextus Empiricus, where the author follows a
source in which the same question - "whether Plato dogmatises?" - is
related to distinctions of style and purpose in the dialogues, designated by
labels (zagazn]gEc;) strongly reminiscent of the ''characters'' in Diogenes
account:
7
Through orru)J..w this passage can be linked with the anatreptic charactc:r as well.
T ARRA:'H believes that the notion of anatreptic argument refers to the overturning of
arguments or theories by sophistic means - the root verb is used with this meaning at
Eutl!wlt!mus 278I3 and 286C.
x C{ T ARRANT 1993. p. 46-57 and esp. 55-56.
9
Pace DECLEVA CAIZZI 1992, p. 186 note 40.
10 Cf. TARRANT 1993, p. 21.
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
As for Platq, some have said that he is dogmatic, others aporetic, others partly
aporetic and partly dogmatic (for in the gymnastic works, where Socrates is
introduced either as playing with people or as contesting with sophists, they say
that his distinctive character is gymnastic and aporetic; but that he is dogmatic
where he makes assertions seriously through Socrates or Timaeus or someone
similar).
(transl. ANl"AS- BARNES 1994)
11
_____ .Jol,..
31
The same link can be discerned in the Neoplatonic Prolegomena in Platonis
philosophiam, a treatise generally believed to reflect Middle Platonic
discussions. Its author, being deeply concerned to refute those who claim
that Plato was an ephectic or an Academic
12
, applies a classification of the
dim:reric type in support of his claim that Plato did have positive doctrines.
These Plato sometimes posited without further ado, while elsewhere.
preferring a zetetic" style
13

That this was the , original sense of the basic division according to
"character" is confirmed by the way Albinus introduces the distinction
between the 'hyphegetic" and the "zetetic"
1
-1:
the subject of the characters will be discussed exhaustively and comprc-
hensi\'ely15. At this point, one should know this much about the main
characters: that they arc two in number, the hyphcgctic and the zetctic, the
hyphegeric being for instruction. practice, and demonstration of the truth, the
:_etl..'tic for training, debate, and refutation of the false; and that the hyphegeric
is directed towards contents, whereas the zcteric is aimed at persons
1
h.
11
Pyrrh. hyp. 1,221: tOV m.Ul(J)\'(1 OliV ol ElfU<JUV ELVUL, ot bi: U:tOQT)liZOV,
oi bi: zm(t piv n c't:tOQT(nzov. zun't bi: n bo'{ltunxov i:v yi.tQ toi:c; yultvuonzoi:c; lrrum]
i.6yo1;. vuu o :Lt"zgun]; EttJc.'tynm rcgoc; nvuc; i1 JlQi'>; ompotu;.
Yl'fi\'ClOll%0\' lE zui U:tOQ1Jli%0V f[CIOL\' EZELV fLltt)V xuguxnjgu, bO'(!ICLli%0V 6, EVUU
CL"tOffHtvnm ijtot btu :Lwzouwvc; i1 ij nvoc; niJv tmoutwv.
l: Cf. 10.4-6 and infra p. 69; 77.
Cf. 17.19-27: 6 bE tg6:ro; ll]; OlVOt'Ot((l; uvu).oyEi: tij cpuon. ottoc; M. ij l'Cflj'{lHIUllZO;
EOTIV i] ij xui EOTL flEV ucrlJYlHICttlXOc; tg6rroc; omv tU boxoUvm
6iza :rcwt]; zui c'mobEi;nuc; rcgoBu)J..TJHLL, M owv fllXto; 6 6
t; c'qHfoi:v ot"{r.gtv6pEvo;. 6lza M 6twgEi:tat huHgos ni>v uzgwv wu yctg ucpJ'flntanxou 6
!lfV onv {)EIJ)Ql]TtZo;, 6 6 Jlohnx6;, zui tou 6 f:onv c'.tycovwnx6;, 6 6
ytpvacmz6;. On this version of the character classification see NOSSER 1991, p. 162-168.
H For an examination of Albinus' account of the entire system (Prof. eh. 3 and 6) see BALTES
(in: DORRIE 1990. p. 513-520); NOSSER 1991, p. 160-161; MANSFELD 1994, p. 77-81.
15
On TfJ.flotata flHU tJloygacffJS see FREUDENTHAL 1879, p. 253"254; NOSSER 1991, p. 60.
16
Prof. 3, 148,23-29: JTEQL OL'V tciJV xagaxn]gcov EV toi:c; El;tic; l[l,ECOTUTU flflU
EiQlJOETCH. v{)u6E 6 yvcJOtfOV toOOUtoV mgi lWV avoncnw XUQUXll]QWV, on buo OvtWV,
l'fPJ'fl]liZOi) XCll 6 !IEV {!Cflj'(l]llXOc; ijQ!IOOLat rcgoc; bLbaoxu/..[av xai rcQUSLV xui
c't:t66n';rv lOL' c'.tt.l]Oot:;, 6 6 rrgoc; xat aywva xat EAE'(I_OV lOU '4'EUDot:;.
zai on 6 llfv VCfl]'(l]TIXO; lllJV ;:rgaywhwv 6 6 lWV rcgoot;mwv. Cf.
GORA:-.oSS0:--1 1995. p. 103.
32 CHAPTER 2
Albinus' contention that the "hyphegetic" is aimed at things (doctrines,
contents), the "zetetic'' at persons
17
, is certainly intended to mean that
Plato's philosophy has doctrinal elements which he is not afraid to assert
categorically, but that in the various subspecies of the "zetetic" he adapts his
style to the interlocutors, who often need to be convinced of their ignorance,
freed of their false notions, or assisted in the delivery of their innate
recollectable knowledge of ideas. The hyphegeric dialogues are composed
with a view to teaching and action and demonstration of the truth. the
"zetetic" with a view to exercise, competition and the unmasking of
falsehood.
The author of the Didaskalikos makes a similar distinction between two
principal types of syllogisms, used for the purpose of refutation and
demonstration, respectively:
Plato employs procedure of syllogism for purposl.!s both of refutation
and demonstration. refuting false statements through investigation, and
true ones through a type of exposition (f).l:yf.uJv <'>Le(
tl( c'croonxvtoJv oi:: btc! nvo; bt!'luox((Hu; tu).,p'h-J).
(15H,l7-20, transl. DILLON 199J)
1
x.
The author maintains the basic distinction between teaching ami inquiry and
"seems to have made a close connexion bet\veen dialogue character,
interlocutor type. and syllogisms

Also Diogenes had related

the main characters to the use of syllogisms (3,52-55). The fact that Galen. at
some time Albinus' pupi!2, applies some kind of character classification in
relation to arguments:!
1
, again shows that there is a close connection between
the use of arguments and the classification of dialogues. Be that as it may, the
crucial distinction is that between the "instructional" and the

it
is far more important than the subdivision of the "zetetic" species.
concerning \vhich our sources arc at variance.
17
One.: may Diu g. lac.:rt. 3,65: [on bi:: I] m'tai::> niJv ).O'(tiJV tQL"l:),,j :rg<inov
11f'v '{(,11) Exbtb<'t;((l ZQi] 0 tl fOllY fY.(((JTOV HUV J.t(O!ll\'(IJV' fj'[fl'[{l , ttvo; flVfY.U ).(i.fY.Htl,
:rOTfQU r.an't :t(IOIJ'tOl'!LEvov i't v Eir.ovo; ILEQEL, r.ui <i> ci; tj fi;
D. EYf,OI' roiJ :rvou0tu}.ryolthou to bi; TQttov, rtoQOliJ; /.Ei.Eztat.
1
x Sc.:c.: DILLO:"\ 1993. p. 78-79.
I'J T ARRA:-IT 1993, p. 52.
::o Gal. Dt! lihr. propr. 19,16 KOHN.
cl De f'lac. 1/ipp. t!t f'lat . 2.3.9-10: o\.x di'lonuv t:J; Tu ltrv btan]ltOVtr.ct )-J']!qtuw :rgo; titv
otoluv uvwrrgnm Toi::> xui Toutov [zn Tov or.o:r6v niJV b' ci.U.(JJV c't:rc'n't<I)V
;(1J0EV QV'[(JJ\', oom; !LEV 6 Ola).rr.nr.o; El; tO '(l'll\'UOCLOOCLL zgfJTUL %Ul OO<fLOTtt;
Y.CLL m'lguv XL'l]OEW; ILflQUY.iou r.ai ILWEtouoOat r.ai :rgooa'(U'(ELV bi nvo; ri:grmv
tE ;roujow, ci:ravta Ota).rr.nr.c't Tf r.ci.i.n, El Bm!J.OlO, r.ai '(l'ILVC!Otli<lt r.ai
Tomxci., ni)v yi.tg 6vo1tc'nwv o\. owgisnv oE: Tui:ta mtQli) niJv btonuLOvtr.li)\: Cf.
TARRANT 1993, p. 50-51.
ll'<TERPRETATIONS OF THE TI!Er\C.TETUS 33
It is remarkable that in all accounts of the character classification,
acknowledgement of positive doctrinal elements in the philosophy of Plato
is implied. This should cause no surprise, for this idea is presupposed by the
classification scheme. It is therefore likely that the scheme was developed or
at least used to counter the claims of the more extreme exponents of
Academic scepticism, who held that Plato himself was a sceptic throughout.
It is certainly not meant to characterise some works as dogmatic, others as
sceptic. but rather to stress the ultimate unity of purpose, as TARRANT has
correctly observed: despite their apparent diversity of philosophical style, all
the dialogues contribute to the one Platonic education, which is considered
to be based on doctrines. "The purpose of the classification is more to show
how all Plato's works contribute to philosophy's ends than to emphasise a rift
between opposing groups of
The t!iacreric classification syslem itself is thus no neutral tool in the
episkmological debate, since its very essence implies the acknowledgment
of some positive doctrinal elements in Plato's position
2
-1. But apart from the
function of the system as a whole, the attribution of labels to individual
dialogues. i.e. their "characterisation", was also a major point of controversy
in this debate. for it involved the determination of their real suhjcct.
I shall show the significance of this opt!ration in the following pages. in
which the focus will be on the 71!eacrews. There can be little douht that this
was considered the most important dialogue for determining Plato's episte-
mological position. TAR RANT's thesis (I tJtJ.3, p. 51-5-l: 57) that the subspecies
of the "zetetic" character were determined in conjunction with the interpre-
tation of this dialogue may also be viewed from this perspective.
22
See <Jlso In Arist. Mclilph. 1.1-20 and 54.3-4: Proclus In Flat. Ale. /236.10-14: bto
Oi] Ot'V CLt'HH :rgo; ti]V wiHqmv Y.Ul Ti]V Ei;QEOlV oboi. prv l] 6 ''1 bt0CLO%Ul.LU.
010 Y.Ctl Tll) \' TOt' niimJVo; l';IJi'l]Hin nvi; TOi.!; biCLi.o:ol'; biED.ov d; Tf TOt; btl'laoxCLI.tr.oi.;
r.ui Tot; rvn:N}cv ).((fkntr; Ti]V Tf]; tOI((l'Tl]; btutQEOftl); At In Flat.
Remp. 1,15.19-21 Proclus mentions <In intermedi<Jte genus: fl oi:: bi] XUL Ol
1
"[(1) tu Elbq
6tatgoipEV (:); tt!)v ni.utWVl%liJV TL\'f;, El; TO l'!flJ'/l]llY.OV d; TO Ei; to [ ... ].
'-' T ARRr\:-.1 1993. p. 47.

T.-\RRA:-;T ( 1993. p. 87) suggests that also Thrasyllus' tetralogic cbssification of the works
of Plato and Democritus may have had the purpose to save both authors from sceptical
interpretations.
,.
-- - - --_..
3-t
CHAPTER 2
11. ANONYMUS IN THEAETETUM
The Theaetews has been a controversial dialogue in the history of Platonism
ever since the New Academics invoked its authority in support of their own
epistemological views:!
5
The anonymous commentary on the Theaererus.
preserved on a papyrus (PBerol 9782) discovered in Egypt in 1901 and first
published in 1905, deals with issues that arc crucial for the controversies
about this dialogue. Only recently has a new edition \Vith commentary been
published by G. BASTIANINI and D. SEDLEY ( 1995). Large parts of the
commentary have been preserved, albeit not always in good state. The
beginning of the papyrus text is missing; the part we have starts with some
preliminary questions about the dialogue and ends with the commentary on
Theaererus 1530. In addition to this more or less continuous kxt, a few
fragments have survived. whose place in the commentary is not always easy
to determine. Thc commentary deals with a whole set of problems, ranging
from simple elucidation of the text, grammatical notes, explanation of realia.
to exegesis. digressions (e.g. on the Stoic theory of appropriation'"). and
polemics with other schools. The commentary is structured according to
lemmata. The basic structure of a scction thcrcforc consists of a lemma, i.e.
thc quotation of a short passage or phrase from the Thc:ac:rcrus, followed hy
a short paraphrase (optional) and the author's comment. The commentary
follows the course of the text of the Theacrerus, but it is selcctive in that not
each passage receives comment.
On paleographical grounds the papyrus itself is to be dated before the
third and most probably to the beginning of the second century A.D.
2
,There
is more discussion about the author and the approximate date of
composition of the cornmcntary. DIEL.S, SCIIUBART and HEinERG. the first
editors. assumed that it originated within the confines of a so-called school
of Gaius
27
, which they linked to eclecticism. But as 11. TARRANT has shown
and as will appear from the discussion below, it is wrong to regard the
commentary as an eclectic The commentary is based on a
coherent vision. and the presence of Stoic or Epicurean terminology and
Cf. PRAECHTER llJOlJ, p. 535 ; GLUCKER 1978. p. 39: "( ... J sorn\! parts of the
Tlrcaetctus were produced as evic..!ence by those who conceivec..! of Plato as a sceptic.""; S!-82:
LEVY 1978. p. 3-t6; TARRA:-IT 1983b. p. 171; 1985. p. 46: "Th\! which must have
the sing.k most important work for the New Academy,[ .. .]""; p. 72; DORRIE- 8.-\LTES
1993, p. 200: HANKI:\SON 1995, p. R-t.

Cf. DIELS - SCHUBART - HEIUERG 1905, p. VIII: '' In unserrn Fa lie konncn wir a us dcr
Schrift des Textes und dcr der nur schlie!3cn. da!3 das 8uch im zweitcn
n. Chr.. ehcr im Anfang als gegcn Ende, geschrieben warden ist.'"; p. XXIV;
PRAECIITER 1909. p. 531 : "ein wohl ausgestattetes 8uchhandlercxemplar a us zweiten
Jahrhundat nach Chr .. und zwar eher dcm Anfang. als dem Ende dessdben: 8ASTIA:"'I:\I -
SEDLEY 1995, p. 236-237.
?:
1



. .,
-;;._,;,
3:

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TIIEAETETUS 35
conceptions is to be seen rather as part of a polemical strategy which consists
in attacking their systems from within. As to the commentary's alleged
belonging to the school of Gaius, it should be clear that recent scholarship
has proven the unfoundedness of this construction. Its basis is the doubtful
assumption that the author of the Didaskalikos and Albinus, Gaius' pupil,
are one and the same person. Other considerations as well have discredited
the view that such a school actually existed; it ought to be regarded rather as
a figment of modern

Moreover, as to the date of the

composition of the commentary, TARRANT has argued against a second-
century date and in favour of a much earlier one- a B.C. date to be more
precise- and even wants to see its author identified with Eudorus. Several
scholars have endorsed the early date
30
, but few are willing to accept
T ARRANT's tentative
31
attribution of the commentary to Eudorus, which .is
indeed highly improbable
32
The determination of the date is definitely a
matter which does not permit certainty, and I think there arc some
:o DIEI.S- SUil ' ll:\RT- IIEIBERG 1
1
)05. p. XXIV-XXXVII. CL PRAECIITER I!JO!J. p. 5-tl:
was c..!cn Stanc..!punkt betrifft. so hat DIELS in c..!cr
c..!all c..!cs cklcktischen Platonismus ist . wi\! ihn u. a. Albinos
"Dall \\ir cs mit durchaus ekkktisch\!n zu tun hab\!n, die cinen
guten Tcil ihrcs lksitzstandes Stoa verc..!ankt, stcht aulkr Fral!c." Sec also PRAECIITER
l91t'i. p. 523: 196-t. p. 17; DORRIE 197lb. p. !XX; ZISTZEN llJXl. p. XII-XIV.
GLCCKER gds his information from th\! prdac\! of DIELS- SU IUIIART- IIEIUERG 190). but
by mistake assumes that they c..!atcd the papyrus to the !hire..! century. !le further ac..!opts
their attribution of the text to the schonl of Gaius (Gl.UCKER I lJ7X. p. 39: p. 219-220 note 152;
p. 30-t). In his Tire Mitlt!!c 1'/atonist.\ DtLl.ON (1977. p. 270). relying on date by
DtEI.S and SCI!l.ll!i\RT ( .. the first half of the sccotH.l century"'). with th\! relationship
b..:twecn th\! commentary anc..! th..: which at th;1t time he as Alhinus'
work (cf. p. 26X). I k plays with th\! possibil ity that the author of comm\!ntator was
Alhinus. but for lack of his hypothesis for what it is. In his l;1ter
publications c..!iscarcJ\!cJ this hypnthesis. Sec also TARRA:"..T llJXJb. p. IM-16.S;
8,\STJ,\:--;(:--;J - SEDLEY 1995. p. 2)2-25-l .
1
' LtLLA llJlJ2. p. lJ to h;1vc the point. For the trac..!itional view also
1981. p. XVII-XVIII.
:J Cf. supra p.19. and also 13ASTIASISI - SEDLEY 1995, p. 251.
.:lil Cf. LO:"\G- SEDLEY Ill9S7, p. -to!; 13r\STIASINI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 25-t-25() (with additional

31
It must he that T ARRA:--;T does not strong claims in this respect. Cf. T ARRANT
1985. p. 68: [ ... J though my dating strongly suggests Euuoran authorship, it is inappro-
priate for either me or the reader to tnke such authorship for granted. " p. 69: "Though I feel
that the weight of evidence on my side, I shnll avoid assuming that I am necessarily
correct about the date. and should not like to think that my case depended upon it. These are
not matters which permit certainty." Cf. RIST 1986. p. 4t'i8.
31
Cf. l\lAl'SFELD 1991, p. 543-5-W; 8ASTIA:-.:Ic-;J - SEDLEY 1995, p. 254; HAi'OKINSON 1995, p.
139. with note 4 p. 338. also RIST 1986, p. 468: "In the past there has been a tendency
among those few interested in matters to drop all unidentifiable theories and beliefs on
to Antiochus of Ascalon or Posidonius. On the whole this sickness has now died down, and
there is even a tendency (still more or less under control) to set up Eudorus as a new dustbin
figure. "
36 CHAPTER 2
arguments which make an early date less likely, more particularly on the
lexical level: the commentator uses 'Azn<Stuta"lxo with a meaning coming
close to our sceptic" (54,40-43, this interpretation is subsequently criticised
by the commentator cf. infra p. 42), whereas this meaning of the adjective
does not seem to have been current before Plutarch 's time; likewise his use
of (54,42-43; 55,1-2; 61,38-39) presupposes a more rigid meaning
of the term than it seems to have had in the first century B. C. -'
3
Also
nA.nTu>vtzo[ does not seem to have been used for persons and certainly not
as a technical term denoting a group of philosophers before the middle of the
second century A. D.
3
-t These arc no more than indications, but neither are
TARRANT's arguments
35
It is also dangerous to give too much weight to
argumcntations based on the assumption that the discussions retlected in the
commentary were no longer of interest in the second century. Therefore if
TARRANT is allowed to state:1
6
:
As one compares K [ = the commentary] with the remains of second-century
Platonist literature one begins to realize that the work does not belong there,
(llJKlb, p. 165)
then one may ask oneself with equally good reason, I think, whether Plutarch
belongs in his own time.
The philosophical capacities of the commentator have been doubted.
J. DILLON
17
is of the opinion that the text "in general maintains a level of
stupefying banality." But on the other hand, as BASTIANii\1 and SEDLEY
have pointed out (I 995, p. 259), the author was probably able to draw upon
a rich excgdical tradition. The debates reflected in the commentary were. at
any rate, of the highest philosophical importance. This work indeed
illustrates the highly controversial nature of the interpretation of the
Thcaetetus at this stage of Platonism.
31
Althouch first to have uscu it thus mav been cf. BASTIA\'1\'1 -
SEDLEY 1095, p. 539; 547; Photius Hib/. cod. 2.12. 170a 17. But it is equally possiblc that our
source Photius is using language of his own period. to which
commentator rdcrs with at 54,42-43 is not necessarily Aenesidemus: According
to DECLEVA CA!ZZI (1992, p. 187) it is "highly improbable that Aencsidemus could have
ucknded the thesis that Plato was a 'pure Sceptic' ... Compare T ARRA:-;T 19S3b, p. 169-170.

Cf. GLUCKER 197R. p. 206-209; 220; 1989. p. 272 : IOPPOLO 1993, p. 185-186. Sce also
Augustine De ci\. Dei 8.12: "[ ... ] reccntiores philosophi nobilissimi quibus Plato
sectanuus placuit. no1uerint se dici Pcripateticos aut Acadcmicos, sed Platonicos." As I have
mysdf verified. Plutarch does not use n/.cmJvtzo; for persons (cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 209;
213 ). Sec on the other ha nu BASTIAL\'INI- SEDLEY 1995. p. 482.
One may compare the caution expressed by BASTIA\'INI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 247.
Jn One may also compare BASTIAN!NI- SEDLEY 1995. p. 256.
37
1977, p. 270. See also BAST!ANINI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 260; HANK!NSON 1995, p. 137.
.l




.s;-


INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TIIEAETETUS 37
A. Knowledge as the subject proper of the Theaetetus
At the beginning of the preserved text
3
s, the commentator deals with the
question concerning the subject proper of the Theaetetus:
TWV 6 ni.a- I V) </Jli- I {hw[ av 1tEQ ]i. X.QlTl)QLOl.l I E.l[ Vat] :r[ 0 ]y
btai.oyov, I ;:r[ E ]i x.CLi. :ri.EovasHI v u mgi. -rouwu ox.- I '-I'Et. :rob' oux oihwt;
-I ZEl, ana :iTQOXEl'Wl J!E- I Ql btanitll]; d:rc[E)i:v I T[lj):; (t[;r).)!j; iWl cw[u)v-
1 {}hol1' Et; TOi)TO a- I v[ a mgi. XQ.LTl)- I gi[ 0) u OXO:iTEL. (2.11-23 )
39
Some of the Platonists have been of the opinion that the present dialogue is
about the criterion. as it dwells at length on the study of this subject. But that
is not correct. The declared aim was rather to speak about knowledge, 'simple
and uncompoundeu knowledge" that is. And it is for this purpose that he inevi-
tably had to investigate the criterion.
The presumption of this desire to determine the true purpose of the
Theaererus is that one single label can adequately cover the whole subject
matter of the dialogue. It is the same postulate that also rules the character
classification. The determination of one ozo:ro; for each dialogue will
become mandatory in Neoplatonic commentaries from Iamblichus on-t
0

One may regard the brief discussion in the anonymous commentary as a
prefiguration of this exegetical practice.
Against those Platonists who regarded the Tlu:aetetus as a dialogue on the
criterion, the commentator argues that it is in the first place about
knowledge (f;rwn'uttj). and that the criterion is being dealt with only in this
broader This argument at once indicates the debate in which the
controversy over the interpretation of the Theactetus is to he situated: the
concept of the criterion had been at the core of the epistemological debate
Sec also frg. 0,16-11): [tot]; ;r).riot; I T(!J[v m .]muJVlZ(!J[v, o'tll !j [n]mv :tfQl Z[ll'CIJQi[ot]l
E[t]vu[t t]ov 8wit[lJTOV]. i\otc the contrast 'COt'; :ti.fLOl'; in this fragment and the
nvr; of 2.12. On the other difficulties involved in the of this fragment. see
SEDLEY llJ95. p. 561 -562 .
1<1 reconstruction of line 20. tf]; t.t:Tt.f];, is based on 15.2-13.
""
1
Cf. Anon. Pro/eg. in l'!tll. phi/os. 21-23; PRAECHTER 1909, p. 537-539; lNVERNIZZI 1976,
p. 217; WESTERI:"oil\. I 1976. p. 2S; \VESTERI:-<K- TROUILLARD- SEGO:"DS 1990, p. LXVI;
MA\'SFELD 1994, p. 21; 30-37. The question as to the ozo:r6:; ought to be settled before the
study of the text : cf. J\.tacrohius In Somnium Scipionis I ,4,1: Procl. In P/at. Remp. 1,6, 1-4. The
anonymous commentator concludes this section, after having expounded his own views on
bton']!tlj. with the promise that things will be elucidated also in the exegesis of the text, thus
indicating that the preceding explanations pertained to preliminary questions: :r<.t ouv
I _[v nj t;'rf!]Ofl ou- I [ rpJtlvw{h']OEWt (3,25-28) . Cf. MA:-iSFELD 1994, p. 20 with
note 22.

T ARRA\'T adduces this passage as evidence in favour of a first century B.C. date: in the
second century A.D .. TARRA:-iT believes (1983b, p. 168; also STRIKER 1990, p. 159-160),
criteriology was no longer a matter of major concern. Given the amount of evidence I adduce
in the present study, I think this argument can no longer be upheld. See also BASTIANtNI -
SEDLEY 1995, p. 256.
...-r
CHAPTER 2
between and within the Hellenistic

Antiochus broke with Philo of

Larissa and the New Academic tradition by his very acceptance of the Stoic
criterion of certain knowledge, the xn-ra.),tptnxt'J Let me just
point out that this cataleptic (or .. cognitive" or "apprehensive") impression
was held by the Stoics to be a presentation of such a kind as could not be
derived from a non-existing object (otn oux U.v yvotTo U;tO
Ka.ni/.tpl'L then is an infallible act of cognition referring
primarily to these self-certifying acts of sense-perception, enabling us to
"grasp"

The Academics tried to demolish this cornerstone of Stoic

epistemology by claiming that for any so-called cognitive presentation a false
one exactly similar to it can be found. This would mean that there is no basis
to distinguish bdween the two, which rendas the concept of apprehension
itself
That Middle Platonists made use of the Theaetetus in their discussions on
the criterion is confirmed indirectly by Proclus' commentary on the Timaeus.
This \vork has a brief section on Plato's view of the criterion, at the end of
which Proclus refers to a more extensive treatment in his commentary on the
Theaetcttts, now lost. Proclus definitely made use of material that skms
ultimatcly from Middle Platonic sources. and mentions explicitly the view of
the Middle Platonist Severus, who apparently posited ).(l'(o; as the single.
encompassing judging faculty, making use of VOIJOL; as one of its

Clood in DILL.0'-1 1977. p. ()J.I)l) : IIJIJJ. p. 61-62: ANNN; llJSO: [l)IJO: rHEDE
IIJSJ: TARRAST [lJ:-i5, p. 1-13; lo"'G- SEOLEY I IIJS7, p. S7-lJO; 2-tl-253; STRIKER llJIJO.
Cf. SA;-.;DBACII IlJ7la, p.lJ; Lo;-.;<i- SEDLEY I llJS7, p. 2-tiJ. On th..: early d..:vclopm..:nt of
th..: theory of th..: %<Jlll.J<JlOV, se..: 19')0, p. 151-152: DOTY Jl)IJ2. p. 9-2'>.
Its udinition is pr..:s..:n..:u in S..:xl. Emp. Acll-. 1/Wih. 7.2-tX = svr I 59: I(U\"T((!Jl((
%HTHi.rpnzr't t'ITTlV l] lC1U w() t:-rc't<Jzovn>; i'.((t Y.cn' Hl
1
TC> t:-rttQzov rvu:-ropqtct'{!l!:-vr] %Hi
,:- v<t:1Tll'l i>:-roiu ot'% (l.v r[vono <'u(> ]tit t:-rttQZO\"To; S.:e also Cic. Acad. IllS: "si
illuu esset, Zeno ddiniret, talc visum [ ... ]. visum igitur impressurn dfictumque ex eo
undo.: ..:ss..:t qu;d..: non posse! ex eo undo.: non ..:ssct.'' On 'I unwJt(( se..: e.g. Lo;-.;G- SEDLEY
I I IJS7. p. 239-24 I : on Z<m.ti.rpit;, i.e. assent to a zmcti.rpnzit 'rm"Tcwiu: STOC<ill 1969. p. 35-
40: SA;-.;DBACII I 1)7 la (pointing out th..: int..:nteJ ambiguity of th..: aetive and passive meaning<;
of %UT<ti.rpnzri: th..: weakness of the translation "cognitive" consists in not pr..:s..:rving this
ambiguity): A:-<;-.;As 1980 (with useful reflections on the connection b..:tween representation
and propositional content); FREDE 1983; LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 249-251; lOPPOLO 19So,
p. 21-2X: 70: 1993, p. 199-200: 207; BAR:-IES 1989, p. 72-73.
Cf. SA:SDI3ACH 197la, p. 19 : "The Stoics claim that cognitive presentations have somr.:
peculiar quality that marks them out. but cannot indicate what that is except by the use of
words like evid..:nt' (enargJs. Sextus Ad1. mnth. VII, 257, 403) or 'striking' (plektike, ibid. VII
257, 25X, 403 ). "
For a more d.:taikd account, with a view to the int..:raction of Stoic theory and Academic
polemic, cf. SA!"DI3r\CH 1971a, p. 15-18; IOPPOLO 1986 and see below. One may also compare
Sex!. Emp. Adr. /llalh. 7,402-403: y[voVTCll yag %((l a:-ro ]tit tiJ[(lQZO\"T(I)V <fU\"TClOlaL c:>; a:ro
l':t((QZOV'l<>V. %(ll Tnqu'JQlOV nj; TO f;-r' rml; wutu; EVCtQyEi:; %Cti :ri.IJ%Tl%C<;
ft'QlCJ%t'UUUl, TOL' bi: {:;-r' LOl]; :rl.lj%TlXCt; Y.ui EvCLQ'{Ei:; ELVCLl n) Tu; azo).o{\}ol';
On !:vugrEin in a Stoic context see IOPPOLO 1986, p. 24 note 24.
L
.
l:STERPRETATIONS OF THE T!IEAETETUS 39
K. PRAECHTER (1909, p. 537) has pointed out that those who- like the
commentator - support the thesis that the oxo;tos:; of the Theaetetzts was
E:non'nnJ may very well have invoked Tlzeaetetus 163A to establish their
claim:
Let us look at it in this way, then (tij6E bi1 o;wm'll[LEV)- this question whether
knowledge and perception arc, after all, the same thing or not. For that, you
remember. was the point to which our whole discussion was directed (d:; yag
TOl'TO :r01..1 :rei; 6 ).6to; t'ntiv EtELVEv), and it was for its sake (wuwu zc1gLv) that
we stirred up all this swarm of queer doctrines, wasn't it?
(transL CORJ\FORD 1935, p. 63)
it should be remarked that the traditional second title of the
dialogue is On knowledge (nr(!i l.--rumJ.IIIJ:.), according to Diogenes Laertius'
account (3,58) of the Thrasyllan tetralogies.
The opposite view. that the subject proper of the TlzeaetNus was the
criterion, is to he regarded as a trace of a more "dogmatic" interpretation
than the commentator is willing to endorse. This view seems to be renected
in the treatment of epistemology hy the author of the Didaskalikos, for the
latter. after having announced the fourth chapter as dealing with the
criterion (I subsequently takes his arguments and examples
concerning the epistemology of the sensible world from the Theaetetus
( 15oA-157D) as principal source. whereas he cites mainly the Republic and
the Timaeus for the gnosiology of the intelligible reaJm-1
9
This procedure is
described in the commentary: there arc those who think that Plato set out to
give a full treatment of the problem of knowledge. dealing with that which is
Cf. In !'/at. Tinz. I .25-t,l9-255.26. Prod us first mentions different vi..:ws of thr.: criterion: the
follow..:rs of Prot ;1goras posit ulm1qm; as thr.: criterion, others <'l<'>;u- for this view h.: quotes
a verse from Xenophanes- others think it is l.o;'o;. still others that it is vo\>s; . Plato, on the
contrary. distinguish..:s according to the different objects of cognition. Next Proclus responds
to th..: ohj.:ction that on this vi..:w the criterion is split up: the soul is at one and many.
and since %Qivnv belongs to the soul. TL> zgmzov too is on..: and many (254,41 -255,2: zcti. To
zgmzov cigu [v l:onv iirw zui :-ro)).c't, zui rtovonbi]; 1'1 xgmzi] OtVClftt; zcti rco).tnor'E;). Which
then is th..: unifying faculty'! (255,2: Ti; Oll\' ]tict ouv<qu;:) The answer is : ).6yo;. For the
contemplation of the it uses both itself and v6qm;. but not, as Severus would have
it. in such a way that /.6yo; would use vt'll]OL; as its instrument. The latter view would imply
that i.6;o; is assigned a sup..:rior position in relation to VOl]OL; (255,4-6: ouz on OQ'{CLVOV !lEv
l] voqm;. TO bi: Z<JO>!lEVO\' uh6;. o>; OlETUl :Uurjgo; 6 n/.mwVL%0; XELQ(J) tOU ).oyou tiJV
vor]otv TlUEltEvo;). We need not go into Prod us' own view of the relation between 1.6yo; and
the other "parts"or faculties of the criterion.
-l'i Both the commentary (2.24-26) and the Dit!asknlikos (154,14-17) use the distinction
between the zgm'tgtov bt' ol. and the zgmjgwv t<f ou (cf. Theaeletus 184A-185E).
Cf. BASTIA!"I:'\1- SEDLEY 1995, p. 482: "Da cio risulta, implicitamente, che il Teeteto non
ha per oggetto la conoscenza ne! senso forte ( conoscenza delle Idee) che Pia tone le attribuiscc
in Repubblica V e Timeo, bens! riguarda la conoscenza sensibile, cioe il principale oggetto di
indagine ddle scuole ellcnistiche Iiella rubrica 'Sui criteria (di verita)'." SEDLEY 1996. p. 89-
93.
40
CHAPTER 2
not the object of knowledge in the Tlzeaeteltts and that which is the object of
real knowledge in the Sophist. This may be called the "object-related
interpretation"
50
. Plausibly this view is to be equated with that of those who
promote the xgmigtov as the true subject of the Tlzeaeterus
51
In asserting
that the Theaetellls, a dialogue which ends aporctically, is about the criterion
and addresses itself primarily to the epistemology of the sensible world,
these philosophers could thus explain its failure to establish any criterion of
knowledge, and impute it to the gnosiological objects under consideration.
rather than assume that Plato rejected the very concept of The
thesis that the Theaetetlls is about the objects of opinion and the Sophist
about the objects of knowledge proper- presumably in the strong sense of
xcnctA.q;rH't- most likely originated in the realms of Antiochus' as
Ant iochus indeed accepted the Stoic xcrwi.q:rnxi1 q ctVTctOLn, albeit in
combination, presumably, with the Platonic distinction bct,veen the
phenomenal and the noctic
5
'.
It is at any rate clear that the aforementioned intapretation of the
Tlzcoe!C!us is discarded by the commentator. He argues that the Theactctus is
not about the object, hut about the essence of knowlcdge
5
-l. He then
continues with the definition of knowledge as derived from the Meno. where
it is said that knowledge is held in higher esteem than true opinion. for it
gives an account of the reasons. this being the bond which gives permanency
so as to constitute knowledge The phrase c\gOIJ bn'h:Toet ui- I Ttc,t
).O'flO!lOO (3,2-3 )'
5
is a curious textual variant for aiTia; but even
more remarkable is that the commentator continues his explanation as if he
did not read ctiTtc,t

but the familiar uh[a; ).O'/lO!U!J
57
The author
'
11
Th..: sugg..:stion is SEDLFY's ( t9%. p. 90) .
' 1 2.32-39 : <'ti.- I/.' otT[ol] rrwnv <tt'TllV I ;t!'\,ll I :t\,)oihprvov TITJ
E-)rwn']T<!J I ;TFQl r( 01\r. fOTlV l'ln-1 ZVl'\'<ll,fv l'lt' T!iH Iocp-1 onj :tf(Jl u [onv.lt should be not..:d
that BASTlANlNl and SEDLEY (llJlJ5. p. 264-21i5: sec also p. 4S-l) read o\ _t[oiJ. "those
m..:ntioncd carli..:r" (i .e. in lin..:s 11-14). whcr..:as DtFLS - SC!Il'BART- HEIBERG 1905 had
i=[vJoij .
Cf. TARRNH p. 171-172.
1 Cf. Sext. Emp. l'yrrll . 1/yf!. 1,235: c'lfJ.('( r.ni 0 'A niozo; Tl]V rroc'(\' prn'rtU'{EV rl; Tlj\'
'Ar.((l'll]!llUY, t;J; Z((l Elgf]m1w {:;t' ((l'Tq) on i:v 'Ar.ctbljplC,l (pt.OOOifl'l TCl rTonr.c'(. 1:-::rrbrir.vt[
'(C.l!J on ltUQtt f!UtrOJ\'l ZflTCll n'! niJ\' Inutr.<in <:H)'{PC(T((. Sec also Cic. Acad. 1122: 30-31: 37
(Lucullus, representing Antiochus' views): LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 249: .WlJ.
' 4 2.39-52: rrgoo-l1V.ilov fti:-v o\.y t-.rrl.;.l 01., pi]v [nzov Tu- I J.rJiloi:; ou '{UQ I TiJv tl.lJV
ITF<J[ij ljv O:nJf- I l] (i:J:t(tJo:tl'utlj.l uJJ.c't Tt_; at_rij; . frf-1 QOY b fOTl\' :tOL'.TO -I
(;); bi niJV Tf- I zwiJV 6.no piv fOTlV I TO froCWTl]; I Tl]\' ol.uiav. c"tfJ.o bi: I tO Tl]V
tl.l]V, ;TFQl flv I ltQCC{ftCnn:ov1:Ctl. CL Theaetellls 146C.
5' Sec also 15.23.
'" CL BASTIAN!Nl - SEDLEY 1995. p. 485 : "la ddinizionc potrebbc significarc o 'opinione
retta legata a causa del ragionamcnto' oppure 'opinione retta legata in funzione dd
ragionamento'"; DlLLO:-J 1989, p. 53: .. 'true opinion tied down by causality
(instrumentality?) of reasoning."'


:-!_

'-"
' - ,
.,.
....
4, :
'-';.
.;.


INTERPRETATIONS OF THE Ti!EAETETUS 41
argues that the requirement for knowledge is not just reasoning, but
reasoning why:
TOTE yctg I '((l I owv dbw- I on EOUV U./J.a zai I
btCl Tl- (3.3-7)
For only then do we know things, when we do not merely know that they are
but also why.
"Knowing why seems to yield permanency, since the cause is also the Meno's
'bond' ( ... ]. by \Vhich correct opinions may be bound so as to constitute
knowledge", as TARRANT (1985, p. 86) elucidates. The commentator first
censures those who overvalue the evidence of the senses, believing that for
their capacity to ''strike" they also possess exactness (3,7-12: ot Ta; I _
cttoOt']oEt; EXTEn- I !ll]XOTf: f>tit TO i:znv I n rr),t]Y.nxov I
w:TCi:; I xui Tt]V U.r..Q[!)rtnv) . The commentator thus reformulates the
argument of the Theaercrus in terms of the Academic criticism of the Stoic
use of the concept of TO

In doing so he has Plato's objections to

Theaetetus' first definition of knowledge also affect Stoic epistemology.
According to Plato the evidence of the senses should first be tested, then one
can proceed to "right opinion" og{h'j), and from there move on to
"right opinion with an account" og01] A.6you) (3,13-19). This
corresponds to the three definitions discussed in the Tlzeacrerus. but despite
the aporetic ending of the dialogue- Socrates has ruled out_ all the answers
produced by Theaetetus- the commentator thinks that the process results in
true knowledge and in the ending of the search:
zui %(L- I :r[iJ]v I [olV" 1[b]g ;:rgooi.c'tBm I r[ov]
b[r]ow'w T1j; ahi- I TE- I !-E_t[o]; 9 :r!i[;] Tqtu0nJ; I
h.t[oJnH!tlJ]; (3.19-25)
Ami will halt the search: for if he were to incorporate bond of the
cause", his account of this kind of knowledge becomes complete.
Inferring from A!eno 9RA that the difference between true opinion and
wisdom consists precisely in the ability of those who possess knowledge to
give "an account of the reasons" and that this is the "bond" which ties down
true opinions so as to transform them into pieces of knowledge, the author
now confidently affirms that assured knowledge, i.e. b61;a og-Di1 ),61ou,
is possible and that at this point the search for knowledge comes
to an end.
57
BASTIA:-Jl:--:1 - SEDLEY 1995, p. 485 offer plausible explanations of this phenomenon. See
also DIELS- SCHUBART- HEIBERG 1905, p. XXXIII; DILLON 1977, p. 271: 1989, p. 52-53;
T ARRA:-.i1983b, p. 162 with note 21; 1985. p. 68:84 with note 6 (p. 158).
5-'l Cf. Sext. Emp. Adr. matlz. 7,25)-258; lOPPOLO 1986, p. 90.
42 CHAPTER 2
B. Academic interpretations of the Tlzeaetetus
From this epistemological stance the commentator obviously opposes those
who invoked the Theaetetus in order to depict Plato as a sceptic. This
dialogue indeed appears to have been produced as evidence by followers of
the New Academy supporting their claim that Plato was to be considered
one of their own. Especially the passage on maieutics appears to have
inspired them. Discussing Theaetetus l50C, cl.yov6; aocr[n;, the
commentator remarks:
E% tOlOU- I HOV n- I YE OLOvtaL 'Ar..u6q- I tOY 01-C.t- I tWV(.( to;
ot.oi::v bo- I (54,38-43)
On the has is of utterances of this kind some consider Plato an Academic'', as
someone who does not dogmatise ahout anything.
Lahelling Plato an Academic clearly refers to the so-called New or
"sceptical" Academy
59
, as is confirmed by the ensuing assertion that Plato
did not dogmatise. The commentator dispuks the validity of this interpre-
tation of Plato's philosophy and at the same time tries to minimise the signif-
icance of the sceptical tendencies within the Academy:
<'>ri;n I 1u\v OL'V o ).oyo; xai.l toi; (i.)).ot; 'Ar..ubl)- I rmir..ot.; {;n::;tJQI]- I flEV<,>v
JT(LVU oU- I 'fl'l[V rh: I m; [llUV 0L'0UV I 'Ar..uot'HlHUV r..m(t I
TO TU ZL'- I (ll<.;>:mw HiJV bo- I '{[H.i.TU.JV tul!TC.t [- I zr[L]v :r(!)
m.(Lt(l)\'[L] I ijOlJ [l[E]vtOl TOY I 0/.('(T(I)\'(.( i::znv I borrww Zl,Ll urr[o-J I
q <ttvt:oilw m;:r<JL- I 11t>:tlll; miQ[ t:on] I i:'; n[ u ]Toi: v.J (5-l,B-55.13)
The discussion will show that, with very few exceptions. the other Aca(kmics
dogmatise. and that there is only one Academy. since they too have the most
important dogmata in common with Plato. And that Plato hau dogmata and
that he asserted them with conviction can be gathered from his writings.
The author denies that Plato refrained from all judgment: on the contrary,
he is said to have had positive doctrines (i!znv and to have made
confident affirmations (cmorra[vw{}cu :;n:rrmOot(l)), which allegedly could
be inferred from his writings. Moreover, even the Academics. with some
very few exceptions

rrc'tvv oA.[ywv), are said to have adhered

to certain dogmata. Since their principal tenets are supposed to be essentially
the same as Plato's, the Academy should be regarded as one. The
importance of the New Academy is thus considerably limited, since
according to the author almost all the Academics had adhered to positive
doctrine.

Cf. PRAECHTER 1909, p. 5-15; INVERNIZZI1976, p. 217 noot 12; GLUCKER 1978, p. 219-220.
-.....----
I:"TERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS 43
The text, however, leaves us with a double question: which are the tenets
that the (sceptical) Academics are said to share with Plato, and who are the
dissidents? Before we tackle these questions, let us first take a look at the
passages which contain references to the Academy or the Academics, as well
as the texts in \vhich the author explicates his interpretation of the Socratic
maieutic method and its significance for Plato and the Academy.
C. ''Those from the Academy"
At 70.5-26, in the context of a discussion on the flux doctrine, which is
attrihuted to nearly all the old thinkers at Theaetetus 152DE, the
commentator mentions the argument "on growth". The argument implies
that the Stoic concept of growth is contradictory, "on the ground that 'x -
grows' is only intelligible if x exists at the beginning and end of the process,
and the denial of identity over time seems to exclude this"
00
Chrysippus
tried to counter the argument with the distinction between substance and the
.. individually qualified'' ('ro tbt(l)s; rrm6v), which again provoked Academic
derision
1

The commentator deals with the Stoic argument at 69,36-70,5. He takes
the argument on growth to he an invention of Pythagoras, used by Plato and
finally employed hy the Academics in their anti-Stoic polemic. Shortly
afterwards, having quoted Theaetetus 152E, where Plato mentions the comic
poet Epicharmus, the commentator appears to link Epicharmus with the
argument. emphasising the latter's Pythagorean allegiance (71, 12-18). Since
Epicharmus is traditionally held to be the inventor of the argument, one may
presume that the commentator's endeavour to trace it still further hack to
Pythagoras (70.5-9), allegedly his master, is an answer to those detractors of
Plato who accused him of plagiarism claiming that Epicharmus anticipated
his flux theory and more specifically the argument on growth
62
In shifting
the origin of the argument to Pythagoras, an acknowledged forerunner of
Plato, the commentator appears to reclaim it, as it were, for Platonism
03
For
his assertion that Plato himself made use of the argument, the author refers
to his commentary on the Symposium, which, one may presume, will have
dealt with it in the discussion of Symp .. 207D-208B. Its relevance for the
Theaetetus will certainly reside in 159A-160A, where Socrates disintegrates
the person into a succession of different individuals
64

Lo:-;G- SEDLEY I 1987. p. 173. Cf. BASTIANINI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 554. See also Plut. De
sera 1111111. 559B-D (in the context of the Heraclitean-Academic flux theory); Comm. not.
1083BC: Tlzcscus 23.
bl Cf. LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 172-176.

Cf. Diog. Laert. 3.9-11. See on Plato's alleged plagiarism B Rtsso:-.: 1993. esp. p. 351.
63
Cf. LONG- SEDLEY I 1987. p . . l72; 11 1987, p. 170; BASTIANINI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 554-555.
t>l Cf. BASTIANINI- SEDLEY 1995: p. 553-555.
.Jio.
44 CHAPTER 2
When the commentator hereupon says that the Academics also defend
the argument (70,12-14: m- I [XEL]goOOl bi:: d; auto I [r.al] Ol :;
he presumably wants to confirm his earlier claim that
Academic philosophy
65
essentially remains in accordance with Plato:
i::;n- I [zn]goDm bi:: de; atrro I [xai.] ol :; 'A;wbtULEtn;, llt[a]gngopEvot I
on C!QE0%0VWl nTJ I dvm aust]an;, btct bi:: I TO TOUS %((- I
TOlJTO, I ou C.mobd- I;(!)[:;], btbci.axovTE; I on f:ci.v n;
TC! fvCLQ'(lj I {}f),tj un:obnxvu- I Vat, ETEQO; d; TO EvCLy- I TLOV :tl\'}(1V(t)TfQ(!)\' I
I::U:tOQl.)Ofl ),oy(J)v. (70,12-26)
Those from the Academy too argue in favour of this, testifying to their
acceptance of the existence of processes of growth. But because the Stoics try
to demonstrate this, which is in no need of proof, they show them that when
one wishes to prove the obvious, someone else will always have an abundance
of more convincing proofs to the contrary.
The tenor of his argument is that the Academics did not want to reject the
possibility of growth, hut merely its theoretical elaboration hy the Stoics.
who establish by argument that which neeJs no proof. The Academics teach
them that those who want to prove the obvious
60
may always encounter an
opponent \vho will easily demonstrate the opposite with equally comincing
arguments. In taking the argument to be ad hominem, the commentator
avoids assigning to the Academy a harsh sceptical position such as wouiJ he
implieJ hy a radical !lux theory including the rejection of the concept of
growth
117

Another instance of an Academic argument referred to by the
commentator is to be found in his criticism of the Stoic theory of
"appropriation'' (otr.cL<J)(JL, 5,3-X,o). Their point was that naturt: has
disposed both animals and humans in such a way that certain values and
behavioural norms arc natural and "appropriate'' to them: it is natural for
human beings to be friendly and just, to live in organized communities, to
marry and have children, to adopt the normal customs and institutions of
socicty<'s. Commenting on Socrates' words that he cares more about the
young men of Athens than about those of Cyrene (Theacterus 1430). the
commentator remarks that Socrates cares about the inhabitants of Cyrcne in
the same sense and to the same extent as he can be said to care about any
On hand it is that of Academics in third CL
infra : p.
w, In a (weak) sense, this was even by cf. STOL"GH 19S7. p. 225-
226: GLUCKER 1978. p. 78.
h
7
Cf. PRAECHTER 1909. p. 545: "70.12 ff. ist es de m Verfasser zwar in erster Linie darum zu
tun, die Akademie vor de m Venlacht der Skepsis zu schUtzen. Aber man merkt doch
das Behagen an der Niederlage, die die Stoa hier erlitten haben soli."

Cf. LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 346-354.

t
:> I
_;

"
..
.
t'



INTERPRETATIONS OF THE Tf!EAETETUS 45
group of fellow human beings, except his own citizens, for whom Socrates
cares more. \Ve have an ''appropriate" relationship to members of the same
species, but a ''more appropriate" relationship to our own citizens, for
appropriation \aries in degrees of intensity (5,14-24). Then the author turns
against "those who derive justice from appropriation" (5,24-27: 9[om
to}ivvy I c'.cto n); otr.E.HDOE(L); I doci.youot n'1v btiWLQ- I ot!Vllv), i.e. the
Stoics
69
Their theory would secure justice, if appropriation were equal for
all human beings, but, as it is, the intensity of appropriation clearly varies
(6,16: r.q.i 11uov) with its object: appropriation towards oneself is
natural and independent from reason, whereas appropriation in relation to
others is natural and rational: moreover, we are not even disposed in the
same way to all of our own parts and members: eyes, fingers, hair or nails
(5,27-6, 16). If, on the other hand, the Stoics agreed that the degree of --
appropriation could vary, philanthropy could be saved on this basis, were it
not for the counter-example of shipwrecked sailors of whom only one or two
can survive (6,17-25). The point of this example, which seems to stem from
Carneades
70
, is that self-interest conflicts with the equal rights of the other
person
71
The Stoics probably did not commit themselves to the position that
appropriation is equal regardless of its object, hut the commentator poses a
dilemma according to which their foundation of justice is problematic on
either option, whether oi.xE[wm; he equal or variant
7
:!.
The argument so far is probably drawn from Academic sources, but only
now arc the Academics explicitly mentioned. Even apart from crisis
situations such as that of shipwrecked people, the Stoic theory, even if it
allows of degrees of appropriation, is susceptible to refutation. Hence "those
of the Academy"- again the commentator speaks of the Academics in the
third person -establish the following argument as well (6,29-31: fn1Ev r.ai.
oi :;'A- I r.c.tblWE[in]; the Stoics discard the Epicurean
view as an inadequate base for justice, for, they say, it excludes the other
people (6.35-40: 6,41-7,1). Well then, the Stoic theory offers an equally
inadequate basis for justice according to the Academics (6.31-35). For if one
admits varying degrees of appropriation (we are still examining the second
horn of the dilemma). self-centered appropriation, which will always be the
stronger, will certainly interfere with our disposition towards others; and
this, in a sense, makes egoism prevail in the end
73
, since any particular virtue

Cf. SVF I.l97 (Zeno).

7
Cf. Cic. Resp. 3,30; De officiis 3.90. See also LEvY 1990. p. 302-304; 1993b. p. 151-152.
71
Cf. LEVY IY90, p. 303 : "si la morale s'identifie a la loi de la vie, la sagesse consistera pour
un naufrage a arracher a un compagnon d'infortune le morceau d'epave qui rendra possible
le salut."

Cf. LO:-\G- SEDLEY l 1987, p. 353; BASTIANINI - SEDLEY 1995. p. 493.

73
Cf. BASTIA;-.;I;--<1- SEDLEY 1995, p. 492: "La conclusione implicita e che la natura umana e
troppo egoist a per offrire da se stessa la base della vera imparzialita, e dunque della giustizia."
.....
46 CHAPTER 2
is destroyed by even the slightest imperfection (7,1-14). Again we are faced
with an ad hominem argumentation: its main premises are taken from the
Stoic criticism of the Epicureans and also from their conception of virtue
74

which allows of no imperfection: either virtue is perfect or it is not virtue at
all. Therefore, according to their own standards, they should admit that their
theory is no improvement on the Epicurean.
After his account of the Academic criticism of otxEiwm;. the
commentator now introduces the correct approach to the question of justice:
because Plato foresaw the failure of any foundation of justice in human
nature, he established its foundation in the divine
75
, or, to put it more
precisely, in the assimilation to the divine (l'J rrgo; tov \h:ov
oOrv 0.- I j[Q n!; Oli<.Wi)0(1); I flO(LYEl 0 ni.Ut(J)\' ti}V bt- I

0./J.c't
0.- I J10 n!; :rg[o]; TQV I QV OftOL<.il[OE(J)]: (7,1-l-19)
Therdort: Plato did not introduce justice by deriving it from appropriation, hut
from tht: assimilation to God.
This is not to say that thl.! doctrine of otxEiwot; as such is abolished. The
commentator only dl.!nil.!s its fundamental significance for ethics. He further
points out that not only Socrates, but also the sophists in Plato rdl.!r to it
(7,20-25). In all likelihood this remark is meant to prl.!vcnt Stoics from
invoking Socrates' authority in favour of the theory: the fact that also Plato's
sophists use it proves that Plato did not intend to presl.!nt it specifically as his
mvn or his master"s doctrine
7
r'.
for a more detailed account of the "likeliness to God" doctrine the
anonymous commentator (7, 19-20) refers to a treatment further in the
commentary. This more extl.!nsive discussion has not been preserved, hut
one may presume that the commentator discussed this issue in relation to
Tlzeaetctus 176A-C
77
the locus classicus for what was to become a Mid<.lk
Platonic Leitmotifs. TAR RANT ( 1985, p. 78-79) puts forward thl.! hypothesis
that the commentary offered an epistemological interpretation of this
doctrine so that it can be rendered as "assimilation to an omniscient divinity

Cf. BASTIA:\1:'-<1 - SEDLEY 1995, p. 49-l.

75
CL I3ASTIA:\l:-<I- SEDLEY 1995. p. 495: "la vera base lklla giustizia none la natura umana.
che c intrinsecamente egoista. mala natura divina. cui l'anima puo assimilarsi trasanclendo la
propria natura umana (nS"s italic). On the other hand, the Stoic prescription of living in
conformity with nature implies a conception of nature in which divine reason is everywhere
immanent.

Cf. 8.-\ST!r\\1:"1- SEDLEY 1995. p. 496.

77
Sec esp. Thcaett:IIIS 176AI3: u)."J.." oi:t" u;ro"AoHm t<'t XCt"XCt bl'vmov, tTJ Gr60t>QF .
U:TFV<tVtLOV '(ll!) Tl t<iJ c:'c;uOri) uEi. rl\'({l l'.tVU'(%11- out' EV Owi; U\JtCt ibgt:oOat, ti]V b 0VT]ti]V
rpL
1
0lV xcti t6vbr tOV t6:TOV rtfQlirOJ.EI UVU'(/.T];. bto X.Ctl irflQC1oOat zgi] vOvbE fxflOf
lf'fl''(ElV on n'tztow. q:t"(i] bi: OflOll!lOll; OE<i) x.cna to bvvcn6v OflOl(.t)Ol!; b bt%ctl0V %U.l 0010\'
flEta !fQOVljorw; yno0m.
. r-
i
'$.


)t
Ji:





l
I
___L_
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
47
as far as is possible", which would have enabled the commentator to ascribe
it to the New Academy. At first sight it might seem unlikely that the
philosophical nD.o; of assimilation to God, which in other texts is regarded
as belonging primarily to ethics and which in the Tlzeaetetus is also presented
in an ethical context. would have been re-interpreted in an epistemological
sense, especially as it is mentioned in an undeniably ethical context in the
text discussed above (7,14-20). On the other hand, some Middle Platonic
texts regard -BHp also as a way of attaining knowledge of the
divine79 and Alcinous in the second chapter of his handbook (Didask.
152,30-153,24) situates it in the f)io; rather than in the
:rguxnx6;. In his fuller treatment in chapter 28 (181, 19-182,14). belonging to
the section on ethics, Alcinous first quotes the Tlzeaetews ( 176B) in order to
define 6po[wot; as bixmov xui omov CfQOV1lOEw; yEvEo-Bm. From the
Respublica (613A) he subsequently draws the definition of assimilation as
merely becoming just (:rotE b n) bixmov Etvm, to; v
no).Ltdn;). wherl.!as from the Phm:do (82AB) it might be inferred that Plato
holds that assimilation consists in becoming self-controlled and just (to
Ol;llfQOVtt ii.w.t xui. bixwov '(EVEoDm). J. DlLLON has compared Alcinous'
account to the exposition in Stobaeus 2.49,16-50,10. The author of the
doxography distinguishes three applications of the assimilation.
corresponding to the three parts or philosophy:
He sees the subject bcing dealt \vith from the "physical" perspective in the
Timaeus (l)Oa-u). from the cthical in the Rrptthlic (possibly the same passage
as A[lcinous] quotes. hut \\'achsmuth thinks of and 60Rc ff.). and from
the in thl.! Tlrcaetcltts (\76a-e). whik he sees the Laws (4. 715e ff.)
passagl.! as a comprehl.!nsi,e treatmenf"'
(DILLO:-i 1993, p. 172)
7' CL DORRIE 1957. p. 213-21-l: 1969, p. 523-524; 197lb, p. 23; 1976b, p. 17R: 197-19H
(DoRRIE tends to assign a perhaps too "'dogmatic character to this doctrine); PRAECHTER
1909. p. 542 with notes 1 and 2: 543; I?'VER:--:IZZI 1976. p. 229; WHITIAKER in \VH!TIAKER-
Lol:Is 1990. note 23 p. 77: note 45-l p. 137-138: BRE!'K 1992. Principal texts are: Stob. 2,49.8-
9: Alcinous Didask. 153.8-9: 181.19-182.14: Albinus Prof. 150,9-10: Apuleius De Plat. et eius
dogm. 2.23.
7'1 Cf. ObRRIE 1976b. p. 197-198: GIUSTA 1986. p. 177. See also Theaetctus 176C: {}Eot;
o{baplj otbet!lll); ltOl%0;. Ctt.i: oJ; oiov tE btr.w6tu.to;. iWL our. f(JtlV OflOlOtfQOV oub(v
l] o; (tv r'Jiltl)V u.u '{EVl]tcll on bt%(((Otcno;. :TfQl tOUtO %Ul ''1 (;J; M.T]\ttl>; bnv6n]; uvbgo; XCll
Ol'DEviu tf XU.l uvavbgiu.. l] !lEV y(tQ tOL!tol' yvtl>ot; OOlflCl x.ai. CtQE1:i] u).T]'0LV1l, 1'1 b ayvotU.
ctwtOin zcti x.u.ziu. hugr1J;.
""' follows a received opinion in attributing this text to Arius Didymus. However. sec
GbRA:--:SSON 1995, p. 202-226. See also id. p. 190 (with note 3) on the text quoted above.
Admitting that he cannot make much sense of this passage, GbRANSS0:-1 argues that it
contains nothing that is especially concordant with Didaskalikos chapter 28. One may also
compare 00:\1:'-il 199-l, p. 5062-5063.

48 CHAPTER 2
Alcinous' exposition may "dimly reflect" Stobaeus' distinctions. In this
respect one may further adduce the evidence of Albinus' Prologus. where
the author advises to read the Timaeus in order to obtain knowledge of
things divine, so as to be able. having acquired CtQEn'J, to assimilate oneself
to themH
1
Plutarch as well is familiar with the concept of assimilation and
tends to use it in an ethical


It is remarkable that in the question of ol.xct(!)at; the commentator again
has the Academics side with Plato, against the Stoics: he applies the
Academic argumentation in order to discard a Stoic immanentist theory of
justice, after which he makes a plea for the Platonic conception. In this
context it should be noted that there was one Academic who chose to
dissociate himself from his predecessors, claiming to re-install the Old
Academy: Antiochus. Disregarding the New Academic argumentation. he
adopted the Stoic "appropriation" as a sufficient basis for his ethicss'. One
may ask who actually is the truer Platonist in this respect: Antiochus or the
follower of the New Academy? The Platonist founJation of justice as
derive<..! from TheaetetLts l76AB consists in a "flight'' ( cruyi'J), an orientation
towarJs a higher reality, which in fact is exactly the opposite of the Stoic
appropriation ( ol.xti(t)at;). C. LEVY ( l tJ90. p. 302-304) has made the
interesting observation that even Carneades, and the New Academy in
generaL appear to remain f<iithful to Plato in this respect. From Plato's point
of vicw it is unacceptable that justice would be foundcd in human naturc. and
in its lowest manifestations of instinctivencss and immediatcness at that. To
bc surc. Carneades' attacks were ad hominem, but it might be no coincidence
that his main target was Stoicism, the natural ism of which inevitably clashed
with Platonism, and that his refutation of Stoic tenets "spontaneously" led
up to an en rwsswlf confirmation of Platonic conceptions. Instead of adopting
the rather simplistic view of the history of Platonism, according to which
Academic scepticism was succeeded by Middle Platonic dogmatism. one
should try to emphasise the Platonist metaphysical concerns of the New

Nous prderons interpreter la facilitc avec laquelle le moyen-platonisme a pu
parfois utiliser Carneade comme la prcuve d' une certaine communaute
XI 150,S- 1 0 : b r i bi: Oci: xai i:v yvuJOEt n\Jv vrioJv t:J; b{vaoOcn Y.tlJOUftEvov tip
UQEtiJv OflOtwOiJvm a{wi:;, vrEu;oftE0a Ttftai(,!J.
Cf. De sera 11111/1. 550CD: uHi..t OZO:TElt E JtQUJtOV, on Y.atCL D),c'ttl!JV(L rtUVTt!)\' zcti.(iJ V 0
vro; f((l'n)v EV flEO(,!J :wgc'tbnnta tijV UvV(llJ:tlVlJV UQEtl,JV, Ol'O(l\'
cqwJOyf:rtJ; ;rgo:; m'tov, f.v0[6oJOL bwOm 0Ec7J bLVctflfVOl;and 550E. DORRIE (1969. p.
524 and 197l n, p. 46-47) points out that the concept also has a cosmologicnl function in
Plutarch ; see De sera tll/111. 5500 (immediately following the previous quote) and De an.
procr. 10148. See also DILLON 1986, p. 223 ; BRENK 1994 (esp. p. 9-10; 14). FROIDEFO:->D's
treatment of the issue ( 1987, p. 210-211) is disappointingly succinct.
HJ Cf. Cic. De finibus 5,65-66 (see also De fin. 4,25-27) .
),
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
d' inspiration entre les divers avatars de la tradition platonicienne, et ce en
depit de differences qu'il n'est pas question denier. (LEVY 1990, p. 304) R
5
D. i\Iaicutics
49
Commenting on Theaetetus 149A, where Socrates reveals that he practises
the same art as his mother, midwifery, the commentator states that Socrates
is entitled to say so because his instruction is of a maieutic nature
116
This is
supposed to mean that Socrates actually has dogmata of his own
117
, but starts
his teaching by letting his pupils first express their own thoughts.
Provisionally keeping his own dogmata to himself for didactic reasons, he
"unfolds" and articulates the thoughts his pupils possess "by nature" (ctva- I
:rtt[o]owv cdm:Ov I ta; (f,l'Q.LXctc; vvot- I et; xai 6wg{)-gGJV, 47,42-45).
Socrates stirs up the knowledge that lies hidden in the minds of his pupils, in
his firm belief that what we call a learning process is in fact a process of
remembl.!ring. anamnesis: since each person's soul has once had a vision of
true being. knowledge actually consists in recovering what the soul has
beheld in its discarnate states.\
GOtU.ER 1994, p.XJS-S-U ismon: scept ical " in this respect. Sec also GLUCKER 1996, p.
22 I : " But assumc that Carncadcs and/or Ciccro ascribed dogmata to Platonic dialogucs : how
arc wc to know how thcv unucrstood those dialo!!ucs'? When: such 'Platonisms' arc being
'dctectcd' . Ll J tl.!nds cite rcccnt intcrprctatior;s of th!.! relevant Platonic dialogul.! or vi
in ordcr to show that Ciccro or Carnl.!adl.!s could have subscrihcu to them. But why assume
that the exegesis offered by Vlastos or Taylor is really 'what Plato said' - or that such an
intcrprctation would even occur at all to Ciccro or to his Acatlcmic mastl.!rs." I think LEVY' s
proccdurc is perfl.!ctly lcgitimalc : hc does not nccd to as.mme mot.lern interpretations to have
definitively overthrown "traditional" ones. hut has mcrcly to show that they offer a valuahlc
alt.:rnativc. Thcrc is no more - m'. - reason to assume that any ancient Acadcmic
would rather have embraced intl.!rpretations stemming from the first half of our century.
Thcn: nrl.! no a priori grounds to dccidc which kind of interpretation would have been most
likel y to have occurrcd to them. Rdusing to consider seriously "modcrn" interpretations
might come do\\n to silcntly assuming that "orthodox" interpretations have "eternal value " .
Sec also LEvy 199Ja. p. 2fi0-274; 199Jb. esp. p. 143-153; p. 153 : de la
philmophic tenait done a la d'unc inspiration authcntiquemcnt
platonicicnnc, mais doni la formulation rcstait par Ics impt!ratifs de la lutte
contrc k sto'icismc. luttc qui dcvait elle-mt:rnc etre vecue comme un prolongcment de cellc
me nee par Socratc contrc les Sophistes ... See also HANKI;-.;soN 1995, p. 83-85.
M 47.31-34 : [r; rz<iv]11; 1 ftmru_n({ov, I 9[n 1'1] I :r!ou
t]ma{nJ(;) Jj-v.
87
47.35-37 : !ibiJo>; ' (UQ tt:Tf- I !craiv]n9 !;LZEV I [boy]!tcmt. This is the text
according to TARRA;-.;T's (1985, p. 158 note 3) conjecture, which is inspired by PRAECHTER
1909, p. 536. Sec also 1:->VERNIZZI 1976, p. 221. DIELS- SCHUBART- H EIBERG 1905 read
!fl6]liJ;. PRAECHTER 1909 and BASTIANINI - SEDLEY 1995 [c'i)./.)qJ.
s..; 47.46-48,11 ; cf. 53.2-36; 55,26-57,22. There seems to be an obvious connection between the
Thcaererm' mnicutics and the Meno's doctrine of anamnesis. although BURNYEAT ( 1977, esp.
p. 9-13) has questioned the common assumption that both doctrines can be unproblcmatically
and harmoniously blended together (most scholars would be reluctant to endorse his thesis
that the theory of maieutics should not be ascribed to the historical Socrates : cf. VANCAMP
1992). '
50
CHAPTER 2
The object of recollection is here designated as cpvOLxai. vvmm s
9
and also
as xmvai. wmm91l or just vvmm
91
, a terminology of an indisputably Stoic
flavour, but here (indirectly
92
) related to the Platonic Forms. The first
editors of the papyrus unfortunately considered this an example of "die
naive Yerwendung stoischer Termini"
9
3, regarding it as one more proof of
the eclectic character of the commentary. Plutarch devoted a whole dialogue
to these Stoic xmvai. vvmm, the De commwzibus notitiis (llEQt nuv %Oll'(Vl'
ivvouvv ngoc; rove; the purpose of which was precisely to show
that the Stoics contradicted their own "common notions"<J.t. T

evaluates the Academic use of this terminology not as na"ive, but as part of
the strategy developed by the Fourth Academy to discard more extreme
positions regarding ar..crraAtlt\'Lct, such as Carneades'. Concerning the
natural notions" the commentator contends that they need articulation in
order to become clear (46,44-49; sec also 53,44-46), which is exactly what
Socrates undertakes to provide, believing that all learning is in fact
anamnesis: we do not need the insertion of knowledge in our souls, what we
need is recollection.
iWL I t0L!10 uxi>).9[ u ]Oov I tu; I fLCtlh'lon; I
<'tVUfLVl.lOEL; E[l}v<.t[t] A eti} I mi.ouv uvOgt;J;tOU I 'I11.J'Xilv -n.:{h:ttaHCJ.l "(('t I 0\"W
Xctl br'tv CLtltlj I oux {:v{)[OEUJS fLCt01j-l w'nuJV una uvu- lfLVlllJf(JJ;. (47.45-4S.7)
And this follows from that of karning arc
actually of remembering. and that the soul of every person has
contemplated Being. and not the input of lessons, but n.:colkction.
ror a full treatment of anamnesis the commentator refers to his other
commentary (now lost) on the nrui
1
l'VJ.Ij; (48,7-ll). i.e. the Plzaedo. What
we have in our text is at least a Platonic reinterpretation of the Stoic
"common notions"%, which I shall discuss when examining Plutarch's
treatment of the natural notions in relation to anamnesis (infra: eh. 4. IV).
X'l 46,43-44; 47,44-45.
'
10
47,20-21; cf. 23,7-8.
53,46; 56,34. Sec also 52.44-53,3: I EV av n;. d Mvuwt I rhm i]l
'I'Et:>bo; 0 EVVOELI oanoot:>v. ;w{}' oii; '(f I at paOT]OEL; I riaiv. On 48.34-35 see
BASTIANINI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 537.
One may compare SCHRENK's (1991, p. lOS) analysis of the two-stage recollection in the
Didaskalikos: "The obj..:cts of recolleclion are the natural conceptions. i.e .. merely the residue
or results of those pre-incarnate acts of intellection of the forms .'' See also SCHOPPE 1994, p.
173.
'11 OIELS- SCHUI3ART HEIBERG 1905, p. XXXI.
E.g. 1060A; cf. BABUT 1969a, p. 39-46; SCHOPPE 1994, p. 249 note 62.
1985. p. 56, with note 70 (p. 154). GIUSTA (1986, p. 176-177. with note 59 p. 197) takes a
different position as to the origin of this terminology, but fails to take into account the
polemical quality of the texts in which this issue is linked to Platonic anamnesis.
90 See also BASTIAN!Nl- SEDLEY 1995, p. 535.
...
_i/



.:.


.... _:'
.-.:;
':?



INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TIIEAETETUS 51
For now it should benoted that the commentator also emphasises that it is
part of the midwife's duty to distinguish the true from the false (51,17-53,36).
The commentary further cites Socrates' words at Tlzeaetetlls 150C, which
might lend themselves to a harshly sceptical interpretation: ayov6[t;]
o]QCfta; (53,37). However, these words should not imply, according to the
author, that Socrates claims total ignorance. The commentator explains that
in his quality as a teacher Socrates does not .. beget" knowledge, but merely
articulates the concepts that are already present in his pupils' souls; his
'ignorance" is no more than a didactic
97
tool. As midwife/obstetrician
Socrates is concerned with the knowledge of others, which does not mean
that he himself has never been ''pregnant" and begotten knowledge of his
own; but when assisting young men in the delivery of their innate notions, he
is. in respect of these young men, ayovo;<Jx_ A similar explanation is offered
for Socrates' intriguing contention that those who blame him for his refusal
to make any positive affirmation because of his so-called lack of wisdom are
right')'):
omv f(ltUTW nvu;. I ot.bi::v (morraivo- I!Lctl, uH' Ctl
1
tWV - I uxovw yi-
1 VEWl () TOl'TO. bt6- I n oubi:.v EX(l) 00- I Cf'QV w; 1tQO totau- I tl]V
6t0(((JY..({J.i<tV. I il E,l C!:t).u>; c't%0l1- I <;n[ov tO fll]bi:.v -I znv OOf('t)v, oux -I O'Wl
Hlt
1
Tl]V ti]V I c;J<;lCflGV oo<ro;. llV I uvettlOl]OlV I l] l]V Ol UAAOl tots; I
oorpowi;.
When I question I make no assertions but I listen to what they
themselves have to say. The reason for this is that I have no \Visdom as far as
this kind of instr11ction is concemccl. Or, if ''to have no \Visdom" is to be under-
stood in an absolute sense. then he will not be wise in that wisdom that he
reserves for God, or that others attribute to the sophists.
Socrates is said to be not "ignorant" without qualification (56,3: m'.,x U.rt:/.ws;),
but only in his quality as a teacher (cf. OTC!V EQWHO nvar; and we; ITQOt;
1:0tat,n1v btbaor..aHCLv)
100
If one would still want to explain Socrates' denial
of wisdom in an absolute sense (l) EL cm).,to; ar..Ol'O't:EOV 1:0 EXELV
oocr6v), then the most likely interpretation would be that Socrates does not
'T! From the commentators' point of view my rephrasing is not quite correct, since, strictly
speaking. the "didactic" should be distinguished from anamnesis. On the other hand, the
author remarks that even Plato did not always use these terms in a strict sense: ij61] oux
a- 1 Ei zgtjTm tc7J a- I VU[lVti9EW; n (56,21-24): Ec'ltj/.worv 16[ Ev n;i.> MEVWVLI rL-nuv
''btWfEQETW I bE: fltE c'ltbct I XTOV ELTE I OTOV Ul."tO Hyo[tfv."(56,26-31).
'M 53,38-5-U3, esp. 53,41-43: ct'A./.' ayo-1 vo:; rlpt n:; EV (t/.-1 ooq-iw; .
99
Theaetell/5 150C: xai O:TEQ 1Ji'>T] n:o)J.ot [lOt cJ)VrlbLOav, to; wt.:; [LEV a)).ov; EQllHW, autoc;
6[ o{c'JE:v a;roq-aiVO[lUl mgi 01\'Jrvo; c'lta TO i:znv ooq-6v, at.t]{}f:; OVEL6H;oumv.
100
See also 5-U0-11: to; ;rgo; EXfivot;. Cf. PRAECHTER 1909, p. 535: "Unser Autor wird
wohl nicht m tide, hervorzuheben, dal3 solche Aeul3erungen sich nur auf Sokrates' Verhalten
im Verkehr mit anderen bezogen und fUr si eh hat Sokrates Dogmen, aber im Unterrichte
stellt er sie zuruck." lNVER;-.;IZZI 1976, p. 221; 222 note 39.
52
CHAPTER 2
possess the (perfect) wisdom he reserves for God nor the (pretended)
wisdom which the others ascribe to the sophists
101
At any rate- \vhethcr one
chooses to interpret Socrates' words cm:f..cl>; or not - the commentator
maintains that Socrates does possess a certain kind of wisdom

The
treatment of this question is immediately followed by the passage which we
have already quoted concerning the question whether Plato and the majority
of the Academics dogmatise.
The next lemma (Theaeteltts 150C) contains the text which also provoked
the discussion reported in Plutarch's first Quaestio Plaronica, a text I shall
examine in the fourth chapter:
10 u(t)t.t(ov wuwv] I n)Nc: !t]wc(uw{)a[ ftt:] I b Ot:(o; I
yEv[vU.]y o[i: amr..Li)-1 I (55.14-19)
The reason for this is that god constrains me to serve as midwife. hut has
debarred mt.: from giving birth.
The commentator's explanation (55,19-33) continues along the same lines: a
philosopher in dialogue with young men evaluates their opinions (2-l-26:
Ttt[;] ll:xcivclV U.v[u-]1 xg[vn). The reason for this is to be found in
the will of God. according to which the souls do not learn in the strict sense.
hut remember (26-30: at:no; [b] TQV- I TOl' o ut:o; rru[gau]xnct- I ou; !Lil
Tu; '\puxc.'t;. (t[).l.il c'tvu-]1 ptflVl.]OXEo\)[m]). Now if a teacher
engendered knowledge in his pupil's soul, then recollection would be ruled
out (31-33: [d]l yc\Q f_y[vvu v[votw;.]
10
-' I ol.zl:n U.v tln[t: t'"lv]l
which is not the way God wanted it to be.
Next in the Tlteaererus follows the most explicit affirmation of Socratic
ignorance. in the commentary spread over two lemmata:
dfti. i:li1 ot"v ct[tno; ftl:v]l ou n:uvl) n [u]o(cro;.] (55.3-l-35)
So of myst.:lf I have no sort of wisdom
oNH': I 1l [unv EVQl)!lCt I 10LOtJTO 'tt:yovo; I EfLfJ; 'l'l'Zl-J; i!r..- I j'O\'OV.
(55.45-56.1)
Nor has any discovt.:ry ever bct.:n born to me as the child of my soul.
( transl. CORNFOIW 1935, p. 26)
The first statement is held to be no denial of the fact that Socrates possesses
knowledge. but merely of his omniscience

Concerning Socrates' second

assertion, that nothing wise has yet come from his soul, the commentator
1
111
See also 57.43-58,12.
10:: In the course of the commentary the author occasionally points at elements supporting his
contention that Socrates did possess wisdom: e.g. 58.49-59,2.
1<!.1 DIELS- SCHUBART- HE!BERG 1905 read f:v [cn'mjJj, PRAECHTER 1909 (utwi;) .


-".::




1:-.<TERPRETAT!ONS OF THE T!IEAETETUS 53
again produces the argument that this should not be understood to be a
general statement, but that it only applies in so far Socrates assumes the role
of obstetrician for the benefit of others. That the scope of the statement is
limited to this, should clearly appear from the context, which is about young
men coming to Socrates in order to converse with him (56,2-10).
As we can see, the commentator invariably rejects the radically sceptical
interpretations of Socrates' words. Socrates is said to be ignorant only when
assuming the role of obstetrician, i.e. in his didactic function of helping
young men with the delivery of their opinions: Socrates examines which
young men arc pregnant with knowledge ( 49,26-39)
105
, puts articulations
into their innate notions (53,44-46; 56,34-37), distinguishes true from false
opinions (51.17-53,3), and at his own discretion accelerates or delays their
labour pains (49,40-50,3: 56,48-57,10). During this whole process Socrates
does not kt his own knmyledge interfere with the souls of his pupils. But the
commentator leaves no douht as to his actually possessing knowledge of his
own. the doctrine of anamnesis as derived from the Meno is
considered a positive dognw

and the definition of knowledge is unhesi-

tatingly presented as firmly established. despite the open ending of the
Theaeterus. In order to arrive at a definition of knowledge the commentator
supplements the Tlteaererus with Afeno 98A (the combination of various
Platonic texts being of course a common exegetical practice in Middle
Platonism).
E. P)rrhonism
In order to obtain a more or less complete picture of the commentator's
attitude regarding "scepticism" in general, one must of course examine the
evidence concerning his interpretation of those who had always claimed to
be the rear sceptics. i.e. the Pyrrhonians. H. TARRANT (l983b, p. 162 note
20: 19K5. p. 66) has suggested that the commentator was quite sympathetic
to their point of view. but, as I shall argue, the few passages in which
Pyrrhonism is mentioned tend to show rather that the commentator
deliberately and consistently dissociates himself from their views, though he
has still more affinities with the Pyrrhonian than with the Stoic position.
1
1).1 55,42-45: OL' %ttl'l}'fO(li I TO fllJ ftvm htvTov I OOffOV, M.l..c1 TO fllll n omp6v.
This interpretation has already been referred to in the discussion of the lemma C('yov6:; rlfll
OOff tct;: let h\Jn I '(Ol'V ;T(lOt).l'h;JV, I on fOTLV fl.fV OQ(p)c;. I ou navtt (53.38-41 ).
w
5
The author also deals with the exegetical question whether or not all souls are pregnant,
as it is stated in the Symposium (57.15-42).
1
l" -l7,47-5R.I: T(il :n!H !La{hjonc; I CtVUflVlJOELC; r[l:]y<;-c[L], and 48,8:
TOttTOL' TOt' bt'rywno;. Cf. T 1985, p. 83.
54
CHAPTER 2
1. "As it now appears to me" (6/,6--11)
At Theaetews 151 DE
107
Theaetetus at Socrates' request offers a first
definition of what he thinks knowledge is, which elicits praise from Socrates
for his not being afraid to stand up for his opinion. Socrates' approving words
deserve a lemma in the commentary:
eu y[e] xai yev- I c9 zgiJ yag I [oih]u> [a]:wcra(t]v6ftE- I [vov]
Ai::yEpf. (60,45-48)
Well done, my boy. You're right to make this kind of assertions.
Then the commentary focuses on the circumspection with which Theactctus
introduced his attempt at ddinition: xcti (.iy; yE vl.'vi cpa[vncn (61,3-4).
Socrates' praise is motivated by the fact that Theaetetus exprc.:sses his view
cautiously but at the same time resolutely:
(mo6(znm L(IJY.(lU- I cl]:;, on OI)X OZ\'fl ),- I '{E(t]v 0 f(ULVt:Tat (tV- I '"C!Jl i'.((l
d- I vm 1i1v man'uuJV. (fil.S-9)
Socrates speaks appraisingly, because he [= TheaetctusJ is not afraid to say
what knowb.lgc appears to be to him and \vhat he indeed bdieves it to be.
The stress is on the last segment of the phrase: Socrates praises Theaetctus
for his conviction that his definition of knowledge actually defines what
knowledge is. Thus Theaetetus avoids lapsing into Pyrrho's position
11
''. who
is -supposedly- known to have contended that one should never posit
anything dogmatically and that one should limit oneself to what appears at a
given moment (61.21-22: ()n vOv cdn<J> rrctLvE[t]<,tl). Pyrrho does not
recognise any stable epistemological criterion: [I] not ) .. t)'{O; (61.16-17.
allegedly Plato's criterion
1
'N), [2.1] nor true impression (ctAl]Oi]; cravnmiu.
17-18, the Epicurean criterion), [2.2] nor convincing
110
impression (:nO<tvlJ.
107 (J./).c't flEV!Ot. r, ;,zgcm:;. oof y ounJ a1o:t.Qt1Y fti] ot nu\'li t(H.:):t((J
rrgo\)qtEToilat on n; EZfl ),f-{nv. OOXEL Ot'V !lot 6 f:ttatCLflEVO; n ctto0(t\'f00Ul t00to 0
biomtcll. r.cti (;,; '(E Vt'\'l !fUlVEtCtl. our. c"tl.i.o ti EOHV i::non'nlll i] u'loOI]Ol; .
61.10-15: ' (CtQ EZEL\'0 !fl]OlV I to nt'QQOJVElO\', on I o\.b.v r.nOogtanr.(iJ; I c"tv -,;t;
I ct/Jit !pl]CllV !fUl\'EO I Out The last clause u/J.a !pl]Ol\' .. . does not belong.
I think. to the epexegctical on-clause. but is paratactic to the first !fl]OlV (therdorc the
translation in 8.-\STIANI:\1- SEDLEY 1995, p. 431 is to be preferred to that of LO:>iG- SEDLEY
I 1987, p. 470). Theaetetus is thus the subject of the second rp]OLV. The difficulty, then. is that
this seems to be exactly Pyrrho's point of view (cf. 61.2122), whereas the commentator has
Socrates deny that Theaetetus takes this position. But the commentator wants to make the
point that Theaetetus. while seemingly saying the same as Pyrrho, transcends his scepticism
by taking appearances in an epistemic sense.
1111 This may have been inferred from Phaedo 99E. Cf. Cic. Acad. I 30: \'arro, siding with
Antiochus. contends that the \'Ctcres (i .e. Plato and Aristotle) "mentem valebant esse
iudicem"; Acad. 11142: "Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam
ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit.' ' See also the view of
Severus as evidenced in Proclus In Plat. Tin1. 1.255,2-6.



INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TIIEAETETUS 55
19, Carneades' "criterion"), [2.3] nor the notorious Stoic "cataleptic" or
cognitive impression (r.ata).lptnr.i] cpavTCmia, 19-20).
Theaetetus' answer is identical to Pyrrho's formula on vuv
([Ctivncu. but according to the commentator he does not use it in the same
sense: from his impression that something appears to him Pyrrho does not
infer the existence of a particular state of affairs:
d bi:: lOtOtllOV EOtlV I l] oux EOtlV, oux ano- I cp<;ttVElat . (61.23-25)
But whether it is or is not of this kind, that he does not assert.
For this practise Pyrrho adduces several arguments, which are meant to
refute one at a time the criteria put forward by the other schools. [1] The
equipollence of arguments (f.6yOL) in favour of opposed theses results in the -
impossibility of preferring one contrary argument over the other on the basis
of its truth (25-28); [2] Impressions (cpavtaotm), being on a par with each
other. offer no sufficient grasp: [2.1] it is impossible to distinguish either the
true from the false (30-33). [2.2] or the persuasive from the non-persuasive
(33-3-l). [2.3] or the cognitive from the non-cognitive (36-37). Even the
sceptical conclusion drawn from these arguments remains provisional and
has no dogmatic status (38-39: ot6 touto The Pyrrhonian
accepts "to live his life in accordance with whatever impression befalls him
at each time, not on the grounds that it is a true impression, hut because it
now appears to him"t
1
1.
Pyrrho can claim to act in accordance with impressions without taking
them to be true
11
:!. Socrates is said to approve Theaetetus' words precisely
for not taking such a view. Mere appearance ( (patvwHm, 61,14-15; ([GLVETCH,
61,22; EL b TOtoi)n'w EOTlV 1i our. fOHV, OtlY. C.mocralVEtm, 61,23-24) is distinct
from affirmation 60,46-47) based on the belief that what
appears to one is actually the case dvm, 61 ,8-9). After all, Socrates'
110
This I take to be a bcttr.:r translation for nn'l((vov than the more familiar "probable". Cf.
BUR:"'YEAT 1980, p. 2R; KLEVER 1982, p. 53-55; LO:"olG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 459. See however
GORLER 1994, p. R60-866.
111
40-46: l;); b:Et<tt I tO btE:;(t'(EtV Y.UtU I n)v Ufl :rgoo:ri..-rtOt'- I aav CfCtVtuoiav ou- I X l;J;
Ul.llOtj. ct/X on I vtv CfULVE- I tat. (transl. LONG - SEDLEY I 1987, p. 470). The
Pyrrhonians (according to Sextus) distinguish between two levels of "assent" to an
impression : cf. FREDE 19s.t, p. 260; 262; 265 ("merely passive acceptance and active
acceptance as true", a distinction which even the Stoics have to acknowledge, and that is
applicable a fortiori from the Pyrrhonian point of view) ; 266. Analogously one should
distinguish between two meanings or levels of b6tpa: though not accepting boyftum in a
strict sense, the Pyrrhonians could very well find a sense of the word in which they would not
object to them. Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrl!. Hyp. 1.13-15; BARNES 1982, p. 9-10; TARRANT 1985, p.
29; SEDLEY I 1987. p. 471-473; LAURSEN 1992, p. 65-79.
111
Cf. BASTIA:"-il:"'l- SEDLEY 1995. p. 547: "Il pun to cruciale che viene sottolineato e che, per
un Pirroniano. vivere in accordo c9n le apparenze significa conformarsi ad esse senza neppure
presupporne la verita, tanto me ne la conoscibilita. "
56
CHAPTER 2
question was about what knowledge is, not about its appearance
113

Accordingly Theaetetus' answer, .. as it now appears to me", is said to involve
an epistemic use of .. appear", as opposed to its non-epistemic use in
Pyrrhonism 11 -t. The Pyrrhonists can only hold beliefs in so far as they do not
posit as real the things they hold beliefs about, or to put it differently, they
say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without
affirming anything about external objects.
2. "Man is the measure of all things"(63,1-.JO)
Socrates also compares Theaetetus' first attempt at definition with
Protagoras dictum "man is the measure of all things". The commentator
makes it perfectly clear that he thinks Theactetus' position to be rcscmblant
to. but essentially different from. the Protagorean (62.R-17). The following
lines, which will have contained an account of Protagoras' theory, are
severely damaged, so that we can only guess at the tenor of the passage
11
'.
At any rate it ends with a reOection on relativity (the category of the :r(H);
n). The commentator makes a further comparison, this time with Pyrrhonian
relativism:
U.l.- I),(!); bi:: m'rvT<t rrgo; I tl rrum oi. nl'QQ<;J\'H I Ol, 'l.(L{)o oubi:v %<LD' (tl!- I "[l)
l:onv, rt:<'rvm be I rrgo; (i))J1 (63.1-6)
The Pyrrhonians say that everything is relative in a somewhat different way. in
that nothing is in se, and everything is regarded in relation to other things.
It is not clear from the lines that have been preserved what exactly
constitutes the difference
11
() with the rdativism of Protagoras
117
but it is
likely that the second part of Protagoras' dictum, which seems precisely to
draw inferences as to being or not-being, was unacceptabk to the
Pyrrhonians:
11.' Cf. 61.1-3: Gwitqto; bfQ(l)Tl] 1\)ri; :-t:FQi i::nun']!tl]; I ti i:unv.
I Cf. BUR:"YEAT 19S-t, p. 230 note 14 (hut compare also BREi":"\A:" 1994): LO:"G- SEDLEY
11 19S7, p. 461; AMICO 1993, p. 27-2S: B.-\STIA:'-il:\1- SEDLEY 1995. p. 545: "La rt:plica dell' A.
c chc il (raivnm di Tectcto non esprime l'enunciazione pirroniana di mere apparcnzc. ma
un asserzione con prctesa di vcrita (BS"s italic). Also WilT 1937. p. 116-117.
115 Cf. BASTIANI;-..11- SEDLEY 1995. p. 43-t-435; 547-548. Sec also Procl. ln Plat. Tim. 1.255.21.
11
" Of course the similarities arc easier to establish. The affinitv between Pvrrhonians and
Protagoras is illustrated hy an epigram in which Timon portr.ays in a ratht:r
appreciative way (Timon Silloi frg. 5 = Suppl. Hell. frg. 799).
117
Cf. BASTIANINI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 5-19: "Pcrche I' A. considera una tcsi diffcrcntc (i()).<,J;.
LXlll 1-2- a mcno chc l'avvcrbo non abbia valore piu dchole, e significhi. p. cs., "inoltrc")
da quella protagorca? Perche per il relativismo protagoreo tuttc le vcrita sono relative al
soggetto giwlicante (LXII 43-44). mentre per i Pirroniani tutte le cosc sono relative. molto
genera le, ad altre cose, compresa distanza. luoghi, ccc." (BS's italic). One may compare Scxt.
Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.216-219 on the question TlVl CLWfEQfl nguHCt'{OQElOl' CC((!l'{i]; ,1

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
Cf'l)OL\' '{UQ ;rou J!UV"[lJ..)\' XQlH!UtWV c'iv-&gwrrov dvm, tWV OvtWV ws;
onv, HQ\' b pl) OvtWV w; OU% onv. (Theaetetus 152A, in the commentary
62.2-8, quoted as lemma)
He says. you will remember, that "man is the measure of all things - of the
things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are
not."
57
According to the Pyrrhonians sensible objects ( aUhrra), the senses
(atoDqnigtct) and also reason ().6yo;) lack independence: they are all
rdative, :rg6; n (63.6-40). It may be useful to note that the Neo-Pyrrhonians
have endeavoured to trace back the Aenesidemean modes to the rrg6; n-
category in a similar fashion, possibly under Academic influence ttH_
In this passage Pyrrhonian scepticism is in no way treated differently than
at 61.6-41, and there is no indication that the commentator has abandoned
his earlier criticism.
3. Pyrrlzo and Pyrrhonism
The discussion pertaining to Pyrrhonism as we find it in the commentary
presumably reflects the debate between Academics and the Pyrrhonians of
the .. school" of Aenesidemus ttY, in which the commentator's plea for an
epistemic use of the phrase "it now appears to me" may be related to Philo
of Larissa's position

(whom

accused of dogmatism). The
commentator's presentation of Pyrrho's philosophy is more applicable to a
later stage of Pyrrhonism, although already Pyrrho is known to have stated
that the nature of things is indeterminable and also completely unimportant:
he would never affirm that honey is sweet, but merely agrees that it appeared
to him as such An indication for my surmise that the views here ascribed
to Pyrrho actually stem from nco-Pyrrhonism is that Pyrrho's position is
presented in such a way as to prevent allegations of "negative dogmatism';
n,; Cf. Scxt. Emp. Pyrrh. 1/yp. 1.31-39, and esp. Gellius 11,5,7, presumably drawing on
Fa\orinus' work On the Pyrrhonian Morlcs (cf. infra: p. 236): "ltaqu\! omnes omnino res. quae
sensus hominum movent. ni>v :iTQ6; n esse dicunt [se. Pyrronii et Acadcmici philosophi]. Id
vcrhum significat nihil esse quicquam. quod ex sese constt:t, nee quod ha beat vim propria m et
naturam. sed omnia prorsum ad aliquid rcfcrri [ .. . ]."On the influence of the Old-Academic
doctrine of cakgorics on the New Academy: cf. 1971, p. 81-107: MORAUX 111984,
p. 487.
119
Sec also 1995, p. 139. with note 5 p. 339.
Ieo Cf. SEDLEY 1995, p. 545-547.
Ici Cf. Photius Bib!. cod. 212, 169b36-170a4l.

One may compare his pupil Timon's words, as related by Diog. Laert. (9,105): xai. f:v toT:;
nEgi aiol'hjoE<i>V (p]Ol. "to flEh on fOTL y).vxv OL' TWIJ[ll, "[Q o' on craivnm OflOt.O'{(ll." Cf.
GORLER 1994. p. 738-7-10. For ,a highly speculative account of "Pyrrho's Pyrrhonism" see
CHATZIL 1970. p. 227-233. Sound methodological remarks can be found in
DECLEVA CAIZZI 1981.
58
CHAPTER 2
(cf. 61,38-39). The historical Pyrrho may well have been susceptible to these
allegations, whereas later Pyrrhonists take care to avoid them
123
The
indeterminability of the nature of things was a doctrine that Pyrrho
positively affirmed, which makes him indeed a .. negative dogmatic"
12
-t,
contrary to Aenesidemus but, one may presume, also to Arcesilaus and
Carneades (despite Pyrrhonian allegations to the contrary)
125
What is here
called "negative dogmatism"
126
may also be termed "a kind of upside-down


or also a "dogmatic scepticism":
[ ... )we might say that the classical sceptic perhaps comes to be left with the
impression that nothing is, or even can be, known, whereas the dogmatic
sceptic takes the position that nothing can be known.
(FREDE 19R4, p. 265-266)
F. Philosophical allegiances- Towards a better understanding of Academic
usccpticism"
After having examined some specific questions related to the polemical
background in which the commentary belongs, l shall now endeavour to
determine the commentator's own position in the epistemological debate.
Did the author consider himself a Platonist, an Academic or perhaps both?
H. TAR RANT's
12
s assumption that the commentator regarded his own
position as Academic has been challenged by J. BARNES (1986, p. 76):
[ ... ] hL: always speaks of the Academics- just as hL: speaks of the Stoics- in the
uninvolved tones of scholarship as though he himself were no party to the
squabbles he records[ ... ] it is unsafe to infer a commentator's philosophical
allegiance from the exegetical notes in his commentary.
lt is indeed true that the commentator mentions the Academics in the third
person and in a tone of objectivity
12
1J, but on the other hand I think it is not
impossible to draw conclusions concerning the author's own allegiance. si rice
!.!.
1
Cf. LO:-.!G- SEDLEY l 1987, p. 18; BElT 199-l. esp. p. 320; DECLEVA CAIZZ11992. p. 1:-IS:
VANDER WAERDT 1989. p. 234-235: Pyrrho was probably not even considl!rl!d a in thl!
Epicurean tradition, at least from the time of Epicurus to that of Colotes. Cicero knows of
Pyrrho only as a moralist who admits no distinctions of value between virtue and vice. not
unlike Ariston of Chios.

Cf. SEDLEY 1983, p. 14 with note 20 (p. 24); LONG- SEDLEY l 1987, p. 17; 472-473;
BRENNAN 199-l. p. 16-l note 22; see also 1971, p. 54; LEVY 1993b, p. 1-ll.

According to at least one ancient interpretation (cf. Cic. Acad. !I 148) Carnt:auc<;
promoted a dogmatic scepticism. Cf. FREDE 1984, p. 267-270. I take the Pyrrhonian
imputations against the Academics in this respect (e.g. Photius Bib!. cod. 212, 169b36-170a-ll)
to be tendentious, cf. infra: eh. 4, Ill, A.

Cf. BURNYEAT 1984, p. 231; ANNAS 1988, p. 103; 112.
m BRUNSCHWIG 1988, p. 145.
1983b, p. 166 (with note 53). One may compare T ARRA:-.'T 1985, p. 66.
.=e
_;:
, ..
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS 59
it cannot be stated as a general rule that he stays out of the discussions he
reports. On the contrary, his interpretation of Plato and the Theaetetus is a
specific one
130
and cannot be properly understood without taking into
account Hellenistic debates.
The author invariably stresses the coherence of the Theaetetus as well as
its consistency with other Platonic dialogues. \Vhat is more, he never
disagrees with Plato and presents the latter's views in such a way as to
suggest his own adherence to Plato's doctrines
131
As we have seen. the
argumentation of the Academics is put to use in order. to refute the Stoics
and to defend Platonism. This is consistent with the commentator's claim
that the Academy throughout its history remained loyal to Plato, while
accepting his positive doctrines. The commentator endorses the "unity of the
Academy" thesis. Would this then mean that he also might agree to being
called an "Academic"?As BASTIANINI and SEDLEY have argued (1995, p.
248). the author would certainly have refused to be called thus if the term
was meant to imply the rejection of all dogmata, but, on the other hand. the
commentator contends that this actually is a misinterpretation of
"Academic", since almost all Academics arc said to accept the positive
doctrines of Platonism. It should be noted that the commentator is ready to
include Plato among the Academics (54,43-55,13), and clearly regards
himself as belonging to the same tradition. There is little doubt that he took
pride in his being a Platonist, and one with a better grasp of Plato's intentions
than those Platonists (t0)v n/..(..tt(I)VlY.<.i)v ttVEc_;) who asserted that the
Theaetctus was about the criterion (2,11-23).
The "unity of the Academy" thesis is not unparalleled. The commentator
shares it \Vith- among others- Philo of Larissa and Plutarch. Philo is known
to have upheld it against Antiochus, who regarded what he termed the New
Academy as an aberration constituting a rift with authentic Platonism, to
which he claimed his "Old Academy'' to revert
132
Plutarch appears to have
endorsed Philo's thesis. This is suggested by the evidence of the so-called
Lamprias-catalogue D3 which contains the title nE(}l roD p{av Ett'at T1Jl' c.bo

6,30-31 : xui EQl!)_TI!J9.lV oi rs 'A- I xubll!l.E[iu]:; oy_t(!J' (against the Stoic olr.Et<Jm;) 54,43-
55.7:55,4 : EXfl\'Ol'; (referring to the Academics); 70,12-14: m- I [zn]got:OL bf d; auto I [r.ui]
ot E:; 'Ar.ablUlftct:; (their argument on growth).
130
Cf. BASTIA:--.11:'-11 - SEDLEY 1995. p. 247: ''L'A. difende apertamente Platone e. piu in
particolare, l'interpretazione di Platone che egli preferisce, mantenendo ne! contempo le
distanze da tutte le altre scuole."
131
Cf. BASTIA:"I:-.<1- SEDLEY 1995. p. 247.

Cf. Cic. Acad. I 13; Augustine Contra Acad. 3,41. Augustine .draws upon Cicero's
Acadcmica as an ouvrage de reference"(cf. LEVY 1992, p. 10; 637-644; FUHRER 1993. p. 114
note 15) and probably also had, at his disposal the books that are now lost.
133
For this ancient list of allegetily Plutarchean works, cf. SANDBACH 1969a. p. 3-29; see also
SCHAFER 1844, p. 2-27; TREU 18,73; ZIEGLER 1951, 696,55-702,30; BARROW 1967, p. 193-194;
lRIGOI:"' 1986.
60 CHAPTER 2
wv fl).cirwvo; 'Axaorj,uEwv (L63 ), the context of which I shall try to
elucidate later (eh. 4, Ill, B). For now I already wish to point out that I do
not share BABUT's
134
view that Plutarch's interpretation of the Academy's
history fundamentally differs from the original "one-Academy-thesis":
On remarquera que Plutarque ne se contente pas de soutenir, comme l'avait
fait Philon de Larissa [ .. . ]. qu'il n'y a eu qu'une seule Academic. mais souligne
que celle-ci est issue de Plato, ce dernier en ayant fixe une fois pour toutes
l'orientation. Telle n'etait pas, semble-t-il. 13 position de Philon, a laquelle on
a souvent voulu assimiler celle de Plutarque.
(13ABUT 1994c, p. 550 note 9)
Later. however. BARUT specifics that Plutarch endeavours to re-interpret
Platonism from within the Academic tradition ( 199-k , p. 575) , which brings
Plutarch actually close to Philo of Larissa. as both are said to present "une
interpretation nco-acadcmicienne du platonisme" (and not une inter-
pretation platonisante de la Nouvelk Academic", which is often ascribed to
Plutarch, notably by INI; cf. infra, p. 220-221, for this discussion) . Be
that as it may, here I only \Vant to emphasise that fiddity to the Platonic
tradition seems to have been Philo's claim too
11
\ and that likewise the
anonymous commentator lets the Academic tradition start with Plato. just as
is implied in the title of Plutarch's lost treatise.
I now return to the passage (54.43-55.13) according to \vhich almost all
Academics cling to dogmata, which an.: essentially Plato' s. The text raises a
double quest ion: wh ich dogmata do the Academics have in common with
Plato. and which Academics arc excepted from this almost unitarian
tradition'? It is obvious that both questions arc intt:rrclated.
In order to avoid a conceptual muddle when assessing this enigmatic
passage. I would like first to point out that the term bt>'(!L(( may be rather
misleading: an Academic might have admitted dogmata without therefore
being a dogmatist in the modern sense of the word. At the time of the
composition of the commentary the term will have meant something like
"opinion". "conviction", without the notion of subjective of objective
certainty attached to it. It is not a "firm belief" or "firm conviction" that
would imply asserting one' s opinions in a doctrinaire's manner so as to
prevent one from examining other views with an open mind. In this general
sense of "having dogmata" it differs from the Stoic demand that one should
not doubt one's dogmata :
B A 13 UT 199-k. p. 550 note 9, challenging 1986a. p. 213; 22-t note 38.
L'
5
Cf. LEVY 1993b. p. 155 : .. Philon ne desavouait ni Am!silas ni Carneade. simplcment il ks
intt:rpretait d' une maniere qui rendait moins prohkmatique la these de la continuite d..:
l'Academie de puis sa fondation jusqua lui -meme.
r
,

"1
.l
I NTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
The term did not per se imply certainty in what had been decided; for while it
was a Stoic ideal that one should not doubt one's dogma (Ac. 2.27), the term
itself did not imply such conviction.
(TARRA:-\T 1985, p. 30)
61
The Academics- and even the Pyrrhonists
136
- would not object to dogma in
this weak sense. \Ve therefore always have to be careful that we do not
import into this early material shades of meaning that are typical of our own
terms or that belong to the standard interpretation of Greek scepticism; the
latter in fact derives to a large extent from Sextus' canonising account of its
history, to which corresponds a more rigid terminology.
The commentator does not make it clear which dogmata the majority of
Academics share with Plato nor who is to be seen as the exception to the
rule. He does say that it pertains to fundamental tenets (55.4-6: ta -
r.t'Qt<.incna tGn m. Presumabl y this will have included the dogma
concerning the final goal of philosophy. which is the The
bel id that any act of learning is in fact an act of remembering may be another
Academic dogma. which is also linked \vith the pre-existence of the soul.
TAR. RAt-iT ( p: 79-82) makes another useful suggestion : one may
presume that the status of dogma is to be assigned also to the conviction that
real knowledge presupposes a stable and unchanging object, whereas the
sensible world is characterised by flux and relativity. From the fact of contra-
dicting sensory impressions one may thus have arrived at a theory on matter.
Aenesidemus
1
\ ' is known to have accused the Academics of treating
differences in our perception of things as differences belonging to the objects
of our perception. which would mean that Academic epistemology is leading
towards an ontology. It is very well possible that the commentator regarded
some kind of flux-theory as a dogma, which he could attribute as well to
Plato as to the Academy L\IJ. At any rate we can safely conclude that the
commentator considered the duality of the sensible and the intelligible world
as belonging to the doctrines shared by Plato and the later Academic
tradition
1411

IJ<> Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. llyp. l.D-15 ; supra: p. 55 note 111.
13
c One m3y compare I he beginning of Alcinous Didaskalikos : ttiJV iWQLtrm'm r)V Tii.C:nwvo;
6o{pt.n<IJ V TOIW.:' TI] n; D.v btbcwzui.ict yrvoLTO. Cf. DILLO:'-i 1993. p. 51 .
1.'-' Cf. Photius Bi b!. cod. 212. l69b36-170a-tl.

T ( 1985. p. 79) rightly argues that the commentator's position is more relat ed to
Protagorean relativism than to Pyrrhonian scepsis. On the other hand I do not endorse his
suggestion Lh3t the commentator actuall y adopted Protagorean relativism: the commentator
st ales that Theaetctus words bear a close resemblance to Protagoras' but actually differ from
his (62.8-12). and does not identify Plato's view with that of Protagoras (see 66.26-43; frg. B,
37--W).
I.:Ir (1985. p. 62-65) offers another series of suggestions for the reconstruction of
the commentator' s view on positive Academic doctrine. which are plausible if one accepts-
as I am ready to do- that the 2nonymous commentary has affinities with Philo's so-called
Fourth Academy.
62 CHAPTER 2
New problems are raised by the interpretation put fonvard by H. J.
KRAMER (1971, p. 55 note 212), who takes dogmata in a very "dogmatic ..
sense. He then reads this passage as evidence for the speculations about
esoteric teachings within the confines of the New Academy, which suggested
that some dogmatic teaching was carried on in secret all the time inside the
Academy. This belief may have derived from the criticism from other
schools, since the participants in the polemics often tried to entangle their
opponents in self-contradiction. If the Academics could be shown to cling to
dogmata despite their alleged universal suspension of judgment, their
credibility would receive a serious blow. The allegation that the l\cw
Academy actually is dogmatic has also been made by the Pyrrhonians. as it
is evidenced notably in Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus. But there is yet
another element that has certainly contributed to the belief in an esoteric
doctrine: in their defence of the unity of the Academic tradition later
Platoni.sts have tried to integrate the Hellenistic Academy into their
interpretation of the school tradition. Its presumed continuity from Plato
until their own days was supposed to knd a considerable authority to their
position.
J. GLUCKER adds an interesting psychological explanation, notably th\..
man in the street's distrust of scepticism and his refusal to believe that the
sceptic's invoking ignorance is sincere:
The simplest explanation is that the man in the street -and this includes a
consi<.krablc number of professional or semi-professional philosophers- does
not suffer sceptics gladly. When he mel!ts with a genuine sceptic, he.: finds it
difficult to believe that this man has really suspended his judgment and holds
no positive views whatsoever; just as, when he comes across a philosophical
discussion which ends on what may well be a genuine aporetic note, would
not for a moment believe that a distinguished philosopher could possibly have
ldt a question unanswered. He would rather rack his brains, or pester his
teachers and friends, in an attempt to find the positive answer behind the intol-
erable mystery.
(GLUCKER ltJ78, p. 300)
However, GLUCKER admits that this explanation alone cannot account for
the originating of the myth of the esoteric doctrine, but his additional
suggestions (1978, p. 301-304) are equally interesting: Arccsilaus and
Carneades are likely to have held private seminars, for their pupils only.
However, it was not dogmatic doctrine they taught. It may have been
instruction and enquiry on a higher level, in which they dealt with
philosophical problems in greater depth than in their more public courses.
Only those pupils will have been favoured with private seminars who could
be trusted not to mistake the results of dialectical inquiry for what they arc
not, i.e. doctrines containing truth claims, but \vere capable of understanding

t}



}


INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
63
that their teachers disclosed their opinions as mere opinions and
probabilities, remaining in the domain of The Academic teachers
could not "reveal the truth" since the truth had not been attained.
Fundamentally there was no difference with the "exoteric" courses:
The difference would have consisted in the professional and technical
standards demanded. To an outsider, however, the very existence of such
private seminars" within the sceptical Academy would suggest something far
more ominous. With our natural reluctance to believe in the possibility of
genuine scepticism, he would be only too ready to conclude that there, in the
secrecy of Plato's house, or the Lacydeum, or Arcesilaus' private house, the
true- and needkss to say, dogmatic- doctrines of Plato were expounded[ ... ]
(GLUCKER 1978, p. 301)
This is borne out by a careful, unprejudiced reading of Cic. Acad. !I 60 :
There remains their statement that for the discovery of the truth it is necessary
to argue against all things and for all things (quod dicwlt veri in\'eniwuli causa
contra omnia dici oportcrc et pro omnihus). Well then, I should like to sec what
they have discovered ... Oh," he says. "it is not our practice to give an
exposition." ('non so/emus" inquit "ostefl(/ere") .. What pray arc these holy
secrets of yours. or why does your school conceal its doctrine like something
disgraceful?" (quae swlt tandem istam_vsreria, aut cur cclatis quasi turpe aliquid
scntcnriam l'l'Stram ?) ''In order," says he, ''that our hearers may be guided by
reason rather than by authority." ("ut qui awlient" inquit '"ratione porius quam
auctoriwre clucmrlllr")
(transl. RACKIIA\1 1933)
What they discovered. quid inrencrint, was not some mysterious doctrine for
which they demanded an unquestioning belief. The results of their search arc
nothing more than probable opinions (sententiam \'estram). which they were
hesitant to reveal to their average students lest they take them for the truth
auctoritate pot ius quam ratione l.tl.
The text of the commentary on the Theaetetus is no evidence, in my opinion,
for a tradition that ascribed esoteric teachings to the New Academy, since it
does not mention any esoteric or secret dogmatism. The passage in question
merely states that later Academic teaching shared basic tenets with Plato.
The commentator presents the Academic tradition as essentially unitarian
and "dogmatic" but does not suggest that the core of Academic teaching had
to be kept secret at any time.
I think that in the discussion related to the existence of an esoteric
Academic tradition two different things are often confused l-e: on the one

GLUCKER 1978. p. 303. See !!lso WE!SCHE 1961, p. 25; LEVY 1978 p. 343; 1992, p. 643.
!'\ot so in LEVY's publications; who nicely manages to keep the two issues separate: see
e.g. LEVY 1978 and esp. 1993a, where it is very enlightening to compare p. 251 with p. 260-274.
......
64 CHAPTER 2
hand we have allegations evidenced in Numenius, who contended that in the
New Academy the initiates were taught an esoteric doctrine which was
fundamentally inconsistent with the universal suspension of judgment that
was "officially" recommended

In other words: the real practice of the

school would be at variance with its official politics. The question whether an
esoteric tradition in this sense really existed is answered in the negative by
most scholars

Tht: tendentious character of our sources should already be

sufficient indication that the existence of an entire esoteric dogmatic
tradition within the confines of the New Academy is to be denied w. But it is
a fundamentally different question to ask whether the Academic attitude
entaikd, or ought to have entailed, the complete disavowal of any dogmata.
This question requires a more careful and differentiating approach.
TARRANT ( 1985, p. 29-33) has convincingly argued that most Academics.
and certainly Philo of Larissa, could accept dogmata, in the weak sense of
opinions, not that of doctrinal certainties. It is obvious that both questions
arc not totally unrelated. As I have already suggested, the New Academic
acceptance of particular dog111ata may have contributed to the myth of an
esoteric undercurn..:nt once the term dog111a had acquired a more rigid
meaning.
We now turn to the question as to the few anti-dogmatics the
commentator acknowledges among the Academics. Who are they anJ why
do they deserve this label'?
There is no n:ason to follow GLUCKER ( 1978, p. 30-l-306) in his
assumption that the commentator is referring to the first few generations of
the Academy. i.e. the genuine Old Academy of Xenocrates, Crantor.
Speusippus. and Polemo. when he speaks of the dogmatism of thc Academy.
GLUCKER thinks that at the time of composition of the commcntary


See Numenius' account of Carneatles' philosophy: Oflt"; br. zctiwt zutn); l':To Tlj;
U1<iizfl; tp).O\'Fl%l(t; l; TlJ rru\'fQOV Xt'%liJV, :TQO; '{E 10t'; fUt'lOl' flUlQOt'; bt' t't:tOQQl.jH<J\'
,;>fto).urn TE zcti t']l.t"p1nf zui ccTEtfuivno et z(iv ciJJ.o; ni>v bt<vz6vnl)v (frg. 27.56-SlJ DEs
PLACES). If the Thmett'IIIScommentary is to be dated to the first or seconJ century A.D .. it
woulJ be quite near in time to Numenius (cf. DES PLACES 1973, p. 7 with note 2) . Other
witnesses to resembl ing traditions are Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.234 (Scxtus seems to ha\c
his doubts regartling this story). Numenius frg. 25; Augustine, Contra Acad. 3.30--H (see on
Augustine's possible motives LEVY 1978, p. 3-W: 1992, p. 6-ll-644).
For a slat/IS qltat'stionis see 1971. p. 55 with note 212. See also LE\"Y 19lJ3b. p.
142; GORLER l9lJ4. p. 925-926.
Cf. 1971. p. 54-55 : "Die Zeugnisse der Doxographie fUr eine verstcckten.
"esotcrischen" Platonismus Jer aporctischen Akadcmic verraten durchweg die Tendenz. die
Originalitat der akatlemischen "Skepsis" gegenUber dcm Pyrrhonismus he::rabzusetzen oder
<.lie aporetischen Wendung. bzw. die spiitcre RUckkehr zum Dogmatismus zu rcchtkrtigen.
uno verlieren dadurch an GlaubwUrdigkeit." See also WE!SCI-!E 1%1, p. LO:'\G 1974. p.
93: LEVY 1978: GLUCKER 1978. p. 296-297; DORRIE 1987, p. 427-430 (DORRIE does not
distinguish "ha\ing MyrtuTU" from "being dogmatic"); LEvy 1992, p. 16-17.
..



f
f:;;f;
;t.
i Si':
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE T/fEAETETUS
65
Academic scepticism was already well-nigh forgotten. But GLUCKER can
develop this argumentation only because he mistakenly dates the
commentary to the third century A.D.
14
1i What is more, "Academics" in the
commentary (5-t,45-46, quoted p. 42) designates the followers of the New
Academy (cf. 6.30; 70, 14)- the members of the Old Academy are referred
to simply as "Platonists"- and a>J.ou; 'A;wlnuw"Lxo{,; (54,46) refers to
the characterisation of Plato as an Academic, which means : someone who
does not dogmatise ws_: ol.,bv 54,40-42) 147
"Other" is therefore opposed to "Plato", not to the sceptical
As GLUCKER's surmise is to be rejected. the passage under consideration
(54,38-55,13) does imply that most of the New Academics held as their
central doctrines some positive dogmata. The question as to the exceptions
becomes all the more cogent : who arc the few Academics who according to
the commentator did reject all dogmata'? Philo's Fourth Academy is
ct:rtainly to be excluded - even if one did not accept that the commentary
hclongs to its intellectual realm - as there is no doubt that Philo and his
followers did hold ccrtain dogmata Is the commentator then alluding to
Arcesilaus' Second and Carncades' Third Academy? One might object that
were this the case the commentator could hardly have written that he made
an exception for only a very small number of philosophers (54.46-55, 1:
m'(Vl.' (lJ.ty(I)V). TARRANT argues that the commentator can
only have meant the follow<.:rs of Carncades. as they supposedly arc the only
ones that cannot he credited with dogmata. In this perspective it will be clear
that TARRA:\T regards the passage in question as evidence for the belief in
an esoteric doctrine of the Second Academy l)ll; this view would have
emerged in the Fourth Academy out of the concern to present the history of
the school as unitarian- as far as possible
1
)
1
In my opinion TARRANT here
is just another victim of the confusion, \vhich I have tried to elucidate above,
!.:<.. Cf. supra. p. 35 note 27.

Cf. TARRA:-.T 1985. p. 62; sec also p. 67 with note 3 (p. 158) ; SEDLEY 1995,
p. 540. Nor is there any reason to assume, with GLUCKER (1978, p. 305). two different
meanings of "Academic'" in this text (54,3S-55.13). See also PRAECHTER 1909, p. 545.
1
-:s This is not the only text in which Plato is called an Academic. pace TARRANT 1985, p. 158
note 5. Sec Cic. Acari. /46: "Hanc Academiam novam appellant. quae mihi vetus videtur, si
quidem Platoncm ex ilia vetere numeramus. cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque
partem multa disseruntur. de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur". On the other hand. this
characterisation of Plato as an Academic cannot have been felt as unproblematic (cf. LEVY
1978, p. 336; 348: HANKI:"SO:'-< 1995. p. 83-85). since the opponents of the New Academy used
to regard Academic scepticism as irreconcilable with the philosophy of Plato. For an
antithesis between Plato and "Academics" see e.g. Stob. 1.475.2-8 (= DG 396b,l2-19), and
also Anon. Prvfeg. in P!t11. phi!. 10.1.'6 (cf. infra : p. 69).
lW Cf. T ARRANT 1985, p. 41-65 et passim; BASTIANI:'\1- SEDLEY 1995, p. 5-40.
150
T ARRA:-<T's view is criticised al so by BASTIANINI - SEDLEY 1995, p. 544.
151
T 1985, p. 63.
66
CHAPTER 2
between the alleged esoterism of the Academy and the possibility that taking
an Academic stance did not impede holding dogmata.
The lack of specificness of the text does not, in my view, allow to
regard it as a testimony to the myth of Arccsilaus' esoterism. The interpre-
tations of Carneades' philosophy, on the other hand, were
divergent, which means that he has not always been considered to be the
most radical New

besides, he too has been charged with
dogmatic esoterism
153
And if the commentary is not to be dated to the first
century B.C., but to the first or even second century A.D., which is not
excluded, then also the first argument put forward above loses its it
remains possible that the commentator, looking back at a more or kss
remote past, gathered the members of the Second and the Third
one heading and designated them as ;rci.vu

It is also
remarkable that BASTlANlNl and SEDLEY (1995, p. 5-lO) advance a
which is actually opposite to TARRANT's : perhaps Arcesilaus could
as the one holding absolutely no dogmata, if one
considers the way he is presented by Sextus at Pyrrlz. lf.vp. 1.232. But on the
other hand. they acknowledge that there were those who maintained that
Arcesilaus was in fact a dogmatic, as Sextus informs us only two paragraphs
later (1,234). Therefore it cannot he considered an established fact that the
commentator with the words ;rci.vu OJ.t'((IJ\' referred
exclusively either to Arcesilaus or to Carneades and their respective
followers. Any attempt to determine which philosophers here
must necessarily remain hypothetic. That is why I prefer to suspcnd
judgment in this matter.
The evidence concerning the New Academy provides an
supply of discussion material. However. I think that the majority of the
scholarly tradition has failed to ask some important preliminary questions
and has unquestioningly adopted a conceptual apparatus whose adequacy is
to be doubted. The scepticism-dogmatism dichotomy does not appear to
provide the most appropriate framework
155
for examining texts such as the
anonymous commentary. However, following E. ZELLER and K.
PRAECHTER (F. UEBERWEG) this antithesis has been used constantly as the
Cf. infra, p. 168.
153 Cf. Numenius frg. 27,56-59 DES PLACES.
According to DbRR!E ( 1987, p. 395) the author "{ist] dieser Epoche ab er so we it ent ri.ickt ,
dal3 er bereits die tiberwiegende Mehrzal der ' Akademiker' als Dogmatiker bac:ichnen
kann." DbRR!E thinks that ;.,ith the "few exceptions" the commc:ntato; refers to Carnc:ades
and his pupils.
l55 Cf. TARRANT 1985, p. 4; STOUGH 1987, p. 222.
.:..

!--
-:::

ill!J
1:--.ITERPRETATIONS OF THE TI!EAETETUS 67
main organising principle for the history of philosophy between Arcesilaus
and Neoplatonism.
According to the comme ntary most adherents of the Academy had no
problem accepting dogmata, without for this reason being dogmatic in our
sense of the word. "Dogmatism" and "scepticism" were most probably not
the terms in which the participants in the Hellenistic epistemological debate
defined their own position. Nor did the members of the New Academy call
themselves or.Errnr.oL The principal intention of so-called scepticism was to
prove the untenability of Stoic and Epicurean epistemology. There was no
need to object to dogmata as such
156
: sceptic'' originally must have meant
.. given to inquiry .. and was not a technical term to denote the New Academic
or Pyrrhonist school'
57
; dogma, on the other hand. did not initially have the
'"dogmatic" overtones we tend to associate with the term, and did not refer
to the infallibility or unquestionability of knowledge tsx. Only later, with
Aencsidemus or even Sextus Empiricus and Favorinus ts<J, did the term
acquire its "technical" meaning. The Academic attacks were not directed
against dogmata, provided that these tenets were not taken in such a way as
to an unprejudiced examination of the views of others:
[ ... ]just as it is mish!ading to speak of Academics of this period as sceptics",
it is dangerous to see their crusade as a fight against dogmata. [ ... ] Third
Academics Wl.!re not chargl.!d with being opponents of dogmata per se, only of
dogmata seh!ctcd by the criterion of compatibility with a system. Thus
opposition to dogma in thl.! old sense of the term was not a stated objective of
the New Academy, and not an objective of the Fourth Academics in any way
at all.
(TARRANT 19R5, p. 32)
The issue is obfuscated by the fact that it was in the interest of the various
participants in the debate to discredit their opponents by forcing them into
vulnerable positions. making them liable to the charge of self-contradiction.
In his account of the history of scepticism Scxtus most probably translated
whatever concepts he had found in his sources into the philosophical jargon

One may compare Cic. Acad. !1133.

Cf. STRIKER 19S0. p. 5-t note 1: BARSES 1982, p. 6-12 (with the notes p. 22-27): TARRANT
1985, p. 25: "It is natural to assume that because scepsis (qua 'inquiry") always led the
Pyrrhonist to counterbalancing arguments, the word came to be applied to the practice of
balancing arguments itself. Subsequently the adjective 'sceptic' would have developed a
usJge, referring to those who employ the antithetic method as a road to suspension of
Judgment.'' LEVY 1993b, p. 1-tl. Sextus Empiricus reserves the term ''scept ics" for the
Pyrrhoni ans. but "the use of 'sceptic' to refer to a special group of philosophers is not typical
of other ancient authors, who apply it descriptively to both Pyrrhonists and Academics."
1987, p. 222). ' ..
Cf. T ARRA}.'T 1985. p. 29-33:62-65.
159
Cf. Gellius 11,5.
68
CHAPTER 2
of his own time and projected the antithesis sceptic-dogmatic onto the past.
which makes his approach basically anachronistic. Nonetheless, his account
-anachronistic and partial as it may be- has constituted the basis for almost
all subsequent historiography of ancient scepticism. I continue, however. to
use the traditional denotation "sceptic'', but remain aware of its misleading
overtones.
In trying to determine with more precision the commentator's
philosophical allegiance, one should take into account both sides: on the one
hand, the commentator clearly has affinities with the New Academy. but on
the other he is opposed to extreme sceptical tendencies. The latter has been
overemphasised, I think, by K. PRAECHTER and G. INVERNIZZI
1
w. H.
TARRANT has offered a more satisfying interpretation of the commentary.
by pointing out that the commentator steers a careful course between the
aporctic and the dogmatic views of Plato
101
I am prepared to endorse his
interpretation to a large extent, as the views the commentator is fouml to
take, his sensibilities and sympathies, arc indeed consistent with what we
know about the Acatkmy or rather about Academism at the time of Philo of
Larissa. However, T ARRANT' s argumentation for an early date is not cogent.
I think, and his plea to identify the author with Eudorus is totally
unconvincing. As I have already argued, I have my reservations regarding a
13.C. date for the commentary.
Philosophically the anonymous author appears to he close to the realm of
Philo's Academy, but his text also shows traces of more extreme sceptical
readings of the Thcactctus - e.g. from those claiming that Plato held no
dogmata (t;>; oiJb(v and equally refers to more "dogmatic ..
interpretations - e.g. from those who, considering the problem of the
criterion to he the subject proper of the dialogue. could relate its aporctic
conclusions to the unstable naturt: of tht: epistemological objects examined.
Tht: commentator reads the Thcactctus as a search for truth, a
1
h
2
but
tr,o Cf. PRAECfiTER 1909. p. 535: "Am m.:istcn inter.:ssiert uns der Eikr. mit dcrn tkr
Verfasser den Versuchen. Platon zum Skeptiker zu macht:n, cntgegentritt." l:--i\' ER:"lZZl
(1976) stresses the anti-sceptical disposition of the commentator. According to him tht:
commt:ntary is to be situated philosophically in the context of tht:! dogmatic rmotln'all
inaugurated by Antiochus (p. 220-222). But this cannot be reconcikd. despitt! unconvincing
attempts by l:\VERNIZZI, with the fact that the commentator advocates the unity of the
Academic the tradition. for it was precisely Antiochus who upbraidt:d the New Academics for
having caused a rift in the tradition of Platonism. For a more refutation of
INVERNIZZI's argumentations, see TARRA:-.-r1985. p. 66-67; p. 77-78 with note 45 (p. 11l2).
lht Cf. TARRA:--IT 1983b. p. 162 note 20; p. 166; 172; 1985, p. 66-88. See also STOUGH I9R7, p.
218; SEDLEY 1995. p. 256: "L'A.. sembra resentire fortemente detrinfluenza dei
dibattiti ellenistici. Pur non essendo affatto uno scettico. trova modo di presentare il proprio
platonismo como scaturente da una tradizione nella quale I'Accad.:mia elknistica gioca un
ruolo rilevante ...
lnZ Cf. 2,42; 3.20-21; 8,27-28; 11.16 et passim.

-?-
:t



INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEA ETETUS 69
not as a ttinlot; without positive results: ox1!n;
163
is held to result in
dogmata, for Plato as well as for the great majority of Academics
1
M. To put
it briefly. the commentator carefully fends off more "extremist" tendencies
that existed in the exegesis of Plato
1
1i
5
; his interpretation of Plato is
consistent with that of the Fourth Academy
1
M. Platonism according to the
commentator is a "zetetic"
167
philosophy which results in positive
doctrines
1
M, or, in GLUCKER's words, "a philosophy which is "zetetic"
without being entirely "sceptic", and ''positive" without being entirely
.. dogmatic" (1989, p. 272).
Ill. PROLEGO\IENA IN PLATONIS PHILOSOPHIAM
In order to illustrate \vhat \vas at stake for Middle Platonism in the interpre-
tation of the Theaetetus , dne may profitably introduce the evidence from the
Prolegomena in P!atonis phi/osophiam by an anonymous Neoplatonic
author
10
'
1
It has bet:n pointed out by J. GLUCKER (1978, p. 38-39) and
H. TAR RANT ( 1985, p. -72-74) that this treatise deals with the epistemological
issue in a way that is strongly reminiscent of debates in the Hellenistic period
and early Empire. The author enters at length into a discussion of Plato's
significance for the history of philosophy, emphasising two points: (l) Plato
surpasses all other philosophers and all philosophical schools; (2) Plato is a
dogmatic, not an cplzcctic: [ . . . ] t;>; ::rcwci>v ::rgouzn 1'1 TOtttou <rt/,oomrin xni.
t;>; ronv xcti ol_,x lcp::xnxt); ( 12.1-3) 1
70

Plato is held to surpass also the New Academy, having established that
epistcmic impressions exist (MJ.ct xni TlJV ni>v VE(I)V 'Axa6JHLCt'ix<i>V
u::rrgif)uhv <p).OOOfflClV fXEl\'1JV C.(X(tT((),1pjtt((V .i1QEOBEt
1
ELV, b
Toihov Eiolv r.rrwnutovtx<tl xcnn)Jppn; nv[;. 10.1-3). The author
163
This term is used at2.16-17 anJ 27.26.
lW Cf. TARRA:--;T P- 77.
16
' Ont! may compare Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. J/yp. 1.221: tOY ni.c'LTUIVC! Ol'V oi flfV bO(flC!tu-:ov
f(ruauv rl:vm, oi bi: a:tOQI]tl%OV. ol b %UTU p[v n <hogr]nr.ov, %UTU b[ n boywm%6v. Sec
also 199-l, p. 5031.
166
Cf. TARRA:--;T 1983b, p. 177: "A.'s kind of Platonism is also Philo's kind of Platonism."
167
Scxtus uses as an alternative designation for the O%EJTtlr.i] ay<tJ'{ll (Pyrrh. llyp.
1,7).
Cf. TARRA1\'T 1985. p. 70 : "'[the author] too seems to see Plato's work as a combination of
the highly essential 'zetetic' inquiry and some more direct method of teaching."
169
On the identity of the author, see WESTERINK- TROUILLARD- SEGONDS 1990, p. VIII-
IX: LXXV-LXXXIX: p. LXXXIX: "La supposition la plus probable est que les Prolegomena
sont le comptt!-rendu de cours donnes par l'un des successeurs d'Olympiodore dans la
seconde moitie du VIe One may take for granted that the Prolegomena are based on
class notes.
r;o There are no occurrences of the word a%EJnt%6; in the Prolegomena.
70
CHAPTER 2
acknowledges that some want to rank Plato among the EcpEznzot or the
'Aza6lntct'(zot, taking their arguments from his dialogues:
HyoLOL bE ouvwHouvus n)v O)...c'nwvn d; wus q:Dcnzo0; rE xai wi!;
WS xai atn:oO ar.cna),tpViav Eioayona.; ;wi Y.CLTCLOZEl'-
asOUOLTOUTO EX ni)v ElQll[lEVU)\' CLtm!> Ev wi:; CLUTOL'. (10.-l-7)
Some force Plato into the camp of the ephectics and the Academics savin2. that
he too introduced inapprehensibility. This they try to establish on b;sis of
what he says in his writings.
It should be pointed out that the author draws a neat distinction between
Academics and ephecrics
172
:
btWfEQOl!Ol ()' oi Tt]; va; 'AxctbtUlLCLS nin EcfEXtlY.liJV Ti> wi!; flEV q:rznr.ot;
OflOLWS Hynv btu rrc'.tvnuv TWV 0\'TWV JtE<fOlllJY.EVCLl <Ti]V azaw).ll'I'LCtV>, wi.;
bi: Tfi; va; 'Aznbl][lLCL; ouz a;rCt\'lltlV OflOllu;, 0.).).' dvui nvc.t TOJV jtQCt'(flCtll!)\'
iJ. OetLVOL'Ol Ti]V 1puzi1v JTQOS ouyzmc'tHEOLV flETQLCtV. (7.13-18)
The New Academics differ from the eplzectics in that the eplzectics say that
inapprehensibility applies to all things in the same way, wherc.:as the: Nc.:w
Academics hold that it does not apply to everything in the same way. but that
there are some things which prompt our soul to give a moderate assent.
Apparently ''eplu:ctics" refers to the Pyrrhonians. The alleged Academic
position is not in keeping with what we know about Arcesilaus or
Carnealks' Academy. for both of them unremittingly challenged any
attempt to establish the possibility of zcrr:c'tAll'I'LS (cf. infra: eh. 4. Ill. A). The
Academic position as defined here is consistent, though, with the evidence
concerning Philo of Larissa. In the Roman Books Philo presumably held the
Stoic concept of xcnu),tppt; to be untenable, leaving the possibility open that
171 There is a ras1tra of four characters before 'AxaOY]ftC.t"txoi.o;. "vix vrou;" (WESTERISK -
TROUILLARD- SEGONDS 1990, p. 15, apparatltS critic11s; otherwise: PRAECHTER 1909, p. 5-l5
note 3) .
172 One may comfare Sext . Emp. Pyrrh. flyp. 1.4: oOEV 1Jt.O'{lJJS &oxoi)mv ai UVUHClH!)
q tl.ooo(rim tQE"i; Et vat, &ontanxiJ 'Axa6Yutcitxil oxErntxil.
:::; '
-,.::
-. -:.
,. -


..:

7"':"\.:




.1.3;'
It-:TERPRETATtONS OF THE THEAETETUS 71
a more modest form of knowledge is within our reach
173
- if this indeed may
be inferred from Sextus Empiricus' testimony:
oi N: mgi <t>O.wva craotv L1oov ftEv bi. .L:nutr.(u wu1:on Tfj
zcnu).l].:HtY.lJ CfCtVTCLOl(t, axma).JFTC1 dvcu TU 1t:QCL'(flCtTCt, ooov 6 EJTl n} cpuOEL
ni)v :rgc.typc'nwv al.nl>v, Y.c.tTn).tpn'c
Philo and his followers say that as far as the Stoic standard (i .e. apprehensive
appearance) is concc.:rned objects are inapprehensible, but as far as the nature
of the objects themselves is concerned they are apprehensible.
(Sc.:xt. Emp. Pyrrh. llyp. 1,235, transl. AN:-.:AS- BARNES 1994)
The evidence of Sextus is at any rate consistent with the tendentious and
somewhat confused picture presented by Lucullus at Cic. Acad. I! 18: Philo
rejected Zcno's ddinition of knmvlcdge but accepted that some things can
be known: "if you stick to the Stoic criterion, you will know nothing; but in
fact knowledge is not unattainable - for the Stoic criterion should be



The view mentioned in the Prolegomena, that Plato was not only an
Academic but even an ephectic, which allegedly included complete
U.zGnti.tpj't((, is too extreme to cmanatt.! from tht.! Fourth Academy of Philo,
or even from the Second or Third Academics. and one therefore has to
reckon with a Pyrrhonist picture of Plato that is being attacked here.
Nevertheless, it must be assumed that much of the material derives from
Academic sources ultimatcly
175
.
The author of the Prolegomena enumerates five arguments adduced by
those wanting to characterise Plato as either an Academic or an ephectic,
each argument being followed by its refutation. I shall now summarise the
tn I follow GCRLER 1994. p. 920-922 in assuming that three stages can be distinguished in
Philo's philosophical development : at first he was a faithful follower of Clitomachus. In a
second. transitional phase he appears to have abandoned the position that one should always
suspend judgment. In doing so Philo endorsed a more "mitigated" interpretation of
Carneades. according to which the wise is allowed to have mere opinions. The third phase is
that of the Roman Books. in which he may have conceded that knowledge is possible if one
drops the Stoic requirement o'la OUY. av '{fvOlTO U:t:O t!:t:CtQZOVTO (cf. Sllpra, p. 38). The
main difference with Antiochus is that the latter believed that this requirement could actually
be fulfilled. I do not think that GLUCKER is right in assuming that Philo reverted after the
Roman Books to an orthodox Clitomachean position, because he was "a weak
man", who could not stand that "his new insight was not appreciated even by his old friends"
(GLUCKER 1978. p. 83-84).

BAR:"ES 1989, p. 74; see also p. 73 : "Philo's thought was this: Suppose I truly believe that
P, and it is because P that it seems to me that P: then I know that P. Perhaps it would have
seemed to me that P even if it had not been the case that P. But that possibility does not
invalidate my claim to knowledge ; for it is no part of the concept of knowledge that I could
noclrme been misled- it is enougltthat I hme not been misled." Cf. TARRANT 1985, p. 53-62;
1993a. p. 271: GORLER 19-94, p. 922-924.
1
'
5
Cf. TARRAST 1983b, p. 170; compare GORLER 1994, p. 839-840.
72
CHAPTER 2
arguments the author endeavours to invalidate (I shall only occasionally
with the author's attempts at refutation):
( 1) Plato's frequent use of such interjections as dx6;, 'low; and taz'
indicate reservation regarding the statements put forward ( 10,10-12:
toiho 6' our. EOTLV, u)J.a nvo; r.aw.).a{Jdtro:; ti]V U%Qt0ii
'(V<.iJOLv)
170

(2) From the fact that Plato upholds opposite positions regarding certain
issues it is clear that he is an of the The
di alogues Lysis, Clwrmides and Ewhyphro are mentioned as cxamplt.:s of
this practice (10, 16-20).
(3) Plato must have been convinced that knowkdge (l:mon'uttJ) is
inexistent, for in the Theaetetus he successively demolishes every definition
of both mon'uu1 and ( 10,23-25)
177
.
(4) Plato distinguishes two epistemological modes: sensibk and noet ic.
Since he affirms that both err
17
S, it is obvious that he is resigned to
(h((tUt.lpl'iH (I O,J4-41 ).
(5) Plato is known to have declared in his dialogues : "ott'>i:v ott'><t oi:n:
t'>tb<.'wzo> n , c't'A'Ait bwj'[ogci> ftovov" (I which is said to he
tantamount to the denial of xnn't/.tppt; (I 0,5lJ-oO: ()g(( otv j'[(i>; OftO).orri
ibi1;> cm'>ftcttl fll]bi:v XCHELAl}lfEVW).
The reference to the Theaetetus in (3) is of a particar intaest to us here.
for it nicely illustrates how Platonists not willing to endcJrse the tenets of the
New Academy- or those with \vhich it later became associated -assessed
the .. sceptical" interpretation of this dialogue. The anonymous author points
out that the doctrine of anamnesis implies that man has although
it has been contaminated by contact with the body, it can be purified so that
the truth can be attained ( 10,26-33)
179
What is needed is therefore a
Cathartic process (31: WJVlj; Ol
1
V brit ut , 33: 'l't'ZIJ
('mozu{)ug{)dmJ). According to the author this is why Plato has refuted the
false notions of knowledge: once they are expurgated. truth is within reach
(31-33).
This reading of the Theactetus as an essentially wthartic dialogue recalls
the "characterisation" of dialogues, and more precisely the way in which. for
example, Albinus treated the elenctic and cathartic as a first stage in Platonic
1
7
h On the value attached to particles expressing doubt in Neoplatonic exegetical practice.
see WESTER INK- TROUILLARD - SEGO:" DS 1990. p. 61 note 109.
177
Cf. - TROUILLARD - SEGONDS 1990. p. 16 note 110 (p. 61) : .. la va inc
recherche d'une definition de la science est le sujet du Tlu!t'rerc: le nombre v est a
plusieurs reprises [ ... ]. m a is il nest ni nic ni m is en question." ( 1985. p. 72). on the
other hand, has offered a satisfactory explanation of the author's mentioning of number in this
context. See al so the alt ernative explanation offered by SEDLEY 1996. p. 87-SS.
17
H The author quotes Plwcdu 658 : 668; 7YC.
17
'
1
See also 10,50-52; 10,67-72. Cf. ANNAS 1992, p. 52 note 23.
.-
2
,,
:.
":ft..
"''
..-:
:;,.
.
:1



INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS 73
instruction: Albinus stated that refutation of the false is an essential part of
zetetics (Pro!. 148,27-28: 6 6 [se. xagaxn'w] rrgo; xai.
uy<.iJva zed Ei.E'(f.OV TOU \I-'EU6ou;) and that instruction should start with the
purgation of false opinions from the mind (150,17-18: 6EI Jt:Q(tnov
xxn0ugm ta; \l' Et,6EI; 66;a; rwv urrol.t1'-JJEwv). With a view to this Albinus
gave the advice to read first the peirastic dialogues, "for their elenctic and so-
called cathartic effect" (150,30-33: 'Lv' ouv ra; \l'EubEI;
6El.]OEL h'lt
1
'(f.c'tVELV n).a-cwvo; toT; TOt) ITELQaOttXOU btaAOYOL,
'Ezotot to EI.Ey%tl%OV xai. to And of course the
Theaetetus was labelled as a peirastic dialogue, at least according to
Diogenes Laert. 3,51
1
s
0
There were also those who had the reading
programme for the young Platonist start with the Theaetetus Ist . From Proleg.
17.19-29 it appears that the anonymous author was familiar with these types
of labelling and classifying

Like the Anonymus in Theaetetum and Plutarch (cf. infra eh. 4) the
author of the J>ro/cgometw invokes the doctrine of anamnesis in order to
challenge radically interpretations of the Tlreaetetus: Plato does not
reject all acounts of knowledge, since he does not accept the view that the
soul is like a on which nothing has been written (10,26-28;
10.o7-6S)
1
s-'. but thinks that it has knowkdge within itself (10,29-30).
The fifth argument appears to be drawn as well from the Theactetus -
from the midwifery section, to be more

Its rebuttal is analogous

to one interpretation offered by the anonymous commentator at the lemma
Tlrl!l/('(('[1/S 150C ( c'iyovo; Elftl OO<p(w;, %CLL om:g 1i6tl no),).o( dJvdbtoav,
(;); tot; p[v <.'i!J.ou; EQ(I)t<t), etuto; b[ otbi:v Uj'[()(J'ULVOfLCH ITEQL oubvo; bta
to fZFLV oo<p)v, c'tl.lJ{)[;

i.troprv bi' %((l rrgu; T0t
1
t0l'S: on. OTCtV !:-l':nJ "oti'li:v oli'lct'', (h; rrgh; ti]V Hr) V
{ldwv ;vc.JJOLV Ti]v ibietv mt{.HtfJc't)J,n 'f''lrJOLV. i:r.dvl] 'fUQ c'it.f..t] i:otiv ;wg(t ti]V
l]!lTfQUV.
To them as well we say that when he says "I know nothing" he compares his
own knowh:dgc to that of divine beings. This is indeed different from our
knowledge. (Proleg. 10.60-63)
'"'' It is missing from Albinus' account (148.30-37). TARRA:O.:T (1993. p. 45: 48) suggests that
it is a late addition to tht! classification and was indeed missing from the original classification.

Diog. Laert. 3.62. Cf. NOSSER 1991 , p. 171 mb 5; p. 172 sub 10.
Cf. supra. p. 31.
1
''' Cf. Thcacrcrus 191 D; Arisl. De anima 3.4, 429b31-430a2.

Cf. 1983b, p. 171. See also Plato Apol. 218: 33B Symp. 177E: Thcng. 1288:
Charm. 1658; Mcno 718 ; 80CD (cf. the apparnllls fonrium in WESTERI;-.."K- TROUILLARD-
SEGO:"DS 1990, p. 17).
185
In the Theaererus these \vords'are immediately followed by the assertion that forms the
subject of Plutarch's first Quaesrio.Piatonica: cf. infra eh. 4.
7-+ CHAPTER 2
i] a:r).0); axou- I c;n:ov n) E- I znv OO<fOV, Ol
1
X E- I OWL TUUTl)V Ti]V I
Q'9(ptav lJV I avmWqmv rh:qJ.
(Anon. in Theaetetllm 54,31-36; cf. supra. p. 51)
From the commentary on the Theaetettls (54,38-43) we know that it was this
very Theaetews passage - among others - that had led some to the
assumption that Plato did not accept any dogmata at all.
The author of the Prolegomena explains the difference between divine
and human knowledge by asserting that God's knowledge is immediate
(cmJ..fj mBoJ..fj) and effective (10.64: \vhereas ours is mediakd
by causes and premisses. The insurmountable difference between divine and
human knowledge is a Platonic theme, which according to C. LEVY ( 1993b.
p. 148) may also have been cherished by the New Academic Arcesilaus -
and, I would like to add, by Carneadcs. This at least is what the evidence
from the Christian author Epiphanius suggests:
'AgzwD.uo; E<fUOY.E n!J Dt:<Z> t:q tr.tov dvm fLOV<!> To at.l)Di::;. c'tvOgt;J::t<!> bi:: ot.
Ta Ul'Ta n!J 'AQY.EOLJit\'l
Arcesilaus used to say that truth is only attainabk for God, not for man.
Carncadc.:s was of the same opinion as Arcesilaus.
(Alii-. haeres. 3,29) tsr..
Eusehius of Cacsarea in one and the same passage (Praep. ev. 14.4,14-15)
offers a fairly precise account of Arcesilaus' professed suspension of
judgment and the information that he liked to quote a Hesiodic verse (Opera
et dies 42) stating that the Gods hide their knowledge from man: .. for the
gods keep their mind hidden from men .. (xQt'lpuvn:; yc'tg iizotm {}Eot vt)ov
<'.t.v{}g<;>;rot<JL, 14.4.15). It is remarkable that the unanimous Hesiodic
manuscript tradition has the reading [)iov instead of voov. Whether
Arccsilaus himself changed the verse or not, the important thing is
"qu'Arccsilas ne se contcntait pas de mettre en evidence la finitudc humaine
et qu'il la mettait en relation avec la transcendance divine, rctrouvant ainsi
un theme important de la tradition platonicicnnc"
1
s
7

To LEVY's examples one may add the following evidence offered hv
Augustine, Diogenes Laertius, and Aspasius. Augustine links
philosophy to the Platonic theme of the limits of human knowledge:
lxn = DG 592.6-8: on Epiphanius' value as a source. see DIELS 1879. p. 175.
IH
7
LEVY 199Jb, p. 148.
Ill/! One may also compare Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1,23 ("harum sententiarum quae vera sit. deus
aliqui viderit: quae veri simillima, magna quaestio est."): Eusebius Praep. 1. 15.62.10 (see
MRAS 1955, p. 88-98). On Philo of Larissas theory on divine knowledge, see SEDLEY 1981. p.
72-73 and T ARRANT 1985, p. 155 note 80. See also below: p. 192.
.,
i'
.,

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
nam et Academicis placuit nee homini scientiam posse contingere earum
dumtaxat remm, quae ad phi/osophiam pertinent - nam cetera curare se
Cameades negabat- ettamen hominem posse esse sapientem sapientisque totum
munus [ ... ]in conquisitione \'eri explicari.
The Academicians are of the opinion that knowledge cannot be attained by
man in so far as those things are concerned which pertain to philosophy- for
Carneades said he did not care about other matters- and yet that man can be
wise and that the whole duty of a wise man is accomplished in seeking truth.
(Contra Acad. 2.11, transl. GARVEY 1943)
75
Diogenes, in his life of Pyrrho, reports the view that Plato himself was a
sceptic because of his conviction that truth is reserved for the gods; therefore
Plato searched for a reasonable account:
r.ai ni.ctt(l)VU TO a).q{)f: Dwi"; T Y.Ctl {}ewv JWlOlV t:Y.x(l)QELV, TOV b' ElY.OW
i.O'/OV (9,72)
Plato, too. h:!aves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and searches for a likely
[or: account.
-
Aspasius, the second century commentator on the Nicomaclzemz Ethics,
explains the Socratic profession of ignorance by the difference with divine
wisdom:
u)).' D.qE. t0; EOIY.EV, atTOV flljbi::v dbvm rragetB(LH(l)V "ti]V (m'}g(l)ITLVlJV
OO!f LC!V ;rgo; Ti]V TOU Owl:. wDw y<'tg Y.(tl E\' nj lOll n/,(nwvo; 'A;w).oy[c;t
flQlJWL.
But hi! usc.:u to said. as it seems. that he knew nothing. comparing human
wisdom with that of God. This is also said in Plato's Apology.
(Aspasius In f:'rlr. Nicom. 54.21-24)
A late parallel may be found in a Ncoplatonic work, viz. Hermias'
commentary on the Plwedrus, at the lemma Plzaedr. 242C: bi1 o{,v
[the Pltaet!ms text continues: ov n::ci.vu 6 ''I am a diviner,
but not a very good one .. ]:
Everywhere Socrates claims to know nothing dbvm). comparing
human with divine wisdom (rrgo; Tijv {}lav yvt"l>mv n::agaBaU.wv n)v
avDQtmnzljv). Likewise concerning divination he claims to be a not altogether
competent diviner, as he is of course comparing himself with Apollo and the
gods (w; ;rgo; TOV 'A;roAJ(l)VU xai wu; {}Ou mnov n:agaBaA).wv).
(Hermias Alex./n Platonis Phaedmm scholia, 70,9-13)
These texts at any rate show that the anonymous author of the Prolegomena
followed an Academic-Platonist tradition in establishing a relation between
an epistemological "scepticism" and the distinction "human vs. divine
knowledge".
76 CHAPTER 2
The rest of the author's refutation of the fifth sceptical argument also
deserves our attention: when Plato says .. 1 teach no one'' (oN)vu
6uSaoxw)
11
N he intends this to be understood as .. 1 do not implant my
dogmata into anyone" (oubEvL l:vdthuu ta (10,66-67), which is to
be related to his doctrine of recollection and maieutics
190
Indeed it is the
person being interrogated that draws conclusions (10.72: 6
onv 6
191
Furthermore, being in aporia" is only preliminary
to cognition: (11,1-2: on <bE> tO ''bwrrogri:v'' 666; EOtl\' ;rgo; tO
xataA.aBEiv, rravti One of the next steps then will undoubtedly he
the maieutic phase. The author points out that Plato does not disavow all
knowledge: he makes exceptions for dialectics
192
, the so-called art of lo\'c".
and maieutics
19
\ \Vhich correspond with goodness, beauty and wisdom
respectively
19
-l.
I also briefly mention argument ( 4 ). since LEVY has drawn attention to it.
It appears that those on whose argumentation the account in the
Prole}{omena is based, related the deficiency of our capacities to the
association of the soul with the body, and in supprt of this rcferreu to the
Plwcdo
1
'
1
"'. LEVY ( 199 I, p. 291)) draws the appealing conclusion that
"la Nouvclle pouvait ;\sa recherchc Je justifications pbto-
niciennes un Jialogue a priori fort d'une inspiration sceptiquc. [ ... ]on
ne peut cxclure que, lorsque le 1'/u!don etait Jans la NouYcllc
Academie, la entre et croyance
sique ait cte moins tranch0e Cjltl.! 110US n'aurions tcnuance ?\ k penser ;I partir
Jc..: sch0mas n0opyrrhoniens"
1
'
1
".
1
''
1
Atwl. 33B.
I'Xl Cf. [0,o7-7l: OU '{<,ll] lt'{Ql(lr!;J. t;JO:TfQ ri"Ql)Htl, '{Q<!f'!l<<H:i!!l Ti1v 'i'l'Zl.1\' 1; 1;
i-rtQc'ttj'Ul w'nj izoim.J n 't :tQ<:t'(!l<mt, c'tl.i.' <;J; ctv Et; <ftl':: c''ttn i'.ui c'tv((ptpvtjoz<JV
l(V((%(1\l((tl)n OtZ11V TtiJV izJLUtHJVT<JV Tlt; UJ!nt; n't; bt:tQOOOOt'!J((; Tot; ()er nui.floi;.
1
'
11
Cf. WESTER 1:-o;K- TROlJILI.ARD- SEGO:o-;Ds 1990. p. note 121: Plato /\/cih. ll E-113[3:
Proclus In Plat. Alcib. I2K3.l-2S6.1R: Olymp./11 Plea. Alcih. I. 98.21-100.2.
1
'
12
11,2-5: ZUl Ui.f.ltJ;, flQ11Z<;J<; "otOEV Otbn" :TQO\JEI11J%fV OTl ":ri.i1v o).i{Ol' nvu;. zni TOl'TO
Toli i.rqtBc'<vnv ).6tov zui <'nbovw", c'n'li TOt' "OLC<).f'{wUm" oibEv ciQu Ti1v btcti.Fznz''1v. Cf.
WESTER INK- TROU!LLARD- SEGONDS 1990. p. IX apparatus fomium, and note !22 p. 62.
1
'
11
11,5-7: At'"{fl Or mi/.tv ri,')t:vw MJ.ctf.OL' Tct (;JlliTf(.l iv C:ii).OL; Ti1v wmt((V. Cf.
Symp. 1770: Tlreag. 128[3: Tlrcaetctus 150C. S<:<: also l'rolegomma 11.13-16: cii<J:<rQ ;i.<<] TOt'
oor1 oi: Ernov n) -ra i:v BaOn z[>u:rn)JLEV(( TiE t1uz1l; fi; <f<IJ; urnv zcti Tct; <;1bTvu; cdTi1;
rxcrctLVflV, o\h(l) r.ui -riv; EQ"{OV EOTLV TO fV Bc'<On ov :tmbiov

1
'
14
Cf. Proclus In Plat. Alcih. Il7l.5-8: oi.'nl); t'1 uvttJLVl]Ot; on. w(w; pi:v otv
6 xui c'iU.ct; rr),fiovu; niTtCt; Tbv r'Ha).Exwuh TQ6:tov nj; otvotoiu; c;J;
c;J!fE).tfujnmov ,nti:v Et; rrgoooz!'1v, d; Et; xu!'JaQan, Et; c'ou.wqm1.

Prolcg. 10,39-41: X((l rrc'tt.LV mgi nuv VOl]TCiJV Cf110lV on .. ,.1 'l'l'Zi1 ,HlCiJV ;t<:_JOO:tf:Ti.E'(flf\'11
<-r</J> ZCLZ</J TOUT<;), T</) OC;)JLan, Ol.'bEv voEi'". Cf. Plwcda 668; 79C.
See also LEVY 1993a, p. 265-266.
(--
%'
-::::


. .\
,:


1:-JTERI'RETATIONS OF THE THEAETETUS
77
Despite the considerable chronological gap between the Prolegomena and
the Anonymous commentary on the Tlzeactetus both seem to reflect
essentially the same debate related to sceptical interpretations of the
Tlzeaetl.'tus. Both authors oppose the contention that Plato rejected all
dogmata. The author of the Prolegomena also defends the interpretation of
the aporetic as only a stage on the way towards knowledge. Presumably the
sections of the text that we have discussed directly or indirectly draw upon
sources belonging to the realm of the Fourth Academy
197
or late.r. The view
that Plato is an Academic, the link between Academic themes and Platonic
anamnesis, the fact that the Theaetetus has supplied the bulk of the evidence,
the argumentation based on the classification and labelling of dialogues, and,
more generally, the fact that "sceptical" themes are allegedly rooted in
Plato's texts. strongly suggest a Fourth Academic
1
<JS and presumably even a -
source for these theses, which the author of the Pro!er;o-
mena is challenging. ' '
The polemic against the "eplzectic" Plato has left yet a few more traces in
later Platonism
1
')'}. Olympiodorus, for instance, repeateuly disputes that
Socrates' notorious contentions would be a sign of real ignorance. In this
context he makes mention of a monograph by the Neoplatonic Ammonius
on Plwedo 690-t-6, in which the latter is said to have ddendcd Plato against
imputations of scepticism. Some philosophers interpreting the Plwedo in this
way apparently took Plato's (over-)cautious formulation in this work as a
sign that he doubted the immortality of the This treatise hy
Ammonius is likely to have proviued the basis for the treatment of this topic
by Olympiodorus (In Plwed. 6,14) and by Elias (In cat. 110,12-28f
0
1.

Cf. TARRA:"'T l9S}h. p. 169-171 (vs. GLUCKER l97X, p. }S-39. who assumes a Second
Acadcmic origin for the TARRAI':T 1985, p. 71-74: A:o-;:'-IAS 1988 .
p. 104-105: LEVY l993a. p. 2o5 note 49.
l% Compare p. 105.
199
One may compar<: Terl. De an. 17.11-12, connecling Academic philosophy to Plato, more
particularly to Phacdr. 229E ("Plato, ne quod testimonium sensibus signet, propterea et in
Phac::dro ex Socratis persona negat se cognoscere posse semetipsum. ut monet Delphica
inscriptio": cf. infra). Thtactcllu ("et in adimit sihi scire atquc scntire": cf.
150C). ant.! again to the Plwcrlms. probably to 2470E ("in post mortem difkrt
sententiam vcritatis, postumam scilicet.").
M In Phaed. R,l7: Ku.i n lji'VOCl.flEl', EY.ClOE i:J.Ool'rEc; OUC['Er; [ Plwedo 6905]: otz on t'rtv6n 6
L(J)%Qc'm]; zui btOTCts(I)V Hlt
1
TU ).fyn, u)).ct lOl'lO btCL cp/..6oorrov fUt.aBnuv CfOQ'ttZOV '{i.HJ '(0
EU.t'TOY bwvr"iv. [ .. . ] nvi:; bf. !fUOlV on CtJLCppaHn6 TI).chCI)V El cd}avcno; D 'I'UZlJ, bto TClUTU
),iln 6 6 Of yE cp).6ooq::o; JLov6Bt()).ov i:ygm}Ev Et; -ro zwgiov
ti:TfQ CttoTOU. .
'
01
Cf. WESTERJ]';K- SEGONDS 1990. p. LXII (see also p. XLIV).
78 CHAPTER 2
IV. PLUTARCH THE THEAETETUS
The crucial function of the Tlzeaetetlls in discussions perta1nmg to
fundamental philosophical options is confirmed by Plutarch's quotations
and allusions to it. There are relatively few borrowings from the Theaetctus
to be found in Plutarch's extant works
202
- especially if one compares them
with the number of quotations from the Timaeus for instance - but when
they do occur the context is often that of "zctetic'' or ''aporctic" episte-
mology. The first Quaestio Platonica, discussing a Theaetews text on


is exemplary in this respect, as I shall show in the fourth
chapter. As for now, I shall limit myself to a discussion of the other principal
texts which contain allusions to the Theaetetus that are relevant to the episte-
mological

One of these is the opening chapter of De E Delplzico, \vhere Plutarch
reflects on the meaning of the most precious gift God bestows on the faithful.
God himself generates intellectual problems (ta; m:(li tov 'A.oyov u:rogiu;).
in order to stimulate our desire and search for truth, our (ptA..ooocriu. The key
example is the enigmatic E, that had become a symbol of the Delphic
Apollo. Its meaning, however. was

The rest of the work is an
account of a discussion in which Plutarch had participated years bdore. The
most important role in this conversation. however, is attributed to
Ammonius, Plutarch's teacher whom Plutarch deferentially depicts as an
impressive. authoritative personality. Plutarch's revered teacher opens the
conversation, arguing that Apollo himself is actually no less a philosopher
than a prophet (3858) and pointing to etymological interpretations of his
cult names: Apollo is nt:n'ho; (Inquirer) for commencing pupils,
(Knowing) for those who already possess knowledge (toi:; i:zotat tl]V
buott.HllJV), and AEUztJVOQLO; (Conversationalist) ''when people have active
enjoyment of conversation and philosophic intercourse with one
:oc Cf. R.t\1.. JO:"ES 1916. p .. 109-119: HELMIJOLD- O'NEIL 1959. p .. 56-63 (more accurate and
more exhaustive than JO:-<ES's list).
:o.1 Sec also frg .. 215h and 215j SANDIJACH 1969a (1\fnemosyne, mother of the invoked
as proof for anamnesis; for the question of the authenticity of these fragments and for a
examination of their contents, cf .. infra: p. 200-203) and 191 D: btiJgov toivtv at to
[se.. (n)) v wT; li'l'zni; ''Httuv hov XlJQLvov (;qtU'fEiov] cpj"Jprv r"lvm toJV 1\lotatiJV plJtQo;
MVllflOOt'Vl];, i'..(Ll d; toDto on U.v tOY ClY LOttJflEY i)(oweOwfl[V lJ
ul.wi rvvOJJawpEv. t:tE;(O\'Tat; al.to wi; ata1hJaEm r..ai vvoim;, a:rott:roeoOm. {iJO:tfQ
bar..tl') .. tttJV OT]flflCl fYOIJ!lCUVOflEVOl'; (als6 compare Quacst. COil\'.. 7-1-18) ..
This is not the case for the allusion to the Theaetettts at De ad .. et am. 6-IE (Thcnetews
1790); De sup .. 16-IE (Thcactetus 155E); De E 3938 (Theactettts 1578): Acil-.. Col .. 1125A
( Theactetus 172E ) ..
:o) 38-IEF: 6 br oi'v q:iA.oc; 'A:r6Hwv i!otx n'.t; flfv :tEQi tov Biov (cwgia; icioOm r..ai Otcthnv
Oquot\:O(J)y toT; .. ta; br :tfQl tOY /.6:ov auto; EYLEVC!l xai rrgoBc'tiJ.nv tqJ creon
cp).oo6Cf(,'J tij; l'l'Zli; OQE;Lv Efl:tOt(iJV aywyov bi ti]V ai.Tl{}nuv, t;Jc; U.J.J.m; lE :ro)J .. oi; blj) .. ov
on r..ui nj tot E r..ctvtE(ltooEL ..
"'r : .
'"t ...
.
. J. .
..
1:-.JTERPRET A TIONS OF THE TH EA ET ET US
79
another"
2116
\Vith a reminiscence of Theaetettts

he defines
philosophy as a search for the truth provoked by wonder:
Since, he went on to say, inquiry is the beginning of philosophy, and wonder
and uncertainty the beginning of inquiry (wD cptA..ooocpdv [ ... ] TO
<crgzt'l tot bf: to ;wt u;rogEi:v), it seems only natural that
the greater part of what concerns the god should be concealed in riddles, and
should call for some account of the wherefore and an explanation of the cause ..
(transl. BAUBITf 1936b
Ammonius here expresses more or kss the same view as that formulated by
Plutarch in the introduction: in order to create in our souls a craving for
knO\vledge, God confronts us \Vith riddles and problems .. Thus in the first two
chapters of the De E the aporetic and zetetic elements are presented as
crucial to philosophy. Aporia, coupled with wonder, after a learning process,
in which one is supposed to search for the cause(s) (cdtia), will eventually
result in knowledge. That God conceals the truth about himself is an idea we
have already encountered. To be more specific, it is evidenced for
Arcesilaus, who is said to have frequently quoted the Hesiodic verse
zgt'lj'ClVH:(_; '(t{{_) EZOl'Ol "110i \'OOV uv{}(l(iJ:TOLOl "
2
()<). The reconciliation of the
aporetic clement in Platonism with manticism is a recurrent preoccupation
throughout the Mora!ia. Moreover, the Lamprias-cataloguc has a title On
the fact that the principles of the Academy are not at rariance with mamicism
(LJ3l: nf{]l TO!-, JUJ f1Uf.HJt9w n] JlUVTLY.ij rvv 'Axa01J,fW.L"Y.()J
1
).l)yov), which
is probably the same work as No. 71 from the same Lamprias-cataloguc:
nrui .uwnxtj; lJn u<vi;nw xu.ni roi1; 'AxuOtJ.uaixOI); .. Apart from these
titles nothing is known of this work and we can only guess at its contents. \Ye
do not even know with certainty whether it was a genuine Plutarchean work.
However. it is quite possible that the line of argumentation was to some
extent comparable to that of the first chapters of De: by positing problems
in his oracles, God stimulates the practice of philosophy. Academic
::t:o. Transl. 3ABUllT 1936h .. One may also compare Theon's statement on Apollo: wt: yag
ui.tot b1'pol'Orv i:on r..ui i.tnv r..ui :rotriv (qupBo/.iu; (386E).
ftc'ti .. u yi.tg q tl.ooc)<f ov tot: to to :raOo;. to Ocnlfta;;nv ou yag U.IJ.tJ (tgziJ rp) .. ooo<ria; f)
ui:n1 [ ... .. ] .. Sec of course also Aristotle Mcwph .. 982b 12-18: btc'.t yctg to {}mftcLsELv oi av1}gw:rm
r..ai \'t'Y r..ui tO :t(ltlnov lj(l;m'TO cp.i .. ooO<fELY, UQ;(lj; flEV tc't rrg6znga HUY at6.rrwv
Onl'pc!am.,.E;. r"lw ;wtc't fttzgov ohw rrgoionr; xui :rrgi -rwv flElsOV(J)V bta:rogl'Joanrc; [ .... ]
6 bE: a:rogwv zni \lmftCt;;(!)v olnw (ryvoE"lv. On the significance of "wonder" for Plato and
and for the later tradition. see LLEWEL YN 1988 ..
:us De E 385C: bri b tot q-J.oooqlv, i!q:t], to ;;tltE"Lv <UQ;(lJ. tot bE to
r..ni a:rogri:v. rir..6no; ta :roiJ ..a niJv :tEQi -rov Orov i!otzrv r..uwzExQtq:{}m [xui]
l .. orov nvct :ro\lotna bta ti xai btbnar..n).iuv cthin; ( = the text as offered by PATON -
POHLE:-.;z - S!E\'EKI:-.:G 19.29 .. FLACELIERE 1974b maintains the reading r..ui ),6yov nva
:roOEiv, which makes hardly any difference as to the meaning of this passage) .
l'fl Euseb. Praep .. e1. 1-1,4,15; Hesioci Op. et dies 42. Cf .. supra p .. 74 ..
80
CHAPTER 2
philosophy and manticism are therefore not enemies, but allies. Plutarch
may have argued further that the Academic suspension of judgment does not
entail doubt as to the truth of oracles, but that no;u1. being cognate to
promotes reverence towards the divine. In other treatises too
Plutarch considers "caution" as the Academic maxim par excellence:
entails the rejection of unjustified truth claims2
10

Theaetetus 1550 is referred to again in Quaestio Comimlis 5,7 (6SOD),
once more in a context of philosophy originating from aporia. The probkm
being assessed in this table conversation is the seemingly inexplicable
phenomenon of witchcraft, to put it more exactly. As the guests
discuss the topic in a light-hearted, playful manner, the host, Mcstrius Florus,
intervenes, declaring that actual facts lend astonishing support to the
common belief. "Yet the reports of such facts are commonly rejected
because of the want of an explanation (t(iJ b, ((LTLW; CCTOQELV cctton:io{}w ti)V
lotog[uv); but this is not right, in view of the thousands of other cases of
indisputable fact ti)v otoiuv i:xovtwv) in which the
explanation of the cause (6 nj; aLtiu.; AC>'(o;) escapes us"
211
Those looking
for plausibility (to c:t,/.oyov)2
12
everywhere destroy wonder (to Hut'!LC.WJOv) .
nut then. Florus continues, alluding to the Tlrcactctus, in a way philosophy is
destroyed along with it:
In general, he went on, the man who demands to see the IOJ.'.iC of each ant.! e\erv
thi;1g ({> i:;t)ni)v i:v i:x<'mt<i> T<'> rM.orov) destroys the (ti> il<n'!l<.HHm' ) i;1
all things. Whenever the logical exrlanation (i> Tfl; ({LTi<t; 1-<'>ro;) for anything
eludes us, we begin to be puzzkJ, ant.! therefore to be philosorhers (<'il);t,nw
til <'t.rrovri:v, HJl1Tl'OTl ttl rrt),onoq riv) . Consequently, in a way, who rl..'jl..'ct
marvels (oi wi; Hm'!l<Wint; <b:ton>t:vn:;) destroy philosophy. (t1SOCD)
'Ano(liu is thus vital to philosophy. The themes of "zctetics", aporctics".
philosophy, wonder, and the search for causes prove again to be inextricably
Also what follows is of interest: the "why" Un<'.t tl) is to be sought
out by reason (t<!J t.<)'(<!l), the facts themselves (the "that", on) arc to he
21
" Cf. De atiii.JWI.'t. l7DE, concerning cschatological mat!l.:rs: lJ bi: iTFQt Tttt't(( t'ti.'p1wc zni
toi; (()).o itfiTOll]fiEVot; fQ'{OV ij yv(i)OlV iWL w'd}r)!JlV TOl' OVTO; Fl' pc'ci.u Otolhh.Hcto;
(on zcti l;J; OflO).oyo0mv mhol. [ ... J %((L vi1 6ict n't I<J%QC<tot; (.1c. f<JTl!J
iTQ<.lf.Fl(.l(LJ t':;ofLVl.'pEVOl' ;wgu ni.C:LtltJVl TiJV itf(.ll TOl'T(I)V yvli'JOLV. De sera ll/1111. 5-NE: 5580:
De def. or. 431A; cf. BAnUT 1969a, p. lNGENKA:-.tP llJ76. p. 5-tS: llJS-t , p. RO : cf. p.
131.
211
Transl. H.B. HOFFLEIT, slightly adapted (CLE:\!ENT- HOFFLE!T 1969). Sec also 6SOEF:
to (J xrtl ;t(_10<J0t.ECf.'{}Evta; ubti<fl01'lm Ol'ft0CLtVEl flEV tiJO;tFQ ElQ'I%U. TIII bi: ti)V cdtiv rznv
btovr'Jgatov c'mtotEi:taL
212
Here not used as a technical term of the New Academics. Cf. BA 1TEG..\ZZORE 1992. note
15 p. 51: p. 25. On the cl:A.orov in the philosophy of Zeno and Arcesilaus. see IOPPOLO 1981.
p. 151-152: 1986, p. 121-131. On Arcesilaus, however, following treatments arc to be
preferred: LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 457; VA:o.;OER WAERDT 1989, p. cf. infra : p. 163-164.
"'"'' .
1:--.JTERPRETATIONS OF THE TIIEAETETUS 81
inferred from lowgtn (here to be translated presumably as "observation" or
recorded cases"
21
-l). Accordingly Plutarch, as a participant in the conver-
sation, will look for a rational explanation, which he seeks in an emanationist
theory ( a;r6ggOLu). From the fact that Plutarch follows Mestrius'
admonition and starts examining the causes, and from the parallel in De E,
one may safely conclude that Mestrius Florus is here expressing Plutarch's
own


In Adlersus Colotem Plutarch takes up the defence of- among others-
Arcesilaus against the malignant attacks of the Epicurean Colotes. He
undertakes to show Colotes contradicting his own doctrines: Colotes, the
very advocate of the evidence of the senses, ignores the evident fact that
people in ecstasy or melancholy arc often deceived by their senses. It may
not be a coincidence that Plutarch's use of the expression to nngoguv 1wi.
;wgcrr..otnv appears to be an allusion to Theaetetus 157E. Indeed, we have -
already considered a sufficient amount of evidence, I believe, to realise the
crucial function of the Theactellls in the debates between Academics and,
among others, Epicureans regarding the criterion. According to the latter it
was situated in the evidence of the senses. It should he no cause for surprise
that precisely in Plutarch's treatment of these issues (or already in his
source) there can he found allusions to the Thcaetetus.
Plutarch' s single most important text on the Tlreaetetus is undoubtedly the
first Quaestio Platonica. Just as in the previous texts the epistemological
issue is central to this Quaestio. A comparison with the Anonymus in
Thcactetum and with the anonymous Prolegomena will reveal remarkable
parallels and will pro\'e to be highly relevant. 8oth the anonymous
commentator and the author of the Prolegomena opposed the contention
that Plato rejected all dogmata. According to the former Socratic ignorance
is a didactic tool or strategy. According to the Prolegomena the aporetic
must he considered a mere transient phase of philosophical development.
21
-' In sc..:m i ng con! radict ion stands a passage f rorn De a Ill!.: <) '(t<Q cpl.ooo(1 o; ).t',:o; n) flEv
; c'.t:roQict; xui c'tyvoi; Vl!l'fll! xcti v<'qt['lo; ;wQfL yvt;JOH x<Li lutoQi<.t tij; mgi fXUUtov
a! tin;. TO o t:i'xo).ov xi JlfTQlOV ;wi cpl.c'tv{}QttJ:rov 01'x c'.t:rt1D.tot ( 44BC). This assertion,
however. is to he seen in its own context. Plutarch holds that many misunderstand Pythagoras'
words when the latter claims that the advantage of philosophy lies in to !ll]Mv VCLL'!lCtsnv.
Plutarch actually stands up for Pythagoras. "To wonder at nothing" is not synonymous with
comm..:nding nothing ami showing respect for nothing. Some people wrongly think that
immunity from wonder lies in disdain and seek to attain dignity by means of contempt. But
Pythagoras' words mean something completely different: Pythagoras merely wants to do
away with wonder and amazement that spring from blindness and ignorance. Plutarch's words
thus fit in with his campaign against OElOlOat[lOVia: cf. PHILIPPON in KLAERR- PH!L!PPON -
S!R!:'\ELLI 1989. p. 52 note 3 (p. 268-269) . For similar contradictions in Plutarch, see
l':!KOLAID!S 1991 (csp. p. 163-167 on bnmbatftoviu and the conclusion p. 186).
214
Cf. Quaest. com. 6420; 66-tC; TEODORSSON II 1990, p.198.
215
Cf. BABt.JT 1969a. p. 283.
82
CHAPTER 2
Both authors invoke anamnesis to turn down radically "sceptical"' interpre-
tations (in doing so the commentator deals with the very text that ga\'c rise
to Plutarch's Quaestio). Both authors also express the idea that Socrates'
assertions are to be related to the contrast between human and di,ine
knowledge. In both texts one can discern the concern to offer an interpre-
tation of the history of the Academy that is consistent with the philosophical
stance of the author; this also implies that the authors hold specific \'iews as
to Socrates' and Plato's positions in this respect. These themes will emerge
as underlying many of the Plutarchean texts we will consider below. and
especially the first Quaestio Platonica, in which Plutarch will emphasise the
importance of the aporetic and elenctic elements in philosophy, uphold the
unity of the Academic tradition and expose the doctrine of anamnesis as the
culmination point of the Quaestio.

CHAPTER 3
SOCRATES ACADE!\IICUS
Having explained the significance of the Theaetetrts and its divergent
interpretations for the Middle Platonic epistemological debate, I shall now
examine Socrates' part in this issue. It is a sufficiently known fact that
Arcesilaus referred to Socrates' example in order to lend support to his own
philosophical method
1
Not only those calling themselves 'aporetics",
'zetetics" or .. ephectics" , however, but also many of their opponents laid
claim to the authority that comes with Socratic pedigree. The former
undertook to establish an' interpretation of Socrates as a proto-Academic,
the latter, mainly the Stoics and Antiochus. tried to minimise the aporetic
aspects and emphasised the importance of Socrates' contribution to ethics.
The Epicureans adopted an alternative strategy: they attacked the New
Academics by discrediting their alleged predecessors, especially Socrates. In
trying to achieve their goal they showed no hesitation in ridiculing ami
slandering Socrates.
For the Stoics, on the contrary, any criticism of Socrates was out of the
question. From the very beginnings of tiH.:ir school they had claimed to be
true followers of Socrates
2
They continued to relate their central ethical
doctrines to his name, as already their founding father Zeno
3
had done-1. At
any rate, the Stoics' favourable image of Socrates antedates the epistemo-
logical quarrels. It is unclear whether the same can be said of the hostile
Epicurean reception of Socrates. Already Epicurus appears to have shown
some antagonism towards Socrates
5
, but specific attacks on the latter's
1
Cf. Cic. De nut. dcor. 1,11; Acad. //1-l-15 (Lucullus, criticising Arcesilaus) ; De fin. 2,1; De
orat. 3,67; Tmc. Disp. 5,11. Cf. 00Rl:"G 1')7Y. p. 7-8: WOODRUff 1906. p. 23; LOL"G 1Y88a, p.
156-160; A:--;:--;As 19')2. p. 4-l-61. At the time of writing this. I did not have access to IOPPOLO
1995. However, it has not led to any fundamental changes in my own position, although it does
contain some useful pages (118-121) on Antiochus' view on Socrates (which is, she claims, a
"dogmatic" response to the sceptic interpretation of Socrates) .
2
Cf. Philodemus, De Stoic. col. 12-13, ed. GIM.;:--;ANTONI 11 1983 (Socraticomm reliquiae) V
B (Diogencs) 126. p. 466 I. 3-4; Diog. Laert. 7.31; DORI:-.JG 1979, p. 5.
3
Ci. Lo:--;c 1988a, p. 160-162. See also )OPPOLO 1986, p. 50: "Nell'interprctazione di Zenone,
dunque, l'elenchos era l'aspctto meno rilevante del pensiero socratico [ ... ]."
Cf. A:--;:-;As 1988. p. 105: "The Stoic-Sceptic debate was in part a dispute as to which school
was to be seen as the true practitioners of Socraks' methods and realizers of his aims." See
also Cic. De orat. 3.61; IOPPOLO 1986, p. 41-42; 50-54; FLADERER 1996, p. 26.
5
Cic. Brw. 292. Prior to this some appear to have shown a negative disposition
towards Socrates : cf. DORil"G 1979, p. 4.
,,.r-
84
CHAPTER 3
reputation may have originated only later, as a reaction against the New
Acadcmy
6

In the following pages I shall endeavour to reconstruct the Epicurean
anti-Socratic polemic, paying special attention to the censuring use of the
epithets dgwv and But first let us examine one of the principal
sources, viz. Plutarch's polemical treatise against the Epicurean Colotcs. In
doing so, we will at the same time have the opportunity to take a look at a
Middle Platonic defence of the Academic tradition.
l. PLUTARCH'S DEFENCE OF SOCRATES AND THE ACADD.!Y
IN ADVERSUS COLOTEM
A. Three charges against Socrates related to anti-Academic polemic
Colotcs, one of Epicurus' pupils, had composed a treatise in which he
polcmicised against several philosophers, claiming that their doctrines made
practical life impossible
7
Among his victims were Democritus, Empcdocks.
Parmenides, Plato, Socrates, Melissus, Stilpon, the Cyrcnaics and
Arcesilaus. In his Ad\ersus Colotem Plutarch takes up the defence of these
philosophers, deploying one of his favourite strategies: he turns the
defaming reproaches against his opponent. Plutarch replies to the title of
Colotes' treatise
11
by contending that the Epicureans destroy the possibility
of an honourable life". In his treatise Non posse he takes it one step further,
arguing that even a pleasant life is made impossible by Epicurean doctrine.
The Greek title of this treatise is: "On or\)[ t}<)iw; /aw r.ar'
';r[r.oPlJov
10
('That it is not even possible to lead a pleasant life according to
Epicurus').
" Cf. VA:-:DER WAERDT 19S9, p. 257-25S.
7
also Diog. OenoanJ. frg. 6 11 S-12 CIIILTO:-:.
x CRC):\ERT ( llJOo. p. 174) a priori that Plutarch haJ a firsthanJ knowkJg.: of
Coloks' book: "Nati.irlich hat Diogt.:nes dt.:n Kolotes cbensowenig gt.:ksen wie Plut:m:h."
Such a contention is unfortunatdy characto.:ristic of philology from the bo.:ginning of our
century (one may compare e.g. SCHROETER 1lJ11, p. 35; 39; 57). when it was simply
that Plutarch had almost never ro.:ad the works he discussed in their original form. However,
there is no reason to assume that Plutarch did not have Colotes' book at his di-;posal. Th.:
comprehensiveness and the fullness of detail of his account of Colotes' argumentation almost
exclude that he had not read his work. See also VANDER WAERDT 1989, p. 229 note 11. For
similar considerations regarding Plutarch's acquaintance with the \vorks of the Stoics. see
BABUT 1969a, p. 225; 237.
'1 llOSD: toT; yag ('t/J.m; q:t}.oo6q:m; y ..w).oumv ouwt [se. the Epicureans]. btct to
OO<fOV l;); to bvcugol:mv, b.fLVOl 6E tOUtot;, on Cl'{fVV{i); zui. OtbCtaZOl'Ol
(cdJ. EI:-<ARSON- DE LACY 1967).
w On the Worrlaw of the title see ZACHER 1982, p. 36. Sec also ADA:'-.1 1974, p. 11; ALBISI
1993, p. 15.
""
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 85
Colotes' treatise was essentially an attack on his contemporary
Arcesilaus. To say that the other philosophers were only criticised in
function of this attack on the Academic scholarch
11
- as Arcesilaus regarded
them as his predecessors- may be exaggerated
12
. But on the other hand, the
philosophers in question all have in common that they can be said to have
somehow rejected sensory perception as an absolute truth criterion. At any
rate. one may safely assume Arcesilaus to have been Colotes' prime target.
Already the title of Colotes' treatise, nEQL TOV on xara TU TWl' UAAWl'
qti.oaocrwv ooypara OtH5E ianv
13
("'On the point that conformity to the
doctrines of the other philosophers actually makes it impossible to live"),
could be an indication that the author sought to challenge the Academy.
Indeed, what is more obvious than the criticism that suspension of judgment
theoretically abolishes ordinary life? How can anyone who constantly
suspends judgment, including the "assent" to sensory perceptions, manage in
daily life? On what basis is such a person supposed to act?
J.P. HERSI!f3ELL has argued that Colotes' criticism of Socrates was aimed
at Socrates himself and is not to be regarded as an indirect attack on
Arcesilaus. According to him, Colotes' criticism of Socrates is not a reaction
to Arcesilaus' sceptical interpretation of Socrates, but is directly based on
the image of Socrates as found in Plato's dialogues; especially the Phaedo
(83A) and the Tlzeacrcws ( 151 E-186E) may have supplied the evidence for
Socrates' criticism of sensory perception
1
-1. HERSIIBELL's thesis is, I think,
11
Cf. EISARSO:\- DE LACY 1967, p. 156: "The hook is an attack on Arcesilai.is. The
philosophers singleJ out because the sco.:ptics of the AcaJemy regarJed them as
predecessors." One may compare GIGASTE llJS I. p. o6; fOWLER llJ04, p. 241.

VA:\DER WAERDT p. 230-231 offers sufficient counter-arguments agzlinst this

extreme theo;is: (I) the list of philosophers attackeJ does not o.:xactly corro.:sponJ to any list of
authorities proJuceJ hy the AcaJcmy; (2) Colotes does not appear to have includeJ Pyrrho
in his criticism. although already in Colotes' days some (notably Ariston of Chios and Timon:
cf. Diog. Lao.:rt. U3) bo.:lievo.:J that he significantly innuenced Arcesilaus; (3) Arco.:silaus can
hardly be supposed to havo.: invokeJ conto.:mporaries (Stilpon and the Cyrenaics) as
authorities in orJ..:r to establish a peJigrce for his aJvocacy of boz1'1; (4) since it was Colotes'
intention to show that life was made impossible by the other philosoph..:rs, he haJ no reason
to confine his criticism to Arcesilaus.
13
Ad1. Col. 1107E; Non posse IOS6C.
u Cf. HERSHBELL 1988. p. 371: "there are no good reasons to look beyond Plato's writings
either for Colotes' attack on Socrates. or for Plutarch's vio.:ws on Socrates. Plutarch himself
was not an Academic Skeptic, and his portrayal of Socrates goes back mainly to Plato, and not
Arccsilaus." WEST:I.IA:\ 1955. p. 62-65, while emphasising the Platonic origins of Colotes'
Interpretation of Socrates, almost completely disregards the possibility that Arcesilaus'
interpretation of Socrates mav have innucnccd Colotcs. WESTMAN's rather narrow
perspective - it is his intention to examine the value of Ad1ersus Colotem as a source for
reconstructing the doctrines of the philosophers in question - makes him inattentive to the
polemical context. KLEVE's criticism (1983, p. 133). on the other hand, is not quite justified:
..WEST:I.IA:\ thinks that the sceptical Socrates is a misconception of Colotes who did not
distinguish between the Platonic and the historical Socrates." For WEST:I.IAN has specified (p.
?3 note 1): Kolotes scheidet alsoiwischcn Sokrates und Pia ton. [ ... ]er weiss, dass Sokrates
tn den platonischen Dialogen wenigstens zum Teil das Sprachrohr Platons ist."
. --
86
CHAPTER 3
untenable. Colotes aims his attacks at Socrates as depicted by Arcesilaus, as
I shall show on the basis of an analysis of Colotes' criticism of Socrates and
the counter-arguments adduced by Plutarch - which is not to say that it
would be illegitimate to trace back this image to the dialogues; on the
contrary, Arcesilaus himself is likely to have done so.
Plutarch distinguishes three main accusations against Socrates:
(1) The well-known story of the young Chaerephon who went to Delphi
and, having asked the oracle if anyone was wiser than Socrates. got a
negative reply
15
, is labelled as a vulgar and sophistical tale (aocponzov
zai cpognxov
10
, Adv. Col. 1116EF).
(2) Colotes made fun of Socrates' criticism of the senses: we eat food. not
grass; we cross swollen rivers by boat, but we cross them by foot when
they are fordable; we cover our body in a coat and never put the coat
round a pillar. Socrates too runs when he sees a snake or a wolf: he
brings the food he wants to consume to his mouth, instead of propping it
into his ear ( 11170; 110SAB). Colotes' examples arc drawn from
Platonic texts which he consequently ridicules
17
His reproach amounts
to the allegation that Socrates' deeds do not match his speech. as Socra-
tes never tires of criticising the senses. Therefore, he argues, Socrates'
words ought to be regarded as boasting ( 11170).
(3) Colotes appears to have derided Socrates for seeking to discover what
man is, which should mean that Socrates does not even know himself
(Ill XI3C) IX.
These three charges can easily he related to the Epicurean polemic
against the New Academy.
(I) With his first reproach Colotes alludes to the Apo!og_v, where Socrates
professes himself in a quandary as to the meaning of the oracle. Plato's story
of Socrates' FJ.qxo; of the oracle appears to have been a central text in
Arcesilaus' portrait of Socrates as a sceptic. Socrates confesses to be still
looking for a wise person, constantly rduting the pretended \visdom of
others.
15
Plato Apol. 20E-21A; Xcnophon Apol. ll.
1
h Strictly speaking the words oocponzov xai q-ognxov only pertain to
Chaerephon's manner. But of course this reproach is implicitly transferred to Socrates
himself. who zealously went looking for the meaning of the Delphic response- the Epicureans
regard belief in oracles as a coarse superstition. WESTMA:-<'s remarks (1955, p. 61-62) in this
respect arc therefore off the mark.
17
Cf. DE LACY 1967, p. 171-172.
1
R Cf. Plwcdms 229E: ot 6uvnrtai ;nl) r.ma TO ygartrta yvt"i1vm EfLCLl'Tov ;r/.otov
<'ll'J [LOL CfCtlVEtaL TOUTO ftl ayvoouvw TCL aD.OTQlU OXO:tELV.

.. *'"!
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 87
(2) The second argument refers to Socrates' criticism of sensory evidence:
oT; yza).d :n:gi t&v vngy&v ( 1117F). Colotes brings up the so-called
a:-rga:;ia-argument or "argument from total inaction": Socrates' doubts
concerning the reliability of sensory evidence apparently did not prevent him
from carrying out the actions required to live his daily life
19
, but they would
have if Socrates actually lived according to his words. As according to
Colotes a consequential suspension of judgment would abolish the
possibility of living, Socrates' words are said to be mere boasting and
bragging. To which Plutarch replies that we can very \Veil direct our actions
by what appears to us, without attributing to appearances any epistemic
value and surely not infallibility:
The inductive argument by which we conclude that the senses are not accurate
or trustworthy does not deny that an object presents to us a certain appearance,
but forbids us. though we continue to make use of the senses and take the
appearance as our guide in what we do, to trust them as entirely and infallibly
true.
(transl. EINARSON - DE LACY 1967r
0
But for the philosophically minded it is not sufficient to act according to
mere appearances; only knowledge can satisfy the true philosophcr
21

Plutarch establishes a close relation between suspension of jugdment and his
self-definition as a philosopher: the true philosopher disavows false wisdom
and cannot content himself. like the Epicurean Colotcs, with what appears
to him. In fact Plutarch's reproach to Colotes amounts to the allegation that
he does not understand that true t:mon'nul is of a different order than what
Colotes believes to he knowledge. Plutarch here intimates that a completely
different form of knowledge might be possible, hut he does not enter at
length into this issue. He does hint at the Platonic difference between the
material causes ("necessity"), and the higher causes that the philosopher
seeks to account for (11188: TO yctg avayzal..ov CtQZEL ;wi. XQElWC>E; an:'
auni)v, on Bl:htov EtEQOV Otl% onv).
Furthermore, the second charge brought against Socrates completely
parallels Colotes' criticism of Arcesilaus. In his defence and reply Plutarch
19
1118A: otbi: rwzgtiTn bt"pot'{h:v flt:robt;>v i]v 1'1 7tfQL niJV alo{hjo(JJV M;n wu
Tot; q-cuvoltfVOL; OILOttiJ;. The question "can the sceptic live his scepticism"' is extensively
dealt with by FREDE (1984), BUR:"YEAT (1980; 198-t) , BARNES (1982) . For a perspicuous
survey of the problems and the solutions proposed. see LAURSEN 1992, p. 6-t-84. The
aforementioned publications focus mainly on Sextus Empiricus.
11 tSB : 6 bi: Tct; aio{hjon:; /,oyo:; bet'{O[lfVOS w:; Ot'Z CtXQtBEI; ouo aoq:at.fi:; ngo:; nionv
OL'Z UVUlQfl TO CfCtLVEOOm tli)V JtQCtY!HlTlJ)V t'JillV EXCtOTOV, ana XQWilEVOl; XCtTCL TO
fj[L Tit:; rrgci;n; Tat:; atm'h'JOEOL TO JtlOT\:.ElV w:; at.t]MOL JtUvtlJ xai a6ta:tninou;
o{ bi6wmv atTat::.
21
11 t8B: 6 \)luziJ ).aBEi:v mannl1JV mgi. b<aoTOu xcLi yvoJoLv, oux
Ezoum [se. nt alo{}TjoEI;]. , ,
....
88
CHAPTER 3
accordingly refers:!:! to his section on Arcesilaus. For against the latter too
Colotes deployed the argument from inaction: "How comes it that the man
who suspends judgment does not go dashing off to a mountain instead of to
the bath, or why does he not get up and walk to the wall instead of the door
when he wishes to go out to the market-place:!-'?" Plutarch's answer to thi s is
once again that l:rrox1'1 does not affect our perception and representation
(ntoOl)OL;, (ravtaonxov), but only eliminates our opinions (tct; bo;;n:::
uvcugEi:), letting the other functions perform their natural task;
( ll22EFf ... Arcesilaus goes to the bath because it appears to

as a bath
and not as a mountain
2
f', but he does not have absolute certainty that what
appears to him actually is what it appears to be. Plutarch's answer here is
remarkably similar to the Pyrrhonian (cf. supra: p. 54-56). It may have been
intlucnccd by later, possibly Pyrrhonian sources, but it is certainly pbusihk
that Arccsilaus too referred to the on ([CJ.lVHaL as an adequate basis for
action.
The ensuing dialectical refutation of the argument from inaction most
probably contains arguments that arc posterior to Arcesilaus and that may
have been <..lcveloped by Plutarch or his source.
Plutarch scornfully opposes Colotcs' lack of learning and intelligence with
the sophisticated arguments of some of his colleagues who also tried to
rdutc the Academic position:
The view that we should suspend judgement about everything (titv :m_lt
:r<.(V1:(t)V l::rozitv) was not shaken even by those who undertook elaboratl' irnes-
tigations and composed lengthy and argumentative treatises to rdute it. hut
these men at last brought up against it from the Stoa like some Gorgons head
(!:JO:rr(l fo!)(OVU 1:i1v t'(:t(lu:;iuv l:m!tovn:;) the argument from total in;1ction
and ga,c up thl' hattk.
( \122A. transl. ElNARSON- DE LACY)
Colotes' more sophisticated colleagues borrowed the argument from total
inaction from the Stoa. The Stoics indeed levelled the (ctgusiet argument
Cf. (:tfQL otv TOt'TWV r.cti :tttl.tv 6 Kt!l).t;m]; ri:tr(v mtnt :wi.i.oi:;
E'{%f%l.IJY.<;l;) and 1120C (yEVOftEvo; iY ovv 6 Kw/.t;nq; c't:to nilv mt!.uttinTQfrrEH<l TOt.';
r.uW cnn)v <p).ooocr ou;. ovowc [ .. . bi: :tQOTEQot; ftEV.<;J; t':tL1\'ot":l,
wi; Kt'QI]\'Ciizou; f.l.f.rJ.ElV, bi:: Toi.; mgi 'Agr.roi/.nov 'AzubtJ!ttiizoi;. ot'TOL ;i.tQ
,
1
octv ot :trgi :tt'tVToJv
2.1 ll22E (transl. DE LACY 1967): U.Hct mil; Ot'% fi; ago; tt:rnm TQt:zt:J\' 6
brztJV c't/X d; Bu/.nvfiov, oubi: :tgo; TO\' TOlf.OV C.t/J.U.. ;rgo; Tct; {}{gn; ll\'ClOTtt;
Bod.O!lf\'O; Ei; aroguv :tQOE).{}{[v;"
!J Cf. BRE:-;K 198Sa. p. 111-114.
25 ll22EF: on <fCllVETCltl:ll'j:t01.!0EV ClUT<il Bni.ClVElOV OD TO ago; ana TO fh/.cm:(ov. %lll {}{gn
ol.z 6 Toi:zo; ctH' l'j {}0get, %(ll niJV c'D.i.OJV OfiOl(l); EZClOTOV.
211 Perhnps one should translate "chamber-pot" instead of "mountnin"": cf. LSJ. p. 1255. s.1.
ogo;. 5: ""= Cf. Aristoph. Aclz. 82; Scho/. in Aristoph. Ach. 82. With thanks to Prof. A.
for this interesting suggestion.
...
SOCRATES ACADEJ\IICUS
89
against the Academics
27
and probably even invented it
28
Also the metaphor
of the Gorgon that turned men to stone was an image favoured by the Stoics
for denouncing the Academic position: Epictetus accuses the Academic
teachers of petrifying their adherents (Diss. 1,5,2-5fl).
Plutarch does not mention by name the authors of the sophisticated
argumentation, which is based on a Stoicising theory of action. Colotes is
certainly not among them, since Plutarch does not deem him capable of
understanding the subtleties of the argumentation: from Colotes one would
expect the response that a performance on the lyre gets from an ass 30 Nor
are they Stoics, for they are said to have borrowed the urrgal;ia argument
from them. According to Ph. DE LACY (1956a, p. 74) Plutarch is referring to
Antiochus and his disciples, but this is rather unlikely and lacks textual
support. Most probably they were Epicureans, like Colotes, as the broader
context undoubtedly is one of anti-Epicurean polemic. C. LEVY is of the
opinion that they were Epicureans posterior to Colotes
31
Nothing, however,
rules out their being his contemporaries.
Plutarch, who according to the Lamprias-catalogue wrote a separate
treatise on this issue '
2
, asserts that the exact refutation of the argument goes
as follows (11228-D). One ought to start from the three different
movements of the soul: sensation, impulse and assent (resp. (ravtaonx6v,
and ouyr.cnaOntr.ov). The (ravtaonxov xiv1uta is the level of
sensible representation, it is spontaneous and automatic: upon encountering
an ohjcct we necessarily receive an imprint and arc affected. The movement
of sensation triggers an impulse which causes an external ("action-
related") movement directed towards an appropriate goal. The metaphor
used in this respect is that of a balance: as it were puts a weight in the
scale that is the directive faculty (here designated with the Stoic term
T)yqtovtr.ov), which causes a kind of inclination. This, in a spontaneous,
natural way (Cfl'OL%ti);). hrings about a movement which is directed towards
n) o[r.Eiov
33
On this view the combination of cpavtaonr.ov and
Cf. Epict. Diss. 1.27.18-19 (ri; t!ptiJV fi; f'\a).uvtiov a:tE).OEiv {}fl.tJV d; cbtj).HEv;);
2,20.28 ( {cvOr(l):tE, Ti :ro1<i;: u{ro; OfcwTov xa{}" 'lPEQnv xni ou OO.Et; c'HfEi:vm TC(
l{'l'f.QU TUl'TCl r.:nzngr'nmm. roOt(I)V ;roi: lj'fQEIS: Ti]V ZElQCl, Ei; TO OTOflCl lj Ei; TOY O<pOa).flOV;
i.Ol'O!tEvo; :toi: %TJ .. ).
Cf. VA:'\DER WAERDT 1989, p. 244-247.
:::-J Cf. BABuT 1969a, p. 138. See also Lucian Vit. auct. 24-25.
::.0 11228: Kw).(OT!J b" OlfiCU TCl :TEQL %Clt 0t''(%ClTCrDoEw; av(,J) Atget; CtXQOCWLV dvm.
31
1993a. p. 26 7 note 55.

L2l0: ri o lrEQi b[xwv.

33
1122C: TO b. 0Qfll]Tl%0V E'(flQOflEVOV u;ro TOt CfClVTaonzou JTQO; l:a Ol%ElCl ;rgaxnxciJ;
ZtVEi: n)v civug(l):tov. oiov go:r1j; f.v T(i.l r'rtEfiOVtZ(iJ r.ai VE1JOE(I); ytVOflEVll; [ ... J XQli>VTCll [se. ot
:rEQi :tU\"tuJv bzovTE;] nj omuj q;votx<J'J; ayoumJ ;rgo; 1:0 q-mvoftEvov oixEiov and 1122F: 6
"'{ag nj; boztj; l.oro; ou :tOQUTQbEt Tl]V atoOqmv, oUb. wi:; aAoyot; :tci.Omtv aunj; xai
%lV1jr1a01v a)).OL(I)OlV rp:tOlEl 1:0 lj'ClVTOOTlXOV, al.l-a nt;
avwgd ZQljTCtt bi: wi; {c/J.ot; 0J; ir<fU%EV:
90
CH.-\PTER 3
suffice to explain action. And as the suspension of judgment onlv
affects the third level, that of assent, rroz1'1 should not in any way

It is only at the level of assent that falsehood and deception

and cmani) may occur, notably when one opines and precipitately assents-,
yielding out of weakness to appcarance
35

These technicalities are cast in almost completely Stoic terms, the account
being based upon the Stoic theory of action
36
This exemplifies a typical New
Academic strategy consisting in refuting the opponent with his own
concepts, and does not imply acceptance of the theoretical framework. Even
at 1122C refers to the Stoic rather than to the Platonic conception
of opinion, although the Platonist will no doubt have recognised it as the
familiarly Platonic doxa and conclude that any case of "assent" will be a case
of opinion
37
Opining is just one of the types of "assent-errors'' distinguished
by the Stoics, next to precipitation and deception (resp. 1:0 rrgo:tt:tTELV and
'I'Dbos;, also present at 1122C)
3
s, in all of which the Stoic sage issupposed to
practise i:rroxti, which in turn is an originally Stoic concept.
Sextus Empiricus reports the dialectical reasoning developed by
Arcesilaus: after having established that is inexistent, Arccsilaus
argues that the sage, if he assents, will assent to non-appn:hcnsiblcs:
' 4 1122CD: i1 y<'tQ rrgit'.;t; bl'oi:v bri:mt, qmrrctt1l<t; wu otzriot zui. :tl)i>; T(> q Oli'.rinv
c.\? it i1;. ot'bt:TrQov nj Erroz(l !tt<znw. bos't; yitg. ouz OQ!tit; q mrrwJiH; (, i.t1:o;
c'tcr iontmv.
ll22C: n) xui. rrQo:ti:tTt:tV Ti]v tJl.''(Y.UTu(h:mv. ri'.;tv t!:t' t'Hn1rvri; T(l
CJ Cf. De: Sto. rep. I 057B: iatiL; Of lfUUt.ot; ovtu; t:t ' tllJ0EVft((; oqr.mmiitronw
Ttd; TOt<!UT((l; lf<IVTUlllW;.
1" Cf. /k Sto. rep. l037F; I 057 A: ps.-Plut. l'lac.philos. 900EF (ddinition of the crm'T<IllHi'.l)v
I== DG 402a.IO-loJ) : 903Afl (== DG 410a25-2l) = SYF 11 R36: Ol rnlllZOl lfC!OlVI::lVUl Ti]:: 1jtzi];
c'tv( ;mnov lttQoc; to irrt::ftOVtzi>V To rrmoi)v Tc't; <rmrrtwiuc; zui. ourl.uTuvEun; zui uloi.h]ort;
i'.UL tlQ!Hi.; i'.((L TOUTO t.O'(lOflOV zu/.oumv): Stob. 2.86.17-19 ( ==SYF 111.169) : TOot: i'.l\"Ol'V Ti)V
OQ!tijv otb[v ETfQOV dvm AE'(OL'OLV ttAI.' i] crmrruiuv OQ!ll]nzitv tou r.uOl'Jzono; ut'TtlHEv.
ti]V bi: ogpi]V flY((( crogC:tv bin Y.UTC! TO 1971, p. 43. The metaphor of
the balance is also Stoic: cf. De 1irt. mor. 446F: Cic. Acad. 11 3R. The rderences to the
qmvo!tEvov oizri:ov and the cp;mz<.i); may be connected to the oizEiwm;-doctrine.
37 As pointed out by STRIKER ( 1980, p. 68). who fails to acknowkdge, however, th:lt at 1122C
bo'.;n is essentially a reference to a Stoic concept.
At De Sto. rep. 1056EF ( = SYF Il 993 ). Plutarch is criticising the Stoic conception of
ri!lC<QftEVTJ. the ineluctable chain of events, which includes human volitions (cf. OO:"'I:\1
1988a). Plutarch states that the Stoics distinguish between three kinds of mistake in the
general case of assent when one should have suspended judgment : precipitation. deception,
and opining, in the cases of yielding to obscure, false or inapprehensibk images, respectively
(uv !lEV ubl]t.OL; ElXtllOt, rrgo;ti:tTO\'TU;. uv bi: ')'Et'OEOl, CIV bi: i'.Ol\'t:);
ur.cna),l']ITTOL;, Sec also Stob. 2,lll.l8-112,4 ( = SYF III 548: lj' Ei:bo; b"
V:tOt.a!LF>ctVElV oubboTE q;am TOV OO<fOV, o\.bi: tO :tUQcL:tav CIZUTahpnp nvi
Ol'YXC!WTifrwOm, bta TO !ll]OE ((UTOV !ll]O' ayvbEiV !ll]OEV. Ti]V yag cl'(\'OLCI\'
!lTamwni'.i]V Elvat ouyxatcLUEOlV xai. UOUEVlJ . !ll]OEV 8 ctafrEvt":);. MJ.a
!lCtHov aocru).G>c; xu\. bto xai. !lllOE TOV OOCfOY. Ottta; '{CIQ dvut oo;u;. Ti]V
!lEv OU'(I.atclfrWlV, Ti]V 0E U:tO).T]\j.'lV UO\}Evil).

SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 91
according to Stoic distinctions and definitions, this means that he will be
opining; but the wise man is not in the class of those who opine; therefore he
will refuse assent, that is suspend judgment
39
Sextus affirms at the beginning
of his account that Arcesilaus emphatically has not posited a criterion and
that those (Academics) who have given the impression to have laid down
one produced it "by way of counterblast to the Stoics"
40
. Arcesilaus has
merely taken a concept to which Zeno had given only a limited application,
reserved for exceptional cases, and accords it a universal extension: "par un
certain nombre de procedes dialectiques, et principalement par le sorite,
Arccsilas passait du constat d'erreurs particulieres a la generalisation du
soupc;on

It is noteworthy that this move from particular

instances to a general recommendation may be observed in chapter 28 of
Col.
Cicero tells a story that is much similar to Sextus' account: if the sage ever
assents to anything, Arcesilaus used to argue, he will sometimes also opine;
but he will never opine, therefore he will not assent to

Cicero
adds that Carneade.s sometimes - i.e. for dialectic purposes, I presume -
granted that the wise man sometimes assents and thus opines, which is
equally unacceptable according to Stoic
It is questionable whether the dialectical refutation of the cmgu;[a
argument as elaborated by Plutarch had already been developed in this form
by Arccsilaus

At any rate it was current in the Academy after

Arcesilaus.
3'
1
Adl" . . \fatlz. 7.155-157.
.1( Atfl-. Mat h. 7.150: ol. bi: :tn,?i. Tov :tQOl]'(Ol'flf\'(1); !lEV WQtouv r.gm'tQLOV,
ol. bi: zCii t;lgtzt:vm bozou\rrr; wi:'w r.fnt't a\rrt:rugr:;((yor{ilv Titv o1; rrgo; Toi.; Ittnzov;
a:trboauv.
41
LEVY 1990, p. 301. Compare ANNAS 1988. p. 107 note 13.
4
: Its conclusion is the dismissal of all t'] b' EV Off'UClt.,lOlS aun] xai. choai; Y.Cll XEQOLV
O..:nmiu xui cl.yvmn r.ni Tngnzit mgi. ta utofrt]n't r.ui Ta; crnvtuoiu;. Ett' ul.l]Hfi:; Eimv EiTE
'i'El'bri:;. Tivn bo'.;uv ou ou).r{n; rro[uv b' oux civt'> xai xcit(l) notEi ovyxcn(turmv xui xgimv;
(l123F).
43
Cf. LEVY 1990, p. 300: "En acceptant comme point de depart le dogme sto"icien de la
perfection de l'assentiment du sage, Arcesilas demontrait la nccessite pour celui-ci de
pratiqucr l'epvc/1t? en toutc occasion puisqu'il vit dans un monJc. cclui des sensations et d' unc
raison tributaire de celles-ci, ou toute certitude est impossible."
Acad. 11 67: " 'si ulli rei sapiens adsentictur umquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur;
numquam autem opinabitur; nulli igitur rei adsentietur'. hanc conclusionem Arcesilas
probabat; confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non numquam secundum
illud dabat, adsentiri aliquando; ita sequcbatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis, et recte ut mihi
videris." Cf. LEVY 1992, p. 270-274.
45
Cf. V AND ER WAERDT 1989, p. _246; LEVY 1993a, p. 265-267.
92 CHAPTER 3
Plutarch in one of his anti-Stoic treatises informs us that Chrysippus and
Antipater of Tarsus upheld against the Academics that there can be action
or even impulsion without assent-1
6
The history of these polemics may
therefore be reconstructed as follO\vs: Chrysippus polemicised against
Arcesilaus, who had attacked the Stoic doctrine propounded by Zeno;
Carneades attempted to refute Chrysippus and was attacked in his turn bv
Antipater-1
7
Plutarch's contention that the opponents of the Academy
up the battle as they were led to acknowledge that leads to action by
itself, without assent ( 1122AB), is certainly to be seen as tendentious. for it
clearly appears from De Sto. rep. 1057 A that Chrysippus and Antipater
rejected the alleged refutation
4
x.
The actual wording of the argument at Adv. Col. 11228-D is undoubtedly
Plutarch's, but it certainly draws on New Academic sources and may even
contain material stemming from Arcesilaus, especially if one takes into
account the larger section ( 1121 E-ll24C). After all, Arcesilaus was at the
origins of the debate and he is the one Plutarch is defending here. The
elaborated refutation of assessing the technicalities of the Stoic
theory of action. however, can hardly be regarded as Arcesilaus'-1'
1
, although
he may have established its rudimentary foundations
50

/)e Sto. ref!. 1057 A: ;wi llijv '(E wi; :rvo; tol:; 'Azu61HlCt'tr.oi.; U'ft'iHHV l.1 :r/.rillTo; i.<.r;o;
cu't<T> tr Xt.wol:r:r<i> zui 'Avtmt'tt(.ll(> :tf<_ll tivo; '{E'(OVC: :tr<_li toO !ll.jtf :t<_Jc'tttnv !ll.jif ih_l!Hi.v
c't<ll.''(i':<Lrttilit(l);. (ti.i.c't ;r).t'Wjllll'lt ).t:'(FLV zcti zrvc't; lo:tollt:on; wi.; oizrict;
<J ctvtcwi; '(FVOJlEVlj; rtdll:; O<_lll<i.v Jlij ot''(ZUHtHqlfvot;.l'lutan:h that
this tenet is in contradiction with Chrysippus' stat..:ment that hoth God and the induct:
false mental images. wanting of us not assent hut only action and towards the
presentations. Ollt that WC OUt Of Weaknl!SS to these images: thOSI.! US \\ith
thcsc images. whoever might he. either know that no assent is required for actiLln
and accorJingly do nnt want assent hut mcrl!ly action. or they hold that assent is required for
action and arc therefore intcntionally responsihk for our precipitatl! and erroneous
behaviour in assenting to inapprchensibh:s (1057BC). Cf. BALDr\SSARRt I 1976. p. L'S-139
121.

Cf. CI!ER:-<ISS !97ob. p. 601 note b.
Chrysippus maintained that every impulse is an assent: cf. Stoh. 2.RB.l2 = SVF Ill 171:
miou; oi:: Tct; OQJlU; 0l''(%((l'(LI')fon; fl\'((l, n't; Oi:: :t(ICtXtlXCt; xai t{) %lVlJtl%0V :tf(llfZfl\:
<'
1
Cf. VA:"DER WAERDT 1989, p. 2-l6; LEVY 1993a. p. 267-269.

He might have said somt:thing in the line of 1 t22F (tu; uvcu<_Jri) . The
reference to De Sto. rep. 1057A, adduced hy ZELLER (Ill.! 192J. p. 513 note 2).
(1905. p. 42 note 5), WEST:\It\N (1955, p. 29-l-295). and SrRtKEH ( 1%0. p.
6H). merely proves that the argument ultimately goes back to Arccsi!Jus, as admittetl by
WESTMAN (p. 295): "Somit hat uns Plutarch in dicscm Abschnitt seincr Schrift cin Ori!!inalar-
gument des Arkcsilaos in desscn Kampf m it der Stoa erhalten (von Wortlichkeit ist n;1tiirlich
nicht die Rede, und tibrig.:ns hat Arkesilaos ja nichts geschricbcn)." LONG- SEDLEY I 19S7.
p. 456 take the text as transparently referring to Arcesilaus' words, whereas Lo:-.;G - SEDLEY
Il 1987, p. 444 are more cautious. IOPPOLO 1986, p. 134-140, 1995. p. SS. and also
STRIKER 1980, p. 68-69, albeit with more circumspection, start from the assumption that the
argument is Arcesilaus'. The opposite error is committed by SCHROETER ( 1911, p. 21-23) and
DE LACY (1953, p. 80). who treat the passage as having nothing to do with Arcesilaus.

'
-..


-S-
?t,:

SOCRATES ACADEMICUS
93
Another question is that concerning the statute of the related views: did
the Academics accept these Stoic conceptions merely for the sake of
dialectical refutation, or did they constitute also to some extent a kind of
positive doctrine? Both G. STRIKER (1980, p. 65 note 29) and A.M. IOPPOLO
(1986, p. 134-146) think that the On CfatVETat formula in COmbination With
zgwvrm nj and n) would offer
Arcesilaus an alternative answer to the reasoning. IOPPOLO,
followed by J. ANN AS (1988, p. 110-111 ), even emphatically affirms that this
is a theory Arcesilaus may be held to have espoused in propria persona.
Even if one leaves Adv. Col. 11228-D out of the account one might indeed
infer from the broader context, and from other sources as well 5
1
, that
Arcesilaus refered to nature as an adequate basis for action. IOPPOLO argues
that Arcesilaus considered nature to be an adequate basis even for
intentional and moral action. for this of course was a problem to the

if they argued that assent is superfluous, what can be said to be

the mark that still differentiates animal from human behaviour, moral from
non-moral action? For if human action is reduced to the instinctive or
mechanical following of natural inclinations, it completely loses its
specificity
5
'. IOJ>J>OLO therefore believes that Arcesilaus, referring to nature,
proposed a practical criterion that could be a sufficient basis for intentional
action. She links Plutarch's account with that of Sextus (Adv. matlz. 7,158).
who reports that Arcesilaus uses "the reasonable" (to EtA.oyov) as a
practical criterion. This complex
54
she takes to be positive doctrine, rather
than a mere dialectical approach to the criterion of action. Arcesilaus, she
claims. positively believed that our actions are grounded in natural instincts,
and even derives morality from nature5
5

51
Diog. Laert. U6: Sext. Emp. l'yrrh. hyp. 1.232-23-l; Atfl-. mat h. 7

Cf. STKIKEK 19SO. p. 67-69; IOI'POLO 1986. p. 140-14J: p. 110.

s:. To the sp.:cificity of human action oclongs judgmcnl, according to the Stoics: cf. Origcnes
Princ. 3.1.2-3 ( =S\'F II. 91\S): Stob. 2.88,1-6 ( =SVF Ill.l71); Clem.:ns Al. Strom. 2. p. 487 Pott
(=SVF Il. 7!4).
s.; On the ft).otov sec STRIKER 19S0. p. 65-66; LONG- SEDLEY I 1987. p. 457; 19SR.
p. 108-111: \V AERDT 1981). p. 260-265; LAURSEI\ 1992, p. 55-56. Arccsilaus' Et).oyov
was not a cognitin:: criterion. as tendentiously imputed hy Sextus .Ad1. math. 7,158 or his
sourct:. nor prt:sumably was it a doctrine Arcesilaus defended as his own: it was a mere
rcjoindcr to the Stoics who claimed xmu).IJ1!'l; to be indispensable; Arcesilaus replied that
their own of thc rt/.orov rendered r.cnui-Jp!t; superfluous- pace IOI'I'OLO ( 1981;
1986, p. 121-131. followed by A:-;NAS 1981', p. 109-110 and HANKI:"SON 1995, p. 90). who draws
on thc aforementioned text of Sextus in support of her claim that the Ei)),otov was a doctrine
Arcesilaus held as his own.

1986. p. 137: "[ .. . ]it problema de'! criteria di aziont: di Arcesilao in Sesto non c dialettico,
ma scaturisce da esigenze intrinseche alle posizione di colui che sospcnde il giudizio. Seguire
l'eulogon significa seguirt: cio che e appropriato a natura"; p. 139: ''Per Arcesilao e sufficiente
l'istinto a farci raggiungere il bene[ ... ]"; p. 140: "Arcesilao vuole indicare che le necessita
naturali ci spingono verso il bene e dunque noi siamo attratti naturalmente da esso"; p. 143:
ha cerea to di spi.:gare .che l'azione morale trova it suo fondamento nella natura."
94
CHAPTER 3
I think, however, that it is very unlikely that Arcesilaus' rejoinder to the
Stoic argument is anything more than a dialectical reply. There is no good
reason to ascribe any positive doctrine to him in these matters
56
a fortiori a
doctrine that would privilege an irrational capacity in the order of instinct
57
and promote it as a basis for moral behaviour; not only does this go against
the grain of Platonism; it was, as I shall argue, precisely one of the
reproaches the Academics directed against the Stoics
5
s. The Academics
actually refused to confound reason and nature.
There is sufficient evidence to assume safely that Arcesilaus .. held" the
thesis that intentional or moral action could be guided by nature; in other
words, that an appropriate mental image (to otxETov) induces
impulse without any intervention of assent
5
'1, but this very thesis I
take to be dialectical: Arcesilaus wanted to prove that even on the Stoic's
own assumptions it is possible to live morally without assent. For is this
reference to the otxEi:ov not an allusion to the Stoic theorv of
"appropriation" ( otxdwmc;), which was meant precisely to found justi-ce in
nature'? And, as can be gathered from the anonymous commentary on the
Theaetetus (5.3-7,20 cf. supra: p. 44-49), this very position was chalknged by
the AcademicsNl, who argued that natural appropriateness was an inappro-
priate basis for ethics. As we have seen, the commentator substitutes the
Platonic "assimilation to God'' t(i) {}EqJ) for the Stoic
"appropriation" (7, 14-19). This move towards a positiw acceptance of the
Platonic telos may be held to be charactl.!ristic only of the Fourth Academy
and Middle Platonism, but on the other hand I think it is plausible that the
New Academics at least never argued against the Platonic conception of
justice and always respected the Platonic opposition between reason and
nature61 It may have been the case that Arcesilaus never elaborated a
Platonic moral doctrine, but at any rate, as he saw himself as a true Platonist,
he is not likely to have been committed to defending in his own name a
theory contradicting central Platonic tenets. As far as I know. he never
upheld a theory that was in blatant contradiction with Platonism. And this
may be no coincidence. Therefore I think that Arcesilaus' argument was
meant purely as a rejoinder to the Stoics: from their own theory of oixdo)at;
it follows that one does not need assent for action, not even for voluntary or
moral action, and as universal suspension of judgment, which they also ought
to accept on their own premisses, only affects assent, bwzt'l does not
See also STRIKER 1980, p. 69; 1981, p. 163; 168; fREDE 1984, p. 258-259.
57 See on the (in)appropriateness of this term. however, STRIKER 1980, p. 69.
5X Cf. LEVY 1993a, p. 268-269.
59
Cf. LEVY 1993a, p. 267.
60 Sec also PI ut. De Sto. rep. eh. 9, 1035A-F; eh. 12, 1038A-C.
61 See also LEVY 1990, p. 302; 1993a, p. 269-270; 1993b, p. 43-147.
.,.-l
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 95
endanger either daily or moral life; therefore there is no reason at all to
blame the Academics for advocating bwx1i and even less for accusing them
of thus making life impossible. For anyone taking this dialectical stance,
there was no need to offer a positive theory of voluntary action
62
Outside
the Stoic context Arcesilaus could always say that he lived according to what
"appeared'' to him (on c.pa[vnm).
There is yet another textual indication that confirms my argument that the
refutation of is to be regarded as purely dialectical. Plutarch
introduces his rejoinder to the sophisticated argument with an Homeric
verse: "as you have spoken, so you will be answered" ( 6rmot6v x' ELrnJo{}a
bo;. toiov x' b:axouomc;, Iliad 20,250), which could be taken to mean that
the argument he will establish or report starts from Stoic premises. It is also
noteworthy that Diogenes Laertius (9,73) says that this very line was cited by
some to show that Homer was a sceptic, insofar as he refers to the
equipollence of opposite arguments ('t:llV l.ooo{}vELaV Hywv xal avt:WEOLV
n!Jv ).oywv). Diogenes continues to explain that the sceptics did not posit
doctrines of their own, but confined themselves to discuss and refute the
theories of the othl.!r schools (9,74). Apparently Homer's verse used to figure
in this context to denote this particular dialectical strategyi\J.
When Colotes and the Epicureans in general borrowed the
argument from the Stoics, they needed only to make small adaptations to the
formulation, the most significant change being that Colotes substitutes
"plain evid!.!nce" for .. cognitive impression", since as an Epicurean he is
committed to the position that all impressions arc trueM. Plutarch indeed
quotes his statement that it is impossible to refuse assent to plain evidence
(1122F: al.i: abtJ\'UtOV tO Pll ouyxatatWw{}m toi; EV(.(QYEOL). Plutarch's
reply is rhetorical and ad hominem: who does away with the consensus of

Cf. VASDER WAERDT 1989, p. 265: "Once one secs that the skcptic's rejoinder to the
apraxia argument in fact relies on his rejection of the Stoic and Epicurean claim that there are
certain impressions to which one cannot avoid giving rational assent. one understands why he
finds no need to account for voluntary or intentional action which the dogmatist claims must
be expbined in terms of rational assent."
63
One may compare Carneades' dictum d !Li] yag lJV oux U.v i:y(i) (Diog.
Laert. 4,62). itself a parody of the famous saying d [LiJ yag lJV Xguomrro;. o{x U.v 1jv LWa
(Diog. Laert. 7,183). Carneades is also known to have frequently uttered the aside "bat[tOVtE,
q:&ion OE TO oov [tEvo;" (1/ias 6.407), referring to Chrysippus (De Sto. rep. 10368). The Stoics
apparently held this verse to mean that Carneadcs, who said nothing of his own (oubv
).f:-.rnv tbtov). made use of the arguments Chrysippus himself developed against his
own theory by way of [;nzEiQl]at; [xcnEgov (cf. the Stoic complaint at Cic. Acad. /187-88:
"ab eo [se. Chrysippo] armatum esse Carneaden": Acad. 1175; CHERNISS 1976b, p. 438-439
note c; ZASATTA 1993, p. 211-212 notes 6-7). But maybe Carneades used to quote this verse
(also) to intimate that he was adopting Stoic premisses merely for the sake of his argument.
See also Colotes' reproach to Arcesilaus rnl''tEv yag attov i:Otov H:yovta cpJOLV (Ad\'. Col.
1121F); Cic. De nat. dear. 1,10; De di1in. 2,8; 2,150; lOPPOLO 1986, p. 193 note 1; SCHOFIELD
1986, p. 59; 61. But see also below: p. 156; 171 note 205.
&l Cf. V W AERDT 1989, p. 246-247.
96 CHAPTER 3
mankind and comes in conflict with the plainest facts? Those who reject
divination and divine providence and other commonly accepted
( ll23A). Plutarch means the Epicureans, of course. implying also that the
Academics are not liable to these accusations and that thev do not do awav
with accepted beliefs- a view dear to Plutarch (cf. infra: -eh. 4. III. B) bu"t
which may have well been so to New Academics as well. It seems that
Plutarch is refuting the accusation that the Academic suspension of assent
makes a moral life impossible. This is borne out by Adr. Col. ll24DE.
Quoting Colotes, who at the end of his book condemns those taking away
law and order and making man live the life of brutes and beasts. Plutarch
contends that Colotes is publicly proclaiming his own misdeeds, for it is the
Epicureans who nullify the laws and the religious beliefs of mankind.
Moreover. even if someone took away law but left us with the teachings of
Parmenides. Socrates, Heraclitus and Plato, one should not be afraid that we
would devour one another and live the life of wild beasts. words may
be hdd to imply that according to Plutarch the Academics respected the
fundamental moral tenets of Platonism. My hunch is that Plutarch's surmise
is not far from the truth.
It must be noted that besides the theoretical refutation of (.CTCJ<t;tct.
Plutarch in other works also illustrates with historical exampks the unfound-
edness of the charge. As Ph. DE LACY has remarked, perhaps the greatest
tribute that Plutarch pays to Arcesilaus is in connection with two of his
pupils, Ecdclus and D!..!mophanes, who by their heroic actions proved the
detractors of the Academy wrong: "It would seem that Arcesilaus. in spite
of his scepticism. was able to inspire useful and heroic action"h'.
(3) Colotcs last point of criticism brought against Socrates is to be situated
again in the "aporetical" or "zetetical" realm. as can be gatherl.!d equally
from Plutarch's rejoinder. In seeking to discover what man is. Socrates is
actually obeying the Delphic maxim yvw{h ocdrcov, and to do so is an
extremely laudable aspiration. This is in fact the starting point for Socrates'
aporetical quest:
We pass to the downright derision and scurrility (xoptblj bttt'{Fi.(t. xct.i
of his attack on Socrates for seeking to discover what

DE LACY 1953, p. 80. Cf. Philop. 1,3: ijbtJ bf: TOt! uni:rwoo; ono;
"Ezbq).o; zui Ot l\lqnAorro).inu btrbf:;uvw ti)V 'r\gzcot/.acp
otvt'p1n; h 'r\zui'ltUlEL\t yqov6n:;. xui cp).ooocriav ttiJv za\}' i:unoi:; bi :ro/.tTfinv
zai :tga:;n; :rgoarayovw; (which also had a faYourable influenct: on Philopot:men's
education: 1.5 : Ul'tOL '{E Ev wi; u)).ou; fQ'(OI; xui ti[V ci>t).o:rOl!lf\'O; f:rowi:-\"!0
1tCLt0Et.'OlV, l;J; ZOIVOV oqrl.o; tij 'E)).abt tov c"tvbga toi:tov t:to cp).ooocria; cbrg;aoupcvOI):
Arar. 5.1: 6 o "EzbtJ).o; 'Agxa; z l\lqai.tt; m)).(1);. aviJQ cp).6oorro; zni :rgnznz6;.
'Agzrm/iwt toi: 'Axabtuuaxou yqovo>; v ctoTEt otvt'p'}q; Cf. A.-\LDERS p. 6:
LACRSEN 1992, p. 25; 54; V ALGIGLIO 1992. p. 4017.
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS
man is and "flaunting" as Colotes puts it- the boast that he
did not even know himself. In all this we can see that Colotes for his part had
never given himself to the problem. Whereas Heracleitus said as of some great
and lofty achievement "I searched myself out"
60
; and "Know Thyself' {to
yvtu{h oaut6v) was held to be the most godlike of the Delphic inscriptions,
being moreover the command that set Socrates to wondering and inquiring so
( 0 bi] %Ct.i LlU%QCtTfl <tij;> Cl.irOQLC; %at taUt!]; agziJV v6wxEv), as
Aristotle
67
has said in his Platonic writings.
(I llSC, transl. EINARSO:-.:- DE LACY)
97
Never should one hope to attain any true knowledge if one does not first
undertake the search for oneself. The fools arc those who think otherwise,
says Plutarch. That Colotes is of the opinion that this is ridiculous, only
shows that he has never reached this stage of undcrstandingn!-l.
Colotes apparently mentioned Socrates' quest in the context of the
cctgct:;iu argument. He \vill have argued that Socrates' search for self-
knowledge was a sign of his refusal to acknowledge plain evidence, more
particularly of his rejection to believe what his senses told him about
himseJfh'
1
, which according to Colotes results in the impossibility of living.
70
To this Plutarch replies that not the reflections concerning the essence of
man. soul and body lead to the collapse of life. but rather the ddusions,
conceits and noisy boastings, of which Socrates attempted to free man hut
which Epicurus stimulated in his adherents. Whereas Socrates strove to extol
the divine clement in man. Epicurus tried to fight it, which makes man look
more like Typhon, a monster with a hundred serpent's heads. Plutarch is
referring to a passage from the Phacdrus which he has quoted somewhat
earlier: Socrates examines himself in order to find out "whether he is a beast
more intricate and puffed up than Typhon. or whether by nature he enjoys a
lot that is divine and free from the fumes of infatuation"71 According to
f<i rprontov = DK 22 (llcraclitus) l3 101.
67
'Agwtorf!.tJ; i:v toi; ni.<LH!l\'l%Oi; FlQlJXE = Aristotle frg. I ROSE = mvi. <p/.ooo<r iu;
frg. 1 Ross.
6S II!RF: Ot L(I)XQCttl); OL'V c't00.tr(lo;. oon; Ell] f(Lt.'tOV, u))-f.J. oi; E1tEllJL tl
tGv c(i).(J)\' :rgo TOl
1
T0l' on tij\' "{Vli>Ol\' ClVCt'{%(t.L(L\' zov OUt(!); rtgdhjwu zni.E:tOV
EOTtV_ Ol' '(C.<Q uv ri.:rionrv hiQOl! /.nBciv f1tlOTI'ullJV, 0\' bta:tE<fEt.''{E niJV fUVTOU 'tO
%t'Qtl;Hutov XutCL/.nBriv.
69
One may compare Tert . De an_ 17.11-12: .. Quid agis Acadcmia procacissima? [ ... J 12 Sed
enim Plato, ne quod testimonium sensibus signet. propterea et in Phaedro ex Socratis persona
negat se cognoscere posse semetipsum, ut monet Dclphica inscriptio, et in Thcaeteto adimit
sibi scire atquc sentire et in Phaedro post mortem differt sententiam vcritatis, postumam
scilicet." (the refen:nces are to Plwcdr. 229E- the passage also referred to by Plutarch -;
Theaer_ 150C er passim: Phaedr. 247DE, respectively)
70
V A:'-IDER \V AERDT 1989, p. 255.
71
Adl'. Col. 11198. transl. EI:-JARso:-; - DE LACY (rtrE Tvcrwv6; on 'frt]Qiov
=toi.v:r).O%<;JTEQOV Xui fltE {}fia; TlVO XUL un:<fOU <pUOEl
J.l!:trzov); cf. Phaedr. 230A.
, ..
98
CHAPTER 3
Plutarch this kind of self-scrutiny absolutely does not destroy life At De Is.
et Os. 351 F Plutarch speculates about the etymology of Typhon: '"For Is is is
a Greek word, and so also is Typhon, her enemy, who is
as his name implies, because of his ignorance and self-
deception (bt' ayvmav xal. arranlv)
73
." Here TU(f O)V is derived from
('to be crazy, demented' , from -rucr6w), whereas popular
etymology tended to relate the name to the more literal meanings of the
cognate n)<p(J) ('to smoke') The latter etymology has the
Phaedms quote, but it seems unlikely that Plutarch discerned any
between the two etymologies, which would have been quite an artificial
distinction anyhow (this is probably not the kind of "scholarly" approach
one would expect from him). Both Plato and Plutarch play on Typhon's
vanity (in attacking the gods) and on his vapourings. meanings which are
combined in the word nJ<f'0
75
Plutarch also links n\ t[o;.
conceit", with ottnta, self-opinion"
76
It is noteworthy that Typhon in De
Is. et Os. stands for the irrational part of soul: Tu<rwv 6 -rf]; 'I' L'Zt-1; to
rruuqnxov xai. n-ravtxiw xu\. uJ,oyov xui. (371 B).
B.
When explaining the meaning t:rrozt'J has for Arcesilaus. Plutarch unambig-
uously sides with the against his In his deknct: of the
Plutarch ofkrs some interesting regarding
sensation, which may be useful to determine Plutarch's own views on this
subject. Every sensory experience (m10o;) possesses within itself a manikst
character that is intrinsic to it and guarantees its truth. As long as opinion
does not go beyond sensory presentations (rrc'tOtl). plain evidence (h<.tl_l'/FW)
will guarantee that it remains free from error. I3ut as soon as mcddks
with judgments and pronouncements about what is exterior to the realm of
7Z A dl. Col. 111 9l3C: u.nu. TOt.I'[Ol; '(f wi:; l::n).o(lO[lOl; OL' "[QV Biov uvrj(_lfl. ritv 8
b. wu xui. TOV Tt'!fOV zui. Ttt; b:uzOri; zcti t':tF<_'I\\;zot ;
xuwtiton; Y.ui. [lE'(CLActuzin;. 1:auta yttQ 6 TuqtiJv l:anv. ov no).i.v i:w:wiqm:v 6
xu01t'(f[ll;J\' zai. HEOi:; no).qtuJv xui. Dcim; (tvbg(tm.
7
J Transl. BABBITI 1936b.
Cf. GRlFflTHS 1970, p. 259, whosl! treatment of this matter is to be prderrcJ lo II OI' FSER
111941. p. 55. For thl! interpretation of De Is. et Os. 351F, sec GRIFFITHS 1956; 1lJ70. p. 260.
Cf. El:-.:ARSON- DE LACY 1967, p. 261 note J . See also De gmio Socr. 5SOI3 : S..:xt. Emp.
Adr. math. 8,5 (M6vqtos; 0 XU(J)V, Tt'CfOV Elnt;JV TCl navw, O:tfQ oi:qoi; EOTl "[lt )\' Ot' Z l.ivtlJ\' l:);
Ovt:!JJV.).
76 E.g. De aud. 39D: 438 (m'iJ<; oir'utcno; Y.Cti. EQtlnwv "[f JI.(Ll crhngin; (t:r oi.d}Ei;
Et; unq-ov xai. tytnivovt:a xcnaon'tow; am1:6v) ; De prof in \ 'irt. 81 C; F. Sec al so Epict.
Diss. 1 ,8,6.
77 On the Cyrcnaics see also Scxt. Emp. Aclv. Math. 7,190-200; for Plutarch's familiarity with
the Cyrenaics, cf. L188 (fl<Qt KVQIJl'ai'r.cuv) and VAN DER STOCKT 1990a, p. 29-30.
SOCRATES ACADEI\II CUS 99
the :tcr0ll (XQLVELV r..cti. Uitocpat\'EO{}m rrEQL l<DV bnos;), confusion and
uncertainty arise
79
. The same objects when perceived by different persons
often give rise to divergent and even contradictory sensations and
impressions. It cannot be denied that each person's experience is authentic,
but this does not entitle her or him to make any inferences about '"things"
outside of sensation. Therefore it would be preferable, according to the
Cyrenaics, to describe one's sensations as "sweetened", "turned bitter",
'"chilled", ''heated'", "illumined", or ''darkened'' (yA.uxatvEo{}m, mxgai-
vca{}w, l}'l:,XEODat, rather than
to affirm positively that honey is sweet, the foliage of the olive bitter, hail
cold, wine hot, sunlight luminous and night airs
1
dark. To some honey is
disagreeable, and likewise it is possible that a counter-example might be
found for each sensation ( ll20EF).
Plutarch rebukes Colotes for not understanding that in fact the Epicurean
theory amounts to the sarne as the Cyrenaic-Sceptic view. He produces the
stock examples of the tower that, seen from a distance, appears round, but
square from nearby, or the oar that appears bent when seen in the water,
straight when seen outside the water ( 1121 Arc. Plutarch points out that the
Epicureans hold that in both cases the imprint is truly received by the scnse.
but also that thl.!y keep us from going further and affirming that the external
objects correspond to our impression. Therefore they ought to say that our
sight is "rounded or be-anglcd"(to orgoyyl't.oOoOm xnt-rb oxaAllvouoOm
-ri1v (hptv) rather than that the tower is round or the oar bent, for it is the
image producing the effect in thc eye that is rounded or bent. As in these
cases the effect differs from the external object, belief ought to be attached
only to the effect. If one proceeds to add ' 'it is" to "it appears", this belief
must be exposed as Plutarch rejects the procedures advocated by the
Epicureans to check and evcntually verify a sensation such as a distant view:
7
s In this context o6;u comprises the pre-rational realm as well (Ep[tEvovoa wT; :n'n'trm it
M;u btttn!Qrl TO UVU!lt(Qll]TOV). which makes that it has a larger extension than the o6;a of
ll22D (M;lt; '(ttQ, OL'Z. ovbi: q-nvmoiu; 0 ).oyor; U!f'LOTIIOlV). which is situated
exclusively in the realm of OU"{zmc!{}Em;.

1120F: o0EV TOt; ;rc't0fOl V l] b6;u btClTl]Qfl to UVClflClQll]TOV. I:Y.Bui \'Ol'OU b Y.Cti
:toi.t':tQCL'f!lO\'Ol'OCl "[q) Y.Ql\'fl\' xcti. U:t0CfULV0{}(Ll JtEQL "[tt)\' EY.Tor;, aun'tv lE noHttY.t;
wgc'wan zcti :tgor; hrQot; un(> tiiJv w'muv [vnvttn m!{h] xai q-ctvwoia;
).apBavovt:a;.
ti<J On the basis of the following list of adjectives, lj'tzwOm and 0EQ[tuivw{}m were added by
REISKE and included in the editions of POHLENZ- \VESTMAN 1959 and ElNARSON - DE LACY
1967.
81
Cf. De prim. frig. 9498.

Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. 1.118-119 (the fifth Aenesidemean mode); Cic. A cad. //19; 79;
Diog. Laert. 9,85 ; Luer. 4,353-468.
!ll 1121 B: btaq-ogU.v oiw wu ngo; 1:0 t':tozri[tEvov i:xn)r;, xovro; 1t [tivnv i:ni. wu
:tt'tOot; bri: 'tl]V :ttOTlv ij To dvm n;o EAEYXE00m.
,.
lOO
CHAPTER 3
"every sensation is equally trustworthy when it tcstifies'in its own behalf. but
none when it testifies in behalf of anything else, but all are on the same
The Epicureans ought to admit on their own principles that there
is no sensation that enables us to make assertions about external objects
rrEQL -cwv Er. -cos. 1121 D). Therefore when they tell us to
make statements about the external world. they in fact appoint opinion
to pass the verdict ' ' it is" and thus transfer the decision from the
supposedly infallible sensation to the highly fallible (1121
This position towards sensation ties in with Plutarch's account of
Socrates' criticism of the senses at 11188: "the inductive argument by which
we conclude that the senses are not accurate or trusthworthy does not deny
that an object presents to us a certain appearance, but forbids us. though we
continue to make use of the senses and take the appearance as our guide in
what we do, to trust them as entirely and infallibly truext>.'' In his ddence of
Arccsilaus Plutarch accordingly argues from the impossibility to distinguish
"normal' impressions from those of sleep, ecstasy or delirium- the so-called
and recommends that one suspend assent rather than take
the risk of granting assent when one should not ( 1123DE). for unccrtaintv
rules in the realm of sensation and makes every assent, judgment or
hazardousss. Who would trust "anything so discredited and incoherent as the
senses" or "appearances which arc so unreliable and

From these various remarks regarding sensation can be inferred a
consistent view that presumably was Plutarch's ivtoremcr. these
\ \21 D: tl) :tCHJllV fl\'!ll !( UVtHlll<LV (J!llll(l); u';n'):tlOtoV {:rig [mtft; . l.':Ti'<_l (()).Ol' 6
lllJ<'lqtt((V ii.)J: znv.
On and tlaws in Lose; - Sr: DLEY I llJS7. p. S5-S6;
ERLER 1\1')4, p. 132-133. For an attempt to ddcnd position l'lutarch's
ar):!Uilli.:lltS sec FOWLER p. 265-2(10.
Kh Transl. El:-<AHSO:"' - DE LACY 1967. One may compare Cic. ;\uul. /1103: "itaqu.: ait [se.
Cl itomachusj crrarc cos qui di(ant ab Acadcmia sensus a numquam
dictum sit aut colorcm aut saporcm aut sonum nullum esse. illud sit disputatum. non incsse in
iis propriam quae nusquam alibi essd veri et certi notam."

Cf. Scxt. Emp. At !I-. matlr. 7.402-411; 421; et passim. lOPI'OLO \9:)fi . p. 21 -2S; 70: 1993.
p. 199-200; 207.
... ll23F: ljb' EV ocrua)qtoT; CLVtll zni. uzoaT; zai. ZEQOLV Cl:tlOtl(l zai. (C(VOlCl i'.Ul wgctzil :TEQL
tU aloul]tU i'.ai. tu; cravtnoia;. Ett' UJ.l\UET; ELOlV Eltf 1VEU0E"l; , tlVCL ba;uv Ot' LHti.r tn : :toiav
b' oux U.vu> xai. Y.ttttt> nmd ouyY.ettt'dh:otv zni. r.gimv ;
H'l Cf. 11248 : the doctrine of suspension of assent is a i!;t:; uvbgG>V i'.Cti. bta 0E<Jt; cr ti.ltttOl'Oa
tO c't6tamunov Y.CLllll]ltQO.lf:!lEYIJ rai'; ow{h{j).r],llhw:; ovrw Y.({L Ot'OWWl., UW:; uioOijUEOI tl]\'
ZQlOlV !llJbE OUVE;et:tat(J>!lEVlJ tottat;, Ol tll CfUlVO!lEVCL tLi>V Ubl.Jl.l>V :ClOt\ V Ef.ttV !f ClO'l.Ol'Ol\',
d:rlOTLUV TOOUVTIJI' ;wi clO(trpEtal' h roi':; C(WI'O,llhot:;OQlil\'tE;.
w See also Quacst. cam. 626AB; 674C; 691 E: 7\SCD: Vltvli)v [se. TII.cnwv] rrtl)!tEtQiav w;_
arroorrGlOCLV lUtti; nj aioutjOEl ZCtl a:tOOtQECfOl'OCLV bi. tiJV \'Oljtl]V 'l.Ctl
a[btOV q-tOlV [ . .. J 0 '(UQ t'JbOVlj; Y.Cll a):(l]b6vo; TJI.o;. rrgo; tO Oli>!ta ti]V 'l'l'ZiJV rrQOOlj).Ol
[Phaedo 830] !lE'(tatov ;wY.ov l!znv i:'otzEv to tct aiout]tu rrmt::"lv t':vagrrotfQCl ni'>v votJ<W"
xu\. rrauEt !lUIJ.ov l] },O'(((l ZQlVElV titv btCrVotCLV. See also 7\SE: Marc. pJl;
SEIDE 198\, p. 21. with note 66 p. 127 ; p. 125 note 37 ; GEORGIADOU 1992.
,

__::.._.
:::.._! .
:(

SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 101
reflections on sensation can be related to De primo frigido, where the
uncertainty concerning such questions as whether earth or air is the primor-
dially cold principle leads to the recommendation to suspend judgment
about the various physical theories examined. Criticism of sensory
perception is an important element, though not the only one, of the episte-
mology of this treatise
91
We should also adduce De E 392E, where
Ammonius concludes his expose of an Heraclitean-Academic flux theory
with the remark that our senses, through ignorance of reality, falsely tell us
that what appears to be actually is C'1'1 a[o{)lJOl ayvo[q tOU OVtO
dvm n) The reason why we should distrust the senses is not in
the first place that our sensory cognitive faculty is defective as such, but
rather that the world is not the sort of place which it is possible to know with
total clarity'J:!. Plutarch's criticism of Colotcs is that of a Platonist willing to
grant the senses but a limited epistemological value: they belong to the realm
of In order to attain the certainty that Colotes requires so as to live a
life of crraga;!a, one:: needs another criterion next to sensation
93

C. Colotcs slandcrotis attack on the "Academic" Socrates
We have considered a sufficient amount of evidence to be able effectively to
dispose of HERSIIBELL's view that Colotes' attacks on Socrates were not
fundamentally related to the polemic against the New Academy. Insofar ns
Colotes challenges Socrates' criticism of the senses he may hnvc referred to
Plato's dialogues. But the renson Socrates is subject to nttack is that his
philosophy allegedly leads to broz1'1 and that Arcesilaus claimed him to be
the predecessor of Academic philosophy. Colotes' target is the "proto-
Academic"

That Plutarch regards the assault on Socrates as

91
This impl ies that I sl ightly disagree with OOS!:'il 19S6a. Cf. infra : p. 21R.
92
Sec also !Jc h et U1. With thanks to Dr Gcorgc BOYS-STONES for this point.
See also De Colll/11. Not. f-rom J>lutarch's criticism of the Stoics it can be inkrrcd that
he bdieves that the Academics do not compktdy disavow the senses. Cf. De facie 933A;
BALDASSARR! 1993. p. 2K
93
Cf. ISSARDI Pr\RE:-..TE 198Rb. p. 76. .
See also CROSERT 1906, p. 172: "So zcigt sich dcnn, dal3 man bei dcr epikurcischen
Literatur jcncr Zcit immcr nach Bezichungen zu Gcgnern und Fragen des Tages suchen mul3
[ .. .]'; KLEVE 1983, p. 229; 231; 233 ; Nr\RDELLI1984. p. 527; ISSARDI PARENTE 198Rb, p. 68-
69 ; LO:-< G 1988a. p. 155: "That they [se. the Epicureans] chose [ ... ] to attack aspects of
Socrates' ethics. and to treat him as a thorough-going sceptic. indicates a view of Socrates as
transmitted by contemporary Stoics and Academics." ; VANDER WAERDT 1989. p. 253-259.
RILEY (1980. p. 57) found little support for his view that in criticising Socrates Colotes actually
wanted to attack Plato: "The doctrine attacked here is Plato's, briefly criticized in the section
of the essay immediately preceding (1115c-ll\6e) [ ... ] Plutarch 's defence makes it clear that
Colotes is crit icizing Plato for considering the visible world around us, the world of as
u.nreal, and for po;tulating a world of the VOI]tOV, i.e., of the Forms, as real. " R!LEY has
smgled out one similarity between Colotes' attacks on Socrates and Plato and ignores the
much more important similarities-\vith his criticism of Arcesilaus (and the similarities between
Colotes criticism of the latter and that of Plato).
102
CHAPTER 3
being connected with the anti-Academic polemic is also confirmed by the
structure and disposition of Adversus Colotem, as Plutarch has grouped in
one section of the treatise his defence of Socrates together with that of
Arcesilaus and the Cyrenaics
95
.
The composite question whether the basis for Colotes' polemic was a
"sceptic" interpretation of Socrates and whether Plutarch himself was an
Academic sceptic, is answered unequivocally in the negative by J. P.
HERSHBELL 9ti. I shall take a more balanced view, in this and the following
chapters. on the nature of Plutarclz's interprt:tation of Socrates and on the
way the Chaeronean philosopher defined his relation to the New Academy.
The Epicurean anti-Academic polemic is undeniably characterised by its
very acrimonious and defamatory attacks. Colotes did not shun abusive
language in his polcmic
97
, which for that matter seems to h::m.: been a general
characteristic of Epicurean polemic, starting with Epicurus himself'!"
Especially the epithets with which Colotes tries to damage Socrates'
reputation arc singularly harsh
9
'
1
, Socrates being called a bragger and a
sophist.
Plutarch takes offence particularly at the allegation of to
which he repeatedly reverts. Colotes indeed accuses Socrates of boasting in
that the latter's suspension of assent is presumed to he mere pretence.
Socrates professes to practise suspension of assent concerning sensation. hut
his deeds allegedly show that he does not suspend assent at all:
l-k w..:nt on. o.:xclaiming: "The fact is, Socrates. that your arguments
charlatans ( uht(;,ovw;); what you said to po.:opk in your dialogues was ono.:
thing. hut what you actually did was something else again"
1
m.
Plutarch replies ironically. linking Socrates' presumed boasting to the
latter's profession that he does not as yet know who he is and that he is still
learning and searching for the truth:
Cf. 1955, p. llt
91> !-IERSHIJELL 1988, p. 370-371.
97
Cf. Son posse IOS6E.
Cic. De 1wt. cl cor. 1,93; 2,74; Diog. Laert. 10,7-8. See also 1974. p. 10: ZACHER 1982,
p. 45-46.
w Cf. 1118C: f.v oi:; M. ;wfubij btcrrd.(i r.al. q;).m.JQtsEtcov
11)1 Transl. EINARSON - DE LACY, slightly modified = lll7D: bu'tEfjl;lVl]ZfV' "ttl.l.tt '{ClQ
f.:tEn']bn;ow; AO'(Ol', 0) LC;lXQaLE; xal. ELEQCl flEv btd.E:to\! LOt; E\'l\!"(f.ClVOt'Ol\'
i!uga 6' bgmn;." Compare Cleanthes's reproach to Arcesilaus: ci.D.a fti:v U:nv, i!uga (li:
;rmE\v (Diog. Laert. 7,171 = SVF I, 605). Inconsistency between one's views and one's conduct
is probably the most favoured form of accusation in Greek philosophical polemics. Cf.
Numenius frg. 26,96-98 DES PLACES. As to Plut. De Sto. rep. 1033AB. however see BOYS-
STONES 1997, p. 47-48.
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 103
How could Socrates' conversations be anything but charlatanism
when he said that he knew nothing himself but was always learning and
searching for the truth.
10
1
Several times in the same treatise Plutarch refers with wry irony to Socrates'
alleged u/.etsOVEiCt
102
, often linking it to the reproach of sophistry (1118D:
;rCtQC( L(r)%QC'nov;. OO<flOTOD %((L a/.atovo; av6g6;)
103
Finally he hurls back
the insult against his opponents: the real sophists and braggers are those who
display such shameless arrogance against men of high esteem:
The sophists and charlatans (oO<flOTat %Cll arc those who in their
disputes with eminent mo.:n write with such shameless arrogance (aoEI.ywc; x.ai.
U:TfQl1<rawo;). ( 1124C)
\Ye will discern exactly the snmc pattern in Plutarch's first Quaestio
Platonica: it is Socrates continually subjects others to examination so as
to make them free of conceit, error and pretentiousness(n)cpou xai.rr/.avou
%eti c't/.usovti((;) and of being burdensome first to themselves and then also
to their companions (Tot, Bagri:; dvm rrgc'lnov ainoi:; dnt xai. toi:;
ot'voi:atv, 999E). His opponents were the sophists
10
s (cpogav
10
1l oocptotwv)
who filled young men with self-conceit (obiw.no;)
107
and sham-wisdom
and encouraged them to engage in useless and futile
(arrgc'r%Tot;) disputations. In order to cure them Socrates used his elenctic
discourse like a purgative medicine (Tov Ot
1
V EAEyxnxov f....6yov worrEg


EX(t)\' rrc'lQ!lCt%0V). At Adv. Col. 11198, referring to Phacdr.
230A, Plutarch describes the same cathartic effect: far from making life
iJr 1117[): :tt7>; '(ltQ o\z t'ti.cts<'>w; oi LCrJZ(lc'not; A<J"{Ol m'nou Etbl:vm t( ctaxovro;
uij.c'lJIU\'l'ltt\'rtV c'tri %Ill :;.ttniv 1:(> t'ti.ttilt;. These words arc not part of the quotation, as they
are taken to be by USENER p. 173. note at frg. 231 I. 21), but mark the beginning of
Plut::trch's reply: cf. 1955, p. 65: Id. in: POIILE:-.IZ- WESTMAN 1959, p. 237, note at
194.26-:!X.
w: Cf. ami Non posse IOS6E, where c'tl.u:;.ovEin; is probably to be understood
as a reference to Socrates (hut see also ZACHER 1982, p. 50-51). Cf. ADAM 1974. p. 10 note
29; DE LACY 1967, p. 16-17 note d.
103
One may compare Cicero's definition of the sophists (Acad. 11 72): "sic enim appclla-
bantur ei. qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur.'
1
().1 See also 1118D: 1121F and Non posse 1090A.
105
Also 1000D: bcryJtma ooq:w1:wv.
100
The metaphor actually is that of a (large) crop: cf. LSJ, p. 1950 s. v. qogu, B,3. Possibly it
is an allusion to Aeschincs In Ctes. 234: on b' ou YEfEVl]l:Cll <j)OQCt %a{}' lJJtu; QT]l:OQWV
:t'O\'l]QVJY apet %CltLOi.ftT]Ql7>V, fllcuzoi:'!lEV (at any rate this text does not figure in HELMBOLD
and O'NEIL's list of quotations. 1959, p. 1). See also Lucian Jupp. Trag. 19: ;roAA.ou;
tOtOtcot; c'tvarp:oro{}m lJftiv oocrtorci;.
107
Oll]}ICl is associated with l:tcro; (cf. supra: p. 98) and oyxo; at De aud. 39D, and with
and qi.t-agict, but opposed to Biov ci.T\!<j)OV xal. i.ytatvovra at 43B.
108
Also 10008 (za{}ugot;): 1000CD (1j,uzt); zct{}aQft6;). Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1,206;
2,188.
10-l
CHAPTER 3
impossible by his reflexions, Socrates "cleared it rather of the crack-brained
vapourings of folly and delusion- of the ponderous load of silly conceits and
noisy boasting" (n'1v 6' b. toO Btou xal tov tDq:ov
xnl tit; bwz{h:T; xal urrrgoyxot; %etTOl1lOELS xal
It is remarkable that the very judgment that Plato had passed on Socrates'
historical opponents, and that Plutarch passes on the detractors of Socrates
and of the Academics- drawing on Plato's texts such as Soph. 230BC and
Theaet. 210C- more or less matches some of Colotes' charges: both sides
accuse each other of the same vices and of a similarly unacceptable
behaviour: insincerity, sophistry, boasting, and arrogance.
When Colotcs addressed himself to the philosophers of his own time. he
apparently did not moderate his tone
11
)'}. albeit that he did not identify li,ing
opponents by name, in keeping with a convention of Hdlcnistic
philosophical polemics
110
Plutarch suggests that the reputation (l'Jl)t'>:;(() of
Arcesilaus must have annoyed Colotes mightily
111
, since the latter says that
although the Academic said nothing of his own, he gave the unlettered the
impression that he did '{UQ m'.Tov l:btov ).f.yov-rU. cp1mv v:rl'>i.lJ'I'LV
xnl ()l):;av

uvOg<.;mot; 1121 F)- as

if, Plutarch sarcastically adds, Colotes himself were so widely read and
cultured. Although Colotcs' allegation was dictated purely hy envy. we
should he thankful to him, says Plutarch with some distortion of the purport
of Colotes' words, for it confirms Plutarch's own claim that Arccsibus was
no innovator but remained faithful to the one and onlv Platonic tradition
( t122A: u;ri:g ouv wttov K(t)i-<;>nJ x.ui rwv1l 1iw
'A;.wl)qWt"Lxtw ).()'{OV ctV<I>{h:v i\xnv d; 'Agxwll.aov (t;ro<rutvovn)- which
is of course part of the argument for the "unity of the Acalkmy" thesis.
Arcesilaus was not fond of a reputation for novelty; on the contrary. certain
sophists" of his day accused him of roistering his ideas about suspension
1111 E.g. 1121 C: Th i':>it0ot1v w)TOi; [se. thl.! Epicurl.!ansJ zulit'{UVUZtElY (i.l.! . in thl.!ir attacks
on thl.! Cyrl.!nJics).
tilt 1120C (ovi'lt:vo; nOd; ovowt) . Cf. YA:'-:DER WAERDT 19X9. p. 231-232 not.: IS: p. 2(,0.
Ill 1121 EF: TOl' b' 'AQZEOl).uot TOY 'Emz01:'QflOV OL' flET(ll(l); EOlZ[V l] oo:;(( ;{(((_l(l).t:rrlv Ev
Tot; tOTE zgovm; flCtb.nu TllJY rp).ooorfliJY U'(lt:1:1J0EvtO;.
llZ On thl.! puns on oo;u in this which hint at an allegation by Colot..:s that
Arcesilaus advocacy of suspension was itself dogmatic. see YAl'ODER WAERDT 19SIJ. p. 262.
tu According to COUISSIN ( 1929a. p. 256-257 note 1) the Stoics. But 8IG:"O:o-:E ( l 1936. p. 46
note 1). (l976b, p. 277 note e). and GLUCKER (1978. p. 36 note H5) argue that the
Thl.!odoreans and Bion are meant. Cf. Numenius frg. 25,75-82 (== Eus. l'racp. 1. 14.6.6): ol.
'(UQ miuoflCll TOV Kvtblou t.tOzhot; rrc'wzovto; Ev tu'l; btrgurropi::vw; D.tClTl,.Hpttl;
'Agzwi).aov q-6B<,<J niJv 8EOOlrJQEttrJY tE zui BiUJvo; TOe oorftOToi) hr:;tovnrJV tol;
rp).ooO<fOl'Ol i<.Ctl Ol.'OEY oxvo{y!(l)\' Cl:!:O :iTCt\'TO; V.E'(/.ElY, atTQ\' lYCt lllJ
rrgc'tntctw l!zlJ. fllJOi::v ftEY boyfta i:rn:tt:"lv qwvoftEVov. t;Jo:rrrg bi: to fti/.uv Tit; oq:riu;
:rrgo0uHw0m :rrgo f:aetaD TlJV r:rrozl.]V. See also IOPPOLO 1986, p. 41 not..: 59 (misrepre-
senting GLUCKER's view).

i:

:_i.
r
r
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 105
of assent and inapprehensibility on Socrates, Plato, Parmenides
11
\ and
Heraclitus. This, of course, he did, says Plutarch, to legitimate his views by
appealing to highly respected authorities
115
.
Colotes, we are told, also called the doctrine of suspension of assent an
"idk talc" (!tOOo;) and a "bait to fill the lecture hall with froward and flighty
youth"
116

The scraps of Colotes' anti-commentaries
117
on Plato's Lysis and on the
Ewhydcmus that have been preserved support the picture that we have
constructed from the evidence provided by Ad\ersus Colotem. Colotes
brands Socrates as a sophist unable or unwilling to speak straightforwardly
(:rgo; btU.vmav btui.EyEoOm)
11
\ and Plato, whom he treats as a <pttmxo;, is
said to be characterised by considerable arrogance ou I 1i);
Tl'ZOl,at];)
119
. The text also exhibits traces of an argument directed
against the Academics
I I. ELQlOVElet
Central to the Epicurean interpretation of Socrates, and crucial to the
Academic reply, is the concept of ELQ(J)Vda, which has always been charac-
terised by a degree of vagueness and ambiguity. Therefore I shall succinctly
discuss the semantics and pragmatics of this concept and its evolutions. As
t:lg<.r)VELH does not always- and never in its oldest occurrences- match our
tu For Colotl.!s' criticism of Parmenides. and Plutan.:h's reply hased on the epistl.!mology of
Timaeus: ISN..\RDI PARENTE l9SSa.
11
' 1121 F-1122A: (J b' 'AQzmi).uo; Tnooi'Tm' (cTct'ln mu zwvoTOfltn; nvu bl'>;uv <'crrcr(tv
zni t:ro:totrioO<ti <n> T<i>v ;ru).lwin. (;Jot' f-tzn).r"lv TO\!; n'nr oorpon't;. on :rr(.Hl<JTQiflnw
L(IJZ(lt'crn %((l rli.t'lTll)\'1 Zlll nuLJ!ll'YLblJ zui 'H(Htz).FlTI(l TCt :rrn_Jl Tl-]; bozft; i'ltl'(llClTlL Zrti n];
uzmui.lpji((; m\)i:v brOJlE\'ot;. c:liJ: OlO\' Ct\'(('(lU'(l]Y zai 1-lr!-lut(I)UlY m:TriJV d; (t\'O(lCl;
hoo;ot'; ;rmo{prvo;. The words T(t ;rrgi n-1; r:rrozft; bo(!lCLHt may be taken to show that for
Plutarch i':>oyprt did not necessarily have any "dogrnalic" and that an Academic
might coned..: having dogmma without falling into self-contradictions hy this very assertion.
Possibly Plutarch is here quoting Colotcs. who on the other hand may havl.! intended these
words to indicate an inconsistency in Arcesilaus position.
116
11248: Jtfl(lfLZiwv /.cqngtiJv zui :rrgo:tntiJv. :rrgo:trniJv being a pun on the rashness of
assent which Arcesilaus condemned. On this and other puns in Colotes' attacks. sec
EINARSON- DE LACY 1967, p. 176-178: p. 178: "The word lamuros ('froward') can mean
greedy'; it is also used of women who invite advances. Like attracts like. 'Flighty' or
'precipitate' makes a neat point. Arcesilatis suspended judgement, since assent would be
precipitate and umvorthy of a sage. The pupils may not be precipitate about assenting. but
they are about acting."
117
.The term is KLE\' E's (19S3. p. 239).
tts In Lys. 10c 1906, p. 165); In 11th. llb-l (CRONERT 1906. p. 170). For the
interpretation of these texts see CRONERT 1906. p. 172: CONCOLINO 1976, p. 64-65;
KLE\'E 1983. p. 234. Sl.!e also GIGA:\TE 1981, p. 67.
119
In Euth. 10c6; IOdR-10 (CRONERT 1906, p. 170). Compare Plut. Quaest. Plat. 1 999D.
t:o Cf. MANCINI 19?6. p. 66-67.
106 CHAPTER3
conception of irony, I shall apply inverted comma's to irony" and cognate
words for the cases in which the meaning may not coincide \vith modern
usage
121

A. "Socratic irony" in Plato?
When speaking of "Socratic irony" one is likely to have the dialogues of
Plato in mind. It is often tacitly assumed that Plato uses the term ELQ(t)Vftet to
designate his master's feigned ignorance. But the textual evidence points to
a more complex situation. Therefore one must ask oneself: to which
situations does Plato tend to apply the words dgcovda, Ei'gwv, dgu>VLY.<); and

Thrasymachus' mocking words in the first book of the Respuh!ica. ui:tq
'Y.ELVll t'J EL(J))'}uta dgcovda LC.rJY.QCttOU, indeed seem to refer to Socrates'
pretence of ignorance. Thrasymachus claims to have predicted Socrates
conduct: Socrates was expected to answer evasively affecting
But, as will appear even more clearly in the ensuing conversation. he really
is prepared to offer honest answers. Yet Thrasymachus \vould like to impress
the interlocutors with a discourse of his own, but acts as if he were keen to
hear Socrates' thoughts. What he really wants is to be begged to deliver his
own speech. As a matter of fact . Plato suggests that it is Thrasymachus. not
Socrates, who is the ELQ(J)V
123
In using it is Thrasymachus'
intention to intimate that Socrates simulates more ignorance or kss
intelligence than he actually possesses, not that he says he is ignorant hoping
that his words would he taken somehow to mean the opposite, which would
be more in accordance \Vith the modern meanings of irony. But Plato is not
using the term in this last- modern- sense. The verb dgcr>VEt'Ofl<H used
by Plato is to be taken to convey the meaning of "simulation", more partic-
ularly. of pretending to be more modest and ignorant , and less a threat than
121
For a concise bibliography on tht: semant ic evolution of EiQtr)VfLCL sec NARDELL! IIJS-L p.
252 note 2. lls etymology is uncertain (CHA7'-ITRA!NE 1968- 1980, p. 326; cf. Plato Crat. 3\lSD:
to yug dgnv / .. i:yELv i:otLv), although a recent suggestion by COTTER (1992) has soml.! plausi-
bil ity. The study of the etymology of the word has not contributed much as yet . howe\1-!r. to a
better understanding of the meaning of the concept in classical and later authors. One of the
reasons for this is, I believe, that etymologies have often been devised with a view to a specific
meaning that was assumed a priori.
122
Resp. I 337 A : xai. os axotoa; UVEil.i.J.Yf.CtOE tf wi).a OCLQCclVlOV zai. El:tfV" t7)
E(f'TI ai:trt 'zELVTJ Eit)frui:a dgwvda Iwzgcnot;, xai. taut' E'(O) lji'll] n zui. tottot;
rrgou}.qov, on ou U7l:OZQLVaO{)CJ.l ouz ElQWVEUOOlO Of: zui. ITUYT<l pct/).ov
rron'tom; i'] anozgtvoi:o, L ti; tL Of i:gwt(L
123
338A: xui 6 cpuvEgoc; El.mi:v tv
[znv arrozgtotv narzci.)..rtv rrgoommdto Of: Cfl).ovtxdv ngo; n) dvm tov <'<:tozQtVoft rvov.
TEJ.futwv Of: ouvqo)Ql!OEV [ .. . ]. Cf. 337D (Thrasym.) : TL ouv, rprt . O.v E'(W 0LS(I) hf.guv
arrOZQlOLV rraga rrci.oa; m um; mgi. OLXaLOoUVT]S. tOlJtWV; tl astai:; rru{}Eiv ;

ff:
'


.!
SOCRATES ACADHilCUS
107
one actually believes
124
On the other hand, Plato presumably does intend
Thrasymachus' \vords to be understood ironically, as he suggests that
dgwvEt,wl'Jm applies to Thrasymachus himself
125
The passage at hand
cannot be counted as an example of the familiar "Socratic irony", as there is
no indication that we here have the specific connotation of feigned ignorance
instead of the general notion of simulation (in this one case applied to
knowledge). But, what is more important, it is one of the participants in the
conversation that makes the assertion about an "ironical" attitude of
Socrates and it is not very likely that Plato can be held to share this person's
view.
Gorgias 489DE is a similar case: Socrates has asked Callicles to treat him
a hit more gently lest he run away from so severe a teacher, to which Callicles
replies saying "dgwvELllJ. w L(OY.QCI.tE." Socrates retorts that not he but
Callicles behaves as an . Ei'gwv. The same kind of game is being played:
Callicles contends that Socrates affects to be less significant than he is by
feigning ignorance and a need for teaching. whereas Socrates has just put
him in a tight spot.. Socrates restores the teacher-pupil relationship by
maintaining that he is eager to receive Callicles' instruction and continues to
ask questions. Socrates' reply is ironical- in the modern sense of the word,
that is

At Soplz. 268B the Stranger makes use of the word ELQWVEUEo{}m to refer
to the sophist who is afraid to be ignorant in the matters on which he
pretends to he a specialist, whilst hiding his actual ignorance
127
The sophistic
"irony" is thus the complete reversal of the Socratic: it is a case of insincerity
and simulation ; the sophist pretends, deliberately giving the false impression
of possessing a certain knowledge. Also at Ewhyd. 302B and Crat. 384A an
'' ironical'' attitude is attributed to others than Socrates. In both cases it
consists in the fact that one of the interlocutors deliberately remains silent
for a while : his hesitation is intended to emphasise the difficulty of the
subject, which ought to make his solution, when he finally comes out with it.
all the more impressive
The Apolog_v clearly shows ELQ(J)VELC! figuring in a context of reproach and
accusations : Socrates confesses to sometimes giving thought to the question
whether it would not be better to give up meddling in other people's
business. Explaining why it is impossible for him to renounce his activities is

Cf. BODER 1973. p. 19.

Cf. BODER 1973, p. 15-17.

Cf. BODER 1973, p. 15.

Cf. Soplz. 268A (tov dg(uvtzov !ll!llll:IJV) ; C (see also Leg. I 908E) . On the role of
Elgomzo; for !he dialectical definition of the sophist, see BLUCK 1975, p. 57; LASSEGUE 1991 ,
p. 253.

Cf. BODER 1973, p. 14.

108
CHAPTER 3
the hardest thing to do, he says, for it is God who demands him to exert his
philosophical activity. But when he says this, no one believes him: everyone
thinks he is being " ironica\"
129
As irreverence towards the gods is exactly
one of the main charges on which he stands trial, the Athenians arc not likely
to believe him when he asserts that his conduct is the consequence of his
obedience to God. The jurors will not accept this motivation. They will
regard it as a mere pretext, thinking that Socrates is trying to avoiJ his
responsibility by invoking a divine command. The Athenians will probably
have disqualified his whole defence as exemplifying his sustained
EtQu)VL10{)CJ.L
130

Alcibiades in his speech in the Symposium speaks the words that have
contributed most of all to Socrates' reputation of being an ironical' person
and to which, as we will later sec, Plutarch alludes in his first Quueslio
Platonica: bE }Wl rravt:U '!OV Btov TtQl); TOt.';
(\vHgt;>;cOU bwnJ.Ei: ("he spends his whole life playing his little game of
irony", S_vnzp. 216E). The purport of these worJs clearly appears fwrn the
context : Socrates seeks to convey an impression of himself that differs from
his real self. He affects admiration for physical beauty and claims ignorance.
hut the real Socrates has great wisdom anti lacks any interest in wor\Jiy
beauty and splendour (216DE) . Alcihiades is one of the very kw persons. or
so he claims, who have ever seen this real Socrates behind the jesting fa<;ade.
at a moment of revelation when Socrates, being for once in a serious mood.
" openeJ himself up" to him (nn:otbcmuv1:o; bi: m)TOO r.cti t'tvmzHEvTo;).
"Irony" thus indicates that Socrates puts up a he pretends to be
erotic and ignorant, hut in fact he is neither the one nor the other. Some
pages further on Alcibiades again broaches the subject of the irony'" he
claims to be typical of Socrates'-'
1
, rdating his attempt to seduce Socrates:
Alcibiades asks Socrates to make him a better person. but Socrates answers
that AlcibiaJes is asking a lot and that he might very well be mistaken in his
opinion of Socrates' capabilities: c't"!J:, uz();cu oE
).uv{h'tvo>, oubi:v (In ("suppose you're making a mistake. my friend. and I'm
not worth anything at all " , 219A). Nevertheless Alcibiadcs remains
convinced that Socrates is capable of making him better, and accordingly
qualifies his cautious answer as

The tone of this remark is again
Ap. 37E-38A: [mn; o\:v l'tv n; rl:tol" "mrwv bi:: zetil.JO'-'Ztctv l'tro>v. I<;>zgctTF:. ol.z o"lo;
T. EOlJ intiV ";;d3h;JV sf]v;" TOUTl O{] hnl ;rc't\'Tl!JV zcti.Ll:l;JTClTO\' ;'[fl(J(ll nvu; t'll(, l\' . f_(n'TF '{ClQ
);E'{(J! on {h:_<i> cbn{}dv TOUT' EOTlV xni. TOUT. CtOt'\'ClTOV 1']01.'J:lClV l'qnv. Ol' :ll' lOfOOE pOl
tn; ElQOJVH'Ofl\'(,!J'
l :l<l l'vtl;-o;EUR-VAN KASSEN 1969. p. 215 ; BODER 1973. p. ROLOFF 197.5. p. 9-10: DE
STRYCKER- SLINGS 1994, p. 197.
131
2180 : zcti. o\:w;; uY.otoct;, flcLht Eigo>VlZtu; zui. OffOOQCl f:nno0 TE zni dlU{}cnr.>; i.:;rv.
Cf. BODER 1973, p. 17-18.

-1
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 109
slightly reproachful: Socrates refuses to abandon his jesting tone and give a
serious answer to his query (the opposition ).
One may conclude that in Plato ''irony" does not mean: saying something
with the intent that the message is understood as conveying the opposite or
an otherwise different meaning. The standard situation designated by
tQ(J)VuEo-Dm appears to be that someone pretends to be different from
what he is, usually more naive or ignorant, and therefore less .dangerous.
Said of Socrates it invariably retains a (slightly) reproachful connotation.
The participants in the conversation are often left with the feeling of being
fooled and made fun ofl.13. In the context of Plato's dialogues the
affirmations of Socrates' "irony" become ironical (in the modern sense):
from the context it appears that those who claim that Socrates is being
"ironic" say so because they do not fully understand what Socrates stands
for. This is overlooked by D. ROLOFF ( 1975, p. 8-ll)
13
-t, who even thinks that
the Alcibiades of the S)imposium is an Zeuge" (p. 9) for
Socrates' "irony" . W. BODER (1973, p. 18) offers some arguments invali-
dating this view: Alcibiadcs, who is incapable of meeting Socratic standards
of conduct. at the cnJ of his speech unmistakably criticises and blames
Socrates (222AB). which should make it clear that his vie\v cannot be
identical \vith Plato'sD
5

What is usually meant by ''Socratic irony" Plato apparently does not
designate with this term un. This specific form of "irony" consists in
pretending to be igno'r<1nt oneself while behaving as if the interlocutor has
the required expert knowledge, in order to expose his actual ignorance
137
. It
shou\J further be noted that Xcnophon does not use ELQl)V or cognates for
his portrait of Socrates - as a matter of fact these words arc completely
missing from his works.
1
-'
3
Cf. Ul iCI\:--;ER 1941, p. 344: '"Manche Gespriichspartner snhen darin ein schadenfrohes
Spiel. Sokrall.:s stelle sich am Anfang nur unwissend. um anderen die Fchlerhaftigkeit. ihres
Denkens nnchzuweisen und sich Uber sie lustig zu machcn ...

Cf. also Ml:"iELIR-YAN KASSEN 1969, p. 223-225.

m Sec also GVTIIRIE (lll.b) 1971. p. 126: "In Plato it [se. eimncia] retnins its bad sense. in
the mouth either of a bitter opponent like Thrasymachus or of one pretending to be angry at
the way in which Socrates deceives everyone as to his rent chnracter (Aicibiadcs at Symp.
216e. 21Sd)" ; GOURI:"iAT 1986. p. J40-342.

Cf. 1975, p. 17 note 4.

m On how the name ' "irony"' came to be applied to this strategy, sec BOO ER 1973. p. 20-36:
and for a closer examination of Socrates' nnd Plato's strntegies, see BODER 1973, p. 159-167;
ROLOFF 1975. p. 11; 18-28 ; GRISWOLD 1986, p. 12-13. It should be noted, however, that
ROLOFF tacitly assumes that our notion of Socratic irony" is present under this very
designation in Plato's dialogues (likewise in LAPP 1992, p. 18), whereas BODER correctly
remarks thnt wherever in the dialogues "irony" is attributed to Socrates. the reliability or
sincerity of the speaker is not unquestionable. fLADERER 1996. p. 31 is insufficiently clear in
this respect.
110
CHAPTER 3
B. Irony and deception, a theoretical digression
The semantic range of dg(t)vda also came to encompass a use of the term
that is closer and even identical to our notion of irony, and that probablv
developed out of the rhetorical tradition. In its earliest attestations, on
other hand, and also in Plato, as we have seen, ElQ(t>VEia can be related to
various vorms of dissembling (feigning, pretending). Scholars have tried to
pin down - in a rather positivistic fashion - its "original meaning", which
some determined as ''Kleintuerei"
13
s, i.e. self-depreciation or mock-
modesty; its motives could be very divergent, honourable or mean: \\'.
BOCHNER (1941, p. 345) mentions "Hotlichkeit, Leistungsscheu, Eigennutz,
Spott- und Necklust''. But as dgwvEiet apparently was not restricted to cases
of :rgoa:roil]at; bri.-.:o EAattov
139
, it is at any rate more accurate to say only
that it is a kind of insincerity, not sharply delimited from various instances of
rrgoarrotl]OL; t.Jo_ In rhetoric, on the other hand, dissimulation came to be
exploited, and developed into a recognisable device, which led to its modern
meaning
1

11
It was defined as the trope consisting in the conveying of
meaning using language that normally expresses something else, very often
the opposite t.Jl_
Irony" appears to have a wide range of semantic values, which may seem
hard to reconcile or even to relate to one another; the meaning "to decein:",
e.g., contlicts with our notion of irony, for which it seems to be indispensable
that the interlocutors know that a certain attitude or conviction is hcing
simulated or dissimulated.
Recent linguistic studies of the modern notion of irony, however. looking
at the phenomenon from the point of view of linguistic pragmatics (P.
GRICE's
1
-l-' ''logic of conversation"), offer a better theoretical framework
than the traditional, purely semantic approach, which has not lead to any
satisfactory theory of irony. Some common misconceptions and ovcrsimpli-
fications have been discarded. many confusions have been clarified. e.g. the
intuition that irony necessarily involves oppositeness between conven-
tionally determined meaning and intended meaning (this is only charac-
teristic of one type of irony). What is more, it even becomes possible, I think.
to develop a comprehensive description for the various uses of Greek
DX 19-H, p. 340; BODER 1973. p. 12.
1
"
1
See e.g. Plato Soph. 2688.

BERGso;-.; 1971 : GOURINAT 1986. p. 34-L .. Tel nous parait bicn ctre en dfet k sens
origind et precis de l'ironie grecque : dissimulation. feinte. faux semblant. quclle que soit la
nature de ce qui est dissimule ."


In this view the rhetorical application of the term is derived from its general use. Cf.
BERGS0:--1 1971. p. 419 (more accurate than 1941, p. 346).

Rlw. ad A/ex. 21 : dgwvEla 6' EOtl. I.E'(ttV n !lll :rgoo:tOlOl'!tEvov ).E'(ttV ij tot; EWt\'tLm;
OVO!lCWl tct :TQU'(!lata :TQOOU'{OQEl'ElV. Quint. 8.6,45; 9,2,44 ; LAUSBERG 1990, p. 446-447,
902: LAPP 1992, p. 21-33.
w Cf. GRICE 1989. See also BROWN 1980.
A

SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 111
ELQWVELC! and the meanings of its derivatives in modern languages. These
uses have in common that they have to do in some way with a kind of
"insincerity" (:rgoo:rob]at;). But whereas it is the point of deception that the
insincerity involved remains unnoticed as such, irony in the modern sense
and irony according to its ancient rhetorical definition are to be regarded as
the communication of this very insincerity. Relying on his knowledge of the
communication situation the interlocutor will understand that a certain
utterance cannot be intended to the conventionnally determined
propositional content or the attitude which conventionnally accompanies a
speech act of a certain type. He must then ask himself and decide for himself
which interpretation is asked for.
E. LAPP has pointed out irony's ambiguity, and explained its essential
double-edged and uncertain character. LAPP's model, which is based
partially on classical rhetoric, allows one to account for the misinterpreting
of irony (1992. p. 142-143; 169). In his terms, irony is the simulation of
insincerity, as opposed to the lie, which precisely simulates sincerity (p. 146).
This can be extended from assertive speech to other forms as promise,
demands, questions ("simulated dishonestness"), expression of gratitude,
greetings. congratulations ("simulated hypocrisy", p. 148). These types have
in common their being "second order simulation", i.e. the simulation of a
certain attitude towards an utterance. The difference from actual lying
(assertive). being dishonest (injunctive, the expression of one's will) or
hypocritical (expression of an emotion)
1
.w, is that the latter are all cases of
''Simulation als YorUiuschung", \vhcreas irony consists in "Simulation als
Scheinvollzug (p. 151 ), i.e. the ironist simulates a specific speech act
145

LAPP then discusses the close relation. and the distinctions, with other forms
of insincere or deceptive bchaviour
1
-l
6
It is not always easy to decide whether
an utterance is to be interpreted as ironic or not
147
Nor is the distinction with
For a definition of these terms see LAPP 1992. p. 136-139.
Cf. LAPP 1992. p. 154 (L.'s italic) : .. Wahrend der Ltigner vorgibt. zu glmtbcn, dal3 p, gibt
der ironischc Sprechcr vor. zu bdwupten, dal3 p. und hat dam it die sprachliche Handlung nicht
ernsthaf! (im Sinne des Scheinvollzugs) vollzogcn."
t.:<> LAPP 1992, p. 17; 140: 145 ( .. Ironic bczweckt gerade nicht die Tiiuschungsabsicht, untersc-
heidet sich insofern fundamental von der Uige, erfi.illt jedoch alle anderen Bcdingungen. die
fiir die Ltigc gelten: der Sprecher behauptct, dal3 p. obwohl er nicht glaubt, dal3 p.").
H: LAPP 1992. p. 147 (L.'s italic) : "Die Ironie ist also einc (bedingt) durchschaubar
vorgespiclte Liige. [ ... ]die lronie [ist] am ehesten erfolgreich, wenn sic evident gegen die von
den Gcsprachspartnern gcteilte Hintergrundinformation verst613t, wenn es offensichtlich ist,
die Aul3erung aufgrund des Kontextes unakzeptabel ist. Will man die betreffende
Aul3erung nicht als widerspriichlich, paradox oder unsinnig interpretieren, bleibt nur der
Ausweg. sie als simct!ierte Liige ( = Ironie) zu verstehen. DaB der Sprecher der Horer dabei im
wortlichen Sinne mehr oder l\'Cniger im Zweifel lal3t, ob es sich urn eine Liige handelt oder
nicht. reflektiert die Tatsache. dal3 lronie urn so subtiler ist, urn so mehr Interpretations-
aufwand sie erfordert. Das Risiko, als Liige interpretiert zu werden, ist also gr613er,je subtiler
die Ironie ist." ,,.
. .. .. .. . .J;;a
112
CHAPTER 3
mockery or scorn always clearl-ls. GRICE's logic of conversation prO\es
useful to explain how interlocutors decide in practical situations.
Starting from the logic of conversation it is possible to integrate the
different meanings of ELQ(J)Vtla into one description. It is a (chieOy linguistic)
behaviour of dissembling, of simulating a certain attitude towards an
utterance. The difference with the modern notion of irony is that the
additional condition is not always fulfilled. This condition entails that the
speaker must make sure that the hearer has enough contextual knowledge to
figure out that the speaker's attitude differs from the attitude conventionallv
connected with a specific speech act. The Greek dgu)vEiet maintains
ambiguity between irony and deception. It should, however, be noted that
our modern notion of irony too allows for those cases in which the speaker
seeks to differentiate between, for example, a privileged audience and those
directly addressed or concerned, when only the former are supposed to
notice the irony and to understand the speaker's real intent l-l<J. One may
conclude that the Greek ELQ(l)Vda, which is invariably a form of JTQOG=toiqm;
in speech or action, has a larger meaning than the modern.
Most studies of irony still start from an idealised model of communication
as the exchange of information between only two sides
150
If one takes into
account the complexity of most communication situations, the border
between deception and irony becomes vaguer, and it becomes clearer how
one term, cLQlt)VELa, may encompass both. To differentiate between the two
forms of insincerity by the transparency criterion may he a theoretically
sound distinction, but it is one that takes too little account of the
compkxeties of actual situations. Transparent to what degree," one must
ask; "hut a hove all: transparent to whom?" To the speaker. to her audience,
to a part of her audience, to her absent opponent, to her present opponent,
to an imagined audience, to future readers, etc.? I3cfore I bring to a finish
these theoretical reOections, I would like to add the reflection that irony in
the sense of second order simulation is not completely absent from the
portrait of Socrates in Plato's dialogues, for it is related. I think. to the
narratological subtlety of the composition of the dialogues: Socrates'
interlocutors arc mostly presented as engrossed by self-conceit. much too
full of themselves to notice the ironic quality of his behaviour, but those
more advanced in philosophy, including the readers of the dialogues (or so it
should be), ought to be able to understand that his attitude involves
simulation and that the author intends them to notice this
1
5t_
Cf. LAPP 1992. p. 12.

LAUSBERG ( 1990, p. 447-4-FJ, distinguish..:s bdw..:en two E1idm::.graden of ironia.
the political-tactical-diakctical and the rhetorical. This distinction may be compared to
LAPP's distinction between first and second order simulation.
1
5 K. BARBE's Irony in context (1995) is a major improvement in this matter.
SOCRATES ACADE1\11CUS 113
In order to evaluate ELQCuvEia as an aspect of the reception of Socrates in
the later tradition, one should also take into account Aristotle's definition of
EtgwvEiu in the Nicomachean Ethics, which has been extremely influential
for ancient reOection on this concept
152
Aristotle defines Etgwvda as the
counterpart of a/.ntovdn ("boasting"): in respect of truth, truthfulness is
the mean where virtue is situated, pretence in the form of exaggeration is
boastfulness, and in the form of understatement is Etgwvda ("self-
deprecation", "mock-modesty"). Both aA.atovda and ElQWVEia are forms of
pretending (rrgoorroil]m;)
15
\ and this explains the moral ambiguity of
ELQ(l)VELCL Noble though its motives may be
15
-l, it still includes insincerity in
some respect. The reason for the limitation to rrgoorrob1oL; l:rri. to Et.anov is
presumably that Aristotle had Socrates in mind
155

C. Socrates accused of tQ(rlvEia
Socrates figured prominently in Hellenistic polemics. As I have explained in
the introduction to this chapter, the general appreciation of his personality
was positive, as he was often presented as the incarnation of the
1
'
1
On!.! m;1y also comparl.! Quint. 9,2,45-46: "cum l.!tiam vita uniwrsa ironiam habl.!re
videatur. qualis est visa Socratis (nam itko dictus El(ll,JV, agens imperitum et admiratorc.:m
aliorum tamquam R<)LOFF 1975. p. 21-22 rl.!nects on tht.: kvels of oh\iousnl.!ss
of "ironv" in Plato. without hnwl.!ver dl.!arlv hdween thl.! "ironv" thl.! reader
discerns-in the dialogues. and !he ri0c'J\Ti(( ;{sa of in the dialogues.

Cf. Th..:ophrastus ddinition and portrait of the Ft(llllV (Char. 1 ): it)tiv dQoJvriu bo;ncv
U\' rl\'((1, (;); n::rr; t ).ujkiv. :T!_)Oll:TOLI!Ilt; C::ri <Tt' zrit_)OV JT!_)l't!;rwv xui l.ll'{(I)V ( 1.1 ). The
ensuing portrait is ;m attempt to combine the Aristotelian theory with thl.! ordinary usages of
rigc,vritt anJ the familiar 1.!\ampks of Ft!_loJvF;. The motive ofTheophrastus' Ft!_llllV is to avoid
trouble: cf. Bt :CI\:"'ER 1941. p. 34tJ: "Th!.!ophrasts Eiron will niemand schadt.:n. er will aber
auch niemaml ntitzl.!n und vor allem sich selbst vor St.:hadl.!n un'd hl.!wahren"
(confirmed by STEt:-; 1992, p. 61-62). SI.!!.! also 1971. p. Stein's n:jection of
the authenticit\' of the ddinition is ill-founded.
153
Cf. F..th. Nfc. 110Sa 19-23: ;rr0i !tiv oLv To l'ti.IJ11r; b 11i:v )troo; ul.l]ih']; n; xui i1 )tw6n];
(U_,,nnn i.qt'oOtl!. ,1 !)f. :rgon:ruitpll; l])ti:v bi TO prisov ttl.l!sovrict Xrtl 0 Ctt!Tl.]V ul.etsl;J\',
,1 bi:: bi TO fi .. UTTO\' riQ<!Vfilt X<ti fl!_l(l)\' <O [zu>V>. Cf. Eth. Ecul. 1121a2-l-25: 0 ;r),fl(J)
TW\' l':tUQZOVTll)\' :rgoo:rotOtl)lf\'0;. fl!_l(I)V oi: 6 O.uTTllland 1233h38-1234a2: 6 oi: c'ti.l]Oi]; r.eti
CL"Ti.ot:;. QV r.ui.Ot'Ol\' ettDbuoTOV, p(oo; TOll i'!_)(I)VO; %ltl 6 !lfV yug EJTl TCt XELQ(J)
zaO' ({t'TOL' 1j'ftbl'lprvo; )ll] uyvo(in ELQli!V, 6 b' EJTL TCt Br/..ti(l) 0 6' (;); i:zn, c'tl.l]Dt'];
[ ... ]. One may also compare Magn. Mor. 1186a25.
15
.: Cf. Eth. Nic. 1124h29-3l.
1
" Cf. BERGSO:-. 1971. p. 413:416. Aristotle's evaluation in the Rhetorica is less favourable:
th.: fli,)UJV provokt.:s anger: [ ... ) X((t Toi; ngb;
'-UTll<j !_lovqnr.uv yc'tg it rl0l11Vftl! ( 137%31 ). Ye\ "irony" is nobler than j)(l)po/.oziu (1419bi-i-
9): ron !)' ,, rtgoJvEiu Ti]; B(l)pol.oziu; O.nDrgtlinrgov 6 !lEV yug atTou EvExa :rotEi: To
'trl.oiov, 6 6 Bcllpol.6zo; higot'. See also Rh et. 1382b 18-20. One is not allowed to conclude
that Aristotle's vic.:ws on dgwvEict an; inconsistent. In different contexts he focuses on various
motives of "irony", that invariably is a form of ;rgoo;roil]at;. In the ethical works Socrates is
the paradigmatic Eigwv. in the Rhetorica he is not. Cf. BERGSON 1971, p. 412-413;
GOl' Rl:-.AT 1986. p. 347.
114
CHAPTER 3
philosophical life. This phenomenon has been examined for later Stoic
philosophy in K. DaRING's monograph Exemplum Socratis (1979). The
major exception to this general appreciation is formed by the Epicurean
school, which once again turns out to be /'enfant terrible of ancient
philosophy, as is clearly apparent from the evidence gathered and examined
by K.. KLEVE in his Scurra Auicus ( 1983).
For the Epicureans dgwvda, being closely linked with
became an important feature of their anti-Socratic polemic. This becomes
clear when we look at the evidence of Philodemus. He deals with EigwvEiet
in the final part of the tenth book of his De vitiis (ed. JENSEN 1911): this
section is partly inspired by, and partly transcribed from, a letter 0EQi. tou
by a certain Ariston (cf. 10,10-15 ), who
presumably is to be identified
156
with Ariston of Ceos. The ELQli>V is described
as one of the Untertypen des u;rEgqrravo;"t
57
In Philodemus'/Ariston's
text ''irony" is ddincd as one type of
l'Ol bi:. ELQlt)\' w; i:n:\. TO l[n:/.}doTOV (21,36-37).
The "ironist" is most often a kind of boaster.
This is followed by a vivid portrayal of the dg(J)v, for which Socrates clearly
serves as the model 15x. The Ei'Q(J)V does not openly state his opinion. but
''praises whom he wants to censure. at every possible moment disparages
and rebukes himself and the likes of him, giving a misleading representation
of his real intentions" 15'J. He exclaims: "What do I know, except for the fact
that I know nothing lW!" He never simply calls anyone hy his name. but
always says "beautiful Phaedrus", .. wise Lysias"
1
1i
1
,

Cf. JE:"SE:-l 1911. p. XVI; KN()GEL 1933, p. 40; 73-75; BUCHNER 19-H. p. 351 with not.: t;
TSEKOURAKIS p. 241: NAROELLI l9R-l. p. 531 with note 42: ERLER 19
1
)-l , p. RIETH
19311. p. 61X do.:s not excluJe the possibility that th.: Ariston mentioned by PhiloJ..:mus is not
Ariston Ccius, though he strongly affirms that this author is affiliated with th..: Ari-;totdians;
cf. OORE 1965, p. 36-37 note 37; KLEVE p. 245.
m Cf. Kr-;6GEL 1933, p. 25-26; 37. It should be notcJ that Plutarch too associates
-L:rE(ltJcrctviu with M.asovda: ;\(11-. Col. t 12-tC.
CL KLEVE 1983, p. 245: NARDELLI 198-l, p. 533-534 and 530 note 32. Sec also 10,23
(Socrates' {:rE(ltJrravia). The section on the r'lgo>v concludes with: r.cti. ti bE[i: t](t :ri.fill> ).rrnv;
I [u;t]av[w r](tQ t[U.] Iwr.ganr.U.I flVllflOVEt'fta[t]a [m!).]H[r]wv (th.: t.:xt breaks off: 23.35-
37). This leads KLEVE (p. 228) to conclude : "A voluminous corpus of critical
flVllflOVEt'ftm:a must have been produced throughout the history of the Garden." Cf. RILEY
1980, p. 61.

CL 22.3-7: wm:' f;IULVELV ov '\'EYE[l, ;mvouv b xai. '\.'E'(ElY EUIJ_t[6]v I tE r.ui to\:; d6;
[onv ovbt'j;tOtE zg6vov fl.E-1 ta rtUQEftffUOEW; wv Bovi .. r:rw. On the interpre-
tation of nagf:wramc;. cf. LSJ, 1336 s.v., Ill: "perversion of meaning. misrepresentation" (\\ith
reference to this very text).
160
22,20-22: "fy(;} yaQ I o't6a tl l1A[TJY yr] tOUtOU on [ou-] \OEV oioa."
lol Compare Anon./11 Arist. Artem rlzet. 190,3-5.
4
t::!
SOCRATES ACADD.11CUS 115


The author quotes the example of Socrates speaking about
Aspasia and Ischomachus (1. 33-35, an allusion to Xenophon Oec. 3,14 and
7,2-3). The dgwv continuously stresses his own ignorance and stupidity.
163
BDcH:-.:ER (1941, p. 352) rightfully remarks that Philodemus'/Ariston's
ELQWV takes after the Platonic Socrates to a large degree, but that he is a
"bosartige Karikatur", and further that this character is close to Plutarch's
portrait of the flatterer (xo).al;) in De adulatore et amico
1
M. At any rate, it
clearly appears that Eigwvda is used deprecatingly. Philodemus can be held
to follow Epicurus in this respect, who is said to have severely censured
Socratic dgwvELa (Cic. Brut. 292). In Philodemus' other works as well
Socrates is subject to criticism, the quarrel with the New Academics never
being far awaytlis.
It might seem strange that the Aristotelian Ariston considers dgwvda to
be a form of whereas Aristotle himself appears to have opposed
these two types of behaviour. But even Aristotle admits tli6 that
and dgwvcia can coincide, notahly when dgwvda is exaggerated, just as
when one shows off the simplicity of one's clothcs.
167
Therefore one should
not he surprised to . find the terms closely connected and even
interchangcabk- in the later
1
M tradition: they arc hoth used to charge
someone with the reproach of insincerity and hypocrisy
11
''J
Further evidence for the importance of the concept of dgwvda in the
Epicurean polemic with the new Academy can be derived from the treatise
De comempw
1711
by Polystratus. This pupil of Epicurus
171
strongly disap-
proves of those philosophers who arc "ironic" (16,28-29: dgwvEuovtm) in
22,27-32: %(1l llil \j'lJ.(iJ; t'woiHl I u)).it "<llutbQo:; 6 r.n).o;" I xui. "/\uoiu; 6 oo<ro:;"
xui Ql.lll<t-1 t' ('t[lth i!\oi.H nO[vw. ZQ[IJOtov,]l itbuv.itrrrHJ. yrvvuiov, c'tv[Ogri:-]1 ov. On the
relation between upcril1oi.ov and rl(lliJVFLU. sec Demetrius Phalereus De eluc. 291.
163
23.20-22: 1 [t]uzu otvitr.n:;. c'tH' urryfJ; 1 f.yw r.ut xut bl'oaioOt]to;'' and .
23.2R-32: "btllOU!fFltf flOl tU.; i::- I flCtc; Cl'((HlllPCttlCL; %cti. tc(; (t).- I [f.w;] uotazia; UIIEL;, Y.Cll I
[ltiJ] :tE(ltO(lCtt' Ul.Tf.llltovoi:v- I [tu"] .
IM Of course. for Plutarch Socrat..:s, exemplifying the JWQQl]otaott'];. is the opposite of a
flatterer. Cf. De ad. et till!. 6<JE; 70E; 71 F-72A.
165
In his anti-Academic treatis.: nrQi oixm'OJilCl:; Philod.:mus deploys the a:rgct!;iCt
argument against the Socrates of Xenophon's Oeconomiws. Cf. RILEY 1980, p. 62-64;
VASDER WAERDT 1989, p. 257 note 47.
IM Pace DORE 1965, p. 36-37 note 37.
167
Cf. Eth. Nic. 1127b27: r.ui. (se. t'] dgtrJVElCt) fvlOtE CfULVEtat, OLOV ti tWY
/\axt;)VO)V o{h't:; xai yctg t'l -l:rcgpol.it r.ui. lJ ),iuv f:)).nljt;
les But see already Aristophanes Nub. 445-451.
169
Cf. RILEY 1980. p. 61-62. Hence it is clear in d.:r allti:iglichen Verwendung des
\Vortes kein.: wesentliche Bedeutungscntwicklung anzunehmen ist und daB lediglich die
Verbindung dt.!r Eironeia mit der Personlichkeit des Sokrates Aristoteles dazu gebracht hat,
ein ziemlich sympathisches Bild des Eirons zu cntwerfen, ein Bild, das sich im praktischen
Lcb.:n nicht durchsetzen konnte" (BERGSO:"' 1971, p. 418).

Cf. GJGA:"'TE 1981, p. 102-106.

171
Cf. lSDELLI 1978, P- 22.
r m , Iwn rr - r ."'V'
116
CHAPTER 3
to please the people in their surroundings (16.28: EVEiW tt0v
rr/..qo[ov) 172 Without bothering about truthfulness or harmony with their
own emotions, they act against their own convictions (16,23-27: t[li;] I b'
[a).l))l?Ei.a; xnl. ti); rrgo[;] I -ra aurwv ;t(d)t.l ouwpwv[a; <pgov(t]isovu; I
rraga to boxoi)v auwt:;). This behaviour is regarded as being completely in
contradiction with truthful, coherent philosophy as practised by Epicurusl
7
3.
Epicurean rraQQl)OLCt is here with Academic dgo>vEtwDw L'-1.
More probably than not
175
, this attack is directed against the adherents of the
New Academy. Not only is "irony" associated with untruthfulness and insin-
cerity, it is also linked explicitly with the contradiction between words and
deeds. That the true aim of these philosophers' "ironic" is onlv to
please people (vEY.C1 ni)v ;tAl)Otov)
176
may remind one of Colotes' scathing
censure of Arcesilaus. alleging that the Academic merely wants to impress
unlettered people (A(I\o. Col. 1121 F, cf. supra: p. 104).
M.L. NARDELLI has drawn attention to a passage from Philodemus' De
li/Jerwre dicendi, where Philodemus apparently offers a more favourable
account of tlQ(1)VfLU in his recommendation of "provident admonition .. as a
form of m.LQQIJOLu. 177 \Vith a view to this goal, one may profit from using
dg<>VELU., says Philodemus. for it enables one to combine rebuke with praise.
This may trick some people into accepting the reprimand
17
s. The theoretical
framework of this fragment is clearly Aristotle' s account in the F.rlzica
NiccHnaclzea 17'1, where Aristotle, modelling his description on Socrates,
ddines the as a ;tnggqmwJn');. allowing him in the same
passage the use of ctQ<I)vdu in specific cases ( ll24h26-31 ). N ARDELLI points
17
" Cf. f) e ad. et t/111 . 57D: T<i> ' l'l>rnv ;-cn-roi; ri; Tll Omlu.tt_nv tot; n).lltltov i:to\.HJ tntmv.
17-1 Cf. 197S. p. l7S. also 1993. p. 16-l .

Cf. 1(1,29-17 .11 . with comml.!nlary ( 197S. p. 170). Alr.:ady Aristotk ddined
d<_HtJ\Tttt as an cxccption to the :t<t<J(lll<li<t norm: l:.tl!. Nic. ll2-lb29-3\.
m According to li'DELLI the (Pyrrhonian) sceptics. ami not the Acad..:mics. ''cr.: th.: Jir.:ct
opponents of Polyslratus (197S, p. 66-70). Yet h.: has to admit that h..: bcl icvc\ (p. 71) .. che
Polistrato. pur non opponcndosi sp..:cificamcntc ad Arcesilao. non pcrda di
punzccchiarc e11 passa11t anchL: il filosofo dell' AccadL:mia, cnn il quale aveva polcmizz:1t0 gia
il suo compagno Colotl.! e chc c, ugualmcnte, un esponl.!ntc di quc\lo scetticismo cosl
pcricoloso contra cui bisogna combattl.!re.' ' The very passage quot.:d abov.: can b.: held,
according to NARDELLI (198-l , p. 526-528) . to be such a text in which Polystratus dra\\S a bead
on the Academy. The verb ELQtt)VcL'W may be consider.:d "il trait d union tra Arc.:silao e
Socrate" (p. 528) .
l7h Something Pol ystratus is wont to accuse " the other philosophers" of: sec 7.2R-S.o : 21.2-5.
m Philod. De /ibert. die. frg. 26 r. 4-7 : OE ngo I r.eti. Ti]v btwr o- ! gav J]V
Ef.El Y.l]l'lqtovt- I r.i] voy0um;. NARDELLI 1984, p. 528 translates Ti]V btWf O!_l(t\' ip f:t.H
Y.IJOf!IOVLZil vouOETEOli; as "le diverse forme que puo assumere il solkcito ammonimento",
but I would interpret btarrogav here as meaning "excellence".
m Philod. De lihert. die. frg. 26,7-12 : I [xouoq]; btEL[z]<.i); b I [b]((zvotm];
O.nuvw; <E>LQlt)- I vEins;. ((C<L Oi] yU..Q I nv; i'[v]toL OEhu[t.6]!tEVOL I Tip: vod)-rwtv
ljbftt); avubf[zov-rCLL) .
IN Cf. supra : p. 113. Cf. NARDELLI 1984, p. 529.
t
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 117
out that Philodemus' use of ("to entice") shows that the
evaluation of ELQWVELC.L is not unequivocally positive, however. It remains a
form of arcani, but one that is admissible with a view to the XllbqtOVLY.ll
vol{)n)OL and its pedagogical merits. Thus dgwvda is not irreconcilable
with Epicurean ;tCtQQllOL((, provided that it is used appropriately.
The seemingly obvious opposition between Eigwvda and the Epicurean
ideal of mtQQlloia has been a determining influence on the latter school's
extremely negative evaluation of dgwvda. TiaQQllOLa is related to truth and
truthfulness and to consistency and harmony between words and deeds,
whereas dgwvd(( was usually held to imply the opposite. This opposition
may also be discerned in Aristotle, for in a sense he sees dgwvda as an
exception to the :t:CtQQlloia-norm; Polystratus sharply opposes both
concepts.
In his treatise De adularore et amico Plutarch devotes several chapters to
the concept of JICLQQllOLUsEODm
1
s
0
, which show that his interpretation of
Socrates not only includes mtQQllOLC.L, but that Socrates is even held to be
exemplary in this respect (cf. infra: p. 153). This certainly does not mean that
Plutarch 's conception of mtQQl)OLct would be incompatible with the
Epicurean one tsi . There even is a quite obvious litteral parallel: De ad. er am.
55B ( o:t:Oli b' ;t(thv i:motQO(pic; bEL'!at, /..<.)yc.p bt'lxnJ xai TI:C.LQQl)OLC,t
%t)6qwvtxij Y.t) . ) seems reminiscent of Philod. De lib. die.

With to thl.! quest ion of a possihk dependency of the Plutarchl.!an on the

Philodemean :tctQ<_llloiu GALLO asserts : [ . . . ] che si tralta di opere assai diverse
nctrimpostazione. ndla slrullura, nei contcnuli . e che le connessioni individuahili appa iono
estrinscchL: e forsc casuali .. (p. 12-l) : .. Le coincidenzc lessicali e terminologiche, quasi mai
riconducibili con sicurczza a precise coincidenzc conccttuali . si possono spicgare senza
bisogno di postularc un modcllo filodemeo da parte di Plutarco [ ... ], communi font i
peripatetichl.! .. (p. 12-l-125 ). In 1 S76 Hcylbut had posited that the source of De ad. et w11. must
have been Thcophrastus lost work n u.}i q-tNa; (p. 21'1-30 and also p. 13; 15; 19; 25; 33),
possibly via a .\!ittclqucllt' (p. 36). BROKATE 1913 (p. 7-11) assumes Thcophrastus (or an
intermediate Peripatetic source) as source of thl.! first part of the treatise, and a Peripatet ic
text as source for the n:st of the treatise as well. 1915, p. 563-565 suggests the
Peripatet ic Aristons nrQi roii Y.otyi{;nv ni; t'';Tr f!'l'r av{w; as source. The arguments
developed are not always convincing and certainly not cogent. Considering the comparable
question as to the relationship between Plutarch' s De coh. ira and Philodcmus' De ira,
1:->;DELLI is more circumspect. Though pointing out the undeniable similarities between both
works. !:->;DELL! concludes that the Qllellenfurscllllng has left an unsolved- and without new
finds unsolvable- problem (1988, p. 60; 64). Nonetheless both works clearly belong to the
same tradition. ISDELLI, however, is careful not to assert conclusions. A like circumspection
would be laudable as well for the question whether De ad. et am. and Philod. De lib. belong
to the same tradition. The similarities may be partly coincidential and may also be accounted
for by the fact that both works draw on Plato/s and Aristotle's views on nUQQl]Oiu, but it is /
equally possible that they directly_ or indirectly share a more recent source. '
181
Cf. GALLO 1988, p. 125: "[ . .".] non esistevano contrasti insanabili tra la linea Platone-
Aristotele-Teofrasto-Plutarco e qu7.lla di Epicuro e continuatori ."
CHAPTER 3
118
frg. 26,6-10 (Y..llbqtOVtKil voufiEtEOLc:;, CtQEOX.OUOll(_; btnr.<.iJ; bE
baY..VOUOllS aJWVtetc:; dgwvda;).
The pronouncedly negative evaluation of ELQWVEla has made it into bter
lexica and scholia, where ELQWV tends to be associated \Vith a).as<.;)\',
arwtEWV, agyoc:;, Uj[EQl)cpavoc;, {mox.gtni;,

The
Stoics too emphatically reject dQ<.llVELa: those who are decent and serious
ought to avoid this, and the related "sarcastic" behaviour as

In Cicero's works as well traces can be found of a polemic with regard to
Socratic ''irony". Cicero 's conception of ''irony" appears to be closer to
Aristotle's than to the Epicurean: the "ironist" is held to depreciate himself
in discussions and minimise his own capacities, exaggerating those of
others The reason for this is often a form of playful, jesting courtesy and
politeness or elegance is a type of behaviour that has become associated
with Socrates:
Among the Greeks, history tells us. Socrates was fascinating and witty. a genial
conversationalist ; he was what the Greeks call E'lg(l)v- in every conversation.
pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of
his companion (dlllccm et facewm fcstil'iqlle scmwnis atqw: in omni oratione
si11wlatorcm, (]liCIII ELlJWl'ct Graeci nominarwzt).
(De off l,lOS, transl. t-.tlLLER

Cicero expressly argues for a favourahk appreciation of Socrates' rloo>vEiet,
as it is courteous, elegant, civilised and suitable for the orator:
Upon the evidence of those who know these subjects better than I do. my
opinion is that Socrates far surpassed all others for accomplished wit in this
strain of irony or <issumcJ simp\i(ity (Socratem opinor inlwc ironia c/issillltllan-
I have copied this list from NARDELLI 19S4, p. 526. Sec also Timon Si/lui. 5!1 frg. 799:
Timon in ono.: anJ the same verse calls Socrates flCi'.tlJQ anJ EiQo>vetij;. Sec further Lucianus,
l'romethrus rs 1: Our.oi:v flQOflljOEU fl ELVUl rpj;: [ ... }d.() U:t:fQCHll\'0)\' toi:; ).tl'{Ot'; w;
bfp'}EY fl'flllf.UYOt'; ov-w; tOY OO<ft;)llllOV tliJV TltClVttJV bl<rlJillsfl; u\wi; . OQ<l !ll.l n;
EiQllJVElClV <ptj XUlfleY."tljQU OtOV 1:0V 'A l11Y.OV :t:QOOElVCll f:rtttYIIl
tK
3
Stab. 2,\0R,l2-15 = SVF Ill. 630: 1:0 b' EigoJvEuwOm <ruu}.wv dvui crumv. ot.6fvet '(UQ
i).n)OEQOV r.ui o:rotbai:ov ElQltlVEUEoOm. bi: Y.cti. 1:0 o hmv flQtJVft'EO{}Cll
fl1:. bmJt'QflOi! nvo:;.
Cf. Brullls 298: "nee in hoc lgo>vct me duxeris esse. quod cam orationcm mihi magistram
fuisse Jixerim." (cf. Brut us 2lJ6): Ep. ad Fa m. 4.4.1: "et ego ipse, quem tu per iocum (sic cnim
accipio) divitias orationis habere dicis. me non esse verborum admoJum inopcm agnosco
(Ei.Qt>VEt'EoOm enim non necesse est). sed tamen idem (nee hoc Eigo>VECO!lEYO;) facik cedo
tuorum scriptorum subtilitati et c\cgantiae.": Ep. ad Quirtt. fratr. 3,4.4: "simul et i\lud (sine
ulla mehercule ironia \oquor) : tibi istius generis in scribcndo priores part is tribuo quam mihi ...
Cf. Ep. ad Att. 16,11,2; Bruws 293; De off 1.108.
tso Cf. Brutus 299 (for Fannius on the "irony" of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus. Africanus
Minor: cf. De orat. 2, 270 and A cad. //15). The context of Brullls 292-299 is the following: the
preceding paragraphs have enumerated the Latin orators that Cicero regarded as
examples; Atticus replies that Cicero is too modest : he is "ironic" in referring to them as hts
masters. for he is far superior to them. Cicero disputes the "ironic" vein of the preceding
laudatio of orators.

.. i
I
-
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 119
tiaque /onge lepore er humanitate omnibus praesririsse). This is a choice variety
of humour and blended with austerity, and suited to public speaking as well as
to the conversation of gentlemen (genus est perelegans er cum gravifate sa/sum
cumque oratoriis dicrionibus tum urbanis sermonibus accomodatum).
(De orat. 2,270, transl. SUTIO:-.l- RACKHAM 19.+2)
It is Socrates' strategy to affect ignorance in discussions on wisdom, initially
confirming the others' conviction that they possess wisdom, in order to
destroy their pretensions the more easily:
I grant. he continued, that that irony, which they say was found in Socrates
(ironiam illam q11am in Socrate dicunt fuissc), and which he uses in the
dialogues of Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines. is a choice and clever way of
speaking (jaceram et elcgantem puto). It marks a man as free from conceit, and
at the same time witty, when discussing wisdom, to deny it to himself and to
attribute it playfully to those who make pretensions to it (est enim et minime
inepti lwminis et eiustlcm etiam faceti, cwn de sapienria disceptetur, hanc sibi
ipsum derrahere, eis tribuerc inlwlentem, qui eam sibi atfrogam). Thus Socrates
in the pages of Plato praises to the skies Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus,
Gorgias, and the rest: while representing himself as without knowledge of
anything and a mere ignoramus (se autem omnium rcmm insc:ium fingit et
rudem). This somehow fits his character, and I cannot agree with Epicurus who
censures it (tfecet hoc ncscio quo modo ilium, nee Epicuro, qui id reprehendit,
adsentior).
(Brutus 292, transl. HENDRICKSON, in: HENDRICKSON- HUBBEL 1939)
Cicl!ro. through his mouthpiece Atticus. explicitly challenges the Epicurean
censure of Socratic ''irony". Under the inOul!nce of the definition of ''irony"
in rhetoric, where its meaning had been confined, as it were, to "saying the
opposite of what one means", Socratic "irony" for Cicero now implies that
Socrates' ignorance is feigned. which means that Socrates actually possesses
knowledge.
At !\cad. 11 15 Cicero makes Lucullus present the Antiochean view of
Socrates' "irony". Lucullus challenges the New Academy's interpretation of
the philosophical past, and more precisely its attempts to establish
philosophical precedents for its attitudes and activities: it invokes the
authority of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides,
Xenophanes, Plato and Socrates, among others (14). According to Lucullus
this is to be regarded as a failed attempt by Arcesilaus who wants to overturn
the established philosophy, and looks for support in the works of philos-
ophers of the past who in his opinion doubted the possibility of perception
and knowledge
1
s
7
Assessing Arcesilaus' view, Lucullus claims that none of
187
Cf. A cad. If 15: "non ne cum iaiT) phi\osophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, turn
exortus est. ut in optima re publica Ti . Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui
philosophiam everterer; et in eorum auctoritate delitesceret qui negavissent
qutdquam sciri aut percipi posse?"Cf. LEVY 1993b, p. 146-147.
,_,..
120
CHAPTER 3
the authorities quoted by the scholarch denied the possibility of
for Plato left a perfectissima disciplina, which has been by the
Peripatctics as well as the Academics and indirectly also the Stoics ts.-;_ Also
Socrates cannot rightfully be considered a predecessor of Arcesilaus,
Lucullus asserts, for his profession of ignorance is .. ironic":
As for Socrates, he used to depreciate himself in discussion (ipse detrahens in
dispuwtionc) and to assign greater weight to those whom he wished to refute
(plus trihuebat is quos vohbat refellere); thus, as he said somdhing other than
what he thought (cum aliud diceret allfUC scwiret), he was fond of regularly
employing the practice of dissembling that the Greeks call irony (lihentcr wi
solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Gracci dgwvEiav vocant) [ ... ].
(Acad. /115, transl. RACKHAM 1933)
"Irony" for Lucullus and presumably Antiochus means that Socrates says
something other than he thinks (cum aliw/ tliceret atque scmiret) ts'-1; his
ignorance is mere pretence
1
'
10
Ciccro himself, in reply to this Antiochean
interpretation, will claim Socrates' profession of ignorance to be genuine,
and his self-depreciation to be a fundamental, lasting attitude (ironiam . . .
papetuam, ;\cad. 11 74) in stead of being a mask intended to hide his true
wisdom.
A text which has been ignored both in the studies on the sernantical
development of dgwvda ami in studies on the of Socrates is to he
found in Aspasius, the second-century commentator on Aristotle. Part of his
exposition of the Aristotelian on the relations between truthfulness,
and dg(l)vdu (In Eth. Nicom. 54J-lX) only makes sense. I
believe, when seen against the background of the old polemic against
Socrates
1
'
11
It is noteworthy that Aspasius marks as those
t\cacl. /115: [ ... ]quia disciplinam, et AcaJcmicos.
nominibus n.: a quihus Stoici ipsi magis quam scnkntiis
This text is crucial for our of Antiochus cf.
BAR:"'ES IW\9, p. (DI STEFA:SO 198-1 is rather superficial). Sec also n:r-.ion
at ;\cad. 115-IS (Antiochus position up by Varro).
1' '1 Sec also 1971.}, p. 9. This interpretation of Socrates is also to b..: founJ in
Quintilianus, where he deals with ironia as tropc and as figure. ln both cases "contraria ci
quod dicitur intcllcgcndum est" (9.2.4-1). Whereas the tropc consists of only a few words. the
figure presupposes a larger context (9.2.45--lo):" [ .. . ] brcvior est tgo;ro;. At in figura totius
voluntatis fictio est, apparcns magis quam conft:ssa. ut illic verba sint verbis vcris div..:rsa. hie
sensus scrmoni et voci et tota interim causae conformatio. cum etiam vita universa ironiam
habere vidcatur, qualis est visa Socratis (nam ideo dictus l'lgo>v. agcns impcritum et
admiratorcm aliorum tamquam sapicntium) [ .. . ]."Sec also Fronto Ad Caes. 3.16.
Cf. FLADERER 1996, p. 33: "[ .. . ] Antiochos. der ebcn diesc sokratische Aporctik als
ironische Maske vcrsteht, hinter dcr sich ein Socrates dogmaticm verbirgt"'. See also IOPPOLO
1995, p. 118.
13ECCHI 199-1. p. 537-1 emphasises the total absence in the commentary of references or
allusions to Epicureanism.
. :
SOCRATES ACADHIICUS 121
.. sophists" who claim to have mantic powers or to possess knowledge which
they in fact do not have IY::!. The commentator relates that dgwvda,
according to some, is not to be considered a vice, since Socrates is considered
an bozEt 6 not dvm zaz[a ll dgwvda n)v yag 2:wzgcntlv Ei:gwvcJ.
rfCIOL yEyovvm, In Arist. Etlz. Nicom. 54,18-19). Aspasius thinks it more
probable, however, that Socrates is not an Ei:gwv at all b oux. 1iv
Etgwv 6 2:wzgan1;, 54,19), since the only persons qualifying him thus, e.g.
.. fcnon and Thrasymachus, may be suspected of not really understanding
Socrates' intentions
1
Y
3
Aspasius' next remark is even more interesting:
Socrates' profession of ignorance is not motivated by an intent to be
untruthful, but by his true conviction, which he expresses in the Apology,
that human knowledge is insignificant when compared to the divine, and also
by his wish not to give offence and pass for


i.ti).' D.q, t;J; rotzrv, a{rov lllJbi:v Eibvm rragaBaHwv Ti]v U.vHgt,mivlJV
OOC{iav ;rgo; Ti]V TOU \}roD. wuw yctg xai EV nj TOll nA.anovo;
ELQl]TUl. row; bf. xai TO CfOQTLXOV q:.v).anowvo; X({l bax{);, ou btu ti]V rrgo;
Tt) lj'Etbo; cp).iav, f:rr' D.mTOV f.i.EyE mgi EUUTOl
1
, omg oux f.onv ELQtuVEl({.
(5-1.21-25)
But usi.!J to said. as it seems. that he knew nothing. comparing human
wisdom with that of God. This is also said in Plato's Apology. But as
well it was in order to avoid what is coarse and offensive, and not for love of
lying. that he spoke depreciatingly of himself- this is not irony.
Yet another possibility envisaged by Aspasius would be that one must
distinguish between two meanings of dgwvdn, a pejorative and a
meliorative one
1
'
1
5.
A late echo of the same controversy may be found in Themistius' twenty-
first oration. In Aristotelian fashion Themistius distinguishes between two
kinds of untruthfulness ('l'El'l'>o;) regarding oneself: dgt,Jvda and
t%. The former is tactful and polite and may sometimes he

In Arisr. Er h. Nicom. 5-1.11-1 J: :TQOTfQOV ni)v :rgoo:rotOL'flEV<tJV

it oorriuv (;JO:TEQ ol. OO<flOtUL :TQOOEJtOIOt'VtO iWL o/.(1); l:ti>V YOl.]HI)V totto z6vt<>V
TOOVO!l(t.

In A ri.H. Er h. Nicom. 54,19-25.

Compare Alii-. Col. 1116EF (quoted above, p. 86).

1
"' In Arisr. Erh. Nicom. 5-1.25-27 (i]Oto tQ6:tot ELQ(tJVEin;. 6 b:hjo(o; rrgoo:rErt:Oll]Y.OTO;
nvo; Y.Cti t<jJ ljJEtOn, 6 M. nvo; to Ert:uz{};
f:ti. tat; ).O"{Ot;) ; 124.16-19 (oi. o fLQ(IJvE; bi. to E).mtov ayovtE; tU flUtWV zugu:atEQOL
<fCtl\'0\'Htl" Ot'tE '{Ct() Y.EQOOt'; ottE oo:;T]; ZUQLV 'JftOOvtUL una <ffUYOvtE; to O'{Y.l]QOV. bto
Y.Cti. tCt arrobgu voo;u Urt:UQVOl'Vtm Y.Ul 'low; oi. Ota tOl'to Y.UL totoi)toV tOV l:QO:tOV
oi:r. ELOlV Ert:llt'O'(Ol, womg 6 :Lwr.gc(n];}. This again is in the line of the Aristo-
telian account. according to which "Socratic irony" is a form of politeness.
'"" 259A: Ot:t).ouv b totto r.ui lj yag v ti7J cravl.6tEQU xni. EAUH(tl ).f:ynv ni.>v
:tQOOOVHJ\' ui.t]OtvtiJ;. lJ fV ti> tE Y.Ui Of[l'I'Ol:EQU. xa).Ei:tm b/: 1:0 [lEV EvOEEOtfQOV
fiQl:.IVElCl, tO bi: rt:).ov .
-l
122
CHAPTER 3
opportune for philosophers. Socrates is of course the obvious example. With
a view to freeing sophists of their self-conceit and arrogance and exposing
their insignificance, Socrates is wont to affect ignorance
197
. The similarities
of this passage with Plutarch 's first Quaestio Platonica are striking. One is
tempted to conclude that Themistius' text draws on sources belonging to the
same context of controversy regarding the appreciation of Socrates.
D. Plutarch on "irony"
The Corpus Plwarchewn, on its own a thesaurus of Greek language. has
nearly all the uses of cl.goJVda we have encountered so far
19
x. As "saying
something using language that normally expresses something else (the
opposite)" had come to belong to the term's established meanings, dgwvdn
was a feature that had to be taken into account in the exegesis of Platonic
dialogues. Plutarch presumably reckoned with the possibility of ELQ(J)VELCt in
his exegetical praxis, as appears from fragment 199 (SANDOACH), a scholion
on Gorgias 4950, if indeed this fragment is to he ascribed to Plutarch of
Chacronea and not the Neoplatonic Plutarch of Athens:
How wise you arc! Said ironically hy Callicks, as Plutarch oorrt;rwn::
m) zcn:' dQ(IlVfl((V \.rro KnAA.tzt.EO dgqtm. o>c; Cfl]Ol m.ouwgzo;.)
(transl. SANDBACII)
At any rate it appears from the first Qua<!stio Platonica (999C) that Plutarch
-the Chaeronean- \vas familiar with the exegetical praxis that consisted in
pointing out the "ironical" quality of Socrates' or Plato's

which was
supposed to release the interpreter from the obligation to take them

Plutarch in some texts also connects "irony" with Socrates- but this does
not necessarily mean that he is referring to a type of "irony" that wou!J be
1'17 259[1: ti> pi:v oi1 i)J.d:TOv tou iWJl'l'ov tf: on xui. ai!tt).ov zui i:viorr o\_z
UXQlJOtuv t<i' <(t).ooo<f\'l' xui ()tu toi:to <a\m)> zui. LWZQUnJ; <t:v> toi:;
).O'{Ol;, o:totE (bfi:to btax(il1f'UL nva oo<rtatiJV tt'<fOV !lt::Otov zai. '{Epovta 1'CEQlOUO<fQOOt'VlJ;.
'{UQ aioOavovtm tij; i:attli)V oubrvrin;. OtaV U!ta0otf{?Ol bu:;r).E'(I,lll\'t((l to0
lllJCEV dbf:vm rtQOO:tOlOU!lEVOL'.
e.g. Dcm. 18,6, Fab. 11.1 (seH-deprcciation); Quaest. cum. 618E (opposition dge>vEia
- Arttn. 17,8; Afar. 43,3; Timol. 15.7; A g. et Cleom. 19.6; Alar. 2-l.5-6; Pomp. 30.6;
Dt! awl. 4-lD; ps.-Plut. Apoplzt. Lac. 236C (irony). Of special interest are those cases in which
the ambiguity of irony is exploited (cf. Pomp. 24,8) or where the interpretation of an utterance
probably does not match the speaker's intention (cf. A rat. 41,7). For a full account of riQt,JvEia
in Plutarch I refer to the paper I presented at the IVth International Congress of the Interna-
tional Plutarch Society, "Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch'' (Leuven, July 36. 1996).
to be published in the proceedings.
1'19 Cf. Anon. In Arist. Artem rhet. 190,3-5: [ ... ] zni. ).f:ynv EigwvEia; :n:U'.'ta tct;
(i.e. having denounced someone as a traitor) "o za).o; o\nooi, o After
this fictilious example the commentator casually remarks: ot AO'(Ol toC foQtiou, ov
rtUQElOCt'{El 6 rn.anJ>V ELQl!)V(UtlXOl dmv

.t: .. I
i
I
I
I
t
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 123
exclusively Socratic. Apart from the Quaestiones Platonicae, which I shall
discuss in the next chapter, Socrates is mentioned along with "irony" in
Quaesr. com. 2,1, which tackles the question which matters according to
Xenophon are suitable for an agreeable and entertaining table conversation.
In other words, this Quaestio is about refinement and etiquette (629EFf'
01
.
The starting point for the discussion regarding is the premiss that
it is extremely difficult to jest without hurting people (631 C-F), as mockery
is even more hurtful than downright

Jesting is said to be admissible
only in the case of someone of unimpeachable reputation being teased for
disabilities which do not exist so that actually the merit which does is


(in stating this Plutarch has unknowingly formulated one of
the conditions for the functioning of irony). The examples given by Plutarch
can each be considered cases of ironical behaviour. He mentions two
anecdotes involving
( 1) Socrates chalh:nges the very handsome Critobulus to a beauty-contest- as
if he seriously believed. to be a match for Critobulus when it came to physical
beauty. This challenge is interpreted by Plutarch as an example of amiable
teasing. not of taunting derision: ('no xai Kgtt6Bou).ov 6 L(l)zgc'nq;
n'.:rgoow:rotatov ovw rrgoza).ot,ftrvo; d; OU'fZQlOtv ELlftOQ<ftet; or'%

:u' A striking is ofkrcd hy lulianus (lmperator). resisting perfidious melhods of
Pla!o. In order to prove Plato showed respect of the Gods,
lulianus (Or. 7.24) quotes a passage from the 1'/tilchus (12C). But merely quoting is not
sufficient. for Plato has put these words into Socrates' mouth. Therefore lulianus continues:
t((L'Ht fV <!>t).l')[l<ll ).1-rcnn zui. toiW)tu hrga ;n't).tv l:v Tqtetllll' ,iU(J'[(l1flV yi.t{? a';wi: i{((l
Xtl!Qi; u;m()Ei;n,>; i.qopt;\'01; OOlt t:tt\l ttiJV {}uiJV <fUOlV oi ITOllJHtl . t(tlTU bi: ITCLQE01]i'.U fliJ
:tOTE oot :trq..>c't<rf.lJ :tQt><fWJtV,tiJU:tfQ OlfltLt tliJv rD.m<>Vli'.UJV rro)J.o'l;. t> 2t,li'.QC.mJ; l:igwv uJv
cr'0on TlJV ni.({TlJJVl%lJV t'mtll.t<JCH bo;uv. fxfl y(tg oux 6 <'tU.' 6 Tiwuo; tuCtu i.iyn
ijztOT(( t7n EiQWV. %Ult0l toi:n) yi:: ronv oi..z lliJ n't ).E'(OflEV(( CtAAU tOt;
)iro\'t<L;. zai to :t(lo; tiva; ot ).oyOL yiyvovtat. Cf. OORRIE 1987. p. 399.
;:1!1 brings the Quaestio to a conclusion referring to a Platonic dictum: being able to
jest without off<.:nding is the hallmark of the well-educated (63-tF: ol bf: tov XCHQOV Eibotr; xai.
qviitTTOvtr; attl]'l t<) niitttllVl on tOL' m:tmbEl-'flEVOU xa).ti>; EQ'{OV fOTl to
f!l!lfhi>; zni XfZUQlO!lEVw;). HUBERT's ( 1938. p. 56) and ( 1972, p. 75,
note 5 p. 178) surmise that is referring specifically to Plato Leg. 654B, is to be
doubted. The allusion in question is more of a general remark pertaining to Plato's "playful"
approach to philosophy. Sec TEODORSSON I 1989, p. 20-l. On the relation between XatQ6; and
:tUQQl]Ota, see V ALLOZZA 1991, p. 329.
:Ol 631 0: Ol'V tu oxti>!qtma baxvn.
:OJ 632A: Ou o.na. :rt{?Ulta flOl bozri ta h:tOLlvtU tot; ho;:ou; oxci>flflUta toi;
otot tiE bwfio).ij; 1'Jbov11v nvu xai. xagtv rrmE'lv.- 632B: 'tCt yctQ ou rrgooovta qau).a
liro\'tE; E!tcfnivm.ot tu ngooovta XQTJOta. bE'l ?:i xai. ngoorivai n
XQTJOTOV' db tO tODVUvtlOV EXEt tlJV U:tOVOl((V.
l().l An allusion to Xenophon Symp. 4,19. Cf. TEODORSSO'-: I 1989, p. 185: "Socrates' proposal
of a beauty contest judged by the guests. was thus an act of self-irony rather than amiability,
as Plut. puts it here. The case is thus not entirely adequate as an example." See also
1972, p. 69, note 3 p. 172. '.
.&i.
124 CHAPTER 3
(2) Alcibiades teases Socrates for his jealousy about Agathon : xai LWXQclTIJV
rrcihv axwj'[n:v d; riJv mQi 'A ya{}tr>vo; ( 6328 ; cf.
Plato Symp. 213q:ws .
Those who jokingly apply depreciating terms to a praiseworthv
accomplishment, give greater pleasure than they would with straightforward
praise. And likewise those censuring through words of praise (used
ironically) are more bitingly effective
206
Illustrations of this last type would
be calling a rascal an Aristides, a coward an Achilles, or Oedipus calling
Creon an old, faithful friend (6320). Thereupon Plutarch asserts that there
is a corresponding form of irony for praise that was put to use by Socrates
when he applied the terms "pandering" and "pimping" to Antistht!nes'
talent to make friends and bring together people by inciting good-will
( c.t.vtimgocpov ouv otr.E yf.vor; dvm dg(t)vlar; to rrEgi. tou; b:nivov; c!> r.ni.
L(J)%Qcln]; zgt]oaw, ToO 'A vnoDf.vou; to <ftAOrrOLov r.ai ouvuytr>'{OV
<'tv{}gc.;J:t:(I}V Elr;, El'VOlCtV WWt(lO:t:ElCJ.V ( XCLL OUVU'((J)'(LUV) iWl rr(lO<.t.'(Ctl'/ ElUV
ovo
1
taaa;. 632DEr
07

Provisionally kaving out the evidence of the first Quaestio Platonica. ont!
is led to conclude that Plutarch does not mention a form of dgc!}VFL<t that
would be specific for Socrates or for the Socratic brand of philosophy. But
he does, of course, speak favourably of Socrates' manner. His defence of
Socrates against the allegations of moreover. belong to the same
controversy. for the relation between Colotes' attack on Socrates and
Epicurus' criticism of Socrates' dgwvEtCJ. is tindeniahtc
2
n''. This will be borne
out by my interpretation of the first Quaestio Platonica in chapter four.
The appreciation of Socrates' personality and the value of his profession
of ignorance arc at stake in the polemics between Academics and
211

1
Plutarch is mist akt.:n: it is not Socratt.:s. hut who is bt.:ing j.:alou-;. Cf.
TEODORSSON I I YSlJ, p. IX5 : "Maybe thl! lapse is simply Jut.: to the ambition to vary tht.: styk
by prt.:st.:nt ing a (rrc!).tv) case with Socrates as the objt.:ct."
2
'"' 632D: "En toivtv oi n't X{.l'!OT<i. ni)v :t(lCt'(ftC'tT<>v toi; /.mbogot'ftivm; ovt'>!LWH pnct
rrwi'lti!; %H).o0VtE;, lt\' fftpr).ti>; 1TOl(iJOlV. ((IJtliJV flUHov HiJ\' t t.:t' n'ilriH;
bwvouvnuv. xui. '(UQ buxvoum fl(t/).ov Ol bt('t niJV El'(p'uw>V ovnbit;ovtE; . Cf. Quint. S.ll.55 ;
lsid. Orig. 2.21.41.
2117
Plutarch has in minJ Xenophon Symp. 4,61-64. As to Qwzest. com. 632D. I follow
TEODORSS0:--1 I I 989, p. 18R for the word order rtvo; dvm dg(l)vcia;.
211
x Pace WESTMAN 1955, p. 67. WESTMAN sticks to the stereotyped translation
"Nichtwissen", ignoring the associations with a).a(;ovEia and the significance of dgr:>vriu for
the Epicurean anti-Socratic polemic. Cf. DE LACY 1956. p. 436. DE LACY, however. dt.:vdops
a strange argumentation: rejecting WEsntAN's view that "by professing to doubt at tht.: same
time that he was using his sense-perceptions in the everyday business of life he was ....
he suggests as an alternative explanation that refers to the Socratic "irony". I think
it is misleading to oppose both explanations. for it is the very attitude exposed by WEST\t.-\:--:
that was commonly designated as ELQ(J)VEtCL. Presumably DE LACY makes the same mistake
hy assuming that ELQ{I)Vfla means "ignorance", whereas it may often be translatt.:d as
"insincerity".
....
SOCRATES ACADEMICUS 125
Epicureans, and among Academics, as is evidenced by the texts already
cited, and especially by the fragments of Philodemus, the philosophical
writings of Cicero. and Plutarch's polemical treatises. The Epicureans linked
ELQ(I)Vflet with ctl.asovda, and considered it one of his censurable character-
istics. It is clear that the Epicureans undertook a fully-fledged assault on
Socrates. Cicero relates the habit of the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon (2nd half
2nd century B.C.) of inventing scoffing nicknames for Socrates, his biggest
hit being scurra Atticus, ''the Attic buffoon"
209
. Philodemus' description of
the ELQ(I)V clearly fits in with Socrates' alleged scurrilitas
210
V ANDER
\V AERDT
211
has convincingly argued that Colotes was at the origin of the
explicitly polemical attitude against Socrates and was the first to develop a
systematic attack. The reason for this appears to have been that the
Academics claimed Socrates to be one of their most important predecessors.
Although Epicurus is known to have condemned Socratic "irony" and to
have shown little respect for Socrates
212
, Colotes may be held the first
Epicurean to have developed an extensive and thorough criticism of Plato's
master.
The defence of Socrates against anti-Academic attacks continued to be an
important issue in Middle Platonic times. This should be clear from my
analysis of Plutarch's Ad\'(!rsus Colotem, and will be borne out by the texts
discussed in the following chapters.
Of course the Epicurean polemic cannot be separated from the
controversy over Socrates during his own lifetime, which ultimately led to his
trial and condemnation. There have always been widely divergent interpre-
tations and appreciations of Socrates as a thinker, and also as a person
213
. In
Attic comedy Socrates was presented as a sophist
214
and a bragger
21
5; the
same tendency may be discerned in one of Acschines orations (In Tim. 173,
345 B.C.). Possibly these accusations already figured in the Athenian orator
Polycrates anti-Socratic pamphlet, which was a fictitious prosecutor' s
oration put into Anytus' mouth and written a few years after Socrates'
:c"' Cic .. De nat. dt:or. 1.93 : "Zeno [ .. . ] Socraten ipsum parentem philosophiae Latino verbo
utens scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat. " Cf. KLEVE 1983. p. 229.
2111
Cf. KLEVE 1983. p. 2-l5-246.
ell 1989. p. 233; 254 ; 257-258.
Cf. Cic. Brw. 292 ; Dt? 1rat. dwr. 1.93.
m Cf. DbRI:--:G 1979. p. 1-17.

Cf. GnHRIE (III.b) 1971. p. 39-57.

Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 102-104: TOUS ai,CL1;6va:;.l TOt'; (;);(QlWvta; . tou; UVU:it00l]T01.; J...tyw;.
I 6 zetzobetif!Cr)\' L(J)ZQUtl]; zui. XmQE<[U)V. Also Nub. 449; 1492 .
------ ....&
126
CHAPTER 3
death
2
1
6
Philodemus appears to be well aware that his portrait of Socrates as
an ElQWV and an could be traced back to Old Comedy
217
.
Furthermore there appears to have existed a biographical tradition, starting
with Aristoxenus, condemning Socrates for his allegedly licentious way of
life2
1
R. Therefore it was not exclusively Plato's dialogues that determined
later views on Socrates, but also the interpretations of Socrates bv
Aristophanes, Xenophon
219
and other Socratics
220
-
Zlo This has been inferred by DbRl"G (1979, p. 3) from Xcnophon ,\/cm. 1.2.\2. where
Socrates is charged with the reprehensible behaviour of his pupils Critias and Alcihiadcs. It is
commonly assumed that Xenophon here treats the accusations from Polycratcs' K(f1Ji'OQLC!
J:oJ%Qrirou; (cf. lsocr. 11.5, and Lihanius Apol. Socr., 136 sqq .. which is a reply to Po\ycrates.
See also GUTHRIE 1II.b 1971, p. 11). However. in this passage of Xenophon there is no direct
mention of the accusation of sophistry (Alcibiades is called a%gcnonn6; 'tf %Ui
uBgun:cnmo;) . The cited text from Aeschines (In Tim. 173) suggests a relation between
Socrates being called a sophist and the fact that Critias was his pupil.
2! 7 De vitiis 10,24-25; cf. KLEVE 1983, p. 245.
2'H Cf. R!LEY 1980, p. 55; Lo:--:G 198Sa, p. 155.
m Philodemus, in his anti-Academic treatise Drqi oi%ovopiu;. undertakes a systematic
refutation of Socrates' words in Xenophon's Oeconomicus. Cf. RlLEY 1980, p. 62-M;
V AND ER W AERDT 1989, p. 257 note 74.
no Cf. KLEVE 1983, p. 238.
CHAPTER 4
THE 1,:\;TERPL\ Y BETWEE!'; ACADEJ\JIC AND PLATONIC TIIEJ\IES
1:-.1 PLUT ARCH
In order to study the way in which Plutarch incorporated Academic themes
in his brand of Platonism, I have chosen the first Quaestio Platonica as a
central text, as it is probably Plutarch's most explicit attempt to combine
harmoniously Academic and Platonic themes. In this text, focused on
Tlzem:r. 150C7-8, Plutarch tries to come to terms with the Academic legacy
within a truly Platonic framework. The text presents a cluster of various
themes, all in some way related to the epistemological polemic of the New
Academy!: Socrates (the incarnation of philosophy), his so-called divine
sign. the Tlzeaererus _(whose philosophical "pregnancy" I am confident to
have made clear by now) ... apore\ics", the search for truth ('zetetics"). and
anamnesis. Were this quaestio an isolated attempt to come to terms with the
Academic legacy, then its significance would be quite limited. But, as it
appears, this succinct text is firmly anchored in Plutarch's a:uvre: its themes
are inextricably linked to other important works within the corpus and
cannot he properly understood in isolation from it. Accordingly. in the
follmving pages this quaestio \vill be used as a guide and an introduction to
the corpus, so that this chapter actually orrers a comprehensive treatment or
Plutarch's Academic Platonism.
I. SOCRATIC ELENCTICS: t\ DIVINE 1\IISSION'? (999C-F)
A. ot yuQ yr zu.i
Starting point of the Quaestio is the question as to the meaning of Socrates'
account of his "midwifery": why did he say in the Theaetetus that God
compelled him to act as midwife, but never allowed him to bring forth?
(999C: d bli;roTE 1ov L(l)zgan1v 6 DEo zf.n.,oEv hgotl,
ahov bf: yEvva.v cmEZO)AUOEV, (0 Ev 8Emnin..o Hynm;) It may now seem
1
POHLENZ (1913, col. 1541) already drew attention to this text. I am much indebted to
CHER:-;tss's extremely rich notes (1976a, p. 18-29)- my paraphrases of the text draw mostly
on his translation; literal translations are his. FROIDEFOND in his survey "Piutarque et le
Platonisme (ANRW) mentions only in passing the Quaestio (1987, p. 188), whereas R.M.
JO:-.:Es ignores it completely in his r_nonograph The Platonism of Plutarch (1916).
128
CHAPTER 4
surprising that Plutarch, having quoted Tlzeaet. 150C, first and foremost
focuses attention not on Socrates' maieutic art, but on the element "God" in
Socrates' assertion:
ou '{CtQ yE xal. llQOOEXQt\om: ' O.v H!J lOL' {)wC ovowm
(9<J9C) .
Certainly he would not have used the name of god in irony or jest.
By denying that Socrates uses the name of God in irony or jest , Plutarch
wants to make clear that Socrates does not use the name lightly, as a
manner of speaking", but that he really means that he considers his maieutics
a divine mi ssion, in the full sense of the word. At the same time Plutarch
stresses that Socrates' claim does not in any way imply a lack of reverence
towards the divine.
The choice of the words and is certainly not
coincidental. On a surface level this refers to Alcibiades' famous words in the
Symposium (216E4-5; cf. supra: p. 1 OS). hut Plutarch 's contemporary public
must also have associated both terms with sceptical tendencies in and oubide
of Platonism. I am confident to have made clear the context which made
Socrates' dQo>vEiet a controversial issue. When Plutarch. immcdiatdy after
the formulation of the question, emphatically disavows the interprctat iun of
Socrates' words as dgu>vdu, this is not a rejection of our notion of "Socratic
irony". What he is rejecting is a notion of ELQ(!Jvdu that would imply that
Socrates is simulating a certain attitude. which would release the interpreter
from the obligation of interprding his words litterally and even of taking his
words seriously: these words, when intl.!rprcted "ironically", might mean
that Socrati.!S does not really believe his philosophy to be a divine mission
2

Someone interpreting Socrates' words in this way. if his attitude is
favourable towards Socrates, might have regarded thl.!m as amiable jest ...
Antiochus probably interpreted some of Socrates' contentions in this vein.
But those wanting to injure Socrates' reputation could interpret his words as
pretentious and irreverent mockery, for the meaning of EtQ<'>vn:own may he
closely linked to that of or It was the Epicureans that
accused Socrates of this kind of arrogance and pretentiousness, as is seen in
Plutarch's anti-Epicurean treatises and from many other texts. Plutarch
rejects the ''ironical" interpretation of Socrates' words at The{l(:t . I SOC. hut
apart from that he appears to have accepted ''ironical" interpretation as an
admissible exegetical tooP.
But not only ELQ(uVE\JOWH, too must have rung a bell. Sextus
Empiricus, discussing the question of whether Plato was a dogmatic. an
aporetic, or both, and relating this controversy to the classification of
CL SCHUSTER 1917, p. 4-t
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 129
dialogues, examines the affirmation that Plato in some dialogues presented
an aporetic Socrates. Sextus establishes a contrast between the "playful"
mode of philosophy (nuisw) and "dogmatic seriousness" ( onouoasw )
4

Numenius (frg. 24,67-79 DES PLACES = Eusebius Praep. ev. 14,5,8-9),
indicating his intention to restore the true, "Pythagorean" Plato, opposes
5
the Socratic component, characterised by refinement, playfulness and
"irony'' (to xui nmyvuWov and dgwvda)
6
, to Pythagorean
seriousness. This passage is taken from Numenius' book On the Academics '
defection from Plato (nrQt nj; nvv 'AxaO'Jitat'xwv lrQDs n}.arwva
Otaaraarw;, frg. 24,4), in which he contends that the Academy had distorted
the true meaning of Plato's philosophy (cf. 24,69).
The anonymous commentary on the Tlzeaetetus offers another indication
that the notion of "play'' had become an acknowledged strategy in
philosophical discussions and that it was closely related to dgwvEiu. The
relevant passage is Anon: in Tlzeaet. 14,34-42, a discussion of Theaet. 145C.
In Plato' s text Theactetus learns that Theodorus has bestowed extraordinary
praise upon him; Theaetetus suggests that Theodorus may very well have
been joking (u)J.' OQUJli] ;wis(J)v >-Eyc:v), to which Socrates replies that he
will not allow Theaetetus to "wriggle himself out of what he has agreed on
the pretext that Theodorus was joking, ( u),A.cJ.. ('tvUOl
1
0U tc't
:rtaisovtu Hynv tovoc) . This is precisely the lemma in the
commentary (14,1R-22) . The commentator explains naisw as "not wanting
to show one's true self" [!ti]] I ot:]t- I

which
actually amounts to the "ironical" strategy of dissembling.
The closest parallel to the use of in the first Quaestio Platonica is
found, I think, in Plutarch's dialogue De E apud Delplw.\, where it is used in
an explicitly Academic context
7
Having related (387E) that the
Pythagorean Eustrophus extolled the merits of the "great and sovereign
pcmpad" (i .e. to cl:= E' =five), the narrator of the dialogue- i.e., as it were,
3
Which is not unraralklcd : sec :-..laximus Tyrius 1H.5,98-99 and 38,4,81 -HJ (xui Tni:w !LEV
OOl' Tll rltE ouv ElQOJVn\ pmu rltf i<UL ttVOQiO!lUTU brumi), o;ttu; CtV n:; UttliJV cb:obE;(l]tUl).
Maximus. for that matter. does not espouse an extremist sceptical interpretation of Socrates;
cf. 38,4: f::non'nu1v tt!t(t; n:avro:; pft>J.ov, ItiJxgutE; (I. 73).
Pyrrlz. llyp. 1,221 : TOY TI/.c'nwvu Ol'V oi !lEV bO'{!lUtlXOV q:' aoav dvm, ol of: U;tOQl]tlXOV,
oi Of: %UHl !IEV n Ct:to\.)l]tl%0V, xcm't of. n oowunx6v EV !lEv yug wi:; Yl'!lVClOTliWL; }.oym;.
v0u 6 IwxQ<tn]; doc'tynm ijtoL n:go; nva; f] ngo; oocponi;.
TE xut Ct:'tOQl]Tl%0\' q:umv rznv autov xugaxnjgu, OE, v{)u
a:tO<futvETm ijwL Otu L(I)%Qcnou; f1 Ttpuiou ij nvo; twv TmoutoJv.
5
Compare Plut. Quaest. col!\'. 719B; Procl. In Plat. Tim. 1,7,24-8,1 ; Augustine Contra Acad.
3,37.
6
One may also compare Numenius frg. 26,68-70 DES PLACES ; Cic. Bmtus 292.
7
Another interesting passage on play and philosophy is Quaest. eo m. 613B; 613F-614A. See
also 611 D. where the fact that a brief reference to epistemology is immediately followed by Et
6 Oi] OOi<llJ may or may not be due to pure coincidence.
130
CHAPTER 4
the "mature" Plutarch, the author at the time of the composition of the
treatise - comments that Eustrophus had not been jesting (-wi::Otet bE :rgo;
fi'Aqt.v ou rwtswv 6 Euatgocro;, 387F). He had at least like-
minded listener: the young Plutarch. It is indeed remarkable that author
immediately relates his observation on the absence of jest in Eustrophus'
words to the information that - at the dramatic date of the dialogue - his
younger self was not yet fully imbued with the Academic spirit (on the
institutional implications of this passage: cf. supra: p. 21-25) and was still
carried away in fervent enthusiasm To'l;
only gradually did he learn to temper his youthful enthusiasm
and pay due honour to the Delphic and maxim tttctv". In
the dialogue the young Plutarch consequently takes up Eustrophus' number
speculation and holds a long expose in Pythagorean fashion.
The young Plutarch seems to have been very serious about the
speculations he develops, but at the kvel author-reader an ironic interpre-
tation is asked for, I believe, as much of chapters 8-16 (387E-391 E) seems to
have been written tongue in check (as may e.g. appear from the brief
exchange between "Plutarch" and Eustrophus at 3<.Jl8C concerning Plato's
alleged embarassment at discovering that someone must have anticipated his
speculations on the number five). Things arc put into perspective by
Ammonius, Plutarch's master, who himself acknowledges the value of
mathematics for philosophy, but mildly reprimands the young men Plutarch
and Eustrophus by dryly pointing out that many would lend
themselves to similar exultant praise and enthusiastic The text
shows, I think, that the Academic fashion is characterised by a playful
approach to such matters as Eustrophus and the young Plutarch discuss.
Plutarch, on the other hand, through his authorial comment at 391E,
intimates that mathematics must not be dismissed entirely, as Ammonius is
said "to have plainly held that in mathematics is contained not least part
of philosophy". When Ammonius subsequently develops his own -
theological - explanation of the Delphic E, no play or irony appears to
interfere with his account. Speaking about the Delphic God. Being and the
One, his tone is definitely revercntial
9
Indeed, Ammonius' speech that
concludes the treatise is commonly supposed to be an expression of
Plutarch 's deepest metaphysical and theological views
1
0. It is all the more
0 6' 'A!l!lWVtO;. Ut 6ij r.at atto<; ou to crad,6tatOV EV !tafrtHlCtnzij <p).oooq-iu;
ijoOq u to"l; ).E'(O!lEVOt; xat dmv "ouz ustOv ngo<; tai:ta Hav azgtBliJ; ci.vnhtEl" -roi:; v0t;.
n).ijV on niJV UQlO[l<JJV EZUOtO<; oux oHra Bou).O!lEVOt; zai ;t:(tg;n."
Compare Quaest. conv. 740AB.
9 E.g. 392A (l'J[lEi:; 6 rtc'.ti.Lv U[tHBO!lEVOl tOV frEOV "EL" CfClllEV, oJ; Ctt.TjOf] zcti zai
!lOVTJV !lOV(,ll rtQOOl,JXOUOUV tijV tOU ELVat rtQOOU'(OQEUOlV a;ro6t66vu;): 393A (o{}EV oN)'
OOLOV onv E1tl tOU ovto<; I.EyEtv, OJ<; lj EOtm); 3930 (omov); 394C; D.
_,...:.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 131
remarkable, therefore, that these metaphysical speculations appear to be
inextricably linked to Academic themes. Not only does the speech contain a
rather extensive expose of a Heraclitean-styled flux theory (eh. 18; 392A-
392E)
11
- which seems to have been an integrant part of Academic
philosophy
12
and which for Ammonius inspires the conclusion that our
senses tell us nothing about being behind appearances
13
- but Ammonius
twice, at the beginning and at the very end of his speech (392A; 394C), links
the Delphic d, interpreted as "Thou art", a ritual form of address to God, to
that other Delphic maxim and New Academic dictum yvw{h oatTov. Both
are related as greeting and response: the God welcomes the visitor with
Know thyself", which may be regarded as a recommendation of Academic
reverential caution (Eul.aBELa), to which we, the faithful, reply with ''Thou
art", which expresses both our awe and the limitation of our human
knowledge in respect to the unspeakable transcendence of God
1
-1. The two
maxims arc each other's counterpart; they form an antithesis but are at the.
same time in acconJ 1s.
In an outstanding. lucid article H.G. INGENKAI\IP has characterised
Plutarch's reverential attitude toward the divine with the term
l:-\GENKA:-.IP explains how oqtv6n]s; is linked to sceptical themes ( 1985, p.
29; 3S). Truth concerning the gods is a matter of truthfulness; it is not
objective truth in a correspondence model, but rather a subjective attitude.
Lf[lVOn]; - awe, reverence, piety, or "sublimcncss" one might sayl7 -
10 S.:.: e.g. DECI!AR:'>IE 1904. p. 414: 478; DEL RE 1950, p. 35; FLACELIERE 1974b, p. 10-11;
WHIHAKEH 1%9; VALGIGLIO 19S9, p. 260; LILLA 1992, p. 14-15.
11
Cf. HERSIIIIELL 1977. p. 1S4-1S5.

Sec also AH:--;1:-.1 1SRS, p. 95-96: SEI'I' 1S93, p. 115-116.

1_\ Cf. SII{Jfil: p. 101.
u Cf. eh. 20 (:193A-D): 3930 (th.: sun is mcrdy Apollo's image). Sec also I3ADUT 1992, p.
201 : .. [ ... ) qu.:l p.:ut-l:tr.: [sic)lc scns de !'expose final d'Ammonios, si cc n'cst pas de n!soudrc
l'cnigmc d.: I'E'? N"est-cc pas justcmcnt de fournir au dialogue sa conclusion logiquc. en
expliquant que l'incapacilc de l'homme a comprcndre les chases divines vient de la distance
incommensurable qui scparc la nature humaine, en tant que soumise au changemcnt
pcrp<.!tucl du d.:vcnir, de la nature divine, scullc immuablement enracince dans I'Etre? Le
n!ritahlc suj.:t du dialogu.: serail alors d'opposer a la transcendance divine, symbolisee par
l'E, lcs limitcs de la connaissance humaine, symbolisecs par d'autres proclamations
delphiques, commc lcs maximes "connais-toi toi-mcme" et "ricn de trop."
15
Cf. 394C (the concluding sentence of Ammonius' speech and the treatise): MJ.c'.t yE t(iJ d
t6 "yvtiJOt OClUtov" EOlZf 1tl1); UVtlZELOfrCH xat tQ01tOV nva :rra/.tv ouv<i6ELV' 'tO !lEV yaQ
b_;i.tj;n zeti OfBaO!l<!J :tgo; tOV {)rov w; Ovta 6ta navto<; avamcpWVljtal, to 8
on t(iJ frvljt(iJ tfj; :tEQl atto <fUOElll; xai ao0VEtet;. Cf. infra: p. 185.
16
See esp. p. 38; 40-44: see also 1:--;GENKAMP 1976, p. 549. Compare DILLON 1986, p. 216.
17
Cf. Il'GEI'KA:<.IP 1985. p. 39-40: "Deve parlare delle cose divine, ma non come se fossero
falli. Se cio nonostante dcsidera sapere "la verita sugli dei", deve intendere con "verita'' una
cosa diversa da quclla dcgli ottimisti della teoria della conoscenza. [ .. . ) "Verita" dev'essere
per lui un valore che non si riferisce al rapporto tra stato di fatto e copia, ma solo alia copia;
''verita dev'essere un valore immariente del suo pensiero e del suo par! are di dio." See also
De def or. 420C; 426C.
132
CHAPTER 4
warrants the truthfulness of our views about God. Here the opening chapter
of De E receives its deeper meaning: God is said to generate himself
intellectual problems (ta:; J"CEQl "COY ).6yov a;wg(a:;) in order to stimulate our
search for truth, our q:n/.ooocpia (384EF; cf. supra: p. 78-80) Is. The
mysterious E is such a riddle; "Thou art" is its reverentiali
9
answer.
Following a suggestion made to my by H.G. INGENKAMP. I would like to add
that dialogue, as a philosophical mode (and accordingly as a literary genre) ,
provides the best context for man's search for truth.
In this vein we may even also assign a deeper meaning to Plutarch's
comment raDta () rrgo:; 1'nu:L; /..qrv ou 6 Euotgoq::o; (3R7F). For
had Eustrophus not declared: "we must offer to the God the first-fruits of
our beloved mathematics" (387E: t<l) i1Etll n]; crii.11;
Eustrophus and the young Plutarch genuinely contribute to
the overall design of the treatise
20
and to the general reverential attitude
towards God. Therefore Eustrophus' "offering" is not to be dismissed
oftlwnd by not taking it seriously.
Similarly in the first Quaestio Plato11ica Plutarch rejects an interpretation of
Socrates' reference to God in terms of mere rrCLts(l) and dguJVFL'Oft<n. Such
an "ironic" interpretation as Plutarch refers to is not unparalkled. We have
already examined Antiochus' assumption that Socrates' profession of
ignorance should be interpreted as being mere simulation, and we have also
seen that the anonymous commentator on the Thenctctus. when discussing
the interprdation of Theaet. !SOC. i.e. the very text Plutarch examines in his
first Quaestio Platollica, alludes to an "ironical" interpretation of Socrates
words. All of this seems to confirm that these and similar interpretations
\vere common practice to those attacking the New Academic view on
Socrates. This exegetical tool allowed them to play down the aporetical or
sceptical side of Socrates and to deny that his mode of practising philosophy,
consisting in problcmatising the common unqualified belief in one's own
knowledge. constituted a fundamental criticism of human cognition. The
authority that comes with a Socratic pedigree was at stake in the debate
between "aporetic", "ephectic", ''zetetic" philosophers and their opponents.
The claim to this authority was of the utmost importance for their self-
definition and self-determination as philosophers, which explains why so
often in these contexts it is stressed what it means for an Academic to be a
philosopher.
Compare BABUT 1992. p. 200.
19 Cf. De E 393A (omov) ; 39-lC (b:rrAiJ:;n wt rrgo<; tov 0E6v).
20 Cf. lNGESKAMP 1985, p. 43 with note 29; BABUT 1992, p. 198-201.

:.' l
l

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEC\IES IN PLUTARCH 133
At any rate, those wanting to label Socrates' attitude as "ironical" could
find support in Plato's dialogues (e.g. in Alcibiades' .or Thrasymachus'
words), not being hampered, probably, by our scholarly conscience, which
systematically looks for chronological and contextual shifts in meaning.
However, as I have pointed out, the semiotic changes of the EigwvEin
complex are to be sought rather on the pragmatic than on the semantic level.
Already Plato in the Apology?.I mentions those people who refuse to believe
Socrates when he proclaims that to renounce his philosophical activity would
mean disobedience towards God (Ap. 37E: t(0 iJE(ll lm:n\JEi:v tout' E:ottv);
they were convinced that Socrates was being "ironic". Much later, at the time
of the polemic concerning the Theaetetus' purport, a specific brand of
Platonists also invoked 'irony" in order to undermine the New Academic
interpretation of Socrates. But contrary to Socrates' calumniators, they did
not intend this to imply n;buke in any way.
B. Blasphcm)?
Plutarch immediately "associates the "ironical" interpretation of Theaet.
150C with many assertions of Socrates in the same dialogue that may be
regarded as arrogant and haughty zal. ooBugU., 999C). The
reader who is familiar with Epicurean polemic, will instantly establish the
link : ftcyct).at'ztu ("arrogance", "boasting") figured in the list of reproaches
against Socrates. The reproach of fLEya/..m_z[et (or coincides.
as it \Vere, with that of It was certainly not difficult for readers
who were ill-disposed towards Socrates and the school that laid claim to his
legacy to find abundant examples of his pretentiousness and even
blasphemy. As an example Plutarch cites Theaet. 151C5-03, a passage
belonging to the same so-called midwifery section:
For a grt:at many men, my excellent friend. have got into such a state of mind
towards me as practically to bite when I remove some silliness of theirs; and
they do not believe that I am doing this out of benevolence, for they are a long
way from knowing that no god is malevolent towards men and that neither do
I do any such deed of malevolence but that it is quite illicit for me to admit
falsehood and suppress
Socrates claims that he regularly deprives others of their silly talk
(/.t]gov), which often provokes a vehement reaction: they would virtually
bite (<J)ot' cnEzvci); 6U.zvELv). Then he likens his practice to a God's and thus

The similarity has been pointed out by CHERNISS ( 1976a, p. 19 note b).

Qcwest. Pial. 9990: .rroiJ.ot '{UQ bt"]. OutflUOlf. ng6; ottw war' CnExvw;
buxvnv, bnbc'tv ttVCt ).ijgov al-t<JJV xcti OUY. OlOVWL EUVOLQ. LOUlO J[OlElV,
:COQQl:J OVTE; tal! dbf:vm on oMEL buavot; cm'tgumot; oM' f.yw buavoig. tOLOUtoV
o{bi:v bgw, a/).u 'J'EtM; tE xat aAt]Oi:; arpaviaat {)f:fu;.
.liil!
134
CHAPTER 4
apparently also his own person to a God: "they do not believe that I am
doing this out of benevolence, for they are a long way from knowing that no
god is malevolent towards men and that neither do I any such deed out of
malevolence" (transl. CHERNISS) . Socrates calls it a divine decree (
prohibiting to admit falsehood and suppress truth.
As P\utarch points out, Socrates does not shun such language. I would like
to indicate three more examples from the Theactctus:
( l) 150DE: -rii; 6 {}6; tE xal yw a'lno; ('"delivery is God's
work and mine"). In affirming that 6 {}Eoc; is "eo-responsible" for his
maieutic practice, Socrates repeats his earlier words 6
{}Eo; clVCl'(Y.clSEl, '(EVVO.V b cliTEX<;>).UOEV ( 15QC: starting point of Quacst.
Plar. 1).
(2) At 151A2-5 Socrates tells us that his notorious ''divine sign" (which has
been assigned the purely negative role of non-opposition at Apol. 31 CD)
prevents him from accepting certain young men as his pupils, whereas it
does not interfere in the case of others (otav nahv D.OoHJt bft)!t rvm nj;
auvouoiac; x.al. bgti>Vt;, l:vi.m; to '{L'(\'O!l \'()v
arroX<I)J,t' El ouvEi:vm, i:vi.m; b l:(t, x.ul. m't).tv OL'tOl
bnbtboum) .
(3) 210C6-D 1: t11v b tnun1v t:yw tE x.al. 1'1 x. Oco0
11 to)v yuvmr.GlV, i:y<;> bi: ni>v v[o>v t x.al. ycvvui{l)v x.ai. (iom x.u).oi
("This midwife's art is a gift from heaven; my mother had it for women,
and I for young men of a generous spirit and for all in whom beauty
dwells", transl. CORNrORD 1935). This is the dialogue' s last sentence but
one. in which Socrates claims that his maieutic art is a gift from God.
It should cause no surprise that Socraks' fellow citizens were offended by
these and similar statements, which must have seemed irreverential and
blasphemous to them.
One can easily understand that all these contentions could rank as
impious. It would not be difficult to augment the list of similar Socratic
utterances from other dialogues. I shall add only one more passage. from the
Alcibiades Maiof23:
(4) Alcib. /1248-0. Alcibiades has asked to \vhat he should apply himself.
Socrates' answer implies that both he himself and Alcibiades must figure
out how they can improve themselves to the utmost. Between them
there is only one difference:
SOCR.: My guardian (ErtL1QOjtO) is better and wiser than your one, Pericks.
ALC.: Who is he, Socrates?
SOCR. : God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with
you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you
attain to eminence. (OE6, w 'Al..xtBtabt), oorrEQ ooL ovx Eta j1QO ti)obE ni;

ACADHIIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 135
t'HtEga; btni.Eztltivw X.Ul motEUWV J....f.yw on mcpavELa bl' oubEVO
a.nou oot otw f1 bL'
ALC. : You are jesting, Socrates. (rratsEL;, w :LwxgmE.)
SOCR.: Perhaps (low;); I am right, however, in saying that we need to take
pains- all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed.
(transl. LA\.IB 1927)
Socrates invokes the authority of his divine sign: in the past it had prevented
him from conversing with Alcibiades. Alcibiades' reaction is sceptical: "you
are jesting Socrates does not insist (tow:;) on his divine tutor, but
does emphasise that they are both in need of care.
There can be no doubt that the historical Socrates sincerely believed that his
mission was in accordance with God's intentions and that a ''divine sign"
interfered with his According to Euthyphro Socrates' claims
regarding the daimonion, among other things, had led to the charge of
impiety (Eurh_vphr. 38). This point has even more emphasis in Xenophon's
portrait of Socrates: "Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed
to he guided by "the daimonion" : it was out of this claim, I think, that the
charge of introducing strange deities arose" (M em. 1,1 ,2)2). On this
particular issue Xenophons account - stressing the similarities with
commonly accepted man tic practices and oracles- is much more apologetic
than Admitting that already many had written on Socrates' trial
and death and had focused on his alleged Xcnophon at the
outset of his Apologia Sncraris declares that he will show that Socrates'
Ev.:r sine.: DT.E. cast doubt on till: authenticity of this uialogu.: (cf.
YI:"K 19:W. p. H-9) there has been an on-going discussion. I mention only YINK 1939 (pro
authenticity. sec csp. p. 126-131) : DE STRYCKER 1942 (sec csp. p. 151 : 11/cih. l is the work of
on.: of Plato's pupils at the time of the redaction of the Leges; it may have been revised by
Plato. Likewise CL\RK 1955) ; GUNDERT 1954, p. 530 note 16 (contra); FRI EDLANDER Il
1957, p. 213-225 ; 317-320 (pro): 1961 (pro) ; KRAMER 1964, p. 136-138 (contra); Bos
11}70, p. X2-112: 116-117 (contra); SEGO:-.IDS I! 19f;6, p. X, note 2; LEDGER l9S9, p. 144 (a
cautious "pro" ). What matters more for my present purpose is that Lhc ancients had no doubts
about its authenticity. Polybius considered it one of Plato's works (cf. FRIEDLANDER 1945, p.
as did Cic.:ro (cf. VI:"K 1939, p. 7). The dialogue was part of the Middle Platonic
canon and was quite popular (cf. DbRRIE- BALTES 1993, p. 194-195), especially with the
"aporctic' Platonists. I would add. It was even recommended as the first dialogue in a reading
programme for the freshman Platonist. Cf. A! bin. Pro!. 148,36; 149,35 (and for Neoplatonism:
cf. Procl. In Alcib. 16.4-10: 11.3-4; 01ymp. In 11/cib. 114,4).
Cf. GuTHRIE (lli.b) 1971. p. 84:" [ ... ]that it was something that Socrates himself took
seriousl y, and that therefore his educational activities were for him a matter of a genuine
vocation."
25
Cf. M cm. 4,8,1 ; STRA USS 1972, p. 4.
16
Cf. Mem. 1.1 ,3-9; GUTHRIE (III.b) 1971, p. 84; STRAUSS 1972, p. 4; 6; 130; GUNDERT 1954,
p. 513: "Xenophons apologetischer Versuch, die dtimonische Stimme, als Weisung des
generell verstandenen "Daimonion" im Sinn der Gottheit i.iberhaupt, in das traditionelle
Orake\wesen einzuordnen". But see also Plato Apol. 40A: l'J yag Eiwfrui:a wu
<'>at!toviov.
136
CHAPTER4
was appropriate (Ap. 1-2). Concerning the pronouncement of
the oracle27, Xenophon's Socrates argues that it does not imply that he is
likened to a god, but merely that he surpasses his fellow human beings (Ap.
15: 6 'frE<fl oux. dxaoEV, U.vitg<.imwv 6 n:oiJ.(o n:gozgtvEv
UJt:EQCpEQELV).
Socrates' alleged was obviously also an issue in the
Hellenistic polemic. His words reported by Plato at Tlzeaet. 150C gave rise to
criticism, not only because of the method of maieutics as such, but especially
in view of his claims to a divine inspiration. This is illustrated by a passage
from the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetlls. At the lemma Tlzenet .
151CD (58,12-23), the very words that Plutarch quotes as being
xai. ao0agc1, the author first gives a short paraphrase:
oi:-1 [b) Oco; oubEi.s; I avOgw-1 :wu;, oub' f.yc.J) t.:to I bl<;[v)oia;
ol.bi:v I m[ bgw, una I tOCfE).(i) CtfpCtLQWV I CJ.UTWY 'I'El'bobo- I ;[ay

No god is malevolent towards men. and neither do I do any such thing out of
malevolence, but l help men by taking away from them false opinion.
Then he comments:
bg(ts; I T[lj A.t:yn mgi. ECJ.U- I T<;ll\ ov CfCJ.I.JLV dow- I VEUt:oOm: on Eli'it- I \;n
i:uutC:>V OE<Il I to cuvor1v Tni; I xai.. to I toutov ovz t']nov, I
{)n ()l'tE 'I'Ei)bo; ovy-1 X,IJl[Q]rL oi:m: c'tA.qHi:; I (5R.39-4<J).
Do you set.: what he says about himself, he who is said to be "ironic"'? He
himself to a god in his benevolence towards men. and no less than this in thatc'
he neither admits falsehood nor suppresses truth.
For the commentator there is no doubt that Socrates likens himsdf to a
god !:auTov {}E<J))2'
1
, and Socrates is held to do so on two accounts:
(I) because he is kindly disposed towards men and (2) does not admit
untruth. This contention seems to be incompatible with his usual ELQl>vr[n3l
1
n Ap. (tVEU.EV 6 'Arr6D.(l)V ltl]bEVa dvm av\}g(;);'[U)V f!tOU lllltE V.n:{)fQtU>1fQOV llllTE
bLZCLlOTF(lOV lll]l:E OOHfQOVEOTEQOV.
zH Another possible interpretation is that the second on corresponds to the first: (he says)
that he likens himself to a god ... and also that he neither admits falsehood etc: Cf.
BASTIANI:"I - SEDLEY 1995, p. 425. Strictly speaking. in that case it is only on account of his
bl.!nevolcnce that Socrates is said to liken himself to a god.
Cf. BASTIANINI- SEDLEY 1995, p. 543-544: "il passo veniva inteso come se Socratl! dicl.!sse:
'Nessun dio a malevolo; dwzque (i.e. per imitare dio) neppure io sono malcvolo.''
JO The relative clause ov q;aolv dgwvn:EoOm has an adversative value. as appears from the
context: og(t; tl I.E'(fl mgi. f:auwu emphasises the unusual of his contention. given his
habitual modesty.

-'H .
:.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 137
-here dgwvE{'Eofrm is to be interpreted as an attitude of modesty
3
'. There
is no criticism implied in the commentator's treatment of this passage.
In that respect things are more complex in Proclus' commentary on Alcib.
I l05C6-D5. Proclus gives some consideration to the question whether
Socrates' pedagogical promises reveal overconfidence and even arrogance
or not:
But let us once more enquire into the former question, whether Socrates is not
engaging in a rash venture ({)gaou by promising that he is able to
provide such benefits (rmauw xmmayyrU .. 6pEVO buvaoOm nagaoxti:v);
for this promise is not in keeping with Socrates' character (mum yctg ou xma
To Lwxganzov 1){)o; To bc'.tnrl.
1
tct).
(155,17-20 SEGO:-.:os Il 1986, transl. O'NEILL 1971, slightly modified)
Proclus remarks that Socrates' rash promise does not fit his usual manner-
his modesty. one may presume - but he does not reprove him on that
account:
To this in turn we must reply that big talk is appropriate for the philosopher
wht.:n it is in season (on T<,t> cpi.ooocrcp rrgoOJ'Jxn TO omv lJ
-rot'tou xwoos;). ( 155.20-22)
.. Big talking" is permissible for the philosopher, provided that he picks the
opportune moment. This condition of respecting the xmg6; is identical to
Xcnophon's justification of Socrates' As an example of
admissible use of Proclus cites the very Theactetus text
( 151 CD) discussed by Plutarch and Anon. in The act. It is appropriate for the
whose duty it is to distinguish fertile ideas from mere images and
impostures. to use in the contacts with his pupils, in order to
obtain good Plato's Apology provides Proclus' second example
(notably 30CD). After these examples from other dialogues Proclus returns
to the text of Alcib. I and praises Socrates' circumspection and prudence in
this matter.
The passage which gave rise to this elaboration. Alcib. /105C6-D5, is also
treated in the commentary of Olympiodorus. The latter, clearly drawing on
Proclus' commentary33 (either directly or indirectly3
4
), asks himself how
Jl Cf. H. !983b, p. !66-167 note 56.

Procl . In Alcib. /155,25-28 (SEGO!'<DS II 1986): btQEltE '(UQ. tcp ILatEunxcJ>, tcJ> XQLtU twv
TE '(OVifLUJV I.O'fUJV xai tWV avquaiwv. 1tQO; tOV fla!El.!OflEVOV Oll"[Qc; OlQOrto; nj; btamjoEtu;,
tvu n xni bguolJ bta nj; 11au:in;.
33
CHER:-;Iss ( 1976a, p. 20 not I.! b), ignoring the Proclus passage, only mentions as parallels to
Plutarch's text the anonymous commentary on the Tlzeaetellls and the two Olympiodorus
texts.
>l Cf. SEGO:>:DS I 1985, p. LXXIV-LXXV. Olympiodorus' commentary is to be dated approx-
imately to 560 (SEGO:-;DS I 1985>p. LXX; WESTERINK - TROUILLARD - SEGONDS 1990, p.
XVII-XXI), Proclus between 440.and 480 (SEGONDS I 1985. p. XLII).
....
138
CHAPTER 4
Socrates' apparent haughtiness can be reconciled with his ElQCtJVElCJ. (here
understood as modesty)3
5
and equally justifies Socrates' behaviour bv
referring to the x.mg6; (53,9: o16Ev ouv 6 L(t)Y.Qci:rq; f.v
The first example Olympiodorus quotes is once again
Theaet. 151CD31i. That Socrates here appears to assume the role of God (H!J
{}0"J aut6v) is to be explained in relation to his maieutic task (In
Plat. Alcib. 52,21-53,17)3
7
Further in his commentary Olympiodorus returns
once again to the Tlzeaetetl/s passage, notably at lemma 124AS:
TE x.ai T0"J v to which 01ympiodorus remarks ( 173,22-174.1):
"he ranks himself with the god; he often does so" ( ouvn!nn !:uttov n .. o
{}E0">,3s ;ro).f..azoD 6 toOto rrou:i:). Subsequently the author cites, among
other texts, Tlzeaet. 151 D.
That the Tlzeaetetus was held to be a serious testimony to the di\ine
involvement with Socrates' philosophical practice appears also from one of
Epictetus' Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae (Epictetus' discourses
published by his pupil), notably Diss. 3,21, entitled rlgo.; tou; Etzt)).ttJ; bi
TO oocpon:unv ("To those who enter light-heartedly upon the
profession of lecturing"). It is a plea for true philosophical teaching as
opposed to the shallowness and uncaringness of sophistry. True
C?lymp. In 1'/aronis 52,21-SYi :V Kfti t'>
FV't!t\'l'lU flF(U).Ot.)(IIJ!lOVn, 0 :t<tVlU/.OlJ flt.)UIV, l'Tf(ll OL' fl(l'!tCLl, 'U\'tlJ br <Jlll 11 flt <J{ltta
Ft(lttJvriu. o i.i:toJv c'tri fll}l'llv dbt:vw. fll]l'lcvu bt.'lt'taznv. btil Zlli tl ilr\1:: b [v
L\rl.cro'l; ft[ I} .:tl'(ll ftlHOV on "lLVOQtiJV u:t<lVlUJV lJOtfl;Jtuto;'' on oc :ti.l]','(j p(nov
tnltlt n.r'{EV %((l 1fl!lVlj, uHit s<JtlZt7J; xrti SlJtlJtfO\' Ot'\' :ttiJ ; tOlOl'Hl; C.J\'
i:VlnOOu tmnOw <rgovd. ttovo; f.:t<t'{{f)J.otu:vo; btvuuOm :tf(H:tmr'lv tcJ'l v[t;J blv<t!nv.
.16 In !'far. 1\lcih. 53,10-17: o'lov t-v Grmn'tttil XQttiJV n't;((; rmtilV ttiJv 'fOVifti'J\' zui
(LVFJllltl(I)V l.c'rtWV IIIJillV lltl "llt:il; '{(t(l Ot!lJVOlJ; m'!bt:i; ILVO(>!;J:tliJ ovbi: lyl;) bt'tl\'lllC,l toitO
<'tD.<'t flOL 'l'rtbtl; TE lJt''(f.UJQitout zui M.tJl'lt':-; c'ttrnviout otb<l!tliJ; llqm:t)\:. il'loi '(llQ
ivctti:l'lu tt/J Ot:</J htutbv EL:toJv "0Ei>; yet(' Otovot; o{bri; c'tvH(lciJ:tt;J otbi.- f'/UJ
btovoi<,t otbqn(t toi:to bQtiJ".
-17 Olymp. does not expressly state that this constitutes the xmQo;. hut this is obvious given
the parallels with Proclus. The similarities the two commentaries regarding this item
arc
- the issu'C is Socrates' !lE'fu).lJ'(OQEi:v and i:rrnl{t)J.wOm (Prod.) or !LE'{<ti.OQQIJ!LOVt::tv and
i:rru:rtr).lta (Olymp.);
- Proclus opposes this to "Socrates' usual manner"(ou xcttc't TO i1l'lo; to
i:.rruytd-tta), Olympiodorus explicitly mentions "his irony we are with" (l'J fll<J0l'tCl
dQuJvttu, an allusion to I 337 A); the aporia is similar in both cases;
the r.mg6c; argument is supposed to justify Socrates (Olymp. offers two additional i.ton;
-cf. WESTERI;-o;K 1956. p. 35; SEGO;-.iDS Il 1986, p. 220 with note 2 p. 380):
besides the text under consideration (Alcih. I 105CD) both commentators adduce two
adJitional texts- the same: Apol. 30CD and Theaet. 151CD. Discussing the text both
authors refer to Socrates' duty to distinguish fertile ideas from mere images and
impostures. (Olympiodorus' treatment of Apol. 30CD is much more elaborate than
Proclus').
]X Compare the explanation at 174,2-6: ounoc; [v t{!l .:taQOVlt6ta).6yrp OUVE"tatt\' fctttO\' t(l
, Arr61J.oJVl wi:c; i\axEbaqwviot; 'tO cp/.ozgt'ntalOV ( lJV '{UQ 6 'l.Ql]OflO; boOEi; :tfQl
actGJV "u q:tAOZQIHIOcnJVa tUV L:tUQWV o).Ei:, &.no M x' ovbv").

- l
j
-- i
i
I
ACADD.I!C PLATONIC THHIES IN PLUTARCH 139
philosophical teaching is only possible with God as a guide (3,21,11: itEov
1)yqt6va- cf. 3,21,13). Philosophical instruction is not a common thing, it is
great, it is mystical, and not given to every man39. \Visdom alone is perhaps
not sufficient; above all things the teacher must have God to advise him to
occupy his office, as God advised Socrates to practise The words
OL'VEBOt!),nEV Tl]V V.Ey;{TlY.llV zwgav EXELV (''he advised him to take the
elenctic office") are reminiscent of Plutarch's account in Quaest. Plat. It
is probable that Epictetus is referring to Theaet. 150B-151D, or, at any rate,
to the idea of the elenctic Socrates inspired by his divine sign, which has been
determined to a large degree by the Theaetews. Elsewhere Epictetus cites
Plato's Apology as evidence for the daimonion-t
2
It is clear that Epictetus
truly admired Socrates - as most Stoics did-t:l - and that he displays a
sympathetic attitude to Socrates' declarations about his divine vocation.
Elcnctics is regarded by Epictetus to be one of the philosopher's most
important duties-t-t.
Obviously there existed a tradition countering the reproach of boasting in
respect to Socrates' words at Theaet. 151 D. In the evidence I have adduced
the advocates of Socrates were invariably confronted with the same aporia:
Anon. in Theaet. and Olympiodorus make the observation that Socrates'
words seemingly contrast with his usual Etgwvda (''modesty"), Proclus
rekrs to to L<I)Y.QCJ.nzov 1]Ho;. Plutarch too mentions dguJVEUEo\}m, albeit
in a different sense. In his first Quaesrio Platonica he disputes the "ironical"
>l 3.21.\7: !ti-'trt flltl til :t(ltl'{lltl.llt'lltlZl)V fllTIV, Ol'Z l;J; Etl'/.EV oub 't(l n.zoVlti'\C<')oftEVOV.
3.21.17-19: <'tiJ.' olbi; lJOift)v fl\'Cllll'/.lW r;nQZrll'T[lll; 'tO El'TifU).lp')i]VlLl VEl!JV' tlt'i: bE Y.cti .
:tQOZfliJllTIJTtt nvu fl\'CLI Y.rtl f:tltl]l'lrtl)TIJHL .:t(IO; TOl'TO. ViJ"tllV l\iu, Y.Ul OtiJflU llOlllV Xctl l'TQO
:tU\'ll:J\' tll\' \lr(lV llt'1'0llt').rtCIV tUl'tl]V ti]V /.liJI_lUV Y.llTlt<rf.ELV, cJJ; Ol
1
VE[)ot).H'EV
ti]V fi.f'[ZTIZi]V fl;J(l((V f/flV, l;l; tiJV [)wn).tziJV Y.lll f.:tt:t).lJZtlY.l.]V, 1;1; Zt'j\'(11\'l TiJV
Zftl bontuttzt.JV.
Jl Esp. 999EF and IOOOC (Fiz6tw; o Ot:b; u:tt:zr;Jhorv etl'tov Ul'TIJVfflla xni. 'I'El'l'llj xui.
<'t!)t'l)wn '{fVV(tV, b tol.; ("t)J,ot; tOIUUW There is yet
link between Epict. Diss. 3.21 and the Qrtacsr. Pial. 1, at least in the Wortlaur.
Compare Diss. 3,21 ,7 :rgouO!'Jo<J ttv rrou xui 'A VlL\c'ttQOl! xni 'AgzEi'll'J!lOU <fOQ<1v with
Quacsr. /'fat. 1 999E TOtE crogctv o1.vfJq yEvroOm oorponiJv. (note the Stoics Antipater
and Archedamus are called principcs dialecticorwn in Cic. A cad. 2. 143; sec also Diog. Laert.
7,61\: POI!LE;o.;z I 19-18. p. 180). Plutarch uses <fOQCt with the meaning "rich crop, profusion".
Sec p. 103 notl! 106. Epictetus uses the word in the sense of "flood of words, rhetorical
impetus" (cf. SCHWEIGHAlJSER II.2 1799, p. 718). If the text of Epictetus is dependent on the
same tradition. one must assume that one of the authors has either made an allusion with
deliberate distortion of meaning. or interpreted q;ogu inaccurately. That there is a tradition
behind Epictetus' discourse may appear from the intriguing similarity between 3,21,16 and
Olymp. In Plar. Alcib. 153.45. Likening the false philosopher to someone miming the manner
of the hierophant, Epictetus asks : lrgni Ei.mv eti q:wvctt at-Tat xa{)' ahu;; Olympiodorus, on
the other hand. in respect to the oracle proclaiming Socrates as the wisest of men, remarks:
oc :ri.ll'{l] UEQO; tal'lCl fi.E'{fV r.ni q-wvij. unct !;wnzw; xai. y{}wc;.
Diss. 3,1,19 (referring to Plato .Apo/. 28E, 29C and 30A).
J> Cf. DORI;o.;G 1979 (on Epictetus: p. 43-79); LO:-iG 1988a, p. 150.
-1-l Cf. DORI;-o;G 1979, p. 7-1.
140
CHAPTER 4
interpretation of Socrates' words at Theaet. 150C7-S. Taking into account
this fairly well-evidenced tradition one may safely posit that he is defending
Socrates against the allegation of It is plausible that this
reproach was felt to be mainly Epicurean. It is also noteworthy that the
Lamprias-catalogue, an ancient list of Plutarch's writings, contains the titles
of at least two apologetic works in defence of Socrates: Lt89 'A;w).O'{Let.
{m.i:g and Ll 90 TIEQL Tii; As to the
contents of these works we can only make conjectures, but their apologetic
nature cannot be doubted. It is also probable that the argumentation
Plutarch developed in these treatises - if indeed they were genuine
Plutarchean works- was similar to that of the first Quaestio Plaronica.
C. An internal or external stimulus? Socrates' daimonion
In asserting that Socrates did not use the name of God ironically or in jest
Plutarch is fundamentally right. The next question he deals with pertains to
the implications of the element in Socrates' Does it Jenotc
a part of his own nature, or rather an external inOuence, such as a goJ or a
daemon, a "truly" divine cause (l16ugov ouv 1:i1v l:mnou <f: l
1
0LV ( ... \ Ot:bv
J1QOOI.:ll1C, ij {)tTov n Y.etl 6aqtOVLOV <.;J; tt).l){)<.iJ;

In the first case would refer to an element of our nature that can be
called divine. Just like Menander, who declared that our intelligencl! (vov;)
is our god, and Heraclitus, who said that our character (1\0o;) is our
Socrates would mean that it is his own nature that makes him
assume the role of midwife and prevents him from himself bcgdting. The
reason for saying this would be that his nature is more discerning than fertile
(zgtnY.urt:EQCt.V 1) '{OVLWtrt:Egav ouoav- this antithesis.;'! is of course directly
related to that between wnoDoOm and The faculty to judge and to
apply distinctions (to zgtnz6v) is rational and is called divine in Platonism5,
whereas the faculty of "procreation" belongs to the utterly irrational part of
the souP'. Usually Plutarch integrates the Platonic bi- and tripartition of the
To the samt: context may have belongt:d L 70, 'Y:riQ rou n).urwlo:; Ehriyot:;. Cf.
0PSOMER l997a.
On Plato's views on the claimonion's nature see BUR::-\ET 1924, p. 96 ; 207-209;
1954, esp. p. 524-525 ; DE STRYCKER- SLii'GS 1994. p. 153-154.

999DE: ;rOtfQOV ouv ti]V ECI.UtOU cpUOl\' oJ; xgmzonEQCtV l] '(OYlllO)lfQClY Ot'OClY 00\'
;rgoo{L"tE, xuOarrEQ Mf.vuvbgo<; "o vou; yi.tQ l
0
HltlJV 6 {)6;" XCI.l 'Hgc'tx).mo; "l,oo; c'.r.v{}gw:tt,.t>
f1 {}L6v n r.ui. bctqtoVlOV lo; ctl.l]OU!; u'lnov UtfT]'(lJOCI.tO Llt JZQCttEl totto tij;
cpt),ooocpiu; to rf.vo; ( . .. J ;
Cf. Alex. Aphrod. (?) Mantissa 25. 185,23-24: J'rOo; ybg U.vOg<i.J:rwv xmu tov'Hgctzi.mov.
OCI.LllOlV, w{n:wu q-um;.
4
9 ROMANO's interpretation of 999D is obviously wrong. as is apparent from his paraphrase
"la stessa sua natura in quanta fornita di une superiore facolta cfi giudizio e di creativita - ,
xgmxwtf.guv r
1

(1965. p. 12o). . . :_ ., __ ! ... ,

1
' .;

..
so See e.g. Plut. De an. procr. 1029E.
......

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 141
soul with the Aristotelian division into five faculties
5
::!. If indeed such a
scheme is read into this passage, then refers to the lowest of the
five parts or faculties (the 0QEJ1nz6v or cpvnz6v), and Y.QLTLY.WTEgu.v to the
highest, rational faculty (the ).oytanzov). According to De an procr. 10248
the Y.QLnz6v5J is the faculty that brings men in contact with the noetic world.
In the composition of the soul vou; is the part of divine provenances
4
The
lowest Aristotelian faculty of the soul is called "completely. devoid of
reason" in De virtute morali ( 442BC), which means that it is utterly
unsubmissive and deaf to reason, whereas the so-called "affective" part (to
:ra0l]TL%6v), while having no reason of its own, is still usually capable of
listening to reason.
However, although Plutarch acknO\vledges that part of our na!ure is
divine in essence and originss, he is little inclined to endorse the interpre-
tation that Socrates is in this context referring to his own soul. The second
option, that Socrates is speaking about a truly external inOuence, is given
much more attention. Already the fact that Plutarch, in using the words
S..:..: tht: in CIIER:-.;IsS 1976a, p. 20 note.: a. To which may ht: aJJeJ, with rt:gard
tot(> X(lll!zov, Arius Didymus ap. Stub. 2,117.1 l -15.
Cf. D.:/: 3'X)f and De def or. 429E; De 1irt. mor. 442BC; Quae!it. l'fca. 9, 1007E-1009B;
DASSARITIS IXS9, p. 22; VERBEKE 1900, p. 239 ; Pt;-.;:-;oy 196Sa. p. 125-12X; CIIER:"ISS 1976a,
p. 20 note a (CIIER:"ISS's text suggests that Plu\arch callc.:J the part also tht: fifth- not
rightly so. as tht: hig.h..:st part is invariably consiJ..:rt:J to be tht: fifth); OI'SO\I ER 199-+b (more
accuratt: than 19lJ4a), p. 511-523 ; 542-546.


is not in his tt:rminology. Usually the r.c_>mxt'w is tht: cognit ivc.: faculty
as such. also to nut'lqnr.ov, as this has its own epistt:mological function: cf. De
an. procr. 1012F; 102:\0; 102-.tE. In Quacst. /'fat. 9lJ9DE it clt:arly rdc.:rs to vot:::; alont: .

Cf. Quacst. /'fat. 2. I 00 I B ( [vrunv f!Ot(lu no/J.i) \;wonJm::; xHi. OnonJto::;, t]V o Ot:o;
!:rr.mio:rn(lfV t'Hr' [uvtou tij i:).,J) ; 100 I C (il bi-: 'l't'i'J\. vou fLEwozouau zui l.orwpot: xni.
UC)J!OYLU;. Ol'Z f(l '(OV t:ati toU Drot: !10\'0\' unu %({t !lf(lO::;. o{:b' un' ut'.tou u)J. . .' u:r' uhou
r.ui t::;uctoi: yf-tovEv); Quac!it. l'fat. 4,1003A; Dean. procr. 1016C (oOEo; [ ... ] tt> voEgov [ . .. ]
l'tc( Cl.l'toU :rUQUU'f.l;l\') ; 10230 ; 1024C; 1026E (tot' OE VOt flEtfOZfV u:r(J nj; %QrlHOVOS
ugzij; fy'(EYO!lfVou) . Cf. Plato Tim. 36E-37A. Sec also Quae!it. /'fat. 3, 1002E with CHERNISS
1976a. p. 46-47 note b; De sera nt/111. 5590 ; Alcin. Didask. 169,18-32; THE\'ENAZ 1938, p. 71 ;
SCHOPPE 1994, p. 169-173; 0PSO:".IER l993a, p. 153-154; 199-lb, p. 270-276; 476.

Cf. Tim. 90A: to bi-: oil :rEgi wu r.ugttm'nou ;wg' ,ut'iv '(uzfJ; Ei:oou; OtuvoE'ioDm OE'i nj6E,
c'igu nino bcti1tovu 0o; i'xaotlll bowr.Ev, wuw o o,l <rurtEv otr.dv ltE:v iuujJV br c'izQ!ll t4l
O{;lflCtn, :rgo; OE tiJV v ouguvqJ Ol''({EVElCI.V c't:ro '(1]::; iutct; Cl.lQflV OJS ovm; tfUtOV oh f.yynov
uiJ.a Ol'QCL\'lOV. OQl'lomm ).yoVT::;. Compare Posidonius frg. 187 KIDD = Galen De pfac.
Hipp. et Pfat. 5,6,4 (to Oi] toJv nu{}wv u[nov, wtton nj; tE avoftoJ.oyiu::; zui. wu
ZU%00C1Lll0\'0; Biou, tO fliJ XCI.tCt ;r(iv bw{}m v uinql OCtlflOVL OlJ'('(f\'EllE ovn r.ut
OflOlU\' I:Vl
1
0l\' i'zovn tO\' o).ov XOOflOV OtOl%0UVn ztL), and SVF Ill 4 = Diog. Laert. 7,88
(Ehru o Cttto totta ti]V tOU docdltOVO; UQEll]V Y.Ctl El'Q0lC1V Biou, OlCI.V :ruvw :rgctHT]tCtl
%CI.tCt ti]Y Ot'WfWVLCtV tOU ;rug' EZUOt!ll OCI.lflOVo; :rgo; ti]V lOU lW\' o).wv OtolXT]lOU
Cf. KtoD II(ii) 1988, p. 676: "The Diogenes passage seems to stress the outside
agency and its will (Bo{l.lJOL;). the law of Zeus. Posidonius stresses the internal daimon"; p.
677: "It seems highly probable that Posidonius knew and had in mind the Timaeus passage. A
development of the Tim. passage is also seen in Plutarch 's myths in De Facie, De Sera and De
Genio, in the last of which OCI.tftWV is equated with vot:; as distinct from other aspects of the
soul."
142
CHAPTER4
{}ci:ov n r.ctl. w; aAl)11<.i); a'Lnov, is alluding to Plato's .Apology
(31 C8-D 1: {){i:ov n

is an indication that he believes this to

be the right context for Socrates' words. Moreover this is consistent with
Plutarch's account57 in De gerzio Socratis
5
s, where he deals extensively with
the nature of Socrates' daimonion .
Several scholars have noted
59
that Plutarch often attributes a role to
56 Pahaps Plutarch is alluding at the same time to Alcibiades' d..:scription of Socrates at
Sylllp. 2llJC: ni> (;); ct).q{hiJ;. This secondary allusion, if it indeed is on..:. is of
a purely literary nature, as it is exactly not Plutarch's intention to rda to Socrates himself.
but rather to an external influence on his conJuct. The clement w; uJ.ljOu>; stresses the divine.
"L.iaemonic" charact<.:r of this influence.
In this cont<.:xt the distinction between God anJ "daemon" is far from Plutarch's mind. On this
kinJ of contradictions", sec NIKOLAIDIS \991 (as contrasting with e.g. GREARD 1902. p. -t7-
60). On the other hanJ, this lack of rigor in his use of these terms will allow Plutarch to hyp;lss
the prescription of the Apology that th..: tlailllonion ol! :t(l<H(lE:tn (see t..:xt) . On th..: bck of
rigour in Platonic t..:rminolngy sec Tyr. 21,4.70-71 : E'{<;J '{<.tl) tot -ru -rr c"tnn. xcti rv nj nilv
OVOp<'tT<!lV n.rl{hl.)t<,t :tri0opm fl)Jn<>VL

In Simmias speech. that is (s..:<.: esp. SSSDE) . not in the mythical part : cf. t\R:"I\1 \921. p.
21-22 ; BECK 1953, p. (i'); BAillJT \9S3. p. 203.
This tn.:atise has b..:..:n th..: object of intcnsiv..: study. ror th..: Qucl!t-nforsdtllllg se.: !IEI:"ZE
UN2. p. 102-lOS. 19!0; \9:?.1; and the summary in BECK !95.\ (esp. p. 57-S:'i) . For
th.: Timarchus myth sec 1950; I 19.\..t: IIA:-<1 1975. Thcr.: is much
concerning th..: overall intcrpn.:tation of the Jialogue, notably about tht.: subject propt.:r.
IIIRZU. (11 \S1J5. p. !51) anJ ZIEGLFR (!951. col. X-H) d.:plore its lack of coherencl.! .
LA! J".,\IH!S ( 1920. p. 112) and VERNii:RE ( 1977, p. 93) claim th;ll the true subjt.:ct is to be found
in th.: historical narratinn. CoRLll ( 1970. p. iN), on the other hanJ. pushing the
ao;pL'CI into the background. fm:ust.:s on its dacmonology. Thert.: have also he.:n atl.:mp!s to
connect the historical and th<.: th..:ort.:tical constituents. POUIWAT (follow.:J hv S IOIKF \IJ75.
bv. p. 2-l3; IIANI 11):-\0, p. 61) claims that the thcmt.: of lih.:ration is central : tl;.; liberation of
Tht.:hcs is a svrnbol for the liberation of the soul. notably its liberation from rationalism
(l'Ol ' lmAT- DI'S Pt.,\CLS \950. p.9X-IO(J; 137; 212. Compare BECK 1953. p. 20-21. J.:..;crihing
the "Zwiesp;iltigkeit scin.:r Seek. in dcr der altcrcrbte Logos dcr gricchischen Aufkl:irung
mit Jcm gch.:imnisdurchwirkt.:n LchensgcfUhl eincr sp;it.:rcn Zcit ringt."; a pbusihl..: socio-
psychologic explanation for P<H!RRA'r's int.:rprctation is to he found in Rt:ssu.L 1992. p.
410) . AccorJing to Rll.EY ( 1977. esp. p. 26X-271) Plutarch tries to d.:monstratc that th.:
practical way of life can b..: reconciled with the theoreticaL Sec also r-.tL\l i fiS \950. p. 201 and
th.: bJlanccJ view of Lattanzi !93.\, p. o7-92. 1-IERSIIBFLL ( 19SX. p. 37X). following
RILEY. stresses the control of the passions. which appt.:ars to be importJnt as well for Theb.:s
liberation as for Socrates' susceptibility to the daemonic influence. BAUUT ( \lJS4. p. 72 : 7-t-75;
19SS). on the other hand. asserts that PlutJrch wants to show the superiority of th..: tht.:oretical
over the practical way of life, and their being irrt.:concilabk (this thesis is unconvincing: see
I3ARIGAZZI \988h. p. 412-413; HERSHBELL 1988. p. 378 and I3AUUT's reaction. \992, p. 187
not.: 2). r-.ton:over it is BAUUT's thesis that thl.! various dacmonological theories Jo not
exclud..: one another. but are to be seen as complementary ( 1983, p. 205; 1988. p. -tOt; ..t07; as
opposed to I-IIRZEL ll 1895, p. 157-160; SOURY 194:?.a. p. 115-139 and 15.1-170); sec also
DORING 1984; GEORGIADOU 1995, p. 192; 199; 1996. p. 121; 114-115 note 6; HARDIE !996,
p. 123-124. According to I3ARIGAZZI the unity of the work is incarnated in the charact.:r of
Epaminondas. whose conduct makes him. as it were, into a second Socrates (19SSb. p. 41-l ;
419-420). Finally I would like to point to BRENK's lucid studies (1991: 1996) focused on time
(historical vs. "daemonological" time, the relation time-eternity).
5'! E.g. L\TZARUS 1920, p. 117-118; SOURY 1942a. p. 122 note 1: CORLU 1970. p. 50 ;
1976a, p. 21 note e; HERSHBELL 1988, p. 379.

i
l
I
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 143
Socrates' that goes beyond the "orthodox" theory of the Apology,
where a merely negative role of non-opposition is assigned to the "divine
sign" (310)1\0. Also, Plutarch's use of (999E) apparently implies
an activity of the which surpasses the merely apotropaic. One way
to see this is to say that the context of the first Quaestio naturally suggested
the more positive role attributed to Socrates' sign: the fact that Plutarch uses
a verb such as in connection with Socrates' divine sign is the mere
consequence
6
' of the assumption he makes in the course of this Quaestio that
the word "Oc6; used by Socrates in the Theaetetus can be substituted with

so that the words WHODa{}w fzEAEUOEV au-rov bE

'{EVvCiv cL-cEr.w/.vaEv would be correctly interpreted as being said implicitly
of the

On the other hand, the role attributed to the 6aqt6vLOv

in this first Quaestio Platonica is not unparalleled in Plutarch's ccuvre. In his
other works as well, Plutarch does not comply with the restrictions on the
role of the spe'cified in the Apology. From De genio Socratis (esp.
5800; 581 B: D) one may infer that Plutarch simply took for granted the
double function of the batflOVLOv without making a problem of itM.
Moreover. contrary to what is commonly assumed, I think that Plato himself
was not always a strict observer of what he stated in the J\pology"
5

Xcnophon, at any rate, tended to assign an exhortative as well as a dissuasive
role to the
The contributions of the various interlocutors in De genio arc not
fundamentally inconsistent with each other, at least as far as the fundamental
"' This is strictly observed by Cicero, De tlil . 1,122. and by Anon. in Theaet. 56.42-47.
61
This has apparently been overlooked by SOUR Y ( 1942a, p. 122 note I), FLACELIERE ( \943,
p. 91 ). CORLU I 970. p. 50), CIIER:-JISS ( 1976a, p. 21 note c), and I IERSIIIIELL 19SX. p. 37lJ.
Compare I3ABUT 19S3. p. 205.
"
1
S.:e also Quanr. /'/at. I IOOOC: t:t%o-rw; o Dro; t'ciF'l.uJ).vot:v u\nov [ . . . ] yt:vvuv, i:U:y1.nv bi:
l:Qt; uj).ol'; [ .. , ].
i>-1 !'ace AR:"I\1 1921. p. 22, who unquestioningly assumes that Plutarch follows the theory of
Plato's Apology. I have examined Lhe Dt.: gcnio's theory in this respect elsewhere: cf.
0PSO\IER !997a. p. 117-118.
b
5
As I have argued elsewhere (1997a, p. 115-121). mainly on the basis of Phacdr. 242BC
(with Hermias In Plat. Phaedr. 67,24-27 COUYREUR; GRISWOLD 1986, p. 256 note 17). Tlrt.:aet.
151 A. and also two dialogues whose authenticity is not undisputed, Tlu'ages and Alcib. I (with
Proclus In Platonis Alcibiadem/80,5-7 and 93,13-17- despite 83,6-7).
!;oS CL GUTHRIE (III.b) 1971. p. 83-84. Xen. Mem. 1,1,4; 4.3,12; 4.8,1. HERSHBELL (1988, p.
366-367; 380; cf. SOCRY 1942a, p. 122-123) posits the influence of Xenophon's description of
the (>((qtovtov to explain Plutarch's account. But see JOYAL I993, p. 102-103. However, the
influence of Xenophon on the later Platonic presentation of Socrates in general may have
been greater than is commonly- see e.g. LONG 198Sa, p. 154- assumed; cf. lOPPOLO 1986, p.
51; V A:-<DER \V AERDT 1989, p. 257 note 74. 1 would like to add that the portrait of the "(New)
Academic" Socrates depends mainly on Plato's dialogues. Xenophon's Socrates never makes
a general profession of ignorance, nor does his wisdom involve in any way a disavowal of
positive knowledge WAERDT 1989, p. 254; 1993. p. 40-41). On the other hand, as
we have seen, Xenophon deals with Socrates' alleged that was to figure also in
the debates between Academics and Epicureans. See also Cic. Bnaus 292.
.Ao
144 CHAPTER 4
question of the conversation is concerned, the existence and the nature: of
the rapports between man and the divine, that is
67
. Galaxidorus started the
discussion exclaiming that it is difficult to find a man untainted with conceit
and superstition (579F: w,:; gyov EOl:l.v ElJQELV avbga xa{}agEU0\'1'(( TtJCfOl'
xal. traits of character unfitting to a philosopher (580A).
Socrates was much more philosophical in his instruction and speech. opting
for simplicity and sincerity, which he regarded as hallmarks of the truth (to
cLCfJEAE<; 1:0U1:0 xal. arr/..aol:OV W<; /..cu{}[gwv xal. CfU,O\' a).t]Odet;
and leaving the humbug to the sophists (1:0V 6 tVCfOV WO:LEQ nva
xarrvov CfJLAOOOCfllCl cl rou,:; OOCfLOl:Ct arroox6ci.oa;, 5808)6.". Theocritus
interrupts Galaxidorus asking whether the latter's account does not do
injustice to Socrates' reverence for things divine, thus confirming the charge
brought by Meletus, notably that Socrates by his utterances about his
daimon ion showed disrespect towards the gods. This is of course denied by
Galaxidorus, who continues emphasising the difference between
and the pursuit of truth relying on sober reason
vt']cpovn ti]V u/..t'j{}ELav, 580C). As is pointed out by 8,\flt.:Tio,
Galaxidorus' "rationalism" is not disavowed by Plutarch and ought to be
regarded as complementary to Simmias' approach, which will offer an
account of Socrates' daimon ion that is presumably closest to Plutarch 'sown
convictions 71.
Subsequently Theocritus likens the daimonion to a light showing Socrates
the way in matters dark and inscrutable to human wisdom (h
ctbt'j),m; xnl. rrgo,:; uv,'}gomtvqv UOUAAU'(LUl:OL and lending a
n
7
Cf. fiAUlJT 19R3, p. 205. Sec also 196lJa. p. 430--BS; 19S4; 1lJSK
Sec also Polymnis' mention of Socrates' truthfulness and simplicity <'t>.Tplnu; zai
c.'m).(mp:o;) as opposed to hollow affectation and boasting (tucrou xui ZOft:tou). and
Galaxidorus' paraphrase of Polymnis' words (582I3: (tTucrir,t x<Li. urp:hic,t) .
n'l 5SOI3. Cf. SOUR Y 1lJ42a, p. 117; I3A!lUT 1lJ88, p. 3tJ3-3lJ-l.
711
I3ABUT 1988, p. 401: "[ ... ]la thcoric de Galaxidoros sur le n'cst pas faussc. mais
appcllc des complements et des rectifications, qui seront apportt!s dans la dcuxil:me phase de
la discussion philosophique, en particulier par Simmias [ ... ]."
71
Cf. CORLU 1970, p. 60; HANI 1980, p. 54.
n Cf. Galaxidorus' words: l:v 1:oi:; ct6t'j),m; xai. T<iJ ),O'flO!l<iJ (580F; t<iJ ).O'flOpcp
is to be taken syntactically with an:;qtagtm;. and not with the subsequent (lo:ti]v baynv: cf.
A RNIM 1921, p. 5; CORLU 1970, p. 48) . These various speculations on the nature of Socrates'
divine sign make use of the terminology of the Stoic theory of action, such as and
(580F; 588F-58lJB; cf. 5818) : see Plut. De virt. mor. 446F; De Sto. rep. l037F; 1057A; Adv.
Col. 11228-D; ps.-Plut. Plac. phi/os. 900EF = DG 402a,l0-16); Stob. 2,86,17-19 (= SVF
Ill, 169); Cic. A cad. ll38; 1971, p. 43. It would be too rash a conclusion to infer- as
does (1921, p. 5-6: Posidonius as source for Galaxidorus' theory)- that Plutarch's
account depends on a Stoic source. Pace FRIEDLANDER I 1954, p. 39. Cf. BABIJT 1969a, p. 250-
252; 1988, p. 397-398 with note 63. Compare NIKOLAIDIS 1991, p. 167. The distinction
between the LEzvtx6v and the cnEzvov yf.vo; is Stoic as well. Cf. ps.-Plut. De vita et
poesi Homeri 212; SOCK 1910, p. 42-43; ARNI:'-.11921, p. 6-7; DORII'G 1979, p. 6 with note 23.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
145
divine sanction to his decisions (rrgomgm:m)73 Simmias in his speech
stresses that Socrates refers to a higher, divine cause74 (already Galaxidorus
had stated that Socrates would only allow himself to be guided by a higher
authority and principle towards the good: {mo motaoia,:; %at
C(QZl]; ;ego; tO %Ct),6v, 5810)75. Socrates is also said to have
branded as impostors ( a),nt6va;) those claiming to have had visual
communication with the divine, whereas he himself paid attention only to
people who affirmed that they had heard a voice (588C).
Just as in Quaest. P/at. 999E and Adv. Col. (11198, 1124C et passim; cf.
supra: eh. 3. 1, A and C) Socrates in De genio is presented as the opponent
of TL'CfO;, OllUlet and a/..atovcia, \Vhich are said to be characteristics of
sophists. Presented as blessed by the gods, Socrates considers it his divine
vocation to free others from these vices.
D. EJenctics and catharsis
Plutarch emphasises ahove all the nature of Socratic philosophical practice,
in which elcnctics is of_rrime importance:
roforo nj; cp).oomri((; Tt> ycvo;. ,;J Toi; <'u:i n:.crou xui
:tt.(t\'Ol! ;-wi xui Tou lht!)rl; r"lvw rr!_)Gnov prv utroi; rl:w %ui Toi;
Ol'\'Ol'Ol V t'.t:tl'j)J.unr.
[ ... ] this kind of philosophy, with which by continually subjecting others to
examination he made them free of humbug and error and pretentiousness and
of being burdensome first to themselves and then to their companions also.
(99lJE, transl. CIIER;o..;rss.llJ7(1b)
Socratic philosophy addresses itself to others, taking them as the subject of
examination (Tot; c!V,oL; time and again (ud). The aim of this
practice is to make them free of conceit, error and boastfulness (tlHfOU %C(L
:r/i(VOL' %((L and of being self-important or burdensome to
themselves and also to their companions (wii BagET<; dvm rrg(inov
ahoi; ELHt %ai ToT; ovvoDOLv). All of the latter is the sophists' trade: they
fill young men full of self-conceit (ohhtaw;) and sham-wisdom
(6o;ouorpia;) and encourage them to engage in futile ( arrgc(%tOu;)
disputations. In order to cure their victims Socrates applies his elenctic
73
This originally Peripatetic term was also common to the Stoics (cf. PETERS 1967, p. 163
Stab. 2,87.16 = SVF III 173 (ngou[grm; as a drSo;); ps.-Piut. Plac. phi/os. 885D
(== DG p. 326a.3-8 = SVF II 966].
74
Cf. 6 o %QEinovo; vo\:; {588E); u;ro vov XQElOOOVOt; vovv xai lJ'UJ:i]V 1jJuzt1; itnon\.>a;
a;EOfrw q:cmTOftE\'t]; {5898). This terminology is partly Aristotelian in origin: cf.
De gen. an. 736b27-28; De part. an. 659b18-19. Cf. HIRZEL II 1895, p. 160. 75
SOURY 1942a p. 122 and 126 correctly points out the Platonic character of this remark, and
in particular the influence of Symp. 203A.
146
CHAPTER 4
discourse like a purgative medicine ( tov ouv V.qxnr.ov AO'{OV (l>o:-rEQ
x.aOagnr.ov xtuv The false knowledge the sophists offer is not
directed at what is serviceable (XQl.JOqtav) and morally good (x.et).6v), but at
a prestige that comes with victory in dispute (v gtm r.ai. 9l)9E).
In true Platonic vein7fl, the antithesis is that between true philosophy,
which strives for truth and the good, and sophistry. that aims at pretended
wisdom and vain prestige77. Plutarch argues that Socrates' words are to be
interpreted in the context of Socratic elenctics: by giving the impression of
searching for the truth along with his interlocutors (bor.G>v r.otvQ),
taking no position himself (t0 a:rocpa[vo0m), and, as a
having no opinion of his own to defend (ouY. aUtO ibi<;t f)OIJ0Ei:V), he
succeeds in creating an image of trustworthiness, so that his interlocutors are
more inclined to accept being refuted (ast6mo-co; 1tv hgou; i.E'(f.(I)V-
1\:-rttto, 999F). In this passage Socrates' ignorance is n:gan.kd as a
didactic device 7K, which means that Plutarch here allows for the possibility
that Socrates actually has knowledge. while his ignorance is merely
pretended; according to this interpretation Socrates is concealing his own
views in order to be in a better position to examine the views of others. l\:ote
that this was also the core of the interpretation of the anonymous
commentator of the Theaetews.
Elcnctics is necessary as a first stage in the search for truth. Plutarch is
indeed convinced that truth is ultimately Socrates' goal. as may appear from
Adv. Col. 11170: "he said that he knew nothing himself but was alwavs
learning and searching for the truth" etuwD dbi:vm <rci.or.ovto;
at:i. r..ai. stltdV tO aA!JOE;). The Corpus PlatolliCII11l holds many
similar declarations coming from Socrates. CIIERNISS ( 1976a. p. 22 note c)
points to Clwmz. 165BC7'1, Gorg. 506As
0
, and Cratyl. 3S4C'
1
, but this list can
easily be In emphasising that the awareness of ignorance ought
to stimulate the continuing search, Meno 86BC expresses the very principle
of "zetetics":
7o CHER:-.;ISS 1976a, p. 21 note f. and p. 22 note a. points to: Thcaet . 210C: Sop/1. 230BC; 231B
77 Compare De clef. or. 431 D.
7
S Compare Theact. 151CD: L:Q. Otl w cr[I.E, on (yt;) !lE\' oi:-c" o"l6a
l10l0t
1
1lCLl TliJV TOlOUHtJV oubi:v EllOV. et}..)..' Eipi. CLUTWV ayovo;. oi: bi: llCLlE\:'OilCtl Y.(ll -cotl:Ot.'
EVEY.CL b<tOUl lE xa\. )"((.lQCLTW!Jpl EY.UOT(I)V niJV OOCftUV ct:toyn:oct011Ctl, E(l); (tv Ei; rr(<> ; 1:0 oov
OO'{IlCl 0\.'VE;aytt'{OJ" ;ny_,'}[v-co; o -c6-c' i"!/:ll] d-e" ClVflllCllO\' fllE y6vtltOV
<.tvwravi1onnt.
7
9 OU llfV w<; CfCtOXOvtO; hwii ELOfVCLl l1fQl fQttllttJ :tQOOCfEQlJ ngo; llf [ ... ] -cb OE oi.:z
ot-cuJ; f:t.El, uJ..>.ul;l]HiJ yf.tQ ILE1:U oou U.Ei. 1:0 1:0 aho; fib[vm.
lil> o\.oi: '(UQ 1:01 eyur(E dot;J; ).f.yt> 0. ).E'{OJ, (t)).ul;t]TliJ zotvij l'lttiJv [ ... ]. .
81 oi:zotV o1oa rtij :n:OlE 1:0 a'Atp')i:; EzEL1tEQl ni)v TOLOUTOJV" oul;l]lflV llf\'1:01 xal
ooi. zai. Kgmu).rp z01vij.

I
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
Y.Cll 1Cl '{E aJJ.ci OV% Cl\' rrc'tvu urrf:g wu ),oyou on b'
olOflE\'Ol bEiv a n; oibEV BEh[ou; &.v ElftEV xat avbgtY.lt.HEQOl xai.
i]nov aoyoi i) d otoiw{}u [t fll) EJtlOTClpE{}a fll)&E buvmov dvm El'QELV
OTv {;t)1ETv, :rEgi. wt:wu :itavu &.v bwftazotfll)V, d oTo; 1E ELl)V, xai. r..ai.
gyc;).
I shouldn't like to take my oath on the whole story, but one thing I am ready
to fight for as long as I can, in word and act -that is, that we shall be better,
braver, and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don't
know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don't
know we can never discover.
(transl. \V.K.C. GUHIRIE, in: HAMILTON- CAIRNS 1963)
147
Drawing on Plato Soph. 230C-231BH3, Plutarch repeatedly refers to the
metaphor of WO:iti:Q r..a{}etgnr.ov EXWV (999E),
r..etOngot; ( IOOOB ), ou yctg ll ia-cgda, b'
t':-t:ot).ou r.ai. (lOOOD)ss.
Here one may profitably adduce Alhinus' Prologus, notably the sixth
chapter where the author tackles the question of the reading programme and
more specifically the recommended sequence of dialogues for the young
se Besides tht.: Tht'tlCtt'tiiS passag..:s alr..:ady quoted ( ..:sp. 150C: uyovo; Ftfll oocrin; [ ... ] (tl'"(t);
6 o\.i'li:v c't:torr Hivo1uu :tqyi m\'H:vo; OH.t -c(l i!znv oo<ftlV}. I furth..:r mention t1pol.
21 B3 7 ( ti JlOtf i.fyn 0 {lfo;. ZHl Tl :ton: CllVlTTETut; f'(liJ yr:u.J oil OLTF pt:'((l oihr Ofll%(.lllV
tputni> UOf i1; Tl Ot'V ).i'(Fl CfC.lll%(1)\' tpr lHll(l;H<lTOV flVUl; Ol
1
y(t(.l /"H.J:lOU
\j.n:bt::wi '(E" ot '/UQ Oi:pt; ctt'TI/J): Mcno 71 B (i:yiJ ovv zu\. al.-ci>;. tvfi:vLtJV, oi:toJ; i'zr
G\.'!l:tfVOJlttl lOt; :tOf.lHll; TOl'tol.' lOl' :TI_)l.t'{I!CtTO;. Y.Ul (WWTOV t;>; OUZ ElOLi>;
:tfQL c'tgnii; n) :tUQ<"t:rruv o i'li: 11i1 oii'lH ti ionv. :rrtiJ; U.v o:to"lt"lV n rii'lri11v:); Menu (m'
'fUQ t:l::toQtiJv m'ti1; w\.; t"ii.i.ou; :TotiJ u:tot.>E"lv. c't/J,(t :rruvto; pc1)./.ov al.-co; {t:tO(>LiJv oiin!l;
zai wi:; t"i)).cn; :tOltiJ u;rogriv. zui \"l'V 1tfl_)l r't(>t::ll}; 0 unv f'{(;) JlEV OL'% oiou [ ... ]). For a
mod..:rn interpretation of lhcsc and similar assertions conlrastt.:d with Socrates' positive
claims to knowkdg..:. sec YLASTOS and csp. LE SI IER llJS7 (p. "'it is abundantly clear
that Socrates commonly claims knowlt.!dgc for himself and attributes it to oth..:rs [ ... ]on moral
as w..:ll as non-moral matters""; 2Hl: any suggestion that the Platonic Socrates embraced a
total scepticism. claimed that he kn..:w absolutely nothing. can be set aside'"; 2H2: Socrates'
denials of moral knowl..:dgc arc denials of knowkdgc concerning the truth of certain basic
theses about 1irtue. thl' good and the nolJle. and arc thcrdore compatible with claims to
knowledge about the moral character of specific actiom."') . As both authors focus almost
exclusively on the Apologia one should also take into account ANNAS 1992. p. 4-t-61.
See esp. 231 D: ZCLL TOV fi.ETf.OV t.f%TEOV uJ; uga IIE'flOTl] xui. X\JQlUlTUll] l(t)V xcn'}ugaE<;JV
E<JTL
&.1 DER STOCKT 1993, p. 132-142 examines tht.: xuOagm; metaphor in Plutarch"s a:uvre.
Dealing with all the relevant texts he shows that zuOagm; as a psycho-somatic process is
transferred metaphorically to the realm of ethics and also that of literature. See also
1964. p. 150; PETERS 1967. p. 98. s.1. katharsis. 2; SAYRE 1983, p. 193. Quaest.
cam. 718E allows us to establish the link with Platonist epistemology; geometry frees man
from the influence of the senses and turns us toward the intelligible: JIUt.lOW of: YEWJlETQlCL
[.;.] bavu'{fl zui mgi:q-n-ci1v Otuvmav. oiov hzaOmgopi:vtlv xeti. a-cQE!ICl n];
ato{h)ot:w;. See also De def or. 432C. Cf. infra: p. 205.
85
See also Ad1. Col. 11198.
, ..
-- - ........
148
CHAPTER 4
Platonist. Since those applying themselves to philosophy ought first to be
cleansed of wrong opinionsso (150,17-18: bEi:rtgG.rrov E:zr.etOCtgm
66sa<; 1:G:JV 1mof...t'pVEwv), they should start with the .. pcirastic'-.
dialogues:
tv' ouv -rac; 1pEubEi:c; bo;w;. bt:1'1oEL hcuY'f.c'.tvnv O).atuJ\o; -roi; tot:
nngaonxou xagax-rf)goc; bLal-.oyOLc;, l!zoum 10 Aqxnxovs
7
xai. to i.Eyt1ftEvov
xa{}agnxov. (150,30-33)
In order that we may remove false opinions, (the student) should read the
Platonic dialogues of the peirastic character, which contain an cknctic and a
so-called cathartic element.
Albinus also explicitly makes the comparison with the doctor's purge
(150,18-20). According to Aristotle the rtEtgaonr.oi. ).6y0l arc directed
against men who pretend to possess knowledge (t0 znv
'tl)V i:mon'uulv)"s. Albinus believes the "pcirastic" character to be suitable
for the initial state of Platonic education, because it incorporates fl.E'(f.O;
and has a cathartic effectH9 He assigns the maieutic dialogues to the second
stage of the course, that of anamnesis, but to this stage also belongs purifi-
cation ( 150,22: b.xnOaignv) of the t:vvmm that have been aroused - note
that xuOagm<; here should be interpreted as "purification" rather than as
"purgation", as in the first stage. The first two stages arc propedeutic to the
Theon of Smyrna likens the Platonic curriculum to the initiation in mysll:rics: purification
traditionally is the first of the five stages of the initiation. Th..: philosnphcr will
attain purification through the study of mathematics (De wilitate nwthcmatical' 1-t-15).
K
7
l do not think that Alhinus is n.:krring. here to the "eknctic character" hc m..:ntion.:d in eh.
3 (if the text is sound: cf. and NOSSER's a pp. er it. : the text of 1-t:-U0-37 is hopelessly
corrupt), thus combining the "peirastic" and the "ch:nctic" species into one . as
would have it (199-l, p. ln the Prologm n.E'(f.OC:, is a characteristic of the zetdic species as
a whole (eh. 3, sec MAi-iSFELD's own remarks p. 7H-79). of the "logical" sub-species
(eh. 6, 151,9), and appar..:ntly also of the "pcirastic" (eh. 6, 150,31-32) . Here it is taken togt:ther
with catharsis as a quality of the "pcirastic" character. It should be notcd that Albinus has
switched the ''logical" atomic spccics to the zdetic group in eh. 6 ( 151,5-6: tot; tal: i.O'{tr.oi'
zuQuxnjgo; ovro; xai. a{rrou - I do not accept Frcudenthars
emendation ovro<; a{q:ou xat, which is included in NOSSER's text: cf. TARRA:-;T 1993, p. 42
note 22; p. 173), whereas the traditional view may still underly eh. 3 (cf. B,\L TES in: DORRlE
1990, p. 516-517; MANSFELD 1994, p. 85). Albinus assigns the "logical" species to the fourth
stage of the Platonic education, that of fixing the doctrines the pupil has acquired during the
third stage. l further think that i:mbLxnr.ol: (151.10-11) should be read. or interpreted, as a
variant of i:vbnr.nxou, and, in consequence, l do not think that Albinus uses it as an
alternative denomination of the "anatreptic" (pace MANSFELD 1994, p. 84). On the contrary,
the "anatreptic" and "endeictic" characters (i .e. Diogencs' "agonistic'" subspecies) are both
assigned indiscriminately to the fifth and last stage of Platonic education. that of securing
one's view against sophists. Cf. supra : eh. 2, I.
Soph. El. 165b4-7; see also 169b23-25.
It is not clear to me where in this sixth chapter T ARRANT ( 1993. p. 4S) has been able to
detect a reference to protreptic elements in the "peirastic" dialogues.
.._...........
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 149
posttive instruction of the third stage
90
They have been assigned the
"characters" which according to Diogenes Laertius' account (3,49-51) are
subsumed under the "gymnastic" subspecies
91
; Diogenes has included
Alcibiades I and 11, Theages, Lysis, and Lachesis in the maieutic species, and
Ewh_vphro, j\.feno, lo, Charmides, and Theaetetus in the peirastic (cf. supra),
whereas Albinus in his hopelessly corrupt third chapter
92
assigns only
'A).ztBtciblE to the "maieutic"
9
3 and leaves out Theaetetus from the
' ' peirastic" group (148,35-37- as a matter of fact, Theaeteflls is completely
missing9-t from his account of the classification)9S.
The catharsis-metaphor was probably much favoured among "sceptics".
The Pyrrhonian applies it in a specific sense. Sextus Empiricus compares the
so-called "sceptical expressions" (ql(l)vat, e.g. "taxn", "swn", "oubi:v
'[;tzw", "ou6f:v and the sceptical arguments (f..oyOL, esp.
the arguments against proof) with purgative medicines (ta xa{}agnr..ct
notably with their characteristic that they not only expel harmful
substances from the body, but also expel themselves along with thcmlJii. This
way the sceptic can make use of arguments and expressions without making
assertions about their ' truth. Or to borrow another Pyrrhonian simile: just
like a ladder used to ascend to a high place may be thrown away after one's
arrival at the top, so an argument used for demonstration of a thesis may-
9>) Cf. 150.23: :tQoxmror.rt'(tOitCVJt; nj; 'l'uzfJ;.
91
It is perhaps impossihk to determine why specific dialogues have been assigned to one of
these two atomic subspecies rather than to the other. Cf. TARRANT 1993, p. "Arc
Charmides and Euthyphro any less "pregnant" than Lysis, Mcnexenus, Laches, and Nicias?
Maieutic dialogues arc obviously not distinguished from pcirastic ones because of "pregnant"
interlocutors. or h..:causc of the examination and rejection of a young person's false notions,
since all works labelled "peirastic'" perform this task.'' NOSSER ( 199 I, 115- I 25) too fails to give
a satisfactory answer to this problem.
<r. At some time the dialogues must have been arranged in columns; a scribe reading across
columns must h:JVc conOated adjacent columns: and this brought about the contaminated
enumeration we arc stuck with. The reconstructions of TARRANT (1993, p. 42-44), NOSSER
(1991 , Appcndix A, p. 224-235) and BALTES (in : DbRRIE 1990, Anhang, p. 513-520) differ
considerably, but they agree on this general cure.
93
According to TARRA1'oT's (1993, p. 44) and BALTES's (in: DbRRIE 1990, p. 517)
reconstructions this species in Albinus' original text comprised the same dialogues as in
Diogenes' account.
(1993, p. 45; 48) suggests that the Theaetctus is a late addition to the classifi-
cation and was indeed missing from the original classification.
95
See also Anon. Pro/eg. in P/at. phi/os. 26,30-44 with WESTERINK - TROUILLARD -
SEGO:\DS 1990. note 221 p. 76; Plot.l,2,4-5; Porph. Sent. 32.
96
Pyrrh. llyp. 1,206 (:tfQi JWOliJv '(UQ twv O'l.En:tlY.tov CfWVtiJv ExEi:vo Y.QilnQOELAI]q'Evm, ou
tO\: u).T]0Et; ahct; ElVm navrw; ou o:rou YE Y.ai. ucp' am:wv
avwgr'loOcn ).i:yofLEV btvcwOcn. Er.dvm; mgi. ow A.i:yovrm, xaOanrg ta
xaOagnr.(r tti>V CfCtQp('tr.uJV ou flOVOV um;mgrt to\:! O<O!latO<;, u)) .. u XCLL autc'1
tol; Zt'ftO!; otvE:;ayn): 2,188: Ack !1wth. 8,480.

150
CHAPTER 4
and, according to the sceptic, should- be abolished afterwards
97
Diogenes
Laertius uses the metaphor in the same sense in his Life of Pyrrho (9.76) .
In the first section of the Quaestio (999C-F) Plutarch focuses on elenctics as
a central feature of Socratic philosophy. The question whether Socrates had
knowledge of his own, is not dealt with, but at least Plutarch has not excluded
that Socrates did have knowledge. Elenctics is directed against the
pretended knowledge of sophists and the concomitant self-importance. This
emotional aspect, the conceit and flatulence, are put into focus in the next
sectionJs. Self-complacent attachment to one's own supposed wisdom
appears to he a substantial impediment to acquiring true knowledge.
I I. '' WHAT LOVES IS I3LINDED AI30UT THE THING IT LOVES" ( 1000:\-C)
Assuming that a divine and external stimulus has led Socrates to his specific
form of philosophical activity, one should ask next why Socrates has heen
given the advice not to hegt.:t own views, hut merely to assi st others in the
delivery of their ideas. The answer is that judging is beneficial and
is an obstacle to it ("ro yEvvO.v

the reason being that what

loves is blinded by the thing it loves". What is more, nothing of one's own is
so beloved as one's opinions or arguments
1
m. As Socrates regards it as his
maieutic duty to judge the opinions of others as to their viability and krtility,
he has acted wisely in "bracketing" his own views.
The saying TU<pA.oDTm Tt) (rt),ouv nEQL to (rtt,OU!lfVOV ("what loves is
blinded ahout the thing it loves") refers to Plato Leges 731 E. where Plato
argues that self-love is the worst of human weaknesses, as it precludes self-
knowledge and makes one prder what is one's own to what is truly beautiful ,
good, just and true ttll. Self-love counteracts the striving for justice and truth,
gi ving ignorance the outward appearance of wisdom. Plutarch refers to the
same text in De capienda ex inimicis wilitate 90Aand 92E and at the outset
of De adulatore et lllllico ( 4SEF) 1m.
1\(11-. Marlz .

( lOOOA) clearly marks the beginning of a new section. just like En toiwv ( !OOOC)
am.l (i gn bi: fll.l (10000) . !\!any quaestiones have a disjunctive structure, in that the different
solutions proposed are mutually exclusive, the solution preferred by the author often being
placed last. However in the first Quaestio Platonica the various sections are clearly intended
to be understood as complementary: as we will see. this quaestio has a climactical structure.
On the typical structural elements of quaestiones and esp. the formulas used to
demarcate sections. see GuDEMA:-l 1927; OPSO:'-IER 1996b.
Cf. Plato Sop/1. 230C: ta; tot; [tm'h'utaatv bobtol'; o6sa:; rsEt.<in. Cf. Albin. Prof. 150.20.
1m lOOOA: bnta tot xgivnv oVTo; U){pEJ.t[tOU to yEvvU.v Eftn60t6v [on. n cf).oQnu ;(tfY to
Cft).oDv mgi to cpi.ot[tfVOV" crt),Ettal OE tO)V i.btO)\' o\.ov OUtO>:; Q):; 06sn %(Ll i.O'(O; {::tO toD
tEZOVTO:; .
--...-
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 151
A. <phwtta and 7taQQllCJta in De adulatore et ami eo
It should be noted that <pt).auTta is the key concept in Plutarch's treatises on
Seelenheilrmg
104
; it is at the root of all moral corruption and is the main
obstacle to knowledge of oneself and knowledge as such. It gives rise to
flattery and insincerity (;w),ar.ELa and rrgoo:rtOLtlOL), rather than to
;caQQllOLa. These are structural semantic oppositions of Plutarch's De
adularore et amico, a treatise in the sign of the Platonic dictltm 'what loves is
blinded about the thing it loves", assessing the question how to distinguish a
flatterer from a friend (rrw; uv n; 6tar.QLVElE 1:ov r.o),ar.a 1:0D cpLA.ov, the
Greek title) but also dealing with the concept of :rtUQQllOLa. The Plutarchean
:retQQllOLa does not fundamentally differ from the Epicurean, as I have
already pointed out
111
5: both arc related to the so-called "concerned" or
.. provident admonition" (r.116qtovtr.i1 vovf}nlot)
106
In fact, Plutarch's
antithesis of the mLQQllotcmni; with the flatterer is analogous to the
Epicurean opposition of rlgu>v nnd mtQQllotcwni;. Plutarch proclaims
:rCLQQlJOLCt to he the true friend's duty
107
: a real friend ought to have the
courage to point out shortcomings to his friend. But the insiduous flatterer
will try to imitate this characteristic of friendship too, in order to get into the
other's grace. Therefore Plutarch's treatise offers several tips and tricks to
expose the flatterer, in other words, to tell the true from the false
:rctQQllOlWJn.l;
10
s. A true friend is not afraid to reprimand and correct his
friend (lp[yu>
1
m, vot0nE(Il
110
), pointing out his moral shortcomings and
I ll! 731 0-732A: ;{(L\'t(l)\' oi: !lC'{l!JtOV %Cl%!i)v c'tvl'l(l!iJ:tOl; rot; :roHnt; f!llfl'tOV i::v tcti; 'I'UX<tt:;
onv. ol. :rei; nh(i1 ot''({\'<iJ!llJV f.zu1v c't:rocll''(l]V oloi'>f!lLHV !lllzuvCnm touto b' f.onv o
i.t:>(ot'CJIV l;J; <fti.o; Hetc71 :tCt; ttVO!_)(I):tO; <[tiOFL n: fOllV XHL U(n'hiJ; EXFL tO brtv dvm tolOUtoV.
to bi: ' (E ;t(.!VT(I)\' <'qWQtl]!lt.Ltli)V Oll:t ti]V 0Cf<l6Qct f(ll'tOU crt}.iav utnov fztL!Jtc,l)
'ti,rvnw izctototr. n y }.Oli rw yuv :rrvi re) Cft).m'fiiT ov c) crtJ..ciH', C:imtE tC:t bizma xui tC:t ttyuOa
zui tc't zui.c't ;wxtiJ; zgivn. tll u{tou ;r!_lo tot <tJ.TjOoi; ut::i tl!t<tv bdv trtOtl!tEvoc;. outE yag
hwtilV Ot'tf tc"t iul'tol> zgi] tOV '(f pf'(uv tt\'Of.)<l EOtlpfVOV on\l'(ELV, c'ti,I.Ct tu CtY.Cll(l, M\.'tE
:r ctg' w:t( l i::c.tVTr :tHQ' c'il.l.c;J !tMJ.ov ;roctHO[tEvu H''(f.CtVIJ. i::z tuuwt: or CL!tagn'utmo:;
tottou zcti. to ti]v c't[t<tOiuv ti]v mtQ' n{rr(iJ bozriv ooq inv dvm yf.yow nftatv.

Sec also 92C. Plutarch asserts that we do better to profit from the words of our enemies,
as they- more than our friends- <He able to discern our shortcomings.
IO} CHER:-.'ISS ( 1976a, p. 22-23 note d) points out that Plutarch 's version of the saying is
slightly different from Plato's (who has 6 cptl.iuv) ; but see also Galen De propr. an. c. aff dign.
er cur. 5,6. On love for what is ones own. i.e. one's children, see also De amore pro/is 493E-
49-lF; 495A-497E (examples taken from the animal and human world).
1
0-l Cf. hGE:-;KA:'-IP 1971 , p. ljl-112.. ,'1 , . ! I.
105 Cf.p. l\7. t; ) " -
1c.; Cf. Philod. De lib. die. frg. 26,6-10 and Plut. De ad. et am. SOB; SSBC; 67B.
107
Cf. 51 C (;r. is the ioia nj; q-tl,[a;); 59B; 66E.
lf.;s Cf. 59 CO: t] u{nJnaQQlJO[a vs. 1'1 ui.T]{}i]; zcti. cpt).tziJnaQQlJOLCL
HJ9 Cf. 50B: S3E; 5SO; 56A; 59C; 60B; 66A-B; 69B; 70B; 70E; 71E; 720; 74C.
110
Cf. SOB (to votOnot:v [ .. . ] zai, :raQQTJOta\;6prvov) ; see also 59C; 61B; 66E; 67B; 68E;
69B; 70E; 70F; 71E; 71F; 72C; 72E; 73A; 740; 74E.
M..
152
CHAPTER 4
convincing him of his own mistakes (l:HyJ.<.u
111
). These are to
be considered diseases of the soul requiring a purgative medicine
1
1
2
, which is
the friend's frank speech. The medicine may often be unpleasant and
painful, but it is always sa\utary
1
D, for the vices must be expelled from the
soul. Ultimately, the only way to distinguish the flatterer from the friend is
by examining the goal he is trying to achieve (54E: i16il).ov on
xgda; The flatterer is eager to please, wanting merely to
gain someone's favourll-t, whereas the friend is concerned about the other's
moral well-being; he is acting for his patient's good
115
, not for his personal
satisfaction I 16 This indeed appears to coincide with Polystratus distinction
between the dgwv and the JWQQl]Olaon']; (cf. supra: p. 116)
117
. But whereas
for the Epicurean, Socrates is the paradigm or the Etgwv, Plutarch considers
Socrates to incarnate rWQQl]OLa

The most powerful impediment to rraggqoia is self-complacency and self-
love. <l>tA.ntTiu.l 1<J is the most fundamental malady
120
, being at the root of the
other diseases of the soul and blinding one to one's own shortcomin\!s; it
prevents well-meaning criticisms from achieving their objective. also
stimulating Llattery rather than n:uQQl]OLCI.: in fact it makes everybody his
own greatest flatterer. In this very context Plutarch uses the Leges quotation:
self-love is an extremely serious moral fault, which makes it impossible to be
an honest and unbiased judge of oneself ( 48E: xaxtu.v ( ... J {<( t];
ouz [onv u{q:oD Y.Ql1l]V blzwov ol.6' <'L6[xuoTov121 dvw). unless one
acquires the habit, through study (<'lv n;

of pursuing
what is honourable rather than what is one's own (n't Ol.!'{'{FVI-1 r..ui oir..E'ln,
4XEF). This indeed appears to be a faithful rendering of the context of
"' Cf. 5(JA; 61 B; 66A; 6713; (JlJF; 71C; 72A; 72F; 7-lC.

For the q <'tQ!I<lY.OVmdaphor. sec De ad. et tmr. 4lJE; 5-lE; 55C; 61 C; 62C; (J4t\: 6M3: 73A;
7-lO; for the purgation-metaphor. see 5-lE (tcl Y.ctOu'lvov); 5lJD (iJ :t<tl_!'!lJ<lin [ ... ]
Y.HillltQOl'IHt): 67E.
11.' Cf. 55C: 5lJB. The ml!laphor of hiting is a further similarity with the first Quant. Pltll. :
compare Qrwest. /'/at. 99lJO ( c'tn:zv<i>; bur.vr'lv = T/reaet. 151 Co) with De ad. et tllll. 5.513; 55C
(q<t(.l!H.tY.til b<'tr.vovn); )oA; 590; 6111; 620: 650; 673 (iJ.f.(f.<UV zuil'l<'tr.vt,Jv); 6SF-6lJ:\: 7-lO.
Cf. 51 E-52A; 540-55E; 6011.
Cf. 51 CO; 55AB; 550; 6oA; 700 ; 710.
llh Cf. 67E: tBQLV un:aoctv Y.ai. y[}.onu xai. Y.CLL Bu>!IOi.ozictv l'lbtO!tmCL :tOVljQU
J1UQQ1]aLU; C.HfalQtiJ!IEV.
1
1
7 Esp. De contemptll 16.28: EVEY.a tuJV n).l]Oiov ELQttJVEtovtCLL Compare Dt! ad. et am. 570:
tt7> 'I'E"{ELV rcntav; d; tO tn"l!; n)..qo[ov u:toQQfO\.'OIV.
Cf. De ad. et am. 69E; 70E; 71F-72A.
11'1 Cf. 48F; 65E; 66E.
loO Cf..Sieferll908, p. 15 note 6; HtRZEL 1912, p. 26; 1971, p. 131-132.
12
1
Compare Q11aest. Plat. I lOOOB: ohm6 Y.aOugol.; !IOVOL Y.cti. M>EY.(tatot; b).Jj0Eia;
;wgzoumv E:autou; 6t;wata;.
l2c On i:Ota!t6; as a technical term in "psychotherapy". see. De cur. 514E; B.-\Bt.:T l969a, P
321 with note 2; 1971, p. 99, 105-106.

AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 153
Plato's words. Our self-love makes us vulnerable to the flatterer, who
actually exploits this fault of ours (49A). Self-love leads to a dangerous
illusion, namely that one is endowed with all manner of good qualities; this
conceit is to be avoided with the utmost care ( 49A: ll 6' o'ltlOl l:macpaA.ti; xai.
;ro)J.li; n)).apcia;) m. The flatterer is therefore an enemy of truth
and an enemy of the gods, of Apollo in particular: indeed, the x6),as
continually thwarts the God's yvw{h oau16v precept t:!-t by always creating in
every man deception towards himself (c.man]V f:xaan ..u n:go au16v) and
ignorance both of himself and of the good and the evil that concern him
(ayvmav autoD r..aL ni'JV ;rEgi autov ayafrwv xai. xaxwv, 49B).
In order to free oneself from cpA.au1ia a n:agg11mcwni; is required. But
on the other hand, <fL).cntia makes one disinterested about recognising the
true ;rnQQl]O!etoni;. Therefore n:aQ(Jl]Oia constitutes a rift in one's
spontaneous disposition. towards

It deserves all praise: the

admonition of a true friend, when it is kept clear of irrational personal
feelings, is a thing to be treated with respect and reverence, and is not to be
dismissed U1 LOt' <f D .. ot vov{)wia z<L{}ugEuouoc.t n:av1b; tbtou n:ufrou;
cdbwrov on zui oqt\'t)\' r..ni avmTifH.E:i[10V, 678). The typical flatterer is
the "chameleon-like" Alcibiadcs (52DE), whereas the exemplary
:-rctQQlJOlCWH.tL arc Epaminondas and Agesilaus (52E), Plato (52E, 69F) and
Speusippus (70A). but above all Socrates (69E, 70EF, 71 F-72A). It is
certainly no coincidence that Plutarch in the first chapter of De at!. et am.
(4SE-40A) twice mentions and cites Plato. This is an indication that Plutarch
wants to stress the Platonic character of the views expounded in this treatise.
He also refers to Platonic psychology, in asserting that flattery is directed at
the irrational and ;rnQQl]OLC.t at the rational part of the sou1
12
1i.
The treatise De ad. et wn and the first Qunest. Plat. have in common the
fundamental opposition bdween what is one's own (tu auyyEVfJ xai. otzEi:a,
to tb10v), and what is good (10 [1A.ttoTov, tu xaA.a): most people are
incapable of being fair and impartial judges when it comes to what is their
own. <l>t).auTia leads to conceit and self-importance ( o'l1nta, bosooorrta).
I!J See also 65E: to q i).cwtav zz6:-rtnv uunl>v Y.Ctl tl]V OLlJOLV.
See also 65F: Y.Ctl tO "yvur(h OCLUtov" w; r.U.on,u TOU navto; a;Lov
Eon !W06vtE;.
115
Galcns treatise De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectlllllll dignotione et curatione covers
the same themes: the dangers of <p).mnia for the Seelenheiftmg. Cf. 5,6: 6 M D)..U.nov xai. tl]V
CtltlCLV a:tobibluOl toi) /l'(VO!IfVOt'' n.q:).wttELV yag <fT]OL tO CfitAOUV nEQL tO <p!AOU!LEVOV. EL.i"[EQ
oh f'I.((OTO:: l'jtiWV ECL\.'TOV CtnUYH1JV !ICif.IOTCL f{'lAfL, t\.'CflAWtlflV ava'{Y.ai:6v EOtlV autov E<p'
fOVtoi). :tGJ; otv O'+JEtaL tU tbta Y.UY.U; Y.UL nw; yvti.JOEtCH; Galen also connects
Platonic dictum with the need for naQQlJOLn (5,36). and with the expulsion of the passions
(tr.Y.6:ttEtv [ ... ]to nU.Oo; [ ... ) U'mtE 111]6 \?isav i:y/.ataAmEtv. Compare De ad. et am. 65E) .
12
; On Plutarch's Platonic psychology. see BABUT 1969b, p. 54-80; OPSOMER 1994a; 1994b,
P 507-5-lS {otherwise: BECCHI 1990_..,p. 46-48).
154
CHAPTER 4
Just like the attitude of the friend
127
is contrasted with that of a flatterer or a
sophist (aocpwnx.6v, 71A) in De ad. et am., so is Socrates' with the sophists'
in the Quaestio Platonica.
This analogy is further confirmed by the praise in De ad. et am. of Socratic
ignorance, which is explained as a didactic strategy in the service of elenctics
and zetetics (72A). The context is that of "provident admonition": whoever
feels obliged to reprimand someone should speak frankly, but do so tactfully
and with circumspection 12s, in order to avoid a purely emotional reaction
resulting in an unreasoning rebuffal of the correction (71 F: TO vouDnEi:v). It
is therefore a wise strategy for the speaker to make sure that he himself is
included in the blame, for people are more wont to yield to those who do not
pretend to be without fault themselves. \Vith a view to this, Socrates is said
to have affected ignorance when searching for the truth along wirlz his pupils:
And in this way Socrates quietly took the young men to task tOI\
v[ot; i\AE'(f.EV), not assuming that ht.: himself was exempted from ignorance
( (;); lllt<Y ((Lto; (mqt.Aft'{llEVO; awdliu;), hut feeling that he had need Wt.!tl
as they to study virtue and to st.:arch for truth (t'tgnft; E:itlftEt.Ei:oOm X((t
to ft).t]Or;). For those win goodwill and confidence who givt.: tht.: imprt:ssion
that, whik addicted to tht: same faults, they arc correcting their
prt:cisely as they correct themselves (xui. yU.g t:i:votuv x.ui. rrionv t:zotmv oi ni.
Ul!TU flEV (qt<1QTt1VlV, bnvogOol'oOm bf. wu; <rll.ot; OlO:TfQ (1L
1
T0t';
i">oxouvn:;).
(72A, transl. I3ABBriT)
By giving the impression (cf. box.oDvtE; in the quote) of being as ignorant as
his pupils arc, correcting himself as he does them, he wins their good\vill and
confidence. Plutarch does not explicitly say that Socrates' ignorance is mere
pretence, but he presents it as a didactic strategy- just as in Quacsr. Plar. 1
and as the Anon. in Tlzeaet.- and as part of his "elcnctics" and "zetetics: his
ignorance secures the pupils' acceptance of the teaching (cf. 999E) .
The comparison with De ad. et am. sheds some light on the first theme of
the Quaestio, viz. the blindness towards one's own cherished opinions and
arguments. Both texts refer to the saying from Leges 731 E: TU<p).oD-rm -eo
1"7 See also 66E: <!l).lr.OV yc"tg ,1 n:U(J(Jl]OlU Y.CLl oqtvov, bi: zni cril.mTOV zni

12x nuQQIJOLCL should be used with circumspection: it should be reserved for important
mattl:rs, and, above all, one has to sec to it that it contributes to the intended purpose. moral
improvement. that is. In other words, one has to respect the xmQo;. Cf. 66A; 6SC (b i:li zwgo;
v n:uvri. flEY n:u(ln'lEL; !lf'(Ctl.n Bl.c't:nn, bi:: tij; rraQQIJOLu; btarr\h:ign to
69E; 74C; 74CD (zni. bta wuto bEt zni. mQi Tt]V rrCLQQTJOLCLV i:atl
XCLL Y.QCtnOtOV Ev Cfll.L\L <p:tQflCLY.OV, EtotOziu; t iWlQOU i<Cll Y.QCLOH>; flETQOV
i:zoum]; uEi bEOfLEVIJV). In so far as n:nggqoin resembles flf'{n).,rrogin, one may thus discern
in De ad. et am. a prefiguration of Proclus and Olympiodorus' solution of the aporia they
were to face (cf. supra: p. 137-138).
..7"'1f
-- l
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 155
qJ.ouv ;n:gt TO As self-knowledge and self-love appear to be
incompatible, one ought to employ every available means to combat the
latter. The :tCtQQllOLaani; is essential in this respect. It is the true friend's
duty to say the sometimes painful truth; such is the role attributed to
Socrates in the first Quaestio too. The exigency to disarm CfllAmn[a and
prevent it from doing harm explains the need for elenctics and catharsis.
\Vith a view to this one has to discard one's own beliefs. The reason for this
is actually double: having own opinions leads on the one hand to cpLI,etuTia;
on the other it makes the rretQQllatcwni; untrustworthy:
B. Impartiality
Having cited Plato's saying on blinding self-love, Plutarch continues with
some examples illustrating his thesis:
(1) The principles used for distribution when one's offspring is involved are
most unjust when it comes to ),O'(Ol (views, arguments): ll yctQ
TEY.V(I)V btY.CHOtUTll ITQO A.oyou; i:m:i.v aOLX.WTC!Tll. For in the
former case.! one must give preference to what is one's own, but in the lat-
ter to what is best, even if it be another's f..6ym. Who begets his own is
therefore a poorer judge of others Although the saying is not attested
elsewhere Do, its meaning appears to be that it is natural, and therefore
also considered just, to show favour to relatives (one's children) before
othersLll. The opposite is true of f..6ym, for one ought to distrust one's
own views, as love for one's own views may always make one disregard
the truth. In order to avoid this danger it is preferable not to beget A.6ym
of one's own in the first place. This example is well chosen as it stays
within the realm of the metaphors of procreation: begetting, delivery,
and fatherly love. It should also be noted that it implicitly entails the re-
jection of the Stoic theory of otx.dwm;.
(2) The Eleans would be even better directors of the Olympics if none of
them were allowed to enter any contest D2, which again has its applica-
l2<1 1000A: bft yctQ fY.cl flEV ).uBftV tO LOlOV, f:vrui:Ou bE:, xav uU.6t(?lOY iJ, tO Brl.notov. oOEv
6 YE\'V0>v ibt(( yirvnm q-nu).OTE(lo; EtEQClY Y.(lltlj;. The last phrase has been isolated by
GREARD (1902. p. 51\) as an illustration- curiously- of Plutarch's alleged eclecticism.
I:.O Cf. HUBERT- DREXLER 1959, p. 114: obscurum; ad fabulam aut provcrbium aut ad
ludum pucrikm nobis ignotum respicerc videtur"; HARntAN 1916, p. 584: "Ista liberonmr
di1isio quorsum spcctel non video" (ita!. H.); CHER:--JISS 1976a, p. 23 note e.
l.ll Cf. 13ETOLAUO IV 1870, p. 328: or, appliquce a des theories, In justice distrihutivc qui
aux devoirs patcrnels devicnt une souveraine injustice. Comme pere, on doit prefcrcr
ses enfants [ ... ]. "
132
See the anecdote reported by Herodotus (2,160): according to the Egyptian sages the
Eleans could not attain complete impartiality, as long as their own citizens competed in the
games (2.160,4). For further references see CHERNISS 1976a. p. 23 note g ("The impartiality
with which the Eleans administerep the games was, nevertheless, held to be exemplary").
_..,
156
CHAPTER 4
tion in the realm of ).oym: likewise "one who is going to be an upright
moderator and umpire in arguments is bound not to crave the palm him-
self or to vie with the contenders." IJ3
(3) The Greek generals, when casting their ballot for the award of cxcd-
lence, all voted for themselves as the best
134
The point is of course that
it was a mistake to let them be judges for a prize for which, in their own
opinion, they themselves qualified 13
5

The conclusion is obvious: whoever has opinions of his own to defend will
not be capable of being an unbiased judge of the views of another. And of all
philosophers there is none \vho is not guilty of this
13
0, apart from those who,
following the example of Socrates, admit that they say nothing original. They
are the only ones who can claim to be sound and incorruptible judges of the
truth (xai. rGlV oubi.; (onv, o; OU TOUTO :rb:ov0E bizu n"in
ulO:TEQ L(I)XQUn]; ru16v 'l6wv Uynv ohm bE xaOugoi; ._,,
xai. abEY.ClOTOU; IJS Tf]; a).lp<Jda; ;T((QEXOUOlV ECtUTOi!; 6Lxwnu;.
10008).
It is clear that the scope of Plutarch's discussion is much wider than
merely the historically correct interpretation of Socrates' words in the
T/zeaetetus : it is just as much- or even more so- about those who lay claim
to the Socratic heritage. That these arc the Academics may be gathered from
the evidence we have examined in the preceding chapters LW. And indeed,
Arccsilaus. according to Ad\. Col. 1121F, and Carneades. according to De
Sto. rep. 10363. arc among those who say [lllbi::v'lbwv. As far as Carncadcs
is concerned. as \VC have seen
1

10
, Plutarch intended this to mean primarily
t 1.1 l!XlOAB: oi'n,>; i..>ltD.f.t,>V l:v ).tr(<.ll; t>(.n'hi>; t':ttm<tttjOrtV X<!L ol. l'liztm.>; tonv
UL'Tl'>; <(t).o<JtE<f<tVClV OtO' tOL; %(HVOflfVOL;.
1q This story too is related by I krodotus : after thl.!ir victory over the th..: Grl.!t:ks
wanteu to determine who amonl.! them had heen the bravest. but v0cti:tu :t(t:: n:: <t\n:J\'
i<,HH</> hiilno tiJv ,lfprov, cn:ro; 1'xamo; boxit,>v c'i.(.H<no; rrvtoOm 123,2). Plu-tarch rd..:rs
to this story in De /lcr. mal. H71D (this treatise's authenticity is now commonly accl.!pkd. cf.
LACII E:--;AUD in CUVIG:--;Y- LACII ENAUD p. 114-117) and Tllcm. 17,2.
Cf. UAOUT 1969a. p. 27lJ-2SO. 11ATIEG:\ZZORE (llJ92, p. 22) explicitly idt:ntifil.!s the
genaals with the dogmatic philosophers. without questioning. however. the term "dogmat ic".
which according to him correctly charaterises the Stoics. The texts adduced by
11ATIEGAZZORE fail to illustrate the fight against dogmatism, in the sense of blind faith in a
peremptory authority.
One may compare Cic. Acad. 11 10, where Lucullus claims to inaugurate a disintc:rested
search for truth. He is not ddending his own. but Antiochus' views. If thcv turn out to be
wrong. he would wish to be refuted ( -dicam enim nee mea nee ea, in qui bus si non fuerint
vinci me malim quam vincere"). Nevertheless he thinks that Antiochus is right.
1n Cf. De ad. et am. 678: 1'1 tou vouOwia xaOctgdouoa :tavro; tl:>iot :tc'd}Ot;
at6EOtOV EOtL %Ul OE!lYOV xai. avavri[)t.EJtTOV. Also compare Galaxidorus' words in De genio
Socr. 579F: tu; f.rnov odv Et'QEl\' avbgu xctOaQfl'Ovt(( ttq:ov %at6ttOLbat!l0\'l(t;.
Cf. De ad. et am. 48E: Oti< EOtLV ninoi: i<QltijV bixmov oub' abxamov Ehw. Compare
Longinus De mbl. 44,9.
; ,

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 157
that he adopted his opponents' premisses merely for the sake of examining
(and refuting) them, without positing anything as his own opinion. This is
fully consistent with the context of Quaest. Plat. 1.
C. Serenit)'
In order further to elucidate Socrates' impartiality Plutarch suggests the
following comparison : \VC cannot accurately perceive sounds when the air in
the ears is full of ringing and buzzing instead of still and free of sound of its
own. Likewise judgment of philosophical arguments requires freedom of
internal noise, for otherwise one will not even understand statements coming
from \vithout
1
ll. Simmias in De genio Socratis offers a similar explanation for
Socrates' susceptibility to the daimon ion' s voice I.J:! (which is not a physical
voice but rather a communication without sound, a kind of mind-to-mind
contact on the purely intelligible level ; cf. 588E): since Socrates' soul was
pure and free from passions (5880: xaOago; iov xaL cma{hi;), it lent itself
readily. without recalcitrance, to purely spiritual conversation. Messages
from the arc all around us ( bLct mivnov fPEQO[lEVOL, 5890), but only
exceptional peopk. who arc free of inner noise and confusion roT:;
ct0t)gt0ov n\ 1'p'}o; XC1l Vl.]Vqtov EXOt'OL TllV 1l'VXl.jY) l-13, arc capable of
1' '
1
Compare Cic. De di1. 2. 150: "Cum autem proprium sil Academiae iudicium suum nullum
intt.:rponere. ea prohare. quae simillima veri viJeantur. conferre causas et, quid in quamque
s..:ntt.:ntiarn dici possit . expromere. nulla adhibita sua auctoritate iuJicium audientium
rdinqut:rl.! integrum at: liberum. tenehimus hanc consuetudinem a Socrate traJitam caquc
int..:r n,h, si tibi. Quinte frater, placebit. quam saepissime utemur."
,.,, Cf. supra: p. 95 note fi:\; 105 note 115. Uul sec also below: p. 171 note 205.
! l l lOOOBC: <;HJ:t r Q 't<'<Qt> iv tOT; t;HJ[v c'o'JQ.(!v pi) omOr Qo; iJ lliJOr cruJVf); toiu; fQIJill>; c'tD:
tjzou 'l.Ut 0oil;.ot ftwn'>;. oix c.'tvrt).<tpjVtvnm ttiJv cpOcyyo!tEV(JJV, oi:n> TO tot;
i.orot'; h <[ ti.ooor ll,l X(.)lVOV, (tV rvoo0fV CtYtlltut<tylj <n> %Ul CtvtlJZlJ, Ouo;uvEtOV EOHll ni>V
ir ropivt, JV ;; ; (! n')rv. Plutarch is referring to features of a Peripatetic scientific theory of the
s.:nses. Cf. Theophr. De scnsihus l<J and 41 (DG 504,27-505.2 ; 511,4-8); CHER:--IISS 1976a. p.
2425 note b. Perhaps the theory may be traced back to Diogenes of Apollonia: cf. OK
64 A llJ. The iuea to use the theory metaphorically to illustrate the nature of Socrates'
daimonion may be Plutarch's own (for a similar use of the metaphor of noise sec Max. Tyr.
ll.lOg). Be that as it may. any such physical explanation of the functioning of the senses can
only limited value. according to Plutarch's conception of dual causality, which is derived
from Plato. CL esp. De def or. 436CD: li1omg apr ) ..n <xeti> m ,anl)v (Resp. 5070) ogav !lEv
l'JitCt; tij :tUQCt ttiJV ocp'leti.ftiiJV Ut'YIJ ouyr.EQClYVl'flEVIJ n:go; tO lOU CftiJ;, CtXOUflV b Tij
:ti.lj'(IJ tOL' ttl\ >a; c.'t:tOffalVOflEVO; oux CtVIJQEl TO xan't AO'(OV xui. n:g6votuv oganxoi.c; XCll
uzot'Ottzoi; yqovrvuL Cf. infra : p. 181-183.
As pointed out by CHER;>;ISS 1976a, p. 25 note c.
w Cf. 589E: TlJV [ .. . ) Xctl tclQUZl.JV, {j; a;ni)J.Ct%t0 LWX(ltltl)S. See also Cons. ad
A poll. 1 OSB: to b. E<rf.ClTO\' n:c'tvtwv, on i:c'tv n; t'HlLV xui oxo/.lj YEVlJHll arr' at'nou xat
1Qa:r0JpEua :rgo; to oxo:rEiv n, i:v tat; n:avrazoC n:agan:T.-nov \t6gvBov rraQEXEl
xai taguzilv %UL fr.:t).JittEl , liJOTE &'Lvao{}m {:r' atlOL' %Ultogav tctf.Tj{);. aD.a t<,u ovn
t'Utl\' 6bnXTCLl on EL !tDJ.OilEV :rotE xaOagtiJ; n low0m, a:taU.axtEOV Ut'tOU xai. autij n)
't' l'zij 0wtov aun1 TCt :rQCt'(!WTC!. Compare GEORGIADOU 1996, p. 121 ; HARDIE 1996, p.
124 .
158
CHAPTER 4
receiving them. Such people are called holy and "daemonic'' ( ol!; bi1 zai
LEQOUc; xal av{}g<.imouc; Most people can attain the
required tranquillity only during only exceptional peopk. like
Socrates, can come into contact with higher beings when awake (5SSDE;
5890). In this respect too the De genio is consistent with Quaesr. P!ar. 1.
One might object, however. that there actually is less consistencv than
appears at first sight. In De genio the tranquillity of Socrates' soul is ;elated
to the surmise that he commingled but little with the body (588DE). whereas
the emphasis in the first Quaestio is on the fact that Socrates has freed
himself from own opinions. Those following his example can show
themselves to be sound and incorruptible judgt!s of the truth, only because
they have no views of their own to ddcnd (10008). For he who ddcnds a
personal opinion is intolerant towards dissidence (lOOOC: t'] y<'tg ol.zc:tet 66;a
Y.Ul OUVOl%0 ou TO blWf(t)VOUV JtQO avn'jv).
The differences between the two texts must however not be overem-
phasised, as Plutarch is wont to associate the senses and the corporal with
bt'>:;<c Socrates frees himself and his pupils from 6o;u, so that they may
search for the truth togethert-t-t. This is also cvidcncc.:d by Alii-. Col. 112-lB,
where Plutarch specifics the significance of bwzt'] as a "settled state and
attitude of grown men that preserves them from error and rduses to
abandon judgement to anything so discredited and incoherent as the senses
or to be deluded as these people arc deluded who call the sec.:n the.: evidence
of things unseen althought they observe that appearances arc so untrust-
worthy and ambiguous"t-t)_ 'E;rozt'] is meant to free the.: faculty of judgment
(1] x(lim;) from the confusing inOuence of the senses. In other words. there
is no sharp distinction between the distrust of the confused information we
get through the senses, and the kind of ;rozt'l that spc.:cifically affects
"intellectual'' judgment t-tr, (nor is there, for that matter, any absolute
rejection of the senses: the insubstantiality of the physical world does simply
not allow a firm grasp) t-t
7
The aforementioned texts from De genio Socr. and
Qtwest. Plat. 999E and lOOOBC should be interpreted in this context: the
b6;m, derived from sensory perception, hinder the voD; to understand the
non-sensory messages from the and to reach a clear and
unencumbered judgment, the initiwn mali being the bond of the body
1
-tS.
I.W Cf. supra: De ad. et tun. 72A.
W Trans\. EI:"ARSON - DE LACY (102-lB : Est; uvbgwv xai bta0Eot; rrl').ctHOl'OU :o
ubtam{J)lOV xai. IT(lO.Lf!lEVll tat; btetBEB).TjflEVUL oihol Y.cti. bl'<TrUlOt'OW; etioOt'toEOl t1lV
XQlOLV !lltbi: OL <Cl TWV ubtV.wv :rionv i:'znv CfCt<JI.Ot'(J\V,
U:tlO<LClV 1:00Ut'1:1JV zai uoarrnav Ev wi:; OQWYH;). Cf. supra: P !00.
See also Quaest. com. 674C.
W Cf. supra: eh. 3. I, B; De E 392E; De Is. et Os. 382A; De facie 933A.
See also VAN DER STOCKT 1990b, p. 182-184; 1993, p. 137 note 66 (pertaining to QuMSL
com. 718E) and p. 138 with the reference to De genio Socr. 5880. See also 5910:5930.

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 159
Socrates' soul was pure and free from bodily influence - in so far as this is
attainable for human beings- and his philosophy consisted in freeing others
as well from this bond.
If one relates the views expressed in Quaest. P!at. 1 and De genio Socr. to
Plutarch 's interpretation of Platonic psychology and, ultimately,
metaphysics 1-l
9
, it becomes clear that they fit in the same framework: both
cp).avTia and originate in the irrational part of the soul (to
:w{}t]nz6v), which itself is closely associated- though certainly not identical
- with the body
1
5. New Academic epistemological motives and Platonic
psychology and metaphysics are thus brought together in the same
perspective. In A{k Col. 11248 Plutarch also makes clear that EJtOXll is not
a refusal to examine the truth inspired by laziness, but rather the very
condition for the search for truth as it eliminates false presuppositions, thus
precluding some fundamental mistakestst.
Plutarch posits an ;malogy hdw.:en th.: composition of the cosmic and that of the human
soul : cf. De 1irt. mor. +tiF-442A; De an. procr. 1025CD; see Plato Tim. 67C; 41(). To
;wOqnzl)v is analognus to the precosmical soul, i.e. t't n't
(Tim. J5A, quoted at the heginning of De till. procr., 101213; see also on the human soul
10260: n]; l'lVljl:fj; ;wi :tf(ll n't mo'lqti"j; cr. CI!ER:-<ISS I!J76a, p. 25S note c).
Cf. De an. prvcr. I 02-lA: llvziJV ouvimqmv n]; < xgflnovo; ot'ota;
Y.Ctl (qtE!)llJTOl' :wi Tfj; ):flQO\'ll;, l]V JtfQl Tll Ol;lflUUl %l"X).1JZEV, Ol'Z hf(HLV Ol'OUV lj
TitV Oo:;aonXijV ZUl f[ll\'l:WntZljV Y.Ul Ol
1
fl7tCdhj Ttil uio{hjT!il Y.lVl]()lV, Oll c't/...),'
l'CfE<TrtilOU\' ci.ibtov u"JO:tf(.> lj hf!)Ct. Plularch resolutely opposes materialistic interpretations
of both the cosmic and prccosmic soul: cf. De an. procr. IOIJC: !022F-102JA. and also
1013EF: 101-lE; !Ot5n et passim. Sec also I!J93a, p. 152. On Plutarch's criticism of
any materialistic approach to "divine' realities: sec 13EAUJEU 1959, p. 208.

Cf. PI:":"OY 1 %Sh. p. 198. Sec also De 1irt. m or. 4-t:m: c't!J..U. nti:-ru Tt> uioihtnxov <o
{}gr:1nxov zrti q l'nxi>V -rft; 11tzf1; ftigo;J pEv ii).!J; itvt'tzou ).orou zui. z(l)rrc't -roo:rov nvit <fJ;
oagxo; xui :trQi. <t> miJfHt :ruvn-).tiJ; xrtw:rirruzr. l\1orl! important is that the
same is said of lhe irralional faculty. 1:0 mdhj<tZov (;t: the part cornplctl!ly devoid of reason):
at :rrgi <o uiftU xui <t> rrvrt'flet xai. <o btv(qu:u; <C:t; niJv mtOtiJv btwrogU.; :tOIOtmv,
_wa:tQ z wi: :rm1ttnzoi: <fJ; ougzo; xui. ouvuvurruono; n'1v
:tOtOTljHt zui <ijV Y.[Hi.OLV. 1:00 b' tLV0(lt;J;Wl' tui; rraOtjTIZCLL; ll!)flULS: 1:0 0\lfl:tm'louv
xai D.E'(f.Otmv t;JZQOnJn:; t'gvOt'Ht<LHL TQOfLOL mJbt'JoEL; zagbiu;, btuzl!on;
au ;tai.tv fv bimv l'jbovt'uv xui 1t(lOUbozim; (De rirt. Ill Or. 451 Al3 ). Compare Dl' libidine et
aegritudine 9: <C:L oi: :raOt] rrc'tvta zui <a; (wOcvEiet; womg EX nj; oagxo;
avaB/.ao<CtVEIV bi. TOY ctv{}gumov (BABUT, 1969b. p. 59 nole 2; note 36, p. 139-140, argues in
favour of the authenticity of De lib. et aegr. which is rejected, however, by most scholars. Cf.
1968h, p. 199-200 note 8 (contra authenticity); 1969a, p. 32-35 (cautiously
contra); 1969b (cautiously pro)). Sec also Mu!. virt. 243C; De 1irt. mor. 442A (<o pf:v uEi.
aww.m Bot).w{}m OU\'flVCLL zai. otiJflU {)f(.>UITE\JElV 11Hftzo;

xf'z).ll<W); 4-l2C;
def or. 437EF bi: <o (ruvraonxov mzE n]; '\f't'Xii; hco wu
Y.QU<EtoOm xai. UJ<; btj).6v EOHV cmo nov ovEigwv [ ... ) ah[a
0
T] xgam; wu Dio 2,4; Arat. 29,8; Demetr. 38,3-4; ps.-Piut. De vita et poesi
H?meri 131. For more parallels see BABUT 1969b, notes 220 and 221 p. 168-169. Cf. Plato
T!maeus 86B-87C, with TAYLOR 1928, p. 610-620, COR:-IFORD 1937, p. 343-349 and esp.
BABlJT 1969b, p. 58 note 3. ,
151
Cf. BABUT 1969a. p. 280. On ubtarrnowv cf. 11188; Sext. Emp. Adv. Alath. 7,110-111;
224; 409. ,.
160 CHAPTER 4
This reasoning is complementary to the view that Socrates .. brackets'' off
his own knowledge for didactics' sake: Socrates above all wishes to
safeguard the search for truth; he does not want his knowledge to interfere
with it. In order to prevent cptA.auda from hampering the search. he frees
himself and his pupils from the distracting and confusing influence of bo;a.
By not giving the impression of wanting to impose his own views, he
facilitates the pupils' acceptance of their being refuted.
The polemical context of the Quaestio is once again evidenced by the
reference to the other philosophical schools, which is meant to illustrate that
self-love is incompatible with love of the truth:
lJ yU.g otxda b6);n xai. ouvotxoc; ou To btarpwvouv :rgo; cd.n'Jv.
w; aigf:onuv TO O)V, &.v agtoTa rrg(tHlJ <fll.OOOCflCt.
xmogOouonv, b TCL a).).ac_; Ct:taoet; xai. fWZOflEVet; :rgo; Ti]V
a).t']OELav. ( lOOOC)
For personal opinion to which one is wedded will not accept what disagrees
with her, as the multitude of systems testifies, of which philosophy, if she is
faring her best, involves a single one being right and all the others guessing and
being in COn0ict \Vith the truth.
The multitude of philosophical aig[ons;
152
must be explained by the fact that
most do not so much seck to attain truth, but rather try to make their views
prcvaill5J. philosophical schools, failing to transcend the kvel of
opinions (oiort[vus;). actually fight the truth (rtazoru::va; nQb; Tt]\'
<tt.1'p'h:w.v) !5-l. Only one single philosophical school can be on the right
track 155, and this only in the best case. It is obvious that according to Plutarch
the one school on the right track will be Platonism. It should be noted,
however, that Plutarch does not affirm that Platonism has fully attained the
truth; he does suggest that it is the only a'lQEat that may be held to be
xu{}oQOouou. As a consequence, all the other schools, differing from
Platonism, err. Underlying Plutarch's reasoning is the conviction that the
truth is one. The very fact that there is more than one school is already an
On ul'grm; ( .. school of thought, persuasion"), sec GLUCKER 1978. p. 166192.
15J A somewhat similar reasoning is to be found in De 1irt. mar. bri Ott't TL toi;:
v OZEflfl((OlV Ol' TCQOOEOTL TO flE'tCt J.U:Tl]; v:ro t(r)\' EtEQCrJV c"trroOw xdi
ftrtmlOwum ;ro)J.uxl;. (tU: cttn6; t' 'Agtatat0.1]; tE xai Xgtm;r:ro; f\'l(t tt!)v
ITQOOUI'V uutoi; UQEOZOVHI)V xai u<'ll'pmJ); xai !ldf T]OOVlj; uqri:oav; As long as
their knowledge was not commingled with irrational passion, the older philosophers were
perfectly capable of admitting and correcting their own mistakes. Of course, cp).cwrin is such
an irrational impediment. One may notice that Plutarch's appreciation of other philosophers,
including the Stoics, is more favourable here than in the first Quaestio Platoniea, the reason
for this being that the context of De virt. mar. 44-17F-44SA is one of praise for the
philosophical life in general.
154 Compare BARIGAZZI 1981, p. 200. on the philosophers who are cpl.obo:;m (on love of
fame in general. see e.g. J:-;GENKAMP 1992, p. 4300-430-1; 4335-4344). On the rivalry between
philosophical schools see De Sto. rep. 1036AB: cf. infra: eh. 4, Ill, C.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 161
aberration. In an ideal situation a single, truthful philosophy would be
sufficient.
Ill. r.cnci).lpjH OR ar.aTat.lp!'La? (lOOOCD)
The third section of the Quaestio Platonica deals with the central question,
i.e. the meaning of Socrates' words at Theaet. 150C, from the perspective of
a dilemma: either man cannot attain certain, "cataleptic" knowledge (d [tEv
o{bfv on r.cnn).tptov r.ni yvttmtov, lOOOC), or knowledge of
the truth is possible and truth is one (d 6' anv man'nu1 TOD aA111>oi: v 6
TO c'ti.tl1>;. IOOOD). In the first case we are left with diversity of opinions, in
the second knowledge of the truth is possible. Plutarch is reformulating the
issue, explicitly relating it to the epistemological controvasies between
Academics, Stoics and Epicureans tsr.. As we have already seen, xan1A.tpl!l
according to the most strict Stoic definition is a self-certifying and therefore
infallible act of cognition, the assent to a "cognitive" or "cataleptic"
impression. i.e. an impression that warrants its own truth by presenting itself
with such clarity and distinctness as can only be produced by a real object
represented accurately. The Academics disputed that such xan:tl.1ppu; is
possible for man: true impressions have no characteristic mark allowing to
distinguish them with certainty from false ones.
Let us return to Plutarch's dilemma: in both cases, he argues
1
57, the
recommendation given by God to Socrates makes good sense. If it is
impossible for us to obtain cognitive knowledge, then it certainly is
reasonable for God to have prevented Socrates from begetting false notions
1
') Compare Lucianus 1/ermot. A YK. (n(tll rbr pm. Ill et n; M>(); unv ll lf t).ooo<riuv
Cl'{Ol'IJU 1,} Tlf)V Itw'ix<r)\' l'lllf)\'; c'ti.t}Ht-J f'{l;) ljr.Ol10\' (;); xui unm j[O)J.oi nvr; dmv; EPM.
fL(t).u ;ro)).oL- flrQt:TltTl}tlXOL zui 'Emxot'QflOl XCtl ol TtW [1/.c'mr>V<t fTCl'{QWfO!Lf\'01, xai Ut'
ll.LO'[E\'Ot; ui),Ol nvt'; zui 'A vnourvov; l;.qi.onui zui ol (t;ro taU n l'U<t'{OQOU xui Etl ;r).riov;.
A YK. (t).1JHfl mi:m ;ro)J.oi y<'tQ rimv. ;ron:Qov 01'1. tTJ 'EQflOTLftr. Ttt uin1 oi':tOL hrotmv fJ
btct<rocu; EP;\1. zai j[(tvu btc't<rogu. A YK. to or yr c't).tp'l; oipcu j[(tvn>; not v t'Jv aini>v,
wJ: Ot' ;T(lVtu. OLCL<{OQC't '{E 0\'Ht. EPM. nuw flt'Y Ot'V. Cic. De /Ill[. dear. 1.5; Plul. Quaest.
COil\', 732E: ui.1J0ft'El\' flEV '(ltQ u:ri.tiJ; 'J'I't'0E00UL 6' (t;tflQCt;(li:J; j[UQE;(El tit TCQU'(flCtHl
1
"' Cf. De Stn. rep. l036A: TOt; !lfv yctg boziJv uyotm :rrgi. j[Uvnuv [se. the Academics] \'S.
toi; 6' bLOt1.J!llJV ivqrru\;.oprvat; za{}' lJY OflOt.O'{Ol'flEVw; BtwOOfLEUct [se. the Stoics].
157
1000C: Eizonn; 0 uro; U:Tf%l;)).t
1
0fV Ul'TO\' Um]VCfllCl XC!l zcti uBrrwu '{EVVUV,
eiirt.ELV b tot; a)).ot; t:Oletlta bosc't\;.ovtu;. Ol' '(UQ fllZQOV lJV OCfE).o; una
PErLOTOV 6 Tal' flE'(lOTOU ttiJ\' %UX(iJV, U:TUT1]; zui Z\'O<fQOOt
1
Vl];, ann)J.c'ttt(UV A.oyo; ''o{8
'Aoz).rptubcu; TOl'TO'/ rbwxE u6;." (Theognis 1,432; cf. VAN GRONINGEN 1966, p. 172-173]
ov '{UQ owputo; 1'1 Iwzgc'not; imgEict, 't'l';(lj; 8 1.1" {;ro{l.ov Xctl OtHp{}C!QftEVl}; Y.etOUQflOS,
Cf. De all(/. 4-IA v:roti.ol'); compare also Lye. 4,3; Mar. 35,1; De ad. et am. 59D;
61E; F (TOI; boti.ot; zai cp).E'(flULVOl'at nj; 't'U;(1j;); De Is. et Os. 383B (oi'm OWfLaOLV oihr.
'ttzui; t:rot/.m; xai. voo<l>brm); De Pyth. or. 394E: De eo h. ira 456E; De sera 1111111. 565C;
567B; Quaest. COil\'. 715F and Plaio Gorg. 4SOB (to ut'nxiw; Uj[OU).ov ti]V 'tJUXllY
:TOLTJO!'l xai uviutov); 518E; Tim. 7:2D.
162
CHAPTER 4
and to compel him to refute those who were forming such opmtons.
Catharsis of the soul is even more imperative than healing the body. for
vanity and deception are the greatest of evils. On the other assumption
Socrates' practice is equally reasonable: as soon as one possesses knowledge,
he who has learned it from the discoverer possesses it no less than he who
discovered it ( oux EAattov EXEL ToD EUQOVTO 6 :rag a ToD
1000D)15H. But with a view to facilitating the acquisition of knowledge, it is
better not to be convinced of already possessing the truth tw, so as to be able
to examine the credentials of the views of others with an open mind and
choose the best b 6 znv, zni
TO r)EJ.LLOTOV cmavnuv, wa:rEQ 6 Jwi:ba ;[OlELTat TO\' CtQLOLOV,
10000).
A. Second and Third Academic epistemology
Who is Plutarch referring to when offering the dilemma about the possihilitv
of cataleptic knowledge? Let us first turn to Arcesilaus, the champion ;f
('tzaTat,tppiu. Arcesilaus is known to have attributed the inapprehcnsihility
thesis to Socrates. Indeed, at Adl. Col. ll21F-1122A Plutarch "thanks" the
Epicurean for having proven- unintentionally- that Arcesilaus' philnsophy
does not constitute a break with the Academic tradition; Colotes added the
information that Arcesilaus ascribed his views to Plato and Socrates. among
others (cf. supra: p. R5). That Arcesilaus did so is confirmed by e,idence
from various sources 1w.
J<x On the comhination r\.eior.nv/fLUVO<'tvnv see CIIERNISS 1 <J76a. p. 27 note c.: {to the
examples from Plato may he aJJeJ Leg. %SD).
'''1 CIIERNISS ( l <J76a, p. 27 note f) compares this to the situation of those mentioneJ in De
1/ttd. 47[): Ol b' ll;t(J 1ft).OTlfllUS <'t<ill_lOl' XHl Y.FVij; ;tQ(>; f'ri:(]Ol'S (qLi)J.q; o':;tnp;<t Zlll
n'tLcd)fiw; i::tt.\ClXVl'fLlVOl, 1'(\_ll V it ).CL[ktV Ef.l'lV tlfiOJ.O'(Oll\'l;, oi ).(LJlfl<'t\'Ol'OlV.I{<l\\ \.!\ <.:r, the
two c1ses Jifkr substantially: Dt: afl(/. 47D is about people \vho are afraid to aJrnit their lack
of comprehension of a particular matter. wherc:as Qttaest. !'fat. 10000 (also <J'NE) about
those who wrongly think that they possess knowkJge.
tw The most important testimonies have b..:en gathereJ by GOEDECKE:'.IEYER l')tl). p. 33-34
and OIERNISS 1<J76a, p. 25 note J . Cf. Lactantius Di1. Inst. 3.6,7: "Arcesilas [ ... ] auctore
Socrate suscepit hanc sententiam nihil sciri posse"; Cic. Acad. I 44-45 : "turn cum
Zenone', inquam 'ut accepimus Arcesilas sihi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut
stullio vincenJi ut quidem mihi videtur, scd ea rum rerum obscuritatc quae ad
ignorationis adJuxerant Socratem, et iam ante Socratem Democritum
EmpeJoclem omnes paenc veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse: dix-erunt,
angustos sensus, imbccillos animos. brevia curricula vitae, et (ut Democritus) in profunda
veritatem esse denH.:rsam, opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri, nihil veritati r..:linqui,
deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. itaque Arcesilas ncgahat esse quicquam
quod sciri possct, ne illud quidcm ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset, ut nihil scire se sciret
[ ... ]"'; De orat. 3.67: "Arcesilas primum, qui Polcmonem audicrat, ex variis Platonis libris
sermonibusquc hoc maxi me arripuit, nihil esse certi, quod aut sensibus aut animo pcrcipi
possit.'' See also HIRZEL Ill 1883, p. 36-37; LEVY 1993b, p. 146-147. For Socratcs. Empedoc!es
and Xenophanes one may compare De aud. poet. 17DE (cf. infra: p. 181 ); for Ocmocritus see
GRAESER 1970, p. 300-301.
AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
163
At the time of the Hellenistic polemic and also of Plutarch, Arcesilaus and
his followers were usually referred to as ot rrEQL rravnuv E:rrzovt:Es;
16
1. Sextus
Empiricus reserved ox.'l>t; and oxErrnx.il <pLAooocpLa for Pyrrhonism,
whereas Favorinus, followed by Aulus Gellius (11,5)
162
, applied it to
Pyrrhonians and Academics indiscriminatelyl
63
The latter use is now
common and is also adopted in the present study for convenience (in
defiance of the fact that the early New Academics did not see themselves in
such terms).
Our sources ascribe mainly two theses to Arcesilaus: (1) the ax.aHLAll'l'ia-
thesis; (2) the recommendation of universal suspension of judgment. It has
not yet been determined to what extent and in which sense these theses can
be said to be Arcesilaus' own: how can he have held these theses without
contradicting himself? For do these theses not compromise themselves and
each other? A.A. LO:\G and D.N. SEDLEY distinguish four types of answer
to these problemsiM:
( l) is Arccsilaus' own conclusion, and suspension is the only
proper solution to it;
(2) suspcnsion is a purely deknsive stratcgy conveying nothing of Arccsilaus'
real aims;
(3) inapprchensihility is a strictly ad hominem refutation of the Stoic
"cataleptic impression", and universal suspension of assent is the embarrassing
consequence which thc Stoic must accept on his own premisses;
(4) for evcry thesis Arccsilaus has hecn offercd he was able to advance a
counter-argument of equal wcight; is his responsc.
Answer (2) amounts to the allegation of crypto-dogmatism and is nowadays
commonly rejected (cf. supra: p. 63-66). Interpretations (3)
165
and (4) JM,
convey important aspects of Arcesilaus' anti-Stoic polemic, but do not offer
an adequate explanation when each is taken on its own. Answer (I) is only
self-contradictory when Arcesilaus cum suis would have claimed to have
cognitive, i.e. "cataleptic", knowledge of ax.cncrA111.I'lCL, which Arcesilaus
actually denies. As we have seen, must follow for the Stoic wise man,
to! Se.: e.g. Atlr. Col. 1120C.
16: Cf. in]ra: p. 236-238.
163
One may also compare Euscbius Pra.:p. cv. 14,18.1, citing a fragment of a work by
Aristocks niJn:; rot\:; Y.u.ru OY.E:rTlY.Ol;:; (the syntax suggests the existence of other
sccptics bcsid..:s the Pyrrhonians).
Thc present account is based primarily on Lo:-<G-SEDLEY 11 <JS7, p. 438-448, and esp. 446-
447.
165
Cf. Num. frg. 25,132-140 (DES PLACES) ap. Eus. Pra.:p. Ev. 14,6,12-13; Sext. Emp. Ad1.
Afath. 7,150-157. See also ANNAS 1988, p. 103.
166 Cf. Cic. Acad. 1,46; Cic. De fi'n. 2,2; 5,10; De oral. 3,80; Diog. Laert. 4,28.

16-t
CHAPTER 4
on his own premisses (cf. supra: eh. 3, I, A). I think it ls unlikelyl
11
7, hut not
impossible, that Arcesilaus considered rro;:1'1 as his own position. The hest
overall view of Arcesilaus' epistemological position will probably combine
elements of (1), (3), and (4):
If, on the one hand, you adopt a policy of Academic opcn-mindcdncss. gi\ing
due weight to the pros and cons of every thesis, you will ipso faciO suspend
judgement. If, on the other hand, you adopt a doctrinal stance like Stoicism, it
will follow from premises to which this stance commits you, in conjunction with
its inability to resist I [ = the ax.ma).tpl,[a-thesis] that you should suspend
judgement. Hence whatever philosophical positions you adopt or avoid
adopting, you will, if wise, suspend judgment. See for example Arcesilaus
argument at

"and if everything is incognitive, it \vill follow, according

to the Stoics too, that the wise man suspends judgment".
(LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 4-+7; LS's italic)
At any rate, brox1'1 never was Arcesilaus' goal. "Zetetics" is the bottom line
of his philosophy, for he considered it his duty never to give up the st:arch for
the truth
111
'
1

Arcesilaus was succeeded at the head of the school by Carneadcs. whl) also
denied the possibility of Stoic xm:c't).lppt;. But although all arc
uxcnut.l)it:tu to him, they arc not all c'ibqAu. Carneades is known for having
distinguished degrees of probability- or rather. degrees of persu;tsi\cncss,
for mHuv(nq; to him is a strictly subjective notion, telling us about
the objective truth of an impression. He acknowledges that some
impressions arc more convincing than others, hut conviction to an
altogether different realm than objective certainty
170
(only in certainty/truth
would the objective and the subjective order meet). It is therefore inaccurate
to characterise Carneades' epistemology as a "probabilisrn .. l 7 1 - also
because the mvav1'1 <ruv-raoin is an originally Stoic conception
17
2. exploited
by Carneades in order to explode their conception of the "cat;tlcptic


CL COUISSI:--; 192lJa, csp. p. 244-241{: l929b. p. 3lJ0-392; llJ71. p. 50-52: FHr:DE
llJ83, p. R7; STRIKER 1980. p. 62-69. This interpretation has been challenged rcct.:ntly by
IOPPOLO (llJ1{6, p. 57-60; 65) and A:--;NAS p. 10}; 106-107; IOlJ). who claim that
Arccsilaus can be said to have defended boz1'1 as his own position. "lnapprchcnsibility". on
the other hand. is regarded as a mert!ly dialectical prt!miss by IOPPOLO ( 1986, p. 55-6 I and t.:sp.
1989, p. 142).
= Sext. Emp. Ad1. Math. 7,I55-I56: n:c'tVHI)V OE OVTwv uxma)Jptu>v ctr.o).mih]nn r.cti
i<atit toi.; LtltHzoi.c; ErrEznv tov Otl!f()V. Cf. IOPPOLO 1986, p. 59: "[ ... ] nt.: conseguir:1 che
anche (corsivo mio) secondo gli Stoici il saggio sospendera, in cui anche sottolinca che ai
saggio stoico non resta che uniformarsi all'attegiamento di quello accadcmico".
Wl CL Cic. Acad. 1176; Al':-iAS 1988, p. 108: LEVY 1992, p. 269.
1
711
Cf. IOPPOLO 1986, p. 205; FUHRER 1993, p. 108-110, esp. note 9; GbRLER I 994. p. 860-866.
171
BURNYEAT 1980, p. 28-29; LONG SEDLEY I 1987, p. 458-459.
Cf. Sext. Emp. Adl'. A-lath. 7,242.


.\
!
ACADEMIC ASD PLATONIC THHIES IN PLUTARCH 165
impression". Carneades- for dialectics' sake- concedes that a weak 1
7
3 form
of assent to "persuasive impression" may be inevitable. Whereas Arcesilaus
still offered to the Stoic wise man an escape route, consisting in suspending
assent in all matters, Carneadcs deprives them even of this possibility,
affirming that it is inevitable to have opinionsl
7
-'. Contrary to Arcesilaus,
Carneades does not recommend universal suspension of assent m, but
introduces instead the distinction between ax.an't),lliTHL and ab11Aa, as
appears from Numenius' testimony!7ti. At Cicero Acad. I! 32 the Academics
merely affirming that everything is uncertain ("omnia incerta") are distin-
guished from those who hold that something is plausible and resembling the
truth ("volunt prohabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile"), i.e. those who
actually complain because the former charge them with saying that
everything is uncertain (''qui etiam queruntur quod eos insimulemus omnia
incerta dicere"), "and they try to explain the difference between what is
uncertain and what be grasped, and to distinguish between them
(quantumquc intersit inter inccrtum et id quod percipi non possit docere
con:1ntur caquc distinguere)". These thinkers presumably arc Carncades
and Clitomachus
177
, and their precise argumentation will have been that all
things are indeed incer/a or ('tiWTc'tl.ljiTTCt, hut not all abtl).a. "Let US
therefore deal with those who make this distinction ... Lucullus continues,
"and leave on one side as a hopeless sort of persons the others who say that
all things are as uncertain as whether the number of the stars is odd or even"
(transl. 1933).
17
1
Cf. Sext. Emp. l'yrrh. 1/yp. 1.22lJ-230.

Cf. Cic.t1nu/. //67 (Cicero speaking in propria persona and addressing Lucullus) : "Si ulli
rei sapiens adsentietur umquam. aliquando etiam opinabitur : nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Ha ne
conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum. Carneades non
numquam secundum illud dahat. adsentiri aliquando. Ita sequehatur etiam opinari, quod tu
non vis et recte. ut mihi videris." Sec IOPPOLO 1986, p. 6-t-65: 2I5-216.
m Cf. KLEVER 1982, p. IS-19: 52-53: !OPPOLO 19S6. p. 197-198. The difference may be
observed in Sext. Emp. Pyrrlz. llyp. I.23I-232: in 231 Sextus is speaking about the
Academics in general. who distinguish degrees of persuasiveness; in 232 he excepts
Arcesilaus. who practises E:rozil :u:gi. rt:U\'twv: 6 fLEvrm 'AgzwD.ao;. &v nj; ftEm];
'AzaO!]!tlet; El.f(OflEV rlVCLl JtQOOtUtl]V xcti CtQZlJ'{OV. n:c'tvu flOl boxd toi; nl'QQltlVELOL;
ZOlVtu\'fl\' 1.6ym;, l;>; fllctV ElVCtl <Y'f.EDOV tl]V zm' autov U'{(l)'{l]V Y.Ctl tl]V l'UtEtEgav oihE '{UQ
JtfQL krc'tg;rw; l] ttvt':tag;ia; nvo; tt:toq:mvOflEVO; fl'QlOZEtal, Ot'tf Y.ata n:ianv il U:ttatiav
:tgozg[vn n ftfQOV EtEQOL', ct!J.(t ilfQL rt:U\'tltlV
17
t Num. frg. 26,103-111 DES PLACES : pd)' ot; Kagvfc't61]; {t:tobf;CtftEvo; tl]V btettQtPilv
tQltl]V atvwnJaato 'AzaOl]piav. i.oy{l)v ftEV oi'"v U'{W{1] EZQl]amo!] xai. 6 'AgzwD.ao; xai.
'{UQ aho; bEtl]Cfl'f tl]V rt; EzUtfQct E:tlXELQT]OLV xai. :tCt\'ta uvwzn)al;E ta imo nl>v afJ.wv
J.f'{OftEVU' o fv t</J :tfQL ti]; bozl]; /.6yc.p n:go; atnov OtEOtlj, q:u; ubuvmov dvm
av{}gc.un:ov OVTa :tfQL cbc't\'t(f)V btEZEtV' OtCHfOQClV b' flVaL xai. uxatal.l):tTOl' xai.
:tU\'tCt pi:v dvm uzatc'tt.l]:tta. ou :tcivra o abl]i.et.
m Cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 77.
.....
\
166
CHAPTER 4
The question whether the number of stars is odd or even is the stock
example of an abllAovl78, and the topic of conversation in one of Plutarch's
Table Talks (Quaest. conv. 9,12: 06-rEQOV f:on mftavwugov TO UQTlOt'; dvm
-cot'<; aorga<; 11 The major part of this quaestio has
not been preserved, but my hypothesis is that it drew on discussions between
Carneades (and Clitomachus) and the Stoics on the difference between
c'.txara/.1pna and a611An, and on degrees of persuasiveness- as one may infer
from m1'lav<.inEgov in the title of the quaestio (741C). In the fragment that
has been preserved, Sospis, one of the conversationalists, mockingly
remarks:
I sec boys playing odd and even with knuckle-bones, and the Academics with
words (WL'S: rra"lbas; aoTQCt'fCL).OL; 6gt0 roil; b' 'Axabqrtci(r.ou; i.o:OL;
There is not a bit of difference between guesswork of this kind
(olwLOVTOL and people who ask whether they hold an odt.l or an
even number of things in their outstretched fist.
(741 C. transl. SANDI1ACH) 1
79
Concerning the subject of the quaestio SA!':DBACII (in: MtNAR- Sr\:"DB:\CH
- HELI\.IBOLD 1961, p. 252-253 note h) suggests: "It would delight an
Academic to show that a probable answer could be given even to this
question." This seems very unlikely to me- if indeed SANDUACI 1 means that
Carneades was prepared to give a ddinitive answer, claiming it to he the
most probable. But Carneadcs had the reputation of being able to tkknd
whichever thesis with tremendous verve, and also of being wont to astound
his opponents by "proving" opposite theses with equally convincing
argumentslso. This last strategy was presumably evidenced in Quaest. cotl\'.
9,12.
A. RESCIGNO (1992, p. 171 note 2) has suggested that there may have
been confusion among Platonists between the question whether the number
of stars is odd or even, and the discussion about the number of worlus. The
latter problem receives an extensive discussion in De defecttl oraculurwn (cf.
infra: p. 194-195), where Lamprias closes the discussion with the remark
that, without claiming certainty, he thinks that the hypothesis that there is
more than one, but still a limited number of worlds does not seem unlikely;
he subsequently adds an argument that makes this hypothesis more plausible
than any other. It is noteworthy that this argumentation makes use of
principles and terms that are characteristic of Plutarch 's Platonist
metaphysics lXI as we know it from other works: matter's nature is oxroaorov
xai but the ordering principle, 1-.oyo;, prevents dispersiveness to
t7H Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 2,97; Adv. Math. 8,143.
17'1 See also GLUCKER 1978, p. 266-267.
IKO Cf. LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 448.

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 167
progress to infinity ( 430F). The Platonist argumentation leads to an
Academic conclusion:
db' aD.azo{h rrou xavtai:!fia Tf]; 'AxabllWlC1s; auwus; TO
Q'(CLV Tii; JTLOTEws; xai. n'lv aocpci.I..ELC1V WOJTEQ EV Y.WQlcp ocpa).Egcp
n,u rrEQL -r1); an:ng[w; ).oy<lJ

But if in any other place we have recalled the Academy to our mind, let us do
so here as well, and divest ourselves of excessive credulity and, as if we were in
a slippery place in our discussion about infinity, let us merely keep a firm
footing."
(431A, transl. BABBITT 1936b)
Already in the course of his argumentation Lamprias had played on the
theme of the m{}awl>TEQOV ( 427B), and also the preceding intervention of
Philippos had developed this motive txJ. One passage of the latter's argumen-
tation may even seem a paro,dy on Carneades' lingo:
Its derivation from the number of elements, at which the Master hinted darkly
(u;nJvt;mo), is in every way hard to grasp (C'llOI..l]moc;) and gives no clear
intimation of the plausibility which must have drawn him on to assert that it is
likely that U:tO<pC1lVOUOa n); EXELVOV m0C1VOTI]TOs;
EL-u:: i:v uJ; Eir.oc; on) etc. ( 426F)
One is tempted to consider EJtEOfWOfLEVlr; an allusion to the Carneadcan
technical term a;rEgio:raow;, used in the definition of the "most
convincing" impression, i.e. the m{}nvil xai xai
c'.t:rEgio:rcwro; cpavnwiH
1
Xt. Be that as it may, on many other occasions
Plutarch indeed shows his familiarity with the terminology introduced by
Carneades.
1
'
1
E.g. Dt: an. procr. 1013E; 1015A; 1015E; 1024AI3; 1026C; Quncst. Plat. 1002AB;
1003AI3; Quaest. com. 7203. For Plutarch"s conception of matter see TI-!EVENAZ 1938, p.
10:-1-113; VERrlEKE 1945, p. 261; I3ALTES I 1976, p. 42; 199-lb, p. 258-260. Also
compare Alcin. Didask. 177,24-26.

This is one of the main passages invoked by ZELLER (111.2 1923, p. 181 note 5),
SCHROETER (1911, p. 23) and DE LACY (1953, p. 83) in order to demonstrate Plutarch's
scepticism"'; but see DONIN!1986a, p. 207-208; p. 222-223 note 11; BABUT 1992, p. 224-226.
lS.l Cf. 426E: TO [ ... } JtfQl lOUTWV xnv i'j OlJ"i(. O.v ywyE
See also 4233 and esp. 422E: "CLS b' av [ ... ) Ev JtQCtYflUOLV ELT)
;n0nv6nr;. o:rou %Ctl D).Ct"t(JJV oUbi:v dn:wv EiiA.oyov ol.b' dxo; o{hw xcnBaA.E TOV /.6yov;
The Academic approach to the problem appears to be in full accordance with the Platonic. Cf.
Tim. 55CD: a n; Ei m:i.vw Efl[lfAWS Ct:TOQOLJIOTEQOV CtJIELQOU; XQll %00[LOUS
dvm/.ynv l] :rga; l!zovw:;. TO flEV UJIELQ0\.1; tiYt]aatT" O.v an:dgou llVOS dvm My[ta
wv Ep:TEIQOV zgniJv dvm, JIOTEQOV Of va l]JtEVt:E auwu; CtAl]{}Eic;t 1tHftx6w; /.ynv ]tOTE
lt(i)J.ov O.v wunJ met; TO [tEv ouv Oi]n:ag' va al.nov
iW"[U "[QV dxow A.oyov 1tEcpux6w [ll]\-ln {}EOV, aA.A.o; b Ei.; a/).a 1t1J ETEQU oo!;c'.ton
(Plato gives preference to the hypothesis of one single world). See also De E 389F-390A.
t!l-1 See e.g. Sext. Emp. Pyrrlz.Hyp. 1.227; 229; KLEYER 1982, p. 55-59.
l
168 CHAPTER 4
To the non-specialist the difference between on the one hand Carneades'
sophisticated definition of the convincing impression, and on the other the
Stoic conception of the "cataleptic impression'' as it had been modified and
refined in the debate with the Academics, may have seemed a fine one tss.
This has led to the paradoxical situation that Carneades radicalised the
Academic criticism of Stoic epistemology, whereas by the subtle distinctions
added or provoked by him the Academic and Stoic positions came to bear a
closer resemblance - at least superficially, for the theoretical difference
remains fundamental. Carneades' mfruvov as a practical criterion ISo- and a
fallible criterion at that, since he did not exclude that in some instances one
would be persuaded of something which is actually false IS
7
- is undeniably
more sophisticated than Arcesilaus' (dialectical use of the) ij),orov, but at
the same time precludes any claim to knowledge txx. This may aud to the
explanation why Cicero is able to consider Carneadcs a more moderate
sceptic (Acad. /166-67; 77-78). relating on the other hand that Clitomachus
was wont to declare that he had never been able to find out what his teacher
Carneaues actually believed (Acad. 11 139)
1
S'J. Sextus Empiricus in A(/\>.
/t.latfl. 7,159-165 depicts him as the more radical sceptic than Arcesilaus,
which seems to conflict with the account in Pyrrfl. hyp. 1

from
which Arcesilaus emerges as being closer to the Pyrrhonian position than
Carneades. This ambiguity is constitutive, I think, for Carneades'
philosophy, and has been externalised in the further development of
Acauemic philosophyt<JI.
At any rate, the thinker associated with thet.Tut.lppia was Arcesilaus- who
is likely to have coined the term - rather than Carneades. If Plutarch had
wanted to attach one single name to the thesis d o{b[v un x<m<l.lpTov
c'<v11Q<;)jH,I) xuL yv<t>OTOV ( IOOOC). it would have been Arcesilaus' rather than
any other Academic's.

Cf. LO:"G 191-lSb, p. 200; 1991. p. 282 note 29; 288-292.

txn Cf. IOPPOLO 1986, p. 208-209; GORLER 1994, p. 860-866.
tx7 Cf. BURNYEAT 1980, p. 29.
txx Cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 292 note 128.
t.w Cf. TARRAt'.'T 1985, p. 63; LEVY 1978. p. 348; STOUGH 1987, p. 224-225;
1992, p. 47-52.
I'M See also Ad1. matlz. 7.166-189.
19
1 See also LEVY 1992, p. 268-276; 1993b, p. 153.
;:;:}
4

AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 169
In the later tradition
1
92 the Academics have been accused of self-contra-
diction, of being .. dogmatic sceptics" or "negative dogmatists". But neither
Arcesilaus nor Carneades made themselves actually liable to this allegation.
Arcesilaus explicitly denied ctr.etTaA1Pl'La any such dogmatic value. In this
issue, i.e. in the question of how the Academics understood their own
position, the Academic source Cicero is certainly to be trusted more than
Aenesidemusm or the Pyrrhonian-minded, tendentiousl
9
-t Sextus:
!taque Arcesi/as negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum
quod Socrates sihi reliquisset, lit nihil scire se sciret.
Accordingly Arcesilas said that there is nothing that can be known, not even
that residuum of knowledge that Socrates had left himself- the truth of this
very dictum.
(Cic. A cad. /45, transl. 1933) 1'>5
Carneades is most likely to have succeeded avoiding the trap of self-contra-
diction in a similarly ingenious fashion '
96
It is said that when Antipater
asked him whether he ought not consistently admit that this single fact can
be perceived, namely -that nothing else can, Carneadcs replied with great
acumen.

David (1711-1776) was of this opinion: cf. Bl:R:-IYEAT 19S4. p. 227 with note 6;
11JS5. p. 71 (it shou!J be noted, however. that Dumont's appn::ciation of the
Acad.:mics and th.: Pyrrhonians is itself tendentious); A:o-::--:AS 19S8, p. 112; LAURSEN 1992, p.
1o1-1o:!. The ht:lid that Academic "scepticism" is essentially dogmatic is, however, still quite
wic.kspr.:ad : sec e.g. 19S5, p. 71 ;76-78; S2-83; 89-IJO; 95-96 et passim; AMICO 11JIJ3,
p. 25 with not.: p. 52.
1.
1
Cf. Photius /Jihf. cod. 212. 16%36-170a41.
I'l-l l'yrrh. /lyp. 1,232-233; cf. STRIKER 1981, p. 154; LO:"G- SEDLEY 1 19S7, p. 447 (s.:c also
p. 457; 472-473); J)()RRIE 19S7, p. 427; ANNAS 1988, p. 103: 107; LEVY 1992, p. S0-81; 181;
274-275 note lJ7.
19
' Cf. SEDLEY 1WG. p. 11-12; LOSG- SEDLEY I 1987. p. 447; HANKINSON 1995, p. 17. Sec
also Cic. Acad. If 28-29; 110. Arccsilaus' ingenious argument did not prevent Colotes from
criticising him on this very point: cf. VANDER WAERDT 1989, p. 261-262. Not only regarding
hut also in respect of the "universal suspt:nsion of judgment" did Arcesilaus
avoid self-contradiction. Cf. IOI'I'OLO 1986, p. 145: "Allo stesso modo Arcesilao non assume
la posizione chc "bisogna" sospendere il giudizio. L'epoclze c il risultato che conseguc di volta
in voila all'ugual peso delle tesi contrappostc."
1
"" Cf. STOUGH 1987, p. 225; LEVY 1992. p. 268-269. Catulus, presenting at Cic. A cad. 11148
his father's views, which are said to be Carneadean, is less careful ("nihilesse quod percipi
possit vchementer adscntior"), but is immediately corrected by the author and by Hortensius :
"'hahco inquam 'scnkntiam tuam nee earn admodum aspernor. sed tihi quid tandem videtur
Hortensi?' turn ille ridens 'tollendum'. 'teneo te' inquam; 'nam ista Academiae est propria
sententia'." Cf. GUJCKER 1978, p. 396-397; LEVY 1992, p. 80-81; 181; 274-275 note 97; 1993a,
p. 270-273 (LEVY argues that the view expressed by Catulus is not Carneades', nor Philo's or
interpretation of the Carneadean view or their own position, but an attempt to
present a formulation to which all the participants of the conversation could more or less
reconcile themselves, that is. bot}l the advocates of universal suspension of judgment and
those believing that assent is obligatory for the wise; Catulus' words are in fact an attempt at
reformulating in Socratic terms theTarneadean position).
',
170 CHAPTER 4
He used to declare that this was so far from being consistent that it was actuallv
grossly inconsistent: for the man who said there was nothing that was perceived
made no exception (qui enim negaret quicquam esse quod perciperelllr, eum
nihil excipere), and so not even the impossibility of perception could itself be
grasped and perceived in any way, because it had not been excepted (ita
necesse esse ne id ipsum quidem quod excepwm 11011 esset conprendi et percipi
ullo modo posse).
(Acad. l/28, transl. RACKHAM 1933)
Cicero himself maintains that to the wise man inapprehensibility is nothing
more than a statement carrying persuasion: he holds this particular opinion,
that nothing can be perceived, in just the same ways as he holds all the other
"plausible" but not "perceived" views ("ut ilia habet probabilia non
perccpta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi", Acad. //109-110).
Carncades is supposed to have introduced n) mDavov into Academic
philosophy. It is a concept Plutarch makes ample use of in various writings-
in Quaestiones Convivales
1
'
17
, and De defecru oraculorum, as we have hecn
able to sec, hut for instance also in De primo frigitfol'Js. However, Plutarch
and already Cicero
1
'J'J use the concept in a larger sense than that originally
attributed to Carneades by his more conservative followers2w. Although
Carneades is not known to have applied it to tenets such as the <'tiWTut.lpl'ict,
in introducing this concept he has none the less forged a very convenient
tool, that allows the expression of central sceptical tenets, or philosophical
views in general, in a non-dogmatic way- provisionally and not infallibly2nl
- thus avoiding the self-contradictions imputed to the Academics by their
opponents2
2
It was presumably Philo of Larissa who first endorsed this
interpretation of Carncades' concept of persuasivcncss2'.
1
'
17
See also Quae.11. cum. 62lJD; 6538: oKlJB; 6lJ5B: 6!J7D: A: 6lJlJD; 70 IF: 72513; 72SF et
passim.

Cf. infra: eh. 5. I. Sec also De an. procr. 10138; l013f-"-1014A; Quant. con1. 72KF.

See also Epist. ad 1\tt. 13,llJ.5. Cf. 1905, p. 145: GAWLICK. GORLER
19
1
J4. p. 10lJ2-10lJ3; GLUCKER 19lJ5, p. 134-135; HA DOT 1995, p. 221. Onr: may compare Anon.
in Thcact. 70,25.
2!Xl Clitomachus. and Philo in the first stage of his philosophical development.

See e.g. Cic. /\cad. lll2l ("modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur"'): 134.
2
2
Cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 2SlJ: "Carneadcs established this concept mainly as a criterion to
guide the actions of the Academic sceptic in practical situations. Plutarch is employing it [se.
in De prim. [rig.] in a context where a whole philosophical system- or at least a large section
of it- is accepted as probable" by someone who confesses to be a sceptical Academic". 19lJ5.
p. 134-135; IOPPOLO l9lJ3, p. 197: In fact, to my knowledge. Carneades did not express his
point of view on the unknowability of all things in terms of the mOuvov. Consistent with
rigorous scepticism, Carneades held that it is not possible either to assert or to dr:ny
knowledge of the external world. whereas assertions or denials are possible as far as actions
arc concerned. None the less, Carneades had created an opening for the possibility of making
assertions or denials, provided they were not accompanied by the acknowledgment of truth:
one can affirm or deny something, by acknowledging this something to be not true but simply
convincing."; HANKINSON 1995, p. 142.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
171
B. Plutarch on the Academic tradition: "scepticism" and religion
Plutarch's attitude towards Arcesilaus and Carneades may be regarded as
one of sympathy, or loyalty
2
o.t at the very least. Let us now proceed to
examine to what extent he can be said to share their views. As we have
already seen (supra: eh. 3, 1), he argues in favour of the principle of
for cases in which the truth is "obscure" in Adversus Co!otem, and even
explicitly recommends it in De prim. Jrig. 955C (cf. infra: eh. 5, 1).
The Lamprias-catalogue ascribes to Plutarch a treatise entitled flEQt rov
p[w Elat n)v ci:ro rov fl},arwvo;; 'AxacJJjptwv (L63). In this work Plutarch
probably claimed that the tradition from Plato to himself was doctrinally -
and perhaps also institutionally - unbroken, thus defending the Academy
against imputations implying that it had deviated from the true Platonic
philosophy during some important phases in its history. The "one-Academy-
thesis" is usually associated with the name of Philo of

who is
known to have upheld this position against the attacks of Antiochus of

Also the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus (54,43-

55,13) defended a similar

Allegations that the New Academics had
a rift in traJition of Platonism were also levelled at them by
Platonising Neopythagoreans, or Neopythagorean Platonists, as may be
derivcJ from the fragments of Numcnius' flEQL njr:; uvv 'Axa01J.laixiiJII :rQor:;
ni.<irWI'U. ()wanJ.urw; that have hcen preserved by Eusehius:!os. Numcnius
in this treatise reprimanded Arcesilaus for having deviated from true

1'\otably in the second ami third stages of his philosophical devdopment. Cf. supra, p. 71.
Cf. DE LACY llJ53. p. HO-RI; EINARSON- DE LACY 1%7, p. 185-1!\7; 8ABUT 196lJa. p. 2R2,
with note 3; DII.Lo;-.; llJS8b. p. 106.

IOI'POLO's criticism of TARRANT l9K5 regarding the one-Academy-thesis is unjustified.
She claims that T ARRANT incorrectly presents this thesis as exclusively Philon's: "Non e
dun4ue un tratto distintivo ddi"Accadcmia di Filone la convinzionc dcll'essistcnza di
un'unica Accademia. mac propria di tutta l"Accadcmia scettica a part ire da Arcesilao" ( 1989.
p. 141). But although the New Academy had always claimed to be the rightful philosophical
heir to Socrates and Plato. and thus spontaneously emphasised the unity of the Academy
(compare G6RLER 1994. p. 925), it only at the time of Philo that the need was felt for an
explicit defence of this unity, for the very reason that it had been disputed by Antiochus. The
evidence adduced by IOPPOLO is not valid: Plutarch 's ironical expression of gratitude towards
Colotcs in Ad1. Col. 1122A (cf. supra: p. 105) merely proves that Plutarch defended the thesis,
not that Arccsilaus already did. The second text quoted by IOPPOLO is if possible even less
De Sto. rep. 10368 (cf. supra: p. 156). Here Carneades is indeed said to assert
nothing of his own, but in the context this means that he made use of the arguments
Chrysippus himself developed against his own theory. The degree of originality of Carneades
words is here defined in relation not to Plato or the Academy, but to Chrysippus.
20ii Cf. Cicero Acad. I 13; Augustine Contra Acad. 3.41; GLUCKER 1978, p. 80-81; 84; 89.
:m Cf. supra: p. 59.
Num. frg. 24,4 (DES PLACES). 1975, p. 150.
172 CHAPTER 4
Platonic doctrine under Pyrrho's detrimental influence2tN. Numenius
himself, not unlike Antiochus, claimed to restore the Old Academy2to, but
nevertheless criticised Antiochus as sharply as any other Academic2tt.
Antiochus was also probably the only "Academic" philosopher whom
Plutarch did not regard as such. Evidence is provided, I believe, by the Life
of Cicero, where Plutarch relates that Cicero attended Antiochus' courses.
Cicero could appreciate his rhetorical talent, but disapproved of his doctrinal
innovations:
He was charmed by his [i.e. Antiochus'] fluency and grace of diction, although
he disapproved of his innovations in doctrine ea 6' EV wi:;
oux bmvwv). For Antiochus had already fallen away from what
was called the New Academy and abandoned the sect of Carneades (1](')11 '(CU.J
r:;[oww nj; va; hyO[lEVl]S 'Axabqrtda; 6 'AVl:LOXOS r.ai. l:l]V KnovcitOOl'
on'tmv i:yxmEAEL.iTfY), either moved thereto by the clear evidence of sense
perceptions (Ei:TE xarmn)[tEvo; u;ro nj; i:vagyda; xai. ni)V aio{}l'JoE(r)v). or. as
some say, led by a feeling of ambitious opposition to the disciples of Cleitom-
achus and Philon to changt.! his vit.!ws and cultivate in most cases the doctrine
of tht.! Stoics (t::tH'. ir'J; rrnmv i:vtm, CfLAOl:LftLr,t nvi. xai. btwroo(t .iT[lo; roi.;
K/.m:owizou xui. <I>D.wvo; ouvt'JHn; tov Ltwtxov l:x ww[\o).lj; Hroct:rn:(!)v
/.l.>:ov i::v toi; rrA.dotm;).
(Cic. 4,1-3, transl. PERR!N 1919)
According to this anti-Antiochean account of a crucial episo<..lc in the histor:-.
of Platonism. Antiochus deserted the Academy in order to become virtually
a Stoic2t2. This presumably is the version Plutarch agreed to. On two other
occasions (Luc. 42,3 and Brut. 2,3) he mentions the altcrrwtive,
"Antiochean", point of view on the event. According to this second point of
view Antiochus woul<..l have restored the Aca<..lemy and put it back on a true
Platonic track, thus adjusting the errors of Arccsilaus, Carneades an<..! Philo.
Yet I believe that in these texts Plutarch is merely reporting the views of
Brutus an<..! Lucullus. One may then safely assume that Plutarch's own
opinion correspon<..ls to the version of Cic. 4, 1-3, which is hostile to
Antiochusw. If Antiochus is to be considered a virtual Stoic, and not really
an Academic, he is less of a threat to the unity of the Academic tradition.
As one may infer from the Numenian polemic, the attacks on the one-
Academy-thesis were directed primarily against the New Academy. and
2m Cf. Num. frg. 25,15-32; 25,72-75 DES PLACES; DILLON 1982, p. 68. Numcnius was
convinced that Platonic doctine was to be traced back to the teaching of Pythagoras: cf. frg.
24,57-59. For the Neopythagorean attitudt! to Plato see DORRIE 1983, p. 95-96. St!t! also
MARTANO 1981.
21o Cf. 1964, p. 65 note 144; DORRIE- BALTES 1993, p. 243-24-+.
211 Num.frg. 28.12-15 DES PLACES; cf. DORRIE- BALTES 1993, p. 246.
m Compare DORRIE 1987, p. 458-465.
}: .,,
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
173
much less so against Antiochus' attempts at restoration. The New
Academics were blamed for having abandoned the true Platonic spirit and
conceding too much to Pyrrhonism. It is by all means likely that Plutarch in
his defence of the fundamental unity of the Academic strove to
emphasise the differences between Academic and Pyrrhonian philosophy.
As a matter of fact, the Lamprias-catalogue lists a work llEQL n]s OLWfJOQCir;
Hvl' llVQQWl'cllVJ' %ai 'A%a01J.uaiY.ivv (L64). It is perhaps no that
this treatise and the one on the unity of the Academy make up two
consecutive entries in the Lamprias-catalogue. Their respective subject
matter was most probably closely related. If this treatise was indeed an
authentic work by Plutarch - which is a plausible hypothesis - one may
suppose that Plutarch drew a clear distinction between Pyrrhonian and
Academic

In the extant works of Plutarch we only have scanty

references to Pyrrho21", but the Lamprias-catalogue has the title lltQt rwv
Oi%a TQO.Ilvl' (L158). This work, if authentic, is a further
in<..lication for the interest Plutarch took in epistemological matters. Lacking
Cf.IL\Bl.lT 196
1
h, p. 198-l'JIJ (against 1916, p. 682-683, and CODIG\'OLA 1934,
p. 478; 4SS noll.: 62: sec also p. 485-486 not..: 52); DtLLON 1977, p. 188. fROIDEFO:'\D 1987, p.
!Sfi intimates that !Jrut. 2.3 repr..:sents Plutarch's opinion, but it should bt! said that
FRomr:ro:-.;n tr.:nds to play down the inOut!nce of the New Academy on Plutarch and
postulates a strong innuence from .. dogmatic" Platonism (e.g. p. 187: 188-189).
( 1904. p. 417) also expresses the vit!w that Plutarch prderrt!d Antiochus to the philosophy of
the New Acad.:my. hut this is only hascd.on the pr..:supposition that this philosophy was anti-
rdigious. Compare also VOLI\\IA:"\' 11 1X69, p. 11-12.
2IJ Cf. IOI'I'Ol.O 191J3. p. 186: R.M. JO:-<Es 1916. p. 17-18: "This of course cannot mean th:lt
thert! compkte a!!rLement hc!ween Plato all his successors in the Acad.:my on all
points of doctrine. for in ell' animac procrcationc he tries to show that the opinions of
Xenocratcs and Cranlor, memhers of the Old Academy. concerning the interpretation of the
world-soul were very L1r from repres.:nting Plato's views correctly. The meaning must he that
th..:re was a general agreement in spirit hdween the representatives of the Academy in all
periods, which was ohscured hy the statement that the Old Academy was was [sic] dogmatic,
while the Middle and New Academics were sceptical."
The Academic in its most conscqut!nt formulation was altogether not that much
different from that of the Neopyrrhonians: cf. STRIKER 1981, esp. p. 168.
21
t. Cf. De prof in 1irt. 82E-F (on Pyrrho's proverbial imperturbability). In one of the
Quacstioms comimlcs (3.5) on the question d 1j'uzg6tEQoc; tfj buv(qtn6 oivoc;; (651F). after
a brief exposition of the Epicurean theory on the subject, l'vh:strius Florus observes that the
conversation is carrying them straight to Pyrrho's refusal to define the nature of nutrients
(652B): Tuit', Ehfv 6 cfJ).(iJQO;. uvnr.gu; d; n)v Titggwva btct tOU Tigwtay6gou CfEQEll'nta;
yctg on xui mgi V.uiot zui mgi ycif..axtoc; pf..rt6c; t xai tGJv U.Hwv btEl;t6vtEc;
(t.:tobgcwo,td)u to ).{rnv JtfQL fzUOtOU, o;rolov tiJ rpton EOtiv, taic; ngoc; U.Ht]ACL xni
r.guoEatv hcwtov yivwum rruor.ovtE;. [ .. . ]. Compare Diogenes Laertius' testimonium
(9,105) on Timon, Pyrrho's disciple: r.ai f:v toT; TIEQi atoutjon;)V (flTJOL, to on f:oti yf..uxu
ot tWt][ll, to b' on cruh'EtCLLOJLO).oytiJ. Cf. LONG- SEDLEY I 1987, p. 17, on Pyrrho's stance:
"that indeterminability really is the nature of things, and that this proposition, unlike any
other judgement we may make about the \vorld, falls outside the exclusion of truth or
falsehood". For the recycling of Protagoras' "relativism" in Hellenistic scepticism, see Anon.
in Theaet. 62,47-63,6.

17-1
CHAPTER-I
more specific evidence on Plutarch's attitude towards Pyrrhonism, let us now
turn to the other testimonies concerning his perception of Academic
philosophy
217

The first Quaestio P!atonica (lOOOC; D) presumably offers some
important clues for a better understanding of Plutarch's views on the
Academy. Plutarch's reasoning probably was that the essential unity of the
Academy was guaranteed by the fact that the core of Academic philosophy
had always been the search for truth, combined with the certainty that the
truth is one. That the Academic brand of philosophy in fact was the
legitimate continuation of Plato's practice appears to have also been part of
Plutarch's One may also presume that Plutarch's defence of the
unity of the Academy, just like that of the Anonymus in Theaet., was closely
related to Philo's2tlJ.
The thesis that Academic philosophy was not opposed to the bdid in the
power of divination was crucial to Plutarch
220
, who probably wrote a treatise
i<JJ.dl TOI'.:;'Ar.w)IJ,llr1iY.OI!; (L71. most likely to be
identificd with LJJ!: nr{}t TOii JUJ JU;f.l.'00w nj ,llUl'TIY.ij r/Jl '1\r.w)IJ,IIUi%/n
lc)yol').
However, R.M. JONES, in his wcll-known study on the Platonis111 of
1'/utarc/z (1916, p. 1R), suspected Plutarch's lost treatise to have been an
attempt to minimalise the scepticism of the New Academy22
1

obviously takcs for granted that Acadcmic "scepticism" and traditional
belief arc natural enemies, without offering any argumentation in support of
this assumption. Instead he simply refers to ''the fact that Carncades made
especial attacks on divination" (p. 19). In starting from this unfortunate
presupposition, JONES is indccd following a conunwzis opinio, for which he
could very well have invoked the authority of E.
m It is extremdy unlikely, I think, that Plutarch bdiewd in an esoteric tradition,
i.e. a secret doctrine conOicting with the "official" scepticism of the school. as DILLO:'\ ( llJS2.
p. 67-6S) has claimed. If one were to accept this. one would also have to assume that PlutMch
is essentially insincere in 1\(k Cof. However, Prof. DILLO:--; has informed me that h.: no longer
endorses tl{is thesis: "it is doubtful if he subscribed to the idea that the New i\cad..:mici;ns
preserved a 'secret doctrine', which they only revealed to initiates''(ktter of Sept. 16, 199-f).
Cf. supra: eh. 2, Il. F.
m As appears from the title of Lamprias 63: nrgi roti piav [lVW Till' c.!:r(J rot; ni.riruJl'o;
'1\r.whjpEIW'. Cf. BOYS-STONES 1997, p. 42.
21'J Also Philo and the commentator apparently claimed that the Academy remained faithful
to Plato (pace 13ADUT 1994c, p. 550). Cf. supra: p. 59.
See also SCHRODER 1990, p. 6; 1996a. COULOUBARITSIS examines the
relationship between divination and truth in Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism and Plutarch.
He discusses Plutarch's defence of divination agaist the Epicureans in the Pythian dialogues
(1990, p. 119122), but ignores the relationship with the Academic bozil.
221 R.M. ]ONES emphasises Plutarch's "adherence to positive Platonic doctrines" (1916, p.
18), and accordingly asserts (p. 19): "[ ... ] of real scepticism there is, I think, no trace in
Plutarch."
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 175
ZELLER believed that after a period in which this anti-religious tendency
dominated Platonism. scepticism was overcome in the beginning of our Era
and transcended (the Hegelian223Auj7zebwzg loosely applied) by a
philosophy of revelation, an Offenbarwzgsplzilosoplzie, in which the poor
natural faculties of cognition were supplemented by knowledge of divine
origin. It seems clear that the religious component was prevalent in Middle
Platonism. But why, one should ask, did ZELLER postulate this revelational
component of Platonism as a new22-t phenomenon? Most probably he felt the
need to create a pagan counterweight to the approximately contempo-
raneous growth of Christianity, not only on the level of popular religion but
also on that of metaphysical-theological speculation. In doing so, he was also
able to embed religious developments and pagan philosophy in an
encompassing (and for this very reason impressive and persuasive),
homogeneous representation of this agcns. (One need not deny there was a
religious revival in the first centuries of our Era- the new elan of the Delphic
oracle is part of it - but on the other hand there is no need to introduce
Offenbarungsplzilusoplzie as a new term and still less to define it as opposed
to a sceptical Hellenistic philosophy.) Subsequently ZELLER made Plutarch
fit perfectly in this R. VOLKMANN
227
and J. SOIROETER, among
others. introduced these ideas into Plutarchean scholarship, in which they
soon took firm root. SCIIROETER is the author of a monograph on the
scepticism of Plutarch (Plwarchs Ste!lwzg zur Skepsis, 1911) in which he
reproduces and elaborates- not to say plagiarises
22
s- ZELLER's schemes.
What is important is that the schemes used by SCHROETER were method-
ically to the study of Plutarch's texts. His point of departure is the
Cf. ZELLER 111.1 1923, p. 529-530. See also SCIIOLTZ 1979, p. 21:\9-311; 01'SOMER 1993b.
On tho.: inOuence of HE<iEL: cf. ZELLER 184-l,p. 819; 1888, p. 8. On Hegel's inOuence on
ZELLER's conception of the relation scepticism-dognwtism, cf. esp. ZELLER 1843, p. 55 (in a
summary of HEGEL's account of the second major period in the history of Greek philosophy):
"Das Zweite ist nun, daG die Idee sich in Gegcnsiitzen ausbildet und durchfi.ihrt. das Ausein-
andergehen der Wissenschaft in die besond"Crn Systemc dcr Stoicismus und Epikuraismus,
gcgen d.:ren Dogmatismus der Skepticismus das Negative bildet."
Cf. ZELLER 111.2 1923, p. 85.

ZELLER suggests an innuence of Judaism (111.2 1923, p. 83; 89).

Cf. ZELLER 111.2 1923. p. 175; 182-183; 207-212.

227
According to VOLK:<.!Ai":--1 Skepsis and belief are antithetically related, but in Plutarch's
thought Skepsi.s is surmounted by faith. See VOLKMANN 11 1869 p. 264-265; 285 and p. 251-
252: "Dcr traditionelle Glaubc wird von ihm allenthalben gegen den Zweife1 in Schutz
genom men." was acquainted with ZELLER's work. The first edition of ZELLER's
history of post-Aristotelian philosophy had already been published in 1852.
Cf. 199-lb, p. 51-55.
2
'
9
Cf. SCHROETER 1911, p. 41-42 (my italic): "Es war schon in der Einleitung erwahnt
warden. dass sich in der Philosophic Plutarchs eine Bewegung von dem Skeptizismus zu einer
Philosophic, die positive Ergebniss,e bringt, volzieht; nun bietet sich die Aufgabe dar, zu
untersuchen, wie und wodurch diese von der Skepsis geschieht."
f ) a; ( t & #a i'bf "Ci' ... ....;,.g. = ... ......
176 CHAPTER -l
opposition Skepsis-Offenbarwzg, for which he refers (p. 1 note 1) to ZELLER
and VOLKMANN and also to his teacher A. whose
history of Greek scepticism is itself dependent upon ZELLER for its
conceptual schemes
2
J
0
SCHROETER assumes that scepticism had
undermined people's belief in man's natural cognitive faculties;
the need was felt for a new and more reliable principle of knowlcdgc23t,
which could only be provided by divine revelation (1911, p. 53): .. Nach
Plutarch beruht alle Erkenntnis in letzter Linie auf Offenbarung". In order
to explain this, SCHROETER postulated- as did ZELLER- an Oriental (to be
more specific: Jewish) and referred (p. 42) to the '"religiose
Stimmung" characteristic of Plutarch's time.
The \VOrk of ZELLER, VOLKl\IANN and SCHROETER has remained very
influentiaPJ-'. The explicit reference to the Hegelian context soon
disappeared. Nevertheless, what was regarded as the results of the German

continued to haunt Plutarchean scholarship: the Skcpsis-

Ojfmharung dichotomyD5 and the unquestioned conviction that the
philosophy of the New Academy was dominated by anti-religious
tendencies, to be subsequently surmounted by Plutarch's deeply religious
philosophy2Jn. Also the great Plutarchean scholar R. FLACELIERE starts
from, and remains within the same conceptual frame
2
-'
7
He took the view
that Plutarch's thought is ci1aracterised by an evolution from a rationalistic-
philosophical to a more theological stage
2
-'x. According to FLACTLILRE,
scepticism was a mere phase in Plutarch's thought and was superseded by
deep religious piety and mysticism. But never did Plutarch let scepticism
1905, p. 250-251 (on Plutarch and Favorinus).
Cf. SU!ROI:TER llJII, p. 6; 4.3 (to with ZELLER 111.2 192.3, p. 20S and
GOFDECKOIEYER llJ05, p. 250 not\.! 5).
Cf. SUIROETER 1911, p. 4o-47. Set.! also ZELLER 111.2 192.3, p. 1:)1).1)2.


nel!ative, but balanced, review (1913) of SCHROETEI(s book has rem;1ineu
without much
Compare also HOLTORF 1913, referring to (note 4).
Cf. e.g. HART:'-.Ir\:'-1 1916, p. 253-254; UEBERWEG- PRAECI!TER I 1926. p. 535; ROUI:\ llJ44
("Deuxii:me partie. La nouvclle academic ou l'anti-dogmatismc"); LEVI 1952. p. 17.3;
1970. p. 88: "Die Einstellung zur Wisst:nschaft hat hicr einen dcutlich
skcptischen Zug: die gelaufigen Schulmcinungen sind nicht tibcrzeugenu. und man wiru
ueshalb ZU eincr aut:lcrwissenschaftlichcn Lchre gedrangt, uie man als Ofknharung
bezeichnen kann und die man glaubig hinnehmen mut:l." DbRRIE, using tht.! t..:rm
"Offenbarung'' (1981, p. 98 note 26; p. 103), refers however to Plato himself. On the other
hand, DbRRIE completely ignores the "sceptical'' or "Academic" component in Plutarch's
thought.
E.g. DE FA YE I 1923, p. 86-89 (referring to ZELLER).
m One should not ignore, however, the innuence of MONTAIGNE (1533-1592) on
FLACELIERE's - and in general the French tradition's - interpretation of Plutarch. also in
regard of his scepticism. See e.g. FLACELIERE- IRIGOIN- SIRINELLI- PHILIPPO:\ p.
CLXXVII I. On Montaigne's interpretation of ancient scepticism see 1985. p. -t 1-49;
LAURSEN 1992, p. 94-124.
. .--,-
!
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEI-.IES IN PLUTARCH I77
interfere with his religious convictions: 'Si notre auteur, en tant qu'il est
Academicien, doute de beaucoup de choses, il y a du moins un domaine qui
lui ; parait devoir etre soustrait a toute objection, a toute critique, a tout
scepticisme, c'est celui de la foi religieuse"239. At the basis of this remark lies
the presupposition that scepticism, i.e. the philosophy of the (New)
Academy, and religion are naturally opposed2
40

Whoever accepts this as an obvious premiss, has to explain how Plutarch
reconciled his loyalty to the Academic tradition with his loyalty to Plato and
with the religious spirit of his own thought. The basic strategies which are
usually applied to effectuate such a reconciliation can all be found in
FLACELIERE's _work: (l) Plutarch's thought developed from a sceptic to a
religious (2) Plutarch excluded the religious domain from his brand
of

(3) Plutarch considered the sceptical phase of the Academy

E.g. 19-0, p. gR; 104 ("1..: De clefectu temoign..: d'un ctat d\:sprit plus rationaliste. et 1..: De
l'ythill(' J'un ct :lt J'esprit plus religit.!ux"); 106; lOS Cl pa.uim; 1947, p. 70 (the De clef or.
cll!lcluues "par un avcu non Mguisc u..: 107; 1974a, p. 8586; 197-lb, p. 85-86
(the Dl' clef or. is allegedly characterised by ''l'aveu J'unc insuffisance a
fLACELitRE- 1987, p. CLI . FLACELIERE u..:velopeu his
point of vi<.:w in a running discussion with SOURY (cf. 1942a; 1942b, p. 50-69).
1947, p. 57. Cf. also p. 51 nok 2: "que Plutarque ne se depart ut.! la rcst.!rve academiquc
qui.! lorsqu'il s'agit des croyances rcligieuses et uu cult\.! ues uicux; lit, it n'aumet pas le doute."
fLACELIIcRE (p. 51 not<: 2) rders to who writes (190-l, p. 419): "Ccst
uans le uomaine Ul.! la religion qu'elles [se. SI.:S iuO.:es] sont le mieux et c'est
lil surtout St.! JO.:part Ul: la reserve acauC:mique." DECHAR:\IE himself has no
scholarly rdercnce for this hut his overall picture of Plutarch seems to be based on
the works of ZELLER (cf. p. 416 note 2) a nu VOLDIANN (cf. p. 417 note 2; p. 41 R note 3). Sec
also ZtECiLER 1951. col. X5o.6-l-66 ("seine cigcnt.! Stellung zur wissenschaftlicht.!n
forschung. sowcit cs sich nicht um die ethisch-relig.iosen Prinzipicn hanuelt"); col. 939,59-64
("A us Jcr Akaucmie selhst cmpfing er die starkc Neigung zur Skcpsis, die ihn, ahgcsehen von
l!t.!Wiss<.:n unu cthischen uic ftir ihn uncrschtitterlich fcststanucn,
in bezug au( uit.! meisten gro[.kn und klcincn fragen dt.!S brznv tihen liel3cn."); 9-ll. In
support of this statement ZIEGLER m<.:ntions the monograph of SGIROETER (939.64-67: 941 ).
Sec also 8,\RIG,\ZZI 1992, p. 302 with note 7 (p. 314).
Cf. fLACELIERE 1964. p. 17-IX: "La nouvelle' Academic d'Arccsilas et de Carncade, a
l'cpoque hcllenistiquc, s'etait montrce quelque peu infidcle aux intuitions fondamentales de
Platon, par la thcoric du probabilismc et du doute systematiquc. Plutarque. lui. renoue avec
la grande et authentique tradition de !'Academic, qui s'etait nourrie des apports mystiques de
l'orphisme et Ju pythagorisme, par excmple en considerant le corps comme le tombeau de
Lime (soma cgale et la mort comme l'acces a la vit.! veritable." One may even compare
GLUCKER 1988, p. 69.
See also 1889; HIRZEL 1912, p. 8-10. VERNIERE (1990, p. 365-366), though
mitigating FLACELIERE's view. maintains the antithesis between belief and (philosophical)
rcncction. BRE:-;K criticises the circularitY often involved in the argumentation for the
development hypothesis (1977, p. 11-15), himself for a more balanced view, which
leaves room for both development and continuity (p. 47-48). Cf. ERBSE 1952, p. 313-314.
See also DE FA YE II 1927. p. 99-102. esp. p. 101-102: "L'attitude de P1utarque vis-a-vis de
la ;:-.:ouvelle Academic nous reserve une surprise. 11 est plein d'indu1gence pour Arcesilas et
Carneade."
- .I
178
CHAPTER 4
as nothing more than a side-step
2
B and did not feel any obligation to be loyal
towards this transitory phase in its history.
One need not look far, I think, to find both "rationalism" and in
every period of Plutarch's thought. Although it is likely that the religious
component in his thought became more prominent in the course of time
(especially since Plutarch became a priest), it would be unfortunate, I think,
to see "rationalism" and "religion" as opposing terms excluding each other.
A closer analysis of relevant texts will show that ;rc'ttQto; rrLon; and
Academism have always been closely interrelated in Plutarch's conception
of philosophy. Moreover, as we have seen, Plutarch never disavowed the
fundamental philosophical orientation of his Academic predecessors.
It is one of the most persistent myths in the historiography of Platonism,
that the sceptical phase of the Academy would be fundamentally
incompatible with the rel igious aspirations of Platonism. Yet recent studies
in the domain of so-called Academic scepticism have established that it is
wrong to consider the New Academic philosophy as anti-religious.
Carneades' notorious attacks on divination should be regarded as attacks on
the Stoic conception of divination, and not on divination as such. Even the
seemingly total condemnation of mantic divination in the second book of
Cicero's De dil'inatione (the information of which is believed to stem from
Clitomachus, and therefore indirectly from Carneades) denounces specif-
ically Stoic conceptions, notably artificial diviniation as "Yorrauszage von
Dingen, die durch das Fatum bestimmt sind"
2
-l-l . The same can be said of his
arguments against Stoic Providence and their conception of astrolngy2-1-'.
And likewise his criticism of Stoic ethics is not intended to destroy
morality2-lh. Academic "scepticism" was never directed against morality or
religion2
47
, but merely questioned excessive Stoic claims to a rational and
systematic knowledge in these domains.
Plutarch shares the Academic conviction that the philosophy of the
Academy protects traditional faith : suspension of judgment (l::roz1'1) is
closely linked with reverential caution towards the divine (Eu).c't0ELC.t ;rgc); to
Hdov) , which for Plutarch is clearly an Academic principle. In matters in
which absolute certainty is unattainable, man should stick to traditional
faith. This can be gathered from Amatorius 7568, where Plutarch - the
w There has been a strong tendency to suppose that the New Academy actually ll'liS nothing
more than a sidetrack: cf. e.g. MORESCHINI 1964, p. 53: "la parentesi scettica e probalistica".
However. for the Old-Academic roots of Academic scepticism: cf. 1971. p. 14-58
(esp. p. 14-16 ; 36; 57).
Cf. PFEFFER 1976, p. 105. See also p. 104-109; TODD 1976, p. 26; 1909, p. 190-194;
LEVY 1992, p. 4-l ; REP! Cl 1995, p. 191. Sec also Cic. De 11at. de or. 3,5-6; 9-10 : 14-15.
w Cf. LEVY 1992, p. 42-46; 624; 626-627.
Cf. LEVY 1992. p. 40-42. Cf. supra : p. 44-49.
W Cf. LONG 1974, p. 101; VALGIGLIO 1973, p. 235-236; infra : eh. 6, V.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
179
interlocutor in a conversation related by his son -criticises Pemptides for
requiring rational explanations of things divine, and thus meddles with what
should not be disturbed : (ta codVlFa Y.LVELV -rlic; Jt:EQL -frEWV iiv
;tEQL EX.aotoD 'Aoyov a;rcuni)v xai. In these matters, where a
more evident proof vagyoTEQov) will not be found, one should
keep to traditional faith (agx.Ei: yag 1'1 m1tgtoc; x.ai. rra'Ama n:tonc;) . Ancient
faith is a firm basis, a foundation which ought not to be shaken, lest the whole
building should become endangered (a'A'A' fibga ne; aun1 xai. Bc'tou;
uq-wTwoa rrgo; f.av f.cp' Evoc; -ragc'tu11-rm xai. oaA.Eulltm -ro
BBmov atlnl; x.at EmocpaA.i); ytvnm JIUOC x.ai. urron:toc;)2-1
9
.
In this context we may take a closer look at the introductory chapters of
De sera nwninis vindicta. The empirical conclusion that punishment for
crimes committed all too often fails to appear was felt by the interlocutors in
this dialogue as a threat to the belief in divine Providence. This seeming
failure of Providence induces an cmogLa among the participants in the
conversation (549E). Plutarch warns not to jump to rash conclusions, but to
keep in mind Academic caution:
First , then, beginning as from our ancestral hearth (l;)omg a<p' i:mic1;
agzopEvot) with the scrupulous reverence of the philosophers of the Academy
for the Deity (Tf]; :rgo; TO l'll'lov Twv l:v cp),oooq:wv) .
we shall disavow any pretension to speak about these matters from knowledge
(To 01; dbon:; n mgi Tott(J)V f..ynv For it is presump-
tuous enough for those untrained in music to speak about things musical, and
for those of no military experience about war; but it is more presumptuous for
mere human beings like ourselves to inquire into the concerns of gods and
daemons ( tt) TU uEia Y.CLL TU btcwxomiv ctv-Dg0mot;
ovra;). where we arc like laymen seeking to follow the thought of experts by
the guesswork of opinion and imputation (uno xal. unovoia:; xmu TO
lr.o;
(549EF, transl. DE LACY- EINARSON 1959)
See Pbto Leg. 6g4E: xtvl'lv TCt <htvl]m, and Leg. 841A: Theaet . 1818. Also compare
Plut. De Is. et Os. 359F; De def or. 435E: b' , EL."TOV, ou Y.EXLVI]ZEV, 0) <f>tALJtJ!E, a/J.<'t
xui Ol''(l.fZl'ZEV, fl EV TOOOUWt; r.ui Tl]i.tXOUTOll:; OUOlV rwg' !']t.lZLUV n,o m{}avc,i)
to[ /.o'{Ol' ctvwgriv n xai. xtvrtv n'iJV c'thp'}[i>c; xai oaiwc; :TE(lL tol> {} Ei ou
Vf VO!llOitfV(I)V. Sec also De Pyth. or. 4028 ; 4048: 4080; 4090; A mat. 7568; Anon. in The a et.
70,12-26 (cf. supra : p. 44): Cic. De nat. deor. 3,10: "adfers haec omnia argumenta cur di sint,
rcmque mea sententia minime dubiam argumentando dubiam facis".
Compare De Pyth. or. 402E: cri yi.tg rcgoc; tov {} Eov lllJO' avwgEiv n];
ll<tVtt%f]; (ipa Tip :T(>O\'O!UV Y.<Ll tO {}fiov, a)J,a n'iJV {rrEVCtVttO[o\)m Oor.ouvnov ),tiOEl
Tt]V b' EUoEBll xui. ;r(ngtov rcgo[w{}m rc[onv. This text is not characterised by an
antithesis between traditional faith and Platonism, as suggested by SEIBERT 1854, p. 33. See
also De E 392F; De Pyth. or. 4090 : xav ti]V ahtetV LXClVO); rcu{}wvn.tt tijt:;
U:tLClOl TOU {}wu xatayv6vn:;. Otz lllllUV olob' CllJ"COJV we; aouva1:WV OVtli)V T</)
t.O'{lOitq> rrgo; tt]V wu {)Oi) Otavotav. Compare SCHOFIELD 1986, p. 56 (on Cicero).
180
CHAPTER 4
It is simply wrong to take likelihoods as a basis for reliable conclusions
concerning divine Providence. Plutarch goes on to say that even in human
matters the motives underlying one's behaviour are hard to penetrate.
Therefore, one should not be surprised at the observation that an
explanation of divine conduct remains problematic
150
. But this is no excuse
not to search for the truth:
These remarks are not a pretext for evasion (C'.mobgaoECJ); ng6cru.ot;). but a
plea for indulgence atn]ot;), that the argument, as though with a
haven and refuge in view, may the more boldly in its bark of plausibility keep
head against the difficulty (dn'lagaarEQOV tcp mOcrvqJ rrgo; ri]v
U;tOQLU.Y). (550C)
\Vhat follows is an exposition of Plato's view on the relation between human
ethics and the gods: the God offers himself as an example man shouiJ try to
emulate (550CD). One may conclude that this introductory conversation to
De: sc:ra mtm. shows how "Platonic" and rcligious:!
51
motives may
harmoniously comhine with "sceptic"
Similar considerations appear in the Comparison of the Parallel U1cs of
Nicias aJl(/ Crassus. Nicias consistently based his Jecisions on divination.
while Crassus disregarded it completely; both, however, perisheJ in the
same way. Plutarch 's conclusion is that in these matters caution is requi reJ,
and that it is at any rate preferable to observe the olJ rules and customs:
lt is hard to draw safe conclusions in these matters (zu.).mi] [v wtTot; lt
<'W<ftlhtcl xHi. beoxgnos;); hut failure from caution. going hand in hand ''ith
ancient and prevalent opinion ('r() flELU boslJS n:u).wu; xui. Ol'Vt.JOm; \'>t'
rltl.<'tBrt<lV {qwgwvoftcvov). is more befitting than lawksncss
and obstinacy.
(Crass . = Comp. Nic. et Crass. 5,3; transl. PERRIN 1'-Jlo. slightly
modified)25J
Likewise, mentioning miraculous talcs in the Life of Canzillus, Plutarch
states that in such matters as miracles, certainty is unattainable for human
beings:
550C: rt bit {}uL'flClOTOV. EL ni)v (tv{}gw:rtV(t)\' Ol!T(I); l'HtlV ovnuv Ol' i'.
Etrrog6v (on TO mgi. ni>v 0Hl>v Etm:iv. 1:oi.; flEV uoTEQOV Toi.; bi:: :1QOTEQOV n i>v
UllClQTUVOVT(!)\' zo}.al;Ol'OlV;
251 Cf. !v1EAUTIS' appreciation ( 1935). p. 55: "CEuvre d'une a me religieuse et grave. le De sera
[ ... ]frappe surtout par son ton de conviction par tout ce qu'il nous revek sur le
caractere et le de Plutarque. il est le testament religieux de l'antiquite. il exprimc l'idbl
le plus eleve qu'ait la race hellenique." Thus MEAliTIS continues a French
"hagiographic" tradition; see his references (p. 21-27) to Jose ph DE MAISTRE ( 1822).
m See also VALGIGLIO 1989, p. 256.
m Cf. SCHROETER 1911, p. 24-25; BRENK 1977, p. 42.
..,_;,._,-

lo.C

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THBIES IN PLUTARCH 181
But in such matters eager credulity and excessive incredulity are alike
dangerous (xal1:6 mOTEVELV mp6bga xai. 1:6 Hav umo1:Ei:v EOTt),
because of the weakness of our human nature, which sets no limits and has no
mastery over itself (bta l:i]V avftQW:itLVl]V

OQOV OUY. xouoav
oH> xgcnoi)oav avn);). but is carried away now into vain superstition (EL
buotbCUftOVtClV xai tDcpov), and now into contemptuous negl.ect of the gods
(d; ohyO)QlUV l:WV OEi'wv xai. Caution is best, and to go to no
extremes Ul b' ElJt.ci.Bna xai 1:0 ayav ClQlOTOV) .
(Cam. 6,6, transl. PERRIN 1914)
Again Plutarch recommends Academic255 caution: and 1:0
U..ruv allow us to steer a middle course between the two extremes,
superstition and irreverence, excessive belief and excessive disbelief2
56
..
The theme of the impossibility to obtain clear knowledge of divine
matters occurs in De audie,ndis poetis as well:
t'J () m:(?i wi:t' c'.tl.l]OEta xni. wi; ClHo ;tE;tOlllftEvOL; i!gyov 1} yvwmv xai.
w'tOl)OlV TOU ovro; EU fLCt).u DvoOt'JQmos; fOTl xni Duo).l):itTO;, lO
CtlJTOl.
truth about these matters, even for those who have made it their sole
to search out and understand the verities, is exceedingly hard to track
down and hard to get hold of. as they themselves admit.
(170, transl. BABBITr 1927rs
7
This is the reason why Socrates never claimed to possess such knowledge
(IolZ(H-'not.,; 7WQU n'1v j!fQL to"lrt(l)V [se. {)nov]
yvtiJOLV, 17E).
For Plutarch there is no conOict between "rationalism" and faith. From
his conception of dual causality it follows that rational explanations
Cf. Cic. Acat!. 14-l ; Acad. 117; Max. Tyr. 2.10,1H7-192; 8,7,152-153; 8,8, 190.
Cf. DE LACY 1953. p. 83.
N Cf. BRENK 1977, p. 30-32. Onl! may also compare Cor. 3R (on which BA BUT 1969a, p. 518
519 and BRENK 1977 note 3 p. 32). and Sept. sap. com. 1630 (Pittacus, mouthpiece of
Plutarch, opposes To rntbi:v c"tyctv to excessive belief or disbelief): Ku{}6).ou b', rtJtEv, Ei: n;
Elbri11 bturrogav c'tbuvuTol xni c'wl.'\'l.l{)ol; xai nagn).6you r.ni nugub6!;ou, uv, w
Xi).wv. 'l.Ul Jll.JTf ;notn:o>V l;>; [nrzE c'mLOTOJ\', TO uyuv <l>; ou 1tQOOETU;w;
Otc<<fl').c'tnot. This of course relates to Plutarch's theory of virtue as a mean between extremes.
See also DESIDERI 1992, p. 81: quest'ultima [se. alia superstizione]. e non alia religiosita,
che la scienza si cont.rappone" (one could perfectly replace "scienza" by a concept like
rational inquiry" or
257
Plutarch also cites Empcdocles and Xenophanes on this subject, resp.: ounu; out'
btbEQ'l.TCt TCtO' c'tvbgamv ov<' buxol'oTa I ovTE v6t;> mgt),lp:Tct (17E) and xai. TO flEV ouv
ouq:i:; ovn; uvitQ '(EVEt' o{bE n; EOTCLl I Eib(i.J; Ultq:i. {}EliJV TE xai. aooa AEYW mgi. navtwv
(17EF). It is noteworthy that both fragments are cited in the seventh book of Sextus
Empiricus Ad1ersus A!athematicos.: resp. 7,122-124 (DK 31 (Empedocles) B2) and 7,49 (=
DK 21 (Xenophanes) B34).

Problably a reference to Phaedo 69D.
. J
182
CHAPTER 4
constitute no threat to mantic divination. This idea is expressed in a short
digression in the Life of Pericles. Plutarch has related a portent that received
a double interpretation, by the seer Lampon and by the man of science
Anaxagoras. Plutarch then continues:
There was nothing, in my opinion, to prevent both of them, the natural scientist
(tov rpumxov) and the seer (tov from being in the right of the matter;
the one correctly divined the cause (ti]v att[av), the other the purpose (to
tfl.os;). It was the proper province of the one to observe from which antecedent
causes anything happens, and how it comes to be what it is (E:x t[vwv 'iEi'OVE
Y.ai of the other to declare for what purpose anything happens,
and what it signifies (rrgos; tL yf.yovE xal. tl mnw[vn). And those who dt!clare
that the discovery of the cause, in any phenomenon, does away with the sign
(ol bi:: t1jc; atttas; ti]V ELQEOLV avn[gwtv Etvm toD otutEiou). do not perct!ivc
that they art: doing away not only with divine portents. but also with artificial
tokens, such as the ringing of gongs. the language of fire-signals, anJ the
shadows of pointers on sundials. Each of tht!se has been made, through some
causal adaptation, to he the sign of something nvl. r.ni. xnnwzn(l
Ol]!tdov dva[ nvos; rn:rro[qtm). However. perhaps this is matter for a diffcn:nt
treatise.
(Paicles 6,4-5. transl. PERRIN \916, modified)25'
1
It is ahsun.J to fear that by explaining the physical cause the higher level of
tekologic causality and meaning might he aholished
2
w.
Anaxagoras is also mentioned in the Life of Nicias (23): Nicias and his
men were panic-stricken at the sight of an eclipse
201
Yet the physical
explanation of this phenomenon, which had already been accomplished by
Anaxagoras. could have preserved Nicias from his superstitious reaction.
However, Anaxagoras' doctrine was still under the seal of secrecy, for at that
time people mistrusted the natural philosophers, accusing them of reducing
the divine agency down to irrational causes, blind forces, and necessary
incidents"2l2 (ou yU.g l'lvdzovto tOU crumx.ous; xai. TOtE
dJ EL attLU aAoyol! xai. buvcqLn; CtrtQOVOlltOL'; Y.((l
rcC:dh1 blatgiBovta; to \h:Tov, Nic. 23,4 ). Plato was the
first. claims Plutarch, to draw a neat distinction between the physical and the
higher necessity, and in so doing, he eliminated the conflict bct\veen
"science" or philosophy and religion, that led to the prosecution of
Cf. BRENK 1977, p. 39-40; HERSHUELL 1932, p. 141-142 (also p. 154 note 5); DESIDERI
1992, p. 80-81.
Cf. A em. 17.5-6 with the comment of DESIDERt 1992, p. 83: "la conoscenza dell a causa
scientifica del fenomeno naturale non esclude la possibilita di riconoscere in esso un segno
divino''.
Cf. De sup. 169AB.
Nic. 23,3-4 (transl. PERRIN 1916). Cf. HERSHBELL 1982, p. 142-144.
ACADD.IlC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 183
Protagoras, Anaxagoras, and Socrates: in later times "the radiant repute of
Plato'' spread, "because he subjected the compulsions of the physical world
to divine and more sovereign principles" (ll TIA.c'.m.uvos;
( ... ] on taT; -3dms; xai. X.UQlWtEQCll agxaT; tas; cpumxa; avayxas;,
Nic. 23,5; transl. PERRlN 1916). These words of course contain a
reminiscence of Phaedo 97B-99D. The concept of dual causality is an
essential component of Plutarch's Platonism, which he derives directly from
Plato. Central texts in this respect are the aforementioned passage from the
Plzaedo, and even more the Timaeus2
6
3, where the physical explanation
remains an dxto; but at the same time presupposes the
metaphysical level (see also below: p. 217)2n5.
ci.:ro/.orlJoopm bE !lclQtl'Qa xni. ouvbLxov O!LOD nl.citwva rragtotciwvos;.
i:divo; yctg 6 c'm'w 'Ava;ny6oav !lEV EJlE!ll!JCtTO tOV rraf..m6v, on ta'ls;
<fVOLY.CtT; ttyav i:vbEbqd.vo; ai-rlms; ;wt n) xm' c'tvc'tyY.t]V toTs; twv OW!tcitwv
c't:ron:I.Ol'flVOV mi{}Ol llEnwv UEl xal. btt0%WV, to ou EVE%(.( xal. ucp' ou,
Bri.TLOV{l; al.t[nc; ouoa; xcti c'tgza;. arpiiXEV" autos; () ITQltHOS 1\ tWV
<( ti.OOCHflllV Ctfl!fOTt'QCtt; btr;lv.\')E, t(ll !lEV 0(0 ti}V <'tgziJV (mobtbous; tGJV Y.ata
i.t'>'tov i:z6vnuv. otx u;rootQti)v b TiJV tAl]V ni">v c'tva'txa[wv rrgos; to
yt'(''O!tEVOV ettn(i)v. ctHc't OUVOQlllV, on tljbf. m1 xcti. to rrdv atoHt]tOV
btetXE%00fll]llEVOV ou %Ct0<tQOV Otb' EOtlV, c'tf..Aa ti); UAllt;
OL'!l:tt.EXO!tEVt}; tt!) /.oy<p ).etftBcivn ti}V yf.vEOtV.
:o.\ Cf. Tim. 6SE-61JA: bti> bi1 Xllil bt' ahirt; dbl] TO flEV uvuyr.urov, tO 6 Odov,
Y.Cll TO JlEV Orrov fV (i;wmv Y.Tl.]fJf(J); [vnw n\)CLlJlOVo; f1iou, xw'}' oaov luuiJV l] cptotc;
(vbrznm, tb OC ttVCl'{Y.CllOV i:zrt\'l!J\' Y.<t(.llV, c:>; (lVE\.' TOtTtrJV OU i)vvcm't CtUTC:C
izrivu [,( oi:; Jl<'JVn zmav()(i:v ot.b' cw /.ufh-:Lv oi.b' ci.)J.trJ; 1Ttr>c; ltEtuoxriv. Also
no.
:M Cf. Tim. 21JD ; 51JC; 6SD. Also :10B; 440; 4RD; 530 ; 550; 56A-I3; 570; 688; 90E et
rwuim. Compare Plut. /)e an. procr. 10138; 1013f-1014A (Plutarch, wanting to attain the
Cti.l]Vi]; bosn ( 1013F). relics on what is probable: mototJtEvo; Eixon xui.
:t(t{_}(<JH.'Ootwvo;. 10!4A). Sec also De def or. 430B (dm:g ouv bd 1TQO<; Ti]v hEivou
btc"cvOtnv bc"trnv tb rizo;. These arc Lamprias' words, who will subsequently offer the
solution that seems to be the most plausible to him. recommending Academic caution; cf.
supra: p. 167); Quaest. con1. 700!3 (dzcna yag mum JLU/).ov xiv(l)v); 728F
(sometimes truth is unattainable, but one may always strive for wu mOnvou xai. ri.xotoc;).
CHER:o-;Iss. when commenting on Dean. procr. 1013B (1976a, p. 172 note a) refers to examples
of Plutarch's use of the concepts of "the probable" and "the plausible", but fails to point out
that Plutarch intends TO rizo; to refer also to the Timaeus. The New Academic awareness
appears to have escaped all the other commentators of De an. procr. See R.M. JONES 1916, p.
80-87; HEL\IER 1937, p. 6; 14-15; 20; THEVENAZ 1938, p. 54-56 (except for a perfunctory
remark p. 55 note 5, where the author disposes of scepticism as a last resource "dans les
questions trap compliquces"); DEUSE 1983, p. 8; 10-11 (discerns a substantial evolution from
Cicero's "scepsis" to the Middle Platonic theory of the soul); 12-13; FROIDEFOND 1987;
HERSHBELL 1987, p. 240-241.
"
6
s At the 1996 conference of the Southern Association for Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge)
M. BURNYEAT pointed out that ' for Plato dxw; primarily means that the account is
reasonable, as it is an image of a
184 CHAPTER 4
I shall defend myself by citing Plato as my witness and advocate in one. That
philosopher found fault with Anaxagoras, the one of early times, because he
was too much wrapped up in the physical causes and was always follO\ving up
and pursuing the law of necessity as it was worked out in the behaviour of
bodies, and left out of account the purpose and the agent, which are better
causes and principles. Plato himself was the first of the philosophers. or the one
most prominently engaged in prosecuting investigations of both sorts, to
attribute to God, on the one hand, the principle of all things that are in keeping
with reason, and on the other hand, not to divest matter of the causes necessarv
for whatever comes into being, but to realise that the perceptibk
even when arranged in some such orderly way as this, is not pure and
unalloycd, but that it receives its generation when matter comes into
conjunction with reason.
(De tlef or. 4J5E-4J6A, transl. F.C. B:\fH31TT l936b, slightly modified)=""
Philosophical inquiry according to Plutarch actually protects traditional
religion, provided that it is conducted in a proper, cautious way, and that it
neatly distinguishes between levels of causality. Therefore D. BAnUT was
right in pointing out that Academic caution should he seen as the ally of
religion2
117
. He has heen criticised, however. for his interpretation. which is
held to ascribe a kind of irrationalism or suprarationalism to Plutarch:
"Babut's solution is that in place of reason Plutarch turns to suprarational
belid based on religious faith"2"x. Any such interpretation would indeed he
in the wrong. as Plutarch's Academism is indeed not an appeal to the
irrational. Plutarch's Academic philosophy is based on an ideal of
philosophical inquiry. on the awareness of the limits of human reason. but
also on the conviction that (divine) truth is ultimately rational and
intelligible. Perhaps BABUT's way of opposing rationalism and scepticism to
religious faith is remotely inherited from the conceptual schemes which I
have discussed above
211
'
1
But there must be no doubt that Academic
philosophy according to Plutarch refers to a fundamentally intelligible and
divine truth, which cannot he fully attained by man. The rational and the
divine arc on the same side, however.
2hl> On the subordination of the Aristotelian and Hellenistic schemes of causalitY to the
Platonic scheme : cf. DO:-<INI 1992a, p. 100-103. Also 1955. p. 251. .
Cf. BA BUT 1969a, p. 283: Et't.c'tBnn is a kind of "ecran protecteur qui mettrait la croyancc
a l"abri des investigations indiscretes ou excessivcs de la raison". Sec also p. 316.
2
hll DE LACY 1973, p. 228. See also ibid.: "That Plutarch attached great importance to
tradition and religious faith is certainly true: but that he seriously questioned the validity of
reason is hardly credible. He embraced the theoretical sciences. especially mathematics. with
great enthusiasm, and his very arguments against Stoics and Epicureans are almost always
formulated as appeals to reason: This criticism is confirmed and repeated by HERSHBELL
1992, p. 3346.

See also 8RENK 1977, p. 84; 0SORIO VIDAURRE 1994, p. 553; 556.
i
'!

1
i
.
j
1
l
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 185
One may safely conclude that Academic philosophy according to Plutarch
is characterised by reverential caution towards the divine:
cwq:a).ELa and TO o:yav. One should also keep in mind that this idea
was dear to Plato himself, as appears from the discussion in book 10 of the
Laws (esp. 88584-88806)27. The advice ayav" clearly is an
Academic principlem, the meaning of which is for Plutarch inextricably
bound up with that other famous Delphic maxim, yvwfrt aamovm. The duty
to pursue self-knowledge is a pre-eminently 'zetetic" principJe273, that could
easily be traced back to Plato's dialoguesm. The defense of the unity of the
Academy, and of the concord between divination and dialectic, has an
apologetic

It was directed against those (the Stoics2

7
o) who
argued that suspension of judgment does undermine divination, in the same
way as the defense of the unity of the Academy counteracts the imputations
that the Academy had abandoned the true spirit of its traditionm. What is
more, Plutarch retorts that the Stoic deterministic conceptions of fate and
Cf. GUJCKER p. 26H (correcting DE LACY 1953, p. 83-8-l); DO:-.IISI 19S6a. p. 205.

cr. [)e F. 3X7F: (r).).' t':rl'i t1]\'l%Ctl
1
T({ :t:(lOOFXEifllj\' Tois; wdh'ulflmv Ffl:t:<dhiJ;. u!za bit
ftt")j_ciJV ri; :rc!VTu Tlfll'tnnv Tl'> fllJDEv (tyav v 'Axw'H]!tftc,t yt::vl'>ftEvos;. Dt! dcf or. 431A: rib'
c'cij.ui'/JOt :rot' xc'tVTetiHlu n-1; 'Axcll'llJflrLU; t':TOfllfl\'l.JOXOVTr; i:cwTov; TO c"tyuv Tf]; :ricJTru>;
llll lti(HiJflEV i(((L Ti]V uorr c'li.flltV WO:TE\_) i::v Y.UlQl\lJ orru).f(l</> :t:f(ll Ti"j; u:rngiu; ).O'fl,tJ 110\'0\'
Sec also Sept. sap. Will ' . 1630; 164U; Dt! Is. t!t Os. 3S5F (comhined with the
quotation of Thcaet. 155D); De: l'yth. or. 40SE; De garr. 511 n.
Cf. Cvm. ad Apv/1. 116D: bl.' hni. TliJv YQUilfHnwv T<lllC.tJ.lln' uvurzwoTmC!
:t:Qil; TUV Biov. Tl> yvri>lh ocwn)v %((L Tl> lll]bi:v tcr((v f:z TOUTo>v '(l!Q ll(lTlJTW ;wi n"t/.i.u :rc'tVTCL
TCll'T(( )'(.(\_) i:onv u>J.l"j/.ot; xui. m:fl!fUlVU, Y.Cll Olfll'lut[QOU OttTf(lOV f0l%f bq/.ouoOw
zcnit bl.vUfllV. [v Tr yuQ Tr/> '(L'(Y<;HlXflV i:-uuTov nt::(ltrznm TC:J pqblv c"eruv, xcd. i:v TOt'T<;> n)
'(l'{Vl;Joxnv Dt! F. 3H5D; De: cap. ex i11im. 89A; Sept. sap. C0/11'. 16413; De: E 392A;
3!J4C; Oe l'yth. or. 40SE; Dt! 51113; Ll77.
Cf. Atk Col. 111RC: [ ... ] TriJV i::v YQUpflUT(I)V OnomTO\' rbozn n) "'[VliJOL
ont'TlJ\,. o bi] i'.Cii. LCI)%(l(.LTfl <Tft;> (t:rogiu; xui. TCttlTt]; <'tQzitv f:v[bwzrv, l;>;
'AgtoTon::i.tt; v Toi; fli.cnuJvtzoi; fl(ll]ZF. Kw).omJ b yEAoTov boxri. [ = Aristotk frg. 1
(Rose); De phi/os. frg. l (Ross). Sec also GUTHRIE (lll .b) 1971, p. 85 note 2] . Dt! E 3S5D (ogu
bi: Y.Cll Tett'Tl TU :t:(lO'((ll.lflflCLTU, TO '"yvti>{h OCtt'TO\' .. i(((l TO "flltbi:v u:yuv", i.lou;
%f%tVl]%f rp).om'Hfot; zcti OOOV }/Jj'll)\' :r).fj0o; c'H( fidtoTO\.' xu{}c't:rfQ c'mo O:TEQflCLTOC::
U\'ll:TE<f tzrv); De ad. et am. 4'JAI3 Ut o Oll]at; f:moqnl.i]; XC!L Ol'OilEVl] :roHfr; El>l.uBEia;. d
bi: bij Oriov !'] c'ti.l)Onu Y.(tl "mtVTlJJV llfV ll'(U\'ltl>V {}roi; m:'tvnov 0' c'tv{)gc;)7{0lS";" ugzi] xmu
fli.c"ml)\'((, Y.tvOuvn:n 0Eoi; rzvgo; 6 z&a; rLVCll, tr,iJ OE nu{)ic,rJ OlU([fQOVT(tJS";. C:rvnTc'tTTET((L
;i.t(l UEl :rgo; TO "yvciJOL Oa\JTOV .. ' a:t:atl]V EzClOT\lJ :rgo; EaUtOV zcti. ayvOLav EUUTOU
zai TliJV :t:f(ll uyetOliJV i(((L xaxciJV, T<l f)..).t..nj xcti TU 8 Of.(J); UVE:ruvogOww
:t:OtliJv); 65E. Academic and Platonic themes were perhaps interwoven in the lost treatise
llr(!i roi' aatrov xai d cWal'aro; 'l'l'vx.'l {Ll77). See also Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 2,22;
Ad1. Math. 7,264 ; Tert. De an. 17,11-12.

Cf. Phaedms 229E; Charm. 164E-165A.

m One need only think of the negative phrasing: llEQt roti 111) rij Jtal'rtxij rov
i.oyov {Ll31).
276 Cf. Epict. Diss. 2,20.
m The very fact of subdividing its history into different phases (Old and New, First, Second,
Third etc.: cf. e.g. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1,220-225) already on its own implies a criticism: cf.
Numenius (?) ap. Euseb. Praep. DORRIE 1987, p. 391.
186 CHAPTER 4
the ineluctable chain of causes actually undermine divine Providencenx;
their determinism- not the Academics' suspension of judgment- renders
the oracles futile.
We may conclude that Plutarch argued
279
that the Academic tradition is
consistent with Plato's philosophy and is fundamentally unitarian. that it is
different from Pyrrhonian scepticism, and that it does not conflict with belief
in divine Providence.
C. Academic strategies
Plutarch is a supporter of the method of in contrarias partes disserere.
Plutarch himself makes ample use of the sceptical strategies as weapons in
his polemical texts2so. It has been argued that Plutarch did not simply copy
New Acadcrnic models, but put their strategies to use in a creative way2sl.
And indeed. arguing both sides of a question, establishing the equipollcnce
of opposed arguments, and exposing contradictions in his opponents'
arguments arc among Plutarch's most favoured weapons.
In De Stoicorum repugnantiis he explicitly defends the in colltrarias partes
disscrcrelllli practice against Chrysippus. The latter did not disavow the
strategy, but claimed to use it for a radically different end ( l035A-l 036A).
Chrysippus affirms this strategy to be the natural ally of those wanting to
suspend judgment. but his claim is that it is also "incumbent upon those who
inculcate knowledge in accordance with which we shall live consistently"-
the Stoics. in his opinion - ''to instruct their pupils in the principles and to
fortify them [ ... ] by destroying the plausibility of the opposite arguments,
just as is done in the court-room too" ( l036A, transl. CHERNISS). Plutarch
reproaches Chrysippus for training his pupils chiefly with a view to refuting
their opponents, maltreating their arguments ''like contenders for victory
and not stri\'ers afta the truth"
2
X
2
. Plutarch assigns a different function to the
in llframqllc partem disscrcrc, making it subservient to the truth. and not to
anyone's desire for victory. Therefore he fiercely disputes Chrysippus'
27s Cf. e.g. De Sro. rep. 1(1-BA; De comm. nor. 1075E-1076A; De Is. er Os. 369A; De Pyrlz. or.
402E; De def or. 4360: Lucian luppirer Conf. 5; 7; 12-13; 18;Juppirer Trag. 25.
m A treatise that also dealt with these themes may have been L\3-l: It.oi.ai 'Axr(()lJ.Ltu.iY.a{.
2so Cf. BABLT 1969a. p. 45-46; 60-61; 12-l-125; GLUCKER 1978, p. 260-261; 271; Dmn:--;I
1()i).')c, p. 129: BATIEG.\ZZORE 1992, p. 23; BALDASSARRI 1993, p. 14.
Cf. BABL'T 1969a, p. 61-62. As has been argued convincingly by BOYS-STO:-.IES (1997),
Plutarch makes use of Academic strategies, but differs from Carneades in that he is simulta-
neously promoting his own Platonism. In De stoicorum repugnanriis his ultimate reason for
denouncing the Stoic contradictions is not so much the internal inconsistency of Stoic
doctrines, but rather their divergence from Plato. Cf. p. 52(iralics B-S) : "If Plutarch can
identify the stricter elements of Stoic ethics with a deliberate act of divergence from Plato,
then not onlv can he sav that the Stoics fall into contradiction because their doctrines arc
obviously and compromising saving-clauses; but he can also say that they fall into
contradiction just where. and so by implication just because, they diverge from Plato."
<

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 187
intimation that the Stoics are the real strivers for truth, contrary to "many
people", by which Chrysippus of course means the Academics (n:oA.A.ou; bi1
Hywv tow; mu; n:xovta;, 1 037BC, ed. CHERNISS 1976b ). Plutarch retorts
that it is precisely the Academics' virtue not to assume a priori that one of
the opposite theses will result in
They frame arguments on either side E:xcrrEQOV bnzELQof.imv). however,
without having an apprehension of either (oUbETEQOV
their notion being that, if anything is apprehensible (w; Et n x.maf..rpnov
f:anv), only or especially in this way would the truth yield an apprehension of
itself ( otnu; U.v f] xmaAll\tlLV i1v af..t1{}Etav
:rragzovaav).
( 1 037C, transl. CHERNISS 1976b)
A remarkable parallel may be found in two Ciceronian texts
21
u. In the
preface to the second book of the Tuscu!anae Disputationes, Cicero argues
that the Peripatetic-Academic method in contrarias partes disserendi is to be
preferred to that of the other schools, not only because it gives the best
practice in oratory, but also in that it is the only one enabling us to discover
what is most \'eri simife2s.!i. This consideration is followed by an associative
transition to Ciccro's master, Philo of Larissa. May one infer that the view
1 O.Yll\ 13: on JIEV Ol!V ciw:ro; EOn tou; <p).ooo<rot; tO V EVC1vtlOV /.6yov oiowvo; bEL V
nOEVUl flil JIFllt Ol'\'lrfO(llCt; u:iJ: OflOLlt); tot; btr.o).oym; r.axouvw;. u'><J:lE(l ou ngo; tl]V
u)Jp'lnuv <'t)JJt :rrgi. \'lXl]; c't'{!J)\'t\;OfLEVOU;, ELQljlCtl Jt(lo; autov bt' Etf(l(l)V. The other works
to which Plutarch is here rd.:rring. probably arc L45 (nrui nj; ci; (x/tuum i.-rtXflQlJOrw;
{Jtj/i.irt r'). L\56 (Ei :nlm m'''/I'O(!lJf/rH') or L\98 (nrci rw1 O!Jl''JYO(!Oiil'Twl'): cf. CHERN!SS
1976b. p. 43X note a. The antithesis love of truth- (p).ovn!.iu is apparently an Academic ropos:
cf. Cic. Acad. I 4-l: "tum ego 'Cum Zcnone' inquam 'ut acccpimus Arcesilas sibi omne
certamen instituit. non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi vidctur, sed carum
rerum obscuritatc. quae au confessionem ignorationis aduuxerant Socratem [ ... ]"';A cad. 11
10; 76 ("Arcesilan vero non obtrcctandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse"); Augustine Contra
Acad. 2,15. Cf. IOI'POLO 1986, p. 29. Sec also De tranq. an. 4710: atnov b' cptA.autlct
<pi.o:rQt;nm; nowvou r.ni (p}.ov[r.ov; v mlm[ ... ]; Adl'. Col. 1115C (with BABUT
1994a. p. 522-523); De Pyrh. or. 395A; De def or. 412E; 427E; 4310: ci.HU. vuv, 6 'Aftfll;JVto;
f(p]. i'.(tl azoi.i]V ci'{Ovtet; c'tr.goatc't; E'f.El',; xai ;rgoOUflOt; tU [lEV tCt bf: fletVOc!vEtv
EQtbo; rr.:robt;)V Ol'Ol]; r.ai !fl).ovEtx[a; UJtcLOl]; ovyyvOJ[ll]; bE navti. AOY<!l xni JtU(lQlj\JLC1t; u>;
og(t; brbopEVl]; (perhaps cp).ovtxia; should be read instead of cptAOVELXLU;). Cf. BROECKER
195-l, p. 120-121. See also Plzi!ebus 14B, and Socrates' words in Phacdo 91A: xtvbuvEuw f.ywyE
EV t("l :rag6vn :lEQi auto\: tottou ou (rt.Aoo6q;w; E'f.ElV ul..).,' WOJtEQ OL nuvu cma[bEUtOL
cp).ovir.w;.
:csJ GLt.:CKER"s remark that "Cicero is our only source for this goal of the Academic
procedure" ( 1995, p. 133) is rather unfortunate.

Tmc. Disp. 2.9: "itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de

omnibus rcbus in contrarias partis disscrcndi non ob cam causamsolum placuit, quod aliter
non posser, quid in qcwque re l'cri simile essct, imeniri, sed etiam quod esset ea maxuma
dicendi exercitatio." See also 1,8: "haec est enim, ut scis, vetus et Socratica ratio contra
alterius opinionem disserendi. nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse
Socrates arbitrabatur"; 1,23: "Harum sententiarum quae vera sit, deus a1iqui viderit; quae
veri simillima, magna quaestio est"; 4,47.
188
CHAPTER 4
expressed on philosophical method was also Philo's? At any rate, Cicero's
mentioning of the reri simile- perhaps a translation for to is to be
understood in the context of (Academic) caution and open-mindedness:
Cicero advises to follow probabi/ia- presumably a translation for ni ;n{}ava
-without taking them to be true. Since he does not have the pretension to
possess truth and does not even believe that it can be ascertained - but
merely attempts to advance as far as one can get, not further than what is
''most like the truth"21lo- he is prepared to refute without obstinacy and to
be refuted without
The same view is expressed in the introduction of Acad. 1!:
[ ... ] although we at all events have an easy brief to argue, who desire to
discover the truth without any contention (1erwn in venire sine ulla comcmionc
w!wnus), and who pursue it with the fullest diligence and devotion.[ ... ] and
the sole object of our discussions is by arguing on both sides (in wramquc
partem dicendo et audiendo) to draw outand give shape (diciant et tallUfttam
exprimant) to some result that may be either true or thc ncarcst possiblc
approximation to the truth (a!iquit! quod aut I'Crtllll sit mtt ad id quam proxime
acccdat). [l-\] Nor is thcrc any diffcrcncc bctwccn ourselves and those who think
that they have positive knowledge except that they have no doubt that their
tcncts are true (i!!i 11011 duhitant quiltl'alcra sint quae defmdwtt). whereas we
hold many doctrincs as plausible, which we can easily act upon hut can scarcely
advance as certain (nos prohahi!ia mu!ta lwhemus, quae s<'qui facile. adfimwr<'
1ix (J0.\'.1'1111/11.\').
(;\cad. 1/ transl. Rack ham 1933, slightly modified)
Cicero is pointing out that precisely because the truth is of prime concern to
them, the Academics do not want to make unjustified truth claims. They
hold on to prohahilia in practical conduct. but avoid positing rigid theoretical
conclusions about them: for Academics the search for truth is
In seeming contradiction with Plutarch's first Quaestio P!atonica ( !OOOC).
Cicero appreciates positively the doctrinal differences and the disputes
among the various schools2K'l. For Plutarch these indeed prove that all
schools, with the (possible) exception of one, err (it is of course his hidden
agenda to make it understood that only Platonists conduct philosophy in the
Cf. GLUCKER 1995. esp. p. 119-123; 129-130; 132-133.
:'xo Sec also Tusc. Disp. l,R ("veri sirnillimum"); De di1. 2,150 ("ea proban: quae sirnillirna
veri videantur"); A cad. 1166; 128.
:'H7 Cf. Tusc. Disp. 2,5: "nos, qui sequimur probabilia nee ultra id quod veri simile occurrit
progredi possumus, et refellcre sine pertinacia et refelli sine iracundia parati sum us." Cf. 1, 17.
Cf. Acad. 117: "etsi enim omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaquc est et
in ipsis rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas. ut non sine causa antiquissimi et
doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint, tamen nee illi defecerunt neque nos
studium exquircndi defatigati relinquemus."
Tusc. Disp. 2,4: "in ipsa enim Graecia philosophia tanto in honore numquam fuissct. nisi
doctissimorum contentionibus dissensionibusque viguisset."
i
t
AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 189
proper way). But the difference between the two texts is less fundamental
than might seem at first sight. Indeed, both philosophers believe doctrinal
differences to be an indication of the fact that truth has not been attained:
actually both are using the notorious sceptical tool of the <:nacpwv[a, which
consists in invoking the factual dissension among schools or thinkers in order
to recommend suspension of assent, or to argue that truth is still out of
Cicero, however, focuses on the positive effect of this situation,
claiming that vivid debates make philosophy- in a sense- prosper, in that
they lead to an intensive philosophical activity. Plutarch's assertion, on the
other hand, is to be understood in the context of his criticism of the tendency
to make one's own views prevail at all costs, often in defiance of the truth.
Plutarch regards philosophy as a continuing search for the truth
2
'.J
1
, the
existence of which is never doubted- as it never is in Academic

The discussion is merely about whether - or to what extent - truth is
attainable for man. This genuine Academic2
9
3 theme is clearly hinted at in
the first Quaestio

As far as knowledge of the highest, divine

reality is concerned, Plutarch makes himself quite clear in other writings: it
is not fully attainable for us. That is why the aporctic condition is to be highly
valued :
It seems th:1t our beloved Apollo finds a remedy and solution for the problems
connected with our life (n't; rrrgt TOV Biov ('trro(liw;) by the oracular
responses which he gives to those who consult him; but the problems
connected with our power to reason (ea; bi.: mgi n)v /.oyov) it seems that he
himself launches and propounds to him who is by nature inclined to the love of
knowlcdge (n/J lfton !p/.ou(Hrll>), thus creating in the soul a craving (TfJ;
, . ., Cf. Cic.Acad. /I(J
1
); 117122; 12
1
); 147; Tusc. Disp. 1,18; Dcnat. deor. 1,1-2; 1.14; 1,17; De
fin. 1,11; 2.4'>; 3.4-l; 5.16-17; De di1. 2.2R; 2.R3; PI ut. Adv. Col. 1123E. Emp. l'yrrh. llyp.
1.165 (z1ti o p[v t'crt> btwrwviu; [se. T(lo:t:o;] i':oTi. zm'}' ov :rrgi. Tot ngmd)[vTo;
::tQ<.<'f!Hm>; <'<vr:rizQtTOv mc'wtv ::t(((l<'< n: ni> fli\'> xut Jtu[Hl mi:; <pi.ooo<rm;
j'E'(t::\'l]pl\'1}\', bt'l]V OU bttvc'qtE\'ot UtQfiO\')({t Tl l] X<nui.J'r{O)lEV Ei; b-rozljv) and
e.g. l.SS; 1,170; 1.178; 2,18-19; 2.56; 2,116; 2,259; 3,3; 3,6; 3.56; 3,139; 3.218-219; Adv. Marlr.
1.27; 1.320; 2.102; 7.380; 8.118; 11,229-231.
:ll Compare Anon. in Theaet., reading the Thcaetetus as a philosophical search for truth:
2.-12; 3.20-21; 8,27-28; 11.16. Cf. supra: eh. 2, 11, F.
Cf. Cic. Acad. 1172: "nos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus."
:!'IJ Cf. Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1,23; Cic. Acad. I 44; A cad. II 7; Max. Tyr. 2,10,187-192; 8,7,152-153;
8.8,190: Anon. in Theaet. 54,31-36; Anon. Proleg. in Plat. phi/os. 10,60-63; Aspasius In Etlr.
Nicom. 5-1.21-24: Augustine, Contra Acad. 2,11; Euseb. Praep. ev. 14,4,14-15; 15,62,10;
Epiphanius Ad\. haeres. 3,29; Hermias Alex. In Platonis Phaedrwn scholia, 70,9-13
COUVREUR. Cf. mpra: p. 73-75.
m 1000C: rt pi:v oN:>i:v EOTt xma).IJ:1n)v av{}gto:rw xni. yvtuaT6v. See also De Is. et Os.
351 CD: :1ttvw [ ... ] bEi: Ta'{aOu [ .. . ] cdTEi:aOm nagu niJv l'tEwv, )tu/,ww bi: Tl); rtEQi. a\;niJv
f:rtOTl.J!ll]; 000\' E<fLXTOV i':anv avOgw;rm; )LEn6vm; fl:'ZO)l{)(( Tl')'XcLVEL\' nng' ((t'TWV
Er.fl\'(1)\'. De sera 1111111. 5-l9E: TOn'!{}{[(( xai TU OW)lOVl(t ]'[QcL'{)WT(t OlCt0%0]'[lV avOgw:tot;
ovw; (cf. BALDASSARRI 1994, p. Cam. 6,6.
190 CHAPTER4
'l.j!U;.(l]; OQSLV) that leads onward to the truth (a:ywyov bri Ti)V aA.lj{}aav), as is
clear in many other ways, but particularly in the dedication of the E.
(De E 3S4EF, transl. BABI3ITI 1936b)
Plutarch clearly considers aporetics to be beneficial and relates it to the
striving for truth. That truth ought to be of prime concern for the
philosopher is confirmed by De audiendis poetis, where Plutarch calls
Socrates the champion of truth (6 LW%Qclll] UTE bi] ycyow(); a).lp'}da;
U.yuJVllHtj; TOV arrana 16C). In De E it is stated expressis that
truth is what philosophy is about (f:rrd ro[vuv cpLA.oaoq;[n rrEgi aA.1)nnc1v
f:anv, 387A).
D. ;wniJ.t]l!Jt; and Fourth Academic epistemology
In the first Quaestio Platonica Plutarch presents us with the following
dilemma:
( 1) "if nothing is apprehensible and knowable to man" (d fLEV ol.6l:v ron
xutut.l]rrTi>v xal yvwa1:ov, IOOOC)
(2) "if. however, there is knowledge of what is true and what is true is single"
(db' fOtlV rmanhlll TOO CtAl]{}oO; EV ()TO Uf.l]{};, 10000).
But the author does not make clear which alternative has his prderence. In
De Stoicorwn repugnantiis, explaining and defending the Academic strategy
of arguing for both sides of a case, he paraphrases their way of thinking:
( .. . ]their notion being that, if anything is apprehensible(<;>; Et n ;.ww).l].:TTtlV
l-onv). only or cspt.!cially in this way (oihw; U.v llOVu>; i't w't/.tota) would the
truth yield an apprehension of itself.
(10J7C, transl. CIIERNISS 1976b)
It is remarkable that he chases a hypothetical wording in both these key
texts. One should not evade the question whether Plutarch believed
xcna).tppt; to be possible. At any rate, by affirming neither of the two theses,
Plutarch, in the best Academic tradition, avoids the trap of self-contradiction
that consists in categorically stating that he knows that nothing can be
known.
Plutarch seems to avoid choosing between the two alternatives. This
makes his position conspicuously different from that of the anonymous
commentator on the Theaetetus. There inapprehensibility is referred to in
the commentator's treatment of the contention "that Plato does not
dogmatise" (54,42-43; see also 63,13). This view is then rejected in
unequivocal terms. Instead the commentator strongly approves of the
second interpretation, notably that the truth (to a certain extent) can be
known and that therefore Socrates' ignorance is to be understood as a
didactic strategy. Consequently the commentator interprets didactic
ignorance in the context of maieutics. Plutarch, on the other hand, while

...
ACADn11C Al'<D PLATONIC IN PLliTARCH 191
pointing out that there is a didactic explanation to Socratic ignorance, never
explicitly states that this is to be regarded as an interpretation exclusive of


The considerations concerning the dangerous love for what is
one's own, which are not paralleled in the commentary, suggest that it is also
in Socrates' mvn advantage to free himself of convictions. At any rate,
Plutarch holds that Socrates is exemplary in his open-mindedness: not
favouring views because they are his own, Socrates remains an unbiased
judge.
The search for truth according to Plutarch is to be philosophy's central
concern. To what extent truth is ascertainable, he does not say, nor to what
extent Socrates has attained it. The most philosophy can hope for (av agwta
:tQUHlJ cp/.ooocria), would be that one school is on the right track (IOOOC).
From this assertion, combined with the contention that only the followers of
Socrates are able to avoid the trap of self-love (10008), it may be inferred
that Plutarch is of the opinion that only the Academics are practising the
right kind of philosophy. They may not possess the truth, at least their
attitude is xm'log{}ofou. It was Plutarch's view, I think, that absolute and
definitive knowledge is not bestowed upon man
2
<J6- at least not as long our
soul is incarnated:!n -, but that there is one, and only one, form of
philosophy. in which truth is sought for in the right perspective. This activity
also requires. of course, an attitude of reverence.
Plutarch's emphasis on "zctetics", his positive appreciation of the
aporetical moment. and his adherence to the one-Academy-thesis bring him
close to the philosophical realm of Philo of Larissa - the so-called Fourth
Academy:!'Js. This hypothesis is confirmed by the many parallels with
Cicero's Acadt:tnica.
Sl!l! Jlso PRAEOITER (1901J. p. 536): '";\uch hicr [se. in Quant. Plat. l] win.l Jic sokratischc
i;wz'J wcscntlich nach ihn:r piiuagogischcn Beut!utung bt!trachtct, abcr van dcr Ausschlid3-
lichkcit cint!r piiuagogischl!n Ahsicht unJ ihrcm Gcgensatz su cincm sonst bestehenden
Dogmatism us Jes ist hia nicht die RcJe. !m Gcgcntcil, was 2,5 f. van der zum 1-loren
nutigcn des Ohrcs u.s.w. bemcrkt wirJ, schlid3t feststchcndc Dogmen aus. In c.
3 wird die dal3 Ol
1
0fV fUll zam}.TJ:I10V UV0Qt0l1\ll XCtL yYu)010V, offcn gelassen
[ . . .]"": INVERNIZZI 1976. p. 222 note 39: anchc Plutarco affcrma che tale attivita ha essenzi-
almentc un significato pedagogico-didattico. ma, a diffcrenza dcii'Anonimo, non fa
rifcrimt!nto ad un sapere dogmatico prcsente in Socrate quando questi non eserciti la sua
funzionc maieutica. Cio quadra perfettamente con l'atteggiamento generale di Plutarco, che
e assai meno antiscettico deii"Anonimo."
:
96
Cf. HARDIE 1996, p. 136: "The last word of De E apud Delphos (394C] is ao{h:vda;. with
reference to the feebleness of mortal man's ability to attain to a full knowledge of Being."

Cf. De gmio Socr. 5910 ('l'uzij :t:Ci.oa \'Ol' fl!'1E(Jf.V, aA.oyoc; of. xai. avouc; oh EOTlV, an
000\' (iv mhij; OU.Q%t !tlZ0Tj zai rru00tV, 1QEJ1Wl xa{)' TjOova; XCJ.L a).'(l]OOvac;
Et; 10 (ij.orov. !ltrvuwt o ou rraoa 10V Ul110V 1QOJ10V' X1A.); SCHOPPE 1994, p. 239; 266.
Cf. T ARRA:--T1983b, p. 173 notes 95-96; 1985, p. 133. On Plutarch's attitude to dogma see
also 1:-.;GE:"KA:<.tP's interesting approach (1984, Plutarch as a Pragmatist, p. 81): "In short, for
Plutarch, dogma represents deba"ie about practicality or applications, and not theorem in
itself." ,.
192 CHAPTER 4
It cannot be ascertained from which sources Plutarch got his information
on the New Academy. At any rate, we have seen that the likelihood that
there had been a continuous school tradition from Philo unto Ammonius
and Plutarch, is extremely remote
299
Possibly Plutarch had at his disposal
Clitomachus' - i.e. Carneades' pUpil's - \vorks
300
, or perhaps writings by
Philo (the notorious Roman Books)31 or by Eudorus32.
The hypothesis of Philo's Roman Books
303
is especially attractive, as
pointed out by GLUCKER (1978, p. 287): this work "conceded[ ... ) that in
themselves, things were xm:a),t1JtT<i, thus leaving room for accepting. with
caution, the more positive views of less sceptical philosophers. This would
allow Plutarch in his later years
304
to espouse the views of the sceptical
Academy without abandoning altogether the more positive aspects of his
Platonism." I would like to remark that I do not think that the '"sceptical''
tendencies were confined to Plutarch 's later years, or even that they were
then more prominent than earlier: Academic themes appear to be present in
his earlier and later works indiscriminately
305
- insofar as a more or less
reliable chronology can be estahlished-'
1
!0.
13e that as it may, innuence of Philo's Fourth Academy is certainly
plausiblc. This would explain Plutarch's somewhat ambiguous attitude with
regard to As I have already discussed (p. 71 ). \vhen Philo wrote
the Roman Books, it presumably was his view that the Stoic concept of
xu.n't).tppt:; is untenable, which should not exclude that a more modest form
of knowlcdge is within our reach
307
Possibly Philo did not even object to the
term %(tt<'tl.tppt:; taken in a weak sense :
[ ... ]if things are apprehensible to any kind of being or of any property
such as truth which they may possess, they have still declared to be non-
Cf. supra: eh. l, If!. See also GLUCKER 1978, p. 98-134.
'
1
M
1
Cf. SVF I (von ARN!M, 1905), p. XIV-XV; GLUCKER 1978, p. 287.
)tJI Cf. GLUCKER 197S, p. 2R7; TARRANT l9R5, p. 42 : .. It is easy to imagine th.: influence of
thesl.! hooks on Plutarch, who clearly considered himself 'Academic', wrote on the Philonian
one-Academy thesis. and retained Academic 'scepticism' as a tool rather than a-; a means of
expressing significant uncertainty" ; also p. 134.
Cf. TARRA:-.IT 1985, p. 134 (via Ammonius).
On this work, which gave rise to the so-called Sosus affair (the title of Antiochus' reply)
and which probably entailed the definite breakup with Antiochus, see Cic. Acari. If 11-12:
BARNES 1989, p. 70-76.
:ltl-1 Sec also GLUCKER 1978, p. 276.

Sec also DON!N! 1986a, p. 212; BABUT 1991, p. 6-10. I shall deal with the question of the
philosophical sources of Plutarch's scepticism in the next chapter, when discussing some
differences of opinion between OON!N! and BABUT (eh. 5, 1).
3<K> Cf. CP. ]ONES 196fi; BRENK 1977, p. 9-15.
307
Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1,235; Cic. A cad. /l18; T ARRANT 1985, p. 53-fi2: Br\R:"ES
1989, p. 73-74; LEVY 1993a, p. 271; G6RLER 1994, p. 922-924; cf. supra: eh. 2. Ill. See also
GLUCKER 1978, p. 80-88; W!SN!EWSKJ's account (1982, p. 27-37) is not to be trusted.


l
1

ACADB11C AND PLATONIC THE:\1ES IN PLUTARCH 193
apprehensible according to the requirements of the Stoic criterion, and some
other sense of apprehemion m11st apply.[ .. . ] If it is enough that we apprehend
things in a non-Stoic sense, and things are, in consequence, apprehensible, it
must surel y be the case that the nature of things is to this extent open to us to
grasp.
(T ARRAJ'.:T 1935, p. 59; his italics)30S
In any event, Philo appears to have been of the opinion that man's faculty of
knowledge is able to grasp reality to a certain extent, and almost certainly
denied that inapprehensibility was to be regarded as an Academic dognza:-
09

IV. ANAMNESIS (lOOODE)
In the fourth and last section of the Quaestio, Plutarch- like the anonymous
commentator on the Tlzeaetctus - relates the epistemological issue to the
doctrine of anamnesis. The \Veil-known Platonic theory of anamnesis implies
that knowledge of a noetic, divine nature is somehow present in the human
soul. but is obstructed and does not surface due to the embodiment of the
soul , for the soul suffers forgetfulness at the time of its incarnation. It was
part of the task Socrates set for himself to assist his pupils in recovering this
slumbering nodic knowlcdgeJ
10

Plutarch has relatively few references to the Platonic doctrine of
anamnesis, although it is beyond doubt that he was familiar with it, as he
clearly was acquainted \vith Plato' s dialogues containing this doctrincJtt.
:l<JS The concept of a .. general'', colll/lloll scii.H' x<n:!'ti.1J1IIt; may be derived from Photius Bihl.
cod. 212 (t1cnesidemus) . at least if one is prepared to assume along with TARRANT that
Photius here is rcOecting the debate between Philo and Aencsidemus: cf. Phot. Bihl. 212,
lfil)b42-4J (TO Ol' TE ur.mc'tl.l):tHt J1(LVTCt EiQlJY.EV oihE xcnu).ljl1Ttt) ; 170a2J-24
( ltVE:ril.l):t'!Ol TO :rw]u:wv); 170a30 (r.mvo); XU'Wl.lj:TtU); l70a36-37 (nuvno<; ur.mu}.lptav);
sec .TARRAl'<T 1%5, p. 57-62; p. 61-62 : .. Philonian doubts only implied the absence of
knowledge of knowledge, and its absence could not be said to entail the complete absence of
apprehension; [ . .. J The idea that things may be apprehensible 'in a general way' or 'in a
general sense' is interesting. The general sense would no doubt have been opposed to the
philosophical sense (determined of course by the Stoics).'' TARRANT's account is at any rate
more plausible than GLUCKER's (1978, p. 80-89).
m Cf. Augustine Contra A cad. 3,41; T ARRANT 1985, p. 54.
31o For references to the relevant Middle Platonic texts on anamnesis see LUSCHNAT 1962, p.
168-169; O!LL0:---1 1977, p. 291-292; WH!TTAKER 1987, p. 94-95; SCHRENK 1991. It should be
remarked that Cic. De fin. 5,43 and 5,59 present the Antiochean, "Stoicising" account,
whereas Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5,58-59, Anon. in Thcaet. and the theses ascribed to Plutarch in
Marcianus gr. 196 (ed. NORV!N 1913, often referred to as Olympiodorus in Plat. Plzaed. ) imply
a fundamental criticism of Stoic notions.
311 The key texts are J\.11.'110 85D-86B, Plzaedo 72E-76E, Plzaedms 249BC. A quick look at one
of the lists of Plutarch 's quotations should suffice to prove Plutarch 's acquaintance with these
dialogues: cf. R.M. ]ONES (1916, p, 114-117; 135-139; 142-144; 150) or HELMBOLD- O'NE!L
( 1959, p. 58-59). ' .
19-l CHAPTER 4
Before undertaking a detailed analysis of the account of anamnesis in the
first Quaestio, let us first take a look at the most important texts pertaining
to this matter in the rest of the Corpus
( 1) The subject of anamnesis is brought up by Cleombrotus in De def or.
422BC when he is discussing the number of worlds, a topic which. as we have
already seen, has a paradigmatic function in epistemological discussionsm.
Cleombrotus claims to relate the doctrine of a stranger, who asserted that
the worlds are 183 in number, arranged in the form of a triangk-'
1
-t. The area
in the middle is called the "Plain of Truth" (rr6lov a.l.t]{}da;, cf. Plwedr.
248B), in which "rest undisturbed the accounts, the forms, and the patterns
of all things that have come to pass and of all that shall come to pass" (tot;
).6youc; Y.ai. tCt. 1:611 zai. tCt. nov yqov6twv xeti Hr)V
yVlJoopvwv uz[vJFa). Once in ten thousand years the best human souls are
given the opportunity to contemplate these eternal realities. Even the hest of
our initiatory rites arc but a dim reflection - a dream - of that highest
initiation. Philosophic inquiry- so as not to he completely futile- should try
to recall these sights (zai. roue; A.6yotc; vzu ni>v hEt:
crtAooocp:.lm'}m %ctAci)v ij m:gctLVEO\'}cu).
Perhaps one should not take Cleomhrotus' account too seriously-'15:
If this is mt:ant to bt: sublime Platonic myth kaving the hearers gasping and
brt:athkss at the new vision opened up to them, it certainly fails in its purpose
among Clcombrotos' friends. Demetrios, in a litt.:rary allusion to Odysseus
among the suitors (Odyssey, 21.397). concludes that tht: man [se. Cleomhrotus'
"strangt:r''j is simply a fraud, \vho had bet:n around enough to make some good
plagiarisms. and that in fact he had stolen the idea from Petron of Himcra.
11: BOI.KF.STEIN (19-t6. p. 103-104) ami TEODORSSO:" (I liJS'J. p. 170-171) ri<,:htly douhtthat
the dedication of the second hook of the Quaestiones comil'lllcs {629DE) contain-; an allusion
to the doctrine of fllllllllllesis (othawisc FUIIRMA:":--1 llJ72, p. 63 note 1 ). But pcrh;1ps l.uc. 2A
alluucs to this doctrine.
11

1
Cf. .wpm: p. 166-167. Sec also Galcn De 1'/ac. 1/ipp. et /'/at. 9.6.20.
"
4
Sec on this theory 00RRIE 1983, p.lJlJ-102; RESCIGNO 1992.
m On the character Clcumbrutus see EISELE 1904, p. 41-46; FLACELIERE 197-lb. p. 88:
"Plutarque lui pn!tc done unc excessive crcdulitc. et il suggerc que lcs qualiks d"csprit de
Clcombrotc n'etaient pas a la hauteur de s::t bonne volontc, de son desintcrcsscmcnt et de son
ardcur pour !'etude."- BRENK 1977, p. Ill: "Even if Cleombrotus is not a bungling idiot in
the piece. he at least is no intellectu::tl genius, and the rest of the company ddight in
manifesting his incompetency in handling philosophical and religious problems.": OORRIE
1983, p. 96-97; 1987a, p. 291. BABUT (1992, p. 231-232. esp. note 157). however,
minimalises the said immaturity of Cleombrotus, considering him an exponent of a
"platonismc populaire" (compare OORRIE 1983, p. 102-105), whose contribution to the
discussion is essential: "Ainsi. des trois personnages princip::tux de cc dialogue, !t.:s deux
premiers, Cleombrote et Ammonios, sont charges. chacun a sa maniere et avec son style
propre, de plaider, pour ainsi dire, pour la 'cause superieure' ou le 'noble principe divin', c"est-
a-dire de mettrc en lumierc la part de la divinite dans le fonctionnement et la disposition des
oracles.'' (p. 223); 1994b, p. 537: "Cicombrote do it done et re pris au scrieux".
ACADEMIC A:--10 PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
Probably only the astronomical mathematical part of the is meant
since the Idealist eschatological part is simply a Platonic hodge-podge.
1977, p. 98)'16
195
(2) The philosophical importance of the P/wedms-reminiscences in the
Amatorius, on the other hand, cannot be doubted. It is in the context of the
analogy between Eros and the sun that anamnesis is first mentioned (764D-
765F). Plutarch points out that the sun may be likened to Eros, but that they
remain essentially differentJt7, just as the body is not the same as the soul:
the sun belongs to the sensible realm, Eros to the intelligible (7640: ou yCt.g
\j-
1
L'zij taut6v, u).A' EtfQOV, WOJifQ ip.tov 6gat6v, "Egwta bE
VOt]t6v). The effect the sun has is even directly opposed to that of Eros, for
it is the sun that by the charm and brilliance of vision turns our attention
from intelligibles to sensibles, and produces forgetfulness of the realities of
which Eros is recollection (764E: Ali{}11v wv 6 "'Egwt; ottv). The
sun bewitches us and makes us look for truth in the sensible

it
dazzles our memory and drugs our minds31
9
: in the sensible realm our mind
is asleep, in the intelligible it is awake. Down in this world the soul may only
admire beauty as in the shadow of a dream (764F). Only Eros can make us
understand that worldly beauty is imperfect and that true beauty is to be
sought in a higher reality. Eros escorts the souls of lovers upward to the
"Plain ofTruth", where pure beauty resides (to CtAl]{}da; JIEblov, ou to noA.u
zcti. zcn')ugov zed c1lpa,6; l'bgutm zc'ti.A.ot;. 765A). Therefore Eros may be
held to be the faculty of recollection32o. This passage of the Amatorius is
reminiscent of the Plwcdms, as is the whole

The "Plain of Truth"

recalls Plwcdr. 24813, the metaphors of sleeping and waking, linked to the
opposition of the sensible and the intelligible, refer to the myth of the
''" DORIUE ( p. 102-105) lahels the theory presented by Clcomhrotus as an example of
pseudo-philosophical Trilial!itaatttr, pointing out that Plutarch takes his distance from these
speculations by exposing. Ckomhrotus' story as plagiarism.
1
17
Cf. D.: def or. 433DE; 434F: 4380; De Pyth. or. 4000; Plato Resp. Cf.
00:"1:"1 1992b.
)IS 76-lE: U:tOOtQfCj l y(tg cmo tti'JV VOl]Hi'>V i'::n:i. n'.t a(o{hltCt ti]V XcLQltl xai.
).ap."TQOtl]tl tij; 01l'f(J); YOl]tEU(J)V xni uvamWwv EV E:mtq) xni. :n:EQl a{nov altEi:o\}m ta t'
(i)).ct Y.ui. tilv u).tiOELetV, n:gw{h bi: !ll]Oi:v. Cf. MARTIN 1978, p. 514516.
319
764EF: tl>o:trQ yi.tQ ri; <fti'>; no/.i. xai.l.utt:rgov uvqgortvwv :n:c'tvta nj; 't'uzij;
tu xa{}" t;noc; qnvvta xui btanrruyrv. oi:nl) nuv yrvor!Evwv f:vtai:.Oa xai. ftEmBa).ovtwv
fi<:r).t'tnnv EOIXE ti]v fLVll!llJV xctt cragrtannv tilv Otavmav 6 ij)..wc;. U<fi' l']bovtj; xai. {}w)rtato;
i':z).nvOavorti:vwv hrivwv.
J:o Sec also 76513 (x1vri titv fLVl.HITJV) and esp. 765F: tutto oi1 to f:gcmxov fllJXCtvtum xni.
o6q lOfltl :itEQL ta; EU<f't'Et; xui. q-t).oxc'tAou; '\jJU;<a; U\'Ctx).umv :n:otEi: nj<; flVlJill]i::; cmo 'tWV
f:vtui:Ou q;mvorthwv xai. ;rgooayognortvwv xa).wv Ei; to {}fiov xui. E:guornov xai. rwxcigwv
w; ct).t]OtiJ; Exft\'0 xai. OaqtaOIOV xaf.Ov. The analogy is that of the reflection of the rainbow
(765E). On the relation between Eros and anamnesis see Phaedr. 249DE.
Cf. TRAPP 1990, p. 155-161; MARTIN 1984. p. 84-86.

196 CHAPTER 4
cicadas
322
The vision of the intelligible realities, the descent to the sensible
world, the glimpses of supreme beauty giving rise to recollection of the
heavenly beauty once contemplated: these are all elements reminiscent of
Socrates palinode
323
Finally, the step-by-step initiation of the soul (Amat.
7658-F) recalls Diotima's discourse in the
Anamnesis is mentioned a second time after a considerable lacunaJ25 in
the text of the Amatorius. The text continues in the middle of a discussion on
heterosexual love. As to the relation between Eras and truth, this passage
adds little to the passage examined

But an important innovation

with respect to Plato is that egalitarian heterosexual love as much as
homosexual or pederastic love may serve this aim
327
In the Amarorius a
number of epithets arc bestowed on Eras : physician, saviour, guide (lcngoD
r.at xat1'wqt6vo;, 764F)3
2
" and mystagogue (765A). As \VC have
seen, in the first Quaestio Platonica too Plutarch uses medical metaphors in
the context of the search for truth.
(3) At the end of the third Quaestio Platonica the issue of TCt rgwnza is
brought up within an epistemological context. As an exegesis of the simile of
the line in Rcsp. 5090-511 E this Quaestio deals with the ontological and
epistemological division of reality into TO Votjn)v anc.l to uioihJTt)\', asking
which of the two is "larger". In the sensible realm man has nion; and
dr.uoLa, whereas voDs; is the cpistcmic faculty in the noetic realm (I 00 ID
- for convenience I leave out the realm of mathematics3-'o. At the end
Plutarch reaches the conclusion that the noetic is more important: :roUiJ
yug ouoa Y.Ctl [se. 1'1 VOl]Tij Y.Ul VOFQU buvcqu;] 1tcQlEUTl :r<tVTtl; TOi)
l'haeclr. 2:'iXE-2590; cf. PINNOY 1991, p. 31 -36. also Max. Tyr. 10Ji.l55-l(l): 21.7. 139-
WJ. Alcinous Dida.1k. 169,39.
.1 !.1 csp. 1'/wedr. 247C-E: 24lJI3-250C; 257 A.
Sec also MARTIN llJ7H, p. 44lJ : 19H4. p. 84-H6.
.1 2.l Cf. UARICi,\ZZI 19H7, p. 250-252.
76liE: xui Tc'cc; xnAc'c;; Tuutcc; xui iE(lc'tc; (cvcqLvlton; c'tvuxul.Ol'flEVu; ll!Lri:; bi Tt> ilrinv xcci
!lt.l)ihvov X((L '0AUfllllOV hri:vo %UAAo<; (cd. FLACELIERE in: fLACELIF:RE- llJSO) .
Cf. 1'/racdr. 2490.
m Thi s is not the most revolutionary innovation of the Amatorius, howcvcr: cf. BRE:SK
1988b, p. 471 : " Rather the evaluat ion of marriage, including sexuality, in ascent toward
the Form, and the identification of the Form with a loving God are its revolutionary
and p. 464 : "The Platonic ascent toward the Form of the I3eautiful as a passive
object has been transformed by Plutarch into the reciprocal love of the soul and its tclos.
conceived of as both the Form of the Beautiful and a divine person." BARIGAZZI (l %Sa. p.
107) points out that Plutarch polcmicises against the conception of Eros : in the
Platonic conception Eros is directed at the higher, teleological causality.
J!M See also 761E (AEYETat of. xai. Ti]V y At.%l]OTLV laTQlXO<; OJV [se. 'Hgax).J!;] OliJOCtl nT>
'AOfll.lT!l> MARTIN 1978, p. 503 sums up some obvious parallels from early
Christianity, but this of course is no proof for direct relationship) and Plato Phaet!r. 2528.
J2Y See also Quaest. Pint. 3 10020 : xgmjg10v 6 wii VOI)"CCi) flOvov EOTiv 6 vot:;. l;>; !fl'Jto;
OL' a;r).OTl]Ta xai. OflOlOTl]ta' TU bf. mi>flata, rro)J.a; btnq;ogc'c; EZOVTU %((l
UVOflOlOTl]W;, ui.Aa ut.l.ot; %QlTI]QLOl<; cJJOITEQ ogyavot<; UAl0%E00at J(f(f'JZEV.

i
(
AND PLATONI C THEI\1ES IN PLUTARCH 197
ato{hrroD r.ai nov {}dwv (1 002E). These words are followed
by the reference to the account of the Symposium, where indeed the
"smallness" of the sensible is opposed to the "greatness" of the
intelligible33l :
The most important point, however, is that , when in the Symposium Plato
explains how one must manage the matter of love 6EI
by diverting the soul Tl]V tpuziJv) from the beautiful
objects that are perceptible to those that are intelligible (cmo twv atoOt]twv
za).wv bt:i ta VOl]Tct), his own injunction is not to subjugate oneself and play
the slave to the beauty of a particular body or practice or of a single science but
to desist from petty concern about these things and turn to the
vast sea of the beautiful (bt:l. -ro 1toA.u wD xa/,oD tgmo0m
332
).
( 1002E) .
This text implies that noetic knowledge comes through anamnesis. The other
faculty of knowlec.lgc is sensory pcrception
333
, which however remains
anamnesis' starting point. The third Quaestio Platonica enables us to reach a
better understanding 9f Plutarch's epistemology, especially of the way it is
c.lepenc.lent on his Platonist metaphysics. At l002E he is speaking of the
intelligihle faculty in us, which he calls " the intelligihlc and intellectual
faculty in us men" (1:11; f.v t'ntiv VOllTf]; xai Our
' '" For a full discussion of Quacst. !'fat. 3 01'SO\IER 1lJ94b. p. 41 H-487. On
csp. p. 440-443. From the two ma in sections of the Quaestio emerges a consistent on
mathematical knowledge. t.H'cvmcc actually is not a separate faculty, but a kind of noetic
knowkdgc. The term VOI]tc'c both the mathematical and the noet ic (the
inll.!lligibk stricto sensu) : cf. )()()) D; 1001 E; l002B: 10020; 1002E. For bLttVOl!t sec csp.
1002A: [n ni>v flEV VOI]TliJV rv %(.lltl.JIJlOV 6 vol';. xni yc'u;_y i1 bdcvotn vot'<; E:onv Ev <:oi:;
tHn11Jpcmxoi:; ti><J:rrg [v xmo:tT!)OL; Efl!fWVOflEV<IlV niJV VOl]ni>v. This is confirmed by 10020:
X(.HTI.JQLOV bi: Toi) VOIJTOU fLOvov hni.v 6 voi: ;. Compare Qtwcst. conv. 8,2 718EF. Sec also
00RRIE 1lJ71a. p. M1; ISSARDI 1992, p. 133: CHERNISS 1976a. p. 40-41 note c
view on the Plato assigncs to mathematics, however. is not commonly
acccpll.!d : compare MERLAS 1934, p. 201-204; GUTI-IRIE IV llJ75, p. 509; ANNr\S 1981. p. 251;
L\FRA:-;CE 1987. p. 235-241).
m Symp. 210C: '[vu TO :tEQi. TO mi>fLn %CLt.ov OJil%QOV n liY'iOIJTUL Etvm and 2100:
apLxgo).oro; vs. bi To :roi.t' Cf. also 21 OB: To i;v mi:; 1juzaT<; xaAAo<; ntncinEgov
''rr,Joua{)m <:ol: E:v tq> Plutarch s argument is not so "strange" as HOL TORF 1913, p.
56 contends.
A paraphrase of Symp. 210A-E, esp. 210CO. Compare Plut. De Is. et Os. 3820; Alcinous
Didask. 157,19-20; 165.30. Cf. CHERNISS 1976a, p. 47 note e.
JJ3 See also 1002C: EOTL b' u6gmo; l]1J'UZl] xcci. "rdcocn; 'tal<; aio{)JjOEOlV avaioOqw;" w; EV
Toi:; NOflOL; EtQI]WL Cf. Leges 8980E; SHOREY 1889, p. 55; CHERNISS 1953, p. 372 note 1;
1976a, p. 43 note g.

Cf. CHERNISS 1976a, p. 46-47 note b, refuting 06RRIE 1959, p. 189 note 5; compare
WHITIAKER in \VHIITAKER- LOUIS 1990, note 163 p. 99. See also De virt. mor. 442A: EtEQOV
flfv rzn TO VOEQOV X{Ll ).O'(l0Tl%0V, xgaui:v TOll civ{)g(;JJtOl' xaTa cpuOLv xat c:igxnv
:tQOOij%OV EOTlV, EtEQOV of. TO ;ra-lh]n%0\' xal c:i/,orov xal rrOAUrrAaVE<; xai. aTaXTOV E:!;naowu
OEOflEVOV. De an. procr. 1016C. ,_.
\
19B
CHAPTER 4
epistemic faculty is the soul, and in particular vou; (in the soul) when it
comes to knowledge of intelligibles. Here Plutarch is referring not to our
lower cognitive faculties, but only to the intelligible zgrn'lQLOV. Since
according to Plutarch's metaphysics the noetic is present in the soul. the
latter- i.e. our faculty of cognition- is akin to the Ideas, so that a necessary
condition for the possibility of intelligible knowledge is met, according to the
principle that ''knowledge is of the like by the like"
3
35. The intelligible
element is originally external to the soul (f:rrdoaY.TOV, De mz. procr. 1026E),
but in the act of "creation", when the Demiurg harmonises the soul, he
imparts vou;, from his own being. to the souJ3
3
1i. It is therefore correct to say,
according to Plutarch, that vot:; (or to or also the noetic
principles tett'tov and {}(m:gov) is in the soul,
337
or, to put it differcntly. that
the soul participates in voO;J-'s- or in the Demiurgm- but also that a part of
the soul is nocticJ-lo. Plutarch takes these expressions as more or less
synonymous. The distinction between sensible and intelligible knowledge is
essential to Plutarch, as it depends on the fundamental ontological division
of reality- the basic division of the line, which is far more important than the
subsequent subdivisions. The same epistemological dichotomy is also
evidenced in De an. procr I 024EF. as we will sec below.
From the various arguments of Quacst. Plat. 3, for each of \vhich Plutarch
may have consulted various sources, can he inferred, however, a consistent
view as to the question whether it is possible in principle for the soul to attain
intelligible knowledge. At the end of the Qual'stio he explicitly says that our
intelligible faculty reaches as far as things divine {}dltJv
I 002E). In the first part of the Quaestio he had already asserted that
intelligible knowledge has the Ideas for objects, and even expounded a
method of acquiring this knowledge through an abstraction procedure
(I 00 I E-1 002A). Plutarch is clearly drawing on sources other than Plato for
the concrete elaboration of this procedurc3-l
1
, but nevertheless the
underlying conviction that this kind of knowledge is in principk possible
may be held to he also his own.
.1.1) Cf. 1\rist. A!t-tap!t. 8 !000b5 =OK 31 (Empcdocles) B 109: 1'1 yvtl>at; mi! opoiot tciJ
J-' 6 De an. procr. 1023D (vouv yU.Q at'mj zui VOl]TOV i1 voqti]; U.gztj;
EflitEJTOlllZf, ed. CHERNISS 1976a, p. 22-l notes 1 and 2); 1024C (6 bi:: tt}
'l't'Xl}); 10 16C: I 026E. On the status of the Demiurgc cf. Quaest. Plat. 3 I 0028 : 6 '{ClQ 0Eo; f:v
TOt<; VOllTOt;.
m Cf. Quaest. Plat. 1002F; 10018; De an procr. 1024E; 1026E; 1013A.
E.g. Quaest. Plat. 1001C; 1003A; De an. procr. 1026E; 1014E: 10168.
Quaest. Plat. 2 1001 C: Ot.'i< EQ'(OV i:oti tou {h:o[ b'A.'J....ct xai
34'' E.g. Quaest. Plat. 1001C: 1002E. Compare De facie 9438; 945A. It would be definitely
wrong to say, on the other hand, that the soul is an Idea: cf. De an. procr. 1023C.
341 See CHERNISS's notes (1976a, p. 37-41); 1994b, p. 443-467.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 199
( 4) The sixth Quaestio Platonica too contains a brief reference to the
doctrine of anamnesis, notably when Plutarch tentatively links the image of
the wings of the soul to anamnesis. The problem Plutarch seeks to elucidate
here, is why Plato asserts in Phaedrus 246D that the nature of the pinion,
among the things of the body, is most closely akin to the divine. The first
answer, which is later discarded, is based on the following reasoning: (1 ) this
/.oyo;- i.e. Socrates' discourse, or perhaps rather: this very utterance of his
-is about EQw;, (2) the object of gwc; is beauty in connection with the body,
and (3) this beauty by its similarity to things divine brings about anamnesis
in the soul (rrOTEQOV on ITEQL EQWTO 6 /..oyoc; EOTL, xat..A.ouc; CE TOU ITEQl TO
6 EQW;, TO CE xa/../..o; n} ngoc; TU frEta XlVEl xai
tilv '4'UXtiv; 1004CD). Here 1'1ToD JttEQOD q:n)mc; is equated
with gw;, contrary to the second answer, which carries away Plutarch's
preference, where it is identified with the faculty of reason and thought (1)
),oytonzil r.ai. CtavollnY.ti)3-l2. The object of gw; is beauty concerning the
body, but at the same time gw; participates in the divine and stirs the
recollection of the souP-H. Plutarch refers to the image of the winged soul in
connection with anamnesis in the Amatorius as well:
Those beautiful and sacred recollections (ta; xnf..a; mutct; xni
ctva!LVT]OEL;). summoning us up towards the divine and true, Olympian beauty
of the other world ( uvctzn).ou!tva; 1'utCt; rri to {)ETov Y.C(L al.tl{}tvov xai
'O).Uftl'Ttov xrTvo xc!Ho;), and furnishing the soul with wings (nt; 1puzi1
mgouwt). (766E)
(5) In Quaestio Con\'i\'{/lis 9,14 Ammonius is replying to the allegation
that Plato3-l-l unjustly assigned to Sirens instead of the Muses the presidence
over the revolution of the eight spheres (745CD). The Sirens' music,
Ammonius replies, reminds men of the heavenly music they once heardJ-15
( Ta; 'l'uzc1.; twv tOTE, 745E), creating in them a passionate
love for the heavenly and the divine, and forgetfulness of mortality (gwta
rrgo; Tct. o{tgcivta r.ai. {}ETa ),tiDllV ()f: nl>v {}v11n.l>v, 745E). The ears of most

Plutarch's discussion is quite superficial: by rigorously distinguishing the two answers, he
fails to sec that for Plato (cf. STEINER 1992, p. 90) the themes of and the soul (and its
parts) arc inextricably interwoven. MORESCHINI calls Plutarch's treatment "deludente", and
concludes (1990. p. J7) : "[ ... ] Plutarco banalizza l'immagine platonica, tanto piu che trova
inutile affaticarsi sui problcma se !'ala dcll'anima abbia, ono. attinenza con l'amore." See also
RO\IASO 1965. p. 37 : "[ .. . ] notiamo che un maggiore approfondimento del testo e dello
spirito pbtonici avrcbbcro dovuto condurre il Cheroncnse ad una sintesi dei due aspetti della
qucstione".
343
Plato in the Phaedms indeed elucidates the relation between and (249D-
250D), being described as the soul's regaining of its wings (249D; 250A; 251A). Through
anamnesis, i.e. recollection of Ideas, the soul approaches the divine (247C-248A; 249C-E).
Cf. Resp. 617C.
345
Cf. SOURY 1949, p. 3:26-327. ''
200
CHAPTER 4
men, however, are blocked, not with wax, as in Homer's story, but with
carnal obstructions and affections ("ra 6' Jrra nl>v ;r/.lotu)V
n:EgwA.tiA.Ln:tm r.at xanmrcA.aotm xai ;raOEmv, ou
XllQLVOL;); yet the souls of others are capable of anamnesis ( 1'1 6E 6t' El'Cf'L'Lav
alm1avncu r.eti 745E). This theme also figures in the first
Quaestio Platonica (cf. supra: see esp. eh. 4, I, D and II, C).
(6) SANDBACH's collection of fragments contains a series of utterances
related to anamnesis which are ascribed to Plutarch. In the manuscript
Marcianus gr. 1963-16 (from the ninth or tenth century), which along with
commentaries by Olympiodorus, also contains some heterogeneous notes on
the Plzaedo, presumably by Damascius3-1
7
, three sets of arguments are
ascribed to Plutarch.
(A) the first series, containing the header information 'Er. ni>v tau
XcttQlt)VE{J);, consists of thirteen separate theses confirming the doctrine
of mwmnesis (NORVlN 1913, 155,16-157,12 = SANDBACII 1969a frg. 215
=Dam asci us 11 275-287 \VESTERlNK);
(B) the second series, contiguous to the first, is entitkd nctgc't toi cu\wt)
(JLotuOElS ht:gw. and holds a numbt.:r of additional "proofs". But unfor-
tunately there is no indication as to where this second set is supposed to
end. Presumably it was the intention of Damascius or whoever collected
these theses to assign only the first five to Plutarch, although there may
be doubt about the sixth and the seventh (NORVlN 1913, 157.13-J0-
(15X,I2) = SANDBACII 1969a frg. 216 = Damascius 11 2XX-294)
1
-ls.
(C) Further on in the same manuscript there is a third set of utterances.
which contains material from the same origin presented in an abbreviat-
ed form. Here the title is : A collection of\'arious to sllfm that
acts of learning are acts of rcmemhering, from Plutarclz of Clwcmnea
('E::ttXElQll!lC'rru>V btwpog(l)v ouvuy<.l)'(i] bnr.vtvt<IJV uvufl\'l.Jnn; rlvw
tc.t.; flCdh']oEt; EX ni>v '!OU XCJ.tQ(I)\'f(l); n/,outc'tgzou, 191.3,
212,1-26 = S,\NDBACH 1969a frg. 217 = Damascius I 28).
D. Wyttenbach was the first to include this material in an edition of Plutarch.
E. ZELLER3-I'J, however, and R. VOLKMANN
350
supposed the extracts were
3-lt, Cf. WESTERI:--.;K ll 1977. p. 15.
3-l7 WESTERINK (11 1977, p. 15-17) has identified this material as two sets of notes st.:mming
from the same lecture by Damascius.
Cf. l"ORVIN 1913, p. 157. note at I. 30: "Hie rccte finem Plutarchci statuit f.[ == finck 's
edition of Olympiodorus, Heilbronn 1847]"; BEUTLER 1951, 970,36-43; SA:--.;DBACH lW1? . p.
133-134; SANDBACH 1969a, p. 388. According to WESTERINK (11 1977. p. 166-167) Dam. I 293-
297 cannot belong to the heading referring to Plutarch, although WESTERI;-.;K conknds that
the material is unmistakably Plutarchean.

ZELLER 111.2 1923, p. 80S( -809) note 3.
35o VOLK\!ANN I 1869, p. XII-XV; 105.
__


ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 201
taken from the Neoplatonic Plutarch of Athens. This is emphatically denied
by R. BEUTLER, who nicely hands the three sets back to Plutarch of
Chaeronea35I_ BEUTLER's view is shared by 0. LUSCHNAT (1962, p.170) and
F.H. SANDBACH (1969a, p. 389), who is of the opinion that the theses may
have been taken from some lost works. L.G. WESTERINK (II 1977, p. 166-
167) believes that the notes do originally stem from a Plutarchean dialogue,
possibly the JlrQi tpvx,r];, and at some point had been inserted in the
Neoplatonic commentaries on the Phaedo. K. ZIEGLER (1951, 753,5-9) is
much more sceptical in this respect: "Bestenfalls konnte es sich urn Notizen
oder Materialien handeln, die aus P.s Nachlal3 herausgegeben warden sind,
wenn diese Stticke tiberhaupt etwas mit ihm zu tun haben."
The arguments for the ascription to Plutarch are indeed frail. SANDBACH
( 1967, p. 133; 1969a. p. 389) points out the coincidence between frg. 215k and
De in\'. et ad. 537 A. which is supposed to support the attribution. However,
the common feature of both texts is an anecdote about Germanicus, which
in my opinion does not prove much as to the fragments' genuineness, since
dissemination is the hallmark of anecdotes. SANDBACII could have invoked
an additional parallel in support of his argumentation, notably that between
frg. 215h and (ps.-Plut.)De lib. educ. 9D as well as Quaest. com. 7448
352
,
which he himself indicates in a note to frg. 215h ( 1969a, p. 392 note c). The
only link between these texts, however, is the mention of or the allusion to
Mnemosyncm.
The only argument remaining is the threefold ascription in codex
Marcimws gr. 196, which in my opinion is too weak a basis to conclude with
certainty that these theses were taken from Plutarch's (lost) works or even
from the Corpus Plutarcheum. Most theses arc stylistically (hiatus15-l is not
avoided) as well as content-wise quite remote from Plutarch's genuine
l<t BEUTLER 1951, 970.30-36: "Denn deren Inhalt sind Beweisc fUr die Bcrcchtigung der
Annahmc dcr Anamnesis aus dcr Beohachtung des Lebens bzw. aus historischcn Exempla,
einc Art die P. a us Chair. wohl zuzutraucn ist und die, wenn man das nicht will, dann doch so
allgemcin gehalt.:n sind, daB sie zum altcstcn Beweismalcrial gehort haben." BEUTLER offers
no further arguments in favour of the ascription to Plutarch of Chaeronea.
When in the same Q11aestio the issue of anamnesis comes up (745E), there is no reference
or allusion to rvlnemosvne.
3
'
1
Besides, frg. 215h bears a much more striking resemblance to Max. Tyr. 10,9,244-248:
wi:ro agu xui ot rronJmi TlJV MvrJ!tOOlJVlJV atv[novwt Movowv Mouow; Ta;
r'rtcil'tEOV zogov xai. gyov t.t6;, uno of:
xai ovYTetTTOfLEvet;. Compare frg. 215h: ''On xat ot 1:wv Mouowv l:lJV Mv'rutoouvrJV
fi_,ovn:; a{.,:o wnw f:vbEiXV1JYTal' ut ftv yag Mouom 1:6 nctgf:zovt:m, 11 bE
TO E{gioXELV and frg. 217j: Et ri l:WV Mouo(i)V MvllflOOUVTJ, we;
Ubtc'tg{}oww; TU)\' atTia. See also Themist. 24, 301C. A1 of this may have
been inspired by Theaet . 1910.
N But this may not be a strong argument , since the notes may merely be summaries of
arguments in a dialogue by Plutarch, which moreover underwent a double condensation
process, first by Damascius, then by the reportator. Cf. WESTERINK II 1977, p. 166.
.......
202 CHAPTER 4
writings
355
. I think it is unlikely- but on the other hand not impossible- that
they actually derive from Plutarch. However, the three sets of theses appear
to belong to a Middle Platonic context
356
, so that, at any rate, they fall within
the scope of the present study. Therefore I shall succinctly deal with the most
relevant among them. The central thesis entails that only anamnesis can
account for knowledge:
"On T0 IlAC(T(J)VL QQ.OTOV a:roboOvm TOY ),oyov, d; ).t'p'}l]V %Cll
CtVWflEQOVtl n'JV yYWOLV XGL Tl]V Ct'{VOLGV.
That a very easy explanation is open to Plato, and to him alone, when he traces
knowing and ignorance to forgetting and recollection.
(frg. 2l5c, transl. SANDDACH 1969a)
A number of arguments are offered in support of this thesis: it is absurd to
think that the origin of knowledge is purdy external; the seeds of knowledge
have to be already present in the soul, albeit in a latent form (frg. 215b: d;
217am; b35H); otherwise we would not even know what we are looking for,
nor would we realise, having made a discovery, that we actually had
discovered anything: coming across things we want to know, we woulu not
even recognise them- they coulu be anything (frg. 215c; f; 217h: k)WJ:
another indication is that when we are concentrating we look inwarus (frg.
216u); moreover our delight in our discoveries shows us to be actually
recognising truth that was ours but had been lost (frg. 216c); the epistemo-
logical doctrines of the other schools fail to explain the search anu the
acquisition of knowlcuge (frg. 215f; 216c)-'w.
Several arguments appeal to the use of ordinary language anu the
meaning of words: the name Mnemosync (frg. 215h; 217j), the common use
of EITlAEll.lJOl'}Ct.l and A.uvOc'tVElV to express "not knowing" ( uyvoEi:v, frg. 215i),
and further the ("Heideggcrian") etymology of ul,1'p'}aa (frg. 215g)
1
.t; 217i).
Then there arc the stories about memories stemming from our pre-existence
ApGrt from the fact that convincing parallels arc lacking, it should be noted that the first
thesis of the first set (frg. 215a) actually implies disavowal of Arcesilaus' position. This would
be the only instance of PlutGrch betraying his loyalty to an Academic. Cf. DE LACY 1953. p.
79: "Piutarch never attacks by name those Ac;-tdemic philosophers, Arcesibus,
and their followers, who turned the Academy to scepticism."
See also BEUTLER 1951,970,34-36.
.157 Ei up' hgou ETEQOV oux av Ei fli] :TQOE'{V(J)OTO. n) ErtlZElQIHlU nl.mttJ\'lZO\'.
Cf. Plwedo 730.
J5H Ei rrgomiOqtEV tO EMElJ[OV toi:c; ato&l]TOL; xai aUTO n/.at(!)Vl%0V. Cf. Plwedo 740.
m Compare Max. Tyr. 10,5,124-139.
3
6
Frg. 2171 is completely different from the arguments in the rest of the series and utterly
remote from the Plutarchean context, which is also the case for frg. 215a. The latter is, I think,
un-Piatonic, and presumably of Neopythagorean origin.
){)I "On xai aA.tj{}na tO Oljf.Ol Alj{}T]; ELVat tijV EJtlOtT.HlTJV, 0 EOllV
UVUflVT]Olt;.

ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 203
or our previous lives, which allow to account for seemingly inexplicable and
unreasonable fears (frg. 215j; k; I; m; 217f). New-born babies have the
strongest recollections from a previous existence (216a; 217c), which can be
related to the \veil-known phenomenon that children are quicker to learn
(217c ). Anamnesis also explains how some are capable of learning certain
skills as autodidacts362 (frg. 217e ), as well as the fact that persons differ in
their capacity for different kinds of learning (frg. 217d).
Finally I mention a thesis from the same lecture-notes that does not
belong to the ones ascribed to Plutarch (it would have been the thirteenth of
the second set), but that is nevertheless close to the first Quaestio Platonica
in that it links maieutics to the doctrine of anarnnesis:
on t'j flWElnl%l] EQUrtllOL; rrgor.).l]OL; ouoa n]<; XUOl'flEVl]; E:monifuj;
avayr.aiw; bcizvtOLv atrrilv JTQOUJTclQXOUOUV, W bEt%VUOLV r.ai. 6
L(J)%(lclTlE: f:v T0 MEVW\'l.
(NORVI:--: 1913, 159,1-3)
That maieutic interrogation, being the elicitation of knowledge with which one
is pregnant, cogently shows this knowledge to be pre-existent. as Socrates
demonstrates by the experiment in the l\leno.
According to this text, the success of the maieutic method proves that
knowledge is already there in our souls before its discovery, as is
demonstrated in the examination of the slave in Mcno.
These theses from Damascius' lecture-notes in Marcianus gr. 196 may be
interesting parallels, but on account of their obscure origin they should not
be used as evidence for a reconstruction of Plutarch's views on anamnesis.
As these fragments (215-217) are to be dismissed as direct sources for
Plutarch's views, the first Quaestio Platonica remains as Plutarch's most
technical account preserved.
The focus of the last section of the Quaestio is on anamnesis. In Plutarch's
opinion this will be the most satisfying approach to the central of the
Quaestio. This appears not only from the fact that this solution is placed last,
as is often the case for the answer most favoured
3
1l3, but also from its
introductory clause, oga b (1000D), which is indicative of the author's
preference
3
fH. \Vithout in any way implying that the preceding sections of the
Quaestio lose anything of their value, Plutarch now transposes the epistemo-
logical issue into a genuine Platonic context: true knowledge comes through
CL Max. Tyr. 10,5,113-124 and LUSCHNAT 1962: Awodidaktos. Eine Begriffsgeschichte.
){,J Cf. KAHLE 1912, p. 63-64; ROMANO 1965, p. 127; STADTER 1965, p. 73.
3N Cf. ROSE 1924, p. 49; SANDBACH in : PEARSON- SANDBACH 1965, p. 175. For a similar
use of this formula, see Plut. Quaesi. cam. 6398; Quaest. nat. 9160; Quaest. Plat. 5 (1004B)
and Quaest. Plat. 10 (10110). ,
204
CHAPTER 4
anamnesis; knowledge of the divine and the intelligible3
6
5 is a matter not of
discovery, but of recollection. It is a passion for truth, an E:gwnxi1 TEZVl].
which Socrates held to be the only wisdom (i]v b llYEi:To :Lwxgcnq;
OO<ptav <tl]V> JtEQL tO {}Iov %(tl VOl]TOV, EQWTLY.l]V u;r' ahoD


Noetic knowledge does not come into our minds-
our souls, to stay closer to the Platonic expression -through generation or
discovery, but is already present and needs only be recollected ( ov yvwL;
[ ... J oub EUQEOli;3
67
aA.f..' Maieutic art does not import this
(noetic) knowledge into our minds from outside ( oux E:vn{}Loav
[ ... J vouv)3\ but shows that men have it already within themselves (a)).'
xovta; otx.Ei:ov f:v auroi:; [ ... J f:mbaxvuouoav).
As I have already argued, from the perspective of the composition of the
soul knowledge of the highest reality can only be accounted for by the
presence of the noetic within the human soul, as a constituent
Plutarch does not focus on this aspect in the first Quaestio, as he will in the
third and in treatises such as De an procr. and De virt. mar. (cf. supra: p. 159
note 149; p. 198), but merely suggests this ontological-psychological
dimension in the words oux f:vtdkroetv ( ... J vouv. The Platonic
theory of the composition of the soul is indeed consistent with Plutarch"s
argumentation in this last section of the Quaestio: knowledge of the divine

1
".1 Cf. Dt! Is. t.'t Os. 351 CD.

11
" A rderence to Symp. 1770 ( otTI:' y('tr,y t"iv rrou [yc;J t.'t:tO<flJ<H.tqu, 01\'u\ <flJ! tt iii./.o
binwo{)m ij n't f(l(I)Tlidt), but Tlzl'agl's 12HB ( otOi:v yr't!J wunuv i:rtimcqHtt niJv fl((i'.<(!_lt<JV Tl:'
xui ;m).riJV ft<dllJflCLTOJV- f:td i:j)ol'l.OfllJV uv- U.D.t't %(tl ).cyw Ol,J:TOl1 ud on irc;J Tl''(/.1.(\'(1) l;J;
lJror;. rl:rFiv ;r),t'Jv '(1:' OJll%LlOU nvo; Twv flJ(IJTl%riJv) or l.ysis
20-tBC (d!tl b" fyl;) Ttt (i).)..(( rrui).o; %Ut (izQlJ<HO;. TOLTo b[ Jl<ll :t(l); (% Hroi: t'l!l'lmw.
Tuzu o'(<iJ T. ftvm '(VliJvcH t\ltiJVT<L TC xui. i:QtDflfvov) may also have been in Plutarch's mind.
Plutarch never doubted the authenticity of the T!tcagt.'s (cf. L70) nor diu any of his
contemporaries: cf. PAVLU 1910, p. 14; lOYAL 1993, p. 97-91-l. The "1/tcagl's belongs to the
Thrasyllan canon (cf. Diog. Laert. 3,49-51) ; it figun:d in the classification system of lh:on
Smyrnaeus (cf. NOSSER Jl)l)J, p. 14R; TARRA:"o/T 1993, p. 60-61; l'vlAi'iSFELD 199-t, p. o-t-n) note
ll ). Diogenes Laertius (3,62) tells us that according to some it ought to be the first dialoguc;:
on the reading list of the students of Platonism. Sec also Albinus Pro/. 149,5; ps.-Plut. /Jc fa to
5748: SOURY 1942a, p. 118; 122; FRIEDLA:"<DER Il 1957, p. 301 note 15 ; Jl)<J7a. p.
114 note 2.
Ji>
7
Compare Plut. (?) frg. 215e; f; 217h: k.
Cf. Anon. in Theaet. 48,5-7 (mi% v{}[ono; fla{}T]-1 flcLTtOV, aUa ava-1 flYl.JOflJ;): 55,28-
30. Anon. Pro/. in Plat. pltil. 10,65-67.
JM See also De Is. et Os. 351 CD: nc'.tvm w KUu, bfi Taya{}a wt.; vouv [zovw; atTrioOcn
nagct ToJV {}rwv, ftc'.tf..wm M. n]; mgi. ai.ToJv moni!t!J; ooov cpx-r6v onv c'tv{}gtiJ;rm;
EU;(OJlE{}a l:U'(f.UVElV ;rag' a-lmiJv E%rlVO)V" UJ; otn'H:v awgtiJ:tQJ l.etBriv Ot'
zagiocw{}m {}f<Jl OEJIVOTfQOV a),JJ{}Eia;. Tuna flEv yag av{}gwrrot; 6 {}Eo; OJV b(oVTCtl
bibwmv, <YOU bf. Y.ai. flETabibwmv,> OL%ELU Y.fi<Tl]flEVO; l:UUTa %at ;(QtiJflEVO;.
Knowledge is the greatest gift the Gods have bestowed on man, or rather they Id us
participate in it, they give us a share. Man cannot attain full knowledge of the divine. as
appears from the words ooov E<ptxT6v onv awgtl!not;. See also De sera 1111111. 549F; cf. supra:
p. 179.
ACADEMIC PLATONIC THD.IES IN PLUTARCH 205
requires anamnesis and the presence of the noetic within our cognitive
faculty, the soul. But this also appears to imply that anamnesis/nollS is not the
only source of knowledge. In De animae procreatione Plutarch argues that
the composition of the souJ3
7
0 is reflected in our cognitive faculties:
Discernment U1 Y.Qim;) has two principles intelligence proceeding
from sameness to universals (n)v TE voDv a:ro wu tauwu n:go; TU xaft6A.ou)
and sense-perception from difference to particulars (Tt]V ato"1h1mv an:o wu
hQou :tQ6; TU %a0' i!r.aow); and reason is a blend of both, becoming
intellection in the case of intelligibles and opinion in the case of perceptibles
(v611at; E:v vot]TOi:; r.ai v wi:; atoftl']TOi:;). (1024EF)
The distinction between noetic knowledge and sensible impressions is in
perfect accordance with Platonism. The sensible world has a confounding
influence on the rational part of the soul and it is precisely Socrates' a
'"blessed"' person, standing closer to the divine than others- to counteract
this disconcerting force and to bring to the surface the rational in the souls of
others. This does not mean that Plutarch reverts to a position which he
earlier, in the first section of the Quaestio, implicitly disavowed, namely that
the instigation to practise maieutics was internal. It is true that the divine is
present in Socrates' soul, but this precisely makes him susceptible to the
divine command, which is essentially external. It is also the presence of the
noetic within our souls, that makes knowledge of intelligibles possible. In the
first section Plutarch, however, did not deny this presence of vou; in the soul
- on the contrary. He merely denied that Socrates' alleged "divine
command" was nothing more than vou; in his own souP
71

The catharsis that Socrates brings about restores the soul to its natural
state of wisdom372. On the other hand. sense perception is not entirely
dismissed, and is even used in the process of recollection. Both faculties
ought to intcract37J.
Actually Plutarch is speaking about the world soul, but this is isomorphic to the human
soul: cf. 1025C; De \'irt. mar. 441F. Cf. Plato Tim. 67C; 410.
m Cf. supra eh. 4, I; C.

Compare SEDLEY 1996. p. I 02: "Following the lead of the Plraedo, ancient Platonism secs
purgation (katharsis) as the restoration of the soul to its natural state of wisdom. The soul
already has the knowledge in it. Purge the obstacles which incarnation imposes, and the
knowledge will surface of its own accord."
m See ;lso De Is. er Os. 382A: rlJTEQ oi'v ot CO%lpWTal:Ot l:WV q'lAOOO!pl!JV oub' EV cniUzOt;
%Cti. aowpuTot; JrQcL'{flUOtV atvtyftU l:Ol! {}Eiou UflfAELV oubf.v oub'
UTlftc'.tl;nv, rn ohtat, n1; v ato{}avoft[vw; xai. '!JUXl'Jv xouow; xalnc'.t-&o; xui.
q:t'OEOlV lCtOTlJTa; ayanT]TEOV OU Tal
1
Ta a/.).a bta l:OUTWV n) {)fiov
f:vag'{EOTEQO>V oo:tTgwv xal. yEyov6Twv. See also supra: p. 101.
,,
206 CHAPTER 4
Also in the Amatorius ('Egurnxo;) Plutarch goes into the epistemological

of Socrates' so-called "Art of Love" (gwnxt}tEXVll)J7s. In the

vein of Socrates' palinode in the Phaedrus and Diotima's discourse in the
Symposium Plutarch expounds (764E-766B) that the god3
76
Eros guides the
souls of lovers through a process of reminiscence to the contemplation of the
Form of the Beautiful (to xaAov). Through reflections of supreme beautv
here on earth - perceived by our sensory faculties- Eros stirs the faculty ;f
recollection
377
. Plutarch here draws a sharp (Platonic) distinction between
the perceptible and the intelligible (to ata{h}tov and -ro vot}tov, see e.g.
764DEJ
7
s).
Along these lines Plutarch combines New Academic philosophy with the
Platonic ontological and epistemological distinction between the sensible
and the intelligibk realm. His epistemology encompasses the Platonic
Forms37
9
: through wwmm!sis we can obtain knowledge of the Forms- to a
certain cxtent3so. It should be noted that Plutarch does not distinguish
between the historical and Plato's Socrates in this respect, and thus tacitly
ascribes the doctrine of Ideas to Socrates- strictly speaking.
Socrates' method consisted in exciting perplexeties as if inducing the
beginning of labour-pains in young men ; in doing so he would arouse and
m Comp;1re !\lax. Tyr. I H,4,65-97. The Orationts I X-21 have t't a\_H,>nZl.l subject
matter. The last one of this series, presented as a kind of palinoJc, relates this to 11/WIIIIIt'sis.
In the first discourse of the series Maximus, like Plutarch, alludes to Symp. 177D: Ztti Tt't fltv
tt).i.tt ii:tttVT<t t't:to;rmrinn d()ivw, zui Tot; ;rqyi t't(lrn .. t; ).{ryol'; z<ti n:t; ;rqyi On7J\ ()t>:;tt;. zcti
ni itntt (i;wvm, Et( ol; oi ooqtonti l:zt'>tH'iV' titv bi: l-(lumzitv TEZVlJV i.:ru()t; . nutq; zai
bum'uu,>v rlvcu zui IT(Ht''(flUTEL'Em'}m rrr(li m\n'tv Uyn {IR,4,92-97). Maximus asks himself
Socrates intends his words to be understood "ironicallv" or wants to he cni!!matic: ti
TliJ tUlltl Tti XOJl11'<'t, ElTE Ul\'li'fl<l'CU rlT!' rfQtiiVEl'flCllU: ( 18j,l)S ..
1
)') ) . Tht.:
author thus n:latcs Socratic ignorance to the EQulnY.i] TEZVIJ. I k also calls Socrat<.:s (> i\!wHit;
OO!fltt; and c't).qi}fiu; qi>.o; (IX.5. 116-11H) and points to his cknctics {1S.5.1.32). Sec also
Themist. Or. 13,16113-162/\. .
m This may also have been the case in two largely lost works: flrui i(}ww; (frg. 1.34138
SAf'.:OIIACH, not in the Lamprias-cataloguc) and Y:ri-u [or flrQi] xc(i).o,; (frg.
SA:"'DUACII , not in Lamprias-catalogue, possibly spurious). Sec also Quacst. con1.
.m This apparently contradicts Diotima's account. who. categorically denying that Eros is a
06;. considered him a OctLfl<JJV. But MART!:-< (1984, p. 83) points out that Plutarch draws on
Phaedrus, where Socrates at the beginning of his palinodc says that Eros is Or(); ij n i'lfiov.
See also HERSHUELL 1988, p. 373. The contradiction with the Symposium must not be a
reason to reject the authenticity of the Amatorius. as HIRZEL (111895, p. 231) would have it.
m 7658: [ ... ] oi!tu>c; lutiv 6 ougavto; "Eg(l); EoorrTga xCt).c7Jv zct),a, \rvltni f!Ev-rm Ot::it JV <zcti
chwOt'i>v> rruHqn't xc1i VOlttciJV uioOt]ttt flltzuvc;>JtEvoc; i:v tE oziutuot zcti ZQ<;IJL<tlll zui rlbrOL
VE(JIV UJQ(,l OTii.flovtu 0ELXV1JOL Y.Ul Y.lVEl titv JlVl.lJlltV <ltQfJlCl OlCt tOUHLlV avwrJ.f'/O!lE\'ljV TO
rrgclnov. Sec also 765F.
Cf. MARTIN 1978. p. 514-516.
m Cf. TARRANT 19S3b p. 173 : "Where we do find a positive epistemology in Plutarch. it is
based firmly on the Meno as is K's [i.e. Anon. in Theaet.]". TARRANT, howt.:ver. without
reservation makes use (ibid. note 9; p. 166 note 55) of the theses of Marciamts gr. 196 for the
reconstruction of Plutarch's view.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC IN PLUTARCH 207
quicken and help to deliver their innate conceptions. That is why he
describes his art as an "obstetric skill" (o-frEV OUDEV EDLDaOX.f. LWXQCtnl;.
a)j.' EvDlDOl\; agxct.l; arrOQlCDV WOJtf.Q w6tvwv tOl VEOL bniyELQE xal
ctvEx[vn xcti. ouvE;llYE ta vmion xai. toDto tEXVllV
1000E)3Sl. The knowledge which we have native in ourselves is
undeveloped and confused and in need of nurture and stabilisation: atf.Ati 6
x.al

xai. -roD tQEcpovto x.al

This
is indeed the classical vocabulary for expressing the doctrine of recollection.
Plato does not use wputoc; in the sense of innate knowledge. It is a Stoic
term, which -strictly speaking- does not necessarily denote innate, a priori
knowledge, but can be used for knowledge that is merely "inbred"JS-l; this at
least may be the case in older Stoicism. The younger Stoics, among whom
Epictetus, accepted the existence of innate notions, which may be due to. the
influence of Platonists3ss. The Platonists themselves probably borrowed the
Stoic terminology and applied it to the doctrine of anamnesis.
'-"' ScHOPPE (t994. p. 466) confirms"!. da!3 cs fi.ir Plutarch absolute Gcwil3heit ist, da!3 cs
einc Erkenntnis der ldt.:cn durch den r-..tenschcn gibt, 2. da!3 dt.:r Erkcnntnisvorgang, die
vC:ntm;. ein seelischcr Prozc!3 ist, 3. da!3 zu Lcbzeiten jedoch die meisten Menschen nicht
wirklich in der Lagc sind. die IJccn zu crkennen, 4. da!3 diejenigen, die zur Erkenntnis dt.:r
ldcc.:n bd:ihigt sind, sic trotzdc.:m nicht im vollen Umfang crkennc.:n." See also p. 237-23lJ:
BRE!'K 19lJ2. p. 51.
.\\I Cf. Thcmt . 151 An: :tc'tozoum oi: bit oi. lhtOt 01J'(Yl'{\'OflEVOL xnt tOUTO tnl!tOV tcti;
Tl%toC(J(ll; (;JOL\'Ol'(Jl '(UQ zui lLJTO(ltCL; EJlJlLJl:TJ.aVTCH vuzta; tf zui. l'l[lf(lU; no).u flCi)J.ov it
'zrivuv TClUtl]V of. ti]V OIOlV(( E'(El(li'LV tl' xai urrorrat
1
El\' l'J EJli] tEXVl] OtiVCttW. See also 1490:
Me no 86;\ ( u).T]{)fi; oo;m, a'L fQOHlJOfl EYEQ1'lEloUL i::mo-rftllf1l ylyvovtw): AI bin. Prof. 150,21;
Alcinous Didask. 169.37-39; Max. Tyr. 10,4,77-98. More examples of the use of these
metaphors in Middle Platonism arc provided by WHJTTAKER 1987, p. 94-95. Compare also
Prod. lnt1lcib. /27,4-7.
Cf. Amat. 7658 : xarrvou xui taQCLXft; EVEITl,l]OUV rautou;. Compare Max. Tyr. 21,7,143-
149: i::v nj on::go OUVOlJOL(,l ou ITclVtlJ i::vngyci); OQ(t, atE[ . .. ] :rtCQtBrB>-.l]llEVl] ITOAll]V zui.
:tavtobet:ti]V D.tl\', l
1
C( 1]; tCtQc'ntl'tUL, OllVOfOEflEVT] ctowpfi: xai OUi'%EXl'JlEV!(l XCll
TCtQcizot zai nl.lJilJlE),ria; noH1j; (also 10,3,49-53) and UJtBAuvnm xcd aJtaugofnm
(21.8,162-163 cf. 21,7,150-151). Alcin. Didask. 177,26-28: xat yag bit r.at 1'1 'l'uzit btu ltf:v wu
ocilwno; rrgo; aio{)lltt;o ytvoltEVTJ ii,L'('{t(t tE xat tctgannm r.ai. oiov Jle{}un( cf. 178, 11-12).
Plato Plwcdo 79C: the soul :n:),uvcnm xai. tagattnm xai. ELAL'r(L(i o>Ort:fQ Jlf{)L'Ol'Oa, UT
tOlottwv [se. sensible realities] cramoJLEV1l
"'
1
Compare !\lax. Tyr. 10,3,69-76: tlJTO bf. nj; tciJv Oti)JlcltWV OUIHfOQ<ic; trrOXfZLlo{)m CLt
1
tfj
az).tV [cf. Alcib. 11 150DE], djv> xai ouyzdv ti]V {)uv xui CHf'<ll(lELO{)aL Titv
zni. arroof3emvm 'tO ol.r.eiov cp<o; ITQOOlOVTU bf: autij tezvitl]V Aoyov WO:TfQ
l.mg6v ot rrgoo-rt{)f:vm a\mj q:EQOVTa o EXEL, aH' En:eyeignv ftv zn
JIEV, UJll'DQttV of. xui. ';uvbrbqtEVI]V zai Y.OQllBagouoav.
].8..1 Cf. SVF Il83; CHERNISS 1976b, p. 480-481 note b.
:.>l>5 Cf. SASDBACH 1971b. p. 27-30.
, .
208 CHAPTER4
The allusion to the Stoic wp-utm vOliOEl is of a polemical natureJsli: just
like De comm. not. 1060A it contains an implicit criticism of the Stoic
conceptions. We find a trace of more elaborate Academic argumentation in
Cicero's account of recordatio in Tusc. Disp. 1 ,57, in the context of his proofs
of the immortality of the souP
87
For Plato's doctrine of the recordario \irae
superioris Cicero refers to lv!eno (81E-86Cpss and Plzaedo (72E-77A):
For he there teaches that anyone, though to all appearance totally ignorant,
shows in answer to skilful questioning that he is not at the time learning a
lesson (non film ilia discere) but taking knowkdge of things afresh by remem-
brance (reminiscendo recognoscere); indeed in no other way was it possible for
us to possess from childhood such a number of important ideas, innate and as
it \vcrc impressed on our souls (insiras et quasi consignaras'"'
1
in animis
notiones) and called EVVotm, unless the soul, before it had entered the body.
had been active in acquiring knowledge.
(transl. KI:":G !927)1<Xl
According to Cicero, the Stoic concept of i!vvotm is inexplicabk without
the pre-existence of the soul, and does not make sense when detachcu from
the Platonic anamnesis. This exemplifies one of the New Academics'
favourite strategies against the Stoics.
Alcinous too borrows the Stoic notion of crumziJ i:vvow, with the qualifi-
cation that the repeated sense-perceptions - as a result of which "precon-
ceptions" rise naturally in the soul, according to the Stoics- actually stir up
a recollection of a FormWI. Also Anonymus in Theact. uses the Stoic terms

1
"' f-urther ex;1mpks of the Academic use of this terminology may be founJ in
llJX:'i. p. !54 note 70; WIIIITAKEK llJH7. p. 115 and WIIITfAKEK in: W!!IITAKER -l.ot ls !')')0,
p. X..t note 5H. A parallel lacking in these surveys is Plut. ('!) frg. 215f. which I deal with in the
tt.:xt. Given this text and the way in which the terminology is used by Cicero and l'luLm:h. I
do not endorse WI!ITfAKER's remark: "Whether or not it retained any specific11ly Stoic
navour is hard to say" ( 1987, p. 115). Plut. Quat:st. !'fat. I 1001 E. De co111111. not. IOW,. \. and
Anon. in Theaet. (cf. TARRANT 19S5, p. 56) contain an tacit criticism of the Stoic cnnc .. rtions.
while in ( ps.- )Plutarch fragm. 215 f and in Ciccro Tmc. Disp. I ,57. WC have a trace of exrlicit
Academic pol.:mic. As far as Albinus and Alcinous are concerned, WHilTAKEK's remark is
justified: these texts more or less match the traditional view of 1\tiddle Platonism. i.e. a
syncretism of Platonism and Stoicism, for which the New Academic polemic seemed to belong
to the past.
3
X
7
In the same context: Alcin. Didask. 177,45-178.2; Max. Tyr.10.5,99-105; Atticus fr\.! . 7.19-
24. -

Ibid.: "Ex quo effici vult Socrates, ut discere nihil aliud sit nisi recordari."
Cf. Sext. Emp. Adr. Math. 7,248.
J<J(J Compare De fin. 3,21.

155,21-28: aht] [se. r'1 vorJot;] btttiJ EOLZV dvm. r'J rrgo ToC f.v niJb nT'
yvoum TiJv uEwgouvTO; atmjc; Tct vorp:ci., 1'1 M. To Ei; n)OE TO
TOUHJJV bf. 1i rrgo wD f.v yEv[o{}w TllV atno wDw VOlJm; i:zCti.EiTO,
bi: atnjc; Ev AYOfLEVlJ VOTJO<.S viiv f.A.zul] q't'Oli'.lJ iivvow, v6qoi; Tt;
otoa f.va:tozEqlEVl] Tlj lpt'Xl]. See also 178,8; DILLON 1993, p. 67-68. treatment
(1993, p. 346 note 13; p. 356-359) is rather superficial.
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH
209
in connection with anamnesis, in accordance with the Academic strategy
against Stoic epistemology39:?.: the commentator associates cpumzat wmm
with maieutics and anamnesis ( 46,43-48,35), just like Plutarch in Quaest. Plat.
1 (using the synonymous term vOliOEL). A similar treatment may be
found in Albinus Prologus (150,22; 33): first the soul has to be purified of
false opinions, and then one must proceed to arouse the cpt.mnwi. vvmm
( 150,21-23: 6 to zza{}ugm brYELQELV zat rrgoxnA.lo{}m 6d ta
CfL'Ol%Ct; Ev\'OL((;, %Cll TCL"lJta; E%%(l{}CltQELV Y..Cll ElJ%QlVEL cmocpetlVELV w;
agza;)393. This is \vhy the maieutic dialogues should be read right after the
"peirastic'' (150,33-35: t:va 6E n; ta; cpumxa vvota d; cpw
rrgozctf.Eom"To, toi; roD xagctztijgo; 6LaA.6ym; 6EliOEL
ruyt.c!vEtv toCto yag onv cdml>v 'l6LOv). That Albinus clearly distin-
guishes the clcnctic from the maicutic moments- more so than Plutarch- is
related to the fact that he. is designing a systematic curriculum, of which
eknctics and maieutics constitute the first two stages (cf. supra: 147-149).
tvty suggestion that Platonist use of Stoic terminology often reOects
underlying Academic pqlcmics receives support from one of the theses
ascribed to Plutarch in Damascius' lecture-notes in codex J\-farc.gr. 196,
notably the thesis knowri as frg. 215f. It states that only anamnesis can solve
the aporia of how search and discovery arc possible:
That the problem advanced in the Meno, namely whether search and discovery
arc possibk (d o!ov tE xai. Et'gioznv), leads to a real impasse (Cmogov
ovnu;). For we do not. on the one hand, try to find out things we know- a futile
proceeuing (oi:n: ytt!J (t llJ!lFY, fttm.Ltov 'tc'tg)- nor, on the other things we do
not know. since even if we come across them we do not recognize them: they
might be anything (Ol'TE u. fll)lUfiE\', XC!V '{CL() mgmEOtllflEV autotc; ayvoOUftEV,
t;J; Toi;
The Stoic "inbred notions" fail to explain the phenomenon of search and
discovery:
The Stoics make the "natural conceptions" (1ac; fpvmxac; vvoiw;) responsible.
If these are potential, we shall use the same argument as against the
Peripatetics: and if they are actual, why do we search for what we know (eta tt
Cf. supra: eh. 2, II, D; TARRA;o..;T 1985, p. 56. INVERNIZZI 1976, p. 231 admits that the
commentator is here transferring Stoic terminology into a genuine Platonic context, but holds
this to be an instance of the commentator's eclecticism, rather than Academic polemic.
The phrase zai TClUta; Er.za{}a[gnv i'.((L Et'i'.QlVELS a;rocpatvnv U); agxci.s; designates the
midwifes additional task of judging the value of what has been generated: cf. Thcaet. 157D,
from which also the expression Ei; crtiJ; is borrowed. See also Theaet. 150BC; 2108. The
parallels adduced by WHITI AKER (1987. p. 95: Resp. 527DS; 564C6; Soplr. 242C2) are purely
lexical. ,
m Cf. frg. 215e: "On zni. TO Y.ai TO n)gtor.nv btJ).oi TiJV o"lm yug l;l]clJOElEV
av n; Ol' fOllY UVEVVOT]'W; OllTE

btci. YE Cf. Meno 80E.

210 CHAPTER 4
a And if we use them as a starting-point for a search for
other things that we do not know, how do we search for what we do not know
(mi)<; amg oux
(transl. SANDI3ACH 1969a)
A further parallel may be found in Maxim us of Tyre: having observed that
most animals have innate skills of survival (rxvm rrgo; ouHl}Qtetv
yf-vEL l;uwpurm, 10,5, 123-124)3
9
5, Maxim us rhetorically asks whether one
should not surmise that (noetic) knowledge is native in man as well
b agn t<JJ VOE(>WTCmp TWV OVHl)V EITLX.TljtOV ij;n n) dbfvm:).
He continues with the argument that sounds already familiar to us :
knowledge comes either through discovery or through learning (o{x.oi)v
rrcn ctvci.yxl} yag i} Ell(lOVtet d6Evat, ii but both arc weak" if
knowledge is not already present in our nature (wv o{z
urrouOlJ E:mon'nnJ cpuon). For how would he who finds he ahle to use what
he has found, unless he already had knowledge ahout its use (o tc ;ctg EUQt;>v
miJ U..v XQI'Jomw T<J> EU(lcfrvn, yvo>(lLOU Tl}V zgdetv m1wt:: 10,5,125-
128)-''J"'?
After the discussion of these parallels, it does not seem too far-fetched to
surmise that Plutarch, when using this Stoic terminology. is tacitly referring
to anti-Stoic polemic. It is clear that Plutarch does not establish an epistemo-
logical doctrine which incorporates Stoic theory in the same way as
Ant iochus did.-m. This exemplifies why Plutarch does not fit the traditional
picture of Middle Platonism, as an eclectic or syncretising movement in the
Antiochean vein. In his treatment of maieutics, Plutarch blends .. Academic"
with ''Platonic" motives. By implicitly referring to the theory of Forms he
hints at a general "solution" for the epistemological issue.
.1'!5 Which makes them attobibuxwt (10,5,113-124): cf. supra : p. 203.
"
16
Cf. CHERNISS 1976a, p. 27 note e. Compare Plut. (?) frg. 217e (utwbibctzTot) : 217h (Et
i:onv Et!(ltoxnv. otn: yi.tg u uv n;. oihE u tO}tEV
ITQOtE(lOV, (/).' ou6' UV (i 2J5e ('"Ott %Ul tO Xctl tO El'QlOZflV blji.oi:
tl]V av(qtVl]OLV" OUtE yug (i.v ne; ou !:onv UV!'VVOljtO; OUtE avn:got Ot(t "{f SIJTl]OEt:);
),yEtm yug EUQLOZflV XCtL 0 xat(t mgirrnumv) ; 215f ("On arrogov OVttl); d OlOV tf s'ltfl\' xai
El'QlOXElV, OJ<; EV MEV())VL rrgofJtrD,ljtaL" OUtE YUCJ u ycl.g oih (t !ti]lO!lfV. XCIV
yU.g aLtoi;. ayvoot'!lEV, (;J<; toT; tt!f.OUOtv) . The epistemological passages of
Maximus Tyrius indeed appear to be quite close to the theses ascribed to Plutarch in
Damascius' notes (Afarciam1s gr. 196). Compare also the title of the third set of theses
('Em;(ElQllflUtWV btCHfOQOJV ouvaywyi] bEti'.VUVt<JJV ELVat t(t; EX n
7
rv
tou Xmgo>vrcll<; TI"-oun'igzou) with the title of Maximus Or. 10 (Et ai.
and also the similar argumentation based on the name Mnemosyne (cf. supra : p. 202). The
similarity between the titels, however, may also be due to the direct influence of Platonic
texts : e.g. Plwedo 72E (on Ol!i(. anon l] UVU!lVT]at; tU'(!: cl. vEt Ot'OCt) and Me no
810 (to yctg uga xai. tO UVCt!lVl]at<; o}.ov Eativ) .
m Pace SCHROETER 1911, p. 21-34.
.,
ACADEMIC AND PLATONIC THEMES IN PLUTARCH 211
This last section of the Quaestio, which broaches the subject of Platonic
anamnesis, preserves the oppositions that were constitutive of the preceding
sections, and that were determined by the anti-Socratic polemic to which
Plutarch is replying. Plutarch now affirms that also from the perspective of
anamnesis God's advice is to be deemed supremely wise, in forbidding
Socrates to loose his time concerning himself with futile and worthless
teachings :
Consider too (oga of. that the other things, poetry and mathematics and
rhetorical speeches and sophistic doctrines xai xai /,6ym
{?qt6gwv zai. bo'/!Lata . oocptotwv), which the spiritual power prevented
Socrates from begetting (ci LWY.Qcttl]V ycvv&..v 1:0 c'tmxtl>A.uoEv),
were worth no serious concern (ol.bqtt&..; aS,ta o;routnl<;). (lOOOD)
The rhetoricians and sophists are once again repudiated as propagators of
futile teachings. Directly contrasted -in a !lEV . . . bf. construction- to their
apparent v-;isdom is Socrates' EQli)TLXll, which is of the highest value, heing
"about the divine and the intelligible" (rrE(lL TO {}ci:ov xni V01Jt6v, 1000D)3
9
S.
Therefore it is certainly worth serious concern ( orroubl'J), contrary to the
teachings of sophists. Thus Plutarch at the end of the Q11aestio confirms his
first contention, \'i:z, . that Socrates' words are not mere play (ou
999C): the antithesis orrovbl'1- rrm6tci. appears to span the entire Quaestio3<N.
The knmvledge offered by Socrates is not external, but comes from the
inside. In other words, Socrates does not implant foreign knowledge into the
soul nor does he. strictly speaking, teach (ofrEv ot,bi:v b[6nox.E L(JJX(lUtt};).
What he does is stir the already present, but slumbering and confused
knowledge ( IOOOE). He does not offer himself as a teacher stricto sensu, i.e.
someone professing to implant new knowledge from outside into the pupil's
soul. This practice is essentially different from that of others:
And his name for this was obstetric skill (!tat(l)ttY.l,JV TEXVlJV), since it does
not. as other men pretended to do, implant in those who come upon it
intelligence from without (ouY. i:vnOEToav :;(1)0v, worrEQ n:got
;rgooE:itOtOt'VTO, vot:v wT; i:vTuyf.c'tvotJotv) but shows that they have it
native (oldi:ov) within themselves but undeveloped and confused and in
need of nurture and stabilization (aTEAll of. xal ouyxXU!LEvov Y.ai.
tou tQE<f;O\"to; Y.ai (1000E)
The is not Socrates, despite Colotes' allegations to the
contrary. The great pretenders are those who unjustly claim to be the
39S Compare Plato Theag. 127E-128B.
Jw Compare the chapter of De Sto. rep. on what philosophy ought to be (10338): o
yU.g i.6yo; tot {p/.oo6q-ou atuaigEto<; xai. i:6t6; i:ottv, L y 6i1 [tl] rrmbtuv xai.
fl'Ql]OlJ.O'flUV EVfX(( M;l]; an gyov u;wv orroublj; tij<; WOITEQ EOUV, llYOUVWL
q-tj.ooocriav. Cf. VALGIGLIO 1989, ,p. 257.
212 CHAPTER 4
teachers of supreme knowledge. Those men are sophists, for they arc utterly
unable to accomplish what they promise. Plutarch deploys the strategy which
he expressly put to practice in Adversus Colotem, albeit now in a more subtle
fashion: he retorts the anti-Socratic allegations, turning them against
Socrates' opponents themselves. Now, at the end of the first Quaestio
Platonica, Colotes' scornful reproaches, reported in Adv. Col. 11170, on
closer inspection turn out to be perfectly applicable to the Epicureans
themselves, as well as to the Stoics: "a).J .... a yag btEtl'jbEUO((;
( w Iwxga-rEr;) xal ETEQa c)lEAyou -roi:r; vnYy.{avouotv -rc:ga b'
rrganE<;." Socrates as it were impersonates the judging faculty itself in its
critical function of exposing false opinions. After the expurgation of fake
knowledge he assists in the recollection of noetic knowledge. Therefore he is
compktely justified in calling his task divine.
1
l
CHAPTERS
FA EPICTETUS THE PLUT ARCHEAN LEGACY
J. fAVORI:-.IUS AND PLUTARCH: DE PR/:\10 FRIG!DO
Plutarch and his younger friend Favorinus of Arelate have in common not
only their being polymaths and polygraphs, but also their loyalty to an
Academic-fashioned conception of philosophy. Favorinus, whose reuvre has
survived only in a fragmentary form
1
, presumably at some time was
Plutarch's pupiP. According to the Suda, Favorinus aspired to surpass
Plutarch in quantity of writing
3
A brief comparison of the titles and subject-
matter of several of theiuespcctive works has led J. GLUCKER ( 1978, p. 283-
to the conclusion that this image of Fmorinus Plutarchi aemulus holds
true -I.
Favorinus is the person to whom Plutarch's most overtly "sceptical'' or
"Academic" text, De prima frigido, is addressed. At the end of this little
treatise, Plutarch advises his friend to compare his own hypotheses
concerning earth as principle of cold with the pronouncements of others. If
1
Euition anu commc.:ntary by fL\RIGAZZI (1966); sc.:c also CALLANAN 1986 for 8 apophteg-
matu of philosophc.:rs overlookcu by UARIGAZZI. For an ovc.:rall picture of Favorinus'lifc and
work. sc.:e COL\RDEAU 1903, BARIGAZZI 1%6, p. 3-85, I30WIE 1997, and l-IOLFORD-
STREVE:-:S 1lJlJ7. Sec also I3ALDW!:-o; 1975, p. 21-31 for Gcllius' evidence on Favorinus and p.
36 for Gc.:llius on Plutarch. Cf. ME:"'SCHING 1963 for Favorinus' Afemorahilia and Omnigena
historia. Since my paper on Favorinus at the 19lJ4 confacnce of the International Plutarch
Society at Trinity Colkgc.: Dublin. "The Intellectual World of Plutarch" (see OPSOMER
1997b ). I have revised my interpretation on a few points (most notably on the value of Gellius
11.5). partially due to an intcnst: and fruitful discussion conducted by e-mail with Dr
l-IOLFORD-STREVEI"S. I thank Judith MOSS:'>IAN for the permission to use material from
0PSO:\IER 1997b.
: Cf. Quacst. com. 734D-735A. From the Lamprias-catalogue we learn of a letter to
Favorinus: 'E:naro). lj :rg(>::; C/>afiwgcl'Ol' JTE(!t C[tAia:; h Oi: nt:(}i cpO.wv XQ1jat:w;(Ll32).
Cf. BARIGAZZI 1966, p. 526-52!); Sandbach 1969a, p. 20 note a; GLUCKER 1978, p. 287; PUECH
1992, p. 4850; BABUT 199-lc, p. 549 with note 2.
3
Suda, s. \". <l>uBwgtvo;. 4,690, ADLER ( = Test. 1): aVTECf"LAOtlftdro youv xai. rLXE :rrgoc;
n/.ovtugzov tOY Xmgwvru EL; to tOJV OlJvtCIHOflEV(l)V BtB).LWV c:'imtgov.
4
In addition to the parallels adduced by GLUCKER. I would like to point out that Favorinus'
'Lri rwv hjgwv may be related to Plutarch's nEgi abo).wztar;/De garrulitate (cf. BARIGAZZI
1966, p. 150) and that both authors have written on Socrates' i:gwnxi1 TEXVTJ: see, for Plut..
above p. 206 note 375. nrQi LW%QUWL'r:; xai nj; xar' at.'rov iQwrtxljr:; dp1]r:; was the title of
one of Favorinus works: Suda s.v. tl>aBwgtvo; 4,690,24-25 ADLER (=Test . 1); cf. infra: p. 236,
note 92.
214 CHAPTER 5
Plutarch's statements appear to be neither less nor more probable than those
of others - i.e. when a state of equipollence/toooDvna is reached -
Favorinus should renounce mere opinions and do as a philosopher should:
in matters obscurt.! he ought to prefer suspension of judgment to (rash)
assent.
Compare these statements, Favorinus, with the pronouncements of others
(wut', 0) <t>aBwg"lv, ucp' Erf(l(I)V rragC:(BetU.E); and if these
notions of mine arc neither less probable nor much more plausible than those
of others (x&v A.Eimrrm n} mOavotqn urrEQEXlJ rroLv). say farewell
to dogma (zatgnv !fa tit; 6o;a;), being convinced as you arc that it is more
philosophic to suspend judgement when the truth is obscure than to take sides
(to rrznv EV wi; atnjA.OL; tOU ouyxcnmWmOm cpt).ooocr<inFQOV

(955C, transl. HELMI10LD, in CHERi':ISS- HEU.IBOLD 1957)
This passage has often been quoted
5
to label the phase in Plutarch's career
marked off by this treatise as one of rather extreme scepticism. But it is only
in isolating the final sentence from the rest of the treatise that one may reach
such a conclusion. Plutarch advises his younger friend to say fan.:well to
considering that it is more befitting to a philosopher ( q ti.ouocr <;HI::'QOV
lJ'(OL'[LEVO;) to withhold one's juugment than to give rash assent
(ovy%<natl0c:m'}m) to mere opinions. It is certainly no coincidence that
Plutarch refers in this context to his ideal of philosophy. Following P.L.
in this respect, I think that the De primo frigido shoulu he read from
the perspective of the relation between the philosophical ( .. physical'') and
the "technical" approach to reality and of the different expectations one is
entitleu to entertain towarus the cpt).c'>umpot.Jq,vat%oi. on the one ha nu a nu the
tc:zvt:tm on the other. This is why I think that K. ZIEGLER's classification of
this treatise ( 195 I. col. 636-637) under ''die naturwisscnschaftlichcn
Schriftcn". as distinguished from "uie wissenschaftlich-philosophischcn
Schriftcn", is misleauing - though typical of the then dominant scholarly
approach to Plutarch's "scientific" work- and that it has hampered a better
undcrstanuing of this trcatiscf>.
Cf. SEPP 1893, p. 115-116; SCIIUSTER 1917. p. 53; ZELLER 1923, p. IS! with note 5;
SCHROETER 1911, p. 23; 40. Most scholars have followed SCHROETER: cf. HART:\!.\:" 1916. p.
253-25-l; ZIEGLER 1951, 856,53-68; HELMOOLD in CHER:--I!SS - HEL:O.IUOLD 1957. p. 227;
GORGE:\IAN:'\S 1970, p. 87.
n The most valuable interpretations have come from DO:--IINI (1986a, p. 20lJ-212) and BABUT
(19lJ-lc, p. 570-575 ). See also BALDASSARRI 1993, p. 41. LONGO 1992 offers a one-sided
interpretation of the treatise as a work of exclusively scientific interest. Nuzzo 19lJ1 points to
its Academic character: De prim. [rig. would exhibit a moderate Academic scepticism in tht!
manner of Arcesilaus and Carneadcs. The way the concluding sentence is intrinsically linked
with the rest of the treatise has somehow escaped the author, since he terms Plutarch's final
remark "un vero e proprio aprosdoketon" (p. 414) .
FAVORINUS, EPICfETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 215
The essay started from the question whether cold is a positive principle
7
rather than a privation
8
( OTEQllOu;). For Plutarch there is no doubt that it
cannot be but a principle in its own right. The next question is then with
which principle it should be identified
9
Plutarch mentions first those who
base their theory on the Timaeus, where Plato has reduced the four elements
to basic triangles. Not agreeing with the details of their theory, Plutarch
acknowledges that they have at least searched for the principle of cold at the
appropriate level. that of the essence of all things (d xat toT<; xanJ.
tllV UQXllV o\'tEV bEI
10
It is suitable for philos-
ophers not to content themselves with superficial causes, but to investigate
the deepest causes of physical phenomena:
For the investigation should begin. as it were from the very hearth, from the
substance of all things (bd yag WOITEQ acp' EOt(a; n]; tO)V o).wv ouo(a;
agzwOm tt)V This is, it would seem, the great difference between a
philosopher (6 Cf't).ooocro;) and a physician or a farmer or a flute-player; for
the latter arc content to examine the causes most remote from the first cause
(tU. rozara tll>v aitiwv), since as soon as the most immediate cause of an effect
(to E'({lm'nw tou rrciHov; atnov) is grasped- that fever is brought about by
exertion or an overflow of blood, that rusting of grain is caused by days of
blazing sun after a rain, that a low note is produced by the angle and
construction of the pipt.:s - that is enough to enable a technician to do his
propt.:r job (ixuvov on t<.,i) rrgo; to otxETov gyov). But when the
natural philosopher sets out to find the truth as a matter of speculative
knowledge. the discovery of immediate causes is not the-end, but the beginning
of his journey to the first and highest causes (tl,i) b cp1mtx(O EVEY.Ct
wn()VtL tM.lp1l; !'J tO)V ozutwv yvGmt; Oll EOtLV an CtQXll n]; rri. TU
:rglina xni avwtUTliJ rrogFict;).
(9-iXBC, transl. HELMBOLD)
7
9-lSF: n; UQU lOU 'I'UZQOU OtVUflli;, JtQ<Oll] xai. ouoia, xcdMmg tOU
{}q?ftOL' TO .rrvg. 1']; .iTUQOt!Ol<;l nvi. xui. flEtozij y[VEt((l l:(t)V aHto)V EXUOTOV lt'l'XQOV;Cf. 947A:
UQZil r.ui :tli'flJ.
s 945F: l] pii)J.ov l] 'i't':t.QOTT]; OTf(?l]Oi; EOTL WOJtfQ TOU <fWTO TO oxotos;
).yovot xui. Tij:; xtvJjOEW Ti]v oniotv;
9
9-l7D: on .rrgo; TO {}q_>flOV w; ouoin ngos; ouoiav l] mi.{}os; ngos; na\}os; ouz w; UJtOCfUOL;
UVTL%ElTlll xai. OTEQl]OL;, oubf. q:Ooga Tt:; on TO\) {}EQflOU xai. avaiQEOL aXA.' unagxti] qn)ms;
xui. ot.vaftt;. 94RA B: d 0. cmo/.n ....tTEOV ouoiav 'l'tl'f.QOU xai. \}EQflOU, ngociyWflEV f:.rri. TO E!;ij;
TOV ).O'(O\', ijn; fOTtv oto[u xcti. CLQ'f.T] xcti q:tm; 1IJUXQOTT]tO The first colon can be
translated as "since it is a settled matter that there is a principle of warm and cold": cf. DON IN!
19S6a, p. 223 note 29.
10
948B: ol flEV ouv, Twv oxn).J]VWV xai. tQtywvonbwv O".(T]fLUTLOftwv f:v toTs; m.Oftaot XEtftEvwv,
TO gtyoi:v xai. TQEflELV xai. <fQLTTELV xai. ooa ouyyEvlj tots; na\}EOL TOUTOL uno TQUXUTT]TO
E'([LVEO{}at ).,[yovtE;, d xai TOt; Y.an'.t OtUflUQTclVOUOl, 'tl]V CtQXl]V o-&Ev bEi:
Cf. Plato Tim. 54BC. '
216 CHAPTER 5
Whereas the "technician" can confine himself to the proximate, superficial
cause to exert his skill, the philosopher should strive for the truth, and go
beyond the trivial causes to the first and highest principles, which are of an
intelligible nature (948C: ra:; VOl)tCt; agxa;).
Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, Plutarch deems it better first to
examine the principle of cold on the sensory leveJl
1
and take issue with the
Stoics on the one hand, who assumed air to be the cold principle, and
Empedocles and Straton on the other hand, who ascribed the primordially
cold to water. In competition with these hypotheses Plutarch will present his
own, according to which earth is the ;rgtin(r); 1puxg6v 17-22, 952C-955C).
He underpins his thesis with a series of arguments that arc of the same order
and at least equally persuasive as those presented by his predecessors 12. In
so doing he is using the tool of equipollence (iaoaOvELn or iaotq; /.()'/Ol') D,
applied by the adherents of the New Academy in order to dispute the truth
claims in their opponents' theories. The one correct attitude in such a case
consists in the suspension of judgment (fj[OXt')), and this is exactly what
Plutarch advises his friend to do at the end of the treatise, at least if he should
judge that Plutarch's solution is not more probable than that of the
If not, should he judge either of the theories to he more preferable as far as
plausibility is concerned, one may presume that Plutarch would allow him to
follow provisionally the most plausible view. Plutarch does not expressly say
so, but his hypothetical wording seems to leave room for a provisional. non-
epistemic acceptance of the theory that is most plausible.
According to P. L. DONI_NI
15
the suspension of judgment as presented at
the end of De primo Jrigido does not follow from the unreliahility of the
senses, but rather from the awareness that a purely physical explanation of
the world can never suffice for the true philosopher. The final explanation is
always of a metaphysical nature: in other words, it must be sought in the
11 9-IRC: OL' !li]V <'t/J.c"t %((l tlt ui<n1qtc't tCLl'tl IT!)0((\'((%lVijom Bl-l.nov fOtlV. D0:\1:'\1 ( I!)S(la. r-
211) points out that Plutarch thus ddibt:rately takt:s a step back\vards, continuing tht:
discussion on a lower level.
OONI:'./1 19S6a, p. 2 I 1: (Piutarch elaborates his own hypothesis in order to provt:) .. eh.:
argomcnti non meno credibili di quelli gia addotti nel corso della storia del pcnsiero grt:co
potrcbbcro esscrc avanzati anche in favorc di un' altra e nuovissima tesi." Lo:--.;c;o 1992. p.
227-229 confirms the originality of the theory Plutarch advances.
n Diog. Laert. 4. 28: Eus. Pracp. 1. 14. 4. 15: 14, 8, 7 ( = Numenius, frg. 27.35 DES PLACES):
Cic. Acad. 145: Gal.. De Opt. Dvctr. 40. For the same strategy as a Pyrrhonian weapon. cf.
Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.8-12; 26; 61; 117; 196; 200; 202-206; 2,79; Adv. Matlz. 7,443:8.159:
Anon. in Theaet. 61,23-33.
14 Cf. BOYS-STONES 1997, p. 44.
15 1986a, p. 210-211; p. 213: "la cautela e infatti motivata non dalla diffidt:nza verso la
scnsazionc, ma della consapevolezza del metafisico che sa di non poter dcmandare alia sob
scienza la soluzione di problemi che hanno un fondamento o un esito nella sfera dcll"intelli-
gibile e del divino."
FAVORINUS, EP!CfETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 217
domain of the noetic and the divine. This dimension is certainly present in
De primo frigido: Plutarch briefly gives a glimpse of the higher reality which
he, being a Platonist, knows to be operative in the kosmos, when he says that
God is called harmoniser and musician ( and because
he imposes order - proportions - and justice, and structures opposites
(946F).
Plutarch's hypothesis certainly makes no pretension to replace Plato's
theory, nor does he criticise Plato, although 00:-.IINI (1986a, p. 210) seems to
suggest the latter. After all, Plato did not offer any theory about the principle
of cold in the Timaeus: he did lay down a theory of basic triangles, which
others made use of when devising a proper theory of the primordially cold.
Their theory does suffer from shortcomings, says Plutarch. However, the
flaws pertain to particular aspects, and do not damage the overall
perspective (9488). In this as in other contexts, Plato is mentioned only in a
favourable manner: he and Democritus have set an example by not limiting
their inquiry to earth and fire, but connecting sensible phenomena to
intclligihk origins, thus reducing the number of explanatory principles to a
strict minimum (948C).
But this is not the whole story: according to Plutarch's interpretation of
the Timaeus, Plato recognises that a physical explanation of the world, at the
very most, may claim probability (Timaeus' account is an dxw:; /..6yo;)
1
6,
and at the same time he goes beyond this level of explanation by offering a
theological account of the kosmos in which the visible world is considered an
image of a higher. "metaphysical'' rcalityl
7
The distinction between two
levels of causality, the sensible and the noetic, explained by Plutarch in the
key passage of De primo frigido (948C), is the fundamental ontological and
epistemological opposition of the Tinweustx. Plutarch's approach thus stays
within the lines set out by the Timaeus. Plutarch is convinced that Plato's
Timaeus, in surpassing the level of explanation offered by the Stoics and
others whose theories he has discussed, including his own hypothesis about
earth as primum frigidum, takes a step beyond E:rrox1i
19

11
' Tim. 29B-D: 480.550, 56A. Cf. supra: p. 183, note 264.
17
Sec, e.g .. the final sentence (92C): {}vlJt<'t yU..g xal cdh1vaw ).aBll>v xat
obE 6 z6o1to; outu>, ogmov tU.. ogmct rrrgtxov. dr.ll>v tou volJtou {)Eo:; ato01Jt6:;,
!lf'{Lmo:; r.al. agwto; ;dtHtot6; tE xnt n).ni.>tato:; yf-tovEv d; o\.gavo:; ME povoyEVlJ wv.
18
See e.g .. in addition to my previous footnote, 28A: ti to OV ad, YEVEOLV b our. EXOV, Y.Ul tl
to ytrvo!LEvov !LEv aEt, ov bi: oUbbotE; to !LEV bi1 vmjon /.6you mgt).TJrrt6v, at xcnU..
tctttU.. ov, to b' au M;lJ aio{)l.JOHu:; a).6you bo;am6v, xat
Ovtu>; bE: oMbot ov.
19
See also p. 212 : "Mala teoria del Timeo non si ferma ai corpi sensibili e non
puo dunque in alcun modo esscre inclusa fra quelle opinioni che secondo la conclusione del
trattato non mc:ritano l'assenso [ ... ].'' DONINI is followed in his interpretation by
BATIEGAZZORE (1992, esp. p. 19; 22; 43).
,.
218 CHAPTER 5
I cannot agree with DONINI's statement that Plutarch's recommendation
in De prima frigido - as in other works - to exert caution and suspend
judgment in the domain of natural sciences has nothing to do with the New
Academic criticism of sensory perception. DONINI makes a distinction
between three components in Plutarch's interpretation of Academic
epistemology: ( l) the btaXll pertaining to sensory perception, (2) caution in
the domain of the sciences and (3) circumspection (d.
1
1.aBELa) concerning the
divine. Since DONINI considers it hardly possible to assign the second of
these aspects to the New Academy, he concludes that Plutarch does not draw
his inspiration for his epistemological stance from either Arccsilaus,
Carneades or Philo2.
I think is not advisable to separate the criticism of the sciences completely
from that of the senses. It is true that doubting the value of scientific
knowledge has to do with the demand for higher, intelligible principles, hut
this is precisely related to the ontological-epistemological difference
between the phenomenal and the intelligible world, and to the
understanding that we will never be able to have a complete and certain
grasp of the sensible world. Moreover Plutarch points O\Jt several times that
the senses often convey incorrect or insufficient information2
1
(but this does
not mean that the evidence they offer is to be dismissed altogether; cf. supm
p. 101). Furthermore, the tool of cquipollence was very much favoured hy
Academics and Pyrrhonians alike. The attitude which Plutarch expresses
here regarding the sciences is thus in accordance with Academic philosophy
and it \vould be incorrect to seperate it all too strictly from the (Academic)
criticism of sensory perception.
The concept of dual causality
22
as derived from the Plwcdo (lJ7B-lJtJD)
and the Timacus (esp. 6KE-6lJA) is, as I have already shown (eh. 4, Ill, 3).
crucial to a good understanding of Plutarch's Academism. The central issue
of the De primo frigido is the question of what exactly characterises the
philosophical approach to our so-called "problems of natural science". The
essential quality of a philosophical investigation consists in the requirement
that it should not be limited to the immediate physical causes, but must
penetrate to the highest level of causality. Plutarch remains within the episte-
mological framework of the Timaeus, according to which the two ontological
levels, the physical world and the reality of the Ideas, correspond to two
epistemological levels, b61;a and All certainty is rooted in
knowledge of the intelligible, as far as this can be attained by humans. The
'
0
Do;o..;r;.;r 1986a, p. 209; 213-214; 1994, p. 5065.
cl 952A: n w[vuv ''lltEv al'o{}qou; rroA.I.axt<; 'ilta; !;arrm(t .. ] ; 955A.
See also DON!i'il 1992a, p. 103: "Lo schema fondamentale della causalita e dunque per
Plutarco quello platonico che ripartisce innanzitutto le cause in due classi, divine e necessarie
(o materiali, come anche gli accade di chiamarle frequentemente)."
FAVORINUS, EPICTETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 219
'sceptical" conclusion of De primo frigido pertains to the which arise
from uncritically believing in the evidence of the senses regarding our world.
Plutarch is deeply convinced that for any human knowledge about the
physical realm- even though it may be presented in the form of a "scientific"
theory - probability (ro dxo;) is the best one can hope for. As the natural
sciences are unable to establish foundations of their own, they are
"fundamentally" deficient and dependent upon metaphysics. This is the very
insight Plutarch wants to convey to Favorinus by means of his essay.
J. GLUCKER (1978, p. 287-289), having pointed out that the De primido
frigido abounds with Aristotelian language and terminology
23
, suggests that
this outward appearance of Aristotelianism should not be taken too
seriously. Since it appears from Quaest. com. 8,10 that Favorinus was known
to have a certain predilection for Aristotelian theories (734F), we may
indeed conclude that Plutarch is displaying a mock-Aristotelian style in
honour of his youthful friend and/or pupil. At the end (955C) Plutarch gently
warns him that this favourite theory of his or any similar theory can,
ultimatc:ly, claim nothing more than persuasiveness: xav AELJn)TaL n]
;m')uvonrn ;ro).{,. The same caution was already implied at
9-llJF. where Plutarch casually reminded Favorinus and his reader of the
status of the theories being expounded: so now, Favorinus, the argument
that attributes the primal force of cold to the air depends on such plausi-
bilities as these ([v Tomunu; EOTl rrll')uv(hl)OLv)." When Plutarch introduces
Favorinus as an interlocutor in question 10 of book 8 of the Quaestiones
conlimlcs, his words are very carefully chosen: "for the most part Favorinus
is an enthusiastic admirer of Aristotle and assigns to the Peripatos the largest
portion of plausibility" (n't ({)),n 'AgtoTOTEAou; gaoni;
EOTl %Ul T<T> ncQL;TtLtC!l vl'!trt TOll mDuvoD :it:AELOTllV, 734F)2-
1
. For the
well-informed reader Plutarch indicates with this phrase that Favorinus,
even in his youth and despite certain Aristotelian leanings, observed
GLUCKER has somt:what cxaggt.:ratcd th(! Aristotelian character of Plutarch's essay, I
think. On the supposed sources of De prim. frig., cf. ZIEGLER 1951,858.1-18.
This characterisation has been comhined with the information derived from De prim. frig.
to conclude that Favorinus was eitht.:r an outright Aristotelian or that he was converted from
an Aristotelian to an Academic position by Plutarch. See e.g. MUHL 1885, p. 91; GOEDECK-
D.!EYER 1905, p. 250-251; in CHER:-.l!SS- HELMBOLD 1957, p. 228; 00R!NG 1979,
p. 10: BOULOG:--;E 1994. p. 170. I endorse ZELLER's argument that there is no reason to believe
that this is another person with the same name: "Schon diese Beschrankung auf das m{}av6v
lasst uns vielmehr den Akademiker erkennen, und an sich ist es nicht wahrscheinlich, dass
Plutarch neben dem bertihmten Favorinus einen zweiten ohne jede nahere Bezeichnung
eingefiihrt hatte [ . . . ]"(ZELLER 1923, p. 78-79 note 3). I would like to add that for the
same reason. i.e. the stress on the concept of 10 m{}av6v (the persuasive, the convincing), this
passage emphatically does not provide an indication that Favorinus progressed from an
Aristotelian to an Academic stance: One may compare Cic. Acad. li 132. See also GLUCKER
1978, p. 287.
220 CHAPTER 5
Academic caution in accepting no physical theory as anything more than
plausible. The reason why Plutarch does not explicate the full epistemo-
logical implications of his words, is to be found in the literary genre of the
table talks: weighty epistemological considerations would seem incongruous
with the situation. For the same reason explicit exhortations to suspend
judgment are also absent from the Quaestiones convivales25.
Plutarch in De prima frigido does not adopt an unqualified "scepticism":
his reflections amount to an attempt to combine i:rroz1'1 with Platonic
ontology and epistemology. The Platonic framework of the theory of dual
causality is essential to his particular brand of Academic scepticism.
According to D. BABUT (1994c, p. 575),
il ne faudrait plus dire que Plutarquc intcrprete la periodc sccptique de
l'Academie a la lumicrc de la metaphysiquc platonicicnne, mais plut6t qu'il
nous prescntc une reinterpretation neo-academicienne du platonisme, axee
sur les concepts d'broz1'1 et de .rrn'}avov.
This statement is to be seen in the light of BABUT's (over)reaction (l9lJ-k, p.
570-575) to some flaws he detects in DO:"iiNI's interpretation, especially his
suspicion that DONINI attempts to minimise the Academic aspect of
Plutarch's philosophy. DONINI indeed seems to restrict the scope of the final
remark of De primo frigido by denying that the caution which Plutarch
expresses regarding the natural sciences has anything to do with the New
Academic criticism of the senses, and hy stating that it would apply only to
the domain of physical explanations. BAUUT considers DONINI's reference
to Platonic epistemology as a means to play down the profoundly sceptical
nature of the essay. According to BA BUT it is the other way round: Plutarch's
philosophy is an attempt to reinterpret Platonism from within the Academic
tradition. Plutarch does not call the phenomena obscure because their
theoretical explanation lacks a metaphysical complement. No, it is because
of their essential uncertainty. Plutarch's caution in scientific matters cannot
be isolated from the suspension of epistemic judgment which is the
inescapable consequence of the uncertainty of sensory experience. BAI1UT is
also of the opinion that Plutarch does not want to separate the Platonist
solution of the problem of the primordially cold from those offered by the
"scientists". According to BABUT, Plato is by no means excluded from
15 Cf. DONINI 1992a. p. 109; 116: "il diverso genere letterario delle opere e il diverso livcllo
di approfondimento filosofico dei problemi giustificano comunque h.: differenti strategic di
prcscntazione della stessa problematica e degli stessi materiali conccttuali ." Nonetheless it
should be added that the epistemological framework of the Quaest. com. is far from clear
(DONINI 1992a, p. 111-112). An interesting interpretation is also offered by BRENK 1977, p.
127, to be complemented however with Do:si;-;J's remark (1992a, note 36 p. 119). Compare
Quaest. com. 646A; 686A-D; 716D-717A.
FAVORINUS, EPICTETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 221
Plutarch 's he is praised exclusively "pour a voir compris
l'insuffisance des explications qui s'en tiennent aux causes immediates et aux
agents perceptibles par les sens" (1994c, p. 575). In my opinion, BABUT
slightly misrepresents the intent of Plutarch's criticism in this particular
respect. As I have stated earlier, Plutarch has nothing but praise for Plato
himself: Plato does not offer any theory of the primwn frigidwn. Those who
do, taking the physics of the Timaeus as a theoretical framework, have been
wrong in the details of their theorY::!6.
I can agree more or less with BABUT's criticism of DONINI, as may also be
gathered from my remarks on the treatise and on DON1NI's interpretation.
Notwithstanding the presence of Platonic epistemology, the inspiration of
the treatise is unmistakably Academic. On the other hand, I would not want
to minimise the merits of DONIN1's interpretation. DONINI has considerably
advanced our understanding of De prima frigido and of Plutarchean
Academism in general. He has been the first to show that Plutarch's final
advice to Favorinus is inextricably linked to the preceding expositions and
has drawn attention to the passage on the specificity of the philosophical
approach (lJ48BC). De prima frigido is to be regarded as an attempt to
combine the Platonic concept of dual causality with Academic scepticism. It
is this Platonic-Academic line of philosophy that Plutarch advises Favorinus
to follow.
II. FAVORINUS ACADEMICUS
Despite the fact that our sources place Favorinus firmly within the orbit of
Academic

older scholarly literature tended to portray him as

belonging to the Pyrrhonian rather than the Academic tradition, or at least
it maintained a great deal of ambiguity as to his precise philosophical affili-
ations. A notable exception is COLARDEAU who as early as in 1903 uncqui-
cb There is a curious slide in the progression of BABUT's argument (p. 57-l-575). BABUT
initially correctly denominates the theories under consideration as "la solution platonicienne
du prohlt!me" and "la solution du problt!me inspirce par la thcorie des triangles elementaires,
dans le Timce". Then he asserts that Plutarch expressly avoids the name Plato so as not to
include his master explicitly in his criticism: "C'est me me justement parce que la solution
platonicienne ne le satisfait pas entien:ment et ne lui parait pas regler dcfinitivement le
probll!me que Plutarque ne mentionne pas explicitement a cet endroit le nom de Platon,
conformcmcnt a un proccdc dont les Moralia nous offrent plusieurs exemples." But then he
claims to give "la preuve que Platun n'est pas entiercment dissocic ici des autres
physiciens"(my italic). Consequently he asserts that Plutarch directs his criticism at "la
solution proposce par Platon au probleme de l'origine du froid" or "ces doctrines, y compris
meme celles de Platon".
27 Cf. Lucian Eun. 7 (=Test. 4: XCtl n; 'AxaOlHta.lXO; ruvouxo; Ex KEAnl>v); Gellius 20,1,21
( = Test. 47: curriculis istis vestrarum academicis").
222
CHAPTER 5
vocally affirmed28 that Favorinus regarded himself as an Academic: .. Ipse
enim Academicum sese dicebat, vel potius dici patiebatur" (p. 58).
I think GLUCKER2<J has once and for all debunked the myth of the
Pyrrhonian Favorinus. It is now commonly accepted
30
that Favorinus was
considered an '"Academic" by himself as well as by his contemporaries. Also
I share GLUCKER's suspicion about the origin of this scholarly myth and the
persistence with which it has been preserved:
What lies at the root of this procedure could perhaps be described as a species
of mau\'{lise foi . All the evidence shows clearly that Favorinus regarded himself
as an Academic sceptic. But placing him within the history of the Academy in
the second century A.D. would hardly square with the general image of the
school of that time, whose chief exponents arc usually taken to be dogmatics
like Ammonius and Taurus.
(GLUCKER 1978, p. 282-283)
Ill. GALEN AGAINST fAVORlNUS
Most of our information on Favorinus' epistemological position can be
gained from a small treatise Galcn devoted to a polemic against him: De
optima doctrina (nt:(}t nj; J.Q[anJ; l)tou.ar..a}.[w;)3I. Galen opposes
Favorinus' thesis that the hest instruction consists in l] et; bdtTFQCt
l:mzdgl]Ol;, i.e. the argument in which one speaks, in each particular
question, in favour of opposite sides (the famous in contrarias partes
dissererr)
1
2. From Ga\cn's treatise we learn, among other things. that
Favorinus wrote a work On the Academic Disposition3-
1
(nrui nj;
'Ar..w)1J.fW.i%1j; l)wJHarwr;), also called Plwarclz (nJ.otlru.uxo;). Another
work was directed against Epictetus and was accordingly named Against
Epictet11s (n(}r)r; 'E;r[r..nJrov). It stages one of Plutarch's slaves in argument
with Epictetus. Later on Favorinus published a work on the same problems,
entitled AlcibiadesJ!j. This was followed by three books On the cataleptic
impression (nt:(]t njr; 'X.(J.Ta}.lpnr..tj; q-avraa[u.r;)3\ in which he is said to have
COLARDEAU 1903, chapter 4 "De Favorino Academico . p. 57-72; csp. p. 58-YJ ; 71.
" 9 1978. p. 280-285. To GLUCKER"s examples one may add HARHIAN 1916. p. 254, and. more
recently, the somewhat ambiguous treatment in BEAUJEU 1964, p. XXI and l3ARIGAZZI 1966,
p. 24-25; 1993, p. 565; CHATZILYSA:"DROS 1970, p. 7. OU:'-.!Oi"T (1985, p. 155 note 6; p. 20; 96)
without the slightest reservation treats Favorinus - at this stage in his career, i.e. after his
dismissal of the Stoic and Platonic schools- as a downright Pyrrhonian.
3o Cf. Oucos 1984, p. 290-291 with note 13; HA:-.IKINSON 1995, p. 142-143 ; f--LADOT 1995, p.
221.
31 = 1,40-52 K. = Fav. frg. 28.
3: De opt. doctr. 40: -ci]V fi; EXCHEQa frCl;(ELQl]OlV agio-cl]V dvm Otbaoxa).iav 6 <I>aB(I)QlVO;
(['l]OlV. 0' OUHJJS Ol 'Axa01Ula"ixoi xa{}' l]V -cot:; 01!\'U'{OQEVOUOlV.
33 Cf. lOPPOLO 1993, p. 191 note 32.
3-1 Cf. BARIGAZZI 1966, p. 192-193.
FAVORINUS, EPICIETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 223
denied the possibility of such a cognitive impression
36
, the key notion of
Stoic epistemology.
\Vhen we take a closer look at Galen 's argumentation, it appears that he
objects above all to Favorinus' method of speaking in favour of both sides in
opposing arguments. The suspension of judgment following from this would
be incompatible with the choice his pupils are supposed to make between the
two.
Galen distinguishes the older from the younger Academics. The first
carried through the procedure of arguing both sides of a question (1i de::;
hcrrEQa :rtzEiQt]OL;) \vith such extreme rigour that the only consequential
conclusion left to them was the complete suspension of judgment, the l:rrox1'1
:r:Egi. :ruvnov. This would imply a lack of determination, i.e. the refu?al to
determine anything or to make any absolute statement:
The oldt!r Academics take this [se. -djv d; b.c'ttEQCL i::nzdgt)Otv] to result in
suspension of judgment (tEhvTav d; broziJv) - they call ''suspension of
judgement" intlt!tcrminateness, so to speak, i.e. not determining or making
firm assertions on any subject (o:;tEQ i:oTi. mgi. rrgci.ywnoc; 6gioao0m
!ll]<Y <bo(p)v<ro{}w BrBaiw;).
(De opt. tloctr. 40)
This was exactly a tt!net of the older Academics: that there is no criterion given
by nature to man. to which he can compare each thing so that he can distinguish
it accurately (to !li]OEV El\'(ll Y.QlTI.lQlOV tlj!Q njc; <pUOcw;.
;"[U(lCtBc'r)J.o>V fY.UOTO\' ni>V ovnuv Ol(f'{Vtimnm). Therefore they
were of the opinion that one should not make assertions about anything
U:;tO!flJvuo{)m :;tEQi !ll]bEvo;), but that one should suspend judgement about
everything (mgi. :;tUVHI)V
(43-44) .
With the words cmocpivao-frm BEBaiw;, Galcn wants to convey what is
better known as (tzataAtP!' ta. According to the Academics, he states, it is
impossible to get a cognitive impression of anything. Galen upbraids
Favorinus for using the words r.atUAlJ"tiH;, x.ataArp1tLY.ll cpavtaota, to
r.ataf.lFCt6v and their counterparts, because they do not conform to the
Attic norm. He proposes to substitute -ro BEBatwt; yvwo-c6v
37
for
zcrw),t]:t:Tov. This might seem a completely neutral and harmless operation,
but in fact the terminological changes proposed by Galen are not without
theoretical implications3
8
. Not only do they obscure the dialectical character
of Favorinus' arguments, they also allow of a considerable rapprochement
between Academic and Stoic epistemology, since, for example, Carneades'
35 Cf. BARIGAZZI 1966, p. 190-19.1.
36
De opt. doctr. 42: E"JTl0ELY.vUVat -cilv xa-caAlj7(HY.l]V cpavtaotav av-Urragx-cov.
3
7
See also Galen De dign. puis. 8,771 K, and compare Plut. De Sto. rep. 10478.
Cf. IOPPOLO 1993, p. 198.
224 CHAPTER 5
"most convincing"3'1 impression, which the latter accepts as a criterion to
guide our actions, can be more readily identified with ro BEBa[w; yvwor6v
than with 1:0 xaraAlpnov, if only for the fact that Y.cna/.tp!L; originally
implied absolute infallibility whereas "firm knowledge" does not. This may
be related to the semantic evolution of xaraJ.tp!n<;, a clear example of the
watering-down of terminology from a highly technical term denoting
infallible self-certifying acts of cognition to a mere "synonym for episteme or
gnosis, mental apprehension quite generally"-1.
Comparing Favorinus' approach to the absolute and fully consequential
suspension of judgment of the older New Academics, Galen claims that
Favorinus' attitude can only be labekd as ambiguous, if not self-contra-
dicting-11. On the one hand, Favorinus professes suspension of judgment:
even the sun-1
2
cannot be said to be apprehensible (Y.cnaJ.tprro;, 40). On the
other, he instructs his pupils to argue both sides of a question and
subsequently to choose the best thesis, that is, the truer one (algt:i:o\)cu rou;
ltt.tp1EOTEQOU<;, 41). But at the same time he does not provide them with a
truth-criterion ( iivc u 1:oD bu)etz 0 :rgoTEgov LnonntovLY.tlV Y.gm'wwv,
41 ). By forcing his pupils to make a choice between two opposed
propositions, Favorinus in the treatise Ploutarclws apparently does accept
the existence of "firm knowledge", Tt) 0t::fkdw; '(V(J)Otov, a concept that,
accon.Iing to Galcn, equals "cataleptic" knowledge:
I3ut in this work [se. th!..! Alcihiades] he said that it seemed convincing to him
rru'luvt>V <rui.vE<JDm) that nothing is apprehensihle t:tvw
xmu/.tprn)v). whereas in his Plutarch he seems to admit that there is
something which can be known with certainty (ot''(f.tJ(lrLV t=otxFv rtv((i n
lkl\uiuJs; '{VtrHJtt>V) - it is better to term thus the "apprehensible" (ro
xmui.IJrrrtw) anti to get rid of the Stoic term (<'mozwQoOvru; ovt.lltmo;
LTilJLY.OU). (41)
Galen's reproach amounts to an accusation of

Favorinus'
pupils arc supposed to judgc-1-1 but are not allo\ved to believe in the existence
of a criterion to judge by. These arc contradictory and thus ridiculous
requirements:
39
I.e. the rm'}uvi] xui xai U:tfQLO:TCLOTOs; ftUVWOlU (cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. flyp.
1.229).
40
LO:"G 1988b, p. 183. Cf. MANULI 1986, p. 249. See also BRU:'\SCHW!G 1911" p. 151 on
Scxtus Empiricus' use of xaTC1Al]1Vt:; in a weaken...:d sense.
41
Carneades is said even to have refused to assent to the proposition that two things equal
to a third are also equal to each other (also known as Euclid's first proposition): o yof.v
KaQVEUOl]; OLb TOUTO TO rrci.vnuv EvUQYfOTCLTOV OU'(/.trJQEL matfl:nv, on TCt T<!J m\n7J toa
xai. a)).J't/.ot:; 'loa yt'(VETUL (45). According to his own words Galen even prefers this
unambiguous attitude: wtvuv i-:n rrgoo:rmou yt'(Vti)OzELv n c't:rorrci.vat
arrobtOQUOXE Ti]V urro TWV rrgwBuTfQtoV 'AxaCl]fta'll<u)v ErrOzl'jv(47).
42 Cf. Cic. De nnt. dear. 2,4-5.
FAVORINUS, EP!CTETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY
225
Favorinus is ridiculous (yEI.oi:o;), for he leaves it up to his pupils to judge, while
denying them belief in criteria (bmgnwv XQLVElV tai:; f.!U0lltai:; avEu ta\:1
Ol''(f.WQiiom Ttlv nionv taT; XQLTllQiOt;). (51)
It seems to me that Favorinus does something similar to one who says that
Dion is blind by nature, but that he is able nonetheless to judge (xgi:vm) which
of us is filthier or whiter, not realising that one has to be endowed with sight
before one may judge in these matters. (51)
He does something similar to a carpenter who demands his pupil to measure
and to \veigh and to straighten and to draw a circle, without giving him a rule
or a balance or straight-edge or a pair of compasses. (47)
Gakn considers Academic instruction in general to be sophistic and
and claims that his own philosophical teaching is the best kind,
after which he explains the basic principles of his own instruction methods
(48-51).
From Galen's text we may gather that Favorinus' main argument for his
denial of the reliability of the senses was cowgaJ.I.ctl;tet, i.e. the impossibility
to distinguish the impressions of the healthy from those of the sick, those
from the sane from those of the insane, those of sleep from those of
wakefulness-In. This is indeed an Academic stock argument against the Stoic
J.\ Sec also ft'Ol]i.o; OlY ionv o <t>u(1t1JQtvo; ni6ouftEvo; :rci.vTu xai
(L'{\'OliJV l':t<'tgznv OftO).oydv, 0 fll] urruQznv oi. rrQOO{h:v n.E'(OV 'AxuO!]flet'izot lE xui.
nt'(H.)I;)\'flOl, :t(lO\J:totOI:pt:vo; b' frrLT(.IErrl'lV Tl]V xgimv wi:; flU{hp:ui;. l]V oub' EUlltot;
oi :t(lo ((tltO[. Galcn confronts favorinus with the following dilemma (cf.
l!A:-;KI:-;so:--: 19!J5, p. 141J): how is he, as a dogmatist, meant to take favorinus' arguments? Is
he simply bcing proddct..! tn accept them or is he supposed to examine them to see if they arc
true? Thc first woult..! mean coercion. but for lht.: second he needs some natural criterion or
some method of jut..!ging truth and falsity in argumt.:nt, which an Academic will not grant him.
In his work on the Pyrrhonians, Favorinus appears to haw granted to them the ability to
judg...:, i.e. to make legal decisions, despite their "suspension of judgment". Cf. Philostr. Vit
soplr. 1.8 p. 491 (Test. 6): xni. rro/J.<7J ltc1D.ov [se. tot:; <flAOOO<fOU!lEYou; auT</l
HiJV ),O'{IJJV, 0)\' U(llOTOl oi nt(,l(l(l)Vl0l' tou; '(Ct(l nug(lWVElOL'S E<fE%Tl%0US ovm:; OL'%
urrmQEinu i'.((i. To buvaoHm
Cf. De opt. doctr. 43; 45 ( OO<fLOflUTCl Eioi.v ot )..oyOL rrci.vtE:; OUTOl): 46; 47 ( oM yag
btbcwzc'ti.ot TO '(f TOlOl'TOV fOllY, an abohozia n; l] ''lQO:; I btba;m OOIJ'lOTa;
lll]bv !'wiv t:tc'tgznv %QlTl]QlOV Ot'llf[UtoV); 48 (ou llOVOV oux EOTLV CtQlOll] TWV ci.Hwv, an
ol.() btbao;w).[a I oi. ooq:wmi.). Cf. DE LACY 1991, p. 286. MARQUARDT (MARQUARDT-
HEL:\.IRE!CH 188-l) atheticises several of tht.:se phrases on very weak grounds. He
is not followed by BARIGAZZ! 1966; cf. BAR!GAZZ! 1956, p. 24.
46
Gal. De opt. doctr. 42 (ErrELCl] yag EVlU l] axotElV l] ol.w;
ato\lci.vEO{)Ul, xaOci.:tEQ Ev OVELQot; xni. Evta 6' OUY. aHct xai. Xat'
ai.ip'}nav OQWilEV l] o).cJ); TU\!Tl TU OElJTEQU rrc'tVTES ci.v{}Q(JJj[Ol
'AzaOllflU'ixtiJV tE xai. nvgQtoVEL(I)V Ei; BEf}aiav '(VWOlV llY.ElV a 8 ovag l]
rraga:tULOVHll\' 1'1 'f'L'Zil ')EU0ll rrcJ.v{}' urrci.gznv) and 43 ([ ... ) TOU
TOV O{I)([QO\'Olh'la roD VOOOUVTOS TOV uywi.vovta toD TOY
E'{Ql]'{OQOTU :tlCJTOTEQOV urrci.gznv.Ei:; Tl]V tOJV yvwmv). Compare Plutarch Adv.
Col. 11238-F (cf. s11pra: p. 100).
226 CHAPTER 5
notion of the self-certifying, infallible and therefore cognitive impression.
Favorinus appears to have drawn the standard Academic conclusion:
is no such thing as self-evident perception (l:vagyELa) that can be distin-
guished with any certainty from non-evident

To Galen this sounds

absurd: he is convinced that the senses and the mind in some cases do convev
self-evident knowledge needing no further examination and providing
natural criterion
4
8. Training, starting from these self-evident matters. will
teach us how to see clear in less evident issues. This "natural epistemology"
is the core of Galen's instruction method, "the best instruction", which he
also claims to be in full accordance with Plato's (52)
49

IV. A RELIABLE WITNESS?
It is difficult to say to what extent Galen a reliable picture of
Favorinus' position. But it is rather improbable, given the polemical context ,
that he is rendering the tenets of his opponent in a completely correct and
sufficiently balanced manner. R.J. HANKINSON affirms that .. Galen is surely
too quick to dismiss as simply inconsistent a position which seeks to marry a
methodology of dialectical opposition on the one hand with a limited
acceptance of moderate belief on the other"
50
The misrepresentation of
Favorinus' views may also be due to Galcn's insufficient knowledge of the
epistemological debatest.
Galen presumably distorts Favorinus' words more than once: Favorinus
would not have advised his pupils to choose the truer propositions52, but
perhaps the most probable or persuasive. as COLARDEAU ( 190], p. 68)
righlly remarks: "Non autem, ut opinor, magis veras, sed magis veri similes,
47
This may be gathered from De opt. dnctr. 44-45: ottm rc'tCJ fimv ot zui tut;
uioihJOCOtV u;non:tv uvun\)[vn:<; it tO)V t:-c6 tOU BrBuitu<; '(l'(VWOZOflEVtoJV ZtltWfCJO\'fl\'.
4
H De opt. doctr. 44 : 47 (iHttV flCvtot to(!); cp:i.mv, ulo\htoiv n: zcti voqmv EVUCJ'(ll ZQlTI.J'Jl!t tot!
c't).rp'}ot:; fl\'Ctl Ol!'(/.Ol(lTJUELEV uv n;); 48 ( !fULVEtUl '(UfJ DfllV lVUQ'(tiJ; toUtO, Ztl\' on fltti.tot'
Hl'tot; ci:-ctatoV oi OO!f-LOWi. ElVUl ZfJltlJ(llO\' !fUOtzov); 49 (:TtOtfVE
ol.v, d BoN.ft, toT; orp{}uf..Jtoi:; EvU(l'(tiJ; O(llilOl xat nj r).olttlJ '(El'OflEVlJ. tOl'ti fiE V JliJl.O\' fl Vat ,
tOI!tl oi: Ol'ZOV, it flr'J 1tlOtEUE. [ ... ] Z[JlV(l) b' [yoJ tu flEV uio\httU tot; EV(t[J'((l); (!tO\hJOfl
<faLVOJlfVOL;. tU bi: VOljtU toi:; fvUQ'(OJ \'OOL'JlEVOt;); 50 (Ei pv autoi: n !j<ll\TH!l :rgo;
a'loOt]OLV it v6tjOlV vagyoJc;. ou toL'tO 51-52 (d yug o{bv E<.mv f.vctQ'(E;
njJ vtiJ lJ :non)v ; f:auwu, btEcr{}ugtat1tll\'tOJV ti zgiat;). See also De plac. flipp. et !'fat. 5.42.

For an analysis of Galen opinions on instruction and learning. sec HAI"KINSO:"i !9<) l ( esp.
p. 294-299) . For Galen's views on epistemology: cf. LONG 1988b, p. 196-208 (esp. p. !99):
BARI"ES 1991; DE LACY 1991; DONI:'\! 1992c; IOPPOLO 1993, p. 206 with note 88 ;
HANKINSON 1995, p. 146-149.
5() HA;-.;KI:'\SON 1991, p. 277; cf. 1995, p. 147.
5t Cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 286: "Galen, as much of his treatise shows, is far from being a
profound connoisseur of the doctrines of the sceptical Academy: indeed, whatever he knows
of their theory of knowledge in this treatise appears to be derived wholly from a superficial
reading of a few works of Favorinus, followed by a swift condemnation."
l
FAVORINUS, EPICrETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 227
vel potius probabiliores rationes sequendas esse censebat". It is indeed
consistent \Vith Academic practice not to lay down authoritative doctrine but
instead to leave others free to judge for themselves which arguments appear
to be most persuasive.
In some instances Galen's text may have preserved traces of Favorinus'
exact wording. This appears to be the case when he tells us that Favorinus
said it seemed persuasire or convincing to him that nothing is cognitive
(:rdJwov qaivEa(}w, dvm ;wtaAlFt:t6v, 41). Most probably
this was indeed Favorinus' position 53. Favorinus probably did not say that he
knew, in a "cataleptic" way, that nothing can be known, but only that this
proposition appeared persuasive to him. This way of expressing his point of
view allowed him to avoid the type of contradictions Galen accuses him of.
Similar imputations of self-contradiction were leveled at the Academics by
the Pyrrhonians as well (cf. supra: eh. 4, Ill, A).
Both A. I3AR!GAZZJ5
4
and J. GLUCKER5
5
have claimed that according to
Galen the philosophical position of Favorinus underwent an essential
change between the composition of his Plwarch and his later philosophical
work. In the work dedicated to Plutarch he is said to have taught the
possibility of cataleptic" knowledge, while espousing axataJ...lppta in his
later works. It is implied that Favorinus adopted a moderate position under
the innuence of Plutarch and that later he abandoned this half-hearted
attitude to espouse a fully-Oedgcd scepticism.
I think this is based partly on an implicit assumption concerning the
nature of Plutarch's Platonism, but above all on a misinterpretation of
Galcn's text. Galen does not want to point out an evolution, but rather a
contradiction in Favorinus' philosophy. A close reading of the text leads to
this conclusion. Galen hegins with the younger Academics, among whom
Favorinus: once (i':v[on: 40) they deny xcmil.lpf't; even of self-evident
things. such as the sun, then again (l:v[otE 6E:, 41) they expect their pupils to
judge and make a choice. This is exactly (ou6i: yag U.J...I.o 'tL l:on, 41) what
Favorinus does in his ni.ot1ra(}'f..O;. and like\'vise (J...E:yEL 6 tau16v, 41) in his
n(!o; 'E:r(Y.nJrol'. In his 'AJ.xt{3ul.OlJ;, too, written after the aforementioned
texts (zed. xciv tui:ta ygmrE:vn njJ '''AJ...xtBtaOlJ"), he

This is more in keeping with Galen's own vocabulary: cf. De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. 2,7, 14.
Compare Lucian Vit , auct. 27, v.-here the Pyrrhonist mentions tov M.tjOEotrgov (t..6yov), but
denies knowledge thereof.
5J See also IOPPOLO 1993, p. 196-197.
5.1 1966, p. 176 ("si mette in rilievo il progressive scetticismo dell'ultimo opera [se. Alcibiades]
rispelto a\le due preccdenti [se. Plutarclws and Ad Epictetwn]".); p. 193 ("In esso [se.
Alcibiades] compariva il grado piu avanzato de\lo scetticismo di Favorino").
55
1978, p. 290: 'This [se ;a{}avov [aunp cpaivw{}m fllJOEv dvm xawt..1Fn6v], as Galen
notes, is a more extreme sceptical stance than the one adopted during his earlier, Plutarchean
period.''
228 CHAPTER 5
invites his pupils to choose the proposition that is closest to the truth. But,
Galen continues, in Alcibiades Favorinus affirms, with caution. the principle
of axm:af..l]ltJLa, whereas in his Plutarch he appears to concede that assured
knowledge of certain things is possible ( ouyJ.WQEi:v EOLY.EV dvai n 0c0etiw;
yvwm6v, 4l). But these words, in my opinion, do not imply that Favorinus
in his Plutarclz actually stated that some things might be xcrni).q;rra5fl_ This
is rather a mere inference made by Galen
57
. He reasons that Favorinus'
demand to make a judgment presupposes the existence of a criterions/\.
Galen finds the same didactic method depicted in the three aforementioned
works of Favorinus: the Academic teacher should invite his pupils first to
argue in favour of two opposed propositions and then to judge between
them. According to Galen's line of reasoning, this inevitably brings the
Academic in contradiction with his own sceptical tenets. Other passages
confirm that Galen wants to point out a contradiction in Favorinus' position,
rather than an evolution (5l; 52). This receives confirmation from the
concluding paragraph of De optima doctrina. After a brief exposition of his
own teaching principles, Galen concludes with a last sneer at Favorinus:
I have shown how, starting from the elements and principles inherent in each
subject, one may prove very well everything that can be proved, unlike our
wonuerful Favorinus, who has written a whole book in which he shows th:H not
even the sun is apprehensible (fV o).ov yg(up((; BtBI.iov, (:v <!l bfl%\'VOL TO\'
ij).tov rivw ;wtu).tpttt>V), anu then in another work speaks to us as if we had
forgotten (<iJ; l:ml.t'JOftomv lJ!tTv) his pn.:vious statcml!nt and aumits that thal!
is something which can he known with certainty (OU'(/.lll(.ltiJv n Bf0C1ttl; r(wu
rvuHnov), and this he commands his pupils to choose (Tott' btt(.lt:n"v
ui(.lrTo0wToT; (52)
Ir arc to believe Galcn, Favorinus had first written (ygu1
1
a;) a hook in
which he professed himself an adherent of the inapprchcnsibility thesis,
whereas in another work as if hoping that one would have
forgotten what he had said earlier, he acknowledged that some things admit
of infallible knowledge and consequently required his pupils to choose in
One may also compare the explanation offered hy SEDL.EY 1996. p. R2 noli: i:
conjectural explanation would be that the apparent concession appeared in the: mouth of
Plutarch, as a speaker in an eponymous dialogue, and that what he said thc:re was no more
than he: says at De Stoicomm repugnantiis that 'those who suspend judgement' argue
on both sidc:s on the ground that, if anything is katah;pton ('knowable'), that would be the best
way of knowing it."
5
7
Cf. IOPPOLO 1993, p.191 note 32: "[ ... ]it seems to me that the words oi.'br '(UQ ul).o TL
i:onv, refc:r to an intcrprdation by Galen of Favorinus' position[ ... ] rather than to a simpk
account ."

Cf. De opt. cloctr. 40-41: Et; wooi:wv (;rgoct'(OL'OL) Ti]\' ywiJOtv, t:J; Z(li wi; p(lOqwi;
bngbELV aun']V UVEt! to\:! btbaz{hjvm 1'CQOTEQOV fJHOT!JrlOVLZOV ZQLTl,]QlO\'. See also De opt.
doctr. 51.
FAVORINUS. EPICfETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY
229
favour of these cognitive objects (xaL 1:o'ln:' nugbrwv aigLo{}m 1:oi:s;
If it were at all possible to conclude on the basis of these words
that Favorinus' philosophical position changed fundamentally, one would
observe exactly the opposite evolution to that which BARIGAZZI and
GLUCKER read into the earlier paragraphs. Instead of a progression towards
a more extreme form of scepticism, we now would have an evolution from
extreme scepticism to a more ambiguous position. This contrast is again an
indication that Galen wanted to show above all that Favorinus' philosophical
position is full of contradictions, and not that Favorinus' opinions on
cognition would have changed in the course of time.
There can be no doubt concerning Galen 's purpose: he wanted to
reproach Favorinus for having entangled himself in self-contradiction.
Galen's portrayal of Favorinus' educational methods can hardly be called
impartial, and it seems very unlikely that Favorinus would actually have
defended ur.ata).lpp[a and the xatu),lptn'Xll cpav-rao[a at the same time.
Gakn's De optima doctrina is not to be seen as an objective and disinterested
presentation of Favorinus' philosophical position5
9
There are, then, good
reasons to assume that Favorinus' scepticism is more subtle and less contra-
dictory than Galen would have it
00

V. EPlCfETUS AGAINST Tl lE ACADEMICS
Another thing we have learned from the evidence of Galen is that Epictetus
was somehow involved in the epistemological debate. Through Epictetus,
Galcn's remarks about Favorinus can be linked once more to Plutarch. Not
only do we know that Favorinus wrote a book against Epictetus in which
Plutarch's slave is a characterf>
1
; from Galcn's survey of his own works we
also know that he himself took up this polemical debate and defended the
Stoic against Favorinus' attacks ('Y.iTEQ 'EmY.n/rov .iT{}i)c; (/>u.(JwQLVOl', De s11is
lihris = 19,44 K.)
6
:1.
BARIG:\ZZI (1966, p. 565) takes it for granted that Galen represents Favorinus' position
corrcctlv.
NJ Com.p:m HA:"'KI:"'SON 1991. p. 276-277.
61 On the possibility that Favorinus himself took part in the discussion as a character in his
dialogue and, more specifically, that he fulfilled the role of arbiter: see also infra p. 243; 245;
H!RZEL 111895, p. 123; 8AEHRENS 1915, p. 459; BARIGAZZI1966, p. 192; BEAUJEU 1964, p.
XXI-XXII and p. LXXXVII.
Most probably not to be identified with nr(!t nj; (De optima
doctrina) : cf. MARQUARDT- MUELLER- HELMREICH 1891, p .. LXXXVIII.
6 ) See al so nr(}i Ki.nro,uU.xou Y.((l T<.Ul' nj; a;wbE[!;rw; at'rov ). vaECVV (De suis libris 11 =
19,44 K.); JhQi nj:; nuv owq-wvovvrwl' EV rot; ooy;watv (De suis libris 11 =
19,45 K): cf. BARIGAZZI 1966, p. 178.
230
CHAPTER 5
The Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae provide us with sufficient
clues to ascertain the connection between Epictetus and FavorinusM. and
most probably between Epictetus and Plutarch as well (Plutarch was after all
Favorinus' mentor). The Dissertationes contain several passages which are
directed against anonymous Academic sceptics.
M. CUVIGNY, in a paper presented to the VII le congres of the Association
Guil!awne Bude in 1968 (published in 1969)
6
5, already suggested that
Epictetus' attacks were actually directed against Plutarch and his circle.
However, the evidence he adduced for this is meagre and his argument
requires some qualification. It is based primarily on the conviction that
Academic scepticism undermines traditional moral and religious values and,
more specifically, constitutes a threat to the belief in divine Providence and
divinational practices. Now this is indeed the very charge Epictetus. like
many other Stoics, brings against the AcademicsM. But CUVIGNY. following
a long-held communis vpinio, took scepticism to be actually guilty of this
charge, believing that scepticism as such inevitably undermined the
foundations of traditional belief. As I have already shown, this is certainly
not the way the Academics used to regard their own philosophy. Our new
understanding of the dialectical and poll.!mical character of the Hdknistic
dchatl.!s has led to serious doubts about the alleged anti-religious ami anti-
prophetic tendencies in Academic philosophy. In any event, the Academics
themselves claimed that their brand of philosophy only challenged the
unjustifiable truth claims of their adversaries and that it in fact protected
traditional bclicf"
7
Academic caution actually warned against the
assumption that man could obtain knowkdgc reserved for the gods.
If we examine Epictctus' anti-Academic polemics, it will become clear
that Epictctus' attacks indeed directed against Plutarch and that
favorinus. who espoused the same Academic principles as his friend and
Both at one stage enjoyed a close n:lationship with Hac.lrian. Cf. Scriptures 1/istoriac
1\ugustac. lladr .. 16,10-11. and 130WIE I9<J7, p. 4. with note 15; p. 11:
CUVIGNY 1969, p. 563-564: "L'accusation s'expliquc [acilcmcnt. Epictl!te a jugC: Plutarque
sur son etiquette de 11 est pour lui l'hommc d'une secte qui croit
impossible d'aboutir a aucune science certaine sur aucun probll!mt::, y compris sur le probll!me
tk Dieu; il est le disciple de Carneade, le dialecticien subtil qui secoua jusqu'a la base
l'cnorme edifice du Portique, qui soutenait avec un egal bonheur le pour et le
contre sur tous les problcmes et qui avait lance de tcrribles attaques contre la Providence
sto'lcienne, lcs croyances populain.:s et la mythologic. Et Plutarqut.:. pour sa part, est un fidcle
partisan de l'epoclu! et des methodes dialcctiques de la Nouvelle et illui est arrive:
de prendre a partie lcs theologiens de Delphcs et de se gausscr de certaines croyances
delphiques dans son De defectu oraculomm."
06
See also Augustine Contra Acad. 3,35-36.
6
7
One may als'O compare Cic. De div. 1,8-9 (the Stoic accusation) , 1,7 and 2.148-150; De Jllll.
dear. 3,5-6. Cf. supra (eh. 4, Ill, B) and infra (eh. 6).
FAYORINUS, EPICTETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 231
teacher, naturally defended him against Epictetus' imputations, whereas
Galen, reporting this polemic, obviously chose the Stoic's side.
So let us take a look at Dissertatio 2,201\.\ where both the Academics and
the Epicureans are Epictetus' targets. The Stoic claims that the sceptic
arguments are self-refuting ( 2-5) and that the Academics invalidate their
philosophy through their own behaviour in daily life, which conflicts with
their professed uncertainty about the world around them. This is a variant of
the well-known cmga;[a-argument, according to which suspension of
judgment would make practical life impossible. Epictetus gives some stock
examples in order to prove the untenability of the sceptical position:
Man, what are you doing? are you confuting your own self every day (auTo;
ocauTov xn{}' l'J!LEgav), and are you unwilling to give up these frigid
attempts of yours? When you eat, where do you bring your hand? To your
mouth, or to your eye? When you take a bath, into what do you step? When
did you ever call the pot a plate, or the ladle a spit?
(2,20,28, transl. 0LDFATIIER 1925)
Similar expamples can be found in Diss. 1.27,18-19:
When I want to swallow anything. I never take the morsel to that place but to
this: when I \vish to take bread I never take sweepings, but I always go after the
bread as to a mark. And do you yourself. who take away the evidence of the
senses b' auwi. ol. Tct; atoOl'jOEL uvmgouvn:;), do anything else? Who
among you when he wishes to go to a bath goes to a mill instead?
From Plutarch's Ad\erstts Colotemm it appears that the Epicurean
philosopher Colotes brought the same charges against Arcesilaus, even
using the same examples:
How comes it that the man who suspcnus judgment does not go dashing off to
a mountain instead of to the bath, or why does he not get up and walk to the
wall insteau of the uoor when he wishes to go out to the market-place?
(li22E. transl. EINARSON- DE LACY 1967)1
11
And, as one could expect, Colotes would like Socrates, the alleged proto-
Academic, to be regarded as equally inconsistent:
Colotes has a way of presenting Socrates \Vith grass and asking how comes it
that he puts food in his mouth and not in his ear.
(1108B, transl. EINARSON- DE LACY 1967)
68
Entitled: flQo; 'EmY.otQdov; Y.ai 'AY.aorzuaiY.ov;. Diss. 1,5 is entitled fleoc; rov;
'AY.whuwiY.ov;.
69
Sec also BA BUT 1994c, p. 568-569 note 115. Cf. supra: p. 88.
70 Cf. supra, p. 88 note 25." -
, ..
232 CHAf'TER 5
So both Epicureans and Stoics use the against everyone
associated with the New Academy or any brand of scepticism". As we have
already seen, the Stoics first came up with the argument ; only later was it
adopted by the Epicureans, at least if we are to believe Plutarch
7
1.
Another charge Epictetus brings against the Academics is that their
principles undermine traditional piety. He asks them about their opinion of
piety and sanctity (2,20,22: d HyEL;, cpL),ooocpE; to nJoEBi:; xai to oOLov
rroT6v tL am cpaivnm;) and then goes on to show what an Academic would
answer to such a question. First he would demonstrate that piety and sanctity
are good (av frEAlJ, xataoxEuaow on ayafrov), only to prove the opposite
afterwards :
you are quite with all this, hear the contrary n't
vuvt:lct): the gods do not exist, and, even if they do, they pay no attention to
men, nor have we any fellowship with them. and hence this piety and sanctity
which the multitude talk about is a lie tolJ hy impostors and sophists
(<'t).ustW(I)V <'LvH(Him(I)V xui ao(poniJv), or, I swear, by legislators to frighten
and restrain evilJoers.
(IJi.1s. 2.20.2J, transl. Ot.DFATIIER 1925)
After an ironical reply hy Epictctus, the Acauemic continues:
What then, does not all this satisfy you? Learn now how righteousness is
nothing. how reverence is folly, how a fathl.!r is nothing. how a son is nothing.
(l)iss. 2,20,25)
Epictctus' allegations concerning the Acauemics' lack of piety anu justice
coincide with the traditional criticism of Epicurean philosophy. Although
the Acaucmics themselves were wont to hring the same accusations against
the Epicureans. one should not really be surprised to find a Stoic censuring
the Academics on the same account : as we have seen, in these and similar
polemics opponents often hurl identical reproaches at each other. and after
all, Epictetus in one and the same Dissertatio is reported attacking both
Epicureans and Academics.
According to our Stoic philosopher, the Academics are guilty of contempt
of things divine (25: xatmpQOVl]OLV tG1V {)d(t)v) but also of contempt of
traditional family values and ethical principles in generaJ72. But the
principles they boast of are contradicted by their acts in daily life : they
marry, beget children, fulfil! their duties as citizens and even get themselves
appointed as priests and prophets (LEQEL xafrwtaoLv ahoi.; xetl
rrgocpl']ta;). "But prophets and priests of whom?" Epictetus wonders. 'Of
7! Cf. Adl'. Col. 1122AB: Ex LToa; [ .. . )l;JO;[fQ rogyovct TijV (t;rga;inv b(tronr; (the
Gorgon-metaphor is also alluded to in Epict . Diss. 1,5,2-3). Cf. supra: p. 88.
n Cf. JAGU 1946, p. 81.
-..,.
1
fAVORINUS, EP!CfETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY
233
gods that do not exist? (ttvwv; twv oux ovtwv;)" And do they consult the
Pythia in order to hear lies (n1v Dufrtav Ct.vaXQlVOUOlV au-rot, tva ta '\.j.IEUOf}
;nj{}wvtm)? Epictetus sharply condemns their impudence and imposture: w
Ct.vmozuvtia; xal. yoT]tdw; (Diss. 2,20,27). It seems to me fairly
plausible that Epictetus, with his references to priests
7
3, prophets and the
Pythia, is alluding to Plutarch 74, also given the fact that through Favorinus
there is at least an indirect link between the two philosophers.
Other elements of his polemic also square perfectly with what we know
about Plutarch's philosophical affiliations from his own writings : he always
remains loyal to the New Academics7s, professes Academic caution, uses the
strategy of arguing both sides of a question in his polemics against Stoics and
Epicureans, endeavours to refute the disputes the
accusations of impiety.
However, there is possibly a stronger indication that Favorinus
understood the argumentation of this particular Dissertatio, which itself is
based ultimately on Epictetus' lcctures
76
, as being actually directed against
Plutarch. Epictetus' attacks on Academic scepticism provoked, as has
already been noted, a book by Favorinus defending the Academy. This
book. entitled Against Epictetus, took the form of a dialogue between
Epictetus and a slave of Plutarch called Onesimus. Wondering what the
meaning could be of the curious detail that it was a slave of Plutarch whom
Favorinus made engage in the dispute with Epictetus, J. GLUCKER
77
suggests
that Favorinus perhaps wanted to remind Epictetus that he, too, had been a
slave. To this GLUCKER adds another consideration:
It is as if Favorinus were saying: "Piutarch himself would regard it beneath his
dignity to refute your uncouth criticism- any of his slaves could do that."
(GLUCKER 197X, p. 294)
A.M. 10PPOL0
7
X is of the opinion that the fact that Favorinus chose
Plutarch's slave as the interlocutor of Epictetus is symptomatic for the
bitterly controversial tone of the debate. One may also take into account the
73 Favorinus as well was appointed UQ;(lfQE1JS: according to Philostr. Vir sopfr. 1,8 p. 490 (Test.
6) , just like Pyrrho much earlier (Diog. Laert. 9,64) ; the Ciceronian Cotta was pontifex
maximus (De nat. dear. 1.61 ; 3,5).
See also CUVIGNY 1969, p. 563-564; PUECH 1992, p. 4850; BABUT 1994c, p. 568-570.
CUVIGNY and BABUT take the reference in Plut. Quaest. conv. 692B to "a famous
philosopher", teacher of the Stoic Nigros, to be an allusion to Epictetus.
75 Cf. DE LACY 1953, p. 80-81; BABUT 1994c, p. 553; 562; 580.
76 We do not know where Favorinus got his knowledge of Epictetus'lectures. The indication
in Gellius 17,19.1 remains vague ("Favorinum ego audivi dicere Epictetum philosophum
dixisse [ .. .)"). Cf. ME:-<SCHING 1963, p. 56.
77 1978, p. 294. ' .
iS 1993, p. 199; 202. ,.'
234 CHAPTER 5
fact that avbgcmobov is frequently used by Epictetus as a playful or
disdainful mode of address.
However, I think there might be another, more telling explanation. In
order to exemplify the absurdity of the Academic position, Epictetus had
mockingly expressed the wish to become an Academic's slave. Were he a
slave to an Academic, he says, he would find pleasure in carrying out his
master's orders in a rather "perverse" way. Instead of throwing oil in the
bath, he would throw in a little fish sauce and pour it down his master's head.
He would explain his behaviour by saying that he had "a presentation that
could not be distinghuished from oil''. If his master would ask for grud, he
would bring vinegar and fish sauce and resolutely affirm that it was gruel.
One simply cannot decide whether it is vinegar and fish sauce any more than
gruel (tt

1} rrnoctVll;). Tasting does not help since the senses

deceive us. If all the Academics' slaves acted in this way, they would drive
their masters mad. "But as it is, such men arc toying with us; they use all the
gifts of nature, while in theory doing away with them"xo.
It is not impossible that it was this very sketch that provoked Favorinus'
reaction. One may even surmise a link with the anecdote told by Taurus at
Gellius 1.26 about one of Plutarch's slaves, who is introduced as a nequam
lzomu et contulllllX having some acquaintance with philosophical books and
discussions and therefore apparently fond of obtrusive and "sophisticated"-
or rather sophistical- argumentations
1
Could it have been the same slave or
rumours about his existence and behaviour that gave Epictetus the initial
idea for his sketch'? It is at any rate very unlikely that Favorinus would have
chosen this slave to represent Plutarch if Epictetus had not done so hefon.:s2_
In any case, this link with the slave mentioned here by Taurus remains highly
hypothetical.
The evidence adduced appears to indicate that the Academics attacked hy
Epictetus were none other than Plutarch and his circle, and that Favorinus
7
'l Presumably a parody of the sceptic formula: cf. Sextus Emp. Pyrrlz. 1/yp. l.ISS-\lJ I: Plul.
Ad1. Col. lllOE: Gal. De opt. doctr. 43.
xo Diss. 2.20,29-31: rt nvo; nt'ttiJv 6oi:i.o; ii!llJV. d xai bn !LE i'.a{f t'uligctv t::r' uttoi:
xbfgro0m. EYl;J (tv uutov Eotgf:j)).ouv. "j)c't).E V.c'tbwv, n:woc'.t.gtov. El; TO j)u).ctvEiov." Fj)ni.ov
U.v ycigwv xni (t;rd .. {)<i>v xcm't at-Tou xatrzEOv. "t[ Toi!w;" "cfn\'Tuoiu !LOL
rvno fi.uio\.1 c't6LctzgLto;. o
1
LoLOTun
1
. vi
1
Ti
1
v oip tuzt
1
v." "6o; QJbr ti
1
v :rnoctvqv ... r
1
vrrzct
U.v auniJ '(qllOa:; jtaQ01i'L0a o;orcigov. "OL'X tJtl]Oa ti]V :tTLOUVT]V;""vui ZUQLE' TOl'TO ;[Tl(J(.l\'1]
EOTLV .. "tOL'TO Ot'X EOtlV o;orugov;" "ti l] :mOUVl] :" "t.c'tj)E %((l ).c'tf)r zui
yEi:om." ":ro{)Ev Ol'V Ot6u:;. El at ulo{)t']oEL:; t']ftd:; '1f'Et6ovtm;" TQELS, TfOO((QU; TLOV
Ottvl'>ot).wv <EL> rozov O!LOVOOUVm;. a:rur;uo{)m uv m!tov f:tobjoa Ql]'(Vl'!lE\'0\' l]
!Ln:a{)f:oOm. wv 6' EvtQl'CfOJOLV t'][ti:v Toi; !LEV n:uga Tij; <fUOHil<; 6t6o!u:vm:; ;cum ZQl;>!tEvm.
b' cttta CtVWQOUvtf<;.
HI Gell. 1.26,5: "servo suo. nequam homini et contumaci. sed libris disputationibusque
philosophiae aures inbutas habenti." See Gell . 1,26,5-9 for the full anecdote.
He Yet this is what COLARDEAU 1903, p. 62 note 1 seems to suggest.
FAVORINUS, EPlCfETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY
235
only too naturally regarded Epictetus' criticism of them as a personal assault
on Plutarch. In any event, it may safely be concluded that Plutarch and
Favorinus considered themselves Academics and that they were regarded as
such by their (Stoic) adversaries.
VI. FAVORINUS AND "SCEPTICISM"
The evidence so far indicates that, by the time of Plutarch and even
the epistemological debate had not yet lost interest. The texts of Plutarch,
Epictetus and Gakn, and the evidence concerning Favorinus, reflect the
same, ongoing controversys.t.
In addition to the more theoretical aspects of the issue, the participants in
the debate attached great importance to several elements belonging to its
polemical nature which 'can be very useful to detect traces of this polemic.
The opponents accuse each other of sophistry, insincerity, boasting
((.t),asovdet), futile and foolish talk ((f'AUCLQLCL, Aiigo;, abOAEOXLCL). These
imputations can he found in the texts of both Epictetusxs and Galens6, but
also in Plutarch's polemical writings and in the texts reflecting the Hellenistic
epistemological debate in generals
7
Yet another characteristic is the
controversy over philosophical predecessors. As I have already established,
the Hellenistic epistemological debate is to a large extent a struggle about
claims to philosophical ancestry. And indeed, Galen wrote a treatise nQor;
n)v xu.ni. L:wX(!(trovr;xs. The Hellenistic Academics had stressed
the aporetic side of Socrates and had claimed him as one of their
predecessors. This provoked a double reaction: the Epicureans endeavoured
to slander Socrates the the Stoics, on the other hand, and not least
s.1 Cf. PEZZATI 1973. p. 1\44: "come Favorino Gellio si sente scettico ne! campo della
gnoseologia": p. 1\48: "Gellio si interessa di scetticismo e deii'Accademia. Favorino si
sentiva c aveva composto un volume sull'argomento."
One may also compare Epict. Diss. 1,5.6 (xntnt.a!tBc'.t.vw; on Ey(njyogw;; "ou". frtJolv
"o{bi: yc'.t.Q, OtUV fv w'l:; UJtVOL; ([UvtClSlll!lW, on EYQlJYOQC.t". oubfv ouv 6twrEQfl aUT!] t'j
CfU\o'tnoiu [xtlvt];: "ot6v". n 6taAEYO!LUL) with Galen's arguments against
a:wQc.UJ.a:;ia (De opt. doctr. 42-43).
M5 Cf. e.g. Diss. 1.27,2; 6.
SI> Cf. s11pra, p. 225. See also Philostr. Vit soph. 1,8 p. 491-492 (Test. 6): Favorinus is counted
among "the philosophers with the reputalion of sophists".
87 Cf. e.g. PI ut. Q11aest. Plat. 999DE; De eo mm. not. 1059A; Adv. Col. 11198; 1124C; Colotes
In 11th. 10c6; 10d88-10 (CRO:-.IERT 1906, p. 170); Polystratus De contemptu 16,23-17,11 (with
1:-.JDELLI 1978, p. 170 and NARDELLI 1984, p. 526-528): Timon Silloi frg. 25 DIELS = SH 799;
see also Numenius (frg. 25,40-45 DES PLACES) on Arcesilaus, apud Eus. Praep. ev. 14,6,1-2.
Cf. supra, eh. 3. .
88 Cf. De suis libris 12 = 19,45 K.
S9 Cf. KLEVE 1983; Plut. Col. 1116E-1119C; 1124C; Philodemus De vitiis 21,37-23,37;
Cic. Brut. 292. Cf. s11pra: eh. 3.
236 CHAPTER 5
Epictetus, established an alternative portrait of Socrates, in \vhich stress is
laid on the moralistic side
90
Plutarch's defence of Socrates against the
Epicurean attacks and his emphasis of the ''aporetic" and "zetetic" character
of his philosophy are indeed at the same time a defence of Academic
philosophy in general. From the title TOV 1>a.jJWQll'01' Y.CJ.Ta


we learn that Galen combined an attack on Favorinus with one
on SocratesY2. This allows us to conclude that Favorinus, in good Academic
tradition and like Plutarch, had associated his philosophy with the name! of
Socrates.
It seems to me unlikely that the source for Favorinus' Academic
scepticism" would have been any other than Plutarch himself
93
Besides. for
each of them there is evidence that they wrote on the Pyrrhonian modes"
an<..! likewise on the difference between Academics and Pyrrhonians'1-l.
Gellius brief discussion of this controversial issue (11,5) might very well
derive from Favorinus' treatise, although this is not certain
9
5:
It is besides a question of long standing, which has hecn discussed by many
Greek writers, whether the Pyrrhonian and Academic philosophers differ at
all, and to what extent (\etus autem qtwestio et a multi.\ scriptorihtts Graecis
tractara, an (JIIid et quantwn Pyrronios et 1\c(((/cmicos phi/osoplws inrersir).
(Nocr. All. 11,5,6, transl. ROI.FE llJ27)


Cf. JAGU PJ.Hi, p. 51-60; DORING 1971); p. 160-1(>2: IOI'POLO 19Sf>. p. 50:
"Ndl'interprl't;l!.ione di Zenonc, dunque. l'clcnclws era l'aspctto meno rikvank del pensiero
sonatico [ ... j."
'
1
1 ( 1914, p. I I I) "emendation" ;tQi>; tiJv <l><t[l<lQil'OI' r.<ntt is
totally unjustified.
Cf.IIIRZEL 11 IS95, p. 121 note I: E3ARIGi\ZZI 1960. p. 17S; IOI'I'Ol.O 1993. p. 212. Since it
is hy no means excluded that precisely in work Dr!}i l'rJ%Qr!ro, ; %rti nj; %rd ru'-rrlv
/uwrt%tj;; (cf. Suda s.v. 4,1)90,24-25 ADLER =Test. I) Favorinus portrayed
an "Academic" Socrates, BARIGAZZI's assumption (196fi. p. 163 ; l7S) that Galcn's tn:atise
was not directed against the a forenamed treatise of favorinus is unfounded. althoul!h none of
the fragments that\ave come down to us (frg. 18; 19; 20 ; 21; 22; lJ7 ('!))pertains
logical issues. But in Plutarch's first Quaestio l'latvnica ( IOOODE), apon:tic and zctetic
elements arc harmoniously combined with Socrates' igtmxiJ -rzv11 (cf. supra : eh. 4. IV). S..:c:
also Quaesr. com. 745E; Amar. 7fi4E-766E3; Max. Tyr. Or. IR-21 (in Or. 21 i1
t\Jtm;ot is linked to anamnesis, in a way comparable to that of Plutarch's first Quaest. P!ta. );
Themist. Or. 13. 16LB-162A. Even the fact that Galen ranks his work nwi LW%0UT0t'( %(tt
n/; xrn' atirin l[}omx1/c; riy_v11c; among his ethical writings does not rule that,he
epistemological questions in this work, since both domains arc linked in Epictetus' attacks as
well.
Cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 290; PUEC!-11992, p. 4850.
9
4 Cf. L 15 and L64 ; Fav.frg. 26 and 27.
95 Cf. BAR!GAZZ! 1966. p. 174; PEZZATI 1973, p. 844; GLUCKER 1978, p. 283 note 106:
1985, p. 155, but also p. 164 (DUMONT argues that Gellius' information is not taken
from Favorinus' book on the ten modes); IOPPOLO 1993, p. 190 note 27.
FAVORINUS, EPICTETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 237
Gellius in his exposition emphasises the similarity between Academics and
Pyrrhonians rather than the differences
96
The very difference he does
notice, "that the Academics do, as it were, "comprehend" the very fact that
nothing can be comprehended, and, as it were, decide that nothing can be
decided, while the Pyrrhonians assert that not even that can by any means be
regarded as true, because nothing is regarded as true"
97
seems nearly
tantamount to the imputation of negative dogmatism levelled against the
Academics, not unlike that brought against them by Sextus Empiricus (e.g.
Pyrrlz. Hyp. 1,232-233). It should be noted, however, that Gellius does not
actually say that the Academics apprehend (or "comprehend") the fact that
nothing can be apprehended. The exact wording of his account is more
cautious: they "as it were, apprehend" ("quasi comprehendunt") the
uza.rct).lllt'La and ''as it were, decide" ("quasi decernunt") that nothing can -
be decided. Of the Pyrrhonians Gellius said earlier that they do not accept
the statement that they'"actually" or "simply" see or hear something ("acne
vidcre quoque plane quicquam neque audire sese putant", 11 ,5,4), but
merely that they sec or hear ''as it were" ("quasi videant vel audiant"). This
distinction is then again applied to explicate the Academics' position
regarding the uznTat.lp.p[a itself. They "as it were" apprehend that nothing
can be apprehended, whereas the Pyrrhonians do not even want to
acknowlc<..lge as seemingly true that nothing seems to be true ("Pyrronii ne
id quidem ullo pacto verum videri dicunt, quod nihil esse vcrum vidctur",
11.5,8). The addition quasi" may make all the difference. In this respect
Gcllius' account differs from that of Sextus, who merely states that the
Academics positively affirm the principle of Perhaps
Gellius' account stems from a larger'>') argumentation that would have been
subtle enough to free the Academics from the suspicion of negative
dogmatism. It seems to me that a careful reading of Gellius' text does not
allow the conclusion that he believed the Academics to accept a negatively
% Cf. I3r\RICir\ZZI 1966, p. 23.


I 1.5,R (transl. ROLFE 1927) : "quod Acadt!mici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse
comprchendi quasi comprehendunt et nihil posse decerni quasi deccrnunt, Pyrronii ne id
quidem ullo pacto vcrum vidai dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur."
9
S Pyrrh. 1/yp. 1.226: oi bi: cbo ni; vin; 'Ar.ablwin;. d x.ai axmu/.rpna ElVClt mivta fpaoi,
Otwp'Qot'Ol tliJV OY.f;ttlY.li)v iowc; !lEV x.ai. x.at' uho to AEYf.lV navw r.Tvm ax.mu/..rpttct
(blu[1Bmo0v-rm yug mQi. tauwu, 6 or or.r.mLr.o; hbEzr.o{}m xui. -rtva
;tQoobor.(i). [ ... ]. Note that Sextus says that they probably (to we;) differ in respect of their
statement on for they categorically assert it ( btaBr.Batouvt:at yaQ)- Sextus does
not qualify bmBfBmouvwL This ought to mean that they definitely do assert it, but Sextus
does not want to go into this point here (hence towc;), the focus of the passage being clearly
on their judgment of good and evil, i.e. their respective attitudes regarding the criterion for
practical action.
99
Cf. Du:-.to:-.1 1985, p. 158. ! do not quite share PEZZATI's (1973, p. 844 with note 4)
negative judgment of Gellius' u_nderstanding of Favorinus' argumentation.
238
CHAPTER 5
dogmatic position, i.e. a position that implies the (quasi-)dogmatic
affirmation of inapprehensibility as a principal tenet
100
As a matter of fact,
Gellius clearly states at the beginning that both sects have in common that
they do not believe that anything can be apprehended:
For both are called ozc:mLzo[
101
, f:<pc:znzol, arrOQl]nxol, since both affirm
nothing and believe that nothing is comprehended" (quoniam utrique nihil
adfirmant nihilque comprehendi putant).
(Noct. All. 11 ,5,6)
Most probably Favorinus would accept the ar.atal.lppia-principle as no
more than a m{}avov, thereby neatly avoiding the trap of dogmatic

It is at any rate highly unlikely that either Plutarch or

Favorinus accepted any definition of Acauemic philosophy that would have
the Academics indeed endorse a .. negative dogmatism" or ''dogmatic
scepticism", which would make it very difficult to avoid self-contradiction,
especially since, as we have seen (supra: p. 169-170), Arcesilaus and
Carneaues alreauy manageu to avoiu this trap. Cicero as well maintained
that inapprehensibility is no more than a statement carrying persuasion
(Acad. If 109-110).
This is inuceu the position Favorinus is said to have espouseu in his
11/cihiadr!s, asserting .. that it seemeu convincing to him that nothing is
apprehensible" (ELQIJ%E ;m'}ctvov q:aivcaDm dvm
Z<t'"C<tt.lJrrn)v) '
0
-' . However, like Cicero anu Plutarch, Favorinus uses the
Carneauean mOuvl>V in a larger sense than is eviuenccd for Carneades
himself. Carneades introduced this concept as a sort of criterion for the
conduct of life. but is not known to have applied it to tenets such as
ur.cnut..l]ll'LU (cf. supra: p. 170). But soon this concept was recognised as a
very convenient tool, as it allows to make assertions undogmatically.
Academics applying it to ur.<.nctt.lppitt itself avoided the sclf-contrauictions
imputed to them by, among others (to name but Galen and Epictctus). the
Pyrrhonians. There can be no doubt that Favorinus unambiguously siucd
with the Academics in this dispute
104

It may be concluded that, like Plutarch
105
and heeding his friend's advice,
Favorinus remained faithful to the true Academic spirit, adhering to
Academic principles without entangling himself in contradiction, never
See also 1-L-\NKI NSON 1995, p.
1o1 Cf. HOLFORD-STREVE:-.:s 1997, p. 214 : "The assertion that both schools are c:1lled
OY.E;tttr.ol indicates that Favorinus still wrote as an Academic, for the Pyrrhonians confint.!d
the title of 'sceptic' to themselves (S.E. PH 1.n0. 226)."
Cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 290-291 ; IOPPOLO 1993, p. 197; HOLFORDSTREVESS (1996]. p. 19.
tOJ Cf. HOLFORD-STREVE:-:S 1997, p. 214.
IQ.l Cf. lOPPOLO 1993, p. 212; I do not acquiesce to HIRZEL's (III 1883, p. 132) nonliquet in
this respect.
fAVORINUS, EPICfETUS AND THE PLUTARCHEAN LEGACY 239
considering the truth a definitive accomplishment and taking the ever-
continuing search for truth itself as the goal of philosophy. Favorinus'
philosophy is essentially zetetic, as appears from Gellius' testimony :
"Don't ask me," said Favorinus, " what I think (noli ex me quaerere, quid ego
existumem). For you know that, according to the practice of the sect to which I
belong. I am accustomed rather to inquire than to decide (scis enim soli tu m esse
me pro disciplina sectae, quam colo, inquirere potius quam decemere) ."
(Noct. All. 20,1,9-10 =Test. 47; transl. ROLFE 1927).
The context of the quotation from Gellius is a discussion about Roman law.
It turns out that Favorinus' philosophical attitude does not imply a
subversion of traditional law. On the contrary, in the absence of an absolute,
reliable truth-criterion, Favorinus claims that it is better to keep the ancient
laws in place. Favorinus' approach to laws thus appears to be remarkably
parallel to Plutarch's attitude towards divination (cf. supra: eh. 4, Ill, B)HlO.
Finally, there is no evidence at all to support BARIGAZZI's
107
assumption
that Favorinus in his work on the Ideasws turned against Plutarch as a
consequence of his scepticism and dismissed the "doctrine of Ideas". On the
contrary, it is unnecessary and even unlikely that he had to reject the
Platonic Forms because of his adherence to Academic principles. Plutarch's
first Quaestio Platonica shows that there is no irreconcilable contradiction
between Academic sympathies and the acceptance of Platonic Forms. Just
like Plutarch, Favorinus may very well have endeavoured to blend Platonic
with Academic themes.
Perhaps the Platonic aspect was less prominent in Favorinus' philosophy
than in Plutarch's. This would explain why Galen polcmicises bitterly against
Favorinus and not against Plutarch. This hypothesis is put forward by
IOPPOLO (1993, p. 211-2!211l'
1
), who asserts that the nucleus of Favorinus'
philosophy remained frankly Academic, whereas the nucleus of Plutarch's
may have seemed more close to Platonism. It is possible that this was indeed
Galcn's impression, although it is equally possible that Galen disputed only
with Favorinus because he was the Academic actually at work in his own
10
5 Cf. e.g. De attd. poet. 16C; De E 384E-385C; Qttaest. com. 6SOCD; Qttaest. Plat. /lOOOB-
0 : De Sto. rep. 1037C (one may compare Cic. Tttsc. Disp. 2.5 and 2,9; Acad. 117-8); Ad1. Col.
11170.
106 Cf. also Gel!. 14,1,5.
10
7
1966, p. 171; cf. 1993, p. 565.
to$ Frg. 25 BARIGAZZI 1966; compare L67 and L68.
109
One may also compare p. 187-188: "Clearly, therefore, Favorinus, at least in the works
discussed by Galen, cannot have mentioned Plato, much less have considered him a sceptic
since, if this were the case, it does not seem likely that Galen would have omitted to discuss
something that was as important to him as the question of Plato's philosophical position. That
is why I find Galen's silence so very eloquent."
240 CHAPTER 5
time and a rival teacherllO. However, both explanations need not exclude
each other. Even if Favorinus did not expressly present himself as a Platonist
- or if he did so less emphatically than Plutarch - thinking of himself as a
follower of the Academy, he is very unlikely to have ever dissociated himself
openly from Platonism, especially as the Academics from the time of
Arcesilaus onward sought to place their philosophy in a direct line of descent
from Plato's.
11o See also Philostr. Vie. soplz. 1,8 p. 490 (= Test. 6) : EmnJbELcnm:os; ouv 'HgwblJ tc,i>
ao<pan] Eyiw.w cStcSaaxaf..ov tE [ . .. ].
.
CHAPTER 6
FELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICIS!\1"
I. THE 0CTA V/US
Traces of a polemic against (Academic) scepticism are also to be found in the
dialogue Octmius by the otherwise unknown Minucius Felix
1
The dramatis
personae of the Octavius are Octavius Ianuarius, champion of Christianity,
the author Marcus Minucius Felix himself, also a professed Christian, and
the philosophically educ;ated pagan Caecilius Natalis, who at the end will
convert to the Christian religion. Caecilius and Octavius engage in a
discussion about religion, and Minucius assumes the role of the umpire. The
introductory conversation is followed by Caecilius' speech: he expounds his
views on religion and consequently criticises the Christians. After a brief
intervention from Minucius, it is Octavius' turn to deliver his speech. In his
reply he refutes and retorts the pagan attacks, and proclaims that the
Christian revelation of truth overthrows all heathen superstitions. The
structure of the Ocrmius is thus very clear-cut. Although Octavius' speech is
approximately three times as long as Caecilius', it closely follows his
argumentation: Octavius deals with Caccilius' points one by one
2
This
procedure is emphasised by verbatim repetitions and allusions.
Cnecilius is commonly held to represent the sceptic's point of view\ As a
typical representative of heathen philosophy, which is held to result almost
inevitably in .. scepticism" in the end\ he has come to be regarded as the
natural, exemplary adversary of Christian religion- it was probably also the
author's intention to present him that way. In this chapter, however, I shall
show that this familiar idea is imprecise, as it is misleading to label Caecilius'
position unqualifiedly as "sceptic". He does exhibit some characteristics of
ancient scepticism - which is already something altogether different from
1
Somt: speculations about Minucius' life: FERRARINO 1986, p. 224-227 [= 1947, p. 135-138].
Set: the table established by BEAUJEU 1964, p. VIII-XIII.
3
See e.g. QUISPEL 1951, p. 163: "Tout le monde connait cette dispute entre un pa'icn
sccptique et un chretien stokien sur !'existence d' un Dieu providentiel et la verite de la
religion chretienne."; BEAUJEU 1964, p. 161: "le scepticisme, incarne en Cecilius"; VoN
ALBRECHT 1987, p. 160; 167. One may compare e.g. DE LABRIOLLE 1948, p. 12 and 167 for
"scepticism" as tht! natural opponent of Christianity.
4
Compare also DE FA YE I 1923, p. 86-90.
,,
2-l2 CHAPTER 6
''modern" forms of scepticism
5
, and, to be more specific. the way he is
presented by Octavius is clearly reminiscent of Academic scepticism. This
should be no cause for surprise, as Cicero's De nalllra deonmz was the main
source for the portrayal of Caecilius in his capacity as a philosophero.
Moreover, the Academic position and more specifically the Academic's
attitude towards religion is less contradictory than Minucius would have us
believe. I will further endeavour to show that Minucius' presentation of
Caecilius is dependent upon sceptic and Academic traditions and at the same
time that, in comparison with the Ciceronian Academic, important transfor-
mations have taken place. There are also reasons to believe that Minucius
knew of Academic tendencies in his own day and that he not only drew
inspiration from a philosophical tradition already belonging to a remote
past. It is likely that Minucius was acquainted with- at the kast- traces of a
living Academic tradition.
I I. MINUCIUS AS A
It is J. BEAUJEU's claim that Minucius Felix wrote his Octarius in the context
of the polemic involving Favorinus and his school. In fact this thesis dates
back to W.A. BAEIIRENS (in an article of 1915), for whom it was primarily
meant as an argument in favour of his tentative determination of the date of
composition. He thinks it probable that the work was composed in the
second century A.D.
BAEIIRENS's argumentation is based primarily on .the function of the
umpire (arbiter) in the dialogue. Claiming the authority of R. HIRZEL,
13AEIIRENS assumes that the character of the umpire was introduced only
late into this literary genre
7
The example of Favorinus is supposed to have
suggested this idea to Minucius. BAEfiRENS refers to Gellius Noctcs Auicae
l S. l, where Favorinus is portrayed as the arbiter in a dispute between a Stoic
and a Peripatetic. The setting of this discussion is Ostia, exactly as in the
Octmius. Moreover. Favorinus is supposed to be "der lezte grofk Skeptiker
(p. 458)s, scepticism being exactly the philosophy that is promoted by
Caecilius, ... only to be subsequently overcome by Octavius. BAEHRENS
combines these elements with the evidence of Galen's De optima doctrina.
Galen mentions, as we have seen (De opt. doctr. 40) a dialogical dispute
between Epictetus and Plutarch's slave Onesimus as one of Favorinus'
5 Pace BEAUJEU 1964, p. XXX.
6 Cf. BEAUJEU 1964, p. XXXII.
7
Cf. HIRZEL II 1895, p. 177-178.
8
BAEHRENS refers to GOEDECKEMEYER 1905, p. 248-257. See also BEAL'JEU 196-l. p. XXI:
"Enfin Favorinus appartenait a la secte sceptique, comme Cecilius [ ... ]:For the unfounded
scholarly bc;:lief that Favorinus was a Pyrrhonian sceptic, cf. supra (eh. 5. Il) and GLuCKER
1978, p. 281-285.
j .. I

MINUCIUS FELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM" 243
works; in this dialogue the slave, presumably Favorinus' mouthpiece, no
doubt refuted the Stoic and showed that a sceptic can indeed have opinions
from which to argue convincingly. BAEHRENS thinks that in order to give
sufficient weight to Onesimus' case, Favorinus inevitably had to introduce
himself as the umpire of the dispute
9
That Minucius aimed at Favorinus and
his circle is thought to be confirmed by his mention of Fronto (9,6; 31,2), who
is known to have been an admirer of Favorinus (p. 460)
10
To this BAEHRENS
adds his surmise that Favorinus, being a sceptic, must have been the object
of hatred by Roman Christians (p. 460). In short, according to BAEHRENS
the controversy with Favorinus is the raison d'etre of the Octavius.
Having thus established his claim, BAEHRENS goes on to detect further
hints of this polemic in the Octavius. In the reference to the adulterous
philosophers of 38,5 he sees a clear allusion to Favorinus, who had indeed
been accused of adultery
11
And when Octavius denounces Caecilius' pompa
facwuliae et gratiae ( 16,6), it is to be understood, supposedly, as a condem-
nation of the zctQL and E1Jyhuttia of Favorinus.
J. closely following BAEHRENS's argumentation, reaches the
same conclusion u. But whereas 13AHIRENS claims that a work against
Favorinus would only make sense if Favorinus were still alive, and that the
Octmius is to be dated accordingly
1
-t, BEAUJEU t5 is less sure on this point. He
Cf. p. -t:'ilJ: nun p:-tl3tc durchaus nicht in den Mund des Oncsimos, dcr
st.:lbst Skb\c und AnUngcr war: Favorin mu!3 sic in dcm Dialog sclhst gdUhrt habcn. um das
Auftrden des Skbvcn als Gcgncr Epiktets zu rcchtfcrtigcn. Favorin hat sich sclhst in den
Dialog cinQdUhrt. und wcnn wir Gcllius XVIII I vcrglcichcn, blcibt kcin Zwcikl Uhrig. da!3
er dic,Roll-e des Arbiter spicltc." Sec also IIIHZEL p. 12J bsst
sich noch hinzufUgen. dass auch Favorin sclbcr zugcgcn war und die Rollc ctwa des
Schicdrichtcrs spicltc."). Compare BARIGAZZ! 196t'i, p. 192: "[ ... ] c possibilc chc Favorino
stcsso entrasse come arbitro [ ... ] m:-t l'ipotcsi non c dimostrabilc."
1
'
1
Cf. Gc.:llius 2.2fi ; BEAUJEU 196-t. p. XXI.
ll Philostr. \'it. soph. 1.8 (= BAHIGAZZI llJ66, Test. 6).
1964. p. XXI-XXII.
P 19tH. p. XXII: .. S.il en est bicn ainsi, la mise en sc0nc de I'Octmius. ou le sceptiquc est
vaincu par sto"lciennc et ou rautcur jouc le role d'arbitre, tout en appartenant
a l'un des deux partis. pouvait apparaitrc, aux ycux (run certain nombrc de kcteurs avertis.
commc unc rcpliquc visant plus directemcnt Favorinus et son cerck." Sec also Vo:"l
ALBRECHT !9S7. p. 160.
u He suggests (p. 463) the years 160-163. This is after the supposed date of publication of the
Noctes Auicac; but on the latter see BEAUJEU 1964, p. LIII note 3; HOLFORD-STREVENS
1988. p. 9-19. BAEHRENS is convinced that Minucius knew the discussion reported in Noct.
Au. 18,1 and even secs a close literal parallel between Oct. 14,7 and Noct. Att. 18,1,12 (see also
BEAUJEU 1964. p. XXI).
15
Cf. p. LIII: LXXXVIII; LXXXIX: "seuls les connaisseurs etaient en mesure de
s'apercevoir que l'Octmitts, par la mise en scene et par certains traits des personnages. visait
plus particulierement Favorinus et son cercle, et d'identifier comme etant Fronton le Cirtcnsis
noster du eh. 9.6. I! fa ut done et il suffit que le souvenir de ces deux personnages ait ete encore
frais dans !'esprit des lecteurs, c'est-a-dire que ceux de la generation ancienne aient pu les
connaitre de leur vivant et que ceux de la generation nouvelle aient entendu parler d'eux par
leurs aines et les aient Ius[ ... ]." .
244 CHAPTER 6
objects that iris less Favorinus' person than his philosophy that is challenged,
and indeed argues in favour of a date well beyond Favorinus' lifcspan In.
Both BEAUJEU and BAEHRENS claim that Favorinus is Minucius' prime
target. But is their argumentation really convincing
17
? The argument from
the evolution of the dialogue as a literary genre only holds if one assumes
that the genre had a ''logical" development, that its characteristics can be
strictly defined and that they imposed themselves with the force of law
preventing the genre from changing. In this perspective 1s each change
should be accounted for as an innovation, i.e. an infringement upon the
existing laws of the genre. It is therefore remarkable that Rudolf H!RZEL's
presentation in his study of the dialogue genre is, at least in this respect. less
rigid than BAEHRENS's and BEAUJEU's. H!RZEL
19
mentions prefigurations
for the role of the umpire already in Plato (Protag. 337E; Symp. 175E).
Moreover. the presence of an umpire is seen as a "natural'' developmcnt2o,
given the different way in which philosophical culture and instruction were
organised in the Hellenistic and Roman periods (H!RZEL 11 I p. 177-
Unlike BAEHRENS, H!RZEL (p. 374) also takes Cicero De nut. dear.
l.l7 to have provided the model for the Octmius. BAEI IRENS dismisses this
parallel (p. 461 ). without adducing clear arguments. But I do not think it can
be that easily disposed of, as Cicero's dialogue is known to he one of
Minucius main sources
2
l. BAEHRENS (p. 457-458F
2
is equally embarrassed
with other examples of umpires in He fails to explain wlwt is so
extraordinary about the umpire of the Octmius that it cannot be accounted
'' Cf. p. LXV <Jnu LXXIV: terminus [Just CfiiCIII is T...:rtullian's i\[Jolot:dil'llll t ( l'J7 . ...:v..:n !lJ9)
tcmrinus ante CfiiCIII is Cyprian's Ad Donatwn (24:-1. prohahly 246) . 13EAli JU:'s tamilttl\ wrtt:
quem. is cha!kng...:d by CARVER ( 197!\). hut the lath:r's argumentation fails to convince me.
At any rat<.:. I think that the priority of Tertul!ian over Minucius can h..: a pron:n
fact : cf. AXELSO:" 1941; FERRJ\RINO 1%6. p. 270 [= !947, p. IS2j; BECKER !%7. p. 74-97;
VON ALURECHT 19S7, p. 157; AHLUOR:" 1990, p. 132-137.
" Cf. BARIGAZZI 1%6, p. 135 (on the argumentation of 13AEIIRE:"S) : "Che Favorino
comparisse come arbitro in qualche suo scritto dia!ogico e possibik (dr. fr . ma non
dimonstr<Jbile. e una semplice ipotesi resta la conclusione che l'Octarius sar...:hhc diretto
contro Favorino e il suo circulo [ . .. J."
"' I.e. the conception of a genre as a well -defined entity within an essentially static literary
system (all evolutions being merely logical developments towards a pre-existing telos ).
HIRZEL 11 1895. p. 178 note 1.

HlRZEL (II 1895. p. 177) nevertheless thinks that it goes against the essence of true
dialogue : ":-.lit dem Wesen des echten Dialogs. der es den Theilnehmern gerade erkichtern
sollte, selbstanuig und unbeeinflusst durch aussen: sich eine eigene Uebcrzl'ugung
zu bilden. wan: dergleichcn unvereinbar gcwesen. "
: 1 As for the setting in Ostia: cf. HOLFORD-STREVENS 1988. p. 48-49. However. HOLFORD-
STREVE:-..:5 thinks that Gellius' mise en scene provided the inspiration for Minucius: d.
HOLFORD-STREVENS 1997, p. 206, note 75; GLO\'ER- REi'iDALL- KERR 1931. p. 307.
:2 See also BEAUJEU 1964, p. XX.
:J Cf. Tacitus Dialogus 4, Plutarch Quaest. Com. 1,2,2 (615E), 9,15,1 (74713) , Non posse
1096F, A mat. 750A.
MINUCIUS FELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM" 245
for but by invoking the influence of

What is more, it was in full

accordance with Academic practice to assume the role of the umpire in all
sorts of debates, as appears from Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5,120: "The controversy
between them used to be decided by Carneades in his capacity of umpire
chosen as a compliment by the disputants" ("quorum controversiam solebat
tamquam honorarius arbiter iudicare Carneades", transl. KING 1927)2
5

Nor are BAEHRENS's other arguments cogent. Fronto was a sufficiently
well-known adversary of Christianity to be a primary target on his own
26

Furthermore, the imputations of adultery and ostentatious eloquence do not
necessarily point to Favorinus. as they figure more often in the debates
between Academics, Stoics and Epicureans
27
What is more, it can be shown
that Minucius, when mentioning "adulterous philosophers" (38,5), is
drawing on Tcrtullian, where the latter censures

Therefore I
do not think that there ar(f solid proofs that Minucius' prime target was
indeed the philosophy of Favorinus.
On the other hand, it would be unwise to rule out the possibility that
l\tinucius had Favorinus and his pupils in mind. It remains likely that
Minucius challenged a -philosophical tradition that still had some actual
significance in his intellectual environment and was not yet totally extinct. In
this perspective, Favorinus remains a good candidate to represent this
particular philosophical ''persuasion''. However, I think that the likelihood
that Academic philosophy as such was Minucius' prime target is quite
remote. It is obvious that the Octavius was in the first place a response to
attacks against the Christians, a fact which has been somewhat obscured by
the eagerness of (Christian) scholars to interpret the dialogue as an
exemplary combat between faith and "scepticism". Minucius does explicitly
mention the name of a notorious opponent of Christianity: Fronto. One may
presume that he is Minucius' main target
2
Y. Caecilius' persona combines
characteristics pertaining to an adversary of Christianity (esp. in 8,3-12,7)
with, as I \vill show, "sceptical'' or rather Academic features (esp. in 5,2-8,2

Influence of the bucolic genre. where an umpire often figures in the context of a singing
contest. is equally possible. Cf. CARVER 1974, p. 357.
zs See also Cic. De di1. 2,150.
Cf. 13EAUJEU 1964, p. XXXV.
Z
7
Cf. Ciccro De nat. dear. 2.1 ; 2.168; Epict. Diss. 2,20,35 (with 2,20,10; 19); Sext. Emp. Adv.
Math. 2.28; Pyrrh. flyp. 1,146; 152; 159; 3,209; Diog. Laert. 7,131 (= SVF III 728).
:x Apol. 46,10: "audio et qucndam Speusippum de Platonis schola in adulterio perisse." Cf.
AXELSO:" 1941, p. 97-100; BEAUJEU 1964, p. LXIV and 161.
Cf. DE LABRIOLLE 1948, p. 90-94; Vor-; ALBRECHT 1987, p. 160-161. One may compare
BEAliJEli 1964, p. LII. VER\IA:-.IDER 1971 has suggested that Celsus was Minucius' most
dangerous opponent (p. 24) : "Car le paganisme du jour, c'est, en verite, celui de Celse, le
maitrc a penser des intellectuels pa'iens de l'epoque et le plus dangereux ad versa ire du
christianisme de ce temps-la." ,
...
246 CHAPTER 6
and 13). Only in his capacity of Academic can the character Caecilius have
been intended as a reference to Favorinus and his circle.
In the following pages I shall only examine Caecilius' '"sceptical" or rather
Academic side. Although there seems to be a general agreement among
scholars to consider the Octavius an attack on "scepticism", it is not alwavs
clear what is exactly meant by this description. A closer look at the conten"ts
of the dialogue may clarify the issue.
Ill. A MODERATED DEBATE- CAECILIUS'
It should be remarked that Minucius has chosen the form- much favoured
by the Academics as a polemical tooP
0
- of the displllatio in lllrmnque
partem. in which, as I have already mentioned, the author introJuces himself
<1s the arbiter, thereby promising impartiality
31
Caecilius having concluded
his speech, Minucius gently warns him against premature exultation,
"especially as the purpose of the argument is not praise, but He
deplores this as a tendency of dispute in general, which threatens to obscure
truth itself (I 4,5-6) . An auJicnce is easily misled by rhetorical display: it
cannot distinguish false from true and succumbs to the cleverness of the
rhetorician. It fails to recognise that the incredible contains an clement of
truth and the probable an clement of falsehood. Being thus deceived, the
auJience imputes the incompentence of the judge on the score of uncertainty
and prefers universal uncertainty to the fallibility of conclusions (14.5:
"culpam iudicis transfcrunt ad inccrti qucrcllam ut [ .. . ] malint universa
suspendere quam de fallacibus iudicare"). That is why an umpire should
intervene. Because truth is often obscure and mere subtlety "sometimes
usurps the credit of admitted proof", we need someone capable enough to
select and approve what is correct, and who carefully weighs all arguments
( 14,7). The whole passage is modelled on Socrates' warnings against
"misology" in Plato's Phacdo
3

1
: as misanthropy is induced by believing in
somebody quite uncritically and eventually being deceived, misology might
arise when one uncritically accepts a particular argument as true: if one finds
out later that the argument is not sound, one might end by believing that
nothing is stable or dependable in facts or in arguments. thus
"' Cf. Vo:--< ALBRECHT 1987, p. 162: "Minucius chose the main Jitt:rarv form of academic
skepticism in order to combat skepticism." See also QuiSPEL 1951. p. 167.
-'
1
Oct. 4,6: "[ ... ] ut arbiter et utrisque proximus aures darem et di sceptantes duos medius
segregarem." Caecilius confirms the expectations (5.1) : "[ .. . ] ut libram teneas aequissimi
iudici s nee in alteram partem propensus incumbas."

Oct. 14.2 : maxime cum non laudi. sed ueritati disceptatio vestra nitatur: Also 1-1.3 : .. [ ... ]
pro disserentium viribus et eloqucntiac potcstate etiam pcrspicuae veritatis condicio
mutctur."
}..fiNUCIUS FELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM" 247
insidiously turns the Phaedo passage against the Academics and intimates
that those who fall into the sceptic's trap are uncritical and naive3-t.
It is clear that in his supposedly neutral comments Minucius does not
quite prove himself unbiased35. His remarks already discredit Caecilius'
speech. \Vhy else does he warn against the power of eloquence? But there is
more to it. His evaluative comment on the words of Caecilius contains
precisely those elements which the Academics and Pyrrhonians use to accuse
their opponents of. Indeed, according to Minucius, Caecilius endeavours to
entice his audience into rash assent to his point of view
36
. The accusation that
Caecilius is looking for praise rather than for the truth, as common an
accusation as it may be, is a frontal assault on the core of Academic
"zetetics"
37
Should this indeed be the case, then Academic claims would be
disingenuous and their search for truth perverted. Minucius' words are thus
a subtle reversaPs of sceptic discourse.
Caecilius does notice this and he reproves Minucius for making improper
use of his position: "You arc abandoning[ . .. ] the role of a conscientious
judge".N. Minucius should not try to weaken Caecilius' position before
Octavius has even begun his reply. It is not his, but Octavius' task to come
up with arguments against Caecilius. To this Minucius answers that his
intervention was only meant to prevent our final judgment to depend on
rhetorical qualities, and not on the content of the speeches (15,2). At any
rate, it seems that, through Minucius' intervention, "the way has been
prepared for an easy victory"
10

After Octavius' speach tv1inucius and Caecilius arc both struck \Vith
admiration. Minucius is silently delighted to sec how Octavius has beaten the
malevolent with their own weapon: philosophical argument-t
1
- another
-' -' (llJX6. p. 237 [= 1947. p. 148]), BEAUJEU (1964, p. 96-97) and BECKER (1967,
p. 6- 10:71 note 21) refer to l'lwcdo SSC (ftiJ oubno; EtflEV XQttcti IJ xui -ru rrg<'tyftuw
ut'n 't <"t:ttow lJ) and 90D (bi wt; I.O'{Ot.'; tt<p' l:umoii -ri1v uhiu v urr<;lOULLO) . One may also
compare Oct . 14.6 ("ne odio [ . . . ] sermonum omnium 1aboremus ita ut in cxsccrationcm et
odium hominum plcriquc simpliciores effcrantur") with l'lwedo 89D (fli] YEVWflE{}((,lj b' o;.
fllOOl.O'{Ol. (;>O:Tf(? OL fllOttv{}gtrl:TOl '{l'{YOflEVOl) .
.>-1 Cf. GART:-;ER 1995. p. 147: .. Dicse Formulicrung ist nun aber doch einc deutliche
des platonischcn Gedankes. [ . .. ] Gemcint sind jetzt die allzu einfaltigcn
die sich durch die Enttiiuschung infolgc widcrlcgter Leichtglaubigkcit in e ine
univcrsale skcptischc Haltung drangen lassen. Also hat die Skepsis auch den Geruch dcr allzu
grol3en Leichtglaubigkeit."

Cf. ALBRECHT 1987. p. 166: GARTNER 1995, p. 141.
-;.;, Oct. 14.4 ("sine dilcctu adsentiuntur dictis omnibus") ; 14,5 (" temeritate decepti"); 14.6
("incautc .. ). Compare Oct. 5.3-6: 7,1; 13,3-5.
37
Compare Plut. De Sto. rep. 1036AB ; De tranq. an. 471D; Adv. Col. 1115C. Cf. supra : eh. 4,
Ill. c.
3.'S This aspect has been overlooked : e.g. FERRARINO 1986, p. 234-235 (= 1947, p. 145-146].
39
15, 1 (transl. GLOVER- KERR 1931) : "decedis [ . .. ]officio iudicis religiosi .' '
40
RENDALL. in GLO\'ER- RE:\DALL - KERR 1931, p. 309.
41
Oct. 39: "quod malevolos isdem illis. quibus armantur, philosophorum telis retudisset".
248 CHAITER 6
strategy that seems borrowed from the sceptics. Caecilius does not wait for
the ruling (40,1: "nee expecto sententiam"). He "spontaneously" avows to
be totally persuaded by the speech he has just heard. But at the same time he
paradoxically claims victory: not over Octavius but over error! He has finally
found truth (40,1-2). In so confessing, he relieves Minucius of the invidious
task of passing judgment ( 40,3).
Having reached the ultimate goal of "zetetics", Caccilius, according to his
own confession, has surpassed the search and is now able to abandon
scepticism altogether. We are here confronted with a shift of paradigm: this
is no longer the point of view of the true SllTlll:txo;. according to whom
absolute truth is never conquered and the very search for truth is the goal of
philosophy. Truth is the limit of sceptic philosophy, but at the hearth of
Christian belicf
4
2. There has been a fundamental shift in the meaning and use
of the concept of truth: truth for Octavius is no longer in the first place the
truth of perceptions, of particular statements, convictions and bdicfs.- the
concept discussed by the Ciceronian Stoics and Academics
43
- but truth in an
absolute sense. \'critas as a kind of timeless and "supra-contextual" entity
4
-'-
it is the light of God, which has been revealed and has come into the world
45

In a sense Caccilius' (i .e. before his miraculous conversion) and Octavius'
4
! St.:t.: aho Octavius' paoratio (:'S,h) : "gloriamur nos quml ill i summ;t intentione
invenire potuerunt. " Cf. VAtJiiGLIO 11J7.1. p. 253: "[ . .. ] Ottavio
contrappone al Juhbio Ji Cecilio la ri\'dazione della verit;'l cristiana. fonJ;tmentn Jdla vera
religion.: ."
41
l'lutarch has the statement that tiJ c/.i.1p'lt:; can only he one. hut "truth" there.: i-; not taken
in an absolute rib' i'onv t:;nott'gll] tou cl.l.l]Oou; (v bi til c'ti.lp'l[; ( 100DD). St.:e for this
of til c'tt.l]Hi- ;. Arist. 1\na/. pr. 47a8-9: O<L 'tc't!! :tilv t(J c't).lp'li:; ni.r(J i:-mtc!> i>JlOJ.O'iOt'!lE\'OV
r tvw :rc'n<lJ. See also Cic. /\cad. 11115: " ' Nostra inquies 'sola vera sunt' . Certe sola. si \'era;
plura enim vera Jiscrcpantia esse non possunt" ; 115: "potius Lie dissensinnihus tantis
summorurn virorum disseramus <de> ohscuritate naturae. Jeque errore tot philosophorum
qui de hf1nis contrariisqttc rcbus tanto opere discrepant ut . cum plus uno rcmm cs.Hnon pnssir,
iacere necesse sit tot lam nohiles disciplinas [ . .. J" (although Cicero is using "\'erum" in the
singular form, he is referring to a multituJe of obscure matters: the same applies to !Je oral.
2.30: "cum plus uno vcrum esse non possit"). Nevertheless. Plutarch's attituJe is already
different from that of Cicero's Academics, hut this may be a matter of emphasis. Cf. mpra
p. lhO; 1R6-190; 203-212 ; INGE!"KA:'--IP 1935. As follows from his Platonist metaphysics,
intelligible truth is in principle attainable for the human soul - but not fully. due to
incarnation. It is a gift from God. But by presenting us with riddles God st imulates our search
for the truth. Truth concerning the gods is a matter of truthfulness; it is not objective truth in
a correspondence model, but rather a subjective attitude.
This way of putting the difference is more correct than GARTNER' s. who merely states that
the Academic's criticism is directed against singular acts of cognition (1995, p. 142. \vith note
8) , and continues to deny the universal scope of boz!J. Even more unfortunate is his
conviction that universal brox,l would not have been satisfactory to the Academics. and that
they inskaJ opted for a probabilist position.
4
5 Sec e.g. Oct. 1,4: "cum discussa ca1igine de tenebrarum profundo in lucem sapientiae et
veritatis emergerem." There is an interesting comparison in Lactantius' condemnation of
Academic philosophy : "una veritas" (Di1. inst. 3,15) .
MINUCIUS FELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM" 249
discourses are incompatible and even incommensurable. To these different
conceptions of truth correspond different views of philosophy, notably
regarding its scope, aim and character. Caecilius' conversion had to be
sudden, as it implies a complete reversal of perspective. His conversion and
the surrender of Academic philosophy had been prepared on the literary
level of the dialogue, but not on the level of philosophical argument.
Caecilius opts for another model of philosophy and truth, giving up his
position, although his opponent's arguments, strictly speaking, fail to prove
that it is actually inconsistent.
IV. TRACES OF ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM"
Having discussed the dialogical frame, let us now brieOy study both
speeches: does (aecilius' speech contain "sceptical" or "Academic"
elements and, if so, is it essentially of a sceptical nature? Can his position be
considered coherent? And does Octavius' discourse exhibit traces of an anti-
sceptical polemic?
From the stiirt Caecilius makes clear his philosophical allegiance: if
Minucius \vill prove himself to be an impartial judge,
it will be easy to make it clear. that in human affairs everything is doubtful ,
uncertain. and in suspense, everything a matter of probability rather than truth
(omnia in rdms lwmanis dubia, incerta, suspensa magisque omnia verisimilia
lflllll11 \-ef{l) . (5.2)
Nevertheless, many people get tired of investigating truth deeply (''taedio
investigandac penitus veritatis") and yield hastily to some opinion ("cuilibet
opinioni temcre succumberc"). Instead they should have kept searching
unremittingly ("in explorando pcrtinaci diligcntia perseverare", 5,3).
Indeed, for an ancient ' 'sceptic" this is the only valuable activity from the
philosophical point of view. Caecilius is indignant about those people who
claim pretentiously to possess knowledge in matters for which centuries of
philosophical investigation have not found a solution, especially as those
matters appear to be of the utmost importance and majesty
4
6. Caecilius
appeals to the famous btaqxuvta: the "sceptics", in their plea for suspension
of judgment, are indeed wont to invoke the factual dissension and
46
Oct. 5,4: "Itaque indignandum omnibus, indolescendum est audere quosdam, et hoc
studiorum rudes, litterarum profanes, expertes artium etiam sordidarum, certum aliquid de
summa rerum ac maiestate decernere, de qua tot omnibus saeculis sectarum plurimarum
usque adhuc ipsa philosophia deliberat." One may also compare Plutarch' s emphasis on
o:rodnj : cf. De Sro. rep. 1033B (6 yU..g AO'{O<; TOU (p)..oo6cpou a\r(}a[gno; xat t6t6t;
mw, EL yE OiJ natbtU..v xai EVQT]Ot).oyiav how M;t); an' iigyov onou011; n1;
wo:tEQ EOTLV, ti'foi:::rm (p).ooocp[av); Quaest. Pial. 110000; cf. supra : p. 211
250 CHAPTER 6
interminable conflicts among philosophical schools (see also 13,5: "tot ac
tantis viris deliberantibus'')"n.
Several times Caecilius warns against rashness in In good sceptic
and Academic tradition he opposes the weakness of the human cognitive
faculty to divine wisdomN. Self-knowledge is something one should care
about. But the wise man is always aware that it is never to be considered an
accomplishment; on the contrary, it is an ideal one should continue to strive
for. In this context Caecilius refers to ''that famous ancient oracle"5u, by
which of course he is alluding to the yvw{h OEaun)v precept of the
shrine5
1
BEAUJEU in his commentary (1964, p. 77) mentions Thales, whose
name is indeed associated with this maxim
52
. But in the "zetetic'' context,
this Delphic precept, bound up with that other famous expression,
U.yav53, provides above all the principle of Socrates' search for knowledge.
This appears clearly from such a text as Plutarch Adv. Col. lll8C, where tt)
yvGn1t oautov is extolled as the most divine precept, having inspired
Socrates' arrog[a and

The Academics indeed considered the duty

to pursue self-knowledge as a prc-eminently "zetctic" principle, \vhich they
could trace back to Socrates and Plato
55

At the end of his speech Caecilius explicitly returns to Socrates, who is
presented as the model of the wise man and the true philosophersn. When
asked ahout "things in heaven", his unvarying reply is: "that which is ahove
us, does not concern us" ("quod supra nos, nihil ad nos"5
7
,13,1). This answer
held to prove his superior wisdom. The oracle was right indeed: Socratt:s
47
Cf.l'lut. Quacst.l'lat. lOOOC;Ildr. Col. liDE;Cic. Tusc. Disp. 2,-t; Denat. deor. 1,1: 1.1-l:
A cad. //117-122 et pas.1i111; Sext. Emp. l'yrrlt. 1/yp. I, 165 <'tpa.lsim. Cf. supra: p. 160 ami eh. -l.
III,C
Oct . 7.1 ("tcmere"); 13.5 ("temere", "audaciter") . Cf. also 5.(!.
"'
1
Oct. 5.5: "nee inmerito, cum tantum ahsit ab exploratione divina humana mediocrita->. ut
neque quae supra nos caclo suspensa sublata sunt neque quae infra terram profunda demersa
sunt aut scire sit datum aut scrutari permissurn aut stuprare religiusum. [ ... ]."Cf. 5.2: "omnia
in rclws /uunani.1 duhia. inccrta [ .. . ]."
'
0
Oct. 5,5: "[ ... J heati satis satbque pruJentes iure videarnur. si secundum illud \etus
sapientis oraculum nos met ipsos familiarius noverimus ...
Cf. Plato Charm. 1114E-Ifi5A; l'lut. De cap. ex ini111. BtJA: Sept .. wp. com. 1MB;/)( F.
3tJ2A; 3lJ4C; De !'rrlt. or. 40XE: De 511 !3.
'2 Cf. ltl.24.1.
Cf. Plut. Cuns. ad /\poll. li6D. Cf. supra: p. lS5.
Cf. .lllfml: p. %; IX5 nott: 273.
'5 Cf. Plato 1'/wcdrm 22tJE (Socrates speaking): oi'. ()Lvtqtrt[ :tt1J zmt't TlJ L\ri.rflZOV '(Qt.qt!Ht
ywinw irtcttT(>V rr).oTov flOL q:<t[vnw Toiiw En ttyvooCVlu n't c'tiJ.6rQta ozo:tfi\:
Oct. 13.1: "quamquarn si philosophanJi libido est, Socraten, sapientiae principem. quisque
vcstrum tantus est. si potuerit, imitetur."
57 Tertullian ascribes this statement to Epicurus (Ad 1111t. 2.4.15: "quae super nos. nihil aJ
nos"). See also Cic. Acat!. I 15: "( .. . ] caelestia autem vel procul esse a no;tra cognitione
censeret (Socrates] vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum". Cf.
AXELS0:'-1 1941, p. 101-103; BEAUJEU 1964, p. 93-9-l.
MtNUCIUS fELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM"
251
was the wisest of all men. The reason is that he had learned that he knew
nothing5S: "so surely is the confession of ignorance the highest wisdom" ("ita
confcssae inperitiae summa prudentia est." 13,2). Caecilius unmistakably
refers to the "sceptical" portrait of Socrates. He is of course alluding to the
well-known story of the young Chaerephon who went to Delphi and, having
asked the oracle if anyone was wiser than Socrates, got the reply that no one
was. This Delphic response played an important role in the polemic between
Academics and mainly Epicureans. It was labeled a "vulgar and sophistical
tak" by the Epicurean Colotes, who went to great lenghts to discredit the
Academy by slandering those who were claimed to be its predecessors5
9
As
a matter of fact, we have seen that Plato's story of Socrates' rJ. ... EyJ...or;, of the
oracle was a central text in the New Academic portrait of Socrates as a
sceptic60 A complex of precepts and anecdotes connected with both
Socrates and the Delphic shrine can be revealed that provide a pedigree for
Academic philosophy (cf. supra: esp. eh. 4, Ill, B).
Thus the very reference to the Delphic response might suffice to infer that
Caecilius has in mind the ''(New) Academic" Socrates. However, this is
made even more explicit in the subsequent lines:
From this source flowed the cautious doubt (tuta dubiwtio) of Arcesilas, and
later of Carneades and most of the Academic school, on all the deepest
questions: this is the kinJ of philosophy in which the unlearned may indulge
with caution, the learned with distinction (quo genere phi!osoplwri et caute
indocti po.uwll et docti gloriose).
( 13,3, transl. RE;-o.;OAU.- KERR, slightly modified)
Obviously Caecilius' words echo an Academic tradition which establishes
its identity by claiming Socrates as one of its chief predecessors. In any event,
the quoted phrase does sound as a pledge of allegiance to the philosophy of
Arcesilaus and Carneades
61
and is certainly meant to be understood this
,.,.ay.
.<s Oct. 13.2: "Merito ergo Je oraculo testimonium meruit prudentiae singularis. Quod
oraculum idem ipse persensit. idcirco universis esse praepositum, non quod omnia
comperisset. sed quod nihil se scire didicissct [ ... ]."
w Cf. Plut. i\clr. Col. 1116EF.
f[J See also VANDER \V AERDT 19S9, p. 254 and p. 255 (''By ridiculing Socrates' reference of
his =:ctcsis to a divine commanJ. Colotes seeks to discredit the skeptical interpretation of
Socrates from its very starting-point."). See also Cic. A cad. /16 ("ita disputat ut nihil affirmet
ipse refcllat alios. nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare cetcris. quod illi quae
nesciant scire se putcnt, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab
Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esse! una hominis sapientia, non
arhitrari sese scire quod nesciat.").
61 It must be noted that Caecilius only speaks of "most Academics". Most likely he will have
considered Antiochus as the major exception.
252
CHAPTER 6
The poet Simonides
62
is quoted as another proto-sceptic. His "hesitation"
deserves our admiration and should be deemed an example worthy of
imitation. When asked about the nature of the gods by Hiero the tyrant,
Simonides kept postponing his answer, until he finally told Hiero, who was
becoming impatient, that the truth became more obscure the longer the
search for it lasted ("respondit ille: quod sibi, quanto inquisitio tardior
pergeret, tanto veritas fieret obscurior", 13,5). Minucius can easily be shown
to draw upon the De nalllra deorum for the Simonides anecdote as well as
for the Socratic inspiration of Academic philosophy6J.
Caecilius concludes his speech by expressing his conviction that things
doubtful should be left in doubt, and that one should avoid above all to give
one's rash assent to either side of an undecided issue. This line of conduct
should allow one to keep clear of both superstition and the destruction of
religionM. The implication is that only Academic caution can protect religion
from two opposite, but equally irreverential attitudes: atheism and
superstition
6
s. This corresponds to Cicero's repudiation of superstition (De
1wt. deor. 2,71-72). What is more, the difficulty of steering a proper course
between acceptance of superstition and neglect of religion is a common idea
in Cicero's De dilinatione, notably in 2.148-149, but also in 1.7. a passage that
both A.S. PEASE (I 963, p. 65 = 1920, p. 223) and J. BEAUJEU (I 96-l , p. 95)
think to have been in Minucius' mind:
For a hasty acceptance of an erroneous opinion is discreditable (temeritas in
adsentiendo errorque turpis est) in any case, and especially so in an inquiry as
to how much weight should be given to auspices, to sacred rites. and to
religious observances. ror we run the risk of committing a crime against the
hZ Cf. 3EAlJJEU 1964. p. 94.
h.1 Cf. rcsp. De 11//l. dcor. 1,60 and 1,11 ("ut haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia di\scn.:ndi
nullamquc rem aperte iudicandi profccta a Socratc repctita ah Arccsila confirmata a
Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem"). Cf. LEONARD 1883, p. 75; 3ECKER 1%7. p. 60
note 85. Minucius account is based on Cicero (Acad. /14-16; De nat. deur. 1,11). and partly
on Tcrtullian as well (Ad 1101. 2,4,15 and 2,2,11). albeit to a far lesser extl!nt than 3E,\l'JEU
(1964, p. 93) thinks. According to Tertullian Socrates denied the existence of gods with near
certainty (Ad lllll. 2,2,12: "Socrates ipse deos istos quasi certus n..:gabat").
Oct. 13,5: "Mea quoque opinione quae sunt dubia, ut sunt relinquenua sunt. nee tot ac
tantis viris deliberantibus temere et audaciter in alteram partem ferenda sententia est, ne aut
anilis inducatur superstitio aut omnis rcligio destruatur."
6
5 See also Oct. 8,1-2. Atheism is rejected by the true philosopher (8,2): "numquam tamen in
hac impictatis disciplina simulatae philosophiae nomine atque auctoritate polkbunt."
Although no agreement exists on the nature of the gods, there is no Otmrwvia at all as to their
existence (8,1: "firma consensio"). On superstition see also Oct. 5,6 ("vanis et formidulosis
opinionibus") . Octavius can easily agree that atheism and superstition are equally
reprehensible: cf. 35,4 ("cum parentem omnium et omnium dominum non minoris sceleris sit
ignorare quam laedere").
MINUCIUS FELJX AND ACADEMIC
253
gods if we disregard them, or of becoming involved in old women's superstition
if we approve them (est enim periculum ne allf neglectis iis impia fraude aut
susceptis anili superstitione obligemur). (Dedi\. 1,7, transl. FALCONER 1923)
It may be worth noting that Plutarch linked this common theme with his
Platonic-Peripatetic66 theory of ethical virtue as the mean between opposite
vices
67
As a matter of fact, Plutarch was of the opinion that superstition is a
worse vice than atheism, for it involves fear of divine malevolence.
It appears that Caecilius refuses to see his allegiance to Academic
philosophy in opposition to existing religion. On the contrary, taking up one
of the main ideas of Cicero's De nawra deorwn, he is convinced that it
actually protects traditional belief. Rather than make positive assertions
about the gods (' ' de numinibus ferre sententiam"), as the Christians do, one
should follow the example of the ancestors and worship the gods of tradi-tion
( .. maiorum excipc;re disciplinam, religiones traditas colere ( . . . ] prioribus
credere", 6,1 ). The prospering of the Romans proves that they were right in
their veneration of the Gods. The temples. altars, shrines, statues, rites,
ceremonies. offerings, and worship of various gods have brought them
success (6.1-7.6) . The Romans even adopted and worshipped the gods of
conquered nations. Divination and mantic practices form an integral part of
the cults and have proven their usefulness as welll'x. According to Caecilius,
the impossibility of assured knowledge concerning the nature and the origin
of the gods presents no impediment to their cult (8, 1 ). When he criticises
providence. he does not intend to eradicate any notion of divine solicitude
for man. but merely attacks particular conceptions of providence. He indeed
endeavours to expose the blatant contradictions arising from a deterministic
conception of providence (5.12-13) and accordingly opposes the human
suffering with the Christian conception of God who in his person unites
supreme goodness with omnipotence ( 12,2). It is certainly no coincidence
that Caccilius' words in this context more than once recall the dialectical
position taken up by the Academics against the Stoics. Minucius draws
heavily upon the third book of the De natura deorwn. where Stoic notions
arc indeed under attack. In the De natura deorwn Cotta did not attack the
notion of divine providence as such, but rather challenged its philosophical
elaboration as established by the Stoics.
69
It thus appears that Caecilius
M Cf. 1994a.
67
Cf. Cam. 6.6; De SII[J. 171 F ( fVlOl crruyovn:s: ti]V OnatbCtl!lOVLctV E!l:ri;rwumv Ets Ct1'}E6nrra
T(lCIZEi'nv r.ni. c'tvtin:rov, XEtpEVlJV ti]V n\oBnav); De Is. et Os.
355CD; 378A; 379E ( ur.gmov OELmbat!toviav ... c'.n'trol'; r.ai. f..oyLOfiOl'S ... ta
Elr.6m); Nun posse llOlC; BABUT 1969a. p. 524 : 0SORIO YIDAURRE 1994, p. 558 ("Esta es
la clave del pensamiento religioso de Plutarco").
This must have been a conviction which was deeply rooted in the Roman mind: cf. BRUI\'T
1989, p. 184: it is also evidenced in Plutarch's writings : cf. RODRiGUEZ ALONSO 1994.
69 Cf. De div. 1,7, and p. 178.
254
CHAPTER 6
displays the main characteristics of an Academic philosopher and that his
portrait in this respect is primarily based on Cotta in De nalllra deorwn.
Octavius in his speech characterises Caecilius' stance as inconsistent or at
any rate wavering and erratic
70
: at one point his position seemed to be that
of a believer in the gods, whereas at another moment he kept the question
open (16,2: nam interim deos credere, interim se deliberare
71
variavit").
Caecilius' doubt and hesitation is imputed - in a complete reversal of
perspective- to his not yet having found the way to truth, i.e. to his ignorance
(16,1-4). Truth, being one and stable (''una veritate confirmata probataque,
16,4), is the starting point for Octavius, not doubt. Octavius explicitly
declares not to reject Caecilius' principle that man ought to knmv himself
and to ask himself what, whence and why he is ( 17,1 ). But these questions
can only be solved by looking at the design of the universe as a whole. And,
at this level, what is more plain and patent than the existence of "some deitv
surpassing in wisdom, by whom all nature is inspired, moved. nourished and
governed" ( 17,4)? What follows is a cosmological vision dnnving heavily
upon Stoic theories and vocabulary
72
, in which Providence is beyond all
doubt (cf. 18,5: "quoniam de providentia nulla dubitatio est"). Octavius even
invokes the authority of pagan philosophers in order to prove the almost
universal agreement on the existence of God. His enumeration (19,4-15)
includes Thaks, Anaximcnes, Diogcnes of Apollonia, Anaxagoras,
Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Antisthcnes, Speusippus, Aristotle, Theophrast,
Heraclides of Pontus, Zeno, Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Diogencs of Babylon,
Xenophon, the Stoic Aristo, and Plato. Even Democritus. Strata and
Epicurus arc said to adhere fundamentally to the quasi -universal
monotheistic conception of the divine. Octavius catalogue of philosophers
is based on the account of the Epicurean Yelleius in Cicero De natura
dcorwn 1,10-15 and 25-41. But whereas Epicurus' adherent had
endeavoured to show the contradictions between these philosophers
regarding the nature of the divine, Octavius points to their factual agreement
on the existence of one God.
73
The very doubts expressed by some regarding
the nature of God, and their refusal to make any positive assertions in this
1o I o,l: "Nee dissimulabo principio ita Natal is mci crrantcm, vagam. lubricam nutasse
scntcntiam. ut sit nobis ambigendum. utrum astu ac iudicio turbata sit an vacillaverit per
errorem." This echoes the Stoic reproach at Cic. De nat. dear. 2.2 (I3albus): "est enim et
philosophi et pontificis et Cottae de dis inmortalibus habere non errantem et vagam ut
Academici sed ut nostri [se. Stoici] stabilem certamque sententiam."
7
1 Octavius is making an allusion to Caecilius' speech, esp. 8,1 and 13,5. Cf. VALGIGLIO 1973,
p. 24R. See also Octavius' peroration (38.5): "Arcesi!as quoque et Carneades et Pyrrho et
omnis Academicorum multitudo deliberet".
12 Cf. Vo:-: ALBRECHT 1987, p. 165.
73 Cf. AXELSON 1941, p. 91; BEAUJEU 1964, p. 108-109; BECKER 1967. p. 10-19. Cotta,
however, disputes the validity of such an argument (Cic. De nat. dear. 1,62).
!
i
I
I
. I
l
1
l\llNUCIUS fELlX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM" 255
matter,
7
-t may actually be regarded as confirmation of their awe and
reverence : they are said to have realised that ''the majesty of God is ihe
despair of understanding" ("maiestatem dei intelligendi desperatione
senserunt", 19,13).
\Vhen Octavius comes to speak about the philosophers' views on the
transmigration of souls, he calls their theory more a pantomime joke than
serious philosophy (34,7: ''non philosophi sane studio, sed mimi convicio
digna ista sententia est"75), but then continues in a more "conciliatory" tone:
for his purpose it matters more that even the theory of transmigration shows
that there is a possibility for consensus (34,8: sed ad propositum satis est
etiam in hoc sapientes vestros in aliquem modum consonare"), for the pagan
philosophas actually affirm the eternity of the soul and the power of God to
ensure the rebirth" of man. According to B. AXELSON
76
and J. BEAUJEU77
it was Minucius' main concern to convince educated circles of the value of
the new religion -even measured by their own standards (those of Greek
philosophy), or, to use a less respectful description, to make it salonfiilzig as
it were. Therefore he seeks to stress the points of agreement between their
philosophical doctrines and Christian bclicfs
711
It seems to escape AXELSON
and BEAUJEU that Minucius is at the same time inverting a sceptical
strategy: whereas the sceptics used to invoke DLCHfWVLa in their plea for
suspension of judgment (cf. supra : eh. 4, Ill, C), Minucius does the opposite
by pointing out the deeper agreement in a situation of apparent dissension.
At any rate, if BEAUJEU and AXELSON are right in their claim that the
Octmius has been written for a public of leisured intellectuals
7
<J, then this
H 19,1.3 : "N;un Socraticus Xenophon formam dei veri ne gat videri posse et ideo quaeri non
oportcrc. Ariston Stoicus comprchendi omnino non posse." Sec also the quote (19,14) from
Plato's Timacus 2HC: "Piatoni itaque in Timaeo deus est ipso suo nomine mundi parens,
artifex animae. caelestium tcrrcnorumque fabricator, quem et invcnirc difficilc prae nimia et
potestatc et, cum invcnl!ris. in publicum dicere inpossibih: pracfatur." Cf. Tert.
Apol. 46.9 ("licet Plato affirmet factitatorcm universitatis nequc inveniri facilem et inventum
cnarrari in omnes difficilem"); I3EAUJEU 1964, p. 113-114.
7
" Cf. Tcrt. Apof. 48.1. with I3EAUJEU 1904, p. LXI-LXII.
76
I Y41, p. 90: "Der eigcntlichste Zweck seiner klassizistischcn, fi.ir ein hochkultiviertes
Publikum bestimmtcn Schutz- und Werbeschrift war[ ... ] m.E. von Hause aus der Nachweis,
die von den heidnischcn lntclligenzaristokraten vcrachtete Religion der vorwiegend armen
und ungekhrten Christen sei in Wirklichkeit eine Art Philosophic, und zwar die wahre
'Philosophic'[ ... ]"; p. 95: "Yon sich aus ware Min. \vohl kaum so leicht auf die Seelenwan-
derungslehre zu sprechen gekommen - von Caecilius war diese weder empfohlen noch
tiberhaupt erwahnt warden: warum dann eigentlich die Kritik? Das scheint sich auch der
Aut or selbst gcfragt zu ha ben. insofern er kurz abbricht, um die wenigstens teilweise Oberein-
stimmung zwischen christlicher und philosophische Anschauung zu betonen."
77 1964, p. XVII-XVIli ; p. 108-109; 151.
78
Cf. Oct. 34,5: "animadvertis philosophos eadem disputare quam dicimus, non quod nos
simus eorum vestigia subsecuti, sed quod i!li de divinis praedicationibus prophetarum
umbram interpolatae veritatis imitati sint."; cf. BECKER 1967, p. 52; 67.
79
See also Vo:-: ALBRECHT1987, p. 159.
256 CHAPTER 6
could be a further argument for the thesis that Academic scepticism, the
philosophy challenged in this dialogue, was not yet outmoded at the time of
its composition. Actually the Academic attitude towards traditional religion
was quite sophisticated and one could hardly have expected it to be shared
by the This also explains to a certain extent the educated pagan's
indignation at the Christian attitude, which in his eyes must have amounted
to the arrogance of uncultured, viz. philosophically uneducated,
On the other hand, Octavius severely rebukes various instances of pagan
. superstition. From his point of view the pagans fear the gods because of their
ignorance. Octavius makes a curious but crucial move, which can indeed be
related to the aforesaid "shift of paradigm": the Academics thought that the
very fact of being aware of their ignorance in divine matters actually
protected them from superstition, while Octavius now claims that ignorance
is its cause ("sic nata Romana superstitio", 24, 10). knowledge of the one
truth coming only through revelation- as he will further explain. Knowledge
and faith (belief) arc inextricably linked for the Christian, and therefore any
striving for belief without knowledge is bound to lead to superstition (24, 10).
The next item in his criticism of superstition is the heathen belief in the so-
called daemones, ''impure spirits" (26,R; 27,1 ). which even their philosophers
discusseds2. Octavius refers to Socrates. who at the instigation and will of his
daemon declined or pursued certain courses of actionsJ. He further mentions
the role the daemons supposedly played in oracular practicess.t. To Socrates
and his he returns in his peroration:
For the.! rest then. kt Socrates look to himself! Socrates. the "buffoon of
Athens" (scurra 1\uicus). who confessed that he knew nothing. though he
boasted of the promptings of a deceiving demon (nihil se scire confessm. testi-
monio liar fallacissimi daemon is glorio.ws): Arcesilas too, and Carneadcs. and
Pyrrho, and the whole host of Academics. let them argue on! and Simonides
procrastinate forever! We think scorn of the high-brow philosophers.
corrupters of youth. adulterers, tyrants. for ever declaiming against their own
pet vices (philosoplwrttm supercilia contemnimus, quos corrttpton:s et
adultaos nmimus et tyrannos et semper ad1erstts stw vitia facwulos) .
(3o.5. transl. RENDALL- KERR)
MO Cf. BRUi'<'T 19R9, p. 194-196.

See also DE LABRIOLLE 1948. p. 117; 153.
Cf. BEAUJEU 1964, p. 132: "Dcpuis Xenocrate. tousles Platoniciens interpretaient comme
un etn! surnaturel, nettcment individualise, le fameux buqtovLOv de Socrate: This is
incorrect, as Plutarch's discussion in the first Quaest. Plea. 9990 shows that alternative
interpretations must have existed: cf. supra, p. 140. See also Apuleius De dco Socr. 150: "nam
quodam significatu et animus humanus etiam nunc in corpore situs daemon nuncupatur [ ... ].
unde nonnulli arbitrantur, ut iam prius dictum est, dici beatos. quorum daemon
bonus, id est animus virtute perfectus est''; cf. CHERl"ISS 1976a, p. 21 note d.
MINUCIUS FELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTlCISM" 257
In his final denunciation of scepticism, Octavius brings together the familiar
sneers: Socrates boasting ("gloriosus") of his daemon in order to justify the
ignorance he claims, the whole host of sceptics endlessly arguing, Simonides
endlessly procrastinating (i.e. avoiding rash assent; "Simonides in
perpetuum conpcrendinet"), the haughtiness ("supercilia") of the philos-
ophers, who should be exposed as corrupters of youth. adulterers and
tyrants, ss but are very eloquent in denying their vices. It is obvious that these
words amount to the classical reproaches of ("gloriosus",
supercilia") and sophistry ("adversus sua vitia facundos"S
6
). But the
dgwvEia-motive is present as well in the scornful characterisation of
Socrates as "the Attic buffoon" ("scurra Atticus"), who confessed that he
knew nothing, while boasting of the promptings of his daemon. Socrates'
insincerity is clearly implied in this description. Octavius borrows the last
term of ahuses
7
from the first book of Cicero's De natura deorum, where
Cotta relates how the Epicureans made it a practice to insult other philos-
ophers. Zeno of Sidon aimed the shaft of his abuse not only at his con tempo-


Oct. 2o.H-9: "Spiritus sunt insinceri, vagi, a c:1elesti vigore terennis labibus et cupiditatibus
<kgravati . [ ... ]cos spiritus daemonas esse poetae sciunt. philosophi disserunt, Socrates novit,
qui ad nutum et arbitrium adsidentis sibi daemonis vel declinabat negotia vel petebat." The
role assigned to thl! famous b({qt<)vtov in this text clearly surpasses the purely dissuasive
function it has according to the account in Plato's Apology (31 D),pacc BEAUJEU 1964, p. 133.
In this respect Minucius' :1ccount is in accordance with Plut:Jrch's trcatml!nt of the bCttft<)vtov
(e.g. De genio Socr. 5XlAB; Quacst. Plat. /99<JE: IOOOC). One m:1y also compare Epict. Diss.
3.21,19.
One may compare text with Tertullian Apol. 22,1: "atque adeo dicimus esse
substantias quasdam spiritales. nee novum nomen est: sciunt 'daemon as' philosophi, Socrate
ipso ad daemonis arbitrium expectante.'' See also Apol. 46,5-6: "nomen hoc philosophorum
daemonia non fug,iunt. quidni'? cum secundum deos philosophi daemonas dl!putcnt. Socratis
vox est 'si dacmonium permittat'. Idem et qui aliquid de veritate sapiehat deos negans,
Aesculapio tamen gallinaceum prosecari iam in fine mandabat, credo, ob honorem patris
cius. quia Socratem Apollo sapicntissimum omnium cccinit. o Apollincm inconsidcratum!
sapientiae testimonium rcddidit ei viro, qui negabat deos esse." Minucius appears to have
made use of Tl!rtullian's Apologeticum (sec also AXELSON 1941, p. 92-94), but the latter does
not appear to make allusions to the Academic context.
Oct. 27,1: "oracula cfficiunt falsis pluribus involuta". See also Tert. Apol. 22,7 ("ut
hominem a recogitatu verae divinitatis avertant praestigiis falsae divinationis"); 22.10 ("in
oraculis autem quo ingenio ambiguitates temperent in eventum, sciunt Crocsi, sciunt
Pyrrhi"); 12 ("dum oracula profitetur"). Cf. Cic:Dediv. 2,116; BEAUJEU 1964, p.134.

Cf. BEAUJEU 1964, p. LXIV and 161. Minucius is drawing on Tertullian A pal. 46,10 and
46,13: "ceterum si de pudicitia provocemur, !ego parte m sententiae Atticae in Socratem:
corruptor adulcscentium pronuntiatur. [ ... ]audio et quendam Speusippum de Platonis schola
in adulterio perisse. [ ... ] ecce Pythagoras apud Thurios, Zen on apud Prienenses tyrannidem
affectant."
;:(, The parallel (Seneca Exhort. frg. 18 Haase, ap. Lact. Dil. inst. 3,15,11) cited by BAEHRENS
(1964, p. 161) is less convincing. just like the parallel quoted for "supercilia" (Sen. Ep. 94,9).
CARVER's (1978, p. 28) remarks on these words are irrelevant.
87 Cf. KLEVE 1983, p. 229.
258 CHAPTER 6
raries, but even scoffed at Socrates himself, the father of all philosophy,
calling him an Attic equivalent of the Roman buffoonsss.
Central to Octavius' invective is the imputation that the Academics'
deeds do not match their words, which is related to the accusation of moral
perversion he is trying to charge them with. Their philosophical discourses
only serve the purpose of disguising and justifying their immoral conduct.
Octavius contrasts the philosophers' insincere outward display of pretended
wisdom with the Christians' attitude, who, according to him, while
possessing inner wisdom, prefer not to boast about it:
As for us, the wisdom we display lies not in outward dress, but in the mind (nos
non hahitll sapil'lltiam sed mente praeferimlls): we do not preach great things,
but we live them (non eloqllimur magna sed \ivimlls): our boast is that we have
won what they with the utmost strain have sought, yet could not find
(gloriamur nos consecl/los qllod illi summa intentione qllaesinnull nee inl'l:nire
pOtll!!rllllt).
(Jg,6, transl. RENDALL- KERR)
Octavius' peroration is a direct to Caecilius' words at 13,1-5 (cf.
supra, p. 25 I), as appears from the literal repetition of phrases and key
words. Caecilius had asserted that Socrates was the source from which
flowed Arccsilaus', Carncades', and the whole Academics' philosophy of
doubt (''hoc fonte defluxit Arccsilae et multo post Carneadis et Academ-
icorum plurimorum in summis quaestionihus duhitatio", 13,3). This he had
said to be the kind of philosophy in which the unlearned may indulge with
caution (cawe), the learned with distinction (g/oriose). It becomes obvious
why Minucius has made Caecilius use the word g/oriose in the first place:
Octavius can now turn the g/oriose against Caccilius and use it to designate
the alleged boastfulness and haughtiness or the Academics. This
is certainly no coincidence: it becomes clear that Minucius has designed
Caecilius' speech in such a way as to make it liable to criticism and thus easy
to ''refute" for Octavius'X
1

Octavius' claim that the Christians have obtained what the Academy has
always sought without being able to find it , i.e. the truth. once more confirms
the Christian's incapability to understand what "zetetic" philosophy really is
about- it is the zctetic' s conviction that the search for truth itself is the goal
of philosophy
91
The fact that they argue from incompatible conceptions of
Nat. dear. 1,93: '"Socraten ipsum parentem philosophiae Latino vcrbo ut ens scurram
Atticum fuisse dice bat.
X'l Cf. BEAUJEU 1964, p. XIII.
9ol Cf. V ALGIGLIO 1973, p. 249-250; 255.
9L This also applies to Plutarch (supra : eh. 4. I. A). according to whom the unattainability of
the truth is related, however, to the incarnation of the soul (supra: eh. 4. IV).
M!NUCIUS FELJX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM" 259
truth, has led almost inevitably to this fundamental and fatal misunder-
standing. Ending the quest for knowledge is not even a conceivable option
or goal from the Academic point of viewn.
According to J. BEAUJEU Octavius added Pyrrho to the list of sceptics at
38,5- he is lacking completely from De natura deonmz
93
and above all from
the list Caecilius had dressed at 13,1-3- to make it clear that he challenges
"scepticism" in general and not only Academic scepticism
9
-l. It is clear,
however, that the focus of the text remains on Academism. The mention of
Pyrrho is to be seen rather in the context of the fact that most sources tend
to attribute Arcesilaus' scepticism mainly to the influence of Pyrrho
9
5.
According to Hippolytus' doxography Pyrrho was even the founder of the
sceptical Academy%. What in my opinion underlies BEAUJEU's assertion,
hmvcver, is the a priori conviction that "scepticism" in general was the
"natural opponent" of Christianity.
V. (ACADEMIC) "SCEPTICISM" AND BELIEF
rvtinucius' Caccilius is to a large degree modelled on the Ciceronian Cotta.
Of course, the Academism inherited from Cotta cannot account for the
whole of Caecilius' personality; what has been added is his outspokcnly anti -
Christian attitude (esp. in 8,3-12,7), the portrayal of which appears to be
based chiefly on Tcrtullian's presentation of anti-Christian polemic and on
Fronto's oration against the Christiansn, and possibly also on Celsus'
'A).lJ{}iJ; ).oyo;'JS. The question which concerns us now, however, is to know
whether Caecilius' opinions, as far as they belong to his Academic pedigree,
may be evaluated as consistent.
In Cotta's own opinion, his Academic convictions arc not really in contra-
diction with his function as pontifex maximus and his traditional beliefs. As
an Academic he refutes the Stoic arguments in favour of ( 1) the existence of

In this respect the anonymous commentator on the Theactetus seems to differ from the
1\"cw Academics, subscribing to the '"zctetic" ideal but also considering the possibility of being
able to end the quest successfully: cf. 3.19-21.
93
Neither does he figure in Plut. Adl'. Col.; cf. LEVY 1992. p. 368-369.
'1-l Cf. BEAUJEU 1964, p. 161: '"["addition de ce nom a la liste des Sceptiqucs academiciens,
dressee par Cecilius en 13,1-3, revele nettemcnt le but et les adversaires que l'autcur a en
vuc.' See also BECKER 1967, p. 61: "er fUgt Pyrrhon, den reinen Skeptiker, ein".
9
5 Cf. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. 1.23-l; Diog. Laert. 4,32-33; Numeniusfrg. 25 DES PLACES 1973,
apud Eus. Pracp. ev. 14,5,12-14; IOPPOLO 1986, p. 3-l-40; LEVY 1992, p. 22-31.
% Phi/os. 23,1 (= DG 572,20-23) : unl] b UlQEOL; <plAOooq:wv ExAJj{)ll 'Axabrv-l(llXl] bta TO
fv nj 'Azubtuti<;t ta; btUTQtBa; (LDtot; rroti:o{)w, (ov ug!;a; 6 OtQQWV, CHp' 01.! 01.!QQOJVElOl
f:r.).ij{)l]OUV q:u.oooq:OL, ti]V CtXCLTClAlJlt'LctV U.rrci.vtwv rrgunoc; ElOlJYUYEV, w; ETrl;(EtQELV de;
EzclTEQa, c'morrat\'fo{}m Cf. GLUCKER 1978, p. 216.
97 Cf. BEAUJEU 1964. p. XXXV.
98 Cf. 1971.
260 CHAPTER 6
gods (De nat. dear. 3,7-19), on (2) the nature of the gods (3,20-64), on (3)
providential intervention in the government of the world'/9, on (4) divine
solicitude for man (3,66-93), and also on divination
100
(3,14-15). but at the
same time, as a pontifex, he admits the existence of gods and their
providence, as it can be seen at work in divination (3,5; 14)tot. There is,
however, no real contradiction involved:
I am considerably influenced by your authority, Balbus, and by the plea that
you put forward at the conclusion of your discourse, when you exhorted me to
remember that I am both a Cotta and a pontiff. This no doubt meant that I
ought to uphold the beliefs about the immortal gods which have come down to
us from our ancestors, and the rites and ceremonies and duties of religion
(quod eo credo wrlebat, w opiniones, quas a nwioribus accepimus de dis immor-
talihus, sacra caerimonias religio111:sque defent!erem). For my part I always shall
uphold them and always have done so (ego 1-ero cas defendam semper
semperque t!efe!llli), and no eloquc:nce of anybody, learned or unlearned, shall
ever dislodgt: me from the bdid as to the worship of the immortal gods which
I have inherited from our forefathers (nee me ex ea opinione, quam a maiaribus
accepi de cu!tu deorum inmortaliwn, ullius unutuam omtio aut docti aut indocti
mmehit). nut on any question of religion (cum de religione agitur) I am guided
hy the high pontiffs, Titus Coruncanius, Puhlius Scipio and Puhlius Scaevola,
not hy Zeno or Ckanthes or Chrysippus: and I have Gaius Laelius, who was
both an augur and a philosopher (augurem ewrdemque sapientem). to whose
discourse upon religion, in his famous oration, I would rather listen than to any
leader of the Stoics.
(/)c nat. dcor. transl. RM"Kif,\\1 llJJJ

Colla's argument can be basically paraphrased as follows: "I believe in the
gods, and always have, as I \vas taught hy my forefathers, based on time-
honoured traditions of the nation to \vhich I belong. Tradition is sufficient
for my belief. Philosophical doctrines, on the other hand, such as the Stoics',
fail to convince me. given also the orientation of my own philosophy, which
distrusts the hubris of reason tm. It is not so that I do not believe in the
existence and providence of the gods, I just don't believe what you Stoics
have to say about them. You adduce a lot of arguments in order to prove that


Lost in a large lacuna at 3.115: cf. MACKENDRICK- LEE SI:"G 1989, p. 179 with note 39 (p.
348-349).
HXJ Sec also Cic. De faro 31-33.
Ill! Cf. V ALGIGLIO 1973, p. 236.
Sec also De nat. dcor. 1,61-62: "itaque ego ipse pontifex, qui caerimonias rdigionesque
publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitror, is hoc quod primum est. esse dcos. persuaderi mihi non
opinione solum sed ctiam ad veritatcm plane velim. [ ... ] quae communia sunt vobis cum
ceteris philosophis non attingam. ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus fere mihique ipsi in
primis deos esse. itaque non pugno: rationem tamen earn quae ate adfertur non satis firmam
puto."
MlNUCIUS fELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM"
261
the gods exist, but instead of convincing, your arguing renders doubtful a
matter which in my opinion admits of no doubt at all"
As a matter of fact, the Academics regard their own philosophy as charac-
terised by reverential caution towards the divine and as the only acceptable
attitude, since it is held to protect traditional belief against the exaggerated
rationalistic claims of, among others, the Stoics. The Academic could
perfectly doubt the value of theodicy without being an atheist !Os. Academic
caution allows man to ward off intrusions into the domain of religion, thus
guaranteeing the autonomy of religion Ioo .The Academic could argue that he
escaped the imputations of impiety that every dogmatist was properly bound
to incuri
07

Insofar as Caecilius is a straight heir of Cotta's philosophical stance, his
position has the same consistency. But Minucius has not just let him borrow
arguments from the Academics; by omission of some arguments, selection of
others, and exagg'eration of certain aspects, he has deliberately weakened
Caccilius' position, so that it could be more easily refuted by Octavius- or
so he thought.
Essentially Caccilius' position has remained that of Cotta, and as such
theoretically avoids contradictions. Caecilius challenges (allegedly)
Christian, but often Stoic- and Epicurean-flavoured opinions concerning (1)
the existence and (2) the nature of gods, (3) divine providence on a cosmic
kvel and (4) solicitude for man, and advises caution, while explicitly
accepting the rdigiones traditae, but only as far as ( l) the existence of gods is
concerned as well as (4) their solicitude for man
10
s. The latter two points he
1
" ' Yt\UiiCil.IO ttJ7J. p. 2:.7: 2JS-2Jl) (on Colla's diffen:nt attitudes towards resp. the
existence of gods- "I believe for reasons of tradition"- and divination -"I believe, but
philosophy has to teach me how to interpret given phenomena .. ; cf. De nat. tlcor. 3,14): p. 240-
241 : "Che per Colla (e gli scettici) non foss!.! provvidenza quella voluta dagli stoici [ ... ]. e che
d"altra parte si potessl.! riconosccre la cura d!.!gli dei per certi aspetti dclla vita di un popolo
diligcntc ne! culto degli dei[ ... ] c cosa possibilc e probabilc. Che la divinazione. a sua volta,
ncgata a livcllo filosofico, come prova dc\l"csistcnza e della provvidcnza dcgli dei, quale e
intcsa dagli stoici, polessc, per un'altra via, esserc ammcssa come strumcnto dclla
henC\"Olcnza divina, quale c intcsa da Colla[ ... ]. e cosa altrettanto possibile e probabile."; p.
244: "Cotta. di fronte a\l"agnosticismo religioso della sua filosofia, il quale non gli permetteva
di adcrirc al dogmatismo stoico. coltiva la religione antica del popolo romano. Del res to, il suo
credo religioso non contrasta col suo credo filosofico."
1
').1 Cf. nat. deor. 3,10 (" Adfcrs haec omnia argumenta cur dii sint, rem que mea sentcntia
minime duhiam argumcntando dubiam facis."); 3,15 ("Non igitur adhuc, quantum quidem in
te est. Balbe. intelkgo deos esse; quos equidem credo esse, sed nil docent Stoici."')
1115
Cf. fESTUGIERE li 1949, p. 373; MACKENDRICK- LEE SING 1989, p. 181; BRUNT 1989, p.
192. Sec De nat. dear. 3.44: "haec Carneades aicbat, non ut deos tolleret (quid enim
philosopho minus conveniens). sed ut Stoicos nihil de dis explicare convinceret." It was the
Academics' view that one must not try to prol'e the obvious. Cf. Anon. in Theaet. 70,12-26.
lOt. See, on Plutarch, 1985, p. 39; BABUT 1994c, p. 578-579.
107 Cf. BRU!\"T 1989, p. 194.
ll\'l Cf. YALGIGLJO 1973, p_ .. 246-248. Cf. supra: p. 178.
----.-:'> .. ,; ...
.. . _
. . '"t:"'!::-'
-
'
..
262
CHAPTER 6
-_-:'i-;:}: __
.:: (I
reaffirms on the level of traditional religious practice after h . : :_::J
challenged them in the form in which they had been b . __ :_..._:-.::
. . . . ) l()l(
theology. Academic caution thus protects traditional religion ag the -;,->
absurdities impiously upheld by dogmatic philosophers ( in
) IO<) I c . . -CtStte --
or a superstitious sense . n essence, aec1hus' arguments are suffi
1
-
subtle to be contradiction-free 1 w. Ietent } _
This not Octavius from his opponent's
as "_wavenng and errati_c, and \16,1:. "errantem .;!
lubncam nutassc ) and from accusmg h1m of mconsistency: .. Fof :-}_i.':i:.
he wavered, from m th_e at one moment, to keeping the
open at another ( .. nam m ten m dcos credere, interim se dclih<:rarc{ -
variavit", 16,2). Caecilius is said to find himself again and again "tossed
and fro amid the waves and eddies of conflicting contradictions .. _
According to Minucius, Caecilius' position is thus full of contradictions an-d
untcnable, whereas in fact it is analogous to Cotta'sii2. VALGIGLIO (1973, p.
249-250) has argued that any Christian (of Minucius' time) would inevitably .:->
have regarded Caecilius' (and Cotta's) argumentation as
whereas the Academics argue for the autonomy of the domain of -;:
and fence it off from "rat ionalistic" speculation, the Christian considers ;..; :,. ,,,
religion and philosophy to occupy the same space. To this one may <,.
considerations I have developed concerning the divergent conceptions
- truth and Minucius' incapacity to understand the nature of "zetetics". To this ;'t;r;
also corresponds a different conception of philosophy
1
I
4
: whereas it was
Academics' concern to fence off the domain of religion from rationalistic
intrusions, and to protect religion by affirming its autonomy, stressing
limits of human knowledge, Octavius proclaims the supremacy of
and, more in particular, divine revelation, but implicitly rejects autonomy

Jm Cf. Oct . S.l : "itaquc cum omnium gentium de dis inmortalibus, quamvis incerta sit \-cl :. ;,
ratio vel origo, mane at !amen firma consensio. neminem fero tanta audacia tamquc
inreligiosa qua prudentia tumescentem. qui hanc rcligionem tarn vetustam. tam
tarn salubrem dissolvere aut infirmare nitatur."
110
Pace VoN ALBRECHT p. lfi3: "Ob,iously, the pagan's ideas oscillate_
a_theism an_d practical accepta_ncc of the cults. It is true that thts ___:: __ ._{_t, :.:_--.:_:. ,_:_' .... __: __
1s psychologically probable and even typ1cal of !he mentality of educated people of that _. ,;:;. . .
but nevertheless Octavius needs only to point out this manifest inconsistency in to :c
sure of winning the game." See also BECKER 1967, p. 28: "\Vie Cotta [ ... ] vertntt
Caecilius zwei die im Grunde nicht zu vereinbaren sind.' ' _ . .:
111
16.4 (transl. RENDALL- KERR) : "identidem in contrariis ac repugnantlbus
aestuct, fluctuetur".
112
I consider the Academic point of view to be quite consistent and believe_ that a
understood "scepticism" allows to avoid both superstition and the destructiOn of fa1th,
leave it to the reader to pass a final judgment_ on. the position. _ _ . -
113
See also BECKER 1967. p. 23-25 on an? treat'?ent of
\V1th thanks to Prof. W. EVENEPOEL for h1s enhghtemng suggestions.

MINUCIUS FELIX AND ACADEMIC "SCEPTICISM" 263
philosophy- which, as a matter of fact, had never been claimed by Caecilius
(as an Academic he had no need to claim it). The confusion is this: the
philosopher searches for the truth; Minucius' Christian professes to be the
true philosopher since he possesses truth - through revelation. Revelation
entails that philosophy is ousted from its own domain, that of the search for
truth.
On the other hand, Minucius cannot be completely absolved from the
charge of unfairness towards the Academics. In some instances he
deliberately twists their arguments
115
The author's mauvaise foi not only
shows in the setting and the construction of the dialogue- Minucius' dubious
role as arbiter and the fact that Caecilius has to expound his views first, after
which Octavius gets the opportunity to refute Caecilius' arguments in a
speech approximately three times as long - but also in the portrayal of
Caecilius and the way' his arguments are presented. Caecilius' style appears
to be more rhetorical and more prone to exaggeration than Cotta'sll6. The
course of his arguments is fairly disjointed and marked by abrupt transitions
-in order to suggest a lack of consistency, as may be presumed (or, at least,
it has this eFfect)
117
Also, when Minucius has Caecilius explicitly deny the
possibility of divine providence, he makes him expound a sort of Epicurean
theory, which can indeed be related to the theory of the Epicurean Velleieus
in De natura deorwnlls. This of course makes it more difficult to keep
avoiding contradictions. Furthermore, Caecilius' arguments are sometimes
presented in such a way as to prepare already their refutation. I have already
discussed the addition of gloriose at 13,3, and C. BECK ER ( 1967, p. 37-38) has
shO\vn that Caecilius is already on the defensive with his account of Roman
piety (6,2). As a further example one may point out li'J the way in which the
115
CL VALGIGL!p 1973, p. 249: "In realta Minucio colorisce un po' la tinta scettica del
pensiero ceciliano. piu di faccia Cicerone per Cotta. e cosf aggrava la sua posizione
contradditoria, rcndendola piu difficilmente sanabile. [ .. . ] Minucio non pote o non volle
credere nella conciliabilita dello scetticismo con la rcligione."; p. 250: "Non sembra percio
essere del tutto in buona fede. Per facilitnre il suo compito, si potrcbbe dire che sottnce, con
una certa tendenziosita. le possibili argomenlazioni degli avversari ." V ALGIGLIO is
convinced, however. that the sceptic arguments do not convince either: cf. p. 241 note 18; p.
251. But his balanced judgment is extremely favourable in compnrison with RENDALL's (in
GLOVER - REND ALL- KERR 193 I, p. 307) : "Caecilius in 13 associates himself with the later
school, agnostic in outlook, acquiescing in the superstitions of the illiterate
mul_lltude, while professing polite but sceptical interest in the speculntions and contradictions
of philosophies." See also his evaluation of the tradition defended by the Academics (p.
30:>-306) : "Religion. alike in mythology and ritual , had more and more become a rubbish or
refuse heap of waste products, a store-house for discarded relics of barbarism and of
superstition."
116
Cf. V ALGIGLIO 1973, p. 249 note 31.
117
Cf. BECKER 1967, p. 64. '-. _
118
Cf. BEAUJEU 1964, p. 90; VERMANDER 1971, p. 16 with note 23.
119
Cf. GARTNER 1995, p. 142'note 6.
264
CHAPTER 6
author has Caecilius portray the scepticism of Simonides and compare this
to Cicero's account of the anecdote (De nat. dear. 1,60): Cicero comments
that Simonides was a man of wisdom and learning who had so manv acute
and subtle ideas that he just could not decide which of them \vas truest.
Caecilius (Oct. 13,4), on the other hand, merely says that things became
more and more obscure to Simonidcs as he went on searching for the truth.
The latter brand of scepticism seems to lead to anxiety rather than to
ataraxia. By leaving out Cicero's quite appreciative comment. Caecilius/
Minucius has presented the scepticism of Simonides as totally undesirable.
Minucius clearly wanted to convince his audience or reader that Caecilius'
position was indeed contradictory and that his philosophy has nothing
valuable to offerl2o.
Minucius at the end of his dialogue has Caecilius betray his zctetic" ideal.
The way Caecilius is cast, and his conversion staged, testifies to Minucius'
incapacity to understand what Academic philosophy is about. Philosophy"
has acquired a new meaning and its relation to religion has drastically
changed. On the other hand, the very existence of the Octarius shows that an
Academic-fashioned philosophy still made sense to some of Minucius'
contemporarics
1
2
1
lt is certainly plausible that the author was acquainted
with philosophers who were wont to call themselves Academics. like
Plutarch and Favorinus presumably did some generations earlier.
Jcn Cf. BECKER 1967, p. 69 note 17: "im Gcgcnsatz zu Cotta /eider Caccilius untcr dcm
Zwiespalt zwischen Skepsis und traditioneller Religiositat."
12
1
GARTNER 1995, p. 144-145 believes that Academic philosophy had long disappeared from
the intellectual scene, and accordingly relates attacks to the Pyrrhonists. He also
thinks that Caecilius' arguments are distorted by the fact that they are essentially no longer
Academic but Pyrrhonian. This follows from GARTNER's interpretation of i\ew Academic
philosophy as a form of probabilism (p. 142-144; 146).
CHAPTER 7
AFTER WORD
When studying Platonic philosophy of the Early Empire one must keep in
mind that there is no such thing as a unitarian, monolithic Middle Platonism.
In the absence of a central authoritative institution different types of
Platonism were free to develop. There was no official course which
Platonists were supposed to adopt. This period saw attempts to study Plato's
philosophy systematically, to structure the corpus of his texts . in various
ways, to write commentaries on dialogues, to gather doxographic accounts,
to develop some kind of educational programme for students, and hence to
compile handbooks such as the Didaskalikos. Attempts to free Platonism
from extraneous innuences- Stoic, Aristotelian (cf. Atticus) or sceptic (cf.
Numenius) - coexiskd and interfered with the practice to discuss Platonic
philosophy in terms of the then existent philosophical koine or to explain it
in a Stoic or Peripatetic theoretical framework. In this diversified
philosophical landscape diversity
1
the need to define and legitimate one's
own position was strongly felt. Contrary to the long-held received opinion,
the New Academic legacy was still of some importance in this context of
connicting self-images. New Academic innuence appears to have been
prominent especially in those cases in which Platonists had to define their
position in opposition to Stoics and Epicureans. In order to emphasise their
loyalty to this tradition several Platonists apparently chose to call themselves
Academics: t!Jis was the case for the line Ammonius-Plutarch-Favorinus,
and probably for the philosophers implicitly addressed in the anonymous
commentary on the Tlzcatellts, and perhaps also for some of Minucius Felix's
con tern porarics.
There is no reason to deny the overall "doctrinal" outlook of the phase in
the history of Platonism conventionally designated as Middle Platonism. But
it is another thing to say that it is "dogmatic". Heterogeneous as its traditions
may be, Middle Platonism is generally characterised by attempts to
determine the doctrines of Plato on the basis of a scholarly approach that
combines the systematic use of texts belonging to the Platonic corpus with
the discussion of previous and contemporaneous interpretations2. As we
1
In words ( 1990. p. 89): "la varieta e la diversificazione delle forme assunte dalla
filosofia platonica nei tre .secoli che intercorsero fra la fine dell'Academia e la comparsa dell a
filosofia di Plotino."
266 CH.-\PTER 7
have seen. the nature of this endeavour does not necessarily rule out nor
even conflict with the incorporation of Academic themes and strategies. If
Academism were to be understood unqualifiedly as "scepticism", then there
would indeed be little room for it in Middle Platonism. It should be charac-
terised more properly, however, as an aporetic" or "zetetic" philosophy,
which functioned in an essentially polemical context. As Academic
philosophy did not object to dogmata as such, and moreover insisted on
Platonic themes such as the difference between human and divine cognition
and that between knowledge and opinion, it can no longer be ruled out on a
priori grounds that it exerted some innuencc in later Platonism.
In order to detect traces of New Academism in Platonism after
Antiochus, I have first examined the treatment of two controversial issues in
different authors and texts, \'LZ. the debate about the overall interpretation
of the Theaetetlls and the different views and appreciations of Socrates'
aporetic approach to philosophy. Middle Platonic references to the
Thcaetetus appear to be very often related to the Academic epistemological
debate, and arc closely linked to the problem of the labdling of Plato's
dialogues and their diaeretic classification. The classification system
originated in the context of the epistemological debate and as a reaction
against radically sceptical interpretations of Plato. Not only do these early
classificatory attempts presuppose these controversies, the authors referring
to it (Aibinus, Diogenes Laertius, the author of the Prolcgomma) appear to
be fully aware of this context. Different readings of the Thcaetetus
corresponded to the divergent positions in the debates raised by the New
Academics. This is evidenced in the anonymous Commentary. which clearly
contains traces of competing interpretations of the Tlzeaetctus. and is itself
one of the major texts testifying to the topicality of the Academic
controversy for Middle Platonists. The much later anonymous Prolegomena,
the sources of which presumably date back to the Early Empire. may also be
held to contain evidence of Middle Platonic debates on the interpretation of
the Theactetus and, more generally, of Middle Platonic interest in the
Academic debate.
Socrates is at the center of a second cluster of themes related to New
Academic philosophy: his zetetic, elenctic. and aporetic approach to
philosophy had been the model for Hellenistic Academics. Plutarch's
treatise against Colotes proves that (some) Platonists of his time still felt the
need to defend Socratic-Academic philosophy against its detractors; there is
some plausibility to the thesis that Favorinus as well shared the same
concern. Both the interpretation of the Theaetetus and the appreciation of
Socrates' zetetic conception of philosophy are main concerns of the
I do not claim, of course, that Middle Platonism is unique in this respect.
l
I
1
1
1

1
AFTER WORD 261
anonymous commentary, but also of Plutarch 's first Quaestio Platonica,
which has served as our guideline through Plutarch 's Academism.
The search for truth, with aporia and elenclzos are essential moments, was
central to Plutarch's philosophical enterprise, as has amply been shown by
the references to various texts of his, such as De sera nwninis vindicta, De
!side et Osiride, De genio Socratis , the Pythian dialogues, the polemical
tracts, the essays on Scelenlzeilwzg and many other passages in the corpus.
Plutarch fully espoused the zetetic ideal and combined the Academic and
Platonic awareness of the limits of human knowledge with Platonist
psychology and metaphysics: in order to do so, he made use of the
conception of dual causality and the related antitheses sensible-intelligible
and opinion-knowledge3. Plutarch's references to the Platonic concept of
recollection are inextricably linked to his conviction that the human soul_, by
its very nature, in principle has the aptitude to attain noetic knowledge and
ought to aspire to it.
In the theses ascribed to Plutarch in Damascius' notes on the Plzacdo as
found in codex Marcianus gr. 196 ( = Plutarch, fragments 215-217) anamnesis
was linked in . like fashion to New Academic themes. Traces of a similar
approach, though much less elaborated, may be discerned in the discourses
of his near-contemporary Maximus of Tyre, as can be gathered from the
passages I have referred to in text and notes.
Plutarch's brand of Platonism presumably owes much to the philosophy
of the so-called fourth Academy; this may be inferred from his insistence on
the one-Academy-thesis. his somewhat ambivalent utterances on
and the extensive use he makes of the plausibility concept to accept doctrines
and theories provisionally. Plutarch was also convinced that the Academics
were not- as their detractors would have it- opposed to traditional religion,
but actually protected the faith handed down by the forefathers. For the
Academic thinkers warned against exaggerated (Stoic) claims to knowledge
in the domain of religion, recommended caution and called to mind the
limits of human cognition.
The evidence regarding Favorinus (who was a very prolific author), Galcn
and Epictetus shows that the epistemological debate had not yet lost its
significance for Platonists of the second century A.D. Indeed, Academic
philosophy could still be fashionable in Plutarch's day, and even one or two
generations after him. If Minucius Felix's Octavius may not reveal much
about contemporaneous pagan philosophy, it seems at least to suggest that
Academism was not yet quite outmoded. A topic worth of further study
would certainly be the treatment of Academic philosophy by Christian
3
In this respect, and probably in others as well, Taurus appears to have been quit e close to
Plutarch. OPSG:\IER 1997c. Cf. supra, p. 18.
268 CHAPTER 7
authors- one need only be reminded of St Augustine's Contra Academicos.
However, this would inevitably result in a study of a different nature, and
although the subject matter is quite close to that of the present monograph,
I have decided to reserve this for another occasion.
I have not exhausted the evidence on (New) Academic tendencies in
Middle Platonism. Other interesting information may still be found, more
particularly in some Neoplatonic treatises and commentaries. It may be
worth the effort to examine, for instance, the evidence on some prc-Plotinian
interpretations of the Parmenides-' offered by Proclus in the introductory
paragraphs to his commentary on this dialogue
5
We have seen that the
commentaries on the first Alcibiades contain references to Middk Platonic
discussions which cannot be properly understood if isolated from the
Academic background. In much the same way the Parmcnidcs commentary
seems to me to refer to discussions on the doctrinal and epistemological
value to he attributed to this dialogue. Their context is ckarly the diaeretic
classification. What appears to have been at stake. I think. was the general
interpretation of Platonic philosophy in the aftermath of the epistemological
debate.
Surely Academic tendencies were not omnipresent in 1\l iddk Platonism,
nor were all the Middle Platonists sympathetic to the New Academy and its
legacy. Many Platonists of this period undeniably belong to distinctly
different traditions - some of them hostile to the New Academy. But the
type of Middle Platonism most scholars arc familiar with - H. DORRIE's
Mittc!p!atonisnl/ls one might say - is not just the only type. With this
monograph I have merely reacted against the extremist but still commonly
held thesis that New Academism was totally extinct in ivliddle Platonism.
What I believe to have shown is that there is at kast one Middle Platonic
tradition, represented most prominently by Plutarch, that still attached great
value to the zetetic and aporctic approach. and most probably even claimed
the epithet Academic to stress its adherence to the ideals of the New
Academy, which it considered to belong truly to the genuine Platonic
tradition. These Academic tendencies were not insignificant either. Issues
raised by the New Academy have left clearly detectable traces in the
anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus and in various other texts such as
the Prolegomena and even the Didnskalikos
0
But above all one should refer
4
Cf. GbRLER 199-l, p. 841.
5 Cf. Proclus In farm. I 630,37-635,27; 992.29-994,12; Tlreol. Plat. 1.8-9: In Alcib. 18.9-21:
9,19-10,2. See also Philop. In Anal. pr. 6.19-9.20 ; Galen De Plac. llipp. et Plat. 9.5-7. See C.
STEEL's article Procltts et /'interpretation logiqtte dtt Parmbride, forthcoming in the
proceedings of the International Symposium " Neoplatonism in the ~ i d d l e Ages .. , Corfu 6-
8.10.95.
6 Cf.. e.g .. p. 39.
AITERWORD
269
to Plutarch. Not only is he the best-known Greek author of his age, but by
the standards of his own time
7
he is also a major Platonist philosopher, w.ith
considerable influence on some of his contemporaries. His philosophical
works show that the New Academic zetetic ideal and strategies are not
naturally opposed to more "traditional" metaphysical Platonist themes.
Plutarch continued the tradition of his master Ammonius and passed it on to
the next generation, as his ideal of philosophy could still inspire others. The
"Academic movement" was apparently sufficiently strong and significant to
provoke fierce reactions from the leading Stoic philosopher of the era and
from the philosophically educated physician Galen.
I have shown that it was a viable option for Middle Platonists to
incorporate Academic themes in their interpretation of Platonism, and that
it certainly made sense to determine one's position relative to Academic
views and issues. Middle Platonic doctrine appears not irreconcilable with
Academism. The resulting philosophy is not dogmatic nor sceptic in an
absolute sense, but truly zetetic. Hopefully the present monograph. through
its focus on the significance of the zetctic approach for some Middle
Platonists, will contribute to our search for truth about Middle Pl atonic
philosophy and correct the view that New Academism \vas completely
forgotten. Fortun<ltely, unlike ancient Platonists, we arc not under the
compulsion to establish a unitarian, monolithic interpretation of the history
of Platonism.
7
And why should we aliVays prefer others? Moreover, not to search for historical standards
takes place at the risk ~ f unquestioningly assuming one's own standards to be universal.
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NEDERLANDSE SAl\IENVATTING
In de traditionelc historiografie van het Platonisme wordt doorgaans gesteld
dat Antiochus van Ascalon (eerste eeuw v. Chr.) een eind maakte aan de
sceptischc tendcnzen van het hellenistische platonisme, de zgn. "Nieuwe
Academic", en een tijdperk van vernieuwd dogmatisme inluidde. Hij zou de
bcpalendc figuur zijn voor de verdcre ontwikkeling van het Platonisme, in de
eerstc plaats voor het Midden-Platonisme (de gebruikelijke b e n ~ i n g voor .
het Platonisme in de vroegc Keizertijd, v66r Plotinus). In deze studie wordr
echter aangetoond dat de filosofie van de hellcnistische "Nieuwe" Academic
nog steeds actueel was ten tijde van het Midden-Piatonisme en dat de
pokmieken over cpistemologische kwesties bleven doorwerken. Dit gaat in
tegcn de gangbare .visie op het Middcn-Piatonisme, die vooral vorm heeft
gckrcgen in de ncgcntiende-eeuwse Forsclwng, met name door het wcrk van
Eduard Zeller. Hij en zijn tijdgenotcn gingcn uit van ecn aantal begrippen
en schema's waaraan een univcrscel karakter wcrd tocbedceld, maar die in
feitc vaak bcpaald waren door de negcnticndc-ceuwse context. Een van die
tcgcnstcllingcn was het paar scepticismc-dogmatisme.
Vcrnicuwd onderzoek naar de geschicdcnis van het anticke scepticisme
hccft er toe gcleid dat onzc visie op de hellenistische Nieuwe Academic
aanzienlijk veranderd is en mccr genuanceerd is gcwordcn. Het is namelijk
geblckcn dat men cen sterk vcrarmd bceld schetst wannecr men de hcllenis-
tische pcriodc wil zicn als ecn moment in de eeuwige strijd tussen
scepticisme en dogmatismc en men de opponenten in het epistemologisch
dcbat zondcr mccr als sceptici en dogmatici karakterisccrt. Vaak hceft dit
schematisch dcnken ook tot een aantal overtrakken of ronduit verkeerde
voorstcllingen gelcid: de scepsis zou een twijfel aan het bestaan van een
objectieve were Id inhouden; de Nieuwe Academic zou gericht zijn tegen de
traditionele religie en moraal; de Nieuw-Academische geest zou in strijd zijn
met het (dogmatische) platonisme en met Plato zelf; het midden-platonisme
zou zich, omdat het door een fundamenteel religieuze bekommernis
bewogen wordt, van de Nieuwe Academic hebben afgewend. Een aantal van
deze gemeenplaatsen en vooroordelen zijn restanten van een type geschied-
schrijving van de filosofie dat zelf in grate mate van a priori schemati-
seringen uitging. Hiermee blijkt men tevens in grate mate de beeldvorming
van de tegenstanders en concurrenten van de hellenistische academic te
hebben overgenomen. ,
,.
306
NEDERLANDSE SA\IENVA TIING
De wetenschappelijke benadering die de laaste decennia gangbaar is
geworden gaat uit van de polemische context van het hellenistische
scepticisme. Als men minder de nadruk legt op doctrines en meer op het
polemische karakter van de hellenistische filosofie, krijgt men namelijk een
geheel ander beeld van dit zogenaamde scepticisme. Minstens even
belangrijk dan de sceptische "stellingen" blijken immers de strategieen en de
argumcntatietechnieken. Een cruciaal aspect is ook de "filosofische positie-
bepaling", waarbij de legitimering van de eigen filosofische positie door het
opeisen van de autoriteit van voorgangers centraal staat, alsmede de
pogingen om de autoriteit van zijn tegenstanders te ondermijnen. In dit
perspectief heeft het onderzoek naar de he\lenistische Academic reeds een
aantal nieuwe inzichten opgeleverd, maar de implicaties daarvan op het
onderzock naar het Middcn-Platonisme zijn nog nauwelijks uitgewerkt. Het
is precies onze bcdoeling gcweest deze nieuwe inzichtcn naar het Midden-
Platonisme door tc trekken. Dit is dan ook de context waarbinnen deze
studic zich wil profilcren.
Ten cindc de aanwezighcid van Nieuw-Acadcmische thema's aan te
tonen, besprcck ik ecn aantal tckstcn, die hier voor het cerst in hun
sarncnhang bestudecrd warden: de anoniemc commcntaar op de Theaetetus ;
de gctuigcnissen aangaandc de systemcn ontworpcn om het Corpus
J>latonicum in tc delcn; de Neoplatonische Prolegomena in Platonis phi!oso-
plzicam, cen gcschrift dat ontegcnsprekelijk tcruggaat op Midden-Plato-
nische bronnen; de gctuigenissen over de polemic ken tusscn Favorinus,
Epictctus en Ga\cnus. De belangrijkste autcur in dit opzicht is echter Plut-
archus, van wic een ornvangrijk reuvre bcwaard is en die als filosoof blijk
gccft van ccn constantc bckommernis om Academische thcma' s met Plato-
nischc metafysischc clcmcntcn te vercnigen en zijn eigcn positie ten opzichte
van de gcschiedenis van de Academic tc bepalcn. Deze tendens komt
duidelijk tot uiting in de polcmische werken tcgen Sto'ici en Epicureeers, in
de werken over Dclphische religic, in gcschriften over ''natuurwetenschap-
pclijke" ondcrwerpcn, maar ook in de werkcn die zijn Plato-exegese
bevatten. A Is centralc tekst voor deze studic werd cchter de eerste Quaestio
Platonica gekozen, die Plutarchus' mccst explicicte paging is om de Acade-
mischc polemiek te combineren met Plato's metafysica. De verschillende
thema's die in deze Quaestio aan bod komen zijn alle op een of andere
manier gerelatcerd a an de epistemologische polemieken: de filosofische
erfenis van Socrates, zijn befaamde "goddelijk teken" (het daimonion), de
interpretatie van de Theaetetus, "elenktiek", "aporetiek", de geschiedenis
van de Academic, de zoektocht naar de waarheid ("zetetiek'') en anamnese.
Plutarchus' Quaestio heeft als richtsnoer voor deze studie gefungeerd. Als
we onderzoeken in welke andere Midden-Platonische teksten de onder-
werpen voorkomen die Plutarchus in de eerste Quaestio behandelt of
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATIING 307
\Vaarop hij alludeert, dan zijn meteen de Nieuw-Academische tendenzen in
deze fase van de geschiedenis van het Midden-Platonisme in kaart gebracht.
Plutarchus' beweringen dat hij zijn filosofische scholing in de Academic,
bij zijn meester Ammonius, heeft opgedaan, kunnen onmogelijk verwijzen
naar de officiele school die de verre, maar rechtstreekse institutionele
voortzetting zou zijn van Plato' s Academic. De Academic bestond immers
ten tijde van Plutarchus niet meer a\s instituut. Plutarchus verwijst dus naar
Ammonius "prive-school'' , een kleinschalige onderneming allicht, die er
geen aanspraak op kon maken de officiele en centrale vertegenwoordigster
te zijn van het Platonisme. Plutarchus' uitspraken bewijzen wel dat
Ammonius zijn school expliciet "Academic" noemde, wellicht om te
bcklcmtonen dat de Platonisch-Academische traditie filosofisch gezien
fundamenteel ~ n is, en dat zijn eigen denken in het verlengdc daar_van ligt.
Plutarchus deed waarschijnlijk hetzclfde voor zijn eigen "school".
In het twecde hoofd,stuk onderzoeken wij het belang dat de interpretatie
van de Thcaeterus had voor het epistemologische dcbat. Yooreerst
bcstudcrcn wij er de classificatieschema's die op de dialogcn van Plato
wcrdcn toegcpasl. De voornaamstc gduigcnissen hierover zijn te vinden in
Albinus' Prologus en in Diogenes Laertius' Levenvan Plato; het systeem zclf
datccrt uit de tijd van Thrasyllus. Het tot stand komcn en de concrete
uitwcrking van de zgn. "diaeretische" classificatic moet warden gezicn in het
licht van de discussies over de vraag ''of Plato dogmatisccrt". Het belang-
rijkstc ondcrscheid dat in de diacrcsc wordt gcmaakt is dat tusscn ''hyphege-
matischc" en aporctische" dialogen. De dialogcn van de ccrstc categoric
zoudcn bcdoc\d zijn om doctrines aan te brcngcn; de aporetischc dialogen
zouden uitsluitcnd gcwijd zijn aan de wecrlcgging van vcrkeerde thcorieen
en opvattingcn. Het bcstaan van het diaerctisch systccm zelf houdt reeds een
vcroordcling van de radikaal "aporctischc" interpretatie van Plato in,
aangezicn het de aporctick slcchts cen gcdcclte van het Corpus laat beslaan.
Men mag aanncmcn dat het systcem daarom gcricht was tegcn Academici
die steeds dczclfdc (passages uit de) dialogen aanhaalden- niet op de laatste
plaats uit de Theaererus- om een beeld van Plato als aporeticus te schetsen.
Het ontstaan van het classificatieschema valt samen met het begin van de
systematische studie van het hele Corpus.
Dat Plutarchus in de eerste Quaestio Platonica van een uitspraak uit de
Theaetetlls in de epistemologische problematiek terechtkomt, is zeker geen
toeval. Deze dialoog, met de thema's van de maieutiek en het zoeken naar
de waarheid, speelde immers een eersteplansrol in het epistemologische
debat, met name in de polemiek rond de juiste evaluatie van de filosofie van
Socrates en van Plato. Dit wordt bevestigd door onze studie van de op
papyrus bewaarde anonieme commentaar op de Tlzeaetetus. In de commen-
taar zijn sporen van radikaal "aporetische" lezingen van deze dialoog zicht-
,.
308
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVA TTING
baar, maar eveneens pogingen om het belang van de aporetiek voor het
Platonisme af te zwakken. De commentator zelf probeert een middenkoers
te varen tussen deze tegengestelde interpretaties. De anonieme Prolego-
mena in Platonis plzilosoplziam bevestigen het belang van de interpretatie
van de Theaetetlls in de Academische context. Uit dit geschrift kan worden
afgeleid dat de aporetici hun interpretatie van Plato's filosofie voornamelijk
op de Tlzeaetetlls baseerden. Het is daarom beslist geen toeval dat ook Plu-
tarchus' referenties naar deze dialoog bijna steeds in een epistemologische
context kunnen warden gesitueerd.
In het derde hoofdstuk benaderen wij de Academische problematiek
vanuit het perspectief van de figuur van Socrates. Een van de voornaamste
strijdpunten in de polemieken blijkt de geestelijkc erfenis van Socrates te
zijn geweest. De Academici inspircerden zich op Socrates' aporetiek en
"zetetiek". Hiertegen rcagcerdcn de Epicureeers, die een zeer negaticf
Socratcsbceld schctsten: Socrates was een en ElQWV. Wij bestuderen
hoc Plutarchus, voornamelijk in het strijdschrift Athersus Colotem, Socrates
tcgen beschuldigingcn en vcrdachtmakingen in verdcdiging ncemt en dit
koppclt aan ccn vcrdcdiging van Arccsilaus en de Nicuw-Academischc
filosofic in het algemecn.
Het vicrdc hoofdstuk staat ccntraal in dczc studic. Hicrin wordt de ecrstc
Quaestio Platonica bcstudcerd, waarbij de aandacht tclkcns ook gaat naar
andcrc tckstcn van Plutarchus en andcre Middcn-Platonische autcurs
waarin dczclfdc thcma's aan bod komen.
Het blijkt dat de ccrstc Quaestio Platonica inspcclt op de anti-Socratischc
polcmick zoals die vooral door de Epicurceers wcrd gevocrd. Plutarchus
vcrdcdigt er Socrates impliciet tcgen het vcrwijt van grootspraak: hoc kon
Socrates zich voor zijn filosofie op ccn God bcroepcn? Mccr spccifick: hoe
moctcn wij zijn uitspraak uit de Theaetetus intcrprctercn dat God hem
gebicdt de verloskundc tc hcocfcnen zondcr zelf tc vcnvckken? Als
Plutarchus ecn interprctatie afwijst die in dcze bcwering van Socrates een
uiting van EtQ<I)VctC ziet, dan kan dit wordcn geintcrprcteerd in de context
van de Epicure'ischc polemiek, waarin Socrates precies dgu)VEia wordt
aangcwreven. Ook Plutarchus' allusie op de nmc>L<i hoort in een
Academische context, zoals op basis van een aantal parallellen \vordt
aangetoond.
Socrates beroept zich volgens Plutarchus terecht op zijn Het
gaat om een externe goddelijke stem, die hem aanspoort tot een bepaald
soort filosofie. Socrates wordt ertoe aangemaand de elenktiek te beoefenen,
die erin bestaat dat hij anderen hun schijnweten en eigenwaan ontneemt. De
elenktiek is noodzakelijk als men de waarheid wil zoeken: elenktiek en
catharsis behoren tot het aporetische moment van de filosofie, dat
onontbeerlijk is voor de "zetetiek" (Dit wordt onder meer bevestigd door
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 309
Albinus' beschouwingen over het curriculum dat de jonge Platonici moeten
doorlopen). De eigenliefde, meer bepaald de verliefdheid op eigen opinies,
blijkt een belangrijke hinderpaal voor het verwerven van echte kennis. Het
hebben van eigen overtuigingen kan dus vanuit deze optiek best worden
vermeden: het leidt tot q)l).auda, de vijand van de zelfkennis, en ondermijnt
de geloofwaardigheid van de leraar die de kennis van anderen meet
beoordelen. Alleen hij die geen eigen opinies te verdedigen heeft, kan als
een onpartijdig rechter optreden voor de opinies van anderen. De
tegenstelling tussen het eigene (ni auyyEvll xai otxEia, to 'Lbwv) en het
goede ('ro pE:krtaTov, ta xal.a) is constitutief voor de eerste Quaestio
Platonica, alsook voor het traktaat De adulatore et ami eo: de meeste mensen
zijn niet in staat zich een onbevooroordeeld, juist oordeel te vormen over
wat van hen zelf komt. Eigenliefde (qnA.autta) leidt tot eigenwaan

Dit heeft grote gevolgen voor de filosofie. Deze moet zich aan Socrates
spiegelen, maar in feite blijven de meeste filosofische stromingen vastzitten
in het formuleren en verdedigen van eigen opinies. De enige juiste methode
is dan ook de socratischc, waarbij het zocken naar de waarheid de enige
bckommernis is, en nict het gelijk halen. De vcelheid van filosofische
stromingen zelf is reeds een indicatie van een verkeerde toestand: er kan
hoogstcns cen filosofic zijn die waarheidsgetrouw is. Wie daarvan afwijkt,
dwaalt noodzakelijkerwijzc.
Plutarchus verdcdigt de eenheid van de academische inspiratie impliciet
tcgen aantijgingcn dat de Academic van de ware geest van Plato was
afgewcken. Het zijn de acadcmici die als enigen in de juiste geest en in het
spoor van Socrates en Plato de zocktocht naar de waarheid aangaan. De
vcrdcdiging van de ccn-Academie-these is een eerste raakpunt met de
filosofie van Philo van Larissa. Andere belangrijke raakpunten zijn de
opvatting over de filosofic als ecn zoektocht naar de waarheid ("zetetiek")
en de positieve waardcring van het aporetische.
Ecn cruciale stelling was voor Plutarchus dat de Academische aporetiek
geenszins in conflict kwam met de traditionele religie. Het was daarentegen
zijn overtuiging dat de Academische opschorting van het oordeel leidt tot
Eul.apna ngo; to -DEiov en dat ze zo de religie in feite beschermt tegen de
rationalistische benadering van godsdienst en theologie die eigen was aan
ender meer de sto'ici.
Als Plutarchus ingaat op het vraagstuk of een "kataleptische" kennis
mogelijk is, houdt hij het op een hypothetische formulering. Zo vermijdt hij
in de tegenspraak te vervallen te zeggen dat hij weet dat de dingen niet
kenbaar zijn. Kata).ll'4JL was een cruciaal concept in de hellenistische
polemieken: volgens, de sto'ici is zekere kennis mogelijk omdat bepaalde
voorstellingen de van hun eigen waarheid in zich dragen. Dit werd
310 NEDERLA:"DSE
door de Academici bestreden. Het is opvallend dat Plutarchus, telkens
wanneer hij ter sprake brengt, voor een hypothetische
formulering kiest. Hierin kan men de invlocd van-het standpunt van Philo
van Larissa zien: dat de stoische definitie van xc.n:aAlJ'f'l; moet warden
afgewezen, betekent niet dat de dingen niet van nature kenbaar zouden zijn.
Plutarchus' cerste Quaestio Platonica culminecrt in de beschouwingen
over de anamneseleer. De enige echte kennis, namelijk de kennis
van het goddelijke, komt niet van buiten, maar is altijd in de ziel aanwezig.
Socrates' verloskunde haalt deze anamnetische kennis naar boven. De
lcraarsfunctie van Socrates bestaat er nkt in dat hij zijn eigcn kcnnis
overdraagt op zijn lccrlingen, zoals de sofisten pretenderen te doen.
lntegendeel, hij wekt de aanwezige maar latente kennis bij hen op. De
nodische kennis die door anamnese wortlt verkregen, is onderscheiden van
de de zintuiglijke kennis. Plutarchus was wellicht van oordeel dat
kcnnis van de intclligibcle wcrkclijkheid in principc mogclijk is, maar dat
pcrkcte kcnnis van het goddelijkc voor de gcYncarneerdc ziel onbcreikbaar
is.
Plutarchus koppelt de Nicuw-Acadcmische filosofic aan het Platonische
ondcrscheid tusscn zintuiglijkc en kcnnis. Door anamnesc kunnen
wij de het goduelijke, tot op zckcrc hoogtc kcnnen. Op dcze manier
wcet Plutarchus "Acadcmischc" en .. Platonische" moticvcn harmonieus te
combineren. Voor hem bcstaat er tusscn bcidc gccn tegcnstclling, laat staan
tegcnspraak. Plutarchus kon zich, in het bcclu dat hij van zichzclf als filosoof
had, zowcl ccn Platonicus als ccn Acaucmicus nocmcn.
Ook Plutarchus vricnd -en vermocdclijk ooit zijn Iccrling- Favorinus
van Arclatc placht zichzclf Acadcmicus tc nocmcn. Aan de door hem
gcvocrdc polcmicken is het vijfdc hoofdstuk van dae studic gcwijd. De
Platonische mctafysica was in zijn dcnkcn misschicn minder uitgcsprokcn
aanwczig. maar wcllicht zag ook hij gccn tegcnstelling tusscn Platonismc en
Acadcmischc filosofic. In het aan Favorinus opgcdragcn tractaat De prima
frigido rocpt Plutarchus op tot een filosofischc, dit wil zcggcn, een
acadcmischc houding van voorzichtigheid, \vaarbij hij ook refcreert aan de
cpistcmologie van Plato's Timaeus en Phacdo. De getuigenissen over
Favorinus lijken te bcvestigen dat Plutarchus' vricnd deze raadgevingen ter
harte nam. De bclangrijkste bran over de filosofie van Favorinus is Galenus'
tractaatjc De optima doctrina. Hierin tracht Galcnus de contradicties in
Galenus' positie aan te tonen. Men hceft uit Galenus' getuigenis proberen af
te lciden dat het denken van Favorinus een evolutie onderging. Ten
onrechte, want Galenus wijst niet op een evolutie, maar op (vermeende)
contradicties in Favorinus' denken. Maar Favorinus' positie blijkt minder
contradictorisch dan Galenus wil aantonen. Uit Aulus Gellius Noct. Att. 11,5
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTlNG 311
kan warden afgeleid dat Favorinus' Academische positie voldoende subtiel
en genuanceerd was om interne contradicties te vermijden.
\Vij zijn erin geslaagd een polcmiek te reconstrueren tussen Favorinus en
de stoische filosoof Epictetus. Hoogstwaarschijnlijk had Epictetus eerder de
academische filosofie van Plutarchus aangevallen. In ieder geval verdedigt
Favorinus de Academic tegen Epictetus. Galenus kiest in deze polemiek de
kant van Epictetus. De polemieken over de (Nieuw-)Academische filosofie
blijken dus door te werken tot in het \verk van Galenus.
In het zesde hoofdstuk wordt de anti-Academische polemiek van de
christelijke auteur Minucius Felix bestudeerd. Minucius blijkt niet te
polemiseren, zoals men doorgaans aanneemt, tegen een absoluut
scepticisme, maar specifiek tegen de Academische filosofie. In zijn dialoog \
Octavius cnsceneert hij de bekering van de heiden Caecilius. De filosofische
standpuntcn van Caecilius- en alleen deze, niet zijn argumenten tegen de
Christenen - zijn duidelijk van Academische aard. Minucius heeft zich
hicrvoor voornamelijk op Cicero's De natura deorum gebascerd. Minucius
hecft echter de Academischc argumentatie bcwust verzwakt weergegeven.
Daarbij komt dat hij nict bcgrcep waar het de Academische filosofie
eigenlijk om te docn is. Waar de Acadcmici de zoektocht naar de waarhcid
als het doe! van de filosofie zagen, bcschouwt Minucius de zoektocht als
voorbij en overbodig, aangezicn de waarheid door de opcnbaring cen
verworvenheid is geworden. Doordat Minucius een ander concept van
waarhcid hantecrt en er implicict een andcre opvatting over de verhouding
tusscn filosofic en religie op na houdt, was de dialoog met de Academici bij
voorbaat tot mislukken gcdoemd. Minucius richt zich met zijn werk tot de
gccultivcerde hcidcnen en geloofsgenoten. De Octavius bcwijst de
actualiteit van de Academische filosofic in zijn tijd. Het is aannemclijk dat
hij pcrsoncn kende die zichzelf- net zoals Plutarchus en Favorinus enkelc
genera ties eerdcr- aanhangers van de Academic noemdcn.
Hicrmce is aangctoond dat de Acadcmischc tendenzen niet gehcel
verdwenen waren ten tijde van het Midden-Piatonisme. Binnen het
Platonisme van deze tijd, dat voornamelijk door zijn heterogeniteit
gekcnmerkt werd, bestond er minstens een belangrijke stroming die zich op
de Academische traditie beriep.
A
Acschines
In Ctes.
234 103
InTim.
173 125- 126
Albinus
Pro!.
148,23-29 31
14S.27-2H 73, 148
148.30-37 73, 148
148.32-33 148
148,35-37 149
148.36 135
149,5 204
149,13 27
149,35 135
150,2150
150, 8-10 48
150,9-10 47
150.17-18 73
150.17-18148
150,18-20 148
150,21 207
150.21-23 209
150.22 148, 209
150.23 149
150,30-33 73, 148
150,31-32 148
150,33 209
150,33-35 209
151,5-6 148
151 ,9 148
151,10-11148
eh. 3 27, 29,31
eh. 6 31
Alcinous
Didask.
152,30-153,24 47
153,8-9 47
INDEX LOCORUM
154,939
154,14-17 39
155,21-28 208
157,19-20 197
158,17-2032
165,30 197
169,18-32 141
169,37-39 207
169,39 196
177,26-28 207
177 ,45-17H,2 208
178,11-12 207
181,19-182,14 47
Alexander Aphrod. (?)
Mantissa
25, 185,23-24 140
Anon. in Arist. Artcm rhct.
190,3-5 114,122
Anon. in Thcact.
2,11-23 37, 59
2,24-26 39
2,39- 52 40
2,42 189
3,2-3 40
3,3-7 41
3,7-12 41
3,13-19 41
3,19-21 259
3,20-21189
3,25-28 37
5,3-8,6 44
5,14-24 45
5,24-27 45
5,27-6,16 45
6,16 45
6,17-25 45
6,29-31 45
6,30-31 59
6,31-35 45
6,35-40 45
6,41-7,1 45
7,1-14 46
7,13-18 70
7,14-19 46
7,14-20 47
7,19-20 46
7,20-25 46
8,27-28 189
11,1 189
14,34-42 129
15,2-13 37
15,23 40
46,43-44 50
46,43-48,35 209
46,44-49 50
47,31-34 49
47,35-37 49
47,42-45 49
47,44-45 50
47,46-48,11 49
47,47-58,1 53
48,7-11 50
4H,34-35 50
48,5-7 204
48,8 53
49,26-39 53
49,40-50,3 53
51,17-53.3 53
51,17-53,36 51
52,44-53, 50
53,2-36 49
53,37 51
53,38-41 53
53,38-54,13 51
53,44-46 50, 53
54,10-11 51
54,31-36 74, 189
54,38-43 42, 74
54,38-55,13 65
54,40-42 65
54,40-43 36
54,42-43 36, 190
314 INDICES
INDICES
315
54,43-55,13 42, 59-60, 171 62,8-12 61 1419b8-9 113
11-12 192
2,8 95
3,44 261
54,45-46 65 62,8-17 56 Soph.El.
14 169
2,15 188
3,66-93 260
54,46-55,1 65 62,47-63,6173 165!H-7 148
14-15 83
2,28 189
De off.
55,1-2 36 63,1-656 169b23-25 148
15 118-120
2,83 189
1,108 118
55,4 59 63,1-40 56 Aristophanc:s
18 38, 71, 192
2,116 257
3,90 45
55,4-6 61 63,6-40 57 A eh.
19 99
2,148-150 230
De orat.
55,14-1952 63,13 190 82 88
22 40
2,150 95. 157, 245
2,30 248
55.19-33 52 66,26-43 61 82(Schol.in)88
27 61
fato
2,270 118-119
55.24-26 52 69,36-70,5 43 Nu h.
28 170
31-33 260
3,67 83, 162
55,26-30 52 70,5-9 43 102-104 125
28-29 169
De fin.
3,80 163
55,26-57.22 49 70,5-26 43
445-451 115
30-31 40
1,11 189
Ep. ad Att.
55.28-30 204 70,12-14 44,59 449 125
32 165
2,1 83
16,11,2118
55,31-33 52 70,12-26 44. 179, 261 1492 125
37 40
2.2 163
Ep. ad Fam.
55,34-35 52 70,1465 As pas ius
38 90, 144
2,49 189
4,4,1 118
55,45-56,1 52 70.25 170 In Arist. Eth. Nicom.
60 63
3,21 208
Ep. ad Quint. fratr.
56,2-10 53 71,12-18 43 5-U-18120
66188
3,44 189
3,4,4118
56,3 51 frg. 8,37-44 61 5U 1-13121
66-67 168
4,25-27 48
Hort.
56.21-24 51 frg. D,16-19 37 54.18-19 121
67 91, 165
5,10163
frg. 107 12
so.26-31 51 Apukius 54.19 121
69 189
5,16-17 189
Rcsp.
5n.J4 5o De deo Socr. 54.19-25 121
72 103, 189
5,43 193
3,30 45
511.34-37 53 150 256 54.21-24 75. 189
7311
5,59 193
Tusc. Disp.
56.42-47 143 De Plat. et cius dogm. 54.25-27 121
74 120
5,65-6n 48
1,8 188
5(1,-lS-57, I 0 53 2,23 47 124.1n-19 121
75 95
nat. deor.
1,18189
57.15-42 53 Atticus
76 164. 187
I, I 250
1,23 74,187, 189
57,43-5:-1,12 52 Anal. pr. frg. 7,19-24 208
77-78. 168
1,1-2 189
1,57 208
58,12-23 136 47aS-lJ 248 Augustinus
79 99
1,5 161
2,4 188, 250
58,28-36 136 D..: an. Contra Acad.
in-ss 95
1,10 95
2,5 188, 239
5X,3'J-49 136 3,4, 429b31-430a2 73 2,11 75, 189
103 100
1,10-15 254
2,9 187, 239
58.4')-59.2 52 g..:n . an. 3.35-36 230
lO'J-110 170,238
1 '11 20, 83, 252 4,47 187
(J0,45-4S 54 731lh27-2S 145 3.37 129
110 169
1,14189,250
5,11 83
60,46-47 55 D..: part. an. J,JS-41 64
115 248
1,17 189
5,58-59 193
lll.l-3 56 65%18-19145 3,41 59. 171
117-122250
1,25-41 254
5,120245
6U-4 54 D..: philos.
121 170
I ,60 252. 264
Clcmcns Alcx.
61,5-9 54 frg. 1 Ross 185
c
128 188
1,61 233
Strom.
61.6-41 54, 57 Eth. EuJ.
132 219
1,61-62 260
2, p. 487 Pott 93
61.8-9 55 1121a24-25 113
Ciccro
133 67
1,62 254
Colotcs
61,14-15 55 1233b38-1234a2 113
Acad.l
139 168
1,93 102, 125,258
In Euth.
61,16-17 54 Eth. Nic.
13 13. 59, 171
142 54
2,1 245
I Oc6 105, 235
61.21-22 54 110Sa 19-23 113
14-16252
1-B 139
2,2 254
10d8S-10 235
61.22 55 1124b26-3 t 116
15 250
148 58
2,4-5 224
11b4 105
61,23-24 55 1124b29-31113, 116
16 251
Brut.
2.168 245
In Lys.
61,23-25 55 1127b27 115
30 54
292 115, 119, 125, 129, 235
3,5 233, 260
lOc 105
61,23-33 216 Mor.
44 181. 189
293 118
3,5-6 178, 230
61,25-28 55 1186a25 113
44-45 162
296118
3,7-19 260
D
61,30-33 55 Metaph.
45 169,216
298118
3,9-10178
61,33-34 55 982bl2-1S 79
46 13, 65, 163
299118
3,10 179,261
Damascius 61,36-37 55 1000b5 198
Acad.II
De div.
3,14 260-261
In Phaed. 61,38-39 36 Rh et.
7 181, 188-189
1, 7 230,253
3,14-15 178,260
I 28 200 61,40-46 55 1379b3l 113
7-8 188, 239
1,8-9230
3,15 261
II 275-287 200 62,2-8 57 1382b18-20 113
10 156, 187
1,122 143
3,20-64 260
II 288-294 200
------........ - - ~ L .
316 INDICES
INDICES
317
Demetrius Phal. 31 (Empedocles) 82 181 1-UU 216
De plac. Hipp. et Plat.
I
Maximus Tyr.
De eloc. 31 (Empedocles) 8109198 14,18, 163
2.3,9-10 32
2,10,187-192 181, 189
291 115 64 (Diogenes Apol.) A19 15,62,10 74, 189
2.7,14 227
Isidorus Hisp.
8,7,152-153 181, 189
DG 157
5,4.2 226
Orig.
8,8,190181, 189
326a,3-8 145
5,t'i.4 141
2,21,41124
10 210
396b, 12-19 65
F
9,5-7268
Isocrates
10,3,49-53 207
402a,10-16 90,144
E
Favorinus
9.6.20 194
11,5 126
10,3,69-76 207
410a25-29 90 Elias frg. 18 236
De propr. an. c. aff. dign.
lulianus
10,4,77-98 207
504,27-505,2 157 In cat. frg. 19 236 Or.
10,5,113-124 210
et cur.
511,4-8 157 110,12-2 77 frg. 20 236
5.6 151
7,24 123
10,5,124-139 202
572,20-23 259 Epictetus frg. 21 236
De suis libris
10,5,125-128 210
Diogenes Laertius Diss. frg. 22 236
11 = 19,44 K 229
L
10,5,99-105 208
3,9-11 43 1,5 231 frg. 26 236
11 = 19.45 K 229 10,6,155-165 196
3,48-62 30 1,5.2-3 232 frg. 27 236
12 = 19,45 K 235
Lactantius
10,9,244-248 201
3,49 28-29 1.5.2-5 89 frg. 28 222, 230
Gellius
Div. inst.
18,4,65-97 206
3,49-51 149 1,5,t'i 235 frg. 30 244
1,26,5 234
3.6.7 162
18,4,92-97 206
3.50 27 1,8,6 98 frg. 97 236
1.2t'i.S-9 234
3,15 248
18.5,116-118 206
3.51 30. 73 1,27,2 235 Test. 4 221
I 1.5 57. 67, 163,236
3,15.1 257
18.5,98-99 129, 206
3,52 30 1.27.6 235 Test. 6 225. 233. 235, 240
11 ,5,4 237
Lioanius
18-21 206, 236
3,52-55 32 1.27.18-19 89,231 Test. 47 221, 239
11.5.6 12. 236, 238
Apol. Socr.
21.4,70-71142
3,5t'i 29 2.20 185, 231 Fronto
11.5.8 237
136 126
21.7,139-149 196
3,5o-61 27 2.20,10 245 Ad Caes.
12.5.5 18
Longinus
21,7,143-149 207
3.58 39 2,20,19 245 3. 16 120
IU.5 239
De suhl.
21,7.150-151 207
3,58-61 28, 30 2.20.22 232
17.19.1 233
44,9 156
21.8.162-163 207
3.61-62 27 2.20.23 232
18.1 243
Lucianus
38,4 129
3.o2 n. 204 2.20,27 233
G
18. 1,12 243
Eun. 7 221
38.4,73 129
3.65 32 2.20.28 231 Gaknus
19,() 18
Hermot.
38,4,8 1-83 129
4.28 163.216 2.20,29-31 234 De dign. puh.
20.1.21 221
14 161
Minucius Felix
4.32-33 259 2.20,35 245 8,771 223
20, 1.9-1 () 239
Juppitt.:r Conf.
Oct.
4,33 85 3.1,19 139
Dt.: lihr. propr. 5 186
1 ,4 248
4,3<i 93 3.21138-139
l'J.1632 7 186
4.6 246
4.49-51 27 3.21,7139 De opt. doctr. H
12-13 186
5,1 246
4,62 95 3,21,11139
40 216, 222-224. 227.242
lkrmias
18 186
5.2 249- 250
7,31 83 3.21.13139 40-41 228
In Plat. Phaedr.
Juppitt.:r Trag.
5,2-8.2 245
7,88 141 3.2l.l6 139 41 224. 227
67.24-27 143
[I) 103
5,3 249
7,131 245 3.21.17139 42 223
70,9-13 75, 189
25 186
5.3-6 247
7,171 102 3.21.17-19139 42-43 225. 235
I krodotus
Prometheus es
5.4 249
7,183 95 3.21,19 257
43 225. 234
2,160 155
1 118
5,5 250
9,64 233 Epiphanius 43-44 223
8,123,2 156
Yit. auct.
5,6 252
9, 72 75 Adv. haeres. 3,29 74, 189
44 226
Ht.:siodus
24-25 89
5,12-13 253
9,73 95 Eusebius 44-45 226
Op. et dies
27 227
6.1 253
9,7495 Pracp. ev.
45 225
42 74, 79
Lucretius
6,1-7,6 253
9,76150 14,4,13-16 13
46 225
Hippolytus
4.353-468 99
7,1 247,250
9,85 99 14,4.14-15 74, 189
47 224-225
Phi Ios. 8.1 253, 262
9,105 57. 173 14.4,15 74, 79,216
47-52 226
23,1 259
M
8,1-2 252
10,7-8 102 14.5,8-9 129
48 225
Homerus 8,3-12.7 245, 259
Diogenes Oenoand. 14.5,12-14 259
48-51 225
Ilias
Macrobius
9,6 243
frg. 6 II 8-12 84 14,6,1-2 235
51 225, 228
6,407 95
In Somn. Scip.
12,2 253
DK 14,6,12-13 163
52 226, 228
20,250 95
1 .4.1 37
13 245
21 (Xenophanes) '834 181 14,6,6 104
13,1 250
,,
318 INDICES
INDICES
319
13,1-3 259 frg. 25,15-32 172 23,35-37 114
Euthyphro 83D 100 Symp.
13,1-5 258 frg. 25,40-45 235 Philoponus
3B 135 88C 247 175E 244
13,2 251 frg. 25,72-75 172 In Anal. pr.
Gorg. 90D 247
177D 76, 204, 206
13,3 251, 258 frg. 25,75-82 104 6,19-9,20 268
4808 161 91A 187 177E 73
13,3-5 247 frg. 25,132-1-10 163 Philostratus
489DE 107 97B-99D 183,218 207D-208B 43
13,4 264 frg. 26,96-98 102 Vit. soph.
506A 146 99E 54 210C 197
13,5 250, 252 frg. 26,103-111 165 1,8 233, 235, 240
518E 161 Phaedrus 210C-210B 197
14,2 246 frg. 27,35 216 Photius
Leg. 229E 77. 86, 97, 185, 250 213C 124
14,3 246 frg. 27,56-59 64, 66 Bib!.
5858-C 47 230A 97, 103 216DE 108
14,5 246 cod. 212 193
60SC 47 242C 75 216E 108-109
14,5-6 246
0
cod.212, 169b36-170a41
631C-F 123 246D 199 216E4-5 128
14,6 247 57-58,61, 169
6328 123 247C-24SA 199 218D 108-109
14,7 243, 246 Olympiodorus cod. 212, 169b42-43 193
632D 124 247C-E 196 219A 108
14-15 246-247 In Plat. Phaed. cod. 212, 170a23-2-l193
63-IF 123 2-17D 77,97 219C 142
15,1 247 6,14 77 cod. 212. 170a30193
6548 123 24SB 195 Theaet.
15,2 247 8,17 77 cod. 212, 170a36-37 193
68--IE 179 249B-250C 196 143D 44
16,1 262 In Plat. Ah:ih. I Plato
715E 47 249BC 193 145C 129
16,1-4 254 14,4 135 Alcib. I
731D-732A 151 249C-E 199 146C 40
16,2 254 52.21-53,17 138 105C6-D5 137
73 1 E 150. 154 249D 195-196, 199 149A 49
lfJ,fJ 243 52.21-53.6 138 !05CD 138
R-l!A 179 2-llJD-250D 199 [ . .ll)D 207
17,1 254 53,10-17138 112E-1 13B 76
885B-l-SXSD6 185 250A 199 150B-151D 139
17,4 254 53,4-5 139 12-IAS 138
SlJSDE 197 251A 199 150BC 209
18,5 254 98.21-100.2 76 12413-D 134
!JOSE 107 25213 196 150C 42, 51-52, 73, 76-
1lJ, 4-15 254 173.22-174,1 138 Alcih. 11
9fJSD 162 257A 196 77, 97, 128, 132- 134,
19,13255 174.2-6 138 150DE 207
Lys. 25RE-259D 196 147, 161
llJ,l4 255 Origcncs Apol.
20-IBC 204 Phi1ch. 150C7-8 127, 140
22,10 257 Princ. 20E-21A 86
~ n o 12C 123 !SODE 134
24,10 256 3.1,2-3 93 21B 73
711373,147 1413 187 151A 143
26,8 256 21133-7147
SOCD 73.147 Protag. 151A2-5 134
2o.R-9 257 2RE 139
ROE 209 337E 244 !SlAB 207
27,1 256-257
p
2lJC 139
RID 210 Rcsp. 151C5-D3 133
31,2 243
Philo A1cx.
30A 139
RIE-86C 208 337 A 106 151C6 152
34,5 255
De chr.
30CD 137-138
RSD-8613 193 337D 106 151CD 136-138, 146
34,7 255
162-205 20
31C8-D1142
86A 207 338A 106 1510 138-139
34,8 255
Philodcmus
31D 143,257
8613C 146 507D 157 !SIDE 54
35,4 252
De lib. die.
3313 73, 76
9RA 40-41, 53 50SE-50913 195 151E-186E 85
38,5 243, 245, 256
frg. 26,4-7116
37E 133
Phaedo 509D-511E 196 152A 57
38,1) 248, 258
frg. 26.6-10117,151
37E-38A 108
658 72 527D8 209 152DE 43
40,1 248
frg. 26,7-12 116
Charm.
66B 72,76 564C6 209 152E 43
40,1-2 248
De Stoicis
164E-165A 185
69CD 26 613A 47 153D 34
40,3 248
i2- l3 83
1658 73
69D 181 617C 199 155D 79-80, 185
De vitiis
165BC 146
6904-6 77 Sop h. 156A-157D 39
10,23 114
Crat.
72E 210 230BC 104, 146 157D 209
N
10,24-25 126
384A 107
72E-76E 193 230C 150 157E 81
Numcnius 21,36-37114
384C 146
72E-77A 208 230C-231B 147 159A-160A 43
frg. 24,4 129, 171 21,37-23,37 235
39SD 106
73D 202 2318 146 163A 39
frg. 24,57-59 172 22.3-7 114
Euthyd.
74D 202 242C2 209 167E 29
frg. 24,67-79129 22,20-22 114
2788 30
79C 72, 76, 207 26SA 107 176AB 46,48
frg. 24,69 129 23,20-22115
286C 30
82AB 47 2688 107, 110 176A-C 46
frg. 25 64, 259 23,28-32 115
3028 107
83A 85
176A-E 47
320 INDICES
INDICES
321
1768 47 L134 25 Pcricles
558C 151 72F 152 387E-391E 130
176C 47 L158 173 6,4-5 182
55C 152 73A 151-152 387F 21, 25, 130, 132, 185
1818 179 Ll77 185 Phi lop.
55D 151-152 74C 151-152, 154 389F-390A 167
1R4A-185E 39 Ll89 140
1.396
56A 151-152 74CD 154 390F 141
19lD 73, 78,201 Ll90 140 1,5 96
570 116,152 74D 151-152 391 13C 130
21013 209 Ll98 187 Pomp.
598 151-152 74E 151 391E 130
210C 104, 146 L21089 24,8 122
59C 151 De prof. in virt. 392A 130-131, 185
210C6-Dl 134 A cm. 30,6 122
59CD 151 81C 98 392A-E 14
The a g. 17,5-6 182 Them.
59D 152, 161 82EF 173 392E 101, 158
127E-1288 211 Ag. et Cleom. 17,2156
608 151-152 De cap. ex inim. 392F 179
1288 73, 76, 204 19,6 122 These us
618 151-152 89A 185 393A 130, 132
Tim. Ant. 23. 43
61C 152 90A 150 393A-D 131
28A 217 80,3 25 Timol.
61E 161 92C 151 3938 78
28C 255 A rat. 15,7 122
61F 161 92E 150 393D 130-131
2913-D 217 29,8 159
De lib. cduc. [sp.]
62C 152 Cons. ad Apoll. 394C 130-132, 185, 191
29D 183 41,7 122 9D 201
62D 152 1088 157 394D 130
308 183 5,1 96 De aud. poet.
64A 152 116D 185. 250 De Pyth. or.
41D159,205 Artax. 16C 190. 239
64E 78 Sept. sap. conv. 394E 161
44D 183 17,8 122 17D 181
65D 152 163D 185 395A 187
48D 183,217 Brut. l7DE 80, 162
65E 152-153, 185 1648 185 400D 195
5JD 183 2,3 172 17E 181
65F 153 De sup. 4028 179
54BC215 Cam. 17EF 181
66A 152, 154 11)4E 78 402E 179, 186
55CD 167 6,6 181, 189,253 De aud.
66A-8 151 169A8 182 40413 179
55D 183,217 Cic. 390 98, 103
6613 152 171F 253 408D 179
56A 217 4,1-3 172 42A 25
66E 151-152 Apopht. Lac. [sp.?] 408E 185
56A-B 183 Cor. 43B 98, 103
67B 151-153, 156 23oc 122 409D 179
570 183 38 181 44A 161
67E 152 Mu!. virt. De def. or.
59C 183 De m. 4-mC81
6SC 154 243C 159 412E 187
67C 159, 205 18,6 122 440 122
6SE 151 De Is. et Os. 420C 131
6SB 183 Demetr. 470 162
6SF-69A 152 351CD 189,204 426C 131
6SD 183 38,3-4 159 De ad. et am.
6913 151 351F 98 426F 167
6SE-6(JA 183.218 Dio 48E 152, 156
69E 115, 152-154 355CD 253 4278 167
72D 161 2,4 159
4SE-49A 153
69F 152-153 359F 179 427E 187
90A-D 47 Fa b. 4SEF 150, 152
70A 153 369A 186 429E 141
90E 183 11,1 122
48F 152
7013 151 3718 98 43013 183
92C 217 Luc. 49A 153
70D 152 378A 253 430F 167
Plotinus 2,4 194
49AB 185
70E 25,115,151-152 379E 253 431A 21, 25. 80,167,185
1.2.4-5 149 42,3 172 498 153
70EF 153 382A 158, 205 431D 146,187
Plutarchus Lye. 49E 152
70F 151 382D 197 432C 147
Lamprias-cat. 4,3 161
5013 151
71A 154 382F-383A 101 433DE 195
Ll5 236 1\far.
51C 151
71C 152 DeE 434F 195
L63 60, 171, 174 24,5-6 122
51CD 152
71D 152 384E-385C 239 435E 179
L64 173,236 35,1161
51E-52A 152
71E 151 384EF 78, 132, 190 435E-436A 184
L 70 204 43,3 122 52DE 153
71F 151, 154 385A 25 436CD 157
L 71 174 Marc. 52E 153
71F-72 153 3858 78 436D 186
L63 22, 25-26 14,11 100 53E 151
71F-72A 115, 152 385C 79 437EF 159
L64 25 Nic. 54D-55E 152
72A 152, 154 385D 185 438D 195
L71 25 23,3-4 182
54E 152
72C 151 386E 79 De virt. mor.
Ll31 25, 79, 174, 185 23,5 183 55A8 152
72D 151 387A 190 441F 205
Ll32 213
558117,152
72E 151 387E 23, 129, 132 441F-442A 159
322 I:-.IDICES
INDICES
323
442A 159, 197 589B 145 Amatorius
lOOOB 103 1026C 167
1118C 88, 97, 102, 185,
442B 159 589D 157- 158 750A 244
lOOOB-D 239 1026E 141, 198 250
442BC 141 589E 157 756B 179
lOOOC 103, 250, 257 1029E 140 1118D 103
442C 159 591D 158, 191 761E 196
lOOOD 103, 248-249 De Sto. rep. 1118F97
446F 90, 144 593D 158 764D 195
lOOODE 236 1033A 102 1119B 97,103, 145,147,
447F-448A 160 Quaest. conv.
764D-765F 195 1001B 141 , 198 1033B 211 235
451AB 159 611D 129 764DE 206
1001C 141, 198 1035A-1036A 186 1119BC 98
De coh. ira 613B 129 764E 195
1001D 19&-197 1035A-F 94 1120C 88, 104, 163
456E 161 613F-614A 129 764E-766B 206, 236 1001E 197,208 1036A 161, 186 1120EF 99
De tranq. an. 615E 244 764F 195-196
1001E-1002A 198 1036AB 160, 187, 247 1120F 99
471D 187, 247 618E 122 765A 195-196
1002A 197 l036B 95, 1 56 1121A 99
De am. pro!. 626AB 100 7658 195, 206-207 1002A8 167 1037C 187, 190,239 11218 99
493E-494F 151 629DE 194 7658-F 196 1002B 197-198 1037F 90, 144 1121C 104
495A-497E 151 629EF 123 765E 195 1002C 197 1038A-C 94 1121D 100
De garr. 632A 123 765F 195, 206 1002D 196- 197 1043A 186 1121E 100
511I3185 6328 123 766E 196, 199 1002E 141 , 197-198 10478 223 1121EF 104
De cur. 632D 124 De Her. mal. 1002F 198 1056EF 90 1121F 95, 103-104, 116,
514E 152 6398 203 8710156 1003A 141, 198 1057 A 90, 92, 144 156
De inv. et od. 642D 81 Plac. philos. [sp.] 1003AB 167 1057!3 90 1121F-1122A 105, 162
537A 201 646A 220 8850 145
1004!3 203 1057BC 92 1122A 104
De sera num. 651 F 173 900EF 90. 144 1004CD 199 De comm. not. 1122A8 92,232
549E 21 , 25, 80, 179. 189 655r: 25 90JAI3 90 1007E-1009B 141 l059A 235 11228 89
549EF 179 664C 81 Quat:st. nat.
1011D203 l060A 50, 208 11228-D 89, 92-93, 144
549f- 204 674C 100. 158 916D 203
De an. procr. 1075E-1076A 186 1122C 89-90
550C 180 6ROCD 80, 239 De facie
1012F 141 10838 101 1122CD 90
550CD 48, 180 o80D 80 922EF 25
1013A 198 1083BC 43 1122D 99
5501) 48 680Ef- 80 933A 101
10138 170, 183 Non posse 1122E88,231
550E 48 686A-D 220 933C 158
1013C 159 1086C 85 1122EF 88
558[) 80 691E 100 9438 198
1013E 167 1086E 102-103 1122r: 92, 95
55913-D 43 69213 233 945A 198
1013EF 159 1090A 103 1123A 96
55lJD 141 7003 183 De prim. frig.
1013F 183 1096F 244 ll23A-11248 91
5osc 161 702D 23 945F 215
l013F-l014A 170, 183 1101C 253 11238-F 225
5()713 161 715F 161 946F 217
10148 48 Adv. Col. 1123DE 100
De fato [sp.] 716D-717A 220 947D 215
1014E 159,198 1107E 22, 26, 85 1123E 189, 250
57413 204 717D 22, 26 948A 215
1015A 167 1107EF 25 1123F 91, 100
De gcnio Socr. 718CD 100 9488 215, 217
10158 159 1108A8 86 1124B 100, 105, 158-159
579F 144. 156 718E 100. 147, 158 94S8C 215, 221
1015E 167 1lOS8 103, 231 1124C 103, 114, 145, 235
580A 144 7198129 948C 21&-217
10168 198 1108D 84 1124DE 96
5803 144 7208 167 9498 99
1016C 141, 197-198 1108F-1109A 234 1125A 78
580C 144 728F 170, 183 952A 218
1022F-1023A 159 1110E 234 De libidine et aegritudine
580D 143 732E 161 952C-955C 216
1023C 198 1115C 187,247 9 159
580F 144 734D-735A 213 955A 218
1023D 141, 198 1115C-1116E 101 De vita et poesi Homeri
581A8 257 734F 219 955C 171 , 214,219
1024A 159 1116E-1119C 235 [sp.]
5818 143 740A8 130 Quacst. Plat.
1024A8 167 1116EF 86, 121, 251 131 159
581D 143, 145 741C 166 999C 122
i
10248 141
1117D 86, 102-103, 146, 212144
5828 144 7448 78, 201
999C-1000E
1024C 141, 198 212,239 fragmenta
588C 145 745CD 199 Sec chap. 4: passim
1024E 141, 198 1117F 87 frg. 134-138 206
588D 157-158 745E 199,201 , 206,236 999D 105, 256
1024EF 198, 205 1118A 87,103 frg. 144-146 206
588DE 142, 158 747B 244 999DE 235
1025C 205 11188 87, 100 frg. 215 202
588E 145, 157 999E 103, 257
1025CD 159 11188C 86 frg. 215-217 203
324 INDICES
INDICES
325
frg. 215a 202 93.!3-17143 26,30-44 149
8,143 166 2,49,8-9 47 46,10 245, 257
frg. 215b 202 155,17-20 137 eh. 21-23 37
8,159 216 2,49,16-50,10 47 46,13 257
frg. 215e 202 155,20-22 137
8,480 149 2,86,17-19 90, 144 48,1 255
frg. 215d 202 155,25-28 137
Q
8.481 150 2,87,16145 De an.
frg. 215e 202. 204 17!.5-8 76
Pyrrh. Hyp. 2,88,1-2 92 17,11-12 77,97
frg. 215f 202, 204, 208- 236,10-14 33
Quintilianus
1,4 70 2,88,1-6 93 17,11-12. 185
209 283,1-286,18 76
8,6,55 124
1, 7 12,69 2,108,12-15118 Themistius
frg. 215g 202 8, 9-21 268
9,2,44 120
1. 8-12 216 2,111,18-112,4 90 Or.
frg. 215h 201-202 9,19-10,2 268
9,2,45-46 113, 120
1,13-15 55.61 2,117,11-15141 13,161B-162A 206,236
frg. 215i 202 In Plat. Remp.
1,26 216 Suda 21,259A 121
frg. 215j 203 1,6. 1-4 37
s
1.31 -39 57 4,690 213 21,2598 122
frg. 2!5k 201,203 l,l5,!9-2! 33
1,61 216 SVF 24,301C 201
frg. 2151203 In Plat. Tim.
Scripton: s Historiae 1.117216 I 59 38 Theognis
frg. 215m 203 1, 7.24-8,1 129
Augustac 1.118-119 99 I 197 45 1.432 161
frg. 216a 203 1,254.19-255.26 39
Hadr. 1.146 245 I 605 102 Theon Smyrn.
frg. 2lfic 202 1,254.41-255.2 39
16.10-11 230 1,152 245 II 836 90 De ut. math.
frg. 216J 202 1,255.2 39
Scncca 1,159 245 II 966 145 14-15 148
frg. 216c 202 1,255.2-6. 54
Ep. 1.165 189, 250 II 988 93 Thcophrastus
frg. 217 200-201 1,255.4-6 39
94.9 257 1,188-191 234 Ill 4 141 Char. 1113
frg. 217a 202 1,255,21 56
Exhort . 1,196 216 Ill 169 90, 144 . De scns.
frg. 217h 202 Thcol. Plat.
frg. 18 257
1.200 216
. ..
111171 92- 93 19 157
frg. 217c 203 l,X-9 268
Scxtus Empirieus 1.202-206 216 Ill 173 145 41 157
frg. 217J 203 Prolegomena in l'lat.
AJv. 1\lath.
1.206 103, 149 111548 90 Timon
frg. 217e 203,210 philosophiam
2.28 245
1.216-219 56 11!630 118 Silloi
frg. 217f203, 210 10, 1-3 69
7.49 181 1.220-225 185 lll72H 245 S H frg. 799 56. 1 18, 235
frg. 217h 202. 204. 210 10.1 -n 65
7,110-111 159 1.221 31 , 69, 129 Syrian us
frg. 217i 202 10,4-6 31
7.122-124181
1.226 237 In Arist. Mctaph.
X
frg. 217j 202 10.4-770
7.150 91 1.226-232 168 1,1-20 33
f rg. 2\7k 202. 204 10,10-12 72
7,150-157 163
1.227 167 5-U-4 33
Xcnophon
fr);!. . 2171 202 10.16-20 72
7.155-156164 1.229 167, 224
Apol.
Polystratus 10,23-25 72
7,155-157 91
1,229-230 165
T
1-2 136
De contcmptu 10.26-33 72
7. 158 93
1.231-232 165
14 86
7 .2s-s.o 116 10.34-4 1 72
7,159- lfi5 168
1.232 66
Tacit us M cm.
lo.23-17,1J 235 10,39-41 76
7, 166-189 168
I ,232-233 237
Dial. 1,1 ,2 135
lti,2X 116, 152 10.50-52 72
7,190-200 98
1,232-234 93
4 244 1,1,4 143
lti,2X-29 115 10,58-5lJ 72
7.224 159
1,234 64, 66, 259
Tcrtullianus 1,2,12 126
21.2-5 116 10,59-00 72
7.242 164
1,235 40, 71. 192
Ad nat. 4,3,12 143
Porphyrius 10,60-63 73, 189
7,248 38. 208
2, 22 185
2,2,11 252 4,8, 1 135, 143
Sent. 10,64 74
7.257 38
2, 79 216
2,2,12 252 Occ.
32 149 10,65-67. 204
7,257-258 41
2,97 166
2,4, 15 250, 252 3,14 115
Prod us 10,66-67 76
7,258 38
2.188 103, 149
Apol. 7,2-3115
In Plat. Parm. 10.67-71 76
7,264185
3,209 245
22 257 Symp.
630.37-635,27 268 10,67-72 72
7,402-403 38
Stohacus
22,1 257 4,19 123
992,29-994,12 268 10,72 76
7,402-411 100
Eel.
46,5-6 257 4,61-64124
In Plat. Ale. I 11,1-2 76
7,403 38
1,475,2-8 65
46,9 255
6,4-10 135 11,13-16 76
7,409 159
11.3-4 135 12,1-3 69
7,421100
27,4-7207 17 27
7,438 100
80,5-7 143 17,19-27 31
7,443 216
83,6-7 143 17,19-29 73
8.5 98
GENERAL INDEX
The reader is advised first to consult the index locorum.
A
Academy 21, 26
Old 64, 173, 185
unity of the 59, 104, 171,
174, 185
action, theory of 89, 96
aci.Ha 165
adultery 243, 245, 257
Aenesidemus 20, 36, 57-58,
61-62,67,99, 169, 193
Aeschines 119

see sensation
a/.:atah'psia 11, 50, 161, 193,
223, 227' 229, 237-238
a!a;:.oncia102-103, 113,118,
121, 125, 128, 133, 145,212,
232, 235, 257-258
Alhinus 17, 29,208
Alcinous 17, 208
Ammonius (Piutarch's
teac!H.:r) 21, 26, 78, 130,
192, 199,222
anamnesis 49, 72-73, 76, 78,
127, 193,212,236
Anaxagoras 119,162,182,
184, 254
Anaximcncs 254
Antiochus 9,13-14,20, 35, 59,
68, 120, 128, 132, 156, 171-
172, 192-193,251
Antipater 92, 169
Antisthenes 254
aparal!axia 100, 225, 235
aporia 79, 97, 127, 132, 250
appropriation 44, 49, 94, 155
apraxia 87, 96, 105, 231, 235
Apuleius 19
Arcesilaus 10, 58, 62, 65-66,
70, 81,83-84,91,93, 96,100,
104,119,162,164,168-169,
172, 202,231, 251, 256
Aristocles 163
Ariston of Ceos 114
Aristophanes (corn.) 126
Aristophanes of Byzantium
29
Aristotle 219, 254
Arius Didymus 20, 47
assimilation 46, 49, 61
ataraxia 101,264
a theism 176, 178, 181, 252, 262
Atticus 18
B
body 72, 76, 158-159, 193, 199
c
Carncadcs 10, 26, 62,
70, 92, 95,164,170-172,174,
178, 202,223-224, 245,251,
256
Celsus 259
characterisation of dia-
logues 27, 33, 72, 147,149
Chrysippus 92, 95, 171, 187,
254 and passim
Cleanthes 254
Cleombrotus 194
Clitomachus 71,100,165,168,
170, 178, 192, 229
Colotes 81, 84, 105, 171, 212,
231, 251
criterion 37-38,40, 54, 85, 91,
93,101,112,168,197-198,
224, 228, 237-239
Cyrenaics 84, 104
D
daimonion 135, 140, 145, 157,
205,211,257
Delphi 24, 78, 86, 96, 131,251
Democritus 33, 84, 119, 162,
254
dialogue 132, 244
see also characterisation
of dialogues
cliaphtmia 158, 189, 229, 249,
252, 255
didactic ignorance 51 . 146,
160, 190,211
Diogencs of Apollonia 254
Diogenes of Babylon 254
divination 79, 86, 174, 178,
180,230, 257,260-261
dogma 12, 42, 49, 53, 55, 59-
61 , 64, 66-67,74,77, 105,
191
dogmatic scepticism
sec negative dogmatism
doxa
see opinion
dual causality 181, 183-184,
217-218,220
E
eclecticism 34
eikos 183,219
elenctics 72, 82, 145, 150, 154
Empedocles84,119,162,181,
216
Epicharmus 43
Epictetus
eh. 5 passim
Epicurus 83, 125, 254
epistt!lne 40, 87
epoc/ze11,B5,B7,96,101,158,
161, 170-171,190,193,214,
221 ' 248-249
equipollence 55, 95, 186,214,
216, 218
Eros 195
.. erotic art" 76, 204, 206, 211,
213, 236
esoteric doctrine 62, 64, 66,
174
ethical virtue 253
Eudorus 20, 35, 192
eu!aheia 131 , 178-181,218
eu!ogmz 93, 168
F
faith 178, 180.230,253, 262
Favorinus 67. 163, 242-243,
245-246. 264
eh. 5 passim
flattery 151-152
Forms,
sec Itleas
Fronto 243, 245, 259
G
Gaius 19, 34-35
Galcnus
eh. 5 passim
gnatlzi sazaon 96, 131, 153,
185, 250
growth, argument on 43
H
Harpocration 19
Heraclides of Pontus 254
Heraclitus 14, 43, 97, 101, 105
Homerus 174
INDICES
I
Ideas 198, 206, 239
ignorance 146
impression 38, 54, 88, 167,
222-223 and passim
in utramque part em disserere
190, 223, 246
irony 105, 126-127, 133, 136,
139, 151,257
isostlzeneia
see equipollence
K
kata!epsis 11 , 38, 40, 55, 70,
90, 161, 193, 222, 224, 227,
229
katharsis 72, 145, 148, 150,
157, 162,205
knowledge (passim)
human 74-75, 144,184,189,
204, 230, 250
divine 74-75
/.:oini: ennoia SO
see also plzysi/.:e ennoia
M
maieutics 49, 53, 76, 127, 130,
134, 138, 203- 205, 211
mathematics 148, 197
matter 61, 166, 184
medcn agan 130-131,181, 185
Mclissus 84
Mncmosync 78, 201-202, 210
Modcratus 20
N
negative dogmatism 57-58,
170, 190, 238
Neo-Pyrrhonism
see Pyrrhonism
Nicomachus of Gerasa 20
number of stars 166
number of worlds 166, 194
327
0
oikeiosis
see appropriation 44
opinion 39--41,98, 101, 148,
150, 158-161, 165, 179,212,
214,218
p
paidia 127, 133, 135,211
Parmenides 84, 119
parrlu!sia 116-117,151-153
plzanwsia
see impression
plzi!awia
see self-love
Philo of Larissa 10, 13, 59, 65,
70-71, 170-171, 174, 192
philosophy 132,214-215,218,
249
physike ennoia 50, 148, 206,
210
piety 80, 131, 176,232
pitlumon 164, 166-167, 170,
180, 188,219-220, 224, 227,
229, 238
p!ekti/.:on 41
Plotinus 13
Plutarchus 21, 26, 59-60, 78,
82, 258, 264
eh. 3 passim
eh. 4 passim
eh. 5 passim
Polemo 162
Polycrates 125
Posidonius 35
Protagoras 56, 61, 173
providence 179, 186, 230, 253,
260-261' 263
Pyrrho 55, 57, 173, 233,254,
256
Pyrrhonism 53, 58, 163, 173,
218,221,225,236-237
see also Sextus Empiricus,
Aenisidemus
Pythagoras 43, 81, 254
Pythagoreans 25
328
R
recolkction
see anamnesis
rt:velation 175-176, 256, 262
rhetoric 247,263
s
Sl.!cond titles 39
sclf-knowkJge 150, 161,185,
250
sec also gni'Jtlti sauton
S!.!lf-love 150, 161, 191
semllolt's 131
sensation 39, 57, 87, 98, 101,
157-158, 195, 197' 205-206,
218, 220
Severus 19
Sextus Empiricus 62, 67
Sirnonides 256-257, 264
1-f\O{JiiS 37, 39
Socrates 169, 181, 212, 231,
250-251' 256
INDICES
eh. 3 passim
eh. 4 passim
sophistry 103-104, 107, 138-
139, 144, 148, 154,212,232,
234, 257
soul, composition 159, 198,
204
Speusippus 254
Stilpo 84
sun 195
superstition 81,241,252,262-
263
syllogisms 32
T
Taurus18,222,234
Thalcs 254
l'!H:on of Smyrna 20
Theophrastus 254
Thrasyllus 27-28, 30, 33, 39,
204
truth 160-162, 174. 181. 195,
224, 239, 248-249. 254, 256,
258-259, 262-263
Typhon 97-98
V
\'eri simile 187-188, 249
X
Xenophanes 119, 162,181,
254
Xenophon 109.119,126,254
z
Zeno of Citium 83. 91,254
Zcno of SiJon 125
zetctics 12, 68, 80. 127. 146.
154, 164, 174. 191, 196,239,
247-248, 250, 258, 262
anJ passim
INDEX OF !\IODERN AUTHORS
A
Aalders 96
84. 102-103
Adlcr 213, 236
Ahlborn 244
Albini 84, 116
Albrecht 10
Amico 56. 169
Andn::scn 184
12-13. 31. 38, 58, 7F-
72, 77, 83, 91. 93, 147, 163-
164, 169, 197
Arnim, van 131, 142-144, 192
Axclson 244-245, 250, 254-
255, 257
B
I33bbitt 23, 79, 98, 154, 167,
181, 184. 190
I3abut 21-22, 24-26, 50, 60,
80-81, 84, 89, 131-132,
142-144, 152-153, 156, 159,
167, 171, 173-174,181, 184,
186-187, 192,194,213-214,
220-221. 233, 253, 261
Bachrens 229, 242-245, 257
Baldassarri 92, 101 , 186, 189,
214
Baldwin 213
34, 135, 148-149, 167,
172
Barbc 112
I3arigazzi 142, 160, 177, 196,
213, 222-223, 225, 227, 229,
236-237, 239, 243-244
Barnes 12, 31, 38, 55, 58, 67,
71, 87, 120, 192, 226
Barrow 59
Bastianini 19, 34-37, 39-41,
43, 45-46, 49-50, 54-57, 59,
65-66, 68, 136
Battegazzorc 24, 80, 156, 186,
217
I3eaujcu 159, 222, 229, 241-
245, 247' 250, 252, 254-259,
263
Bccchi 120, 153
Beck 142
Bcckcr 244, 247, 252, 254-
255, 259, 262-264
Bcrgson 110,113,115
I3etolaud 155
Bcutlcr 200-202
Bignone 104
I3luck 107
Bock 142, 144
Bodcr 107-110
Bolkestcin 194
Bos 135
I3oulognt.: 219
Bowit.: 213, 230
Boys-Stont.:s 101-102, 174,
186,216
Brenk 47-48, 88, 142, 177,
180-182, 184, 192, 194-196,
207
Brennan 56, 58
Brinkmann 236
Brisson 43
Broecker 187
I3rokate 117
Brown 110
Brunschwig 11, 58, 224
Brunt
BUchner 109-110, 113-115
Burnet 140
Burnyeat 11, 49, 55- 56, 58,
87, 169, 183
c
Cairns 147
Callanan 213
Carver 244-245, 257
Chantraine 106
Chatzilysandros 11, 57, 222
Chcrniss 92, 95,104, 127, 133-
134, 137, 141-143, 145-146,
151, 155, 157, 159, 162, 183,
186-187, 190, 197-198,207,
210, 214, 219,256
Chilton 84
Clark 135
Ckmcnt 80
CoJignola 173
Colardcau 213, 221-222, 226,
234
Concolino Mancini 105
Corlu 142-144
Cornford 39, 52, 134, 159
Cotter 106
Couissin 11,104,164
Couloubaritsis 174
Couvreur 143, 189
Cr6riert84. 101,105.235
Cuvigny 156, 196, 230. 233
D
Dassaritis 141
Dccharmc 131, 173. 177
Decleva Caizzi 30, 36. 57-58
de Faye 10, 176-177,241
dt: Labriollt: 241, 245,256
De Lacy 26, 84-89, 92, 96-
100, 102-105, 124, 158, 167,
171, 179, 181, 184-185,202,
225-226, 231, 233
Del Re 131
de Maistre 180
330
Desideri 181-182
Des Places 13, 19, 64, 66, 102,
129,142, 163, 165,171-172,
216, 235, 259
de Strycker 108, 135, 140
Deuse 183
Diels 34-35,40-41,49-50, 52,
74, 235
Dillon 9, 18-19,21,24-25,32,
35-36,38,40-41,47-48,61,
131, 171-174, 193,208
Di Stefano 9, 19, 120
Donini 19, 21-24, 47, 60, 69,
90, 101, 167, 184-186, 192,
195, 214-218, 220-221' 226,
265
Don: 114-115
Dtiring 83, 114, 120, 125-126,
139, 142, 144,219,236
Dorrit: 13-14, 19, 31, 34-35,
47-48, 64, 66, 123, 135,
148-149, 169, 172, 176, 185,
194-195, 197,268
Doty 12,38
Dn:xh:r 155
Ducos 222
Dumont 169. 176, 222, 236-
237
E
Einarson 26, 84-88, 97-100,
102-105, 158, 171, 179,231
Eist:le 194
Erbse 177
Erler 100, 114
Evenepoel 262
F
Falconer 253
Ferraria 10
Ferrarino 241, 244, 247
Festugierc 261
Flaceliere 23, 79, 131, 143,
176-177, 194
Fladen:r 14, 83. 109, 120
Foucault 10
Fowler 85, 100
Frede 11, 13, 38, 55, 58, 87, 94,
INDICES
164
Freudenthal 17, 31
Friedlander 135, 144, 204
Froidefond 48, 127, 173, 183
Fuhrer 59, 164
Fuhrmann 123, 147, 194
G
Gallo 117
Gartner 247-248, 263-264
Garvey 75
Gawlick 170
Georgiadou 100, 142, 157
Giannantoni 83
Gigante 85, 105, 115
Giusta 47, SO
Glover 244, 247, 263
Glucker 10, 13-14, 21-24, 26,
34-36, 42, 44, 49, 62-65, 69,
71, 77, 104, 160, 165-166,
168-171, 177, 185-188,
192-193, 213, 219, 222,
226-227, 229, 233, 236, 238;
242, 259
Goeucckcmeyer 92, 162, 170,
176, 219,242
Goransson 20, 27, 31,47
Giirgcmanns 176, 214
Gorier 14, 29, 49, 55, 57, 64,
71, 164, 168, 170-171, 192,
268
Gourinat 109-110,113
Graeser 162
Grcaru 142. 155
Grice 110,112
Griffiths 98
Griswold 109, 143
Gudeman 150
Gundert 135, 140
Guthrie 109, 125-126, 135,
143, 147, 185, 197
H
Hadot 170, 222
Hamilton 142, 147
Hani 142, 144
Hankinson 34-36, 49, 57, 65,
92-93, 168-170, 222, 225-
226, 229, 238
Hardie 142, 157, 191
Hartman 155, 173, 176, 214,
222
Hegel10
Heiberg 34-35, 40-41, 49-50,
52
Hcinze 142
Helmbold 78, 103, 166, 193,
214-215,219
Helmer 183
Hclmreich 225, 229
Hendrickson 119
Hcrshbell 85, 101-102, 131,
142-143, 182-184,206
Hicks 28
Hirzt:l 10, 21, 142, 145, 152,
162, 177. 206, 229, 236, 238.
242-244
Hofncit 80
Holford-Strcvcns 213. 238,
243-244
Holtorf 176, 197
Hopfner 98
Huhbd 119
Hubert 123, 155
I
Inuelli 115-117
lngenkamp 80, 131-132. 151-
152, 160, 191,248,261
lnvernizzi 19, 37, 42, 47, 49.
51, 68, 191,209
Ioppolo 11, 13, 36, 38, 41, 80,
83, 92-93, 95, 100, 104, 120,
143,164-165,168-171, 173,
187, 222-223, 226-228, 233,
236, 238-239, 259
Irigoin 59, 176-177
Isnardi Parente 25, 101, 105,
197
J
Jagu 232, 236
Jensen 114
Jones 78, 127, 173-174, 183,
192-193
Joyal143, 204
K
Kahle 203
Kerr 244, 247, 251, 256, 258,
262-263
Kidd 141
King 208, 245
Klacrr 81
Klcve 85, 101, 105, 114, 125-
126, 235, 257
Klevcr 55, 165, 167
Knogel114
Kramcr 10, 12, 57-58, 62, 64,
90, 135. 144, 164, 172, 178
KUhn 32
L
Lachcnauu 11,156
Lafrancc 197
Lakmann 18
Lamb 135
Lapp 109-112
107
Latzarus 142
Laursr.:n 11. 55. 87, 93. 96. 169,
176
Lausbr.:rg 110,112
Leuger 135
Lr.:c Sing 260-261
Lconaru 252
Leshr.:r 13, 147
Lcvi 176
Uvy 11. 13-15,21,34,45.48-
49.58-60,63--65.67.71,74,
76-77, 89, 91-92, 94. 119.
162. 164. 168-169.178, 192,
259
Lilla 35. 131
Llewelyn 79
Long 10, 12, 35, 38. 40, 43-45,
54-56. 58. 64, 80. 83, 92-93,
100-101, 126, 139. 143.
163-164, 166, 168-169, 173.
178, 224, 226. 236
Longo 214,216
Louis 17, 47, 197,208
Luschnat 193, 201,203
Lynch 21
INDICES
M
lv1acKendrick 260-261
Mansfeld 17, 27, 29, 31, 35, 37,
148, 204
Manuli 224
Markantonatos 109
Marquardt 225, 229
Martano 172
Martin 195-196,206
Meautis 142, 180
Mensching 213, 233
Miller 118
Minar 166
Mineur-van Kassen 108-109
Misuri 10
Moraux 57
35, 178, 199
Mossman 213
Motte 135
Mras 74
Muclkr 225, 229
Muhl219
Mutschmann 117
N
Nardelli 101, 106. 114, 116,
118, 235
Nikobiuis 81, 142. 144
Norvin 193, 200, 203
Niisser 17, 27, 29, 31. 73, 148-
149, 204
Nuzzo 214
0
O'Ncil 78, 103, 193
O'Ncill137
Olufather 231-232
Osorio Yidaurre 184, 253
p
Paton 79
Pavlu 204
Pcarson 203
Pease 252
Perrin 172, 180-183
Peters 145, 147
Pezzati 235-237
Pfeffer 178
Philippon 81, 176-177
Pinnoy 141, 159,196
331
Pohknz 79, 99, 103, 127, 139,
176
Pourrat 142
Praechter 19, 34-35, 37, 39,
42, 44, 47, 49', 51-52, 65-66,
68, 70, 176, 191
Puech 23, 213, 233, 236
Q
Quispel 241,246
R
Rackham 63, 119-120, 165,
169-170, 260
Radice 12
Realc 12
Rcckmans 88
Rciskc 99
Rcndall 244, 247, 251, 256,
258. 262-263
Rcpici 178
Rcscigno 166, 194
Ricth 114
Riley 101,114-115,126,142
Rist 13, 35
Robin 176
Rodrfguez Alonso 253
Rolfe 236-237, 239
Roloff 108-109,113
Romano 140, 199,203
Rose 97,203
Runia 14
Russell 25, 142
s
Saffrey 171
Sandbach 38, 59, 78, 122, 159,
166, 200-203, 206-207,210
Santese 10
Sayre 147
Schafer 59
Schleiermacher 135
Schmertosch 177
332
Schnaublin 168
Schneider 10
Schofield 95, 179
Scholtz 10, 175
Schoppe so, 141, 191,207
Schrenk SO, 193, 208
Schrodcr 174
Schroeter 84, 92, 167, 175-
176, 180,210, 214
Schubart 34-35, 40-41, 49-50,
52
Schuster 22, 128, 214
Schweighiiuscr 139
Scdley 10- 12, 19, 34-41, 43-
46, 49-50, 54-59, 65-66, 68,
72, 74, 80, 92-93, 100. 136,
163-164, 166, 169, 173,205,
228
Segonds 37, 69- 70, 72-73, 76-
77, 135, 137-138, 149
Seibert 179
Seide 100
Sepp 22, 131
Shorey 197
Sieveking 79
Sirinelli 81, 176- 177
Slings 108. 140
Soury 142-145. 177, 199
Stadter 203
Steel 268
Stein 113
Steiner 199
Stoike 142
Stough 12-13,44,66-68, 168-
169
Strauss 135
I:'-IDICES
Striker 10-12, 37- 38, 67, 90,
92-94, 164, 169, 173
Sutton 119
T
Tarrant 11-14, 19-20, 25, 27,
29- 30, 32-38, 40-41 ' 46,
49- 50,53, SS, 58, 61,64-69,
71 - 74, 77, 137, 148-149,
168, 171, 191-193, 204,206,
208-209
Taylor 159
Teodorsson 81, 123-124, 194
141 , 167, 183
Todd 178
Trapp 195
Treu 59
Trouillard 37, 69-70, 72-73,
76-77. 137. 149
Tsekourakis 114
u
Ueherweg 66, 176
llsener 103
V
Valgiglio 96, 131 , 178. 180,
211 . 248. 254. 258, 260-263
Vallozza 123
Van der Stockt 98, 147. 158
Van Groningen 161
Vancamp 49
Vander Wacrdt 58. 80, 84-85,
89, 91-93, 95, 97, 101. 104,
115, 125-126,143,169, 251
Verbeke 141 . 167
Vermander 245. 259, 263
Vernit:re 142.177
Vink 135
Vlastos 147
Volkmann 173. 175- 177. 200
Von Albrecht 241, 243-247,
254- 255, 262
\V
Weische 10, 63-64
Westerink 37. 69- 70. 72-73,
76-77, 137-138, 149, 200-
201
Westman 85-86, 92. 99. 102-
103, 124
Whittaker 17, 47. 131. 193,
197, 207-209
Williams 11
Wis'niewski 192
Witt 56
Woodruff 13. 83
z
Zacher 84. 102-103
Zanatta 95
Zdler 9-10. 66. 92, 167. 174-
177.200. 214.219
Ziegkr 59. 142, 177, 201 . 214,
219
Zintzen 9. 35