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This reviewer has two parts: 1. Outline based laws and cases 2. Discussion based Transcriptions ___________________________________________ Outline Based Laws and Cases III. COMMISSION ON ! CTIONS a. Co"position and #uali$ications %rt. I&' C' Sec. 1 (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. owever, a ma!ority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine "ar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. # chairman $ commissioners %ualifications& 'atural-born citizen - (ho are natural-born citizens) #. citizens of the Philippines from birth who do not need to perform any act to ac*uire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. +. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under ,rt. -., /ec #012. 3 least 14 years old College degree 5ust '6T have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceeding elections. Chairman& member of Phil. "ar 7 practiced law for 3 least #8 years 3 least ma!ority of commissioners member of Phil. "ar 7 practiced law for 3 least #8 years Term& 9 years without reappointment, inorder to assure the independence of comelec. -5ust not be engage in any other profession. -/alary is fixed by law and cannot be increased during tenure. as fiscal autonomy and there is assurance that approval of annual appropriations shall be automatic and regular. -:emovable only by impeachment. %rt. *II' Sec. 1+' par. 2 The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as 5embers of the Constitutional Commissions, or the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman, or as /ecretaries, ;ndersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Ca,etano vs. Monsod Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which re*uires the application of law, legal procedure, <nowledge, training and experience. =To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. >enerally, to practice law is to give notice or render any <ind of service, which device or service re*uires the use in any degree of legal <nowledge or s<ill.= -s teaching considered practice of law) 'o. ,ccording to ;./. !urisprudence teaching is not practice of law. There must be a client and lawyer relationship. b. %ppoint"ent and ter" o$ o$$ice o$ Co""issioners %rt. I&' C' Sec. 1(2) - The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on ,ppointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. 6f those first appointed, three 5embers shall hold office for seven years, two 5embers for five years, and the last 5embers for three years, without reappointment. ,ppointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. -n no case shall any 5ember be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. b.1. Dis.uali$ications %rt. I&' %' Sec. / - The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. b.2. Salar, %rt. &*III' Sec. 10 - ;ntil the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos? the .ice-President, the President of the /enate, the /pea<er of the ouse of :epresentatives, and the Chief @ustice of the /upreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each? the /enators, the 5embers of the ouse of :epresentatives, the ,ssociate @ustices of the /upreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each? and the 5embers of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. %rt. I&' %' Sec + - The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. b.+. %ppoint"ent o$ personnel %rt. I&' %' Sec. / - The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. b./. 1e"oval %rt. &I' Sec. 2 - The President, the .ice-President, the 5embers of the /upreme Court, the 5embers of the Constitutional Commissions, and the 6mbudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. ,ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. c. 2unctions 3a,tan vs Co"elec ;nder /ection +, ,rticle -A-C of the #BC9 Constitution, the C65EDEC exercises both administrative and *uasi-!udicial powers. The C65EDECEs administrative powers are found in /ection + 0#2, 012, 0F2, 042, 0$2, 092, 0C2, and 0B2 of ,rticle -A-C. The #BC9 Constitution does not prescribe how the C65EDEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the C65EDECEs administrative powers in the =Commission on Elections,= while providing that the C65EDEC =may sit en banc or in two divisions.= Clearly, the C65EDEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. -ndeed, this has been the practice of the C65EDEC both under the #B91 and #BC9 Constitutions. The C65EDECEs exercise of its *uasi-!udicial powers is sub!ect to /ection 1 of ,rticle -A-C which expressly re*uires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the C65EDEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the C65EDEC en banc. The C65EDEC is empowered in /ection +0$2, ,rticle -A-C of the #BC9 Constitution to =prosecute cases of violations of election laws.= The prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of the C65EDECEs administrative powers. Thus, the C65EDEC en banc can directly approve the recommendation of its Daw Gepartment to file the criminal information for double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no constitutional re*uirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided by any of the divisions of the C65EDEC. 'otes& administrative powers /ec. +. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions& 0#2 Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. 012 Gecide, except those involving the right to vote, all *uestions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. 0F2 Geputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the >overnment, including the ,rmed Horces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
6ther examples of this power to enforce and administer laws& o Power of comelec to loo< into issues regarding the determination of location of polling places, appointment of official and inspectors registration of voters
'ote& constitutional prohibition that the right to vote is not part of comelec power --- no law can ever be passed transferring the inclusion or exclusion cases from the courts to comelec o Constitutional mandate that the right to vote is excluded from comelec powers because the disposition pertaining to rights is inherently !udicial Thus, tegistration of voters, annulment of list of voters belongs to comelec bu the determination of whether a person has the right to vote is with the 5TC
and ad!ucatory powers 0*uasi-!udicial2 /ec. +. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions& 0+2 Exercise exclusive original !urisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and *ualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate !urisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general !urisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited !urisdiction. Gecisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. /ection 1. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. ,ll such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. o
c.+. 4etition $or inclusion or e6clusion o$ voters 7%rt 8' C' Sec 2(:)9 upon a verified complaint or on its own initiative, file petitions in court for the inclusion and exclusion of voters c./. 4rosecute election law violators 7%rt 8' C' Sec 2(:)9; 34 <<1' Sec 2:=; .O. 1+/ Sec 11 investigate and prosecute 0where appropriate2 cases of violation of election laws including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices Section 2:=. Prosecution. - The Co""ission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the e6clusive power to conduct preli"inar, investi5ation o$ all election o$$enses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government& Provided, however, That in the event that the Co""ission $ails to act on an, co"plaint within $our "onths $ro" his $ilin5' the co"plainant "a, $ile the co"plaint with the o$$ice o$ the $iscal or with the Ministr, o$ >ustice $or proper investi5ation and prosecution' i$ warranted. Sec. 11. 4rosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same& Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act in any complaint within two 0+2 months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the 6ffice of the Hiscal or with the Gepartment of @ustice for proper -nvestigation and prosecution, if warranted. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
-mportance of classifying the powers& because procedureJ remedies are different depending on whether it exercises ad!ucatory or administrative powers o "ayan vs. Comelec& re*uirement that decisions, ruling and final orders of comelec involving elective officials are re*uired first to go through various stages, plus the re*uirement that must go through comelec in division before proceeding en banc 0see /ec. 1, ,rt. B-C of the #BC9 Constitution2 pertains only to powers exercised by comelec in its *uasi!udicial powers
Taule v Santos
4eople vs Del5ado Issue: authority of the :egional Trial Court 0:TC2 to review the actions of the Commission on Elections 0C65EDEC2 in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court is the center of controversy of this petition. ,side from the ad!udicatory or *uasi-!udicial power of the C65EDEC to decide election contests and administrative *uestions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the C65EDEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preli"inar, investi5ation o$ an election o$$ense and upon a pri"a $acie $indin5 o$ a probable cause' $iles the in$or"ation in the proper court' said court thereb, ac.uires ?urisdiction over the case . Conse*uently, all the subse*uent disposition of said case must be sub!ect to the approval of the court. The C65EDEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court. The records of the preliminary investigation re*uired to be produced by the court must be submitted by the C65EDEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the C65EDEC to file the information, by the same to<en that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 'evertheless the court may re*uire that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The refusal of the C65EDEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court re*uiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is certainly untenable. what is contemplated by the term @$inal orders' rulin5s and decisions@ o$ the COM ! C reviewable on certiorari b, the Supre"e Court as provided b, law are those rendered in actions or proceedin5s be$ore the COM ! C and taAen co5niBance o$ b, said bod, in the e6ercise o$ its ad?udicator, or .uasi-?udicial powers.= Thus' the decisions o$ the COM ! C on election contests or ad"inistrative .uestions brou5ht be$ore it are sub?ect to ?udicial review onl, b, this Court. c.=. 1eco""end pardon' a"nest,' parole' or suspension o$ sentence o$ election law violators 7%rt 8' C' Sec =9 favorable recommendation from the comelec to the President is re*uired c.:. DeputiBe law en$orce"ent a5ents and reco""end their re"oval $or violation o$ its orders 7%rt 8' C' Sec 2(/C<)9 deputize with the concurrence of the president o law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the government o including ,HP o for free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections recommend to president the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized o imposition of any other disciplinary action for violation or disregard of or disobedience to its directive, order or decision c.0. 1e5istration o$ political parties' or5aniBations and coalitions and accreditation o$ citiBenDs ar"s N,rt B, C, /ec +042? /ec $,9,C? ,rt $, /ec 40+2O register after sufficient publication
3a5on5 3a,ani vs Co"elec >ive them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies? and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the /tate. c.< 1e5ulation o$ public utilities and "edia o$ in$or"ation 7%rt 8' C' Sec /; Sec 89 superviseJ regulate franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges or concessions granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof N4C vs Co"elec The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the en!oyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such =supervision or regulation= has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of =e*ual opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,= as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with =public information campaigns and forums among candidates.= o Dimited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability o Dimited in the scope of application o Exempt from prohibition the purchase or donation to the Comelec The li"itation bears a clear and reasonable connection with constitutional ob?ective SES vs Co"elec ,ccording to the Court, /ection 4.F was invalid because of three reasons& o 0#2 it imposed a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, o 0+2 it was a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression was only for a limited period, and o 012 the governmental interest sought to be promoted could be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. c.8. 1ule-"aAin5 7%rt 8' %' Sec :9 commission en banc may promulgate own rules concernin5 pleadin5s and practice before it or before any of its offices such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights %ruelo vs C% Constitutionally spea<ing, the COM ! C can not adopt a rule prohibitin5 the $ilin5 o$ certain pleadin5s in the re5ular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the /upreme Court 0Constitution, ,rt. .---, /ec. 4 N4O2.
-t is true that generally, the method of assailing a !udgment or order of the C65EDEC is via petition for certiorari. MendoBa vs Co"elec issue with the C65EDECIs appreciation of ballots even when the ballots and other election materials were no longer in its official custody and were outside its premises, authority and control -n this case, the C65EDEC has transferred possession, custody and !urisdiction over the ballots to the /ET, a tribunal separate and independent from the C65EDEC and over which the C65EDEC exercises no authority or !urisdiction. Hor the C65EDEC to still conduct proceedings on property, materials and evidence no longer in its custody violates the principle of separation of powers. C65EDEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature 0i.e., to enforce and administer election laws2, ## *uasi-!udicial 0to exercise original !urisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate !urisdiction over election contests of other lower ran<ing officials2, and *uasi-legislative 0rulema<ing on all *uestions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure2. The C65EDECIs ad!udicative function is *uasi-!udicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its !urisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a !udicial nature? #+ it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders !udgment. #1 Gespite the exercise of discretion that is essentially !udicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, C65EDEC is not a tribunal within the !udicial branch of government and is not a court exercising !udicial power in the constitutional sense? #F hence, its ad!udicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is *uasi-!udicial (e state at the outset that the C65EDEC did not lose !urisdiction over the provincial election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the /ET. The Constitution conferred upon the C65EDEC !urisdiction over election protests involving provincial officials. The C65EDEC in this case has lawfully ac*uired !urisdiction over the sub!ect matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties. ,fter its !urisdiction attached, this !urisdiction cannot be ousted by subse*uent events such as the temporary transfer of evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its own !urisdiction over another election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of !urisdiction. Thus, the !urisdiction of the C65EDEC over provincial election contest exists side by side with the !urisdiction of the /enate Electoral Tribunal, with each tribunal being supreme in their respective areas of concern 0the /enate election contests for the /ET, and the regional, provincial and city election contests for the C65EDEC2, and with neither one being higher than the other in terms of precedence so that the !urisdiction of one must yield to the other. -ncidentally, the C65EDEC authority to promulgate the above rule en!oys constitutional moorings? in the grant to the C65EDEC of its !urisdiction, the Constitution provided it with the accompanying authority to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, provided that these rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. +C The Constitution additionally re*uires that the rules of procedure that the C65EDEC will promulgate must expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. +B This constitutional standard is authority, no less, that the
Oca"po vs Crespo
%rt. 2F+' 14C 4ublic o$$icer is any person who by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority shall ta<e part in the performance of public functions in the government of the Phils. or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official of any ran< or class
1.
F.
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Characteristics #. -t is not a party and cannot be sub!ect of a contract Concerned CitiBens o$ !aoa5 Cit, vs %rBa5a being notoriously undesirable , court employee being a public servant "ust e6hibit the hi5hest sense o$ honest, and inte5rit, not only in the performance of his duties but also in his personal and private dealin5s with other people to preserve the court@s na"e and standin5. Therefore, it becomes imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of !ustice.= 0Paredes vs. Padua, +++ /C:, C#2. The conduct and behavior o$ ever,one connected with the o$$ice charged with the dispensation of !ustice from the presidin5 ?ud5e to the lowliest clerA should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. +. 1. -t is not a hereditable possession -t is personal to the holder (e consider that :esolution 'o. BF-19#8 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. -t is essential to note that none of the = chan5es in or5aniBation= introduced by :esolution 'o. BF-19#8 carried with it or necessarily involved the ter"ination o$ the relationship o$ public e"plo,"ent between the Co""ission and an, o$ its o$$icers and e"plo,ees . (e find it very difficult to suppose that the #BC9 :evised ,dministrative Code having mentioned fourteen 0#F2 different =6ffices= of the Civil /ervice Commission, meant to freeze those 6ffices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal
Creation
#. constitution 0office of the president2 +. valid statutor, enact"ents 0 office of the insurance commissioner2 1. b, authorit, o$ law 0david commission2
!aurel vs Desierto salar, is not a necessar, ele"ent o$ public o$$ice the ele"ent o$ continuit, cannot be considered as indispensable $or public o$$ice 5echem describes the delegation to the individual o$ so"e o$ the soverei5n $unctions o$ 5overn"ent as =Nt9he "ost i"portant characteristic= in deter"inin5 whether a position is a public o$$ice or not the "ost i"portant characteristic which distin5uishes an o$$ice $ro" an e"plo,"ent is that the creation and con$errin5 o$ an o$$ice involves dele5ation to the individual o$ so"e o$ the soverei5n $unctions o$ 5overn"ent to be e6ercised b, hi" $or the bene$it o$ the public and that the so"e portion o$ the soverei5nt, o$ the countr, either le5islative' e6ecutive or ?udicial, attaches $or the ti"e bein5' to be e6ercised $or the public bene$it thus, unless the powers so conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer The characteristics of a public office, according to 5echem ' include the dele5ation o$ soverei5n $unctions' its creation b, law and not b, contract' an oath' salar,' continuance o$ the position' scope o$ duties' and the desi5nation o$ the position as an o$$ice. 'CC performs executive functions? created by an Executive order; Clearl,' the NCC per$or"s soverei5n $unctions. It is' there$ore' a public o$$ice' and petitioner' as its Chair' is a public o$$icer. That petitioner alle5edl, did not receive an, co"pensation durin5 his tenure is o$ little conse.uence . , salar, is a usual but not a necessar, criterion for determining the nature of the position. -t is not conclusive. The salary is a "ere incident and $or"s no part o$ the o$$ice . (here a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a na<ed or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. ence, the office of petitioner as 'CC Chair may be characterized as an honorar, o$$ice, as opposed to a lucrative o$$ice or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. +F "ut it is a public office, nonetheless.
Se5ovia vs Noel Though there is no vested ri5ht to an o$$ice , which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense' a ri5ht to his o$$ice. I$ that ri5ht is to be taAen awa, b, statute' the ter"s should be clear in which the purpose is stated. Public office cannot be re5arded as the propert, of the incumbent. , public office is not a contract.
Corne?o vs Habriel 6rdinarily, a public official should not be removed from office without notice, charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. -TC& we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a !udicial proceeding Gue process of law is not necessarily !udicial process? much of the process by means of which the >overnment is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is !udicial process. (hile a day in court is a matter of right in !udicial proceedings, in ad"inistrative proceedin5s it is otherwise since the, rest upon di$$erent principles. In certain proceedin5s o$ an ad"inistrative character' the ri5ht to a notice and hearin5 are not essential to due process o$ law. , public o$$ice is not propert, within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law but is a public trust or a5enc,. 2or this petition to co"e under the due process o$ law prohibition' it would be necessar, to consider an o$$ice as propert,. public offices are "ere a5encies or trusts' and not propert, Power to suspend temporarily may be exercised without notice to the person suspended. 'otice and hearing are not prere*uisites to the suspension of a public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing. The basic idea of government in the Philippine -slands, as in the ;nited /tates, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of
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NdO one who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under color of an election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may be irregular may have reputation of being an officer he assumes to be but is not a good office in the point of law appointment is valid on its face one who continues in the exercise of the functions and duties of the office without legal authority or after his term or title has ended one who performs the functions of the officer in good faith and under color of right to the position involved polic, and purpose o protection o$ the public and individuals inso$ar as the, beco"e involved in the o$$icial acts o$ person dischar5in5 the duties o$ an o$$ice without bein5 law$ul o$$icers
Sa"pa,an vs DaBa -TC, congressman was a greencard holder and did not renounce his status as a permanent resident of ;/ ,ppropriate remedy was to cancel C6C or *uo warranto "ut term already expired ,s de facto officers, he cannot be "ade to rei"burse the $unds disbursed during his term of office because his acts were valid as those o$ a de ?ure o$$icer. ,s de facto officer, he is entitled to e"olu"ents $or actual services rendered.
%be?a vs Tanada (e also find as erroneous the substitution of the deceased :osauro :adovanIs widow, Ediltrudes :adovan, on the ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for damages. =4ublic o$$ice is personal to the incu"bent and is not a propert, which passes to his heirs= 0/antos vs. /ecretary of Dabor, ++ /C:, CFC N#B$CO? Ge la .ictoria vs. Comelec, #BB /C:, 4$# N#BB#O2. The heirs "a, no lon5er prosecute the deceased protestee@s counter-clai" $or da"a5es a5ainst the protestant $or that was e6tin5uished when death ter"inated his ri5ht to occup, the contested o$$ice 0Gela .ictoria, supra2.
3.
3, ri5ht; b, ri5ht in law validly appointed an officer who exercises the duties of an office for which the holder has fulfilled all the *ualifications D 2%CTO
"D,CMEs ,n officer who e6ercises the duties o$ an o$$ice under the color o$ an appoint"ent or election but who has $ailed to .uali$, $or office for any one of various reasons as by being under the re*uired age, having $ailed to taAe oath
Heneral Mana5er vs Monserate -n this respect, while petitioner ,ninoIs appoint"ent to the contested position is void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de $acto o$$icer during the period of his incumbency. , de facto officer is one who is in possession o$ an o$$ice and who openl, e6ercises its $unctions under color o$ an appoint"ent or election' even thou5h such appoint"ent or election "a, be irre5ular. -n 5onroy vs. Court of ,ppeals, this Court ruled that a ri5ht$ul incu"bent o$ a public o$$ice "a, recover $ro" a de $acto o$$icer the salar, received b, the latter durin5 the ti"e o$ his wron5$ul tenure' even thou5h he (the de $acto o$$icer) occupied the o$$ice in 5ood $aith and under color o$ title . % de $acto o$$icer' not havin5 a 5ood title' taAes the salaries at his risA and "ust' there$ore' account to the de ?ure o$$icer $or whatever salar, he received durin5 the period o$ his wron5$ul tenure. -n the later case of Civil Diberties ;nion vs. Executive /ecretary, this Court allowed a de $acto o$$icer to receive e"olu"ents $or actual services rendered but only when there is no de jure officer, thus& =. . . in cases where there is no de ?ure o$$icer' a de $acto o$$icer who' in 5ood $aith' has had possession o$ the o$$ice and has dischar5ed the duties pertainin5 thereto' is le5all, entitled to the e"olu"ents o$ the o$$ice' and "a, in appropriate action recover the salar,' $ees and other co"pensations attached to the o$$ice.K
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#. may refer to endow"ents' .ualities or attributes which ma<e an individual eligible for public office 0e.g. citizenship2 +. may refer to the act o$ enterin5 into the per$or"ance of the functions of public office 0e.g. ta<ing the oath of office2 C.1. EGO M%J 41 SC1I3 #I%!I2IC%TIONS (hen the *ualifications are prescribed by the Constitution, they are generally exclusive, except where the constitution itself provides otherwise :elative to public offices created by statute, Con5ress has virtually plenary powers to prescribe *ualifications, provided that o the *ualifications are 5er"ane to the ob?ectiveMs for which the public office was created ,'G the *ualifications are not too speci$ic as to $it a particular' identi$iable person because that would deprive the appointing authority of discretion in the selection of the appointee
C.2. TIM O2 4OSS SSION O2 #I%I2IC%TIONS 5ust possess the *ualifications ,PP6-'T5E'T or EDECT-6' ,T T E T-5E 6H
2rivaldo vs Co"elec D>C does not specify the date when the candidate must possess Hilipino citizenship Philippine citizenship is re*uired in order to ensure that no alien shall govern our people ,n official "E>-'/ T6 >6.E:' 6'DT ;P6' -/ P:6CD,5,T-6' ,'G 6' T E G,T T ,T -/ TE:5 "E>-'/ D>C spea<s of *ualifications of elective officials and not of candidates Doss of any *ualifications during incumbency will be a ground for termination ;nder /ec. 1B of the Docal >overnment Code, =0a2n elective local official must be& a citizen of the Philippines? a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected? a resident therein for at least one 0#2 year immediately preceding the day of the election?
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*ice president o /ame *ualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the president 5ay be removed from office in the same manner as the president 5ay be appointed as a member of the cabinet and such appointment re*uires no confirmation
%rt 8' 3' C' Sec 1(1) Civil Service Co""ission o o o Chairman and + commissioners 'atural born citizens of the Philippines ,t least 14 years of age at the time of their appointment (ith proven capacity for public administration 5ust not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment ,ppointed by the president with the consent of the commission on appointments Term of 9 years wJo reappointment Chairman 9 years, a commissioner for 4 years and another for 1 years 'o member shall be appointedJ designated in a temporary or acting capacity
o o
o o
C.+. ISI%! #I%!I2IC%TIONS %rt. :' Sec 2 C : Senate o +F senators elected at large by *ualified voters of the Philippines as may be provided by law
COM ! C o o o Chairman and $ commissioners 'atural born citizens of the Philippines ,t least 14 years of age at the time of their appointment olders of a college degree 5ust not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections , ma!ority including the chairman shall be members of the Philippine bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least #8 years ,ppointed by the president with the consent of the commission on appointments
Gouse o$ 1epresentatives o o o o 'atural born citizen of the Philippines ,t least +4 years of age on the day of election ,ble to read and write Except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected :esident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election
o o
Sec 22' 3ooA *' .F. 282 %rt +' Sec = 'o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof Hree exercise and en!oyment of religious profession and worship wJo discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed No reli5ious test shall be re.uired $or the e6ercise o$ civil or political ri5hts
%rt. 0' Sec 2'+ 4resident o o o o 'atural born citizen of the Philippines
:egistered voter ,ble to read and write ,t least F8 years of age on the day of election
Ma.uera vs 3orra
13
C./. DIS#I%!I2IC%TIONS c./.1 under the constitution 'o candidate who lost in the election shall, wJin # year after such election be appointed to any office in the government 0sec $, art Bb2 'o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure 0 sec 90#2, art Bb2 ;nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other position in government 0sec 90+2, art Bb2 o Di<e when another office is held by a public officer in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as re*uired by the primary functions of his office S because such other office does not comprise any other position The ex officio position is actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office
property *ualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the :epublican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social !ustice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned
S>S vs Dan5erous Dru5s -n the same vein, the C65EDEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement /ec. 1$ 0g2, validl, i"pose .uali$ications on candidates $or senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. -f Congress cannot re*uire a candidate for senator to meet such additional *ualification, the C65EDEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of re*uirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. /ec. 1$ 0g2 of :, B#$4, as sought to be implemented by the assailed C65EDEC resolution, effectively enlarges the *ualification re*uirements enumerated in the /ec. 1, ,rt. .- of the Constitution. ,s couched, said /ec. 1$ 0g2 unmista<ably re*uires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with li<e effect, a condition sine *ua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The C65EDEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that =NnOo person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test=. .iewed, therefore, in its proper context, /ec. 1$ 0g2 of :, B#$4 and the implementing C65EDEC :esolution add another *ualification layer to what the #BC9 Constitution, at the minimum, re*uires for membership in the /enate. (hether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
The president, .P, members of the cabinet ad their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the constitution hold any other office or employment during his tenure 0sec #1, art 92 'o senator or member of the : may hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision or agency or instrumentality thereof, including >6CCs or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. 'either shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the tern for which he was elected. 'o member of the constitutional commission shall during his tenure hold any other office or employment 0 sec +, art Ba2 The same dis*ualification applies to ombudsman and his deputies 0 sec C, art ##2 The ombudsman and his deputies shall not be *ualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office 0sec ##, art ##2 5embers of the constitutional commissions, the ombudsman and his deputies must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment 0sec #, art Bb, sec # art Bc, sec # art pd, sec C art ##2
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c./.2 under local 5overn"ent code c./.+ other laws Provided that the prescribed dis*ualifications do not violate the constitution o Daw declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the constitutional presumption of innocence& when laws said the filing of a criminal information for disloyalty was a prima facie proof of guilt 0dumlao vs comelec2
c.=. $$ect o$ pardon Pardon is forgiveness and not forgetfulness hence it will not bring restoration to the civil and political rights of the person being pardon. Civil and political rights can only be restored when it is expressly stated in the pardon or when the pardon states that the person did not do the crime. ( sounds absurd, being pardon even though you did not commit the crime)... -talics supplied.. %rt. +:' 14C - , pardon shall not wor< the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. , pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. MONS%NTO *. 2%CTO1%N -//;E& wJn a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relin*uished or forfeited by reason of the conviction 2= although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. 2: The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mista<en notion that the pardon virtually ac*uitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. , pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral ris<, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her dis*ualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. (hile a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness . -t does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. ;nless expressly grounded on the personIs innocence, it cannot bring bac< lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. "ut since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to bac< wages. d. 2or"ation o$ 1elations d.1 3, election P /election and designation by a popular vote. , mode of filling a public office, by which the enfranchised citizenry is able to participate directly in the conduct of the government, through
15
o o o o
$. Code o$ Conduct: 1% :01+ U Code of Conduct that public officials and employees are re*uired to observe& o Commitment to public interest, professionalism, !ustness and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism, patriotism, commitment to democracy and simple living. They are re*uired to observe this by law.
II. 4OE 1S' DITI S' 41I*I! H S %ND 41OGI3ITIONS Two thin5s that would stand out in !o Cha" case: 1. Her"ane 2. ssential
Do Cham S from being head of medico department to assist prosecutor in signing information S accused said it is not valid, he is as<ed to assist prosecution but /C said the power to sign is inherent or essential to the performance to assisting the prosecutor. -t is necessary implied from the express function of assisting the prosecutor. (hat if authority granted is only to issue subpoena. Can you cite in contempt) 'o. this power to cite a person in contempt is inherently !udicialJcoercive. -nherently !udicial but still exercisable by other agencies. 'ot exclusive to courts S also exercised by legislative bodies. Citing in person in contempt is germane and essential. 6ne expressly authorize subpoena, no express cite person in contempt a. %uthorit, o$ 4ublic O$$icers consist o$ those powers which are: #. +. 1. Expressly conferred upon him by the act appointing him Expressly annexed to the office by law ,ttached to the office by common law as incidents to it
16
d.1 1i5ht to O$$ice Term& period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right while Tenure us the period which the officer actually holds office. d.2 1i5ht to Salar, Salar, is the personal compensation to be paid to the public office his services and it is generally a fixed annual or periodical payment depending on the time and not on the amount of the services he may render. "asis& legal title to the office and the fact that the law attaches compensation to the office. %rt.I* S C.1F 18<0 Constitution: Salaries o$ Senators and Me"bers o$ G1 a. Getermined by law b. 'o increase until after expiration of full term
%1T.*II S C.: 18<0 Constitution: Salaries o$ 4res and *4 a. Getermined by law b. c. d. /hall not be decreased during tenure 'o increase until after expiration of term 'ot receive any other emolument from gov. or any other source
%1T.*III S C.1F 18<0 Constitution: Salaries o$ Chie$ >ustice and %sso. >ustice' lower courts a. Hixed by law b. Guring continuance of office, not be decreased
%1T.I&-3 S C.< 18<0 Constitution 'o elective or appointive public office or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without consent of Congress, any present, emolument, office or title of any <ind from any foreign government. Pension or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. d.+ 4residential I""unit, $ro" Suit -mmunity from civil damages cover only official acts. This privilege us en!oyed only during tenure. ,fter tenure, he cannot invo<e immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties. /he may not be prevented from initiating suit. d./ Doctrine o$ O$$icial I""unit, P see transcriptions d.= 4re$erence in 4ro"otion d.: !eave o$ %bsence d.0 1etire"ent 4a, e. 4rohibitions (Sec.= (+)'< %1T.I&-3 18<0 Constitution)
2irst 4hil Goldin5s vs Sandi5anba,an ,s provided under :ule #+, /ec. + 0b2, intervention shall be allowed =in the exercise of discretion= by a court. 6rdinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. "ut where there is =gross abuse of discretion, manifest in!ustice or palpable excess of authority= e*uivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and ade*uate remedy, the writ shall issue. ,lthough, as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other, =yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if
b.
Sec.+< P a public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or negligence Sec.1B S no subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. owever, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under orders or instruction of his superiors. Linds o$ !iabilit,
17
c.
S%N !IIS * C% -t is well-settled that when a public officer goes beyond the scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is liable for his acts li<e any private individual NPalma v. >raciano, BB Phil. 9+ 0#B4$2O. Thus, in 5endoza v. Ge Deon N11 Phil. 48C 0#B#$2O, it was held& 'or are officers or agents of the >overnment charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative or *uasi-!udicial liable for the conse*uences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act wilfully and maliciously and with the express purpose of inflicting in!ury upon the plaintiff. ,ccordingly, applying the principle that a public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith, the Court holds that petitioner Helicisimo T. /an Duis, the Provincial >overnor of Daguna who has been sued both in his official and private capacities, must be held personally liable to "erroya for the conse*uences of his illegal and wrongful acts. ChaveB vs Sandi5anba,an The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Do"in5o vs 1a,ala "asic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. ,n action for each can proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment. d. !iabilit, o$ Superior O$$icers $or %cts o$ Subordinates S a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of suty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of. %rias vs Sandi5anba,an (e can, in retrospect, argue that ,rias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and *uestioned persons. -t is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be as<ing for the impossible. ,ll heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent Ion their subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. -f a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, *uestion each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, in*uire whether the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally loo< into the reimbursement voucherIs accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. ,ny executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. I*. T 1MIN%TION O2 1 !%TIONS a. Modes o$ Ter"ination in Heneral #. Expiration of Term or Tenure of 6ffice End of a fixed term End of Pleasure where one holds office at pleasure of appointing authority Doss of confidence in primarily confidential employment :eaching the age limit? :etirement "ona fide abolition of office
2.
nd o$ 2i6ed Ter" ;pon the expiration of the officerEs term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must be ipso facto terminated. nd o$ pleasure where one holds o$$ice at the pleasure o$ the appointin5 authorit, President can validly terminate tenure of .ice 5ayor of :oxas City as the office was created at the pleasure of the President. (hat is involved here is not the *uestion of removal, or whether legal cause should precede or not that of removal. (hat is involved here is the creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President 0,lba v. Evangelista2.
2ernandeB v !edes"a The Charter of "asilan City provides that the President shall appoint and may remove at his discretion any of the cityEs officers, including its Chief of Police, with the exception of the municipal !udge, who may be removed only according to law. The legislative intent is to ma<e continuance in office dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Congress has the power to vest such power of appointment. Hurther, K, public office is the right for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power.L ,lba v. Evangelista states that the replacement is not removal, but an expiration of tenure, which is an ordinary mode of terminating official relations. (hat is involved is not removal, or whether legal cause should precede such removal, but the creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President. !oss o$ Con$idence in 4ri"aril, Con$idential "plo,"ent GernandeB v. *ille5as 6fficial and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be !ustified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case, their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office. c. :etirement a. Conditions for entitlement to retirement benefits 0:.,. 'o. C+B#2 V b. he has rendered at least fifteen 0#42 years of service? c. he is at least sixty 0$82 years of age at the time of retirement? and d. he is not receiving a monthly pension benefit from permanent total disability. e. Compulsory :etirement f. ;nless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at least $4 years of age with at least #4 years of service? Provided that if he has less than #4 years of service, he may be allowed to continue in the service in accordance with existing civil service rules and regulations.
+. 1.
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3usaca, v. 3uenaventura "usacay was laid off as toll collector when the bridge was destroyed. owever, the bridge was later reconstructed and opened to the public with a new collector being appointed. "usacay was ordered reinstated by the /C. To consider an office abolished, there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently. -n the case at bar, there was never any thought of not rebuilding the bridge. The collapse of the bridge did not wor< to destroy but only to suspend the position of toll collector thereon, and upon its reconstruction and re-opening, the collectorEs right to the position was similarly and automatically restored.
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Su""ers v. OBaeta /ummers, a cadastral !udge, assumed office as CH- !udge due to an ad interim appointment. owever, the ad interim appointment was disapproved and /ummers now see<s to be reappointed as cadastral !udge. /C held that /ummersE voluntary acceptance of the position of CH- !udge amounted to a waiver of his right to hold the position of cadastral !udge during the term fixed and guaranteed by the Constitution. e accepted and *ualified for the position of !udge-at-large by ta<ing the oath of office of !udge-at-large, and not merely of an KactingL !udge-at-large. The situation is one wherein he cannot legally hold two offices of similar category at the same time. 5. V -ncompatible 6ffice e who, while occupying one office, accepts another office incompatible with the first, ipso facto absolutely vacates the first office. That the second office is inferior to the first does not affect the rule. ,nd even though the title to the second office fails as where election is void, the rule is still the same, nor can the officer then regain the possession of his former office to which another has been appointed or elected. -f the law or Constitution as an expression of public policy forbids the acceptance by a public officer of any other office other than that which he holds, it is not a case of incompatibility but of legal prohibition. -ncompatibility of offices exists where& V There is conflict in such duties and functions so that the performance of the duties of one interferes with the performance of the duties of another, as to render it improper for considerations of public policy for one person to retain both. V 6ne is subordinate to the other and is sub!ect in some degree to its supervisory powers for in such situation where both are held by the same person, the design that one acts as a chec< on the other would be frustrated. V The Constitution or the law itself, for reasons of public policy, declares the incompatibility even though there is no inconsistency in the nature and functions of the offices. Exceptions to the :ule on olding of -ncompatible 6ffices V (here the officer cannot vacate the first office by his own act, upon the principle that he will not be permitted to thus do indirectly what he could not do directly, as where the law re*uires the approval of the provincial board before a municipal official can resign. V Hirst office is held under a different government from that which conferred the second. V 6fficer is expressly authorized by law to accept another office. V /econd office is temporary. :esignation , resignation of a public officer need not be in any particular form, unless some form is prescribed by statute. 6rdinarily, it may either be in writing or by parol. There must be an intention to relin*uish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relin*uishment. The right of a public officer to resign is well recognized, even where it is provided than an officer may hold over until election and *ualification of a successor. Conflicting .iews& V ,ccording to some authorities, no acceptance is necessary to render a resignation effective, especially when the resignation is unconditional and purports to ta<e effect immediately. V 5any other cases ta<e the view that to be effective, the resignation must be accepted by competent authority.
Dario v. Mison , reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to ma<e the bureaucracy more efficient. >ood faith, as a component of reorganization under a constitutional regime, is !udged from the facts of each case. -n the case at bar, there was lac< of good faith. Dela !lana v. %lba 'othing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The "atasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary conse*uence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the /upreme Court. :emoval is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. ,fter the abolition, there is in law no occupant. -n case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. -t is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the *uestion of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. 'onetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. ,s to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. :ealistically, it is devoid of significance. e ceases to be a member of the !udiciary.
h. V V V V
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V V i. 1. V 2. V
*. %DMINIST1%TI* DISCI4!IN a. Over 4residential %ppointees a.#. Exceptions M%C D% *. *%S#I O -ssue& (hether the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a !udgeIs certification submitted to the /upreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the /upreme Court. :uling& -n fine, where a criminal complaint against a @udge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the 6mbudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said @udge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. The investigation being conducted by the 6mbudsman encroaches into the CourtIs power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. ,rticle .---, section $ of the #BC9 Constitution exclusively vests in the /upreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding @ustice of the Court of ,ppeals down to the lowest municipal trial court cler<. "y virtue of this power, it is only the /upreme Court that can oversee the !udgesI and court personnelIs compliance with all laws, and ta<e the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. 'o other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The 6mbudsman cannot !ustify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a !ustification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the /upreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but li<ewise undermines the independence of the !udiciary. Thus, the 6mbudsman should first refer the matter of petitionerIs certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to ma<e such a determination. The 6mbudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent ,biera in his affidavitcomplaint
V V
+. V V
g. 6thers 1ecall V The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum 0/ec. 1, ,rt. A, #BC9 Constitution2 V The procedure for recall is provided in /ections $B-94 of the Docal >overnment Code. 4rescription o$ 1i5ht to O$$ice Inabia v. Cit, Ma,or ,ny person claiming a right to a position in the civil service is re*uired to file his petition for reinstatement within one year, otherwise he is deemed to have abandoned his office. :eason is public policy and convenience, stability in the public service. V The one-year period is the prescriptive period to claim public office 0whether through *uo warranto or otherwise2. The oneyear period presupposes !udicial action, not administrative action.
DO!%!%S *. OM3IDSM%N -ssue& (6' the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman may ta<e cognizance of the complaint against petitioner for purposes of investigation and possible prosecution in accordance with its mandate under /ection #1 0#2 and 0+2 of ,rticle A- of the #BC9 Constitution for alleged violation of the ,nti>raft and Corrupt Practices ,ct. :uling& The complaint against petitioner-!udge before the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman is basically administrative in nature. -n essence, petitioner!udge is being charged with having violated :ule #.8+, Canon # and :ule 1.84, Canon 1 of the Code of @udicial Conduct. -t must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms and scandals case, petitioner-!udge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the :ules of Court and in the ,dministrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of @udicial Conduct. /uch is clearly an administrative matter. ;n*uestionably, this Court is mandated of the #BC9 Constitution to assume under section $, ,rticle .--- of the #BC9 Constitution to assume administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. b. Over Non-4residential %ppointees
/ection F$. Giscipline& >eneral Provisions. 0a2 'o officer or employee in the Civil /ervice shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. 0b2 The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action& 0#2 Gishonesty? 0+2 6ppression? 012 'eglect of duty? 0F2 5isconduct? 042 Gisgraceful and immoral conduct? 0$2 "eing notoriously undesirable?
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,ll these provisions in :epublic ,ct 'o. $998 ta<en together reveal the manifest intent of the lawma<ers to bestow on the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. #emedy available to the aggrieved party Hindings of facts by the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. ,ny order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one monthEs salary shall be final and unappealable. -n all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman may be appealed to the /upreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten 0#82 days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with :ule F4 of the :ules of Court. 1 MO!ON% *. CSC Issue: (6' a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which is not wor<-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. 1ulin5: -t cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under /ection +1, :ule A-. of the :ules -mplementing "oo< . of Executive 6rder 'o. +B+. ,nd the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The >overnment cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed? and by reason of his office, he en!oys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private li$e o$ an e"plo,ee cannot be se5re5ated $ro" his public li$e. Dishonest, inevitabl, re$lects on the $itness o$ the o$$icer or e"plo,ee to continue in o$$ice and the discipline and "orale o$ the service. The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the ob!ect sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publicIs faith and confidence in the government. %CO4 *. O22IC O2 TG OM3IDSM%N Issue: 0#2 (6' the 6mbudsman has prosecutorial powers? 0+2 (6' respondent Casaclang as Geputy 6mbudsman for 5ilitary ,ffairs has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation involving civilian personnel of the >overnment must first be resolved. 1ulin5: 0#2 (hen one considers that by express mandate of paragraph C, /ection #1, ,rticle A- of the Constitution, the 6mbudsman may =exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by la$,= it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to
d. O"buds"an d.1. >urisdiction OM3 *. C% -ssue& (6' the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman has the power to impose the penalty of # month suspension for simple misconduct of the GE': officers. :uling& 0Case at bar2 -n the present case, the Court similarly upholds the 6ffice of the 6mbudsmanEs power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and :epublic ,ct 'o. $998. The authority of the 6mbudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. -t is mandated by no less than /ection #10#2, ,rticle A- of the Constitution. -n con!unction therewith, /ection #B of :epublic ,ct 'o. $998 grants to the 6mbudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints. 6ther provisions in :epublic ,ct 'o. $998, li<ewise, pertain to the exercise by the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman of its administrative disciplinary authority. /ection #B states that :epublic ,ct 'o. $998 shall apply =to all <inds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee x x x, during his tenure of office.= /ection +# defines the !urisdiction of its disciplinary authority to include =all elective and appointive officials of the
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F.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized 6mbudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized 6mbudsman prosecutors under the 65"-G6@ Circular is a mere superfluity. The G6@ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the 6mbudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the G6@Is authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the :evised Penal Code is derived from the :evised ,dministrative Code which had been held in the 'atividad case#1 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the !urisdiction to do so in the first place. owever, the 6mbudsman may assert its primary !urisdiction at any stage of the investigation. Petitioner insists that the 6mbudsman has !urisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because petitioner is a public officer with salary >rade 1# so that the case against him falls exclusively within the !urisdiction of the /andiganbayan. Considering the CourtIs finding that the G6@ has concurrent !urisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a /alary >rade 1# position does not by itself remove from the G6@ Panel the authority to investigate the charge of coup dIetat against him. d.2.+. 4ower to investi5ate cases o$ ill-5otten wealth a$ter 2eb 2=' 18<: 1 4I3!IC *. S%NDIH%N3%J%N Issue: (6' the PC>> had the power to conduct an investigation as re*uired by /ec. + of :epublic ,ct 'o. #19B. 1ulin5: The power of the PC>> to conduct preliminary investigation of cases of this nature does not extend only to cases brought to recover illgotten wealth accumulated by former President 5arcos or his close associates but includes as well cases of graft and corruption assigned by the President to the PC>> for investigation. Hor what has not been sufficiently noticed is that complaints for graft and corruption, although not committed because of close association with former President 5arcos, can be investigated by the PC>> if directed by the President of the Philippines. -n accordance with /ec. # of Executive 6rder 'o. #F, dated 5ay 9, #BC$, the PC>>, with the assistance of the /olicitor >eneral, is the agency of the government empowered to bring these proceedings for forfeiture of property allegedly ac*uired unlawfully before Hebruary +4, #BC$, the date of the EG/, :evolution. The power to investigate cases of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth ac*uired after that date is now vested in the 6mbudsman. 0Case at bar2 "ut although there is neither allegation nor showing in the case at bar that former 5ayor ,rgana had unlawfully ac*uired his wealth by reason of close association with former President 5arcos, the PC>> had !urisdiction to conduct the investigation because this is a
1ulin5: #.
The office of the 6mbudsman has the power to =investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, un!ust, improper or inefficient.= 1/ This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. -t is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. ence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official li<e a municipal mayor, is within the power of the 6mbudsman to investigate and prosecute. -n the existence of his power, the 6mbudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. (hen a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the =supervision and control= of the 6mbudsman which means that he is sub!ect to the power of the 6mbudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his 0prosecutorIs2 decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the 6mbudsman.
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The 6mbudsman ,ct gives the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman the power to =punish for contempt, in accordance with the :ules
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Transcriptions 1 (hat is the nature of Comelec) -s it something created by the Constitution) This one is mandated by the Constitution. (hat is the composition of Comelec) Chair and $ commissioners. Term of office) is it possible for Comelec Darazabal to re-appointed by ,*uino) Cannot. "ut how they are appointed) President cannot appoint unless appointee is recommended by C65EDEC. There also has to be consent of Commission on ,ppointment. C6, is within Congress. /o youEve got President appointing C65EDEC to be confirmed by C6, by serving 9 years without reappointment. %ualification& you must not have an elective position in the immediately preceeding elections.There is also re*uirement that you must be a lawyer. Kmember of the barL. There is re*uirement that a chair as well as the ma!ority must be a member of the bar who practiced law for #8 years. Practice of law S has a modern concept which is practice of law in and out of court. /ee cayetano vs monsod case. Common notion is that if you practice law it means you have practice litigation. 'ow, for as long as you apply legal <nowledge, that is practice of law. Practice of law in the modern concept S it is in and out of court S in the same decision S must apply legal <nowledge and perform such act to establish that whenever you do apply legal <nowledge S you have attycient relationship. ,pplying that S teaching cannot be li<ened to that. The application of <nowledge is in the concept of rendering legal <nowledge that will lead to an atty-client relationship. Element there is that such person becomes the client. Teaching S is not e*uivalent to practice of law 0although there is yet no decision about it2 -n monsod S you do not have to appear in court to have engaged in the practice of law. (hat is this rotational scheme) -n succeeding appointment, all seven will serve for 9 years. (hat authority does court have over Comelec) Goes court have supervisory powers over Comelec) -t is a matter of constitutional provisions. (hat about the decision of Comelec in the exercise of its *uasi !udicial powers) Tou can have this corrected by court only when you have grave abuse of discretion. -f its appeal and you go to /C, you address the *uestion of !urisdiction. ,rt. .--- /ec. #.
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The retiree must have rendered at least #4 years of service and must be at least $8 years if age upon retirement.
(hy is retirement ac<nowledge) Case of "eronilla. (e said we want to maintain efficiency in the government. The other reason is to en!oy the remainder of his life. KThe compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of $4 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the opportunity to en!oy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inade*uate perhaps for their long service and devotion to. the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their wor< and their relations with their superiors as well as the public would impose upon them. 'eedless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and <eep. -n this case, all that the "oard has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the >eneral 5anager in approving the change of date of petitionerIs birth, because from the evidence before it, the "oard was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. (e cannot see where the charged ine*uity of such action of the "oard could lie.L 1. ,"6D-T-6' 6H 6HH-CE or 6:>,'-W,T-6' S find mostly in local government unit. Ex. Tou competed with incumbent and he again won and at the end of the day, your position became vacant and suddenly youEve been we are reorganizing or abolishing the office when you <now the reason is political.
:ead case Garion vs 5ison S this is your authority telling when is it therefore not done in good faith. /C has given us example of reorganization done in good faith. /C already told us when is it in good faith S when it is for economy or you reorganize because of the efficiency. /C said if itEs done in bad faith, /C says you wanted to reorganize and so abolish certain offices but thenagain you go about increasing the number of positions in the new department S very clearly thatEs not done in good faith. That?s not reorganization for purposes of economy. /C said if you abolish office and create new offices with substantially the same functions, /C said reorganization done in bad faith. Garion vs 5ison S K>ood faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is !udged from the facts of each case. owever, under :epublic ,ct 'o. $$4$, we are told& /EC. +. 'o officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. , valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil /ervice Daw. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party& 0a2 (here there is a significant increase in the number
"usa<ay vs "uena - office collapsed and he was terminated and few months after it was rebuilt and he applied again but said to him that there is abolition of office but /C said there is no abolition because in abolition there has to be the intention formally to do away with office. The intention to do away permanently. -f you have got to abolish, it must be shown that you abolish because the abolition must have to be done in good faith. "ut when do you <now its done in good faith. The good reason you can put up so then the abolition be in good faith is before you could say that the abolition is for promotion of simplicity, economy and efficiency in the operation of the government. -f that is the case, then the abolition is done in good faith.
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Tou see you can be disciplined possibly by 1 persons. Tou can be disciplined by President, by C/C, by 6mbudsman if it would li<e to discipline you. ,s to President - as disciplining authority. -f you are appointed by president S does that mean that you can also be removed by him or disciplined by him - because the power to appoint is the power to remove but it can happen that it can be otherwise. Di<e the power to appoint 6mbudsman but removal by impeachment because Constitution says so. /imply because that you have appointed does not mean that you can be removed by him, li<e in 6mbudsman. Tou can be removed because the power to appoint comes the power to remove except if law provided otherwise. -t can happen that law will provide otherwise li<e the Constitution S li<e 6mbudsman S appointed by President and removable by impeachment. 5embers of !udiciary S appointed by President but !udges of lower can be removed by /C because Constitution says so. There are also those appointed by him but removable by another entity because the law says so. Ex. Civil servants appointed by him but removable by C/C because law says so. /o when it comes to those removable by C/C, the rule is if you are employee in the civil service S you can only be suspended or dismiss for cause as provided by law and after due process. -t has to be for cause as provided by law and after due process. Chapter 9 S /ec. F$ S the moment you say as may be provided by law S wrongX (hy) (hen you say as may be provided by law S thatEs to admit he can be removed on grounds as to exist after his entry to the civil service. "ut you see the Daw says S he can only be removed for cause as provided by law, cause must already be provided by law and not to be provided some time after. The way it should be stated, Kfor cause as provided by law and after compliance with due process.L -f you are a C/C employee S you can only be removed as caused provided by law and due process. :ead & Chapter .-- sec.F$ on C/ code preventively suspended. - civil service can be
/ec. F9 S what is important to remember S C/C can be preventively suspend. Gistinguish the power of C/C to preventively suspend vs power of 6mbudsman and president of DC> to preventively suspend. /ec. 4# of C/ code, -t says, C/C may preventively suspend an employee under his authority pending investigation if the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty or there is reason to believe that respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant removal from service. ;nder this, you can be preventively suspended for B8 days 01months2. Can you preventively suspended, without hearing or having heard) Tes. -t is not violation of due process. ,lso, because it is not a penalty. -t can be imposed without having heard you first, it can be heard without violating due process. ,nd it is for a maximum period of B8 days. (hat about elective officials) They can be removed if they are impeachable officers under ,rt. A-. Dist of impeachable officers is exclusive. Hor Docal officials S /ec.$8-$B will come in. /ee ,dmin Giscipline Docal >overnment Code. -f itEs a complaint against elective official of a province, highly organized city S it is the office of president that has authority to sit on your complaint. Hor a case against municipal S it should be sangguniang panlalawigan. Hor elective barangay officials S it should be file to sanggunian panglungsod concerned. Can you as an elective official S can you be preventively suspended) D>C has a different re*uirement. Tou can only be preventively suspended only after issues have been !oined. -f the issues have been !oined which means you have already been answered. ,nd the period is
Tou accept the incompatible office S lose that office S ,rt. .- /ec. #1. Ex. Can you appoint de lima as ombudsman) or <i<o as sec. of !ustice) Can be) Tes. There are only + <inds of forbidden offices& a. b. 'ewly created during your term or 6ld office but the emoluments for which have been increased during your term.
'ewly created d.i ang secretary of !ustice post) -t is not forbidden, it is !ust incompatible. Tou can give up your senate post so that you can accept this secretary of G6@ which is why acceptance of an incompatible office will amount to termination. -t is the acceptance that will result in the giving up of post. -t is when you accept that you are deemed resigned. :ecall what youEve learned in Public Corp)
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