Perception and Reality in the Making of Foreign Policy Author(s): P.N.

Haksar Source: India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (JUNE 1986), pp. 229-238 Published by: India International Centre Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23001476 . Accessed: 05/03/2014 06:31
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LECTURE

VI: UNDERSTANDING

FOREIGN

POLICY

Perception Foreign

and Policy

Reality

in

the

Making

of

P.N. New Senior Mr. public

HAKSAR India Delhi

at the

extempore, speaks, International Centre, on 10 and a June 1986. statesman, well-known

diplomat is Haksar figure

in India.

WHEN I was thinking about the theme of my talk for this evening, I suddenly realized that I have perhaps unwittingly led myself into and "reality" are extremely great difficulties. Words like "perception" contentious. And my only hope is that there aren't in the audience, who will this very distinguished audience, philosophers professional make

an area of grave doubt as to what is real and what is not real. Be that as it may, for my purpose 1 don't want to go into epistemiology or theories of knowledge as to what is real and what is not real. I will the existence of phenomena which can be subsumed merely assume the word as also under the word "perception". The under "reality" only point that I wish to make is that if one studies these two sets of one does not invariably find a one-to-one correspondence phenomena 229

than it is! Around these words my life even more unbearable been woven great philosophical and "perception" "reality"have western and the in the eastern system of thought. both in traditions, with In fact, in the eastern system of thought, there is an obsession the question, what is Reality? And the western system of thought is One is always in full of conflicts between Reality and its Perception.

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P.N.

HAKSAR

between perceived

them. It is not as and vice versa.

if Reality,

howsoever

defined,

is perfectly

tend to persist. During reality has, in effect, changed, old perceptions of International Affairs, I have often found that my limited experience the main difficulties arise from our incapacity to have a close approxi since I am proceeding of reality. Perhaps, mation in our perception a suffice. few examples might They are drawn at empirically here, random from my memories of readings are from my own experience. One in history, and some of them

This hiatus between one's Perception and the Reality, which one has to cope with in the arena of International Affairs, is a continuing problem. One has to be aware of it in order not to commit too many or seeing reality refracted mistakes by either having false perceptions, through the prism of ideas, value systems, moulds of thought, carried over from the past. Such thought structures and formations of ideas and values have regrettably a durability to an extent that even when

of the most dramatic ones, which forms a part of my own I was is an eventI believe it was in October 1938when experience, return of Mr. Chamber we all awaited the Neville in London: anxiously or rather Hitler in Munich, lain from his talks with Herr Adolf in a He London came back to called a place Berchtesgaden. and a piece of paper in his hand, moodwith joyously triumphant that the piece of paper which he had signed with Herr proclaiming Adolf in our time". a guarantee of, as he put it, "Peace even a meaner intelligence, and people possessing People possessing in those days thought that somehow this achieve less of experience, in Munich was not quite what he took ment of Mr. Neville Chamberlain of his, that he had somehow it to be. Indeed, that perception got an of peace in his time, came up against the reality as it un assurance Hitler was folded itself within eight months was the beginning of the Second of the signing World War. of that agreementthis

Now, prime ministers, presidents, foreign ministers, diplomats and The so on, are, by definition, men of more than ordinary intelligence. on the what call is not based lack of of I.Q. people perception falsity how could a prime minister, or A.Q. There is, therefore, this question: of all the facts at his command, have come to the con in possession clusion around of assured the corner? example, not drawn strictly from the realm of poli two books. One is a very famous there appeared peace in his timewhen actually a world war was

I have another tics. Around 1911

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UNDERSTANDING

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book, The Great Illusion, by a very famous writer, Norman Angell. If you read that book, which I did in my young days, you will find him and even greater conviction, arguing with a great deal of passion marshalling facts as he saw them, or as he perceived them, that war was no longer a possibility or a profitable enterprise. In the same year, there was a book written by a German general, called von Bernhardi, and it had an appropriate title, Germany and the Next War. The title itself is interesting because in General Bernhardi's perception war was somehow brewing. Here were two men, belonging to the same pattern of civilization, Western Europe, who, writing in the same year, came to opposite And conclusions. come that these two perceptions this question has tormented me: how are so much at variance with reality as a historical fact? After all, howsoever a bent of mind philosophical one has, one has to accept that World War I was a reality, for certain World War I took place. purposes: We

have other examples from more recent times. The United for conceived that the world as emerging after the instance, States, Second World War, and as presented in United States' formulation of world: a its foreign policy picture, was a rather simple, dichotomous A value and a world of Democracy. world of International Communism, was attachedalthough in my humble view, in matters judgement a moral should best be to priori Foreign Policy judgements relating the arena of because International Affairs has left out, been, until Sermon on the or the of the Mount Buddha now, despite preachings the it is arena of morality: an arena or anybody you may have, outside of conflict of what are called "interests". find that in dealing with the world as it is, one has the as best as possible, to try and understand, reality compulsion it. And in the effort necessary for doing so, howsoever you may define to consciously somehow transcend the I have found it is essential in terms of which the human mind, or policy very formal paradigms, So makers, or politicians, tend to think. Now, the perception of the United States in the post-war years, cast in this simple dichotomy of International Communism led them quite normally and naturally into the vast Democracy, we

being versus

of seeking to erect barriers the of enterprise against spread I happened to be in England at the time when they Communism. debated with the British, with a great deal of passion, about what they call the "Southern flank of NATO". And if one goes through the record of debates on Foreign Affairs in the Hansard, one gets the following picture: there is, they said, a great man in the Middle East, called Nur-e-Said and that around Nur-e-Said Pasha and Iraq Pasha,

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HAKSAR

be erected a structure of security called the Middle East That took place in the year of grace, 1952. Naturally, Organization. Yet when one erects a structure, one doesn't expect it to collapse. in 1958, within six years, the whole structure collapsed. I am not was good, or the structuring was good saying whether the collapse or bad: I am concerned only with noting the facts of history. There there would fore I conclude that there was something, be called a falsity of perception. The same somewhere, which might

thing happened years later with regard to a structure which moved further east into Iran, linking Iran in the Regional set-up which involved Iran, Pakistan Cooperation Programme Development of and Turkey. And the Shahenshah of Iran was, after the disposal Mr. Mussadegh, the centrepiece of a new structure.

of 1971 in Quite by accident, rather than by design, the events of the world our sub-continent chanceries sent a message across the India and it certainly went to Iranthat Indira Gandhi's of'71, with a its triumph in Bangla was emerging as power in its own Desh, right. I'm not saying whether this perception was right or wrong; such was the perception. Iran, from years of hostility towards Suddenly steps to India, explicitly expressed by theirforeign minister, Zahidi,took in their relations with India. They sent an emissary to New Delhi in the first week of January 1973, a man called who came here and insisted that our prime Sarfullam Rashidianan, minister send an emissary to Iran. Although I was due to retire, I was with the Shahenshah asked to go. In the course of my conversations of Iran, I asked His Imperial Majesty the following question: I said that I often witnessed when I was in Vienna, and even earlier, in London, that a very large number of young Iranians tended to express their dissatisfaction with Iran; and how come that when Iran had a growth rate of 14 per cent and had no foreign exchange problems (with which correct this one-sidedness we had been boast

bedevilled from time to time, and we certainly could not of a growth rate of 14 per cent, ever), how come that there was The Shahenshah of Iran replied that I was not such disgruntlement? to worry too much about these young men; he said there are always me that he had the in society, and he assured elements disgruntled means to 'take care' of them. He repeated this with greater confidence in '76. And within three years history was to ask, who 'took care' of Did the young men 'take care' of the Shahenshah of Iran 'take care' of them? the Shahenshah whom? Here down. we have a series of Iran, or

These

are not the

which somehow of perceptions of some weak country perceptions

broke with a

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mass of illiteracy behind it, not a poor, poverty-stricken country. They are perceptions of the United States, in the post-war years, of suc cessive attempts to build up structureswhich successively collapsed. to the question of And, I often wonder and ask myself, in response the kind of foreign policy one should have for one's own country: what are the basic elements that one must inevitably take into account during the formulation of any foreign policy? Of course, at a formal level of presentation, all foreign policies seem to pursue the same aim: from Moscow, to Peking, to Washington, to London, to Parisevery government, every prime minister, every foreign minister would assure you that they are pursuing a foreign of course, they would sayin the pursuit of peace policyunselfishly, on this earth, in the pursuit of cooperation on this earth, and in the pursuit of the well-being of their respective peoples.

Then their foreign policies are also clothedthey wear garments in moral tones. The Americans would invariably say that their of democracy and human rights; the foreign policy is in defence Russians would say that their foreign policy is for peace, or nuclear and for social progress, for the liberation of the people disarmament, from racial discrimination, from colonialism and neo-colonialism; the Chinese am in their own the same I would, thingalthough way, say bound to observe that the Chinese of shows foreign policy expression more zig-zags the Chinese call it zig-zagsthan the foreign policy of almost any other country.

had an institution called the Great Hall of the Barbarians, where all matters relating to foreigners were dealt with; in fact, the Hall of the Barbarians was the place for the conduct of China's re international lations. I make no comment on this fact. But, there is a way in which a nation its position in the itself, its own self-estimate, expresses of reality world, and its relationship with other countries as an aspect which must be taken into account. So these have a realistic are of over-riding importance, if we are to perceptions foreign policy which does not draw heavily, as it were,

This raises a question that perceptions are not simple phenomena to divine; they are deeply embedded of in the historical consciousness each country. There is a Chinese way of looking at things, and one would not understand what the Chinese are driving at unless one has some idea of the historically-determined perceptions the Chinese have about themselves. I don't want to vulgarize it, but it is of interest that until 1818 the Chinese had no institution called a Foreign Office. They

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HAKSAR

of more foreign policies pursued by Imperial Britain over a period than a century, which said that their foreign policy or their conduct of international relations was dictated by the tremendous burden they had taken upon themselves as a great civilizer of African and Asian This was their refrain all the time, at one level of exposition, peoples. of what I call the "outer of a foreign policy in which garments" Imperial Britain's policy was clothed.

is not a non-aligned policy, or that we do not belong to the Non Movement. But our non-aligned Aligned policy and the Non-A!igned Movement have as much validity as the description of American as dedicated and to human policy being democracy rights; or the

which are inherited as a set upon what might be called perceptions of beliefs, including a set of mythswhich every country weaves around itself. That is why, if I may say so, I have been of the view, which I have expressed from time to time, that India's foreign policy to be realistic, and for us to perceive it in realistic terms, has to be cleared of the entire gamut of ideas and emotions (particularly words which have round the rather simple emotions) gathered the "Non-Aligned I am not saying that our policy Movement".

trouble with foreign policy in our times, unlike any previous period of history, is that, as my dear friend Henry Kissinger observes unmindful of public opinion. regretfully, it can no longer be conducted When Castereagh, or Metternich, or his French colleague Tulleyrand sat down in the Congress of Vienna, the consciousness, or ebb and flow, of public opinion was furthest away from their minds. Foreign of policy was structured in terms of the arithmetic of the Balance Power, and public opinion had hardly any interplay in that structure. The in the twentieth century, those of today, comforts means are missing. the cumulative In the world effect of the

to

public opinionwhich of millions of people whose consciousness is heightened aspirations the itself and (b) by the modern communica (aj by political process tions systembeats structure which might against the international be erected. And any structure which seems to impede the interaction of these aspirations with that structure is rendered fragile. In order keep

drowning,

it going, one then has the choice of using force as a way of for the time being at any rate, these aspirations.

The story of the demise of the Baghdad Pact, the story of the demise of the Shahenshah of Iran, the story of the Viet Nam war, the of Marcos in the Phillipines, the story of the story of the demise

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in Latin Americaall are stories of the impact of non goings-on nevertheless real interplay in a large arena of palpable, non-tangible, the world, of what are called the people's Any foreign aspirations. not relate itself to these, which imposes on the policy which does world simple and of a power structure, keeps wobbling systems shaking. Unlike in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, classical periods of European diplomacy, or in the classical period of Chinese in diplomacy, or Indian essays in diplomacy in Moghul times, essays in all perceptions in respect of foreign policy during the remainder of

century, and in future centuries, this factor must be taken into account by makers of foreign policy: apart from the interplay of power in economic terms, there is the raw interplay of power of the expressed of millions of people. He who does not take into account aspirations this fact tends to come to griefand there is enough empirical material of the post-war years alone, even if one discounts the earlier years of history, which would substantiate what I am trying to say.

this

As you know, one of the great examples of imposing on a live, pulsating, human reality, a structure of status quo, is the classical of Vienna, and the settlement that followed example of the Congress the Napoleonic of that settlement, wars. Metternich, the arch-priest was meant to bring calmness who is a to Europe. Henry Kissinger, I do not great admirer of Metternich, says that Europe was becalmed. he says so. Within the Metternich period there were vast in Europe. The first turbulence, beginning from earlier times, coming to a head in 1848, and continuing up to 1871, was called the Turbulent Period of German Unification. German unification was see how turbulences
ultimately brought about after the Franco-Prussian War, and United

in 1871, on January 16. And where? In the Germany was proclaimed Hall of Mirrors in the Palais de Versailles. The Metternichian system Met could do nothing about it. The Resorgimento in Italy, despite ternich's constant interference, proceeded and 1861, by up to apace, 1871/72, Italy was unified, Garibaldi even attacking the Papal territories.

So even in earlier times, structures designed to keep, as it were, have shown fragility. I see no reason to believe that a quo which seeks to freeze the status quo in the turbulent foreign policy of success world of today has more prospects than it had in previous the status times. to that are the complications that arise from the entire of thought, and a legitimate structure of thought which from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, war as an appro and right up to the Second World Warlegitimized structure Added

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priate instrument of policy. It was said that when diplomats failed, had to soldiers took over, and vice versa. After all, the diplomats clear up the mess of a Napoleonic war and of Napoleon's terrible defeat at the gates of Moscow. But it is not as if soldiers alone create a mess: politicians and diplomats do the same. Anyway, they try to clear up each other's mess! We are living in a nuclear age where the whole world of Clause no meaning whatever. Although we have been through the of nuclear nuclear doctrines, gamut strategic weapons got their it got doctrine of assured the mutual legitimation by destruction; witz has attempted legitimation at the possibility of a limited nuclear war; then it got legitimation through various doctrines of flexible response until the Geneva when Conference last year, the two super powers on a piece of paper this great discovery (which formally put down lesser like us were aware of) that there was no winnable beings nuclear war. Yet it is a long way from there to really working out this there is no winnable nuclear warinto appropriate perception--that policies relevant to the scenario of a non-winnable nuclear war.

As far as the contemporary world is concerned, first and fore mostas i have said before and will go on repeating again and again this world of ours, the twentieth centurywhat remains of itis characterized not merely by what is called the technological explosion even more but it is an explosion (which is of course very palpable), of human consciousness. This the explosion called fundamental, of human consciousness does not relate itself merely to explosion what is called Latin America, the Third World; it is equally operative in Europe, in the Middle East, in Africa and all over the world. in

How do you handle it? There are no technological solutions, how ever great the technological advancement might be. You cannot say that electronics, howsoever arranged, either in a computer or compli cated computer or super computer or fibre optics, or genetic engine ering of one sort or another, can answer the problems of the social, and spiritual human, economic drama of our times. condition of human kind or the human

As far as our own country is concerned, things ought to be clear, if we do not wallow, as it were, in our usual habit of thinking with our heart rather than with our head. India has had, all theseyears, one can say, a fairly successful foreign policy, with only one great it, with a degree failure which was in 1962; one can analyze of clinical objectivity. it, and one ought to analyze Nevertheless, foreign policy

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must be understood not merely as the formulation of nice phrases such as "we are for peace"; "we are for disarmament"; "we are for "we are for Namibia's ending racial discrimination"; freedom"; "we are for South African's rights" ... all this we are, of course. But the question is, what weight do these words carry?

There is a very salutary thought, uttered by a man called Louis Namier who said that arguments, howsoever howsoever clever, founded in facts, when uttered by weak people, cogent, howsoever were apt to be dismissed as mere quibbling; but arguments, howso ever nonsensical, howsoever irrational, when uttered had a of their own. sessing power, persuasiveness by people pos

before our country, and the day problem now, tomorrow, the aims and after, will be to match with a clarity of purpose of our foreign policywhich objectives are obvious enough; the is the preservation and strengthening of our primary aim of course and our territorial integrity, and above sovereignty, our independence ail, the capability of carrying on our development under processes the most favourable conditions. It's not easy. We can see the difficul ties which we are experiencing on all counts. The problem of national integration is certainly there; there is no use hiding it; it is not per se insoluble but one can forecast that it can't be solved within the framework of the calculus of politics that we have hitherto pursued a calculus of politics which puts a premium on the lower-order identification of human rather than the higher-order beings identification of human homo the Indian human beings: Indianus, identities in of terms being as against expressed religion, caste, language or region. Identity is an important thing: the question always is, what do you identify with? Under Indian social conditions one can have a perfectly legitimate identity in terms of one's primordial mole cular social structures. The question therefore is whether we Indians are capable of transcending these of our primordial particularisms social system into a larger loyalty. Unless we make a conscious effort that our perceptions, even of our domestic situation, are not refracted creed and religion, reinforced by the of vote-gathering, then one can predict that the problems of national integration will be more serious, more difficult to solve, more intractable than they need be. through calculus I think one has to Similarly, in the area of economic development, consider well the complex inter-relationships which must exist in an the prism of caste, of short-term politics

The

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India of 700 million people, of the emphasis on production and pro ductive efficiency, and the relationship between them and distribution. Can we say that the first priority is production, that distribution can wait? Or that distribution would be the product of a trickle from pro duction down to the lower levels of society? I think I discern certain false perceptions gaining ground in our contemporary were not there in earlier times, that somehow one could is called production and what is called distribution. India, disjunct which what

Therefore I, are not likely to succeed. the separation Third of the so-called World from the First or Second axis called World, or the geographical the North and South. Whichever the problems you look atthe prob lems of nuclear war, of disarmament, of of conventional disarmament, economic of global indebtedness and its consequences development, to the world at large, of trying to sell your goods in the markets-all these problems are global, and we must not assume that there are less than global. Unless regional solutions, or that there are solutions we do this, our perceptions of reality will not correspond more closely to realitybut remain wishful thinking.

er basis than the world scale for one, have never understood

And finally, I should like to conclude by saying that the world of as it exists, is not a world that is moved, as it were, by some divinely ordained moral imperatives; that the crisis is, whichever way you look at it, of a global nature; that attempts to solve it on a narrow today,

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